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# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF  
RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND  
PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

L. P. JACKS, M.A.

AND

G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D.

*VOLUME II*

OCTOBER 1903—JULY 1904

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27/10/05

LONDON  
WILLIAMS AND NORRIS

1904

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# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

VOL. II.—1903-1904

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# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

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## ST PAUL AND THE IDEA OF EVOLUTION.<sup>1</sup>

### THE MASTER OF BALLIOL.

“THINK not that I am come to destroy the law and the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil” (Matt. v. 17). “Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law . . . . that we might receive the promise of the spirit through faith” (Gal. iii. 13). These two sayings may not be essentially opposed, when we realise all that they mean, but they involve two different ways of looking at the history of religion, and especially at the transition from Judaism to Christianity. Christ seems to view that transition as a movement towards a higher and stricter, because a more spiritual fulfilment of the law: St Paul, as the rescue of man from the bondage of the law, and the introduction into him of a new principle of life. The one dwells on the positive, the other on the negative relation of the present to the past. To the one, the life of the Church is only a higher form of the life of Israel, while, to the other, the two lives are almost diametrically opposed. In short, the one regards the history of religion as a growth, in which each stage continuously passes into the next, while the other conceives it rather as a drama leading up to a crisis, in

<sup>1</sup> A lecture delivered to the St Paul Society.



which the opposing forces come into collision, and the aims of human existence become changed or even revolutionised.

This contrast throws some light upon the ideas of St Paul, and also prepares for the main criticism to which they may be subjected. There is a negative side in every phase of growth or evolution: for the new stage is always in some degree contrasted with, and opposed to the old: and a certain vividness of presentation is attained by dwelling upon this aspect of things. And there is a special temptation to do so in the case of a great moral and religious change such as took place at the introduction of Christianity. At such a time men are inclined to say, "Old things are passed away: behold, all things are become new." Yet this, after all, is not the deepest view of things. If the contrast between the old man and the new, between the law and grace, between the state of a man before, and his state after conversion, or even between the religious life of mankind before and after Christ, is exaggerated into an absolute division, the real meaning of the transition in each case will be lost. In all evolution we must realise that there is a positive connection which underlies all changes and maintains itself in and through them, otherwise the crisis will tend to appear as an absolute break and not as a new phase of the same life. While, therefore, an antithetic writer, *i.e.*, any writer who masses his facts under opposite and contrasted points of view, is likely to bring out certain aspects of life and history with a vividness and force which could not be attained in any other way, he is likely at the same time to fall into an over-estimate of these aspects, and an under-estimate of other aspects, which by this method are necessarily thrown into the background. He is apt, therefore, somewhat to lose sight of the *callida junctura* of life, and to substitute for its continuity the idea of abrupt, inexplicable and arbitrary changes, introduced into it by an external power. One who habitually adopts this catastrophic way of thinking, and who is not restrained in its use by any real grasp of the facts of the moral or religious life, will produce a scenic and rhetorical view of



the world in which high lights and deep shadows are brought into immediate juxtaposition (as I remember Ruskin characterising one of Dore's drawings as a ghastly picture of darkness with only a few spots and splashes of pure white, to make the blackness of it more startling). And, even in writers whose depth of feeling and thought make such obviously artificial effects impossible, and with whom it is not rhetorical device but a somewhat exceptional experience that has given rise to an antithetic habit of mind, we have to allow largely for the personal equation of the individual in our estimate of the value of his utterances. In reading such writers, we have to remember that we are not seeing things in the clear impartial sunlight, but under an electric beam which throws an intense brilliance upon certain of the elements of existence and leaves the rest in shadow. The force of this contrast may be realised if we compare the spectacle of the world, as it mirrors itself in the mind of Homer or Shakespeare or Goethe, with the vision of it which we receive through Æschylus or Dante or Milton. Still more marked examples of the second type of mind may be found in St Augustine or in Pascal, writers who, to use a well-worn expression, "cut the world in two with a hatchet," to correspond with the division of which they have had experience in their own lives. We are not, indeed, to assume that between these two classes the advantage is all on one side: for the impartial contemplative intelligence which spreads its equal sunshine over the whole scene, often fails to throw so vivid a light on certain parts of it, as a mind which has less comprehension but more penetrative insight can do. What other writer, for example, makes us realise the littleness of man in one point of view and his greatness in another—the strange combination in his nature of the infinite and the finite—with such vivid, sharp distinctness as Pascal, with his epigrammatic and passionate utterances? Or again, what psychologist has ever pictured the struggles of the human spirit seeking for happiness and harmony with itself, and its incapacity of finding either except in the entire surrender of itself to God, with such

intense force of realisation as St Augustine? Yet it must be acknowledged that both these writers purchase their power in one special direction by an almost total blindness to the manifold riches of human life, to the æsthetic charm of finite things that lifts them above their finitude, and to the real value of social and political, as distinguished from religious interests.

Now, as I have already indicated, there is something of the same contrast between the words of Christ as they are narrated in the Synoptic Gospels and the letters of St Paul. Christ in his mode of expression is essentially imaginative, full of symbol and parable, presenting the things of the spirit under manifold analogies borrowed from nature and from human nature. And although he is brought into collision with the religious authorities of his time by the spirituality of his conceptions of the kingdom of God and of the work of the Messiah, yet he always presents his own teaching as a legitimate development of the law and the prophets. He speaks from a consciousness of the unity of the whole divine system of things, which does not allow him to draw hard lines of division between nature and man, or between the different stages of the divine revelation to and in man. And we may add, as a consequence of this, that he almost never argues, but simply throws a new light upon the subject he is considering which lifts it out of the sphere of controversy. In such sayings as these, "Wisdom is justified of her children;" "The Sabbath is made for man, and not man for the Sabbath;" "God is not the God of the dead but of the living;" the question is, as it were, raised above the ordinary region of arguments for and against, by an insight which makes them irrelevant.

How different is it with St Paul! In the first place, in all his writings we are confined for good and evil to the special sphere of religion and theology. The religious aspect of life is not only the predominant, but we might even say, the only aspect regarded in them. Almost his only reference to nature is in that great passage of the



Epistle to the Romans, in which all creation is conceived as "groaning and travailing" for the manifestation of the sons of God. The idea of beauty hardly occurs to him. And while he could not be a Jew and a Christian without a consciousness of the ultimate unity of the old and new, of nature and spirit, of the human and the divine, yet his primary thought is always of division and antagonism, and the unity appears rather as something to be sought after than as something already achieved. Christianity is nothing if it is not reconciliation, but with St Paul this reconciliation tends to become a far-off divine event, which is to be attained by a long struggle, by a war between the principle of the past and the principle of the present in the history of man, and between the natural and the spiritual element in the individual soul. One might almost say—though this would need some qualification—that the good news that the kingdom of God is already "in" or "among" men, has been changed for a Gospel which declares that it *has been* in Christ, and that it *will be* in his followers at his second coming.

Now there is a sense in which this change was necessary, *i.e.*, in which it was an inevitable step in the development of Christian thought. The rich, implicit fulness, and, at the same time, the untroubled unity of the first expression of the new faith by Christ, the expression of a consciousness for which the whole movement was finished in its beginning, which looked steadily through the antagonisms of life to the goodness of God as the source and the end of all things—this is no doubt the root and basis of Christianity. But it must be recognised that, for the development of this prophetic germ of truth, it was needful that the different elements in it should be clearly distinguished, and that their antagonistic aspects should have full justice done to them. It is impossible that any difference or opposition of ideas can be overcome till it is completely realised and fathomed: and the transition from the Gospels to the Epistles of St Paul exhibits only the inevitable differentiation, through which every principle must pass in the

course of its development. Hence if, in one aspect of it, it is a falling away from the simplicity of the original idea, yet it is a necessary stage through which it had to pass on the way to the full comprehension and realisation of its meaning. Nor need this be a matter for regret unless the transitional form is taken as the final and complete expression of that meaning. The subject, however, will become clearer, if we look a little more closely at the genesis and nature of the Pauline doctrines.

Now it is obvious, and has often been remarked, that the antithetic character of St Paul's teaching is immediately a result of his personal experience. His conversion may have been really mediated and prepared for by a process which had been going on in his mind for a long time before it took place, but, for his own consciousness, it was a sudden revolution, in which he broke away from his past life, and of which he could give no account except to refer it to a divine illumination. And while the apparent abruptness of the change no doubt coloured his views of Christianity from the first, it is only what is natural in such an experience, that the difference between the old life and the new should become deepened and emphasised with time, as the nature of the new was more clearly appreciated in its opposition to the old. This growing sense of contrast we can show very distinctly in the case of St Augustine, if we compare the books which he wrote immediately after his conversion, with the *Confessions*, which belong to a period when he had moved much farther away from the associations of his earlier life. And something of the same kind may be traced in the case of St Paul, if we compare the *Epistles to the Thessalonians* with those to the *Galatians* and *Romans*, and note how much of the Jewish apocalyptic type of thought is still retained in the former, and how little is said of the essential contrast between the Law and the Gospel, which becomes so prominent in the latter. In any case, we can see that St Paul soon came to look upon his life as sharply divided into two sections, and that, if the first section was regarded by him as preparing for the second, it was only



negatively and not positively. In other words, he did not conceive that his earlier Jewish beliefs contained in them the germ and potency of his later Christian faith, but only that the inability of the former to give satisfaction to the religious wants which they awakened, had produced an aching void and therefore a readiness to receive the latter. Hence it was natural that the new light should take for him an external form. It came to him at first as an outward vision, and even when he learnt to regard it also as an inward revelation, he still referred it simply to the act of God as an external will: "When it pleased God to reveal his Son in me." What we have, therefore, in St Paul's own view of his conversion, is a sharp opposition between two periods of life, which are connected only as it were dramatically, in the providence of God—who has deepened the darkness in order that the incoming of light may be more fully realised and appreciated—and not an evolution, in which the later stage reveals what was already implicitly present in the earlier. It was, indeed, just this sharply defined antagonism that made St Paul so powerful an agent in the process of universalising Christianity and freeing it from the particular forms and observances of the Judaism out of which it grew; while the original Apostles, in whose minds the Christian faith was gradually developed by the teaching of Christ, as a kind of idealisation of Jewish religion, found it more difficult to emancipate the new spirit from the old letter.

We shall, however, be able to penetrate a little deeper into the nature of the Pauline teaching, if we consider what exactly was the aspect in which Christ presented himself to St Paul at the time of his conversion. Now it is obvious that the centre, round which all the Pauline theology crystallises, is the idea of a Messiah who suffers and dies, and who rises again from the grave. It is the idea of one who seeks to overcome the antagonism of his enemies, not by fighting against them, crushing their resistance and destroying their power, but by enduring the utmost evil they can inflict, even to the extreme of the most shameful of deaths. The resurrection of Christ

means for St Paul that *this* is the true path of Messiahship, the path which has been owned of God, and in which all must tread who would be followers of Christ. It is an exaggeration, but no very great exaggeration, to say that we should not gather from St Paul's Epistles that he knew anything, or cared to know anything, of the life of Christ, except that he suffered and died and rose again.

Now, as we see from the Gospel narrative, this idea of a suffering Messiah was the hardest lesson which Christ had to inculcate upon his disciples. In the critical scene at Cæsarea Philippi he had scandalised his most prominent disciple, the disciple who first owned him as the Messiah, by prophesying his own rejection and death, as the necessary antecedent to his triumph. The principle that "unless a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone," was one which St Peter found it very difficult to receive, and which, indeed, he did not receive till after the crucifixion. And there can be no doubt that it was an equal offence to St Paul, when he found the disciples of Jesus proclaiming that a man who had died upon the cross was the Messiah, and declaring that they had had visions of him as their risen Lord. Such a belief he could not but regard as degrading and blasphemous, and even as a kind of treason: for all the hopes of the nation seemed to him bound up with the idea of a Messiah, who should free Israel from its bondage to Rome, and subject all the Gentiles to the chosen people, the only people to whom the divine law had been revealed. To speak of a crucified Messiah was to deny the privilege of Israel. It was to subvert their law and take away the reward which they hoped from the observance of it: it was even to suggest that Israel also was to suffer and not to triumph. In view of all this, we can easily understand how St Paul came to be the most energetic of the persecutors of the new sect. On the other hand, we know that he was secretly dissatisfied with the result of his own rigid obedience to the law which he so zealously practised. It had become to him not a free service of the spirit, but a



bondage to a dead letter of observance, which was endured mainly in view of an outward reward. He had begun to feel that such an obedience was barren and unreal, and perhaps also, to his generous and sympathetic spirit, the outward reward, the triumph of his nation and himself over the Gentiles, had begun to lose its attraction. In such circumstances the dauntless faith of Stephen and others in a crucified Christ, who was now at the right hand of God, could not fail to make a deep impression upon him, and to produce much searching of heart. Could it be that the true victory of the Messiah was to be reached through loss and defeat: that his conquest over men was to be won, not in the way of overcoming all their forces by superior force, but by an endurance and self-sacrifice which appealed to their hearts and exhausted and removed their antagonism? Could it be that the true kingdom of God was to be one in which no nation should lord it over another, but one in which all division of nation against nation should cease, and all men should be welded together by reciprocal service? We cannot say how far such doubts and difficulties had distinctly presented themselves to St Paul, before the vision on the road to Damascus. What we do know is that from the first all these issues were bound up together in his mind, and that, therefore, his conversion seemed to settle them all at one stroke. If Christ had risen again, then the conception of the Messiah as one who suffered and died was true, and with it came a complete inversion of all St Paul's whole previous scheme of thought. The Gospel must be substituted for the Law, faith for works, the universality of the kingdom of God for the national particularism of the Jew, the idea of self-realisation by self-sacrifice for the idea of self-realisation by self-seeking. By one sudden illumination St Paul became at once a believer in the death and resurrection of Christ, the apostle of the Gentiles, and the teacher of the new ethical doctrine that men must die to themselves that they might live to Christ. It was a "transvaluation of all values," which made the Christian view of life stand out in

abrupt opposition to all the past beliefs of himself and his nation: and, as the years went on, and St Paul grew in appreciation of the meaning of the new doctrine, and, perhaps we may add, as his memory of the past and his sympathy with it became dimmed by distance, he inevitably yielded more and more to the tendency to deepen the lines of division between them. He objectified the contrast in his own life and made it his key to the history of the world. Judaism became to him, we might almost say, one with Pharisaism, a rigid external law which, by the multitude and collision of its precepts, was continually raising questions of casuistry, and rendering the path of human existence dark and difficult, while Christianity was a gospel of freedom, which delivered men from all such harassing scruples, and turned the moral life into the spontaneous expression of the spirit of love. This is what is meant by the opposition between justification by works and justification by faith: for the law is conceived by St Paul as an influence which merely vivifies and develops the consciousness of sin, without giving any power to overcome it. All that it can do is, in short, to fill the soul with self-despair, and so to prepare it to welcome the new force breathed into it by the spirit of Christ, and to surrender itself to be the organ and vehicle of that spirit.

In this connection I must refer to another point in the Pauline doctrine. Christ, he declares, "hath abolished death and brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel." "The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death." In St Paul's view of things, the moral and the natural are immediately and closely bound together, and the former is always viewed as the source of the latter. The fall of man has, by an inevitable sequence, brought death into the world, and by an equally inevitable sequence the moral renovation of man by Christ must lift him from the grave, and fill him with the power of an endless life.

Now, when we examine the sources of this view of the process of man's life, we find that there is behind it a deep



psychological conception both of the causes of evil and of the way in which it is to be overcome. According to St Paul, the *σάρξ*, or, as we should say, the natural life of man, is essentially self-seeking. The natural man endeavours to draw everything to himself as an individual, to aggrandise himself at the expense of all others, and to break through all the limits set to him as a finite creature by the divine will. And when the law awakes him to a consciousness of the opposition between itself and his own greed and ambition, its demands at first only stimulate his passions to a more open manifestation of their evil nature. It is true that there is something in him which takes sides against him: for he cannot but "delight in the law of God after the inward man." But, however deeply he may be convinced of the claims of that law, his carnal nature revolts against them. He is forced to regard it as an external limit which is keeping him from his happiness, and he cannot prevail upon himself to submit to it, still less to love it and find satisfaction in it. What he has to learn is that, in seeking to save, he is really losing himself, that what his selfish efforts are bringing to him is not "more life and fuller" but death. For the finite or earthly being of man has no spring of life in itself, and he who makes his natural existence his end must perish with it. On the other hand, the real source of the natural life lies in the spiritual; and, therefore, he who seeks the latter, even by the absolute sacrifice of the former, is taking the way, and, indeed, the only way, to secure both. He who gives himself up to the universal or divine principle, which the law imperfectly represents, and of which Christ is the only perfect manifestation, is taken out of his finitude and saved from the inevitable destiny of the finite: he finds a divine energy springing up within him which is superior to decay and death. When once the supreme renunciation of the natural selfism has been accomplished, the spirit of life streams into the man: and, though he cannot escape the ordinary fate of mortality which sin has brought upon his race, yet, as this very fate can be made instrumental

to his spiritual growth, death cannot hold him. He must rise again, as Christ has risen before him.

And this suggests another point. Christ, in the view of St Paul, "tasted death for every man." He showed how the last enemy, which sin had armed against mankind, was to be encountered and vanquished. He turned what was a penalty into an expiation, and his followers can do likewise, "filling up that which is behind of the sufferings of Christ." In this point of view, St Paul conceives the whole race as summed up and incorporated, first in Adam, and then in Christ. "In Adam all died, in Christ shall all be made alive." This statement, taken in a hard dogmatic way, has given rise to a theory of original sin and atonement, which seems, first, to make all men guilty of an act for which they were not responsible, and then to free them from guilt by another act in which they have had no share. But, though such conceptions may find a basis in the language of St Paul, they distort his real meaning. St Paul, indeed, realises very vividly the corporate unity of mankind, and the way in which their lives are bound up together, both for good and for evil. He sees that if any man sin, we may fairly say that the weight of the evil of others and ultimately of the whole race is pressing him down, and that, if any man does rightly, the righteousness of others, and ultimately of the whole race, is lifting him up. And in this he is far nearer the truth than the ordinary individualism, which treats mankind as a collection of separate persons, each master of his own separate fate. What is peculiar to St Paul is that he expresses this truth in a personal way, identifying the principle of sin with the first man who sinned, and the principle of redemption with the first man who, in his view, became the embodiment of the new spirit of life. To him, therefore, Adam is not only the father of mankind, but the source of the carnal or earthly life: and Christ is not only the first man who was conscious of the true relation of man to God, and who lived consistently in that relation, in the continual surrender of the finite to the infinite, carrying his



faithfulness out to the last sacrifice of life itself: he is, moreover, the one man through whom alone, in sympathetic self-identification with his life and death, other men can have the same experience. As, therefore, the existence of the principle of sin in us is regarded as a consequence of our natural union with Adam, so the existence of the principle of grace in us is viewed as conditional upon our union with Christ, or rather, we might say, the principle itself *is* Christ: and "he who is joined to Christ is one spirit." It is such language as this that has given occasion to the forensic view of the atonement, according to which Christ is conceived as paying the penalty for others; but, when we perceive what it really means, we see that it refutes that view. It is not, as St Paul represents it, that Christ dies to save us from death, as the penalty for sin: for he does *not* save us: it is that he makes death itself the greatest means of manifesting and realising the new principle of life, and enables us also to take death in the same way, and so to overcome its power. "For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection." In this way the resurrection of Christ becomes the pledge and proof that all who have his spirit will rise again: and that, not merely as the result of any arbitrary reward attached to their faith, but because they have the same seed of immortal life in them, and cannot be holden of death any more than he. Thus it is not they that live but Christ in them, and therefore they cannot die.

Such, then, is St Paul's interpretation of the history of humanity before and after Christ. How far is it possible for us to accept it as a true speculative interpretation of that history? I have already pointed out what I think its main defect. St Paul is in one sense the second author of Christianity, in so far as he first separated it decisively from the husk of Judaism and gave it a universal form, which Jew and Gentile could accept on equal terms. His emphatic declaration, "If ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing," was the declaration of independence for Christianity, which

secured that it should not be an idealised Judaism, but the religion of humanity. St Paul was, moreover, the prototype and example of all those valiant souls who have entered upon a new life by a decisive act in which they have seemed once for all to leave their past behind them, freeing themselves at a stroke from the yoke of custom and tradition with all its clinging restraints, and, as it were, renewing their spiritual youth in all its unstained freshness and energy. Such an example is a perennial source of encouragement and hope to those who seem to themselves to be entangled in a net of difficulties from which no outlet can be found. It seems to say to all weary and unhappy souls that faith and love can always begin the world again, and "the deepest wounds of the spirit may be healed so that not a scar remains."

On the other hand, as I have already indicated, these advantages are purchased by a certain exaggeration and over-emphasis, by greatly sharpening and simplifying the contrasts of human existence and setting one stage of its progress in such direct opposition to another, that the transition appears to be a miracle brought about by an external power, rather than a natural growth. This, again, tends to produce a conception of God, not as working in man and through his own spiritual development, but rather by sudden interferences and overpowering shocks, which break in upon the natural process of his life. It stimulates the superstitious habit of thought which refuses to find the ideal in the actual, and seeks for it rather in something transcendent and out of the common, in something that descends upon us from the clouds rather than in that which springs up under our feet. It encourages men to look up into heaven or down into hell for that which is "in their mouth and their heart."

Connected with this is another essential characteristic of St Paul's way of thinking, viz., that while he regards the spiritual as the source and principle of the natural life, he yet, in the ultimate resort, seems to base his faith in the spiritual on the fact of its manifestation in one event in the natural



world. For, not only does he conceive identification with Christ as the only way in which the highest life can be communicated to man, but he is prepared to stake the truth of Christianity on the objective reality of the vision of the risen Christ which was given to himself and to others of the apostles or disciples. "If Christ be not risen, ye are yet in your sins." It is quite in harmony with this that the hope of a future life seems for him to be bound up with the apocalyptic idea of the second coming of the Lord in the clouds of heaven. The universal truth is thus regarded as essentially connected, not with the ordinary course of nature and history, but with repeated miraculous interferences. Now, if we were to follow out this way of thinking to all its consequences, we should be forced to renounce the belief that this life, just as it is, is the manifestation of the divine—a belief that seems to find expression in many of the words of Christ, as when he discourages the demand for signs and wonders, and finds evidence of the love of God even in facts which some have regarded as showing the indifference of nature. "He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth his rain upon the just and the unjust." Time has taught Christians to renounce or forget the idea of a second coming of Christ as the visible manifestation of the triumph of Christianity, or to find it only in the gradual amelioration of the conditions of human life, and the growing sense of the brotherhood of man. It is also withdrawing from them their former confidence in the outward reality of the visions of the risen Lord by St Paul and the other apostles, and teaching them rather to regard these visions as a last reflex of the Jewish idea of a conquering Messiah, an idea which clung to St Paul's mind even while he apparently had renounced it. But does not this mean only that men must ultimately find the spiritual *in* the natural and not beyond it, and that the evidence for any future life of man must be placed on the ground on which Christ placed it, that "God is not the God of the dead but of the living?"

There are especially two points, in which the tendency of

St Paul to conceive things in sharp antithesis seems to carry him away from a true view of development: first, in reference to the transition in the history of the race, and secondly, in reference to the transition in the life of the individual. As to the former of these points, it is hardly possible for us to accept the Pauline conception of the relation between Judaism and Christianity, in the form which St Paul gives to it, as an abstract contrast between law and grace, works and faith. How, *e.g.*, can we suppose that the law did nothing but excite a deeper consciousness of sin without bestowing upon its votaries any positive ability to attain to righteousness? Can we think of Judaism as at best an effort after something which was never reached or enjoyed, as having never in any measure participated in that freedom of spirit which belongs to the service of love? Do we not find the spirit of Christianity, the love that is the fulfilling of the law, anticipated in many passages of the Psalms and the prophetic writings? And, if so, must we not greatly modify the Pauline representation of the connection of the two dispensations so as to bring out the fact that their positive is far deeper than their negative relation? I have heard liberal-minded Jews declare that they could quite understand the language of Christ, even in his strongest condemnation of Pharisaism, but that there was something in the attitude of St Paul, which they could not but regard as prejudiced and unjust.<sup>1</sup> Now

<sup>1</sup> Thus Mr Montefiore (in the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, January 1901) says: "The Jesus of the Synoptic Gospels was a critic and pathologist of Judaism. His criticisms are real: they are flesh and blood. There are, be it observed, parallels and illustrations of them in the Rabbinical literature. Jesus put his finger upon real sore places: upon actual dangers, limitations, shortcomings. But the author of the Epistle to the Romans fights, for the most part, in the air. He sets up imaginary evils, and with superb eloquence and admirable rhetoric he brushes them away. His conception of the Law—for we are agreed that everything turns upon this—is unreal." This is perhaps too strongly expressed, but Mr Montefiore seems in his article to show that the abstract description of the Law by St Paul does not in many respects agree with the characteristics of the Torah, as it existed in the beginning of the Christian era; as it certainly does not agree with the idea of the Law as it is presented in the Old Testament.



we have seen that this seeming injustice was a very natural reflection of St Paul's own history: but this psychological explanation leaves it only the more obvious that we cannot quite vindicate his statements from an objective point of view. And they become even less capable of justification, when we have learnt to look upon Christianity, not merely as the culmination of Jewish history, but as the result of a combination of Jewish with Western thought, and especially with many influences from the literature and philosophy of Greece.

As to the second point, I have already said something of the psychology of conversion. It was very natural for one who had had the experience of St Paul to say, "I have passed from death to life," but when we look at him as the zealous Jew and anxious observer of the law, in which yet he was unable to find satisfaction to his soul, we cannot but see that he had only passed from life to higher life. What happened to him was more or less what happens to us all, when the rules or customs, which we have observed or rebelled against, become vivified, and it may be transfigured in our eyes, by a recognition of the principle imperfectly expressed in them, and we suddenly perceive that what we were rebelling against, or reluctantly obeying as an external law, contains or points to that which our inmost souls desire. There is a difference of degree, but not of kind, in the case of men like St Paul or Luther, who come at some great crisis, when the outward transformation of the forms and customs of life is very marked and decisive: for then it becomes much more difficult for the individual to knit his present to his past, and to recognise how the one leads to the other. Such men are often the lights of the world, from whom we learn, as we could not learn otherwise, the meaning of the new conception of life which is dawning upon men. But they are inevitably unjust to their own past and to all that is connected with it: and we must allow for their special point of view in any estimate of the value of their teaching.

In what I have said I have been led to dwell mainly on  
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the defectiveness of St Paul's doctrine in one particular aspect of it, in a way that would be quite unfair, if I had undertaken to give a complete account of it. Above all, it is necessary to notice that, in spite of the antithetic tendency of which I have been speaking, St Paul rarely, if ever, loses sight of the unity which is beyond the differences which he states so strongly. This comprehensiveness of view becomes very clear, when we compare him with those Gnostics who carried out to an extreme the tendency to exalt Christianity by depressing its antecedents, and turned St Paul's contrast between it and Judaism into a contradiction. Thus we find some of these writers speaking of the God of the Old Testament as an evil *Demiurgus*, a ruler over the natural world, whom Christ, as a power emanating from the spiritual world, has to conquer and depose. As against such extravagances, we have to notice how St Paul clings to the thought of the close connexion of the Law and the Gospel, even while he is insisting most strongly upon the contrast between them, how he asserts that the Law is "holy and just and good," and that, if what it produces is mainly the consciousness of sin, yet God "hath included all under sin"; only "that he might have mercy upon all." Again, deeply as St Paul draws the lines of opposition between the natural and the spiritual, he holds firmly to the central truth that good is deeper than evil, and he looks through the struggle not merely to triumph but to the ἀποκατάστασις πάντων, the restitution of all things. At times he looks back to the beginning and on to the end in a way that almost carries him beyond the limits of Christianity: "Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father, that God may be all in all." God, for St Paul, is all in all: yet he is no pantheist in the ordinary sense of the word, and he finds it possible to believe in human liberty without losing sight of the idea that men can do nothing except as the organs of a divine power; nay, that this is just what constitutes their liberty: "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God



that worketh in you." And it is in harmony with this that he grasps the idea of the Church as a living organism, in which one spirit holds the community together, while it manifests itself in each member by stimulating him to the exercise of his special gifts.

All these points are important as indications of the comprehensiveness of St Paul's religious view of life; but they are all subsidiary to his great work, which was to universalise the principle of Christianity and free it from its Jewish envelope. The truth, which is the moral essence and kernel of Christianity, that he who loseth his life alone can save it, is, indeed, already clearly expressed in the words of Christ and illustrated in his life and death. But St Paul was the Apostle who first grasped it in its broad generality and made it the foundation of a great systematic view of the whole existence of man in his relation to the universe. Seeking to give the most emphatic expression to this view, as we have seen, he throws humanity into two great groups under Adam and Christ—groups standing in strong dramatic contrast to each other; and in the same spirit, he splits the existence of the individual into two between the flesh and the spirit. He thus somewhat obscures the truth that all the elements of the life of man are organically connected, and that its successive phases are parts of one process of development. But he often escapes from the influence of his own abstractions, and even where he does not succeed in doing so, we have to remember that the sharpness of the antitheses which he draws was a necessary accident of the first attempt to give a general statement of the original element in Christianity. For new ideas, in the first stage of their development, can hardly be expressed with sufficient emphasis, except by putting them in extreme antagonism to those that are already in possession of the field. Nay, we might even say that this one-sidedness is necessary to their gaining eventually their true place as elements in the life of the world.

# THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF REFLECTIVE THOUGHT TOWARDS RELIGION.

## II.

HENRY JONES, M.A., LL.D.,

Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow.

I ENDEAVOURED to show in a previous article in this Journal<sup>1</sup> that one of the characteristics of our time is the contradiction between its practical faith in morality and religion and its theoretical distrust of the conceptions on which they rest. In the present article I propose to examine this contradiction a little more closely, with the view of indicating that the new way in which our beliefs are being challenged demands a new method of defence, or at least one which is fundamentally different from that most in vogue in our day.

For, what is set in antagonism to our spiritual convictions is not any longer a particular philosophical theory, or a particular science, nor even the whole body of the sciences. If that were the case, we might reasonably look to the advance of knowledge to remove the obstacles to our beliefs. The contradiction is much deeper: it is a contradiction between the principles on which our intellectual and practical life seem respectively to rest. It is the very process of knowing that appears to be destructive of the objects of faith. For that process con-

<sup>1</sup> January 1903.



sists in bringing phenomena under laws, and culminates in establishing a universal order, in which everything has its place fixed. But the objects of faith seem to resist inclusion in any such universal scheme. Free-will, duty, right and wrong, God, cannot form parts of a necessary system. They imply a spontaneity which seems incompatible with that systematic necessity which is the ideal of the intelligence.

Hence it would appear that there is no way of defending the objects of our moral and religious faith except by limiting the pretensions of the intelligence. And this is the method usually followed. It rests on two suppositions:—*first*, that the province and the authority of reason are limited; and *second*, that the phenomena of spiritual life are not confined to that province nor subject to that authority. We are told that the universal order to which reason pretends is an empty conception not justified by experience—a mere ideal not sustained by facts nor compatible with our finite nature. We are told that there are phenomena in our experience which do not belong to the intellectual province; for they do not appeal to the intellectual side of our nature, and are not subject to intellectual criteria, but they prove their validity in other ways. Even those facts which do fall within its purview refuse to yield themselves up entirely to the intelligence. “‘Ever not quite’ must be the rationalistic philosopher’s last confession concerning them. After all that reason can do has been done, there still remains the opacity of finite facts as merely given, with most of their peculiarities mutually unmediated and unexplained.”<sup>1</sup> The impulse of the intelligence towards systematic coherence, even if it is not a fiction of the “Intellectualists,” is never fully gratified, any more than are the other impulses of our complex nature; and, in any case, it is only one impulse amongst many. And the necessity with which reason binds its objects in a system—in so far as it does so—is only an epistemological necessity, purely psychical and, therefore, subjective. Its

<sup>1</sup> James, *Will to Believe*, Pref., p. viii.

“universal” and “necessary laws” are only generalisations obtained by skimming the surface of facts, bye-products of our method of arranging phenomena, subjective creations incident upon our way of comprehending things. But they are not objective realities, and they correspond to none. In the actual world there are only particular facts and events, specific phenomena, each of which has its own character and acts in its own way; but beyond these particular things and their specific activities there is nothing. The universal laws are expressions we employ to indicate that the behaviour of things is constant; but they are nothing more. In the realm of existence there are no such abstract entities, no things-in-general, and no events-in-general, or, in a word, no universals.

Hence it follows that it is impossible to employ the system of thought as a criterion of the reality of objects. An epistemological necessity is one thing; an ontological, or real, necessity is another. Even if we concede that in order that objects may be *thought* they must form parts of a necessary intellectual system, it does not follow that they must fall within such a system in order to *exist*. Man is not mere intellect; thought is not his sole psychical activity; knowledge is not his only aim and achievement. Our experience is wider than thought, and we can possess objects in other ways than by intellectual apprehension. And especially do the phenomena of our moral and religious life appeal to other powers, and prove their validity and worth by other means than those of intellectual demonstration. The attempt to include these realities in intellectual systems, repeated by philosophers in all ages of the world, has only ended in giving rise to antinomies, or contradictions, which reason has neither been able to set aside nor to solve. These facts do not belong to the province of the intelligence, and will not be subjected to its methods. They are facts of “another order.”

Now, I am persuaded that this method of defending morality and religion—*i.e.* by representing their objects as exceptions to the order set up by reason—is a wrong method, and



calculated not only to perpetuate the contradiction between the theoretical and practical aspects of our life, but to injure religion in a fatal way. The true defence seems to me to be in a direction which is almost directly opposite. *Instead of a theory of their mutual exclusion, I should proffer a theory of their mutual inclusion.*

We are familiar enough, no doubt, with the practice of relegating into different spheres such objects of experience as we cannot directly assimilate to one another. The various sciences furnish examples of this method. And, in particular, the phenomena of the physical and psychical life are very generally represented as constituting different orders of facts—parallel to each other, no doubt, but not connected by any principle known to us, nor reducible either into each other or into any third form of existence which we can know. Why then, it may be asked, can the phenomena of our spiritual life not be treated in the same manner? Nay, can we avoid doing so? Do they not present themselves to us from the beginning as facts of a different order; and does not our attempt to reduce them to a common basis always result either in denying that nature is natural, or in denying that spirit is spiritual?

Now, if the question be put in this way, the answer is not difficult. The analogy does not hold. It is one thing to divide the intellectual realm into more or less separate provinces, each of them resting upon its own hypothesis, as do the sciences; it is another thing to set up an order of facts outside of the whole intellectual realm. In the former case the operations of reason are facilitated, for nothing has contributed more to the advance of knowledge than this separation of provinces; but, in the latter case, the operations of the intelligence are excluded. But is the sphere of the intelligence thus limitable; and what kind of reality, if any, remains for the objects which are thus excluded? May not the limits of intelligibility and the limits of reality, after all, coincide; and may it not be true that what is necessary in order that an object may be intelligible, is necessary in order that it may exist?

It cannot be denied that our experience is constantly impinged upon by objects which we do not at the time comprehend, or which we cannot bring in a precise and clear way into relation to that experience. The scientific man, or the philosopher, who is most devoted to systematic thinking, will readily acknowledge that, at any given moment, facts and laws may exist of which he is entirely ignorant. Even the "Absolute Idealist" or "Intellectualist" admits that the world as known by man never presents itself as a complete system, and that no object within it is ever completely known. The "absolute order" is undoubtedly an "unrealised ideal." No one, so far as I know, ever pretended that any man, or that all men together, possessed all knowledge, or knew all the relations of everything to everything else. In this respect the ideal of complete knowledge is analogous to the ideal of a perfect morality; it is not actualised or achieved, it is not even adequately conceived.

But the question at issue is whether these "unrealised ideals" can be treated as "mere ideas," in the sense that they are fictions which we can set aside; or whether, on the other hand, they are not things which neither knowledge nor morality can forego. It is possible that the whole function of the intellectual and the moral life is just to make them real; and that without them the whole process of knowing the true and doing the right would be both unintelligible and impossible. It is even possible that each thought that is in any degree valid, and each act that is in any sense moral, is already, in its own place and context, their verification and actualisation.

Now, to begin with the simplest point, in the ordinary investigations of science it is never assumed that an unrealised ideal is false. It is the aim of scientific investigators, each within his own limited domain, to verify some particular principle on which his own particular science rests. In none of these fields of enquiry is the principle fully verified; in all there are facts which, so far, resist inclusion within the general



law or principle, and which, therefore, menace the validity of the law, while themselves remaining unexplained. Even universal causation is still not demonstrated; for there are phenomena to which, so far, we can assign no cause—events, like tag-ends, which we are not able to fix and place in necessary relations. But we do not on that account jump to the conclusion that there are events which have no cause, or that the idea of causation is a mere fiction. To do so would be to stultify the whole enterprise of natural science, and to deprive it of its sole function, which is simply to relate events to one another as causes and effects, or, in other words, to verify an ideal with which enquiry begins, and within which it consistently moves and advances.

It seems, therefore, that we cannot conclude that because an ideal is not actualised it must be false. We cannot conclude to its falsity even if we are convinced not only that it is not realised, but that it is not realisable. For there is a third alternative which does not seem to have been sufficiently considered—namely, that it may be in process of being realised, and therefore in process of being demonstrated as valid. And this is the case not only with the ideals of the sciences, but with that of the moral life. There, as might easily be shown, the conviction that an ideal of moral perfection cannot be attained by man, is not incompatible with the effort to realise it. On the contrary, in every act which is approved as right, the ideal is conceived as in that particular already realised. The particular right action stands in its own place and context as a representative and embodiment of the moral law. Nothing better could be done by gods or angels; for it is *right*. Hence, if the moral life is not attainment, it is at least a progressive attaining. The ideal lives *in* the process through which it is being realised, and the process is possible and intelligible only as the expression of that ideal. In other words, the ideal is not something that comes to be at a particular moment, at the close of a process, as if it were fired out of a pistol; and the process is not something alien and foreign, to which the actualised ideal

is suddenly added. The process leads up to it, because it is *its* process, in which it has verified itself all the way. The good life is the life in which the ideal of a perfect goodness is operative, and in which to live is to do the will of God.

Now, analogous in many respects to the principles which we assume in science, is the conception of a completed system of rational experience. Indeed, it is not denied, even by the sceptics, that the function of the intelligence is to represent its objects, so far as it can, as parts of a congruous system. To comprehend objects is to discover the relations in which they stand to other objects, and to represent them as depending upon some principle which is their reason, if not also their ground. Whether the intellectual act be rudimentary or advanced, analytic or synthetic, or both, it is still concerned with the relations of objects. Reason is always finding either similarities or differences, always connecting objects either positively or negatively, always passing judgments which always assert or deny relations. It never deals with the absolutely single or simple. Indeed, it cannot do so. Absolute sameness and absolute difference are impossible objects of thought. They are void of significance and offer no problem, and nothing either true or false can be said of them. They are, in fact, quite meaningless; for identity or sameness must be the sameness or identity of one thing with another, and therefore cannot be absolute in the sense of excluding difference; and difference is the difference of some one thing from another, and therefore cannot be absolute in the sense of excluding sameness. Hence it matters nothing whether the immediate aim of an intellectual act be to explain some particular object, such as a stone or flower, or to expound the universe in a metaphysical theory; it is still employed upon a unity of differences, and never with a mere unity or with mere differences, never with mere universals or with mere particulars.

But if difference and unity imply each other and are not conceivable apart, then reason does not, as is ordinarily thought, aim at *introducing* systematic continuity amongst its objects, in the



sense of forming connections where none existed before. Its object must already be a system, for it presents itself as one thing, and also as a thing which has some quality or character of some kind: it is not a mere many, nor is it mere sameness. The function of the intelligence is, therefore, not correctly described as consisting in relating a manifold, or in superimposing connections upon particulars. It is not called upon to invent generalisations or to fabricate connecting conceptions, any more than to distinguish into differences a mere continuum. Such a process is both impossible and unnecessary: it is impossible because it cannot grasp, and therefore cannot proceed from, pure differences; it is unnecessary because the differences are already relative to the unity which gives them meaning. The principles are in the facts, as are the particulars, and neither has priority over the other. In other words, the objects of thought are always concrete systems; the activities of thought are both analytic and synthetic; and the process of knowing is neither movement towards a unity which swallows up and deletes all differences, nor towards differences that are not connected. It is a movement from a less complete towards a more complete system. Thought articulates more closely—that is, both distinguishes more clearly and integrates more intimately—the concrete datum on which it is engaged from first to last.

The universals of knowledge—the “generalisation” of common sense, the “laws” of science, the “principles” of philosophy—cannot, therefore, be regarded as having only subjective significance unless we are prepared to regard the particulars which they connect as equally subjective. For universals and particulars emerge together, and are known only in relation to one another. We must regard both as merely subjective, or attribute objective reality to both. We cannot place the one in the epistemological, and the other in the ontological sphere; and if we did, we should not be able to conceive how the universals of the one province should connect the particulars of the other, or how “mere ideas” should bind together “real” things. But these are precisely the impossibilities assumed by those who

attack the universals of knowledge in order to leave room for religious faith. They take for granted the "existential reality" of the mere particular. They call it a "datum," or a something "given," ignoring the fact that what is intrinsically unintelligible cannot be "given" in any sense; and then they connect these *data* by laws invented by the intelligence, and which have only epistemological significance.

But the objective validity, or ontological reality, of *something* must be presupposed, if knowledge is possible. The attitude of thought which presents both universals and particulars as merely subjective is self-destructive. It is Nihilism. Even Scepticism must assume the truth, or objective validity, of something. Nothing can be proved false if nothing is taken as true. The Sceptic cannot overcome his opponent if his own feet also are in the air. The error, therefore, lies not in presuming the objective reality of particulars, but in not presuming the objective reality of something much more significant than any collection of particulars can be. The only alternative, therefore, is that to which we have been already led in our analysis of knowledge—that both its particulars and universals have ontological significance, and that the connecting conceptions are no more mental fabrications than are the particulars, and not less. Both are "given" and both are "discovered," and both are given and discovered together. In one word, the possibility of knowledge rests upon the presupposition that its object, whatever it may be, must be conceived as a veritable unity of real differences, or, in other words, as a concrete and coherent system.

But, once more it will be urged, such a system is neither given nor acquired. "Absolute unity, in spite of brilliant dashes in that direction, still remains undiscovered — still remains a *Grenzbegriff*."<sup>1</sup> The conception of unity is, at the best, only the contrast we set up to our actual experience, and suggested by its imperfections. It is by the contradictions of our finite knowledge that we are driven to assume

<sup>1</sup> *Will to Believe*, Pref., p. viii.



the absolute. Each object of knowledge in turn shows, upon investigation, that it contains discrepancies, and each category or constructive hypothesis breaks down. We are therefore compelled to regard the object thus distracted by contradictions as "appearance," and to contrast it with a supposed reality; and we, in a similar way, contrast our imperfect colligating conceptions with a unity which is supreme and absolute. But that real and that absolute are never reached. They are only regulative conceptions which we employ as negative criteria of our actual knowledge, and then, by an old philosophic trick, objectify and hypostasise. They are fictions.

I shall not return to the question whether an unrealised ideal is necessarily a fiction, for the problem has now taken another form. What we have to ask now is whether a merely regulative conception can even regulate? Is not a merely regulative conception, the conception of a blank unity—that is, of a unity that unites nothing in particular? But such is not the unity which we contrast with our actual experience, or by reference to which we could condemn our acquired knowledge. What can serve as a criterion of any experience, however limited, must itself have content, and its content must be continuous with that of the experience with which it is contrasted. It is, indeed, already present in that experience, and a higher form of it: for it is the implicit unity which gives the discrepancies meaning, the principle within which they must fall in order to be mutually repugnant.

The same consequence follows if we examine the meaning of the statement that the finite object, or the finite point of view, contradicts itself, or contains elements not mediated or related, but repugnant to the others. It contradicts itself only because it implicitly contains more than is explicit and manifest. There is something in it not adequately expressed in our thoughts, and it is that which drives thought further, and "points to the absolute." But no object points beyond itself in a strict sense; no conception suggests what it does not already contain. There are no blind leaps in knowledge;

its process is continuous and by way of relations. Things which imply one another are not entirely separate, but elements of the same whole. We must conclude, therefore, that either the finite does not suggest the absolute, and that, therefore, the absolute is an empty word; or else that it does point to the absolute, and therefore already contains, and is contained by, the absolute. We must either, with the Pragmatists, reject the very idea of the absolute and strive to be content with an experience that is not a unity, a universe that is not a cosmos, and a God who is not infinite; or else maintain the presence of the absolute not only as critical and regulative of knowledge, but as constitutive of reality. There is, indeed, no way from the relative to the absolute, from the phenomenal to the noumenal, from difference to unity, from appearance to reality. Defined as mutually exclusive at the beginning, they must remain exclusive to the end. The absolute cannot enter in by the way, nor the real break in upon the phenomenal. It must be the original datum which experience explicates and reaffirms throughout its whole process, and which progressively manifests itself in its advance; or it must be denied altogether, and regarded as a figment of philosophical intellectualism. But, as we have already seen, the denial of the unity of experience carries with it the denial of the differences. And it is only a further extension of the same truth to say that the denial of the absolute is the negation of the relative as well. They arise together in experience, for experience is throughout implicitly systematic—never a blank unity nor a pure manifold. And even if explicit or completely systematic continuity is regarded as only an ideal or unproved hypothesis, it is still a hypothesis which is essential to *any* knowledge. If it is never absolutely realised in our experience, nor *can* be realised in an experience that, like ours, is essentially progressive; if, in a word, we only distinguish in part and unite in part, and the concrete wholeness of reality is never grasped by us in one act of thought, still we work within this absolute system, and there is no stage of our experience in which it is not mani-



fested. It is the reality with which experience is engaged. And the whole progress of our experience is but a continuous proof that reality is a coherent system, all of whose parts and elements exist in and through a supreme principle which manifests and embodies itself in them.

This principle philosophy calls the absolute, and religion God; and in calling it so, they imply no bare unity which devours its contents or deletes particular existences, but a concrete unity in which and through which the particular, the finite, maintains its own character and significance and reality. For the relation of finite and infinite is not that of mutual exclusion, but that of mutual inclusion—a conception which is familiar and even essential to the religious consciousness, however little it may be able to say in explanation of it.

The result to which our enquiry thus points is that human knowledge rests upon the same presupposition as religion; that both require the conception of the absolute.

But it may well seem that this assimilation of knowledge to religious faith, instead of furnishing a defence of our religious convictions, only involves the intellect and its products in the same suspicion. For it is precisely on the ground that religion pretends to deal with the absolute, that the validity of its conceptions and the reality of its objects have been questioned. Are we, therefore, to conclude that knowledge, too, transgresses the limits of our finite nature, and rests upon notions that are *ultra vires* of our intelligence? If so, religion is, no doubt, safe from the attacks of reason; but it is safe only because reason has been found guilty of the same extravagance. It is a sceptical defence of religion, like Mr Balfour's, and "brings peace by making a desert." For, on this basis, it may be maintained that in both philosophy and religion the presupposition of the absolute is false; indeed, this is precisely what the modern Pluralist does. It is in the utter rejection of the absolute that he finds the only means of maintaining the validity of religion. Sharing the view of the ordinary Positivist in so far as he refuses, and rightly refuses, to postulate more

unity in experience than experience actually warrants, and finding in that experience no trace of the absolute, no evidence anywhere that either experience, or the universe which is its object, is a systematic whole, he denies the absolute of religion also. Religion, he contends, does not require this impossible conception. Revelation no more grants it than reason discovers it. "There is no possible point of view from which the world can appear an absolutely single fact." "Not unfortunately the universe is wild . . . nature is miracle all."<sup>1</sup> 'Providence' must be "allowed to provide possibilities as well as actualities to the universe, and to carry on his own thinking in these two categories just as we do ours; chances may be there, uncontrolled even by him, and the course of the universe be really ambiguous."<sup>2</sup> "We must leave room for surprises even for God," as another writer expresses it. The absolute, as the Pragmatist believes, is a fiction of the ambitious thought of the Intellectualist, and so also are the minor universals and unities by which nature is converted into a dead mechanism. And it is these conceptions which are the source of the antinomies into which the intellect falls when it endeavours to make room for the spiritual nature of man, and especially for the moral life; while, once they are destroyed, room is left for man to express himself in actions that are spontaneous, to build himself a character, and, in short, to be a person. The Pluralist, therefore, rejects these conceptions both in their regulative and in their constructive use. He finds the impulse towards truth in our practical needs, and its criterion in the practical purposes of our life. He appeals, in fact, from the intellect to the will, from the theoretical to the practical reason. But he does not, after the manner of Kant, bring back in this practical form the absolute which lay beyond the reach of theoretical knowledge. On the contrary, reason, in its practical use also, moves tentatively in the evolution of its ends, and there is as little need or room for the absolute in morals as there is in knowledge and religion.

<sup>1</sup> *Will to Believe*, Pref., p. ix.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180.



I am not at the present moment concerned with the truth of this view. I believe it is possible to show that its consequences are fatal alike to knowledge, morality, and religion; that the denial of the absolute in knowledge implies intellectual Nihilism; in morals, an Empiricism which deprives the moral law of its autonomous character, and duty of its obligatoriness; and in religion, at most, nothing better than a kind of polytheism such as some of these Pragmatists profess. But putting aside the question as to the ultimate value of this theory, it has the merit of raising the problem in a fundamental way, in which alone there can be any hope of a solution. The essential weakness of the defences of religion which are ordinarily offered springs from the attempt to distinguish it from other forms of human experience. As religion alone was believed to deal with the absolute—except in so far as certain philosophers in their pride of intellect were regarded as trespassing beyond the limits of legitimate knowledge—the victory of the Sceptic was all too easy. For how could reason, which, *ex hypothesi*, had only a finite content and relative methods, substantiate a faith that surpassed its bounds? But, as the question is now raised, knowledge and morality must share the destiny of religion. What, on this view, is admitted into, or excluded from, one form of human experience, must, in like manner, be admitted into, or excluded from, all its forms. In a sense I could accept the assertion of Professor James, that “The difference between Monism and Pluralism is perhaps the most pregnant of all the differences in philosophy”;<sup>1</sup> for it shuts us up to two alternatives. We must either reject the very idea of the absolute with the Pragmatists, and be content with an experience that is not a unity, a world that is not a cosmos, a moral law whose authority is relative, and a God who is finite; or else we must be prepared to assert the presence of the absolute in all experience, as the truth which knowledge is progressively attaining, as the good which is being realised in

<sup>1</sup> *Will to Believe*, Pref., p. viii.

morality, as the reality in which the religious consciousness finds its fulfilment and satisfaction. It must, moreover, be held to be present in the *whole* process of experience, and not as coming in at its close, to reconcile in some mysterious way the contradictions of our finite views. Art, morality, knowledge, and religion do not "come together" in the absolute, unless they have been together in the absolute throughout their history. We cannot pass *from* appearance to reality, *from* phenomena to noumena, *from* finite premisses to an absolute conclusion. Either the Absolute is beyond our reach altogether and a mere name, or it is the supreme hypothesis which knowledge verifies, and therefore its first datum as well as its final result; it is the principle on which morality rests, and therefore active in the most rudimentary duty, and realised throughout the whole history of the moral consciousness; and it is the God in whom religion lives and moves and has its being.

When the question is raised in this way, it is evident that one part of experience cannot any longer be set against the other. We cannot appeal from reason to faith as has hitherto been the way with one class of controversialists, nor from the intellect to the will as has been the way of others, nor, after the manner of the Positivists and Agnostics, contrast one field of experience as valid against another as void. The choice lies between a "Radical Empiricism" and a thorough-going "Monism," as Prof. James suggests. It is, in fact, a choice between an anthropo-centric and a theo-centric point of view; between a method which, in the last resort, is psychological and even subjective, and a metaphysical and ontological method which *begins* with the *whole*, with the real, with God, as the datum on which all experience is engaged, and which all experience only explicates and realises more fully as it advances.

To those who desire to maintain the validity of our spiritual convictions from this higher point of view, the task will present great difficulties. They must be prepared to defend the hypothesis of God on deeper grounds, and to apply it to the whole



of life. But, on the other hand, the Agnostic and Sceptic and Radical Empiricist must also cease to employ their easy methods. In a word, if knowledge and morality are made to share the insecurity of religion, religion, on the other hand, shares their safety. It cannot be deprived of its supreme object without casting precisely the same doubt on the ideals of knowledge and morality.

Once stated in this way, a more satisfactory solution may be expected than is possible by the pusillanimous methods hitherto followed, with their shallow appeals to immediate convictions—*on both sides*. Nor can it be doubted in which alternative the investigation must culminate, if it is faithful to the human experience which it is its business to interpret. For experience, in whatever form it is observed, makes claim to the absolute. This claim may be false; but it is, at any rate, not an invention of the "Intellectualist" or "German Idealist." It is as old as human nature, which has always sought *the* truth, pursued *the* good, and laid its trust in a God who gathers in Himself all the perfections that man is able to conceive. These ideals of reason Kant found to be inherent in the nature of reason, even while he deemed that reason was not able to justify them in the way of knowledge. And observation certainly seems to uphold his view. Man pursues absolute ideals, however well he may know that they are never fully attained in his life and action; and *the pursuit is his life and action*. Both philosophy and religion lay claim, each in its own way, to the whole range of human experience and the whole realm of reality; neither tolerates, nor can tolerate, a decisive limitation which would place any part or element of reality beyond its range. It is not their inheritance which is limited, but their possession and use of it.

Difficulties follow upon this view, as upon any other; and amongst these one of the greatest is to explain the relation in which these supreme forms of human experience stand to one another. But we must endeavour, in the first place, to state the fact as it is: and it is a fact that for philosophy the whole

world is regarded as expressible in the form of truth ; that for art all is expressible in the form of beauty ; that for morality all is expressible in the form of goodness ; and that religion seeks to combine all perfections in its object. There is no phenomenon on which each of these may not pronounce its judgment : the categories true or false, beautiful or ugly, right or wrong, are, each in its own way, deemed to be applicable to every fact. Hence the world of reality is not divisible into compartments, as Lotze seemed to think, which appeal, and are responded to, by separate sensibilities and powers of our nature. On the contrary, every object in the world is subject to appraisal from each of these points of view. And it is just possible that our experience becomes adequate to objects, only in so far as we possess them in all these ways, and relate them to all our ideals, intellectual, æsthetic, moral and religious.

If this view is correct, it follows again that each of these aspects of experience falls into the province of the others ; for each claims the whole of reality for its object. But, at first sight at least, this appears to be an inconvenient or even an inexplicable consequence. It seems to imply that not one of these forms can be subordinated to the others ; so that, for instance, it could not be admitted that philosophy “ passes into ” religion, or religion into philosophy. I shall not raise the question of the exact relation of these different forms of our higher life. But it must be conceived as an organic relation, that is, as that of mutual inclusion. No doubt, if spatial categories are to remain dominant, mutual inclusion seems to be impossible in fact and altogether unintelligible. But here, again, the first step towards the truth is to acknowledge the facts. And even if we are unable to resolve one form of our experience into a mode of the other, or to conceive of any higher mode in which they could all come together, observation shows that religion does fall into the province of art, for it is one of the forms in which art expresses itself, and which æsthetically attracts or repels ; and so also does a moral act or a mathematical demonstration. It is not less true that art,



morality, and religion are objects of intellectual investigation ; or that art, knowledge, and religion are objects of interest to the moral consciousness. And it cannot be denied of the religious spirit that it can be manifested in the meditation of the philosopher, and in the practical enterprises of the moral agent and the artist. These forms of experience are, then, mutually comprehensive.

But if this is so, then each in turn is an element of the others, and hence each of them will suffer from the limitation of the others. Religion, for instance, becomes the poorer, the less room there is left within it for intellectual, moral, and artistic activity. In losing these, it loses its own content. And the same truth holds if religion no longer inspires the practical, the intellectual, or the æsthetic consciousness. They are all, in fact, mutually implicative, and not in any wise separable. There is no experience which is exclusively intellectual, or exclusively volitional, or exclusively æsthetic, or exclusively religious. These exclusive modes of experience are only abstractions hypostasised by the psychologists, distinctions hardened into fixed differences, the old "separate faculties," reintroduced under another name.

Nor is the intrinsic intimacy of their relation adequately conceived if we endeavour to supplement the experiences obtained under one form of experience by those gained under another. This is one of the cardinal errors of the modern Pluralists. It is not that they reject "Intellectualism" and endeavour to bring in Voluntarism instead ; but that they have not realised that the "Intellectualism" they reject is a phantom of their own creation. It is not an error to contemplate all objects from the intellectual point of view ; it is by the way of the intellect alone that we attain truth. Those who endeavour to interpret all things in terms of the intellect do well ; but so do they also who seek to look at all things from the point of view of art, or of morality, or of religion. If the former are only strenuous enough in their intellectual endeavour, they will be at the same time realising

the ends of the will, and even of art and religion. For the intellect is not, as the Pluralists seem to think, a faculty of otiose observation which must borrow its activity and its purposes from the Will; nor is the Will an incalculable, miraculous activity unguided by knowledge and unintelligent, which creates "purposes" as it pleases and employs these purposes to give objects meaning. The intelligence is not an abstraction which has to be supplemented by the addition to it of a will. It will show itself on analysis to contain the properties of the will. It is in itself, and intrinsically, active, purposive, creative; in none of its operations is it merely receptive, nor when most purely theoretical is it an indefinite and aimless dreaming, but an activity which, like the will, constructs objects in an objective world, changes some part of the universe of real being. In a word, just as the will is not a will, but a physical force, unless it is intelligent, so the reason is not intelligent if it is not a will—that is, unless it is active, purposive, creative, practical. The human spirit does not exercise its functions alternately or serially, and is not "will" at one time, and "pure reason" at another. We cannot exclude volition from intellection, nor intellection from volition. And if we distinguish, as it is well that we should do, between projecting a plan of action and resolving to carry it out in practice, and call the first "Knowing" and the second "Willing," we are in both cases alike dealing with an intellectual content and objectifying that content in a practical result. In other words, there is in both alike something both willed and known; and they differ, in the last resort, only in regard to the content which, in the two cases, is being willed and known. Sometimes, no doubt, the content of the willed action is more rich than that of the projected action. But it were rash and false to represent the Will as the intelligence *plus* the addition of something more that is not intelligent. The so-called "willed" action is not always more comprehensive than the so-called merely intellectual act; nor the practical reason than the theoretical. The contemplative act may be the richer, and the



mere thinker may change the actual world for the "practical man" much more fundamentally than the practical man can do for the thinker. Measured by their consequences, the will of the speculative philosopher who confines himself to the so-called "world of ideas" may often prove more potent and comprehensive than that of the statesman. But the attitude of mind is fundamentally the same in both; for in both the whole rational soul is engaged in realising ends that are at once theoretical and practical, and these different elements of experience are never found apart.

There is one further consequence of this view which I must indicate before I close this sketch. If the different forms of experience thus imply one another, and the soul is involved as a whole in each of its acts, then it acts in relation *to the whole of reality*. The immediate object of any intellectual enquiry is, no doubt, the comprehension of some particular phenomenon, and the immediate aim of any volition is the realisation of some particular end. We never think-in-general, or will-in-general; but all thought, practical and theoretical, is definite. Nevertheless the practical truth or good which is sought, is a partial and transient expression of an ideal that is permanent and universal. Man, whether he be seeking knowledge or goodness, does not move from act to act by leaps, nor is his life a mere collection of particular events. As Plato showed, man desires *the good*, of which the immediate good is a part; and similarly it is in the pursuit of *the truth* that a special truth is sought. He applies the whole of his past to the present, for his past thought and action has been organised into that which he is at present; so that his criterion of right and wrong, or of the true and false, is the whole of his experience, which, in the last resort, is his conception of the world as a whole. Hence when a particular truth is considered as attained, as when the mathematician concludes that the angles of an equilateral triangle are equal to one another, or when a particular act is pronounced to be right, this appraisalment takes place by reference to ideal standards—that is, to the conception

which the individual has of absolute truth and absolute goodness. The particular achievement is approved because it is held to stand for, and represent, to be continuous and one in principle with, the whole of truth and goodness. It is presumed that further thought and action will only reveal more fully its connection and identity with this whole. In fact, the particular judgment is sustained with the whole strength of the individual experience, and cannot be refuted without destroying it.

It may be admitted that in every one of these practical and theoretical judgments the individual may be wrong. The conception of the whole, which he employs as his criterion, may contain false elements as well as be inadequate in content; and his view of the relation of the particular act to that whole may also be false. But this does not affect the truth that in his judgments, whether they be speculative or ethical, he is employing ideals and presenting them to himself at the time as absolute. Indeed, this is the very act of judgment, this reference of the part to the ideal, this employment of the system of experience upon the particular fact. He must presume the validity of his ideal in order to judge, and cannot call a thing true or false, right or wrong, except on that presumption. He may, no doubt, be aware, in the very act of judging, that his criterion may be false; but in that case his judgment is inconclusive, and the distinctions he draws are tentative. But even then he does not forego the use of the conception of an experience that is absolute; for it is only in relation to that conception that he presents his immediate criterion as hypothetical, and withholds himself from a conclusive judgment.

This process is, perhaps, most clearly illustrated in the methods employed by the natural sciences, to which a passing reference has already been made. Prior to the formation of a hypothesis—such as that of the three dimensional space by the geometrician, or the transmutation of energy by the physicist, or the evolution by the biologist—there is, in



truth, no science, but only a collection of loosely similar and indefinitely suggestive facts. When the hypothesis is formed it presents itself to the investigator as the rational ground, or universal law, which shall bind all the facts together into one consistent whole, by representing them as instances of that law. That hypothesis, so long as it is so employed, is held to be true, and is spoken of as "applied to the facts" as if its truth were fixed and unalterable. As a matter of fact, however, the hypothesis is itself on its trial throughout the whole process. It is referred to facts, no less than are the facts to it. With every fresh application to a new phenomenon it gains wider significance and becomes a richer hypothesis; while, at the same time, the facts gain a new significance in being interpreted as expressions of the general law. Facts and hypothesis are thus, in strictness, only abstractions which have *no* meaning apart; the meaning comes when the fact is found to exemplify the hypothesis and the hypothesis to be embodied in the fact. Truth, in other words, is a system, in which the universal and particular, the one and the many, meet and interpenetrate in the concrete individual.

The hypothesis of the unity of the whole of experience, or the absolute, upon which our intellectual life as a whole rests, does not differ in these respects from that of the special sciences. Indeed, it would not be difficult to show that, indirectly and remotely, but quite necessarily, this wider ideal of an all-comprehensive or absolute system underlies the investigation in the particular field. It is with this hypothesis of an absolutely coherent experience that intellectual life begins, and it moves within and exists to verify it. Unlike a scientific hypothesis, it cannot be rejected in favour of another hypothesis, for to give up the ideal of intellectual coherence is to cease to form judgments or to endeavour to know. Only absolute scepticism could do this; and absolute scepticism is the self-contradiction, and therefore the cessation, of thought itself. But in another respect this permanent hypothesis is in constant process of change. Poor in content,

and incoherent at first, with few distinctions and these confused, few facts to interpret and shallow similarities to connect them, it is "applied to facts,"—to facts presumed to be already within its province, and which, therefore, are at once new and old,—and in the application it itself comes to signify more. The "application" is never complete, and in that respect the "facts" are only "appearances," and the hypothesis only possibly true. But, on the other hand, every advance in knowledge, in any department, is a fresh ratification of it; and there arises a more competent representation of the world of reality as a coherent whole. So long as there are any facts not yet known in their context, so long the Absolute of knowledge remains, in a sense, a hypothesis; and this will be so long as man is man, whose law is not finality but progress. But, on the other hand, it is a hypothesis whose truth is implied throughout the movement, and without which no single step can be taken, and whose truth is held to be explicit and actually experienced in all that we regard as true. It is therefore more than a hypothesis; it is an absolute postulate.

The same line of argument is applicable to morality and the other supreme forms of human experience; but we cannot pursue it here. They all rest upon and move within their respective ideals, and these ideals are absolute. And if, on the one hand, the very fact that the ideals of our intellectual, moral, and religious life are all-comprehensive, prevents them to the end from being fully verified in experience, on the other hand, experience is nothing but a continuous demonstration of their validity. In one respect they are less secure than the hypotheses of the particular sciences; for there will always remain apparent accidents not reducible to any law we know, and wrongs that we cannot right nor harmonise with the conception of a God who in all His ways is perfect. But, in another and a far deeper respect, their security is indefinitely greater; for they are not only ratified by the experience of mankind as it grows in its knowledge of the good and the true,



they are essential conditions of that experience. Neither the sceptic nor any other has any truth he can set against them, and even in negating them he must presuppose their validity.

Scepticism as directed against the objects of the religious consciousness has owed its success to the fact that it was allowed to distinguish between these objects, as absolute, and those of our ordinary intellectual and moral experience, as relative. And the defenders of religion have too often played into its hands by endeavouring to represent religious phenomena as unique, or as constituting some higher order, which human reason could neither deny nor demonstrate. Of such a debate there can only be one issue; for in defending religion on this ground, its friends have given away its contents and retained for themselves only the empty shell of the Unknown and Unknowable, which is neither a possible nor a worthy object of worship, and has no claim to be called God. But if it can be shown that reason, in its speculative and moral use, rests upon the same presupposition as religion; if our intellectual and moral experience as a whole is a progressive proof that this presupposition is valid; if, above all, the very possibility of any intellectual act, however primitive, and of any moral good, however rudimentary, implies the conception of an absolute truth and absolute goodness as their condition, then the destiny of religion will be identified with that of our life as rational beings. It cannot be denied without stultifying the intelligence, and therefore cannot be denied at all.

HENRY JONES.

GLASGOW.

## MR F. W. H. MYERS ON "HUMAN PERSONALITY AND ITS SURVIVAL OF BODILY DEATH."

G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D.,

Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of St Andrews.

THE Society for Psychical Research presents us with a mass of testimony to the occurrence of phenomena which seem to be discontinuous with ordinary experience as sifted and systematised by modern science. Their comparatively strange and isolated character constitutes an antecedent improbability which requires to be compensated by a very high degree of cogency in the evidence. But the evidence itself is weakened by the peculiar nature of the alleged phenomena to an extent difficult to estimate. Their discontinuity with ordinary experience precludes the application of most of the tests which corroborate or invalidate testimony to other occurrences. The facts investigated in a court of law are interwoven with a system of presuppositions, consequences, and implications yielding a wide field for "circumstantial" evidence. But the peculiarly isolated character of "psychical" phenomena reduces the range of circumstantial evidence for and against them within very narrow limits. In a law court my statement that *A* told me something at a certain date and place would be regarded as disproved if stronger evidence were produced to show that *A* was dead or fifty miles away from me at the time. But it would be a *petitio principii* to reason in this way against telepathy or communication from departed spirits.



It would seem, then, that it is of vital importance to psychical research to exhibit continuity between what are called "psychical" phenomena and the normal course of nature recognised as such by common sense and science. Mr Myers, in the present work, fully admits this, and he makes a sustained and strenuous attempt to meet the requirements of the case. He speaks with sympathy of those "resolute antagonists," who urge that "no new evidence can carry conviction to them unless it is *continuous* with old evidence." He himself "would not ask to stand with the theologian on the summit of a 'cloud-capt tower,' but rather on plain earth, at the measured base of a trigonometrical survey."

Taking Mr Myers at his word, I propose to inquire how far he is successful in showing that the alleged phenomena of telepathy, clairvoyance, haunted houses, communications from departed spirits, and so forth, are really of a piece with generally admitted facts of science.

His "measured base of a trigonometrical survey" seems to be found in such phenomena as dreams, hysteria, hypnosis, genius, and the various forms of mental disintegration. These and allied phases of mental life have so much in common, according to Mr Myers, that they all involve the presence and operation of what he calls the "Subliminal Self"; and he also holds that the presence and operation of the "Subliminal Self" pervades and unifies the phenomena in which the Society for Psychical Research is especially interested. It is the conception of the "Subliminal Self" which is to supply a principle of continuity between "psychical" phenomena and facts commonly recognised by psychologists and physiologists.

What, then, does Mr Myers mean by a "Subliminal Self"? To gain a clear understanding on this point it is necessary to dismiss the associations which have gathered round such phrases as the "threshold of consciousness" since the time of Herbart. The theory represented by Mr Myers diverges in a startling way from all the various forms of the doctrine of sub-conscious or unconscious mental states and processes which

have ever been current among psychologists. The theory has at least as much affinity with such conceptions as that of a tutelary genius or a guardian angel. The Subliminal Self is not to be identified with any organised system of mental traces or dispositions formed in the course of the conscious experience of the ordinary self or in the conscious experience of any other self analogous to the ordinary self in nature and in the conditions of its development. The Subliminal Self is rather to be conceived as a primary and independent stream of personal consciousness having its own separate system of mental traces and dispositions formed in the course of its own separate experience. "There is a continuous subliminal chain of memory (or more chains than one) involving just that kind of individual and persistent revival of old impressions and response to new ones, which we commonly call a Self" (vol. i. p. 1). So far from the Subliminal Self being in any sense derivative from the ordinary self or any self of the same kind, the reverse is supposed to be true. "I conceive also that no Self, of which we can here have cognisance, is in reality more than a fragment of a larger Self—revealed in a fashion at once shifting and limited through an organism not so framed as to afford its full manifestation" (vol. i. p. 15). Again, "the 'conscious self' of each of us, as we call it—the empirical, the supraliminal Self, as I should prefer to say—does not comprise the whole of the consciousness or of the faculty within us. There exists a more comprehensive consciousness, a profounder faculty, which for the most part remains potential only as regards the life of earth, but from which the consciousness and the faculty of earth-life are mere selections, and which reasserts itself in its plenitude after the liberating change of death."

The most distinctive feature of Mr Myers's view is to be found in this contrast between the earth-life and the life of a Subliminal Self. Any self which derives the material for its mental development from experience through its relation to its earthly environment—*e.g.*, in the way of ordinary sense-perception—is to that extent supraliminal and not subliminal.



The recognition of mental process taking place below the threshold of consciousness is in no way a distinctive feature of Mr Myers's theory. So much he has in common with modern psychologists generally. And modern psychologists also recognise the occasional occurrence of relatively discontinuous and separate streams of personal or quasi-personal consciousness connected with the same organism. But the meaning which they attach to the term subliminal is different, and they interpret the facts connected with the existence of relatively independent streams of consciousness in a different way.

Subliminal process, on the traditional view, is a constant and omnipresent factor in the development of our conscious life. The onward flow of thought depends in every moment of its course on the co-operation of an organised system of conditions which have indeed been formed in and through bygone conscious experience, but which are not themselves present to consciousness. Consider, for instance, the process of recollecting a name. The endeavour to recollect is a conscious process; but its success or failure depends on another factor. It depends on the trace or disposition formed in the course of previous conscious experience in which the name has occurred. Conditions connected with this trace or disposition determine whether the name will be recalled at once or after prolonged effort or not at all. It may happen that we fail to revive the name while we are trying to do so, and that it suddenly emerges into consciousness after an interval during which we have been occupied with other matters, or have been asleep. This implies that our conscious effort has set going a subliminal process which continues after the conscious effort has ceased. Now what holds good of the attempt to recall a name holds good throughout our mental life. Whether my thoughts come to me fast or slow, easily or with difficulty, they come to me only through the co-operation of subliminal condition. My conscious processes constantly set in operation processes beneath the threshold of consciousness, which in their turn give rise to new developments of conscious process. My conscious

activity is never the sole factor involved; it always makes appeal, so to speak, to something else, and awaits the result which may or may not be such as it requires. This general principle applies not only to what we commonly call memory; it is most important to bear in mind that subliminal process is equally essential to the emergence of relatively new ideal combinations. What has been said of recalling a name holds good, *mutatis mutandis*, of guessing a riddle, or inventing a tale, or solving a chess problem. In such cases, conscious endeavour to find an ideal combination which shall satisfy certain conditions serves only to set in operation subliminal processes which may or may not yield the required result. And here, also, the process may continue after the consciousness which prompted it has ceased. The ordinary man, no less than the man of genius, may find that what relatively to *him* are original ideas develop while his thoughts are occupied with disconnected topics, or even while he is asleep. In general, we take an utterly false view of mental construction when we regard it as a mere putting together of data already present to consciousness analogous to the putting together of the parts of a puzzle spread out on the table before us.

This account of the subliminal factor in mental life in no way involves a secondary personality or other self. But it affords a basis for interpreting the curious phenomena of double or multiple consciousness. The essential point of departure is the fact that not all the traces of past experiences are at the disposal of the conscious self, though they may none the less persist, and be revivable under certain conditions. In particular, there are certain variations in the general state of the organism which so affect the nervous system (or the soul) that experiences acquired in one state are not reproducible in the other. When a man is sober he is often unable to remember what he said or did when he was drunk. The experiences of the hypnotic trance are in most instances beyond the recall of the ordinary waking consciousness. The same holds good of somnambulism and allied states, and, to a great



extent, of ordinary dreams. A blow on the head may reduce a man to a condition of having to begin his education *de novo*, the trace of past experience serving only to accelerate the process. Or it may merely have the effect of barring the revival of what took place at the time of the accident and for some time before or after it. The next point to be noted is that the experiences of state *B*, which are not revivable in state *A*, may be revivable in recurrent states *B*<sub>1</sub>, *B*<sub>2</sub>, *B*<sub>3</sub> . . . . more or less akin to *B* and discontinuous with *A*. The experiences of the drunken man, which he cannot recall when he is sober, may be revivable when he is drunk again. My forgotten dream of last night may be repeated and continued when I dream again to-night. The sleep-walker who knows nothing, when he is awake, of what he did in his sleep, may, on a recurrence of his somnambulism, pursue a train of thought from the point where it was broken off on a previous occasion, just as if nothing had happened in the interval. Similarly the experiences of a hypnotic trance which are obliterated from the memory of the waking consciousness are in general revivable in similar phases of subsequent hypnotic trances.

Now this is all we require to conceive the possibility of alternating personalities. Suppose a series of states *A*<sub>1</sub>, *A*<sub>2</sub>, *A*<sub>3</sub>, etc., each separated from its successor by a corresponding member of an intercurrent series *B*<sub>1</sub>, *B*<sub>2</sub>, *B*<sub>3</sub>, etc. If each series is sufficiently continuous within itself, in the sense defined, and if each series is in the sense defined sufficiently discontinuous with the other, the result will be two distinct and relatively independent streams of personal or quasi-personal consciousness. It may even be natural, for social purposes, to call them by different proper names. They may even regard each other as distinct persons. All this may be brought under the general conception of the more or less complete functional detachment of systems of mental dispositions formed in the ordinary way of "earthly" experience. Cases of the simultaneous duplication of consciousness are a little more surprising. But they can easily be

brought under the same general conception. We have only to think of functionally detached systems of dispositions operating in relative independence at the same time, each being corrected with its own distinct stream of consciousness.

This interpretation of the facts is fundamentally diverse from that of Mr Myers. It presupposes no ultimate source of material for mental development other than "earthly" experience, and no forms or laws of mental process other than those recognised by ordinary psychology. The theory of the "Subliminal Self," on the contrary, is akin to the conception of a tutelary genius or guardian angel. According to it, the various, relatively independent, streams of consciousness which may arise in connexion with the same bodily organism are all partial manifestations or revelations of a single "deeper" personality related to an environment other than this common world.

The "Subliminal Self," according to Mr Myers, is the unifying principle of "psychical" phenomena. On this assumption, if he can show that the "Subliminal Self" is implied in admitted facts of ordinary experience, he will have shown an important continuity between psychical phenomena and ordinary experience. This is the line of argument which he actually follows, and we have now to examine its cogency.

In Chapter II. of the first volume, Mr Myers treats generally of such "disintegrations of personality" as occur in hysteria. It is not clear to me whether or not he supposes this chapter to contain an argument in favour of his central thesis. He does, indeed, constantly use the phrase "Subliminal Self" or "Subliminal Selves," wherever there is evidence of a stream of consciousness distinct from that which is identified with the ordinary self. But I find no reasons assigned for the hypothesis that these secondary selves are manifestations of the one primordial, unearthly personality of the Subliminal Self. The conception of functionally detached systems of mental disposition seems to be congruent with all the facts, however much it leaves to be explained in detail. On the other hand, the



secondary selves, in general, fail to show distinctive peculiarities such as might be expected were they generated as Mr Myers assumes them to be. They show no indications of their supposed origin in a deeper personality related to an environment which is not of earth. They are only unusually poor specimens of earthly selves, deriving the material for their development from experiences of an ordinary kind. Mr Myers refers to the occasional occurrence of hyperæsthesia in hysterical patients as a confirmation of his view (vol. I. pp. 66 and 240). Now, it is part of his doctrine that the ordinary self is a portion of the total psychical being which has been specially selected and trained to respond to the earthly environment. It is therefore difficult to understand why it should be inferior to the Subliminal Self in acuteness of vision, touch, or hearing. In any case, the occurrence of hyperæsthesia is easily accounted for from the point of view of ordinary physiology and psychology.

In Chapter III. it is argued that what we call *genius* must be regarded as a manifestation of the Subliminal Self, partially interpenetrating ordinary consciousness. What is supposed to be distinctive of this intervention of the Subliminal Self is its adaptation to the requirements of "supraliminal" thought. Genius is, on this view, a "power of appropriating the results of subliminal mentation," so as to subserve the interests of the ordinary self. An "inspiration of Genius" is a "*subliminal uprush*, an emergence into the current of ideas which the man is consciously manipulating of other ideas which he has not consciously originated, but which have shaped themselves beyond his will, in profounder regions of his being." Such "subliminal uprushes" are definitely contrasted with "supraliminal mentation," which is credited with a larger "proportion of practical human achievement." Now, if this contrast be understood, in a certain sense, it cannot be maintained. I have already urged that all mental construction as well as all mental reproduction essentially involves the co-operation of processes which go on below the threshold of consciousness,

and also that processes may develop themselves when the conscious activity which initiates them is discontinued. There is in this no distinctive characteristic of genius, and, so far as I can see, no indication of the presence and operation of the Subliminal Self. Otherwise I should have regarded this article of mine as dictated by *my* tutelary genius, co-operating in an argument against his own existence. The mental constructions required to constitute cogent evidence of the intervention of the Subliminal Self must have other characteristics peculiar to themselves. They must present a discontinuity otherwise inexplicable with the previous mental life of the person in whose consciousness they arise. But the facts point in the opposite direction. The achievements of genius are through and through conditioned by the circumstances, the social environment, and the education of the individual, together with his special interests and propensities. Newton in the time of Roger Bacon would not have discovered the law of gravitation. Shakespeare in the age of Pericles would not have written such a play as Hamlet. Finally, there is more truth than Mr Myers will allow in the saying that genius is an "infinite capacity for taking pains." There is no high genius without extraordinary capacity for intense and sustained mental activity, which is sometimes very painful, though it may in the main be a source of the keenest pleasure.

In Chapter IV., sleep and dreams are treated as manifestations of the Subliminal Self. Mr Myers begins by laying stress on the ignorance of physiologists concerning the nature of sleep, the conditions of its genesis, and its recuperative effects. Now, it is true that a competent physiologist will be likely to aver that little is known concerning these matters. But I venture to assert that, in making such statements, the physiologist has in mind a far higher standard of what constitutes knowledge than that entertained by Mr Myers. Certainly he would regard the reference to the hypothetical agency called the "Subliminal Self" as an addition to his ignorance rather than to



his knowledge. To his ignorance of the precise nature of certain physiological changes would be added the incomparably denser ignorance of the nature of the supposed agency and of its *modus operandi*. The suggestion that the recuperative effect of sleep is due to something which pumps into the organism "a fuller influx of vital energy," would strike him as infantile. Mr Myers adduces the fact that even a brief slumber may be very refreshing. But there is no reason why an important physiological change should not take place in a short time. It is indeed somewhat perplexing that a change which most frequently requires hours for its development should occasionally be effected in a few minutes. But how does Mr Myers himself deal with this problem from his own point of view?

Dreams, according to Mr Myers, are constituted by the partial emergence of what he calls "subliminal mentation" above the threshold. Though he does not explicitly say so in the chapter on Sleep, it is plain that this is his explanation of dreams in general, and not merely of certain exceptional phenomena of dream-consciousness. Reserving general criticism of the theory, we shall begin by examining the value of the special arguments which are adduced to support it.

Mr Myers makes much of the fact that experiences are frequently revived in dreams which are beyond the recall of the normal waking self. According to him, this is to be accounted for by assuming such experiences to be retained in the memory of the Subliminal Self which recalls them while we sleep, and communicates them to our dream-consciousness. Such surmises are completely gratuitous. Ordinary physiology and psychology find here no special difficulty, though they must, of course, confess much ignorance. The general state of the organism and especially of the nervous system differs widely in sleep from its state in normal wakefulness. We should therefore expect the excitability of the traces of past experience to be differently conditioned. There is no

presumption in favour of the exclusive revival of those experiences which can be recalled in our ordinary waking life. On the contrary, the affinity of sleep to the hypnotic trance and allied states is a condition favourable to the reproduction of experiences connected with these; and the affinity of one sleeping state with others is favourable to the revival of previous dream-experiences. In general, the mental organisation of the waking self being, to a large extent, dissolved in dreams, the limitations imposed by it are removed; and both the relative excitability of mental traces and their actual stimulation depend on many and fluctuating conditions which in part operate in a detached and irregular way. The flow of consciousness is indeed constantly determined by laws of association, etc. But, in most cases, it spreads somewhat like a flame in a pile of fuel in which the parts are inflammable in very varying degrees, and in this respect very irregularly arranged, and also liable to be ignited from outside in different places. The resulting mental processes unify themselves as best they can, in accordance with normal psychological laws, often generating strangely novel combinations. Of course, dreams are not necessarily incoherent. Isolated wakefulness may affect a whole system of dispositions having an internal unity and continuity of its own. In such cases it is natural to expect a heightening of faculty above the level of waking life. The very isolation of the mental activity ought to give it an important advantage. For it is not subject to competition, interference, or contest from concurrent conscious processes. Hence we should expect it to develop itself with exceptional intensity and fulness. As a matter of fact, in some very rare instances, a man has achieved, while dreaming, intellectual performances, equalling or perhaps surpassing the best of which he was capable in waking life. Such cases are adduced by Mr Myers in support of his peculiar thesis. But they really do not bring any grist to his mill. On the ordinary view, the only difficulty, if there be one, is that they occur so rarely, not that they occur at all. It is still easier to dispose of the



somnambulist who "walks on perilous ridges with steady feet." If the perilous ridge were only a few inches above the ground, any waking person could do the same. It is the sense of peril—of the giddy height—which creates the difficulty. But the whole attention of the somnambulist is concentrated on the matter in hand. Whatever is irrelevant to the development of his dream is non-existent for him. He has no sense of peril or of the giddy height.

The peculiar vividness sometimes found in dream-imagery is in part explicable on similar lines. The dream images have the field to themselves, and can therefore develop with special intensity and distinctness, provided that other conditions are not unfavourable. Besides this, we must also take account of the fact that in dreams actual sensory stimulations are commonly operative, due partly to processes going on within the organism and partly to external impressions on the organs of sense. It is also probable that the nature and distribution of the blood-supply may have an exciting effect on the nervous tissues. Finally, it is from the nature of the case very likely that there are other obscure physiological conditions at work which cannot be at present defined.

As the present issue is the continuity of dream-life in general with what are called distinctively "psychical" phenomena, we need not here concern ourselves with the testimony adduced by Mr Myers to the occurrence of "telæsthesia," telepathy, clairvoyance, etc., in connexion with dreams. Such phenomena may or may not really be found, and they may or may not involve the agency of the Subliminal Self. But these questions are irrelevant when what we have to determine is whether the agency of the Subliminal Self is implied in ordinarily admitted facts concerning dream-consciousness.

I have tried to show that Mr Myers has failed to produce cogent evidence in favour of this conclusion. I would now urge, that his whole theory is vitiated by an intrinsic weakness which seems fatal to its claims. As Mr Myers himself

admits, the usual incoherence of dreams is an objection to regarding them as manifestations of a stream of thought equal or superior in systematic complexity and continuity to that of the waking self. This difficulty cannot be met by saying that the manifestations are merely scattered fragments of the contents of subliminal consciousness. For the incoherence of dreams is not mere fragmentariness. Very frequently it includes what the waking consciousness recognises as positive absurdity and inconsistency of the most glaring kind. Hence, Mr Myers is compelled to have recourse to an expedient which I must call desperate. He surmises that the Subliminal Self includes several distinct layers or "strata" of mental life. Some strata are supposed to have the incoherence of dreams, and it is these which we are supposed to "tap" in our own dream consciousness. In other words, Mr Myers assumes dreams in order to explain dreams. He assumes dreams about which we know nothing in order to explain dreams whose conditions are partially known and are capable of being further investigated on the lines followed by ordinary science. And there is really no disease which demands any such heroic remedy. For the hypothetical dreams of the Subliminal Self are just of the kind which would be formed by elaboration, according to ordinary psychological laws and forms of process, of material derived from the past experience of the ordinary self or other "earthly" streams of consciousness.

This difficulty reappears in an intensified form when we consider the application of the general theory to hypnotism, which is expounded at great length in Chapter V. In ordinary dreams the Subliminal Self is supposed to manifest itself spontaneously. Hypnosis, on the other hand, is distinctively characterised by the opportunities which it offers for experimentally raising "subliminal mentation" above the threshold. Suggestion is defined a "successful appeal to the Subliminal Self." Now the absurdities and incoherences of ordinary dreams are found also in the hypnotic trance; and we need not repeat here the argument used above. But I must point



out that the part played by the hypnotiser in experimentally evoking the various phases of the hypnotic dream constitutes an additional difficulty. At the suggestion of the hypnotiser, his subject takes vinegar for wine, or sees a cat where there is no cat, or believes himself to be Napoleon or a snake, and acts accordingly. What can be meant by saying that the process of suggestion consists in evoking the thoughts of the Subliminal Self into supraliminal consciousness? Are we to suppose that the Subliminal Self is having or has had the experiences of taking vinegar for wine, or of believing itself to be a snake, and that all which suggestion effects is to bring these experiences above the threshold? This would presuppose a very wonderful pre-established harmony between the casual whims of the hypnotiser and the mental processes of the Subliminal Self of the hypnotised subject. But if we are to avoid this glaring absurdity, what alternative is there? I can only think of one. In order to explain hypnotism, we must presuppose that the Subliminal Self is hypnotised and subject to suggestions, and we must assume, in addition, that the thoughts, etc. suggested primarily to it are then evoked into supraliminal consciousness. This involves the same circle we have previously referred to, and the same attempt to explain the partially known by the totally unknown.

And here also there is no excuse for so desperate a leap in the dark. Setting aside alleged cases of telepathy, clairvoyance, etc., hypnosis presents no phenomena so extraordinary as to justify our regarding them as beyond the reach of explanation in accordance with the ordinary methods and principles of physiology and psychology. The way is dark, but it is not blocked by insurmountable barriers. We need not have recourse to a flying-machine.

The hypnotic trance is essentially akin to ordinary sleep, and especially to somnambulism, though there are well-marked differences. The difference most important for our present purpose is that the dream consciousness of the hypnotised subject is, to a very large extent, under the control of another

person. The sleep is so induced that if the patient remains awake to anything, he remains awake to the bodily presence, words, and actions of the hypnotiser. The hypnotiser is the persistent and dominating centre and source of his dreams. While the total system of mental dispositions is otherwise unexcited and unexcitable, or comparatively so, fragmentary and, so to speak, localised excitations may be set going from this centre. And in the more or less complete absence of competition, conflict, or interference from other concurrent and coalescent conscious processes, these "suggestions" have the field to themselves, and are therefore enabled to develop with abnormal intensity and fulness. This holds of negative as well as positive suggestions. If it is suggested that a cat is present where there is no cat, the patient will have the vivid dream-image of a cat, and will believe in its actual existence, or at least act as if he did so. Inversely if it is suggested that there is no cat when there actually is a cat, the perception of the cat will be excluded from the dream-consciousness, or, at any rate, will be inoperative in determining its development and the actions connected with it. The sensory stimulus operates, and may give rise to sensation, and perhaps even to perception; but the perception either fails to enter into the stream of dream-consciousness at all, or at least fails to influence its course in an appreciable way.

To complete this broad and schematic account of hypnosis we have only to add that the hypnotiser may sometimes by a suitable procedure prolong the effect of certain suggestions after the trance in general has ceased and given place to waking consciousness. He does this by making the additional suggestion that the subject shall remember what he has been told after he has been awakened. When the experiment is successful, the result is that the particular group of dispositions affected continues to be specially excitable after the trance has ceased, and in such a way that it comes into action when appropriate occasion arises. The corresponding mental processes may either enter into the content of waking conscious-



ness or may merely modify its development without actually becoming part of it.

It must be frankly admitted that both in this post-hypnotic suggestion, as it is called, and in other facts connected with hypnosis, there is very much that is for us, in the present state of our knowledge, exceedingly obscure and ill-defined. But the difficulties do not seem to be such as positively to preclude explanation on some such lines as I have roughly indicated. It is for Myers to show that his "Subliminal Self" is necessary to make the facts intelligible.

His case seems to rest mainly on the curative and recuperative effects of hypnotic suggestion. He holds that these can only be explained by assuming "some energy" to be added, though in an irregular fashion, to both organic and psychical operations. This energy is supposed to be "indrawn" from the "metetherial environment" of the "Subliminal Self." But, as a matter of fact, it would seem that the therapeutic operation of hypnotic suggestion presents no difficulties which demand so strange and far-fetched a hypothesis to mitigate them. Consider first the "reintegration of multiplex personality." The malady in this case is mental disintegration. There are two or more distinct streams of consciousness connected respectively with systems of mental dispositions which are functionally discontinuous with each other. In the hypnotic trance these systems are dissolved, and with their dissolution the general conditions of reproduction and association are altered. The functional discontinuity between the traces of past experience is more or less completely abolished, so that reconstruction becomes possible. To use a rough metaphor, the type is broken up and may be re-arranged. Take next a case of moral cure, *e.g.*, of drunkenness. If you tell a drunkard under ordinary conditions that whiskey is poisonous or disagreeable, your words will probably produce no appreciable effect. But the same statement made by a hypnotiser to his suggestible subject will give the corresponding ideas relatively uncontrolled dominance and a peculiar intensity and

fulness of development. The subject will believe or at any rate proceed as if he believed whiskey to be poisonous or disagreeable. And there is nothing especially mysterious in the fact that the advantage thus gained may sometimes and in very varying degrees be utilised, by means of post-hypnotic suggestions, to influence the course of waking life. The production of analgesia by suggestion is equally intelligible, apart from the "Subliminal Personality." Pain is essentially correlated with a certain state of the nervous system. Now, according to any current view of the connection between mental process and nervous process, the full development of the idea of not feeling pain will be accompanied by a different and incompatible state of the nervous system. Thus the hypnotic suggestion of analgesia must tend to produce analgesia, including the non-appearance of those organic accompaniments of pain which are conditioned by neural functions. It may seem surprising that in some cases the operation of suggestion should be so powerful. But in reality this is no stranger than the similar effect of morphia, chloroform, or cocaine. Finally, we have to consider generally the effect of suggestion on such organic processes as the circulation of the blood and the secretions. Here we have to bear in mind that the nervous system is an integral part of the organism in dynamical relation to the other parts. In ultimate principle, there is no more difficulty in the influence of ideas and beliefs on the vaso-motor system or the secretions than in their influence on the voluntary muscles. In fact, the difference is only one of degree. It is matter of everyday experience that ideas and beliefs determine other organic change than ordinary muscular contractions. Further, their efficacy in this respect is greater in proportion to their unchecked dominance and intensity. But the ideas suggested in the hypnotic subject possess in a special degree unchecked dominance and intensity. Hence they are especially effective in determining organic changes.

The result of this long discussion is that the "Subliminal Self" is not implied in the generally admitted phenomena of



multiplex personality, genius, sleep, dreams, somnambulism, and hypnosis. It cannot, therefore, constitute a continuous connection between these and alleged cases of telæsthesia, telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, communication from departed spirits, etc. We may now inquire whether it forms a principle of unity connecting with each other the several diverse groups of those phenomena which are distinctively called "psychical," presumably because they especially interest the Society for Psychical Research. On this point I can afford to be very brief. If my previous contention is justified we know nothing of the existence of the "Subliminal Self" independently of "psychical" phenomena. And when we turn to these, it seems to be a mere assumption, that any of them depends on the existence and operation of this tutelary genius. Granting that telepathy, clairvoyance, and so forth, actually occur, and that they imply a soul separable from the body (or, at least, from the "gross" body), it by no means follows that the mental life of this soul is "in each of us" split into two primarily distinct and discontinuous streams of personal consciousness, one specially concerned with an earthly and the other with an unearthly environment. But if the Subliminal Self is neither known otherwise nor implied in the nature of the "psychical" occurrences it is plain that it can supply no real principle of unity. The attempted unification is verbal merely. It consists in referring the various groups of occurrences to a purely hypothetical and otherwise unknown agent. I must, however, add that, apart from this futile hypothesis, Mr Myers seems to me to have been in some measure successful in exhibiting affinity between the several classes of "psychical" phenomena. The conception which has been really useful to him is that of telepathy. Given that communication takes place between individual minds unmediated by ordinary physical conditions, we may regard intercourse with departed spirits as a special case of the same kind of process. And clairvoyance, precognition, etc. may perhaps be referred to telepathic communion either with

departed spirits or with other intelligences superior to the human ; or they may be considered as sometimes involving a relation between knower and thing known analogous to telepathic connection. This is all very obscure and conjectural. But it seems a more hopeful mode of treating the question than any which is based on the hypothesis of the existence of the Subliminal Self.

The reader will no doubt expect from me some attempt at a general estimate of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence accumulated by the Society for Psychical Research and partly reproduced by Mr Myers in these volumes. On this subject I have certainly no claim to speak as an expert. I approach it, therefore, with much diffidence, contenting myself with a brief indication of my own personal attitude. It seems to me that, after all criticisms are allowed for, the evidence is still decidedly impressive, and that it is sufficient to constitute a good case for further investigation. But I am not convinced by it, even as regards telepathy. I admit that the results of some of the recorded experiments in thought transference cannot be explained as due either to coincidence or to fraud. But I cannot regard them as showing unambiguously the existence of a mode of communication between mind and mind radically different in its nature from communication through the ordinary channels of sense. An ultimate explanation may reasonably be looked for in the hyperæsthesia which is not an infrequent feature of states akin to the hypnotic trance. And this explanation is, I think, rendered peculiarly probable by Lehmann's experiments on "unconscious whispering." We must also remember how inexplicable "muscle reading" performances appeared before the actual process was known. There is no reason why the slight sensory indications operative in so called thought transference should be exclusively muscular or auditory. And it is quite probable psychologically that such sensory indications may operate without being discerned by the person whom they influence. Finally, hyperæsthesia and thought transference



are not initially on the same level as principles of explanation. Its continuity with the general system of knowledge constitutes a strong initial presumption in favour of hyperæsthesia.

The other evidence presented to us is permeated by inherent weaknesses for which it is very difficult to make proper allowance. I have already referred to those connected with the peculiarly isolated character of the alleged occurrences within the general system of our experience. Another arises from the relative disconnection of the several groups of phenomena with each other; for this involves a number of distinct improbabilities instead of one. And it is no satisfactory cure for this evil to accept some and reject others; for they all appear to be supported by a considerable body of essentially the same sort of testimony. Another most important source of weakness is found in the connexion of psychical phenomena with mental states which are abnormal in the sense of being discontinuous with ordinary waking consciousness. In the first place, an otherwise honest person may be quite untrustworthy under abnormal conditions. As ordinarily known to his friends, he may be highly respectable and honourable, and yet he may be very capable of fraud, falsehood, and evasion in a trance or *quasi*-trance. In the second place, the experiences of abnormal states are often quite beyond the recall of the waking consciousness, or, if they are remembered at all, the memory of them is peculiarly apt to disappear with the lapse of time. This constitutes a special drawback in all alleged cases of a person in an abnormal state displaying knowledge which he has not acquired in the way of ordinary experience. On such a point, it is quite unsafe to trust the memory of the person himself. He cannot even be relied on for remembering whether or not or how often he has been in an "abnormal" state before. The absence of experiences which could have supplied or suggested the knowledge shown by him must be inferred from the general circumstances of the case; and such inference is commonly very precarious. In the third place, the same discontinuity with normal mental life which tends to

produce forgetfulness is and must be a prolific source of unconscious falsification of memory. Even under normal conditions, the testimony of honest witnesses frequently contains important inaccuracies on points concerning which they themselves appear to feel quite confident. When such falsification of memory is favoured by special conditions, it is evident that we ought to be very slow to accept testimony to occurrences otherwise highly improbable. This difficulty especially affects instances of alleged coincidence between actual events and dreams or hallucinations. For full satisfaction we need in such case a very precise and full written record of the dream or hallucination certified by independent witnesses to have been made immediately after its occurrence.

Reasons of this kind lead me to adopt an attitude of suspended judgment in regard to "psychical" phenomena. I am not myself clear as to the degree of my scepticism, or what evidence would be sufficient to remove it. But, at least, my doubt is not dogmatic denial, and I agree with Mr Myers that there is no sufficient reason for being peculiarly sceptical concerning communications from departed spirits. I also agree with him that the alleged cases of such communication cannot be with any approach to probability explained away as mere instances of telepathy.

In conclusion, I would express the hope that nothing I have said will be interpreted as implying a hostile attitude towards Psychical Research. In criticising the theory of the Subliminal Self, I seem to myself to be doing it a service. For an investigation which aims at being really scientific ought to be definitely disentangled from a hypothesis so baseless, futile, and incoherent as I hold this to be.

G. F. STOUT.

UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS.



## BABYLON AND THE BIBLE.

THE REV. CANON T. K. CHEYNE, D.LITT., D.D.

IF it is true that great changes are passing over our conception of the Old Testament—changes compared with which those connected with mere literary criticism are but trifling—and that it can be said with some apparent plausibility that the Old Testament study is becoming a dependency of Assyriology, it cannot be a matter of indifference to find out the workers who are best able to cope with the difficulties of the situation. Let us at least know where we are, and whether this plausible statement is a truth or an error or an exaggeration, so that we may adjust ourselves to the new facts, and find in them what compensations we may. Those of us who have been trained in the old-fashioned methods of Biblical criticism, almost as much as the public in general, need guidance and direction. They seem to want men who, without making a complete break with the earlier criticism, can recognise the new problems which present themselves, and make them intelligible to students of the Bible, and also make genuine even if imperfect contributions to their solution. Not only a wide range of technical scholarship but clearness of vision and fertility of resource are demanded, for it is becoming more and more manifest that many parts of the Old Testament study have to be to a large extent reconstructed. Unfortunately the ideal representative of the newest criticism—great alike in philology, in historical insight, and in the disengaging of ideas from strange and unfamiliar integuments—cannot as yet be found. Achilles

has not yet put on his armour, and we are dependent on special workers whose inevitable limitations may sometimes provoke us, but who nevertheless, by what seems one of the laws of human progress, supplement and correct one another.

One of the workers in this new field—the reform of the Old Testament study—is a scholar in whom for his own as well as for his father's sake all who care for Biblical or Semitic researches cannot fail to be interested—Prof. Friedrich Delitzsch. As his father's son, he was bound to be in some sense a critical Hebraist, though his criticism and exegesis (as his recent work on the Book of Job<sup>1</sup> shows) are not in all respects progressive; in a word, he is not very friendly or respectful to textual criticism.<sup>2</sup> His promised new Hebrew-Aramaic Dictionary to the Old Testament has not yet got beyond the Prolegomena (Leipzig, 1886), but these Prolegomena are rich in suggestions, always new and sometimes even startling, and in his excellent work on the site of Paradise he has stated his own solution of one of the knotty problems arising out of the parallelisms between Israelitish and Babylonian myths.<sup>3</sup> If we also consider the leading position of Delitzsch as an Assyriologist, we shall not think it strange that when an attempt had to be made to break down academical and ecclesiastical conservatism, he felt himself the man for the task. The opportunity was provided by two lectures which Delitzsch had to deliver before the *Deutsche Orientgesellschaft* in the presence of its imperial “protector,” the first on January 13th (this was repeated on February 1st), 1902, and the second on January 12th, 1903.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Das Buch Hiob neu übersetzt und kurz erklärt. Ausgabe mit sprachlichem Kommentar.* Leipzig, 1902.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2. The preface is full of interest even for those who disagree with it. Cp. Delitzsch's *Babel und Bibel*, p. 167.

<sup>3</sup> *Wo lag das Paradies* (1881), pp. 93, 96.

<sup>4</sup> English readers of Delitzsch's lectures will naturally use the translation edited and introduced by Mr Johns, Lecturer on Assyriology at Cambridge, and published by Messrs Williams & Norgate under the faithfully reproduced title, *Babel and Bible* (1903). They will perhaps derive most profit from the notes, which are not the writer's (as the reviewer in the *Athenæum* supposes), but the author's.



As a society, the *Orientgesellschaft* has, of course, no views on Biblical criticism, but, naturally, it left Delitzsch quite free to express his own personal opinions on the relation between the Old Testament and Assyriological facts. The result is too well known to need long narration. The general public, much less accustomed than our own to the current results of Assyriology, became excited, some persons even hoping for a new church-reformation as the consequence of wonderful discoveries credited—strange to say—to Delitzsch. We may be sure that a more sober view of the situation will quickly follow in Germany, but we in England can hardly recognise Delitzsch as a leader until he finds time to provide for a more serious stratum of the public, and accompanies the instruction that he has to give with more connected arguments.

Another eminent Assyriologist who would have at least equal claims with Delitzsch to leadership is Prof. Paul Haupt, formerly of Göttingen, and now of the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, U.S.A. He, certainly, would never condescend to sensationalism, nor would he be chary of historical proofs and arguments. In some degree indeed he is a leader, but his writings on the relations between the Old Testament and Assyriology are scattered in divers periodicals,<sup>1</sup> and a visible thread of connection is wanting. Moreover, Prof. Haupt's activity is so varied, and his capacity for detailed technical scholarship is so extraordinary, that one would prefer to wait patiently until the series called *Sacred Books of the Old Testament* is complete, and until the new Semitic Department at Johns Hopkins University is less in need of the guiding hand of its distinguished founder.

There remain two more highly qualified workers, one of whom has but recently come forward with connected contributions to the reform of the Old Testament study, while the

<sup>1</sup> For references to these writings see the notes appended to *Bible and Babel*, by Paul Haupt, in the *Johns Hopkins University Circulars*, June 1903. The results of these writings are given in the text of the article, which is a refutation, based upon personal work, of the erroneous idea that a Babylonian origin of much that is contained in the Bible is novel.

other has long been proving his capacity as a fearless champion—these are Heinrich Zimmern and Hugo Winckler. It is of the latter that I must speak first and chiefly, in continuation of words spoken in this JOURNAL (July 1903, p. 754), and in an article called “A Turning-point in Old Testament Study,” in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, Jan. 1903, pp. 60–70. It is about ten years that Winckler has been before the public as a searcher into “Biblical antiquity” (if the convenient phrase may be allowed), and he has not escaped hard blows from conservative and moderate critics, and from the versatile Mr Andrew Lang, in the *Pilot*. Winckler, however, is not discouraged by these rebuffs, and no one can fail to see that his influence is slowly but steadily growing. His discovery of the N. Arabian land of Muṣri in the Old Testament has been more or less fully admitted, first, by writers in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*,<sup>1</sup> then by Guthe,<sup>2</sup> Gunkel,<sup>3</sup> and L. B. Paton,<sup>4</sup> to the benefit of history and exegesis. Even that great stumbling-block of old-fashioned Hebraists—the theory that mythology supplies the essence of the earlier figures in the Old Testament portrait gallery—has received a large measure of approval both from an orthodox Lutheran pastor who is also a well-equipped Assyriologist, Alfred Jeremias,<sup>5</sup> and from a learned American archæologist, G. A. Barton.<sup>6</sup> Lastly, Wilhelm Erbt, the writer of an acute investigation of the Biblical Purim-legend, and of an equally keen article on Tobit in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, is engaged, he says, at present in

<sup>1</sup> See “Exodus, The,” “Egypt, River of,” “Isaac,” “Jarha,” “Jerahmeel,” “Kadesh,” “Kenites,” “Meroz,” “Mizraim,” “Negeb,” “Solomon,” “Tahtim-hodshi,” “Zarephath.”

<sup>2</sup> *Geschichte des Volkes Israel* (Freiburg i. B., 1899), pp. 149, 201.

<sup>3</sup> *Genesis*, 2nd ed., Göttingen, 1902, pp. 168, 199, 203 (very tentative).

<sup>4</sup> *Syria and Palestine* (London, 1902), p. 185.

<sup>5</sup> *Im Kampfe um Babel und Bibel*, Leipzig, 1903.

<sup>6</sup> *A Sketch of Semitic Origins* (New York, 1902), pp. 289 f. “Winckler has with much acuteness shown that many of the traditions of patriarchal Israel go back to myths of Tammuz and Ashtoreth. No doubt in his application of this solution to the period of David and after, he has applied his key where it is unnecessary, but many of his suggestions are exceedingly plausible.”



working in a limited section of the field on Winckler's lines,<sup>1</sup> and B. Baentsch, Siegfried's successor at Jena, confesses that he has seldom learned so much from any book as from Winckler's most recent work (to be referred to presently), especially on account of the author's keen historical insight.<sup>2</sup>

Still I think it necessary to return to Winckler in a friendly and yet critical spirit, (1) because his own distinctive point of view is so novel, and he is so apt to leap where feebler mortals walk, that explanations cannot be entirely superfluous; (2) because in my *Nineteenth Century* article the object of making one of Winckler's works better known in England obliged me for courtesy's sake to put my own views into the background; and (3) because he has lately brought his researches to a provisional close in Part I. of the new edition of Schrader's *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament*, referred to here as *KAT*<sup>(3)</sup>—i.e., ed. 3.<sup>3</sup> In this work, which Schrader was unhappily prevented by illness from rewriting himself, Winckler treats of the history of Israel in connection with the larger subject of the history and geography of Hither or Nearer Asia; if the results which he gives are largely his own, it is because no one else has as yet come forward with a completely critical history of Israel in its proper historical setting.

Here as elsewhere Winckler writes as one who is both a Hebraist and an Assyriologist, but it is the Babylonian and Assyrian inscriptions, and next the Tel el-Amarna letters and the Arabian monuments, which have given him his point of view. He admits indeed that in literary criticism he has

<sup>1</sup> *Die Sicherstellung des Monotheismus durch die Gesetzgebung im vorzivilischen Juda*. Göttingen, 1903, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Review of *Die Keilinschriften, etc., dritte Auflage, erste Hälfte*, in *Literarisches Centralblatt*, Feb. 1, 1903.

<sup>3</sup> I confess that in the interests of young students I wish that *KAT* could have appeared in two forms, (1) that used by Schrader himself—the form of notes on Biblical passages taken in order, and (2) that prepared in the interests of advanced students by Winckler and Zimmern.

learned much from men like Wellhausen and Stade, and in the earlier Arabic literature from men like Nöldeke and Wellhausen, but these very men he now criticises as not having moved on with the times, and expanded their too narrow point of view. He himself turns aside into literary criticism when his studies require this,<sup>1</sup> and has given considerable attention to the Arabic literature referred to, but he denies the possibility of writing a history of Israel on the basis of literary criticism, even with the aid of the Arabian poetry and of Wellhausen's *Reste Arabischen Heidentums* for the earlier period. He also objects to much modern exegesis (and exegesis is the necessary preliminary of criticism) because it takes little or no account of the Oriental *Weltanschauung*, and consequently too often in a certain sense rationalizes. A rationalistic tendency, according to him, is conspicuous in Stade's treatment of the traditional accounts of the origin of Israel,<sup>2</sup> and with regard to the prevalent views of old Arabian society and culture he maintains that the pre-Islamic poems handed down to us by Islamic editors cannot be accepted as faithful records.<sup>3</sup> Winckler himself fully admits that the patriarchal stories are not historical, but he holds that the legend-writers are, in essentials, veracious. The only way to do justice to these writers is to study the mythological and astrological system which their mode of representation pre-

<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., *Alttestamentliche Untersuchungen* (1892), pp. 1-54 (contributions to the literary analysis of the Books of Kings); *Altorientalische Forschungen*, i. 42-59 (composite story of Gideon); *Geschichte Israels*, ii. 149; *KAT*,<sup>(3)</sup> p. 221.

<sup>2</sup> Review of Stade's *Entstehung des Volkes Israel in Oriental. Litt. Zeitung*, 1899, reprinted in Winckler's *Kritische Schriften*, i. 1-59 (1901). Stade's work is an academical discourse, delivered in 1897: it is reprinted in his *Akademische Reden und Abhandlungen* (1899), pp. 97-122. Winckler, however, is somewhat too unqualified in some of his statements. What he really means with regard to Israel's tradition as to its own origin is better expressed in *KAT*,<sup>(3)</sup> pp. 212, 220. Budde's criticism in his lecture (pp. 32 f.) deserves Winckler's attention.

<sup>3</sup> For Winckler's own results with regard to ancient Arabian culture, see his *Arabisch-Semitisch-Orientalisch: Kulturgeschichtlich-mythologische Untersuchung* (in "Mitteilungen der vorderasiat. Gesellschaft," 1901, 4 and 5; cp. also *KAT*,<sup>(3)</sup> 1, pp. 137 f.).



supposes, and which has sprung from a *Weltanschauung* wholly different from our own.

It is the study of this *Weltanschauung*, and of the cosmology which developed out of it, to which Winckler especially has devoted himself. His discoveries (as he regards them) are set forth in vol. ii. of the *Geschichte Israels* (1900), with which compare a brilliant essay by Winckler in a historical *Zeitschrift*,<sup>1</sup> an article also by him in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* ("Sinai," 2), and *KAT*,<sup>(3)</sup> p. 223. In fairness to Stade, however, I must remark that he too has recently shown that he has an eye for Oriental symbolism in the series of "Contributions to Pentateuch Criticism," begun in 1894, and still in progress, in the *Zeitschrift* for the Old Testament study of which he is the editor. And it must be admitted by Winckler's friends that his style, though grammatically clear, is not exactly persuasive, so that even Budde—no unprogressive critic—can say of the tendency of Winckler's work, "So all that we were proud to possess in the Old Testament sinks into insignificance" (*zusammensinkt*).<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps we must not blame Winckler; it may be his misfortune, not his fault, that he has produced this impression. A researcher can with difficulty turn aside to the task of overcoming prejudices. And when abstruse (but not therefore incorrect) theories like Winckler's are brought forward, we may expect that all but a few will be strongly prejudiced against them. Very careful readers, however, might have noticed that, in the same volume which may appear to resolve the whole of the patriarchal story and much besides into mere mythology, we read<sup>3</sup> that it would be a grievous error to reject everything expressed in terms of mythology and astrology as

<sup>1</sup> "Die Weltanschauung des alten Orients," in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, civ. 224-275 (1901).

<sup>2</sup> *Das Alte Testament und die Ausgrabungen*, Giessen, 1903 (a lecture delivered May 29, 1902), p. 24. Translated in the *American Journal of Theology*, vol. v. pp. 582 ff. (1902).

<sup>3</sup> *Geschichte Israels*, ii. 296 (1900); cp. *Nineteenth Century*, Jan. 1902, p. 65, foot.

necessarily unhistorical, and again, at the end of the brilliant essay referred to above, that even if the details be not credible, yet much of the great outlines of tradition becomes credible to those who can enter into the Oriental mode of thought and expression.<sup>1</sup> The misfortune was that in his eagerness to get on, Winckler was somewhat chary of these explanations. The hint that a mythological outside is quite compatible with an historical kernel should have been frequently repeated, and some rays of the light which our guide has recently thrown on what he considers the historical kernel of the Abraham and Joseph stories should have been permitted to shine upon the somewhat bewildering chapter on Abraham and Isaac in vol. ii. of the *Geschichte Israels*. This would have softened Winckler's reviewers, and would also have saved him from an explanation offered by a friend of his own which appears to me somewhat disparaging to this gifted worker.<sup>2</sup>

Winckler, however, has by this time addressed himself to another section of his task, and may soon begin to draw more students to his side. Many may have been angered at finding the connection of Abraham with the two great centres of the worship of the moon-god (Nannar, Sin), viz., "Ur of Chaldæa" and Harran in N. Mesopotamia, used as a confirmation of the theory that Abraham was a lunar hero,<sup>3</sup> and have ridiculed the idea that a further trace of this can exist in the number 318 given in Gen. xiv. 14 to the patriarch's homeborn slaves.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Preussische Jahrbücher*, iv. 275 (1901).

<sup>2</sup> See A. Jeremias, *Im Kampfe um Babel und Bibel* (4th ed.), 1903, p. 65, foot. Winckler's confession (*Arabisch-Semitisch-Orientalisch*, 1901, p. 7) that for a time he had held the "religionsgeschichtlich" point of view, in which Wellhausen, Stade, and Robertson Smith led the way, surely refers to a period earlier at any rate than the composition of vol. ii. of his *Geschichte Israels*. Jeremias has not indeed a perfectly clear style, but he appears to mean that Winckler has only lately begun to free himself from the error of those three scholars, two of whom—Stade and Robertson Smith—have, I may add, expressed their hearty attachment to evangelical religion, and could scarcely have approved Winckler's first volume.

<sup>3</sup> *Geschichte Israels*, vol. ii., p. 23.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27; 318, says Winckler, is the number of the days in the year during which the moon is actually visible.



But in Winckler's latest publication, *Abraham als Babylonier, Joseph als Ägypter* (1903), we hear something much less uncongenial to religious minds, whether or not they accept it. The story of Terah and Abraham is there said to be based on a reminiscence of the religious changes in ancient Babylonia. The tradition of those patriarchs' residence at Ur and Haran means that they stood in a close relation to the worship of Nannar or Sin, who to the primitive Babylonians was the supreme god, *i.e.*, the chief manifestation of the hidden divine power. And when it is said that Abraham left Haran to find a land—viz., Canaan—in which he could live for his religion, this is because in Canaan the power of the new lords of Babylonia was at an end, and the religion which they promulgated had no force. In fact, under the first Babylonian dynasty Marduk instead of Sin became the supreme god,<sup>1</sup> in opposition to the older doctrine, with which Abraham (conceived of as a Babylonian) must have been in some sense connected. And this, according to Winckler, is the reason why Gen. xiv. 1 represents Abraham as a contemporary of Amraphel, for Amraphel is Hammurabi, the uniter of N. and S. Babylonia, the most powerful king of the first Babylonian dynasty.

In the same booklet a similar explanation is given of Joseph, who, as Winckler (following Marquart, and very nearly agreeing with the article "Joseph,"<sup>2</sup> in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, vol. ii., 1901) now holds, is to be identified with Janhamu, the officer who was over the magazines of grain in the land of Jarimuta (see *Enc. Bib.*, col. 2593), under the Egyptian king and monotheistic reformer Amen-hotep or Amenophis IV.

<sup>1</sup> On this religious revolution, cp. Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria* (1898), pp. 134 f.

<sup>2</sup> I must regretfully admit that though I leave it an open question whether a redactor, acquainted with Egyptian matters, may not have sought to give some degree of Egyptian colouring to the Joseph-story, I now see how impossible it is to point מִצְרַיִם (mizraim) in Gen. xxxix. ff., when all the other legends of Gen. imperatively require us to point מִצְרַיִם (mizrim). Winckler's inconsistency here is parallel to his inconsistency in making Solomon's wife come from Egypt instead of N. Arabia.

According to this scholar, indeed, even apart from the study of details, the Joseph-story must have some relation to the attempted reform of the "heretic king," for it is the object of the Old Testament narratives to show how the Israelitish religion developed, and that it was not uninfluenced by the older cultures of Babylon and Egypt. How this idea, which Winckler even introduces into the section on Israel in *KAT*<sup>(3)</sup> (see p. 211, and cp. p. 194), is to be worked out historically, our author leaves to the future to show. With him at present, as in other cases, faith (a *subjektives Glaubensbedürfniss*) must make up for the deficiencies of knowledge. For my own part, while not denying that there were monotheistic tendencies (which for a combination of reasons came to little) both in Babylonia and in Egypt,<sup>1</sup> I do not feel able to adopt this theory, not only because of the *lacunæ* in the argument, but because it seems to me to be opposed to the most probable results of methodical textual criticism and the best results of research into Israelitish history. Nevertheless, this attempt of Winckler was worth making, and those who accept "Ur of Chaldæa" and the Mesopotamian Harra<sup>n</sup><sup>2</sup> are surely bound to account more fully than they have yet done for the introduction of these places into the life of the Hebrew patriarch. Why, then, should they not follow Winckler? Budde's remark<sup>3</sup> that the Old Testament in Winckler's hands becomes "a domain, an outlying fort of the cuneiform inscriptions"—because of the relation which Winckler and Delitzsch assert between the monotheistic movement in Babylon and that in Israel—is surely too pessimistic. It also appears to imply a

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Delitzsch, *Babel and Bible* (Johns), pp. 75, 143; cp. Jeremias, *Im Kampfe um Babel und Bibel*, 4th ed., 1903, pp. 18–21. I need hardly point out that this is no new discovery.

<sup>2</sup> Jensen is said not to agree with the ordinary theory of Ur. But it is the reading "Ur-kasdim" which has first to be investigated. I would draw Winckler's attention to the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, vol. iv. (1903), cols. 5233 f.

<sup>3</sup> *Das Alte Testament*, etc. (lecture), p. 23. Delitzsch (*Babel and Bible*, p. 39) uses the same word,—"a land which was completely a domain of Babylonian culture." Is not Delitzsch nearly right? (cp. note on p. 97).



momentary injustice to one of the grandest theological principles—the universal operation of the divine Reason. Is the Jordan to be the only sacred stream, and may not Hammurabi, and others before him, have been illuminated by the true divine Sun? Why should not leading men like Budde make it more manifest that they are not only historical theologians, charged with the duty of keeping the Church at large in touch with history, but also explorers of a “domain” exposed to the constant though doubtless not exclusive influence of Babylonia?<sup>1</sup>

It is the relation of the nobler spirits of Israel, symbolized by Abraham and Joseph, to certain currents in the more advanced religions (or, as Winckler says, cultures) outside of Canaan which accounts, according to our guide, for the constant friction between the prophets and the people in general. Both the prophets and the people (at any rate, Winckler would say, the people of Judah) worshipped Yahwè, but the Yahwè of the prophets differed widely from the Yahwè of the people, who was merely Israel's Baal. The prophets, from Amos and his unknown predecessors onwards, were at once thinkers, popular orators, and statesmen, though doubtless not all of them united these functions in the same degree. Winckler lays the chief stress on their political activity, but there are now some signs that he is becoming more attracted than formerly to the religious problem presented by the life and activity of the prophets. I do not say that he shows any special sympathy (I wish that he did) for religious ideas; that, however, is not one of his gifts.

I venture to remark here that there is no historically attested class of Israelites of which in the present stage of research it is so difficult to speak with precision as the prophets. That there is very much in the existing treatises on prophecy which will in some form remain is certain, but what modification will have to be introduced is somewhat uncertain. A

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *Nineteenth Century and After*, Jan. 1902, p. 68. “Would it not be better to put aside prejudice,” etc.

condensation of Winckler's views on the origins of prophetism and on the "great prophets" will be found in passages of his monograph on Ancient Western Asia, vol. iii. (1901) of Helmolt's *Weltgeschichte*, which is now accessible in an English form.<sup>1</sup> These passages need, however, to be supplemented by passages in vol. i. of his *Geschichte Israels*. We are there told that the priesthood of Jahu's sanctuary on Mt. Sinai had given much thought to the divine nature, and developed a doctrine of Jahwè (Yahwè), as the Lord of all life, which the neighbouring clans (formed by David into the tribe and kingdom of Judah) accepted, and which David, when he conquered the older tribes of Israel, imposed upon them as the national religion. The prophets were "clear-sighted, educated men, who were superior to the people," and represented this refined view of God.<sup>2</sup> They also had the welfare of the people at heart, and so, when the kings oppressed the people, they were against the kings, and when the priests became the ruling class, and in their own interest encouraged Baal-worship and "exploited" the people, the prophets were against the priests.<sup>3</sup> They became statesmen, and one of them—Amos—even became what we should call a political agitator, for he took up the idea of a restored kingdom of David (the pan-Israelite idea, as one might say), and preached it in northern Israel,<sup>4</sup> while in a subsequent age, says Winckler, Jeremiah became a decided adherent of the Chaldean party. While, therefore, we can hardly say with Budde that, according to Winckler, "the nebiim are merely political agents of the *Weltmacht*,"<sup>5</sup> we must admit that, superficially regarded, what Winckler says in his earlier books does appear to make the prophets too completely men of their age. To this he now replies that

<sup>1</sup> Vol. iii., part i., section 12 ("Israel"), sub-sections H(a) and J(b); pp. 204 ff., and 210 ff. in the German edition.

<sup>2</sup> *Geschichte Israels*, vol. i., pp. 37-42.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. Helmolt's *Weltgeschichte*, vol. v., pp. 204-206, 210-212.

<sup>4</sup> *Geschichte Israels*, i. 91; Helmolt's *Weltgeschichte*, v. 206.

<sup>5</sup> *Das Alte Testament und die Ausgrabungen*, p. 24. Budde is probably thinking of a somewhat carelessly-worded passage of Winckler in *KAT*,<sup>(8)</sup> p. 171.



from the point of view of secular history even Isaiah must be regarded as a man of his age. The value of the inner truth of Isaiah's utterances could only be estimated at a later day. "History has to explain the man from his age, and not from his significance for eternity."<sup>1</sup> But should not a historian confess that there are in some lives phenomena which, simply by the study of circumstances, he cannot explain? If Winckler had admitted this, his explanation would perhaps have had more force. The prophets were neither mere thinkers who sought to popularize their theory, nor political agitators, nor even popular tribunes; they were enthusiasts filled with a passion for Yahwè.

So much, however, must at any rate be said in defence of Winckler—that he does not seek to explain away phenomena. He may sometimes leave them out of consideration, but he does not deny their existence. He acknowledges that researches like his may lead some to a far-reaching historical scepticism, especially as regards the figures of the earlier "history." But, as we have seen, he himself is of opinion that a mythological form of expression may have a historical meaning, and the expansion of passages of his works having this tendency by A. Jeremias (who adds further illustrations to those of Winckler) will probably induce conservative theologians to trouble themselves about these new lights. For my own part I think that Winckler has deserved well by working out the idea that passages of the Old Testament may have a mythological connection. It is not indeed a new idea, but no one has shown so plainly as Winckler and Stucken that some of the strangest details in the Old Testament narratives can be most fully explained from mythology.<sup>2</sup> Mythological "motives" were floating, as it were, in the air, and attached themselves to well-known personages and stories. So it was among the Greeks and Romans and Scandinavians; so it

<sup>1</sup> Winckler, *Abraham als Babylonier*, etc., pp. 35–38.

<sup>2</sup> See Winckler, *Preussische Jahrbücher*, civ. 268–275 (1901), and many passages (e.g., p. 76) of vol. ii. of his *Geschichte Israels*.

was among the Israelites. Whether Winckler and Stucken are right in working out the idea with such "vigour and rigour," is to me very much more doubtful, considering the fragmentary and much-edited form of the Hebrew traditions. Nor, except in the cases of the Creation and the Deluge, can it be shown that we have any connected Hebrew narrative with a mythological basis. Zimmern hopes<sup>1</sup> that the researches of Jensen may shortly reveal more such stories. It may indeed be that Jensen may be able to persuade himself that he has found them.

I have not yet spoken of one great difficulty that I often have in following Winckler; it is that his criticism of the readings of the Hebrew texts is neither thorough enough nor methodical enough. The idea that the land of Israel was saturated with Babylonian influences—direct or indirect—has long fascinated me, but until scholars who take up this idea have accustomed themselves to work on a more thoroughly revised Hebrew text, the results of their criticism must often be very insecure. Nothing would, in my opinion, be gained by elaborating more such theories as the at present popular mythological theory of the Book of Esther.

The amount of thought which Winckler has given to his theory is worthy of admiration. But without here raising any objection arising from textual criticism, it appears to me that neither in the story of the patriarchs, nor in that of the judges or of the kings, is there any clear and unmistakable evidence of the cosmological *system*, and that Winckler's explanation of the names Saul and Solomon is less easily defensible than my own.<sup>2</sup> Our guide is apparently still somewhat uncertain as to the amount of history, if any, in the accounts of the first three kings. He has, however, done his best to produce a plausible and probable narrative out of them. I should not be surprised if some readers should let themselves be persuaded that Saul

<sup>1</sup> *KAT*,<sup>(3)</sup> part ii., p. 365. "Voraussichtlich" is his word.

<sup>2</sup> See *Encyc. Biblica*, "Saul," "Solomon."



was really a Manassite,<sup>1</sup> but still more shall I wonder if many are not somewhat moved by Winckler's representation of David's gradual acquisition of power at the expense of Saul,<sup>2</sup> and if many do not come to admit the close relations between Palestine under Solomon and the N. Arabian land of Musri.<sup>3</sup>

The discovery of Mizrim (Muşri) in passages where the pointed text has Mizraim (Egypt) is, as I have already said, one of the chief titles of Winckler to the gratitude of Hebraists.

In pp. 136-153 of *KAT*<sup>(3)</sup> the reader will find an admirably condensed account (such as few could have written) of the ethnic conditions of N. Arabia. In pp. 144-148 Winckler deals more especially with Muşri and Cûsh (Ashûr he does not touch), indicating passages of the Old Testament where we are bound to recognise these names (properly names of regions). Before this summary was published, one had to refer for Winckler's views to two of the numbers of the *Mitteilungen* of the so-called *Vorderasiatische Gesellschaft* (1898, 1, and 1898, 4), and since no reference to any part of the *Encyclopædia Biblica* occurs in the first half of *KAT*,<sup>(3)</sup> it is incumbent on me to remark that the article "Mizraim" in *Enc. Bib.*, vol. iii. (written long before the date of publication), is not a mere *résumé*, and may still be worth consulting; also that my relations to Winckler and to Hommel, as regards the "discovery" of the N. Arabian names of regions and peoples in the Old Testament, have been stated in this JOURNAL (July 1903, p. 755, with notes 1-3). Winckler, I know, will not take it amiss that I have gone further than himself and Hommel in the "discovery" of points of contact between Israel and the N. Arabian populations. If even half of my results are approximately certain, I shall have no cause for discontent. Winckler cannot possibly stop short

<sup>1</sup> For this theory and its reasons, see Winckler, *Geschichte Israels*, ii. 158; *Encyc. Bib.*, "Saul," § 1 e; "Manasseh," § 3.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *Nineteenth Century*, Jan. 1902, pp. 65, 66.

<sup>3</sup> Here, as in the case of David, I have given independent confirmation to Winckler. Cp. Winckler's note, *Geschichte Israels*, vol. ii., p. 270, note 1, and *Encyc. Bib.*, "Solomon."

where he does. When he has time to publish that colloquy with his critics which is expected, and upon which I hoped to base this article, we shall see better how he regards the position of the N. Arabian question. He cannot indeed settle it at all points. We cannot re-discover the original condition of the region referred to by Winckler and myself; it was doubtless very different from the condition of the so-called Negeb<sup>1</sup> to-day, just as the Bedouins of to-day are vastly different from the Arabians of antiquity. Dr E. A. W. Budge's arguments against the view that there was a land of Muṣri in the neighbourhood of the "Negeb" have, as I understand, produced no impression on Winckler. Whether he will directly answer this scholar and Eduard König (*Fünf neue arabische Landschaftsnamen*, 1902, against Hommel and Winckler) I do not know, but I think that he would not find the task a difficult one. Provisionally, as against Dr Budge, I may venture to refer to the *Enc. Biblica*, col. 4529, note 5, where Professor H. W. Hogg shows that Dr Budge's reasons in his *History of Egypt* (vol. vi., pp. ix-xxx), at any rate "do not settle the question." König's controversial treatment of Biblical passages is equally unsatisfactory. The best way to settle the question is to treat these passages, together with a multitude of others, text-critically and exegetically, and, in fact, to go through much of the Old Testament with an eye to possible or probable references to N. Arabia.<sup>2</sup>

That Winckler has done as well for Solomon as for David can hardly be asserted. He rightly asserts the large amount of idealistic (or, as he says, prophetic) legend in the narrative, but he does not make the most of the indications of the earlier tradition. The amount of Solomon's connection with N. Arabia is much understated by him; he still holds to the "Egyptian

<sup>1</sup> "Negeb" is usually said to mean "dry land." This is quite uncertain, and not very probable.

<sup>2</sup> It is perhaps permissible to refer here to Parts I.-IV. of *Critica Biblica* (A. & C. Black, 1903).



princess" and Hiram "king of Tyre." Consequently he goes quite astray in his explanation both of Solomon's name and of Solomon's traditional wisdom. He tentatively connects the former with a divine name sh-l-m, which he also finds in a Phœnician proper name, and which he compares with the Phœnician divine name Shalman,<sup>1</sup> belonging, as he thinks, to a god of healing. But by Solomon's place in the mythological system he corresponds to Nebo, the god of knowledge and of wisdom. Hence the legend made him the wise judge and author of proverbs. Had Winckler been more consistent, he would have seen that *Shelomoh* is to be grouped either with "Ishmael" or with "Shalamu," both N. Arabian ethnic names. In the Biblical literature there are proverbs of Shalamu or Ishmael in a Hebrew dress; in fact, the N. Arabians were celebrated for their "wisdom." The son and successor of David bore a name which invited irresistibly to a representation of him as a just judge (cp. Prov. xxx. 1) and an author of proverbs.<sup>2</sup>

The historical narrative in *KAT*<sup>(3)</sup> down to the exile is less startling and relatively conservative. It seems to me that Winckler has given less historical consideration to this portion, which may, however, please many persons all the more, as showing that the author does not alter for the sake of altering. The abundant use of contemporary history, and the moderation with which textual criticism is practised, will also be much appreciated. Without going into the many points on which Winckler appears to me to be unduly conservative (*e.g.*, the Aramæan wars), I would venture to express deep regret at his generally unsatisfactory criticism of the text of Psalm xxii., and his connection of this psalm with the very probable but here not illustrative fact of the captivity of King Manasseh.

In his treatment of what is known as the "post-exilic" period, Winckler is so revolutionary that I could not attempt

<sup>1</sup> *Geschichte Israels*, ii. 222; cp. *Preuss. Jahrbücher*, civ. 270; *KAT*<sup>(3)</sup>, p. 234.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *Enc. Bib.*, "Solomon," § 1, and in due time, *Crit. Bib.* on Prov. i. 1.

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to do him justice at the end of an article. Even when he is less thorough than one might like, he has based his work on careful preliminary researches, and still more is this the case in the most startlingly consistent portion of his system—that to which I now refer. Let any one give even a slight study to his series of *Altorientalische Forschungen*, begun in 1893, and still in progress, and judge, for a number of the most important discussions refer to the “post-exilic” period of the history of Israel.

Less revolutionary, but not less thorough, is Zimmern's most interesting contribution to the third edition of Schrader's work. His competence as an investigator is beyond dispute, and many will be glad to have it on the authority of Gunkel<sup>1</sup> that the two friends, Zimmern and Gunkel—the Assyriologist and the Hebraist—were for years in constant intercourse. Gunkel's views of textual criticism, which I presume to be shared by Zimmern, are more moderate (if that be an advantage) than Winckler's. I cannot hesitate to say that all students alike of the form and of the contents of Israelitish and Jewish beliefs will have to reckon with Zimmern as an investigator of the first rank. Should I some day be able to return to the subject of “Babylon and the Bible” in this JOURNAL, it will be a pleasure to me to meet Dr Winckler and Professor Zimmern again. And still more shall I be delighted if the examples of Professor Sayce and Professor Haupt should stir up able rivals to these scholars in Great Britain and America. All critical methods must be tried, and all schools have their chances. The subject is one which will not yield up its full secret to a first attack, and to rise at length to the height of so great an argument would be a not unworthy object for a life of study.

OXFORD.

T. K. CHEYNE.

<sup>1</sup> *Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit* (Göttingen, 1895), p. vii.



## MORALITY IN ÆSCHYLUS.

THE REV. PROFESSOR LEWIS CAMPBELL, LL.D.

TRAGIC art has of late been much associated with the doctrine of pessimism. The subject had a fascination for Schopenhauer, who is the author of the memorable saying that "every life considered as a whole is tragic, while the several parts or partial aspects of it are proper subjects for comedy." His æsthetic theory was naturally coloured by his main thesis. The aim of Tragedy, according to him, is to detach the human spirit from the will to live and direct it for consolation to the contemplation of art. The genius of Wagner is known to have been much influenced by Schopenhauer's philosophy, and certainly that which has most resembled Tragedy in recent drama is not inspired with hopefulness for the future of mankind. A gloomy so-called realism is strangely combined with morbid, or impossible, fantasies,—as if the imagination when baulked of its best object had sought a temporary refuge in cloudland. The remarkable essay of Friedrich Nietzsche on the *Origin of Tragedy* was prompted by a belief in Schopenhauer and admiration of Wagner, from which that wayward mind afterwards reacted. But this youthful rhapsody contains a pregnant conception which no student of the subject can afford to ignore.

Nietzsche's famous distinction of the Dionysiac and Apolline elements may be accepted by those who look in tragic drama for something more than an artistic consolation, and to whom his postulate, that the factors so contra-distin-

guished are harmonised by music, appears either superfluous or unmeaning.

What, then, is the Dionysiac element?—Song, which, as Charles Darwin observed, has an important place in all animal life, is the natural accompaniment of each fresh access of vitality. And in the earlier phases of human civilisation, song was the confused expression of much that in the later developments became differentiated or modified.

There was certainly a time when collective humanity simply revelled in the imagination of horrors. What thoughts were germinating in the mind of the tribe, when at their communion festival they tore in pieces the live animal that was their God, the symbol and warrant of their union, of their prosperity and their security? The act seems akin to madness; yet in the impulse which led to it there was a religious fervour in which human joy and grief, hope and terror, resolution and despair, were blended in one overpowering emotion. What wonder if such a celebration were followed or accompanied by the utterance of strange imaginings, in contradiction to the ordinary tenour of men's lives, and yet related to it,—by tales of crime and outrage, of divine agonies, of unnatural revenge?

Such pristine emotion found vent not only in song, but in representative action. The imaginary scenes were often invented to account for the wildness of the ceremonial. And fables thus originated lived on as legends into a more civilised period when the community was bound within the limits of convention and of positive law.

Periodically the old frenzy returns and bursts the bonds, and a struggle follows which ends in some license being accorded to the turbulent element. Civilised man, for a time, breaks loose in fancy from the limits of the accustomed routine and indulges his genius in free communing with primitive nature. But the spirit of order persists, and is not really overborne. To apply Nietzsche's image, Apollo leads Dionysus by a silken thread. For in the bosom of that untamed



exuberance, of those orgiastic outbursts, there stir the pulses of a life more deeply interfused, anticipations of a wider all-embracing law, that only wait for the hand of some poetic and religious genius, of a spirit that is "touched to fine issues," to draw them forth into forms of beauty and strength. Either element is really powerless without the other. Dionysiac passion, but for the guiding hand, must evaporate in sound and fury, and the shaping, formative power is impotent, unless it works in a medium where the great primary emotions have been stirred to their depths. The same antinomy in milder shapes recurs again and again. The commonplace remark, "God made the country, but man made the town," is an expression of it. The German romanticist, writing his mystic effusions in the intervals of official desk-work, or the author of "Foc'sle Yarns" roaming over Durdham Down and meditating his Manx tales after six hours of teaching boys at Clifton, were, in a manner, carried off by the Dionysiac afflatus—(*Quo me, Bacche, rapis?*). The poet's "sympathy with all wild things," the "return to Nature" of the sentimentalist, even the complaint of Wordsworth that "custom lies upon us with a weight heavy as frost," belong to the same inexhaustible resilience of the human spirit.

Mr Gilbert Murray, in the commentary appended to his fine translation of the *Bacchae* of Euripides, has some good remarks on this subject.

It was the general belief that Dionysus came to Hellas from abroad. Whether Crete or Thrace were the chief cradle of the religion, it would seem that the native exhilaration of the annual village festival was stimulated by exotic ceremonies that grew together with the cultivation of the vine—believed to be the gift of Dionysus, as the olive was of Athena, and the yet more primitive cereal culture of Demeter.

That Attic Tragedy was the offspring of this Dionysiac worship is generally acknowledged. But long before the dithyramb was naturalised in Attica, other elements had

entered in. The well-known dithyrambic fragment of Pindar begins with an invocation to the Olympian Gods, who are invited to countenance the celebration; and Æschylus, as Aristophanes knew, was the votary not merely of Dionysus, but more intimately of the Eleusinian Demeter. We have therefore to distinguish between the crude form of tragic song, more nearly related to the bold strain of which Archilochus boasted, and the art as matured in Attica, where Apollo's musical and prophetic gift, Athena's equity, and the deep thoughts attendant on the mysteries of Demeter, had tempered and harmonised what might else have remained a harsh and discordant cry.

Even the original tale of horror contained an implication of some contrasted form of good: some inarticulate pleading for justice underlay the tragedy of doom. But gradually there arises the promise of a clearer and steadier light, which reaches its acme with the advent of some great poet in a happier generation; and thus the transition is effected from the crude to the developed "birth of time."

The great period of Attic, as of Elizabethan Tragedy, came when men's hearts had been elated with high hopes, and their power of enjoying scenes of pity and fear was at once intensified and refined. For as Keats has sung—

"In the very temple of delight  
Veiled Melancholy has her sovereign shrine,  
Though seen of none, save him whose strenuous tongue  
Can burst joy's grape against his palate fine.  
His soul shall taste the sadness of her might  
And be amongst her cloudy trophies hung."

What I have termed the crude aspect of the art is not eliminated but subdued. It forms the material on which the "Apolline" influence is to work. For not merely, as Matthew Arnold said, "the creative imagination requires for its exercise an intellectual and spiritual atmosphere, a current of ideas in which it finds itself," but dramatic creation, whose power is addressed directly to the popular apprehension, needs also a body of traditional legend both living and familiar, which



it may mould by its own genial power. The classical drama in England, through such works as Gascoigne's *Jocasta*, *Gorboduc* and *The Sorrows of Arthur*, could not of itself produce a national theatre. It was only when the culture of the renaissance descended amidst the "rude jumble of sport and earnest which the mob loved,"<sup>1</sup> and converted it into a source of imaginative and passionate effects, that Marlowe stood forth as the herald of a new era. But in him the Dionysiac overbore the Apolline element, and although to say that in passing from him to Shakespeare English drama was *moralised* might give a misleading impression (our Will among the prophets!)—yet that it was humanised and harmonised when the raw though stupendous force that created Tamburlane gave place to the heart-affluence which inspired Hamlet, Macbeth, Othello and Lear, there can be no doubt at all. And on comparing the two crowning epochs in Greece and England, it may be permitted to affirm that if the crude form of the art is pervaded by a deep vein of pessimism, the creations in which it attains perfection are pervaded rather by that wiser optimism which fearlessly confronts the utmost possibilities of evil in the faith that there are still greater possibilities of good.

The triumphs of evil destiny are placed by Æschylus in a distant past, and are contrasted by him with that ideal of equity towards which humanity is guided by beneficent powers. Such, at least, is the teaching of the one Trilogy which has remained complete—the Oresteia—and such in a more sublime manner was the root conception of the Promethean Trilogy, of which only the second drama, the *Prometheus Bound*, remains. But the presentation of the evil is not the less impressive for being contrasted with the good. On the contrary it is more vividly conceived. That crime which is the beginning of sorrows, extending from generation to generation, the curse that will not rest till all be fulfilled,

<sup>1</sup> Moulton.

the untameable spirit of revenge, the perilous consequence of any breach of domestic sanctities, are delineated with a master hand.

Thus the "lawless and uncertain thoughts" of a past age were moralised by the Eleusinian prophet. In the history of his own people from Miltiades to Aristides, in which he personally had taken an active part, he saw the rising of a spirit that was not to be overcome of evil, but, as he believed, was destined to overcome the evil with good:—the spirit of those who nestled under the Ægis of Athena and listened to the Apolline voices that preached the higher law. To speak of such an inspired teacher as one who through the influence of music found refuge from the miseries of life in the enchantments of art is surely an inadequate view. Something greater than the beautiful is here (*κρείσσον' ἢ μορφὴ καλή*).<sup>1</sup>

In his poetic service to his countrymen, the Marathonian warrior was from first to last tremendously in earnest. For the genial Sophocles, as for the gentle Shakespeare, we can imagine times of relaxation, when the deep thoughts that moulded his imaginative creations were veiled with good-humoured tolerance or ironical pleasantry. But in Æschylus there is a fire which never slumbers, and the tradition which represents him as having been persecuted for his opinions has a strong appearance of truth.

In accordance with what has been said above, his task was to interest and instruct his countrymen through their own legends and their own mythology—much as modern musical composers have based their high-wrought numbers on national dances and on popular airs. But in the half century before his time, what is vaguely known as the Orphic movement, due partly to fresh contact with Egypt and the East, had gained much prevalence amongst enlightened Greeks. A new spirit of Pantheism was gradually remoulding Polytheistic Religion, and developing on different lines that side of early speculation which had been expressed in such theogonies as Hesiod's.

<sup>1</sup> *Soph. Oed.*, Col. 1. 570.



The horror of blood-guiltiness, the sense of human sinfulness and divine wrath, and of the need of purification and atonement were at the same time greatly deepened. Religious hopes and fears, though still largely turning on ceremonial conditions, became more individual and personal. The movement was widespread, and not confined to those who had been initiated into the Orphic or other mysteries. There is little doubt that it influenced such centres of theosophic teaching as the shrines at Delphi and Eleusis. And Æschylus, who was not merely a professional artist but an independent teacher, profoundly steeped in all the culture of his time, is not to be too closely identified with the doctrines of any school. It will therefore be more profitable than the detailed discussion of obscure questions, for which the data are defective, to go straightway to the poet himself and to examine the ground ideas of his seven extant Tragedies in a brief survey. In speaking of "ground ideas" I do not mean that he proceeds deductively from first principles in the construction of his plots, but that in seriously handling a traditional fable he is inevitably guided by the conceptions as to human life at which he has arrived. By taking the seven dramas together with due regard to the order of their production, and considering them in the light of what we can else discern of Hellenic thought in the early fifth century B.C., with the help also of the fragments of lost plays, we may hope to catch some glimpses of the grave countenance which looks at us from behind the tragic mask, some tones which may be detected amidst the harmonies that thrilled the Athenian auditory.

I. The morality of Æschylus, then, is in the first place profoundly religious. He has thought deeply on the divine attributes and the divine working. In several of his plays the *dramatis personæ* were wholly superhuman. But the only work of this kind which has come down to us is the second or central drama of the Promethean trilogy—the *Prometheus Bound*. This is not so much a tragedy in the modern sense

as a mystery or morality play, embodying symbolically the poet's view of heavenly things.

The *Prometheus* of Æschylus has appealed in various ways to the modern imagination. Goethe saw in it the protest of the human intellect against the perversions of Christian theology. To Shelley, the suffering Titan personified the hopes and struggles of the Revolution, prefiguring the destruction of privilege and the triumph of equality and fraternity. To Mrs Browning he represented all that was noble and beneficent in human progress. But in such "private interpretations" there is too much of subjectivity.

To understand Æschylus, the trilogy must be taken as a whole. Zeus in the central drama is tyrannical indeed, for in his immature and arbitrary rule he has quarrelled with wisdom and beneficence personified. But the Zeus whom Æschylus worshipped was of a different mood. For, ages since, the supreme God and Prometheus had been reconciled; power and wisdom had met together, force and beneficence had kissed each other. This had been brought to pass by the destinies and the law of retribution working in concert towards a consummation in which righteousness should at length prevail. No modern verse is more expressive of the spirit of the *Prometheus* than the lines which occur in one of Browning's latest poems:—

"I have faith such end shall be :  
From the first, power was—I knew.  
Life has made clear to me  
That, strive but for closer view,  
Love were as plain to see.

When see ?—When there dawns a day,  
If not on the homely earth,  
Then yonder, worlds away,  
Where the strange and new have birth,  
And power comes full in play."

Not the destruction of an existing order as in Shelley, not the omnipotence of human intellect as in Goethe's lyric, but the ultimate harmonising of apparent opposites in the divine nature, with corresponding peace on earth and goodwill



amongst mankind, is the ground idea of the Trilogy as a whole. In the extant play the opposition culminates and forms indeed an effective protest against any theology in which God is conceived merely as the Almighty, to the exclusion of the other divine attributes of benevolence, equity and mercy. Zeus as he now reigns—not as he is imagined to have ruled in some distant past—whether as “winking at the times of ignorance,” or because he had not yet attained perfection—is rather that ineffable power to whom the chorus of the Agamemnon appeal:—

“Zeus—by what name soe’er  
 He glories being addressed,  
 Even by that holiest name  
 I name the highest and best,—  
 On him I cast my troublous care,  
 My only refuge from despair :  
 Weighing all else, in him alone I find  
 Relief from this vain burden of the mind.”  
 . . . “Zeus, who prepared for men  
 The path of wisdom, binding fast  
 Learning to suffering” . . .

But the poet is not to be supposed to have attained to this conception at a single bound, or to have cleared it from all confusion and ambiguity. In the *Supplices*, perhaps the earliest of the extant dramas, while the power of Zeus is sublimely expressed, the pleadings of his children or descendants with him are tinged with a pathetic doubtfulness. The poet’s faith shone out most brightly towards the end of his career. His thought in its earlier efforts was still struggling within the swaddling bands of tradition and mythology.

II. Now to descend from the divine into the human sphere. In this there is a corresponding contrast between the former and the latter dispensations: a corresponding progress from moral Chaos towards moral Cosmos; from wrathfulness to mercy, from revenge to equity, from sheer autocracy to ordered liberty, from a blind fate to righteous retribution; from divine malignity to divine Nemesis, from the dread Erinyes to the

Eumenides, who preside over public and domestic peace. Meanwhile the prophecy of Æschylus, like other great prophetic utterances, is pregnant not only with rich promise for humanity, but with solemn warning. The elemental passions, which he so vividly depicts, are tamed by heavenly influences, but not extinguished. The civilised human being has still a wild trick of his ancestors, and should those latent fires again break forth, then woe be to the world and to mankind.

At first the traditional darkness still hovers over the scene. The appeal of the Danaïdes to Zeus as Io's lover is only temporarily successful; for the sequel, although the drama has perished, is known to have been disastrous. The persecuting cousins in some way vindicate their right; the marriage is solemnised but not consummated, except in the case of Hypermestra, whose love is won by Lynceus, so that she breaks her rash vow—*splendide mendax*. When taken to task for this, she gives the well-known answer:

“Heaven broods with holy longing o'er earth's breast;  
Earth inly longs for gentle Heaven's embrace;  
Till showers descending from the brooding Heaven  
Quicken her womb, and she brings forth for mortals  
The grape, the olive, and sustaining corn.  
From that moist marriage, too, the woods are clothed  
With beauty:—these are partners of my sin.”

We are reminded of the words of the half chorus at the end of the *Supplices* in praise of the gentler mood of Aphrodité.

But the point about the extant play is that it represents a time when the law of sanctuary was not yet absolute, but could still be matter of debate, to be decided only by a popular vote. Indirectly the whole drama is a plea for the claims of natural affection and humanity—for civilised as against barbarous proceeding—and the assertion of a religious sanction for equity and mercy.

The Œdipodean Trilogy, of which the extant part,—the *Seven against Thebes*,—appears to have been the concluding drama, would seem to have likewise ended in gloom.



The tragic Muse still works beneath the shadow of that elder dispensation, in which the sins of the fathers are visited on the children, and the dead man's curse lives on to blight his posterity. Eteocles saves his country, but falls a victim to a predetermined doom. The main impression is one of pity and terror unrelieved. Yet in depicting the nobleness of the Cadmean prince's contention against such fearful odds, the poet emphasises his deep moral conviction that honour and virtue are of more account than the life itself; and in the description of Amphiaraus, commonly supposed to contain an allusion to Aristides the Just, an ideal of disinterested public spirit is held up to view. The harshness of the situation is further softened by the sisterly affection of Antigone, who, as afterwards in Sophocles, defies the edict of the citizens who forbade the burial of Polynices. Yet if the poet had ended there, his art might well have been accused of pessimism. The Erinyes works only for destruction; the power of the curse is absolute; the sin of Laius is not purged. It is in the great Orestean Trilogy, which has fortunately come down to us almost entire, that the higher mind of Æschylus comes clearly forth. Greek Tragedy is here approaching the stage so well described by a French critic quoted in one of Matthew Arnold's note-books, as "the song of humanity when detaching itself from gloomy images of Fate, and setting its face freely towards the light" (*Sophocle chante l'humanité à l'heure où elle se dégage des fatalités sombres et se dirige librement vers la lumière*).

It does not follow that the fatality, which is of the substance of the legends, is by any means discarded. Fate, Nemesis, and divine anger still form the warp of Tragedy—but the ideas which they symbolise are modified by the nature of the woof. Destiny is no longer the blind inexorable power of primitive belief, but has beneficent aspects, and works, however slowly, in harmony with eternal Justice. Divine Nemesis is no longer moved by the mere determination to pull down what is high. It is only impious self-exaltation that goes before disaster. The Erinyes

are transformed into the Eumenides, losing nothing of their awful dignity, but reserving a blessing.

An injustice is done to the poet when the *Agamemnon* is produced alone: or when, as in the *Les Erinyes* of Leconte de Lisle, the action ends with the catastrophe of the Choephoroi. That is to mutilate a grand creation; as if *Macbeth* were ended with the murder of Duncan, or with the passion of Macduff over the loss of his wife and children. It would be as reasonable to tell the story of the Flood without the setting of the bow in the cloud, or the death of Stephen without his vision of the open Heaven. For it is in the Trilogy as a whole that the mind of Æschylus is fully revealed. The crude morality of a previous generation is corrected; the "miserable child's play" of action and reaction, revenge upon revenge, is finally condemned:—

"Thanks to the power that wields the sovereign oar  
Resistless, toward the eternal shore."

The evil-doer must suffer, but this is the work of Him who by a supreme law has made suffering the condition of learning to do well. When right is vindicated, then "the darkness is past and the true light now shineth":—

"Night is past, behold the day" (*πάρα τὸ φῶς ἰδεῖν*).

But the experience of former evil remains to warn mankind of possibilities that may recur, and the heart which exults in this fresh vision of a new ideal has leisure "to grieve at grievances foregone,"—to make allowance for the embitterment of Clytemnestra, to enter into all the pathos of Cassandra's fate, to fathom the darkness enveloping the house of the Pelopidæ, and sympathise with the long agony of Agamemnon's children as they stand before his tomb: to follow Orestes in his wandering, as he slowly expiates his heaven-appointed matricide, and rejoice with him when by the grace of Athena he is once more an Argive and may return to reign in his own country, and in his father's home.

The *Persians* of Æschylus is the sole extant example of a Greek historical drama. His predecessor Phrynichus had



produced a play on the calamity which befell the Ionian name in the sack of Miletus and gave a foretaste of the Persian War. And he had been fined by his countrymen for reminding them of a personal sorrow. But Æschylus, only six years after *Platea*, was not afraid of presenting to the Athenians an image of their triumphs in which he himself had shared. The play belongs to an early stage of his career,—still having more the form of a *cantata* than of a *drama*,—but he is untrammelled by the time-honoured legends, and his own thought is consequently more clearly apparent.

Dramatic perspective is secured by remoteness of place, which serves instead of remoteness in time. The scene is laid at Susa, the centre of the Persian empire, at a distance of three months' journey from the Ægean. And for the contrast between the earlier and later dispensations, we have the jubilant antithesis of an ordered liberty to bare autocracy. The Athenians are taught to feel compassion for a fallen foe; they are warned against the danger of overweening pride, and they are instructed to attribute their success, not to man's power or wisdom, but to those free institutions which are the gift to them of Athena. Already the decrees of Destiny are seen to be conditional on human conduct. They may be retarded by wise foresight, or hastened, as in the case of Xerxes, by human folly and sin. It is observable that while many individual Persians are celebrated, not a single Greek is mentioned by name. Whether this is meant to conciliate jealousies or to emphasise the impression of divine intervention, it gives striking evidence of the feeling of equality which prevailed amongst Athenian citizens, and it may be fairly understood as a Greek equivalent for "*Non nobis, Domine.*"

The spirit of the piece approaches that of our latest war lyricist:—

"The Sea-kings loved not boasting, they cursed not him that cursed,  
They honoured all men duly, and him that faced them, first;  
They strove and knew not hatred, they smote and toiled to save,  
They tended whom they vanquished, they praised the fallen brave."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *The Sailing of the Long Ships*, by Henry Newbolt.

Yet the praises of Darius imply the possibility of a beneficent paternal monarchy: and the supernatural in Tragedy has never been used with more effect than in the apparition of his Ghost. His last words in departing are possibly an echo from the wisdom of some Persian sage. They have something in them of the tone of Omar Khayyam, and of the verse in Ecclesiastes (ix. 10), of which Mr C. Montefiore says,<sup>1</sup> "the moral is found in reasonable enjoyment and in fruitful energy. Be active while you can."

In loftiness of Ethical conception, the only Greek poet comparable to Æschylus is Pindar. But Æschylus is by far the more expansive, the more human. Pindar's sympathies are with the scions of great houses, and to them also his warnings and exhortations are addressed. Whether for reproof and admonition or for consolation, the appeal of Æschylus is to the people at large. Although a brave soldier, he has a pious horror of king-made wars. He sees that popular respect for a throne not established in righteousness is sure to decay, and that freedom itself is valueless without the maintenance of law. And he cares for order in the family no less than in the state. The breach of domestic peace and purity is breach of all. It is like the letting out of waters, and must redound to national disaster. Herein Æschylus is wiser than Plato. And for woman he has everywhere the tenderness that accompanies the truest manhood. His *Electra*, although embittered, has not the touch of iron which we find in the *Electra* of Sophocles, and his compassion for the female captives in a conquered city breathes the very spirit of chivalry. The devotion of the Ocean-nymphs who share the fate of Prometheus is measured by the feminine tearfulness of their first approach to him.

Æschylus has much in common with the Hebrew prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. Like them he holds before mankind an ideal of righteousness and mercy, of

<sup>1</sup> In his *Bible for Home Reading*.



purity and equity. But he differs from them in his bright appreciation of innocent human joys; and while the glorious city of the Messianic vision was in the far future, Æschylus exulted in a redemption of humanity which he saw to be actually in progress, and which, amongst his own countrymen, he believed to have begun. Though his latter days were overclouded, and he espied danger in some threatened innovations, he was happy in not anticipating the evils consequent on the Peloponesian War. Else the end would have appeared to him as still remote, and he might have exclaimed with his own Prometheus:—

“Not so.—Not yet.—All-consummating Fate  
Ordains this otherwise. When countless woes  
And agonies have bowed me—not till then—  
These bonds shall leave me.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The quotations are naturally taken from my own translation (*Æschylus in English Verse*; Kegan Paul, 1890). I may also be permitted to refer to my volume on *Religion in Greek Literature* (Longmans, 1896), and to a *Guide to Greek Tragedy* (Rivingtons).

LEWIS CAMPBELL.

LONDON.

# PLATO'S CONCEPTION OF DEATH.

BERNARD BOSANQUET,

Professor Elect of Moral Philosophy in the University of St Andrews.

1. CERTAIN ideas and sentiments are found in Plato, the value of which, as he understood and felt them, this paper is an attempt to appreciate. I may call them "apparent commonplaces," because there are modes of thought and feeling, familiar to us as half-truths grown obsolete, which are the lineal descendants of these Platonic principles.

I allude to the whole vein of sentiment connected with the professed preference of death to life. This sentiment comes to us, I take it, mainly from Plato, though modified and reinforced by many Eastern influences. We are accustomed to regard such ideas as half-truths or worse, reminding us of senseless and ugly forms of martyrdom or Puritanism. Our favourite half-truth is the opposite one:—

"How good is man's life, the mere living, how fit to employ  
All the heart and the soul and the senses for ever in joy."

We triumphantly confront Plato with Spinoza, "The free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life." We come back to him with minds full of the triumph over Puritanism, the joy of living; we find in him something that looks like the obsolete commonplaces of asceticism, and we incline to set it down as a platitude of religious sentiment misunderstood, and one which our healthy modern living has for ever discredited.



It is our own favourite platitude, or let us say more temperately, our modern side of the truth, that we like to find in Plato to-day. This interest is very noticeable in modern interpretations of him. The order of the dialogues has been reconsidered; the social and logical side of his writings has on the whole come forward; the religious and supra-mundane side has on the whole passed more into the background. Whatever detailed processes have led to this result, I do not think we can doubt that it represents on the whole a change in the trend of interest with which Plato is approached by the general mind.

Yet his inspiration is nowhere more intense than in the *Phædo*, the type for all time, in Western thought, of the praise of death. No one who reads the book can doubt that he is here expressing some of his very deepest experiences. It would be a great thing if, fairly reading through what he actually says, we could form some distinct and sympathetic notion of the determinate ideas and feelings which clearly meant so much to him.

There is a great philosophical doctrine, which writers of the last few generations have made and are making familiar, known by the catchword of "dying to live." I believe in this doctrine, and think that it is involved at any rate in the highest form of religion. But though our view may reduce itself in pure theory to this, it is more especially our aim to see how the particular contrast of life and death in the everyday meaning of the words presented itself to Plato's mind when he wrote the *Phædo*.

2. We should notice, in a very few words—the story is familiar to everyone—how the subject is approached. For the phrasing of Plato's argument is coloured no doubt to some extent by the occasion to which it is adapted.

It is the day on which at sunset Socrates is to die. He is conversing with his friends, and has let fall lightly the saying that to one who has lived the life of the intelligence, death cannot be unwelcome. His friends cry out upon his readiness

to abandon them, and he, in answer, undertakes to defend himself from the charge of being unreasonably ready to leave them, more successfully he hopes than he had defended himself before the Athenian jury.

Let us first define, he begins, what we mean by death. Obviously it is the separation of the soul or mind from the body; so that each of the two comes to be by itself, and to go its own way apart from the other.

(This is the conception which governs Plato's account of the death in life which is the ideal for man at his best. The further question, whether or no the soul itself is liable to dissolution, is also treated in the *Phædo*, but it is beyond the present subject.)

Now this definition of death, the Platonic Socrates urges, is exactly the definition of what the best kind of man must have aimed at his whole life long; that is to say, the liberation or isolation of mind from body. Therefore, when there comes upon him in fact the very fulfilment of all that throughout life he has been striving for, would it not be absurd that he should be troubled?

3. That is the burden, in a few words, of the defence which Socrates makes. We are not proposing to pursue the more familiar and more exciting side of his great argument, the destiny of the soul after death. We wish to turn our thoughts to Plato's meaning in the other side of his contention, and try to appreciate what he feels and intends in speaking of the liberation of mind from body as an actual experience of human life.

i. And, in the first place, what does "the body" mean, when Plato assures us that the man who would make the most and best of life must above all things yearn to be free from it?

Let us see how it presents itself to him under three main aspects,—Sense Perception, Pleasure and Pain, and the competitive and material needs of life.

Sense Perception is for him, in the present argument, a mixing up of soul with body.<sup>1</sup> "And when we turn to the

<sup>1</sup> *Phædo*, 65.



actual acquisition of wisdom, what then? Is the body a hindrance to us, or is it not, if we take it as a partner in our search? Have sight and hearing, for example, as we men employ them, any grasp of truth? Or are not even the poets, who are no great philosophers, always repeating to us that there is nothing precise either of what we hear or of what we see? And yet if these, of all our bodily senses, are neither precise nor lucid, it is pretty certain that the rest are not, for they are all inferior to these; so it is plain that when the mind tries to apprehend reality with the help of the body, the body simply leads it astray."

Moreover, Pleasure and Pain are nails or fetters which rivet the mind to the body. "When a man (*Phædo*, 83 B) has a violent feeling of pleasure or of fear, of pain or of desire, the mischief it does to him is not what one might suppose, such as making him ill, or making him spend money on his lusts; but the supreme and superlative evil befalls him, and that without his knowing it. It is this: that in the moment when a man's mind feels intense pleasure or pain at a certain object, it is constrained to suppose that the special occasion of its feeling is the most distinct and the most real of things; whereas it is nothing of the kind—so that in this experience more especially the mind is fettered by the body, the reason being that every pleasure and pain brings a rivet and rivets the soul to the body, and transfixes it and makes it resemble the body, and judge those things to be real which the body affirms."

And lastly, the term "body" itself is practically a synonym (as implied in the *Republic*) for the competitive desires; ambition on the one hand, and avarice based upon sensuality on the other, as opposed to the spiritual goods, which, as Green tells us, are essentially non-competitive (*Phædo*, 68 B.C.). In this spirit Plato writes (*ib.* 66 B), "For the body causes us endless interruption by the mere necessity of food; and moreover, if any illnesses attack us, they obstruct our pursuit of truth. And it fills us with lusts and desires, with fears and fancies and follies, so that one may say in real truth it never

allows us a moment to think of anything. For it is the body again and its desires that are the source of wars and factions and fightings. War is made to get wealth, and wealth has to be got for the body, to the service of which we are bound. And hence, for all these reasons, our intelligent life is broken up. And what is worst of all, if we do get a moment's peace and set ourselves to any bit of study, it always interrupts us, bringing trouble and distraction, and driving us off our point; so that it utterly forbids us to behold the truth."

There is no doubt, I think, that these quotations, which could be indefinitely multiplied, reveal a perfectly actual experience, which the writer passionately felt to be a fact of the first importance.

We can see, to begin with, that, as is always the case in moral or religious language, "the body" means for him a certain element in what we call the mind. If we ask what he takes to be the central feature of this element, we shall note that it is expressed by such words as conflict, distraction, interruption. Of this conflict and distraction, inherent in the element in question, actual war is only the strongest case. And another extreme case is the sort of topsy-turvydom that comes of our pleasures and pains: they are so obviously irrelevant to the real importance of things, and yet our individual feeling of what is important or actual is constrained to follow them. This seems to be the seamy side of voluntarism. It is a well known gospel to-day that things are real for you in as far as they are the occasion of feeling or volition in you. Plato seems to have been familiar with the tendency which finds expression in this idea, and further to have observed upon it, what extraordinary notions of reality it produces in us.

The body, then, is for him, in the usage we have now before us, a name for fragmentary, unharmonised forms of experience.

ii. We will look again at Sensation and Feeling in the light of this suggestion to try and appreciate the point of view which evidently meant so much for him.

First, as to Sensation—we are accustomed, so far from



holding that sensation is a hindrance to cognition, rather to believe that all knowledge comes by observing and combining sensations. And Plato of course knew that human beings could only get knowledge by help of sense-perception; he says so over and over again. But what he seems to feel is that every sensation as such, though it may somehow *carry* a meaning, *is* itself a fragment and a distraction. I suppose a psychologist would tell us that every sensation is not only what it is, a colour, sound, or so forth, but constitutes a certain drag or demand upon our entire being. A number of unconnected sensations (as nearly unconnected as they can be got) are absolutely painful from the distraction which they produce. Each of them, no doubt, brings with it a something which somehow can further cognition; but as they come to us, they are a clashing of fragments, or an effort to fix points in a many-coloured stream. Every one must practically be aware of this, I believe. The mind no doubt demands activity, but an activity which involves repose; not a mere hurrying from point to point and back again. And until sensation is profoundly transfigured, the attempt to use it for purposes of cognition comes to this, like trying to do a sum in one's head and finding the numbers too high—an example which has been used to illustrate the feeling of discord in music. A glance at any logic of science—Mr Karl Pearson, for instance, is very emphatic on the point—will show that logical nexus is not to be found in sense-perceptions, which always give us both too much and too little to make a term in a strict inference.

What do we say, it may be asked, of sensation *par excellence*—the sensations of fine art? Surely these carry with them their significance and their warrant; they at least cannot be, in their essence, such as to worry or to perplex the mind.

First let us note two things that Plato says about this.

“If anyone tells me the reason for which anything is beautiful, because either it has a brilliant colour or a certain figure, or anything else of that kind, I let all this go, for all these other explanations I feel distracting, but in my own

mind I adhere to this one conviction simply, and downrightly, and perhaps rather stupidly, that nothing can make a thing beautiful but the presence of, or participation in, the ultimate real beauty, however the connection may come about, for as to this I will not go on to make any assertion. But it does seem to me a perfectly safe answer that beauty is what makes beautiful things beautiful.”—(*Phædo*, 100 D).

The passage reads like a comment upon the history of æsthetic theories, and the depth of its irony can be best appreciated by those to whom this ground is familiar. Beauty, after all, must be beauty, and that means something more than the fulfilment of a special recipe, whether for colour or spatial figure, or for any other particular sensuous combination. Plato is saying *at least* what is said by our own modern descriptionists, or advocates of “the sum of the conditions,” though he may be saying more as well. If you want to know what makes a thing beautiful, you have got to find out what, in its complete and characteristic nature, a beautiful thing is. And what he expects of real beauty, Plato tells you in another place (*Sympos.* 211 A). “It is not beautiful in one way and ugly in another, nor beautiful at one time and ugly at another—nor beautiful in the eyes of some and ugly in the eyes of others—it will not appear in the guise of some face or hands, or anything else in which body plays a part—it will not be on a level with gold, or fine clothes and beautiful boys—not full of human flesh, and of colours, and of all kinds of earthly folly, but would be the spectacle of divine beauty itself, in its simple nature.”

We are not trying to defend these sentiments philosophically. Perhaps they would transform beauty into a perfection in which it would be beauty no longer. What we wish to remark upon is the genuineness and depth of the experience to which Plato here gives expression. Even in art, sensation is not deified in itself. The true enjoyment of art is a much rarer thing than we are apt to suppose, and demands a higher effort. Even here, sensation as such may be an obstacle. I



wonder if the musician does not sometimes hear what is so plain to others—the scraping of the violin, the hammering of the piano, the blaring of the brass.<sup>1</sup> At least it is hardly possible to reflect on the perishing nature of the greatest works of art, without realising that it is something in them, rather than what common-sense perception accepts them as being, which makes them a joy for ever.

To borrow Plato's favourite phrase, we feel ourselves "distracted" by all these things. They drag or push against one another, and against the balance of the mind, and obstruct its attainment of an unimpeded activity.

Now this distractedness, as we saw, is at bottom what Plato means by body. The question of materialism, for him, is not whether movements of bodily particles accompany the course of consciousness; it is the question of the distinctive nature of certain elements in consciousness themselves. Body is for him that which is outside itself; that which has its parts lying side by side, which is always "in another," and never attains to being a self (*Timæus*, 52 c). It is, by its very nature, a mere nest and focus of distraction and contradiction. Mind, in as far as it approaches such a state of distractedness, approaches to the nature of body. Look at a dog "distracted" between the scent of a rabbit and his master's voice. He reminds us at once of a piece of matter between alternate attractions. Unorganised attractions are, indeed, necessarily distractions.

Now let us turn to feeling, pleasure and pain. It too, we have seen, our common "bodily" feeling, is for Plato a sore distraction. It is in contradiction with itself and with everything else. Violent pleasure and pain rivet our interest to their objects, and make us, whether we think right or not, esteem perhaps a toothache or a love-intrigue the most important matter in the universe.

But yet, is this not so, and is it not feeling that gives every-

<sup>1</sup> I have seen it said that there are musicians who prefer reading the score to hearing the performance, because the sounds are liable to jar upon them. This is ultra-Platonic.

thing its value? And can feeling be judged by anything but simply what we feel? Well, we are not arguing metaphysically; we are trying to realise the experience which Plato is transcribing. Now is not what he says familiar in human nature? Is it not obvious that our most violent pleasure and pain distract the mind, and make it attach supreme importance to objects which in looking at life as a whole we pronounce of little worth? Can we believe that intensity of spiritual emotion is the same thing with, or measurable by, violence of psychical perturbation? A light in a turnip lantern may give a man a shock that kills him, but this proves nothing at all for the degree of spiritual emotion involved for him in the perception.

iii. Here, however, we may be met by the reproach of intellectualism, and we will observe upon it in a digression. If anyone ever inferred that because psychical perturbation is a fallacious test of feeling, we are abandoned to a cold intellectualism, it certainly was not Plato, nor, I think, any true Greek. Wordsworth's "philosophic mind," if it means "apathy," is neither Platonic nor yet Hellenic. The thinker for whom love is the spring of knowledge — for whom the very experience of mathematical "equals," as our senses perceive them, "is zealous for" or "aspires to" a perfection which it cannot attain, and for whom the great ocean of beauty is the goal of education, is certainly not what most people mean when they talk of an intellectualist. It is true that he considers it improper to ascribe pleasure to God; but this only means, I think, that the unimpeded activity of a perfect being seems to him to demand a name which should not recall the contradictions of human enjoyment.

Intellectualism in the modern sense ought not, I believe, to be ascribed to any true Greek thinker. The Greek principle that knowledge and goodness are one destroys it, root and branch. The triumph of "knowledge" for Socrates was to classify things rightly; and to classify things rightly, for him, was one and the same with "attending to the most important things in life," the root of moral strength and self-control



(Xen., *Memor.* iv. 5, ii.). It is surely obvious that we are here dealing with the view of a sane and large-minded man, who has never made the fatal separation between will and intellect which modern psychology is now striving to undo, while a philosophy, which I think one-sided, is setting about the same task by the road of reducing intelligence to will. In the same spirit of "classification" must have sounded the great lost speech of Themistocles before Salamis, to which the historian devotes three meagre lines of reminiscence.<sup>1</sup> "For the great deeds and men of Athens had ceased when he wrote to be a welcome memory to Greece." "The argument of it was," Herodotus tells us, "an enumeration and a contrast of the higher things and the lower in all that is possible for man's nature and situation; and of these having exhorted them in every case to choose the higher, he summoned them to go on board the ships." And before returning to Plato, I cannot omit to mention the passage of Euripides, recently new-created for us by the touch of a master, where the great poet militant of intelligence reveals his old love of knowledge blended with the praise of the fuller wisdom, which as Plato taught, and the New Testament agreed, "is itself that divine foolishness, that strength in weakness, before which the cunning of the world and the pageantry of power fade and are discomfited."—(Nettleship, 1, 385.)

"Knowledge, we are not foes;  
I seek thee diligently,  
But the world with a great wind blows,  
Shining, and not from thee;  
Blowing to beautiful things  
On amid dark and light,  
Till Life, through the trammellings  
Of laws that are not the right,  
Breaks, clean and pure, and sings  
Glorying to God in the height."

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus, viii. 83. The introduction to Prof. Gilbert Murray's Euripides reminded me of this passage, by which I had often been struck before, but had never seen its importance recognised. The passage from Euripides below is quoted from the same volume.

The common principle of all these sayings, of all supreme life and art and thought, is, it seems to me, that true and great feeling cannot exist apart from true and great intelligence, and partakes of the same character, and is recognisable by analogous tests. I do not suppose that the underlying unity of the classical and romantic spirit, their common passion and yearning, has ever been more profoundly expressed than in the following words, which sum up the part of Plato's argument which we have been considering: "If it be true, as it is, that for the sake of an earthly love, or of a wife, or of a son that has departed, many a man has been ready to go to the other world, led by the hope of seeing once more those whom he yearns for, and of being with them; shall then the true lover of the perfect mind, who has strongly grasped this very hope, that in the other world, if nowhere else, he shall find its reality, shall he be troubled at dying and not go thither joyfully? Surely we must believe he will be glad, if he was a philosopher indeed."

4. These are indications of the experience in view of which Plato contends that the man who makes the most and the best of his life must always be discontented with what he calls the body;<sup>1</sup> and that he will live in the practice of dying, that is to say, in the effort to recall and collect the mind into its true and complete nature, out of the fragmentary and perishing experiences which are so closely akin to body, itself the focus of all distraction and contradiction.

We are naturally struck by the opposition of sentiment which appears to subsist between views like these and Spinoza's great saying to which I have referred, "The free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation (= Plato's word, 'practice,' or 'rehearsal') not of death but of life."

But let us look a little closer. In the first place, it is perfectly plain that the two great philosophers are arguing in the same practical sense, to the effect that the man who knows

<sup>1</sup> The "carnal mind" of St Paul.



how to live, will never be troubled by the fear of death. The spirit of both of them is, in the blunt phrase of Lewis Nettleship (I. lvi), "Don't bother about death, it doesn't count."

And further, we carry the spirit of both along with us, if we pursue the thought of the same writer (I, 91), and say "Fear of death, or clinging to life, is fear of, or clinging to, certain fragments of ourselves" (and therefore is what Plato calls "bodily"; as indeed such fear is for Plato throughout the mark of a carnal mind). "If we could energise a great deal more continuously than most of us can, we might experience physical death literally without being aware of it." Or in Spinoza's words (*Ethics*, 5, 38), "Since from (the highest kind of) knowledge there arises the highest possible peace, it follows that it is possible for the human mind to be of such a nature that that part of it which . . . perishes with its body, in comparison with the part of it which remains, is of no consequence." What we call "death" depends, we begin to see, very much on the point of view, and Plato's meditation of death is not very far removed from Spinoza's meditation of life. Both of them mean a conquest over the mood in which so many seemingly petty things stand between the soul and the truth (Nettleship, I, 71) while a man is alive. What is the part which perishes, and what is the part which remains, to speak in our imperfect language of parts and divisions, is a problem we have not approached. We have confined ourselves to ground which I believe cannot be shaken, that in life as we know it there is a more real and a less real; and that in attending to the more real, to love and intelligence, the "important things of life," we are certainly and truly reinforcing an element of our being which is not opposed to, but is continuous with, the truer and more essential aspect of what we commonly call death.

B. BOSANQUET.

OXSHOTT, SURREY.

## FROM AGNOSTICISM TO THEISM.

THE REV. C. F. DOLE,

Jamaica Plain, Mass., U.S.A.

I HAVE no desire to make out an argument for Theism, least of all things a defence of it. I abhor special pleading, and have no confidence in any cause which requires it. I merely propose to state, as simply and briefly as possible, the considerations which urge my mind to a theistic view of the universe, or, in other words, to a spiritual philosophy of life. Incidentally, I shall of course presently explain in what sense I can use these easily misunderstood words, "theistic" and "spiritual."

Let me confess at the outset how strong my intellectual sympathy is with the agnostic position, as represented, for example, by such a mind as the late Mr Huxley. In fact, the way of agnosticism has proved to my mind an admirable and necessary mode of approach to the philosophical problems of human existence. Thus, if I have ever had any postulates of thought, they have been substantially the following: that all human opinions are fallible; that they are therefore fit subjects of inquiry, correction, and further development; that the open mind, free of bias, prejudice, and egotism, is the essential condition of discovering truth; that whatever is true can bear the most searching examination; that the realm of knowledge is democratic, by which I mean that there can be no facts of importance which any fair-minded man may not verify, if he will, for himself; that no one has any right to profess to believe any-



thing which one's own mind has not apprehended; that there are various subjects of speculation towards which the only honest attitude for many minds, at least for the present, is of him who says, frankly, "I do not know." Is not this the characteristic temper of the "Agnostic"?

Let me add that, although reared in an "Evangelical" denomination, my mind has always revolted against the word "supernatural," and the implications which usually go with it. I never could easily believe that, besides nature and natural processes, there was another world where processes were not natural. Thus the biblical stories of miracles were an unassimilable burden, till I caught the clew of the great procession of the wonder stories and psychic phenomena which mark the history of all peoples, and which we are studying to-day at first hand. This sort of study—for instance, Professor William James' new work on "The Varieties of Religious Experience"—leaves me still agnostic as regards any assumed supernatural existence.

Moreover, I cannot believe in God as many conceive of God. They seem to have three different facts in view: There is the self; there is nature; of these two facts they are sure; and besides, there is God, of whom they are not as sure as they would like to be. As an old Doctor of Divinity once said to me, looking up to the stars at night, "Ah! if we only were sure that there is a God." Here was the conception of a Being, to be demonstrated, perhaps some time to be seen, inclosed in a form, sitting on a throne; a Being now here, and again somewhere else,—a third something in addition to the universe. I suspect that it was with reference to such a God, a supernatural existence, that Mr Huxley was agnostic. I find myself equally agnostic about this supernatural God. I cannot disprove the hypothesis that such a God is. But my mind does not find such a God in the facts which present themselves. Besides Nature (taking this word in its largest meaning), I cannot discover the evidence of another Being.

Once more, I have to be an agnostic about a future life. Who really knows that he shall have continued personal

existence for ever, as he knows that he loves his wife and children? Here is a subject towards which the attitude of modesty, rather than dogmatism, seems to be fitting. While I go heartily with those who hold to the idea of immortality as a valid and rational hope, I cannot feel that this hope is in any way strengthened by making it an article of a creed. To insist that men shall express a stronger conviction upon any given subject than they sincerely possess, seems to me to be really, not a confession of faith, but of intellectual distrust.

I said that I see no evidence of the existence of a God superimposed upon the universe, or dwelling somewhere in it as an inhabitant,—a sort of a supernatural third Being, besides the self and the world. So far as this variety of theism prevails, it is a survival of polytheism. In place of many supernatural beings, one only remains. Putting aside such an idea of God once for all, I proceed to tell what theistic conception not only satisfies my mind, but appears to tally with all the facts which I know. I may rather say that my thought of God grows out of the facts, and is indeed the only satisfactory interpretation of the facts which I can find. In short, the name "God" is the highest, and on the whole the most comprehensive name with which to sum up my understanding, and my feeling too, about the universe. When I say that I believe in God, I really mean that the universe does not appear to me as a mere mechanism, but as pulsating with life; I mean that the intellectual aspect of the universe is the most striking fact that I observe; I mean that I find in its higher reaches an ethical order or structure; it seems to me singularly purposive; I find it one in essence, and nowhere chaotic or dualistic; it exhibits to my mind not ill-will or indifference, but, as I am more and more firmly constrained to think, a predominant good-will. Seeking to study all kinds of facts, daring to blink none of them, I am simply compelled by the weight of these facts to call this a Divine Universe, or, using the highest name which man has ever developed to describe reality, I say that the Universe brings me face to face with God.



This name indeed seems to me of little moment. The profound question is: What kind of a universe do we live in? I am bound to answer that we live in a good, a rational, a spiritual universe. When men ask, "Is there a God?" I reply, We live in a universe which possesses every quality and characteristic which rational faith ever attributed to God. When men ask, "Shall we ever see God?" I answer that we can already see and feel and know every fact which constitutes the "divine" nature.

Before I go on to show how the facts impress me to say these things, let me use a simple illustration to explain just what I mean in calling the universe "divine" or "spiritual." I am accustomed, for example, to say that I believe in my friend as a man, or as a person. Can I prove the rather mysterious fact of personality? It is not even easy to define it, thoroughly as I believe in it. I see no person, but only a physical structure. Nevertheless, when I speak my friend's name I sum up the total impression that he makes upon me. It is more than a bodily impression: there is intelligence in it; there is sentiment and affection; there is the exhibition of a good-will toward me. All these subtle things are as hard facts as my friend's bones and muscles, and even more indispensable, if I am to call him by the name of a man. Thus, besides the material aspect of the man, there is another aspect which, for want of any better term, and by a sort of figure, we call the man's spiritual nature, without which he would not be a complete man at all. In this mode of thought I do not find it of the slightest consequence how this spiritual aspect is brought about, or what relation it bears to the mechanical facts of nerve and brain cells. Choose any theory that you please as to the part which the nerves and the cells and the blood play, the fact which holds over is, that none of these physical processes have the slightest significance except by reason of the intellectual or spiritual results which they work out. An automaton would not be a man even if you could make it act and dress itself. The man thinks and reasons and

loves ; his consciousness lies at the heart of his manhood. Grant that man should learn to produce life as he once learned to produce fire, so much the more wonderful is this nature which I call spiritual. When I say, then, that the universe impresses me as divine or spiritual, and when I sum up my total impression of it by calling it God, I mean the same thing as when I think of my friend,—not as body alone, but as a spiritual personality,—and when I accordingly sum up my total impression of him by calling him my good friend.

I will now explain more in detail how I get this spiritual impression of the world. Grant that we all begin with what we call the facts of sense. Grant, if you like, that nothing ever comes to us at all except through the door of some one of the senses. Go as far as you like in your study of the kind of phenomena which engage the attention of naturalists like Haeckel. Presently the inevitable question arises: What is this mystery which we call matter? We are of it; we play with it; we handle it and construct with it; we believe in the reality of its existence; but its essence eludes us. We might as well call it spirit as matter. Among our speculations about it, the hypothesis that its atoms are each a whirling centre of force serves as well as anything else to cover our ignorance of its inner nature.

And now, what is force? We feel its presence everywhere. We possess a little store of it in ourselves; we learn to turn it on and apply it. We live as if in a boundless ocean of it. Its tides sweep over and through us. In regard to both matter and force, we appreciate the reality of what Mr Herbert Spencer has called the "Unknowable." Philosophical theists have always been modest in naming the mysterious source and origin of things. God is another name for the "unknowable"; God is that which is in and behind matter; God is that which exercises force; or, if you prefer, Force is one of His names. In other words, that which is behind all things is revealed in Force, both in me and everywhere around us.

I have willingly enough adopted the term "unknowable."



I should as willingly have used the same expression to characterise the inscrutable kernel of personality which we find so difficult to catch and define in the case of the individual man. And yet, however mysterious man's innermost nature is, man is not altogether unknowable. However mysterious the universe is, beyond our finding out, it is not unknowable. If we never know quite what force or matter is, yet our science at every step consists in learning about matter and force.

The truth is, that through the phenomena of both matter and force the unknowable enters the field of knowledge.

Let us see what other qualities or attributes we discover in our universe through which the unknowable makes itself known to us. Thus, for example, in a recent paper before the American Association for the Advancement of Science, its president, Dr Charles S. Minot, calls attention to the marvellous fact of consciousness. The life of the universe rises into consciousness, and reveals itself in consciousness. In other words, there is something in the nature of things besides machinery; there is life, of which consciousness is the signal and characteristic. Try if you can to imagine a universe without anywhere a ray of consciousness. Such a universe might exactly as well be non-existent. It could have no value or significance unless consciousness in some form took cognisance of it.

This brings us to another fact which we predicate about our universe. It is instinct with intelligence. I mean that everything that we see passes over at once into terms of thought. However carelessly we may use the word *law* to describe the processes of nature, we at least mean to affirm our conviction that this is a rational world, and no chaos. We express the relations of the atoms and molecules by ideal numbers, and the motions of bodies in ideal curves. Our own minds are able to hold the universe in a certain sense in our thought. This is simply because we are ourselves the children of the universal intelligence, and our minds reflect back what we discover.

The universe is also beautiful. This is to say that there is

everywhere order, structure, and form. Wherever the play of life is, there is beauty. It is a world that makes patterns and colours and harmonies, and its forces play in rhythm. It is as true to call the universe beautiful as to call it orderly, or to say that it reveals energy. Neither do I forget the facts which we call ugly, without specimens of which I cannot see how we should ever discover the nature of beauty at all. But the ugly thing is never wholly ugly. Even the dead things have a beauty of their own, or else they are on their way to pass over into new forms of life. The worst ugliness is a tribute to the reality of beauty.

Can we now, in any legitimate sense, say that the universe is moral? With difficulty, if we set man over against the universe. But our thought of man is not as separate from the universe. We think of man as the child of the universe. Here the life of the world rises towards its fruitage. Elsewhere we have a partial expression of what the universe is. Here, especially at man's best, we have the fullest expression of the nature of the universe. Man is what the universe has made him. Man at his best shows, does he not, the trend of the process of evolution in the universe? Here is matter, force, consciousness, intelligence, beauty, or art; also goodness, justice, love.

This is very obvious to the student of morality upon the large scale of history. Morality begins with the dawn of intelligence; it is in the animals; it exists as a social or co-operative force, without which animal existence could not go on. It is at work among the most childish peoples, who all respond to some sort of appeal to the sense of justice. Show men's intelligence that a course of action is for the common good, and there sets in a natural tide of obligation pressing them to take that course.

This fact is, of course, most marked in the case of men who are quite normal and mature, and less marked in children and childish peoples. Why must Darwin find out and tell the truth, however little his fellows relish it? Why must Haeckel go to the trouble of puncturing popular superstitions?



Why must Wilberforce or Garrison give his life for the sake of freeing an "inferior race" from slavery? Why must men die at the stake or on the Cross for an idea? Is this all only another form of egotism? Or is it not rather because the spirit of the universe is in these men's acts? Because, in other words, goodness or good-will is as really a characteristic of the hidden life of the universe, as it is of a true and normal man? Whence does justice, love of truth, mercy, sympathy, humanity, idealism come from, unless these spiritual factors are as truly of the nature of the universe as force is, or orderly sequence, or the mathematical relations of a parabola? In short, I find in man—not in one man alone, but in all men at their best—a natural, not supernatural, incarnation; by which I mean, that "the unknowable," or God, is made known in man through all the characteristic qualities of the universe, whose child man is. The universe is the macrocosm, man is the microcosm.

"An audacious conception," it may be said. But is there any other conception that tallies with the facts or makes any sense of them? And is not man—I mean, man at his best and most mature development—entirely worthy of this conception? That he can conceive of a universe at all, much more a divine universe; that he can talk of the infinite in space and time; that he can prefer a thousandfold honour, or love, or the good of men unborn, to the longest life, is the mark of his birthright. The "unknowable" is in him.

I hear, now, a chorus of the voices of distrust. "Very good," men say; "if goodness is in man, and idealism, and the love of truth, so are sensualism, cruelty, injustice, and all animalism. Are these ugly things also the characteristics of the universal nature?" This seemed to be a perfectly valid difficulty to men who held the old-fashioned dogma of creationism. I wonder that men find it a difficulty who hold and apply the idea of evolution. To the thoroughgoing evolutionist, evil can never seem the same kind of universal fact as force is, or intelligence, or goodness. Evil, like cold or darkness, is merely incidental and relative. The feebleness of

a child, his falls and hurts, his backwardness and waywardness, his lapses, his faults and his stupidities, simply mark the path of a being who must grow before he comes to fuller and ampler health and life. That he is still a child, and not a mature man, means that he needs yet more life, and especially the higher qualities of life. He errs and falls and "sins" by way of the process of life, wherein he finds out for himself what the fulness of the life of the universe is. He never breaks the Golden Rule without learning a new lesson of the fact that the Golden Rule is the way of his happiness.

Is not ill-will, it is asked, a species of force? The ill-will, for example, of a passionate child or an excited mob seems to me like the misdirection of the power in a mill by an ignorant workman, whereby he and others are injured. In the display of passion or hate, in falsehood or cruelty, I see simply the crude force of the animal nature. The man is not yet "all there." The very fact of immorality implies ideals to which the man is climbing.

What shall we say of the man slowly dying of cancer? We say, what some of us have actually witnessed, that the spirit of man never shows itself so sublime, like the child of the universe, as when it lifts itself above disease and pain, which touch only the body, and translates suffering into the terms of a nobler good-will. Here is God in his highest manifestation, turning what we call evil into good.

The time has gone by when, after having driven the devil out of every corner of the phenomenal universe, and failed to find the touch of malice or hate in earthquakes or tempests, we can be scared by the presence of the devil of dualism in the moral order, and persuaded that "sin" is a kind of power, and not, rather, the want of power, the mark of low human vitality.

I have so far simply followed a common modern habit of speech and used the word "universe." But how does anyone know enough to make this magnificent assumption? And what do we mean when we say that we live in a universe? We surely do not know this by the superficial facts of obser-



vation. Early men were not unreasonable in thinking that they saw the working of all sorts of discordant forces, if not of numberless deities, in the processes of nature. Are we perfectly sure even now that the earthquake is a part of the order of the universe? If our idea of a universe is anything like the unity of a machine, we cannot easily adjust the facts of earthquakes and falling stars and death to such a mechanical universe.

The truth is, we do not believe in the universe as a piece of mechanism. What we think is that all things in it are related together, that all things work together. The unity is vital; it is the unity of that which moves and grows, as if it corresponded to some idea or purpose. As an actual world, seen only for the moment, it is not a universe. It becomes a universe to us in view of the ideal suggestions that its æonian processes reveal. Suppose, for instance, that the only tenable supposition of the consummation of the universe was its total collapse into darkness and death. I doubt whether in this case we should call it a universe. There are facts, such as man's love of truth, his justice and his disinterestedness, which lie outside of the processes of a world simply grinding itself to extinction. Moreover, the intelligence stands aghast at the conception of a meaningless universe which only exists to run down. I suspect, therefore, that the word "universe" has no valid meaning apart from the conception of an ideal, or intellectual, or spiritual order, which indeed we do not see actually realised as yet, but which the processes of nature, including the story of man, urge upon our minds. The universe is not merely certain physical processes so correlated as to work aimlessly together, but its vital processes work together for good—that is, for life, and not for death; for the expression of goodness or spiritual personality; and not for annihilation and chaos. Thus, we see power in our universe, we see intelligence, we see form and beauty, we see also already good-will, or love. We conclude that this, the latest of the characteristics of the universe to develop into manifestation, is the key and clew to

the meaning of the whole. In this case, and in this case only, we have a valid universe. As Mr Browning says,

“From the first, Power was—I knew.  
Life has made clear to me  
That, strive but for closer view,  
Love were as plain to see.  
When see? When there dawns a day,  
If not on the homely earth,  
Then yonder worlds away,  
When the strange and new have birth,  
And Power comes full in play.”

In short, I cannot use the word *universe* intelligently except as I find in it a spiritual meaning. There might conceivably be a material aggregation, but not a material universe.

This sort of unity seems a bold flight of the intelligence. I for one am filled with wonder whenever I turn to it. It betokens the marvellous nature which man shares, that he should be capable of this thought. But what else or less will satisfy man's thinking? That all the phenomena of existence are translatable into the conception of one universe life, present everywhere, of whom Power and Mind and Will and Love are so many names, seems to me vastly more satisfying and rational than anything else which we can say. For example, Haeckel's "Law of Substance" does not seem to me at all adequate to account for the very things which he makes the basis of religion, namely, the good, the true, and the beautiful. What a perfectly marvellous world it is if we suppose its infinite number of atoms to have combined together of themselves and to have built up the colossal structure of order and beauty; to have made history, and written dramas, and thought out philosophies, and urged men to bear the crosses of sorrow for love's sake! This is a harder and not an easier form of the mystery which theism interprets under the name of the One and Infinite God. Haeckel hardly does justice to the higher possibilities of his monistic philosophy. He therefore seems to me to fail to answer the practical problems of human life as regards what duty is, and why I should die rather than deny it, or what truth is, and why,



unless I happen to like it, I ought to follow it. Whereas, if our monism is once seen to be theistic or spiritual rather than mechanical, the intelligence, the goodness and the truth now appear, not as mere accidents of being, but as coeval with the star-dust, and universal as force is. I not only feel in my body the pressure of the law of gravitation, but I feel a nobler urgency, namely, the pressure of the universal good-will, commanding all men to live like "sons of God."

Let me reaffirm that I am professing to make no hard and fast demonstration of Theism. I simply state what I find as I study the universe. I am everywhere impressed with the fact that thought is dominant; that material things are made intelligible only in terms of thought; that, begin as often as you will with matter or phenomena, you are presently dealing with ideal, moral, spiritual values; that, so far as the universe bears any fruit or promises any results, the fruit and the results are measured in such spiritual values. I do not find the universe bad or indifferent; I have to call it good. In short, the mystery that is in and behind all things—Mr Spencer's "Unknowable"—is as truly characterised by goodness as by power or by order. This is essentially a theistic interpretation of the facts of the world.

Grant now that this is only at first a working theory. It is at least as good as the conception of gravitation or of the atomic theory. It seems to tally with the facts and relate them together as nothing else does. We try such a working theory and inquire how it works. Will it work? I cannot see why any reasonable agnostic should not go with me here. I observe indeed that most of the agnostics whom I know actually proceed as if this were a good and spiritual universe. They live as a man would live if he believed in goodness as the most substantial reality. They hold virtue, truth, honour, civic duty, and humanity as the most precious things. They measure success not in what they get as animals, but in what they can give and accomplish as men. Thus Haeckel, I take it, does not study and write in order to coin his power into money, but

to persuade men's minds, to teach what he holds to be truth, to increase human welfare. This is exactly the kind of conduct which corresponds to the theistic interpretation of the universe. It does not seem to me to correspond with the idea of a chaotic, or bad, or meaningless, or atheistic world. If that of which we are only the children were futile or bad, or if goodness only consisted in an accidental arrangement of nerve cells, I cannot see why we should recognise any obligation to be good. Where does the obligation arise unless in "the nature of things"? But this obligation is a spiritual force, and, to my thinking, presupposes a spiritual reality. This is the very fact which men have groped after under the name of "God."

The fact is, the agnostic likes to pique men's curiosity. He enjoys the advantage of living the "good life" just as the most consistent theist would live it. He gives access to the moral or spiritual forces which play through him. He knows that this course works well, and nothing else brings a man satisfaction. "But see," he says, "how little I need the usual religious capital in the way of phrases and formulas and creeds. I get on without any of them." As if a man were ever richer for phrases and creeds! As if the man who believes in truth and goodness were not infinitely more religious than he is who talks of God, but really believes in his own selfishness! The "religious" men have professed too much. It is they who drive the agnostic to say less than he really believes. When unreal men make superstition into a religion, real men are tempted to say, "If this is religion, we want none of it."

We are brought here to the relation of our Theism to Ethics. The highest of all sciences is that which is concerned with the principles of human conduct. The most practical of the arts is the art of living together in society. Grant the theistic interpretation of the universe, and at once all conduct relates itself to the vital power at the heart of Nature. To do right is simply to live in unison with the invisible good-will. When man, the child of the universe, expresses goodness or love, he simply expresses the highest characteristic of the Spirit of the



Universe, the Father and Mother of us all. Here is the only permanent foundation of a Science of Ethics.

We see at once what human happiness, or welfare, or satisfaction is at its best. It is the unison of the individual life with the life that makes all things. We are happiest when there flows through us most fully the motion of the life which is summed up into the names of Mind, Beauty, Truth, and Good-will. All Experience bears out this assertion. The fact is beneath all names, descriptions, and religions. The fact at times transcends bodily weariness or pain. Jesus' beatitudes only partially express it. In his hours of uttermost good-will a man most completely lives. Is not this what we should expect in consonance with the thought of an infinite good-will at the heart of the world? Here is a sort of "experience of religion," free of all visions or swoons or rhapsodies, that lies within the reach of the most prosaic or humble citizen of the universe. Try the recipe and see for yourself. Come out of your selfishness or egotism; enter by any genuine act of good-will into the universal order of love, and see if the world does not behave as if it were God's world.

A simple parable may serve to help some minds still further to grasp my meaning. Let us suppose some little vein in my hand to be gifted with self-consciousness, after the fashion of a man's consciousness. This bit of a vein goes on to philosophise about its relation to the life of the man in whose body it lives. It has been told that there is somewhere a man, but it cannot see any man. It only sees a little part of my body. It hears about the indefinite expansion of the body in all directions, as the man hears of the stellar system. The mite of a vein begins to doubt whether there is a man. No one has seen him. Where is he? There is nothing but nerves and muscles and organs. There is no unity apparent except a mechanical one. The very fact that I am everywhere in my body, that I, the man, am moral or spiritual, and have no fixed habitation in the heart or any gland, that my unity is of a person and not of a machine, mystifies the poor little agnostic vein.

Suppose now this little vein fairly goes over to the side of outright pessimism. It "guesses" that no one cares for it; it is bruised and wounded at times, and complains that its life is not worth living. And yet all this time, so long as it performs the functions of a vein, I am really taking care of it. I suffer in its hurts; I am glad through it too whenever my body tingles with health. The vein does not know when it is well off.

The tiny vein at last proceeds to act out its pessimism about me. It ceases to play its part in the circulation; it tries to get its nourishment as before, but without doing its work, or pouring my life blood through it. And now pain sets in, and the nerves bring the story of the little vein's need—the need of more of my life!

Suppose "the gospel" comes to this pessimistic vein; I mean the fact that my life is in and through my whole body, and that the single condition necessary to enjoy all that I possess is that each nerve and vein and cell shall keep in line with the flow of my life, shall give the circulation full and free play through it, shall pour my life out and share and express it, and not try to get and keep life for itself. The sick vein obeys the message; it wills to do all that I ask; it will be hurt and bruised if need be, and it will not complain; it will die for me if I require. And now this little vein, once restored to its place in unison with my life and my will, has new fulness of life, in which all the other veins in my body partake.

This is only a parable, but it serves to illustrate what the nature of the relation is which I conceive we, the conscious selves, bear to the universal life. There is a sense in which we can never see or know God at all. There is a profound and practical sense in which we can be sure of the indwelling reality of the life of the universe. It is the sense in which the old writer taught that "whosoever loveth is born of God and knoweth God." For, to love or to show good-will is the highest function of the life of man. To love is to enter into the divine order.

C. F. DOLE.



# DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A MIRACULOUS BIRTH.

REV. C. E. BEEBY, B.D.,

Vicar of Yardley Wood.

## I.

THE question of which I treat is become of urgent interest among a large number of professing Christians in all denominations. The visible sign of the fact is its treatment as among "critical questions" by such eminently respectable divines as the present Bishop of Worcester, Professor Sanday, Dr R. F. Horton, not to mention the incomplete effort of the Dean of Ripon.<sup>1</sup> The time seems now ripe for an attempt to make clear the inwardness and real import of that for which, on one

<sup>1</sup> "The Historical Trustworthiness of the Gospels," Lectures delivered by Dr Gore, Bishop of Worcester, at St Philip's Church, Birmingham; Lectures iii., iv., published in *The Church Times*, Dec. 24th, 1902. "Sermons on Critical Questions," a course of sermons preached at St Martin's, Marylebone Road; No. 4, "The Virgin Birth of our Lord Jesus Christ," by Professor Sanday, published in *The Church Times*, Feb. 6th, 1903. Sermon on "The Virgin Birth of Christ," by Dr R. F. Horton, published in *The Christian World*, Dec. 26th, 1901. Lecture given before *The Churchmen's Union*, Oct. 29th, 1902, at St Martin's Vestry Hall, Charing Cross, on "Natural Christianity," by the Very Reverend W. H. Freemantle, D.D., but not published. "The Miracles and Supernatural Character of the Gospels," a paper read at the Church Congress, Northampton, by the Rev. H. B. Swete, Regius Professor of Divinity, Cambridge. "The Supernatural Element in our Lord's Earthly Life," by Professor Chase, President of Queen's College, Cambridge (Macmillan). "The Virgin Birth of our Lord," by Dr B. W. Randolph (Longmans). "Some Thoughts on the Incarnation," by the Very Reverend J. A. Robinson, D.D. (Longmans). "The Dogma of the Virgin Birth of Christ," by Paul Lobstein, Professor of Dogmatics in the University of Strasbourg, English translation, edited by the Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D. (Williams and Norgate).

side or the other, men contend in the debate of the question of a miraculous Birth. Once the doctrine began to be discussed by theologians, its real significance was sure to show forth with all the immense issues involved, altogether unsuspected by the majority of those who repeat the terms of the Creed, and honestly enough contend for what they have been taught to regard as "the faith once delivered to the saints."

My object in this paper is to attempt to set forth the issues involved in the doctrine, and to make clear some implications which are not, it seems to me, as yet sufficiently realised by English theologians.

First let me ask, on what does the expectation of miracle to produce Christ depend? And what is the general view of the universe and of the relation of God to it, to which such an expectation is adapted? It has been laid down by a leading divine that "Humanity in its ordinary course could not have produced a sinless man."<sup>1</sup> We are able here to join issue at once. The whole theological interest of the question lies in the points of view thus differentiated. Nature is apparently conceived as acting and producing apart from God. Could Nature, we are tempted to ask, do anything of itself? Could Nature, for example, produce Man? When they are not discussing a miraculous birth, most Christian believers, I imagine, will indignantly repudiate the suggestion that Nature can do anything of itself, as though indeed it were a second God. God, they think, can and does act through Nature to produce what He has pre-ordained and pre-destined.

There is no evidence that Nature was ever different from what it now is in respect of its primary elements, and the fundamental laws of its operations and forces. Monotheism, indeed, is commonly based on the assumed fact of the Uniformity of Nature and the universality of the Reign of Law, which is recognised as one, with the inference that it represents in some manner the operation and work of God. The conception of

<sup>1</sup> "Our Lord's Nativity," by Canon Charles Gore, M.A., published in *The Christian World Pulpit*, April 3rd, 1895.



miracle is perforce built on the notion of the insufficiency and imperfection of Nature's normal operations and general laws. Nature is regarded either as originally the work of a Demiurge, or as the subject of "some terrible aboriginal calamity," to use Newman's phrase. Nature being given over to evil in its normal operations, perforce producing and continuing evil in the world, we must look for the sign of God's presence to a small and very special department of human life, to a page in human history, to a miraculous episode in the course of the Great World-Event.

It is, of course, a possible conception, but have those who maintain it realised fully what it means? If God can work miracles and does not; if He merely gives a specimen of what He could do if He would, and all through the ages of suffering humanity He does it not, but does quite differently, such an imagination, so far from enlarging our idea of God, and our conception of Him as an object of worship, makes Him morally a Being whom it is impossible for moral man to worship. It is not an intellectual difficulty which compels men to reject miracle; it is the moral sense which protests against the whole conception in the urgent interest of a fundamental faith. If the miracle contended equally with the normal operation of Nature, we might believe that the Good Being, meeting with some difficulty, would one day overcome Nature completely and win the victory, and so in the end the love behind the working of the miracle would be manifested in the Almighty Power which rules the universe. The miracle is of necessity a strong rebuke of Nature as normal operation of the Universe. But when the miracle, which, by the hypothesis, is the work of mercy, is but a spot in the ocean of what is, by the same hypothesis, unmerciful, how can one put one's trust in the Power behind the miracle?

The problem is stated with a certain amount of ambiguity in the saying, "Humanity in its ordinary course could not have produced a sinless man." In a sense it is a truism, for the many exceptional and unusual events which happen in the world cannot with propriety be called ordinary events; they are

commonly called, indeed, extraordinary, yet they take place within the order of Nature. It is not a question whether Nature or Humanity of its own will, apart from God, could have produced a sinless Christ, but whether He could have been produced according to the ordinary processes and operations of Nature. Previous to experience, how many events are there in respect to which it might have been said with some confidence that God could not effect these through the ordinary course of nature; previous to experience, might it not even be held that any one fact in the world is quite as inconceivable as any other possible or imaginable fact? The first manifestation of life on this earth was certainly an exceptional and unusual event, extraordinary, as we say in common speech; but if the main notion of evolution be true, it occurred as an event quite within the order of Nature, whatever metaphysical account be given of the fact. The introduction of a new species was by the hypothesis new, and extraordinary in the popular sense of the term, but it was not miraculous, that is to say, it did not happen suddenly by a Divine interposition, it arose out of the ordinary course of Nature's laws and operations. So, too, the first appearance of man is not maintained by any at the present day to have been miraculous in the sense that it did not occur within the course and order of Nature, so far forth at any rate as "the material frame and its powers and adaptations" is concerned. By the hypothesis it did not require a miracle in the sense in which miracle is asserted of the introduction of Christ into the world.

In the Neolithic age, if the portraiture of a St Paul, a St John, a St Francis, a Shakespeare, an Edison, or a Marconi had been presented to them, men might well have said that Humanity in its ordinary course could not produce such beings. But Nature has produced them all. In view of what Nature has accomplished, it would seem to be nothing but a violent prepossession and special interpretation of "sin" which must lay down the "a priori" axiom that Nature could not produce a sinless Christ. How they regard a



Virgin-Birth who frankly accept Evolution as the normal process of the becoming, or event, of the world and its content, I cannot surmise. I cannot but think that the most anxiously orthodox theologians must often experience a strong wish that they might be able to say, "See what Nature has produced! Not a theoretical Nature apart from God, but Nature as we know it, instinct with Divine Power, has produced Christ. He was fore-ordained before the foundation of the world; God predestined Him, a kind of first fruits, that is, best fruits of creation." That seems to me a grandly inspiring idea. Nature belongs to God. Evolution is the law of His working, and see now what, in the slow patient predestination of God, Nature, as the instrument of God, has produced, a Christ! This is the climax, the acme, the crown of human evolution through the processes and operations of Nature, the foretaste and prophecy of what God will do "at last far off, at last to all," for all men and for all humanity!

## II.

Let me now point out some further implications of this view of "Christ according to the flesh," as the acme and crown of terrestrial Evolution.

Evolution means, very briefly, that Man has emerged out of a lower stage of existence, and that some elements of his present life are traceable to the lower animal world. This is the case not only in respect of the structure and composition of man's physical organism, but in respect also of his primary psychical powers, whatever fulness of capacity or height of attainment they may now have reached. Man, in his march of progress, carries with him the elements of the lower life. The question cannot be shirked. If Christ was a physical organism in nature, then He carried the elements of the lower in Him. He was a natural organism in physical structure and composition, built up as a physical organism on the

skeleton of the vertebrates. He had, we must suppose, all the structural organs which are proper to man as genus "Homo," was subject to all the automatic natural processes, and exercised all the normal functions of the natural organism such as are common to man. Some of these are expressly stated in the records of His life, as that He hungered and thirsted, ate and drank, made effort, was weary and sad, needed rest and recreation; and the residue are implied in the silence which takes for granted their existence, no hint being given that there were any exceptions to the full subjection to which He submitted, sharing the animal necessities which belong to "the body of our humiliation."<sup>1</sup> Then again, on the psychical side He was human, as well as in respect to His body. The facts recited in the gospel records imply the limitations of His human nature in respect of knowledge. If Christ's intellectual capacity and secular knowledge were perfect, the only conclusion we can come to is that He did not care for knowledge, and this conclusion is more discouraging and more disconcerting to faith than the opinion of Christ's imperfection as human in respect of intellectual capacity. If Christ was a physical organism, by the recognised relations of the physical and psychical we should expect Him to be subject to the accompanying limitations of a normal physical organisation in respect to His human intelligence. His limitation in respect to knowledge is, indeed, allowed and even maintained by some of those who, like Dr Gore, would affirm Christ on His human side to be a kind of "new creation," abnormal "in physical structure or composition." I urge this point because it seems to me that they who recognise "the intimate connection between the spirit character and the physical organisation," and admit likewise the limitation of Christ in respect of knowledge, are on their own grounds bound to recognise equally a limitation on the moral side of His human nature.

If we refer to the sacred records of His life and to the

<sup>1</sup> Phil. iii. 21, R.V.



apostolic testimony this limitation is manifest. He not only grew in wisdom as in stature, but He was subject in no less degree to the law of moral growth and development. The character of Christ's sacrifice was the surrender of the human will in obedience to the Divine Will. "When he" the Son "cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not, but a body hast thou prepared me: In burnt offerings and sacrifices for sin thou hast no pleasure. Then said I, Lo, I come (In the volume of the book it is written of me) to do Thy will, O God . . . . He taketh away the first, that he may establish the second."<sup>1</sup> This sacrifice of obedience to the will of God, which would seem to be the essential character of the perfect sacrifice of Christ, was not all at once complete; it was a sacrifice He learned to offer through the experience of life, till it was perfected on the cross. He had to learn obedience, and He learned obedience in the school of suffering. "For it became him for whom are all things, and through whom are all things, in bringing many sons into glory, to make the author of their salvation perfect through suffering."<sup>2</sup> The Son, like the many sons, must be made perfect through suffering.

Now let it be observed that the statements compel a conception of the growth of Christ as something more than an inevitable unfolding of a nature already perfect. He was tempted or tried. This temptation or trial of Christ was more than a mere trial of physical endurance or endurance of moral strength. He suffered being tried. Not only did He suffer because of the trial, but He suffered in the trial because of the infirmities of His nature. "Who in the days of his flesh, having offered up prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears unto him that was able to save him from death, and having been heard for his godly fear, though he was a son, yet learned obedience by the things which he suffered, and having been made perfect, he became unto all them that obey him the cause of eternal salvation."<sup>3</sup> Such an account of Christ's life

<sup>1</sup> Heb. x. 5-9.

<sup>2</sup> Heb. ii. 10, R.V.

<sup>3</sup> Heb. v. 7-9, R.V.

in the flesh seems quite inconsistent with the conception of it as the simple unfolding of an already perfect nature. Suffering through trial implies real effort needed and put forth to resist temptation ; it implies real internal struggle. It implies the recognition in His nature of elements capable of seducing Him to evil. Did the power of evil assail Him, no temptation from without could produce any suffering, through effort and struggle in resistance, were there in His nature no elements capable of responding to it and of being laid hold of by it. He acquired moral strength, the reinforcement of the will to resist and overcome, as we all acquire it, by constant trials, through the experience of life, and by the discipline which is constituted by repeated acts, which finally become habits of resistance to evil. It is given as the ground why He has been made the great High Priest of redeemed Humanity, that He can feel with our infirmities. Not only does He feel compassion for us because of our infirmities, but Himself experienced the infirmities which we experience, such as are common to beings of flesh and blood, not only in respect of the physical suffering but of the moral struggle. He is able to bring succour to them that are tried, for the reason that He himself has suffered in His own trial and testing "in the days of his flesh."

The sinlessness of Christ in this view is the sinlessness of One who, not incapable of sin, but really tried and tempted, resisted and overcame and did no sin. Sinlessness can, indeed, with little propriety be attributed to a human nature which is incapable of sin. Such a being, artistically perfect, would be morally less perfect than many a sinner who hates sin and resists, yet only imperfectly overcomes. We feel it at once impertinent to say that God is sinless. Perfect Being cannot be sinless because there are in Him no elements which make sin a possibility. Only the being who has in him the elements of a lower life, as well as the potentiality of a higher, is capable of sin ; only such can be sinless. Sin, I submit, is a conception which in its very nature implies a conflict in and for moral beings. You may hold that Christ was sinless, in the



sense that He was so constituted in His human structure and composition that He could not sin, that "Sin had no concern with Christ's nature," but then you are bound at the same time to avoid all language which should suggest temptation, trial, testing, effort, prayer, resistance, overcoming, on the part of Christ.

The conclusion we draw from the facts of the records and the apostolic testimony is that which is involved in the opinion that Christ was of the same nature in physical structure and composition with ourselves, a physical organism in nature, flesh and blood in the ordinary acceptation of the terms. The normal physical man, as man, standing forth a physical organism of flesh and blood, carries with him the elements of the lower animal world, with the appetites and passions of the lower. A being of different physical structure or composition, whatever outward semblance to us he may assume, is no more human nature, and can have no more sympathy with us, and be no more an example which it is possible for us to follow, than an archangel or a megatherium.

We must pursue the subject to its proper end and trace Christ as a natural organism to His origin on this earth-plane of existence "according to the flesh."

Christ is presented to us, then, in the records of His life and in the express statements of the apostolic writers, I submit, as an organism in nature, subject to all the ordinary limitations of human nature. He grew in respect both of His moral and spiritual nature and of His intellectual nature. He learned obedience by the things which He suffered; He grew in wisdom, He grew in favour with God and with man. And further, this mental, moral, and spiritual development accompanied, as we might anticipate, a growth in His physical constitution. "He grew in wisdom and in stature." Having reached so far back in the earthly origin of Jesus from mature manhood to boyhood, we might anticipate that the same course of nature would be continued back to its natural origin. We might presume that Jesus, since He is thus pictured to us as growing in His moral, mental, spiritual, and

physical nature, would be truly an infant as other infants; that He would be introduced into the world by the natural process of birth, and that the pre-natal process, of which birth is but the natural issue and event, would in His case precede. And when we consult the records they seem to bear out our presumptions in every respect.<sup>1</sup> Further back than this, as the origin of the human life manifested on this earth-plane, we cannot go. But if so far I have been followed with consent, and the significance of the course we have thus pursued to its result be realised, there can arise, it seems to me, no further question of real interest or serious concern.

What is needed now is little more than a definition of terms. We can think of the beginning on the earth-plane, as constituted by the half-life of man and the half-life of a demigod, some being of some material form. We can conceive that the introduction of the life into the world was effected by means wholly beyond our knowledge, and rest in the simple assertion of miracle or the infinite resources of Almighty Power. But when my mind is directed to a beginning of the life in time and space, known in human experience, and understood in science, the statement that the human life came out of the half-life of a single parent represents nothing to my mind. It is not only unthinkable, it is destructive of the thought to which I have been introduced by the reference above.

“Conception” and “birth” are both well understood physiological conditions. If, in the mind of those who use the terms in the Creed, they be used in a non-natural sense, in some technical meaning of theology, it is incumbent on the theologian to make clear what that particular sense is in which he uses them. “The test of sound technical language,” in the opinion of Sir Frederick Pollock, “is that it is capable of being put into sensible English.” No one will deny the right of theology to have a technical language of its own. Certainly, if such common

<sup>1</sup> Luke i. 31; ii. 5, 6. See also Luke ii. 21-24, and *cf.* Leviticus xii.



terms as these are to be understood in a sense peculiar to theological science, it opens out a very wide field of doubt, and seems to make religious thought a peculiar possession of a very special class of minds. That would seem to be undesirable enough; but what is worse is that theology should have a technical language of its own, which not only ordinary men may not understand, but to which the theologian himself can attach no intelligible and definite meaning.

The only definition of a miraculous birth that I know of is that given by Roman Catholic theology. It has saved the miracle at the expense of the true conception and birth, and true humanity of Christ. He is introduced miraculously into the womb of the Virgin, already a perfect Man, and is hidden in her, as in a pure tabernacle, until the time appointed that He shall, as a spiritual body, come forth into the world. That is neither conception nor birth. The theory is, in fact, a Valentinian heresy, which later found admittance into the Catholic Church. It is not, I believe, a doctrine of the Church of England, and it is from Anglican theologians that I seek an explanation. The language of the New Testament is too plain to make such a doctrine possible to those who refer the substance of their faith to the warrant of Scripture. It must be confessed at the same time that the Roman doctrine assigns the most intelligible meaning to the terms of the Creed, if they are to be interpreted as affirming the apparently contradictory propositions of a miraculous "conception" and a miraculous "birth." The Roman Catholic definition frankly disavows true conception and birth, and sets forth some process altogether outside human experience, by which Christ was introduced into the world, which, for want of better terms, it agrees to call "conception" and "birth."

### III.

We have considered the doctrine of Christ as a natural organism. What is the alternative doctrine of which a miracu-

lous Birth is the keystone? It is clearly set forth by a leading Anglican divine. An ineradicable taint of sin belongs to our nature. The fault is man's fundamental physical structure or composition. "In view of the power of heredity and of the entail of the lower animal which belongs to all, there must be a physical miraculousness as the foundation of moral perfection." There must be "something that was also physically and materially miraculous" in the birth of Jesus. It is further explained that "the physical miracle" was nothing less than "a new physical creation," "something miraculous in the fundamental structure of His manhood," yet more plainly "something miraculous in its physical structure or composition."<sup>1</sup>

The ineradicable taint of sin is here avowedly bound up with the physical structure or composition of the natural organism. The problem of Salvation is how to escape from the body of natural flesh and blood. This school of thought, represented by Dr Gore, continues to speak of the flesh and blood of Christ, but the terms are used metaphorically. Flesh and blood are no longer natural flesh and blood, but elements proper to the new kind of organism, new in physical structure or composition, which correspond to the flesh and blood of the natural organism, and which it is agreed, for want of better terms, to call "the flesh and blood of the new spiritual Manhood." In strict accordance with this theory, this school speaks of Christ no longer as having taken upon Him our nature, but, in more guarded language, declares that "He embodies a nature like our own."

We have thus to imagine a body of a fundamental physical

<sup>1</sup> An address delivered by Canon Gore "On the Virgin Birth of Christ," at Wesley's Chapel, reported in *The Christian World*, March 21st, 1901, and *The Methodist Recorder*, March 21st, 1901. *Dissertations* by Chas. Gore, M.A., i. § 7. "The New Manhood," by Canon Gore, published in *The Christian World Pulpit*, March 28th, 1900. "The Historical Trustworthiness of the Gospels," Lectures delivered in St Philip's Church, Birmingham, by Dr Gore, Bishop of Worcester; Lecture iv., published in *The Church Times*, Dec. 24th, 1902.



structure or composition different from our own, yet apparently and superficially resembling our own; a miraculously organised structure, with all the common organs of the natural body, exercising apparently the same physical functions, subject to all the same internal operations of the natural body; a bodily life which developed itself apparently under the same laws as these we know, a physical frame apparently like our own in being renewed again and again in cycles of years, every particle of it having in these successive periods been carried away and replaced. We have to think of the same organic relationship of the mental and the physical, a human mind that works through the instrumentality of a brain, and a relationship of the moral and physical that generally holds, a being limited by the laws of moral growth in harmony with the growth of the physical organism, a being limited by the law of heredity, so far as He was of a particular race, a Jew, in some of the characters of His humanity, and born in the hereditary line of a particular descent, of the house and lineage of David; but we must tell ourselves at the same time that in reality all these processes and events of nature were but a semblance, imitations only of operations and functions of a natural organism acted in a being to which they do not properly belong, at best representative only of other actions which took place in an organism outside nature. His flesh and blood were not natural flesh and blood, but something corresponding thereto in a new kind of miraculous organism. He ate and drank, He spake, He moved from place to place, in semblance only. It was all a part played for our edification. His temptation was a splendid dramatic action. He humbled Himself in appearance only, for He did not take on Him the elements of the lower out of which man has emerged as a physical organism in nature, which constitutes this body "the body of our humiliation," and creates the very conditions for us of the moral conflict. His death was a simulation; for how can we imagine that God, in creating a new kind of physical organism by a special miracle, would endow it with the very elements of corruptibility which (by

the hypothesis) are the result of the sin of man? His birth was not a natural birth; He was not truly conceived. He had the semblance of man. It would be unfair to charge those who advocate such views with Docetism, but in the absence of further explanation it is difficult to give any intelligible account of the course of events other than that of the Docetists.

The most serious issue of this doctrine of Christ as "a new physical creation" remains to be pointed out. It is plain that such a being can be no possible example for us in our human nature to follow. We need not be told that "there were, after all, necessary limitations to the 'example' idea. Christ is only our example inasmuch as He is what, by dwelling in us, He will ultimately bring us to."<sup>1</sup> It seems to follow clearly enough from the doctrine, and yet it is not too much to say that it entails the elimination out of Christendom of almost every sermon and treatise ever preached or published bearing on the practice of the Christian life. We have no longer a Christ who is the Great High Priest of redeemed humanity. We have lost the Christ who can feel with us because He is one with us in physical structure or composition. No longer can He help us in our trials, Himself having experienced the same trials, and suffered with the same kind of suffering. "There is no kind of temptation," taught the late Archbishop Temple, "that takes us, which did not in some degree take Him."<sup>2</sup> With a Christ different from us "in the fundamental structure of His manhood," the sympathy, the hope, the courage of that thought are taken from us. "Leaving you an example, that ye should follow his steps: who did no sin," implies capacity on our part, and Christ Himself seems to place no limit to our aspiration and hope of attainment, saying, "Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect."

<sup>1</sup> "The Virgin Birth of Christ," an address delivered by Canon Gore at Wesley's Chapel, reported in *The Christian World*, March 21st, 1901.

<sup>2</sup> "Temptation," by Frederick Temple, D.D., published in *The Christian World Pulpit*, March 2nd, 1898.



But our hope lay just in the belief that we are "all of one," and therefore that He is not ashamed to call us brethren. What seems to be required by our condition of temptation and trial, in order to resist and overcome the evil by the good in us, is the reinforcement of the human will by the strength of the Spirit of God. That our nature has the capacity, and that Christ has proved it, is the good news which the earthly life of Christ has brought to many. But if sin is radically attached to our fundamental constitution in nature, this capacity may be given as a reward of moral effort, but in no case can any moral effort avail for salvation without the acquisition of a new kind of physical organisation. Life must come directly to us through the impartation to us, in some way, of the new physical structure that Christ is. And if we cannot rise into higher life by the strengthening of the will in our natural constitution, but only by a new physical organisation being given us, then I have no concern so far in the enterprise; it remains for God to re-construct me. The principle which inspires devotion to a miraculous birth falls in with the principle of Sacramentarianism to which we are now bound. It is the principle of mediæval Catholicism. The salvation of man is to be effected by the introduction of a new organic material cell. The scheme of salvation is dependent, first of all, on the entrance of the new cell miraculously, by processes other than natural, which secure for the Mother freedom from all defilement, and for Christ freedom from the inheritance of all taint of sin. This cell must be incorporated in some manner into ourselves. It is distributed in the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ, and the assimilation of it into the physical organism through natural processes is the guarantee that we shall rise from the dead in a new and glorified body. From beginning to end, salvation in the Catholic system is bound up with the new material cell. Our hope is in the priest and the sacramental system.

But are believers in a miraculous birth pledged to the consequential beliefs in which Dr Gore involves it? To my mind,

he has thought out the doctrine to its clear issues, and is more logical than many of those who profess this belief. The doctrine carries with it logically the consequence that Christ, as a human organism, should be not a natural organism but a new miraculous kind of organism; and if a miraculous birth be unique in the case of Christ, it will follow that this new kind of organism will be unique also in the history of the human race. We cannot but follow Dr Gore when he insists on the fact "that there can be nothing moral or spiritual which is not intimately connected with our physical structure," when he further urges, supporting his opinion on the authority "of one of the most eminent living scientific men," that the introduction into the world of a morally sinless Christ (in Dr Gore's sense of sinless) must have involved something miraculous about His physical origin, and infers the probability of the issue of a new kind of organism, from the fact of an altogether unheard-of and miraculous physical origin. When the human life, so wrapped up in the conditions of its physical existence, has its earthly origin not in a whole human life but in a part life of one parent only, probably a different kind of physical organism will arise. Any form of being, imaginable or unimaginable, might be the issue, we must admit, of such an abnormal origin altogether out of the course of human nature.

So far, I think, Dr Gore has rendered an important service to Theology in making clear the vital questions involved in this discussion. But it shows the chaotic state of Christian belief, and the unintelligent hold which men have in doctrine at the present day, that so many who would be far from professing themselves attached to the Catholic system in the technical sense of the term, should cling so passionately to the belief in a Virgin-Birth as part of the Christian faith. The marvel is retained, but at what a cost! To many the loss is nothing less than the very root and hope of the Gospel man-ward, Christ our example.

CHARLES E. BEEBY.

YARDLEY WOOD, WORCESTERSHIRE.



## DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

### "JEWISH SCHOLARSHIP AND CHRISTIAN SILENCE."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1903, p. 335; July 1903, p. 789.)

I HAIL Professor Menzies' reply to my short article on "Jewish Scholarship and Christian Silence" with the greatest satisfaction. For the *main* complaint which I ventured to make was not that Christian scholars were certainly wrong in their estimate of the Pharisees and of the Rabbinical religion, but that they wrongly ignored what Jewish scholars had to say. And now, though I only made one short quotation from Professor Menzies' admirable commentary, he has at once replied. Moreover, Professor Oort has written an article on Corban in the July number of the *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, and Professor Bossuet has published a pamphlet to refute Perles' detailed attack upon his *Religion des Judentums*. The dawn of a brighter day seems breaking.

I will not attempt to discuss whether Professor Menzies' forcible and ingenious attempt to convict me out of my own mouth is justified or not. Even if "the *Am ha-Arets* was probably the creation of the burdensome agrarian and purity laws," it is, I think, a loose way of speaking, to talk of "the heavy burdens imposed upon the people" by the laws of clean and unclean. These laws were "not *imposed* upon the *people*," but only upon the priests and upon those who chose to live as if they were priests. Even if, through the special causes which I indicated in my Hibbert Lectures, they partly helped to create an outcast class of sinners, it is misleading to write as if they were imposed upon the people generally as obligatory enactments.

As regards Corban and Mark vii. 11, Professor Menzies makes two remarkable statements. The first is that he did not "rely on any Rabbinical corroboration of Mark's statement . . . but simply accepted that statement of the Evangelist." Therefore he was "not called on to refer to Dr Schechter's article." But surely this defence involves the very question at issue. Of course, if the Gospel statements about the Pharisees

are to be "accepted" as correct, there is nothing more to be said. But if they are to be *tested* by all the available means, then I contend that any critical commentator on Mark is bound to and "called on" to refer to Dr Schechter's article.

Secondly, Professor Menzies argues that "in Christ's time" "religious temper was higher than in the days of the Mishnah." Therefore (a) the Scribes may then have committed "excesses which were not perpetuated." Moreover (b), Christianity may have influenced the Rabbis for good between the life of Christ and the compilation of the Mishnah by "showing them the weak points of their own system"; and lastly (c), "the Scribes of Galilee may have given special [bad] decisions, which did not pass into the code."

Now these arguments are highly interesting: they are also highly problematical. They all come to this: that the true explanation why Mark vii. 11 conflicts with the Mishnah and is yet accurate, is that the Rabbinic religion of A.D. 200 was better than the Rabbinic religion of A.D. 1. But if this be so, then, as I showed in my article (p. 342), the usual contention that the *Law* produced and *necessarily produced* the evils which are denounced by Christ and Paul, wholly breaks down. You cannot have it both ways. The Rabbinic religion became more and more legal, and the Jew became more and more the devoted and enthusiastic worshipper of the Law. If, then, legalism makes men irreligious and immoral, the Rabbinic religion of A.D. 200 should have been worse than the religion of A.D. 1, and the religion of 600 worse than the religion of 200. On the other hand, if the "outcast" and other religious evils existed in A.D. 1 but not in A.D. 200, then legalism and the law do not *necessarily* imply a low, servile and unethical religion.

Professor Menzies may say that he has never said or implied that legalism necessarily produces a low religious and ethical tone. And this is perfectly true. I therefore wish that I had not mentioned his name or made those two allusions to his book from which I have learned so much. It would have been better had I only mentioned those writers who do assert or imply that the Rabbinical religion as such, and in its completed development, was a religion necessarily productive of much religious and moral evil, because it rested on Legalism.

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

### THE ABBÉ LOISY AS A THEOLOGIAN.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1903, p. 602.)

To those who believe that it would be of advantage to students of theology were the works of the Abbé Loisy better known in this country it is matter for regret that *L'Évangile et l'Église* should have been taken as an attack on Professor Harnack's *Wesen des Christenthums*. That, from one point of view, it is a criticism of that famous book is true, and in Germany the



criticism is regarded as weighty. Controversy, however, even between scholars of the reputation of the two in question, is ephemeral and seldom decisive. While assenting, on the whole, to Dr Percy Gardner's defence of Harnack in the April number of this Journal, it appears to the present writer that each of the two has something which the other lacks: the Frenchman has the quicker eye for actuality, the German for idea. The real importance of *L'Évangile et l'Église*, however, is theological, not controversial: the author examines the *Wesen des Christenthums* "non précisément pour le réfuter, mais pour déterminer sa véritable situation à l'égard de l'histoire." Owing to circumstances which are sufficiently well known the book is out of print, and, for the time being at least, it is improbable that it will be reprinted. But the lines on which it is conceived are being followed up by other writers: the English reader who desires to make himself acquainted with them may be referred to the copious extracts, amounting almost to a compendium of the original work, published in the *Contemporary Review* of March last under the title of "The Abbé Loisy and the Catholic Reform Movement."

*L'Évangile et l'Église* presents us with an account of Christianity, partly historical, partly psychological—since Sabatier's memorable *Esquisse*, history and psychology are inseparable in this context—which differs radically from that given by orthodox Catholicism, orthodox Protestantism, and that liberal or scientific theology which, originating in the reformed Church, is making its way slowly but surely in the unreformed. The Catholic sees in the Church, her hierarchy, her teaching, her sacraments, the direct and immediate institution of Christ. When He said *Tu es Petrus*, He commissioned Pius IX. to proclaim the dogma of Papal infallibility; when on the eve of the Passion He "took bread and, giving thanks, broke it," He taught the doctrine and enjoined the ceremonial of the Mass. This view, M. Loisy is aware, is based on an unreal perspective. Catholicism was instituted by Christ in the sense in which the Levitical or post-Exilic Law was of Divine appointment; mediately, that is to say, and as part of the Providential world-order. The imminence of the Messianic Kingdom is the key to Christ's personal teaching; the belief in the Parousia to early Christianity. It is by anticipation only that even Baptism and the Eucharist can be attributed, as institutions, to Jesus. He had no thought of a society which was to endure for centuries: neither He nor His apostles would have recognised in later Christianity, hierarchical, dogmatic, ceremonial, the representative of the simple brotherhood of the first days.

Protestantism, on the other hand, regards the message of Christ as addressed to the individual; the orthodox and the Liberal Protestant differing chiefly as to its content: the former construing it in the terms of the Pauline theology, which, whatever else it may be, is certainly not evangelical; the latter reducing it to a simple essence;—belief and trust in the Father-God; "God and the soul, the soul and God." Here, again, M. Loisy demurs. If the Gospel is not ecclesiastical in the Catholic sense, neither is it indi-

vidualist in the Protestant. It has neither the formal character of Lutheran nor the mystical of later theology: those readings of it are construction or commentary, not text.

The Gospel has been long enough in the world to entitle us to deal with it as a fact. The scientific methods of modern theology, the advance in historical and archæological knowledge with the consequent training of the imagination to more sustained and at the same time more disciplined flights, have made this easier than it was formerly: instead of looking in the Gospel for certain preconceived ideas, true or false—a task at once endless and unprofitable—we have to ask ourselves, with the assistance of the best means at our disposal, what the Gospel really was. Was it, as a matter of fact, a message addressed to the individual apart from, or in union with, his fellow-men? One answer only is possible. Historically the Gospel and the community were correlative: the Christian idea was planted among and has never in fact existed apart from the company of believers in Christ. Nor was this connection an accident, necessary or unnecessary. The Messianic kingdom, which was announced as “at hand,” was the union of believers with one another and with Christ in the Father’s house: religion as such, Christian or non-Christian, has a side turned towards society, and is a bond of fellowship among men. The Christian community is not necessarily the Catholic Church; nor does the recognition of an element of brotherhood in religion necessarily make for Catholicism. But against an individualistic Christianity M. Loisy’s reasoning is conclusive. The Gospel was not, as a matter of fact, individualist; and individualism is inconsistent, historically and psychologically, with the religious idea.

Abstraction is the bane of theology. Reasoning from conception to conception, and so at every step getting further from reality, theologians arrive at conclusions which are as inevitable in logic as they are at variance with fact. Thus from the evangelical notion of the community of believers comes the *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII.—“*subesse Romano Pontifici omni humanæ creaturæ omnino esse de necessitate salutis*”; from the religious view of Scripture as a Divine message and record the verbal inspiration and absolute inerrancy of the canonical books. Given the premisses the conclusion follows. This is the strong point of Ultramontaniam. We must go further back than we think to meet it; hence the ineffectiveness of so much Protestant controversy: to give battle on the enemy’s ground is to court defeat. But it is not Catholic theologians only who have fallen into the pitfall of abstraction. There is an abstract analysis as well as an abstract synthesis of Christianity: theologians, Protestant and Liberal, are still theologians, and exposed to the besetting sin of their class. From the fact that the Gospel and the community are, as has been said, correlative, it follows not only that Christianity is collectivist in principle, but also that a purely ideal Christianity, invariable, true for all time and in every place, is an *ens rationis*—an empty abstraction, to which no concrete *in rerum naturâ* corresponds. We have this treasure—not certain secondary parts of it only—in earthen vessels. The



Gospel is Divine, not because it is unconditioned by its environment—it is not, it never was or can be, unconditioned in this way—but because it is life and spirit; because, while informing and modified by the changing states of human consciousness, in each and all it gives meaning to life and hope in death, entrance upon larger horizons and the breath of a purer air. As a vehicle it differs in quality, not in kind, from art, from poetry, from philosophy. All are channels through which the living waters flow in upon us. In all the content is conditioned: the idea embodies itself in a concrete shape, something of the original being lost in the process; the Word is made Flesh.

The mind of the Christian of to-day is not that of the original followers of Christ: it is probable that no single religious conception of theirs has come to us without modification. "*L'Évangile tout entier était lié à une conception du monde et de l'histoire qui n'est plus le nôtre.*" Its survival is due to the fact that it has been able to disentangle itself from this conception and from others which have succeeded it, and that this disentangling was entire, not partial: "*c'est l'Évangile tout entier, non seulement sa prétendue essence, qui n'y était lié 'inséparablement.'*" The Fatherhood of God, in which many—and, from the religious standpoint, not without reason—would see the substance of the Gospel, means at once less or more to us than it meant to the first Christians: historically it must be taken in and with its varying content, if we would estimate its relation to Christ's teaching as a whole. Christianity, indeed, can be reduced to an invariable essence only by an unreal process of abstraction: it was not given in the beginning, it is not now given to us in this way. The Absolute underlies religion as it underlies life and the world. The Supernatural, as we know it, is not so Divine, the natural is not so human as we think it: there is a Divine in the human and a human in the Divine. The hard and fast lines which we draw between them exist for thought, not in things; the two are fused and interpenetrated, not simply juxtaposed. And, from another point of view, it is in virtue of the harmony of the parts that the whole lives. To take one part, separate from the rest, and distinguish it as "essence," "substance," a "soul," is an unconscious survival of the imperfect scientific methods of the past.

M. Loisy, as a Catholic, applies these conceptions to his own communion—to whose difficulties he is not blind, and of whose manner of meeting criticism he has had experience. But the philosophy of religion which he represents has a wider application: the Church of Rome is not the only religious society whose authorities oppose force to reason and whose teaching offers moral and intellectual difficulties to thoughtful men.

"Par suite de l'évolution politique, intellectuelle, économique, du monde contemporain, par suite de ce qu'on appelle d'un mot l'esprit moderne, une grande crise religieuse, qui atteint les Églises, les orthodoxies et la formes du culte, s'est produite un peu partout. Le meilleur moyen d'y remédier ne semble pas être de supprimer toute organisation ecclésiastique, toute orthodoxie, et tout culte traditionnel, ce qui jetterait le christianisme

hors de la vie et de l'humanité, mais de tirer parti de ce qui est, en vue de ce qui doit être, de ne n'en répudier de l'héritage que les siècles chrétiens ont transmis au nôtre, d'apprécier comme il convient la nécessité et l'utilité de l'immense développement qui s'est accompli dans l'Église, d'en recueillir les fruits et de le continuer, puisque l'adaptation de l'Évangile à la condition changeante de l'humanité s'impose aujourd'hui comme toujours et plus que jamais. . . . Si l'on a réussi à montrer que le christianisme a vécu dans l'Église et par l'Église, et qu'il est bien inutile de vouloir le sauver par la recherche d'une quintessence, et petit volume est suffisamment rempli."<sup>1</sup>

ROMANUS.

### THE LIBERAL CATHOLIC MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1903, p. 704.)

MR PHILIP SIDNEY in the July issue of this Journal describes what he calls the Liberal Catholic Movement. It is clear from his remarks that he does not understand the circumstances of the case, and mistakes effect for cause. His paper consists of mere assertions without a word of proof; and from what he says I do not gather that he is in a position to know practically anything of the abuses he mentions. Fortunately, by his title he limits the field of discussion to England, so I need not concern myself about what may or may not go on elsewhere. Before opening out the real facts of the case, I must spend a few lines in replying to certain of his charges; and as regards my capability for dealing with them, I may say that I am an hereditary Catholic and have been a cleric for nearly thirty years. Mr Sidney, who, I understand, is a convert and was received after the very smallest amount of instruction, has to be asked a few questions. Can he give me, from his personal experience or knowledge, one example in England (his own limitation) of buying bogus relics? Or of any infamous trafficking in masses? Or of any idolatrous worship of the Blessed Virgin?

I know how easily abuses may creep in, and I am not at all afraid of pointing them out, for I believe in public opinion as a wholesome regulator. But as regards trafficking in masses, does Mr Sidney know of the stringent laws which are in force against any such practice and of the severe punishment meted out to transgressors? Like any other legislative body, the Church can forbid and punish, but she cannot hinder abuses which are flagrant breaches of well-known laws. As truly might the State be said to encourage murder because murderers exist. I will add that I have never come across in this country any case of buying or selling relics, bogus or true, of trafficking in masses, nor have I ever found Catholics so foolish as to put any creature, even the Blessed Virgin, in place of the Creator. When I get such cases I shall know how to deal with them;

<sup>1</sup> *L'Évangile et l'Église*, p. 233.



until I find such, Mr Sidney must excuse me from wasting my time in the pursuit of phantoms.

Again, he says that the present bishops of Clifton and Nottingham were foisted upon their diocese by Rome. He evidently knows nothing about the laws which regulate the appointment of bishops in England. Canon Law is a subject which it would be unfair to expect an ordinary layman to know anything about. But then, why should such an one be so ill-advised as to write on the subject at all? English chapters, *pace* Mr Sidney, do not recommend names as *dignissimus*, *dignior*, or *dignus*. The bishops of the province claim equal rights with the canons in recommending names to the Holy See. In only one instance known to me has Rome set aside both chapter and bishops; and that was in the case of Manning. In the two cases mentioned by Mr Sidney, Rome offered no opposition at all but chose from the names submitted by the legal electors. One more point. Mr Sidney seems to be at sea altogether about the subject of Infallibility and Anglican Orders. The more liberal (in the sense of educated) a Catholic is, the less likely is he to have any belief in the latter or to misunderstand the former; and I may add, he will see that there is no necessity to bring into court the question of Infallibility when he is considering the case of the condemnation of Anglican Orders. I can now go on to the real facts of the case.

I object altogether to the use of the word "Liberal." Most disputes in this world turn upon the use or abuse of adjectives. The term, innocent enough in itself when it means one who has had a liberal education, has a sense affixed and generally accepted, which makes it impossible to use in a good sense. The Liberalism condemned by the Church is the anti-dogmatic principle; and Newman in his *Apologia* thus defines it:—

"Now by Liberalism I mean a false liberty of thought or the exercise of thought upon matters in which from the constitution of the human mind, thought cannot be brought to any successful issue, and therefore is out of place. . . . Liberalism is, then, the mistake of subjecting to human judgment these revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine on internal grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of the Divine Word" (ed. 1900, p. 228).

The origin of Liberalism may be traced to theologians who rationalise Faith, and so destroy the spirit of worship. The later school of scholastics helped to bring about the Reformation; and their successors have not healed the breach. Extravagant assertions, begotten by the Syllogism, have brought about a natural recoil.

Now with Liberalism of this kind no Catholic or anyone who believes in Revelation can have anything to do. So I am inclined to deny altogether the existence of anything that can be called a real Liberal Catholic movement in England. It is like the charge of "Americanism." If one looks at it as the anti-dogmatic principle, the very term "Liberal" is contradictory of "Catholic." There are, I am sorry to say, a handful

of half-fledged (or shall I say half-baked?) converts who have never realised what the Church is or the reality of her divine mission; but these are a mere handful, and they quickly find that their proper place is outside the Church altogether. As they have never been in more than outward communion with the Church, I do not so much blame them as I blame those who received them without full instruction and preliminary trial. While I have the highest respect for the man who follows his conscience, I have none for those whose policy seems to be Quantity, not Quality.

If, then, I object to the term "Liberal" and deny the existence of anything like such a movement, I am happy to admit that there is progressing a movement which is based on the effects of Liberal Education. It is the same spirit which animated Lacordaire and Montalembert together with Newman, who concurred in their general line and conduct. It is at work in America, and is that force which, as reported, Pius X. recently said, is coming to rejuvenate Europe. It has nothing directly to do with the Faith except to serve it in the truest and most submissive manner. It is opposed only to those who, like owls at noon, blink and refuse to see the growth and life round about them. It is the gospel of Light, Life and Fresh Air fighting against the heresy of Obscurantism, Fossilisation and Mugginess. The really educated Catholic has a balanced mind; he knows his own limits, and he deals with things as they are. He is at the other side of the circle from the Anglican who longs after what he calls the Primitive Church, as though the Bride of Christ, living and progressive, suddenly in the seventh century fell into a magic slumber like the beautiful princess of the fairy tale, and was only to be awakened by the kiss of the ritualistic curate. The educated Catholic sees the Church as universal in time as well as in place. She is as living to-day and has the same authority as she had at Jerusalem, Nicea, Ephesus, or Chalcedon.

The educated Catholic, if I must use an adjective at all, is one who has the sense of proportion and has learnt to put the various points of his religion on their proper basis: some on the sure ground of Faith; others on practice more or less closely connected with the Faith and therefore jealously to be guarded; others on discipline, recent or ancient, universal or local, special or general, practical to-day or out of date. He protests against jumbling everything up together in defiance of theology and history, and labelling as dogmas of the Faith what are, in reality, only speculations of individuals. He has recognised the importance of the Facts. As regards Faith, he inquires into the fact whether God has revealed or whether the Church so teaches a dogma; as regards everything else he tests its agreement with or divergence from other ascertained facts. The result is that he distinguishes clearly between Faith and Obedience, two separate virtues which the less educated Catholic confounds. This distinction does not in the least militate against the perfection of the submission of his intellect to a truth revealed by God, or his acceptance, in practical matters, of the orders of those who are in a position to com-



mand. It only enables him to render, in one or the other case, that reasonable service demanded of a reasonable creature to his Maker. Blind obedience to order does not appeal to one who has learnt the important duty of self-responsibility, and is not a child but a man whose obedience is fuller and more perfect because it is manly. To know is the surest ground of loving and serving; and the more the educated Catholic knows, the less does he fear knowledge, and the less will he be in danger of confounding Revelation and Science, for he will recognise that they are on different planes, and, like parallel lines, can never cross. Hence he has no difficulty in being filial, docile and generous towards the Church when she warns him not to mistake the shadow for the substance. So he, I claim, is the truest Catholic and the most devoted servant of the Church; for he uses to the glory of his Maker all the powers of his being. It is the half-educated man who is either the Obscurantist or the Liberal.

The genesis of this educational movement, for that is what it amounts to, can be traced to a healthy reaction against the stagnation begun in the middle part of last century. It would be beyond my present purpose to describe the intellectual blight which seemed to rule the day. Mediocrity was the badge of the tribe, repression their engine, and exaggerated authority their idol. This, they claimed, was the one solution for all difficulties, whether of Faith or Science. The minority, who knew and suffered, stood aside silent, sorrowful, but patient. Time is justifying them. But the stirring of the dry bones began. A handful of earnest men recognising the situation, saw, if anything was to be done, that they must begin by reforming themselves. They were contented for some years to go back to the foundations of learning. Quietly and without any fuss they repaired the lost time. They were possessed by a spirit of thoroughness which has resulted in an educational force which is telling and prevailing. The firstfruits appeared in 1888 with *Henry VIII. and the English Monasteries*. Here was a book which was concerned only with an investigation of facts. The scientific treatment of an historical problem was a revelation of method and aim. This epoch-marking book gave to Catholic thought an impetus which has been the surer because it has acted slowly.

Perhaps it is the practical instinct of the English race, joined to the eminently practical nature of the Catholic Church, which calls out for facts, facts, and again for facts, that has opened to us the doors of intellectuality by means of history. While we may vary in our estimate of the meaning or the drift of facts, there can be little room for doubting their existence. So I hold the important service rendered by that work to the Catholic Church in England was that it impressed on us that the more we go to facts and study them in their mutual relations the more surely shall we discern their real meaning. This new spirit of inquiry into things, of looking at the sources of knowledge, of criticising the past, of watching its influence on the present, of tracing cause and effect—this, I say, is the real and hopeful feature of the intellectual movement in the Catholic Church

in England to-day. It is only at its beginnings, but its results are already showing themselves. It is misunderstood by many, and discredited by those who do not understand it. We have already gained this much. Many are impressed with the advantages of Light, Life and Fresh Air, and know that thoroughness, solidity, yes, even truth for its own sake, are virtues, and worth cultivating. This, then, I think, is the real movement making for life amongst us. Laity and clergy alike come under its influence. And the admission of our youth, clerical and lay, to the national universities is the most hopeful and surest sign of its permanence.

This being my estimate of the situation in England at the present day, I submit that Mr Sidney has not understood it at all ; therefore his article has no more serious importance than those which, last year, told a tale of a revolt from Rome.

LONDON.

ETHELRED L. TAUNTON.

### OPTIMISM AND IMMORTALITY.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1903, p. 425.)

MR LOWES DICKINSON in the *Hibbert Journal* for April, discusses admirably that Optimism which is so characteristic of the Western peoples ; finds it to be a fact ; finds that the fact is expressed more in attitude and action than in words and opinions ; and sets forth on the quest of an hypothesis on which it may be possible to justify this optimism to the reason of men.

He finds a basis for it in the theory of the steady progress and advance of all things towards some far-off goal of ultimate perfection, and to an unreasoned consciousness of ministering to the attainment of that end, this being the main source of enthusiasm, ambition, and action in the strenuous individual life.

But this is not sufficient in itself : there must be, further, in each life a more or less definite expectation of individual participation in the perfection that is to be attained ; and so we are bidden to believe "that a doctrine of progress which is to be a basis for optimism must comprise at least the possibility of a Good to be attained by individual souls after death." And here the writer, apparently to his deep surprise, is brought, as he says, to the point of view of the Catholic Church. Yet surely there is here no cause for surprise, since the Church has been proclaiming this "point of view" in the ears of all men from their cradles upward. Nothing can be more optimistic than the Church's view of life, and of its possibilities and promise. No optimism could be based on a hypothesis surer or more consonant with reason and philosophy than is hers. It would be hardly possible to express, in general terms, that hypothesis more fitly than in the words of the sentence which I have quoted above.

One might have expected that the writer, having arrived at this point



of view, and having recognised it as that of the Church, would have been at great pains to pursue his researches into the doctrines of the Church in the expectation of finding in them that basis of reasonable optimism which was the objective of his adventure. Up to a certain point he finds the teaching of the Church noble and stimulating: just up to the point at which he wanders away into regions of pseudo-theological speculation, where the teaching of the Church is in some matters wholly misrepresented by him; or where the Church is described as bound by definitions to which she has never given any formal assent nor required the assent of her children. And therefore he fails to find in the doctrine of the Church that basis for an optimistic view of Life of which he is in search, and is driven to formulate three postulates which fail to convince, because they lack conformity to the general law of progress so far as Science has been able to observe and record its operation in the physical world; and omit to give due place and consideration to the inexorable demands of Justice, which in any theory of moral perfection cannot be set aside without the effect of shattering the ideal. From such a pitfall a surer knowledge of the doctrines of the Church can save us and provide us a better and sounder basis for our optimism.

Mr Dickinson finds the doctrine of the Church "noble," "because it recognises that this life is not all: beyond it lies an eternity either of Good or Evil; which of these will be the lot of the individual soul depends upon its conduct while on earth. The soul is free to choose either Good or Evil: and as it chooses so will be its reward"; because it recognises "that the goal of ultimate satisfaction is eternal life in the contemplation of the Good"; and "because of its implicit assertion of the infinite distinction between Good and Evil." But this commendation, acceptable enough so far as it goes, is followed by a statement to the effect that the doctrine of the Church "has other aspects which are irrational, and even immoral." This is a sweeping assertion, and surely needs to be carefully substantiated: yet one looks in vain for any such care. What are these aspects of the doctrine of the Church which Mr Dickinson finds irrational and immoral? He appears to have made some excursions into the region of a crude and rather barbarous eschatology, and to have come to the conclusion that the Church's doctrine "sends men to an eternal hell, not for any fault of their own, but because they have been once for all created bad"! He points out that this doctrine "will not commend itself to the conscience of mankind," nor "support an optimistic view of the world," and leaves the impression that he seriously believes, and expects his readers to believe, that this is the teaching of the Church. If it were, we should all agree with Mr Dickinson in his despair of getting any help in his enterprise from the Church. But evidently he has been scandalously imposed upon! Is it credible that the Church could teach in the same breath (a) that the soul is "free to choose either Good or Evil," and that "as it chooses so will be its reward"; and (b) that men must go "to hell because they have been once for all created bad"?

Indeed this is nothing less than a caricature! If it be true that the doctrine of the Church consigns some men to hell, it is certainly not true that it does so "for no fault of their own." The writer himself, as we have seen above, refutes the idea, where in his earlier account of the doctrine of the Church he points out that the individual soul is held to be "free to choose either Good or Evil: and as it chooses *so will be its reward*" in eternity.

Again, if it be true that the doctrine of the Church consigns some men to hell, it is certainly not true to imply that the Church teaches that this is because men were created "once for all bad." For she denies that men were created "bad," much more that they were created or have become irremediably (if that is what "once for all" means) bad. On the contrary, the doctrine of the Church declares that man was created *integer*; a responsible agent endowed with a free will; in a state of perfect moral and physical equilibrium; with an inherent capacity for immortality.

Though she teaches that man fell into sin, and consequently into imminent jeopardy of his august destiny, yet she does not teach that he became wholly depraved or irremediably bad. On the contrary, she teaches that his nature became only in part demoralised; that its equilibrium was disturbed, but not beyond hope of restoration; and that so far as each individual soul is willing to choose the good in this life, good will co-operate with his will for the gradual processes of restoration; until at last, though not in this life, the effects of evil shall be eliminated from his nature, and he shall attain to final perfection after death.

And here we have in a doctrine of hope and progress a sound basis for an optimism which postulates something even more than "the possibility of a good to be attained by individual souls after death"; which goes far to unravel many of the perplexities of human experience in life, and to account for and to sustain men in face of the apparent failures and disappointments of it: which certainly includes and endorses the first of the postulates of optimism which Mr Dickinson formulates in his article, viz., "That the world is not eternally good, but embodies a real (not merely an apparent) process in time towards a good end."

There remain two postulates to be examined; but before proceeding to deal with them, it is perhaps necessary to add that the Church has never given her formal assent to, nor embodied in her creeds, any specific doctrine of Hell at all. Nor has she committed herself to any formal or authoritative declaration or definition on the subject; so that the whole question remains still within the domain of "pious opinion." She has allowed the most diverse teaching on the subject within her communion, and has abstained from branding as heretical the teaching (*e.g.*) of Tertullian on the one hand, or of St Gregory Nazianzen on the other.

The two remaining postulates—"that this end is one in which all individuals will somehow participate"; and "that therefore individual souls must all of them be immortal and ultimately reach heaven"—must be dealt with together. The former with its delightful "somehow" does



not seem to afford as sound a foothold for the optimist as one might desire; while the latter is based upon a demand that any heaven which we can hold to be good must be a heaven for all. Mr Dickinson admits that this demand may be represented as "weak and sentimental": it does not seem to strike him that it is hopelessly immoral!

He is surely not the advocate of an Optimism based on assumptions or demands which are calculated to destroy in man the sense of moral responsibility; to ignore the idea of the Moral Government of the world; to aim at a perfection which shall lack the element of Justice; to evacuate of their force the sanctions of Law; and to degrade man to the stature of a puppet that can be coaxed or pummelled by an ultimately irresistible force into a negative condition of conformity to a given pattern of propriety whether he will or no? Yet he argues on one page that the doctrine of the Church is "noble, because of its implicit assertion of the infinite distinction between Good and Evil"; a little later he propounds this demand, which he admits may be charged with ignoring the distinction between the good and the bad; attempts to sustain it by emphasising the obvious truisms that no man is as good or as bad as he conceivably might be, or, that no man is altogether bad or altogether good; triumphantly asserts (what none will labour to deny) that few men will be found so presumptuous or censorious as to declare that any man is so bad as to deserve "eternal hell," or so good as to deserve "eternal heaven"; and with such arguments buttresses this demand, which is at once an affront to the courage and dignity of humanity at its best, and a sop to the weakness and pusillanimity of man at his worst! The Church, on the other hand, upholds before the eyes and hearts of men the highest and most inspiring Ideal of Goodness, wrought out in obedience to the requirements of the Eternal and Immutable Law of Righteousness; diminishes naught from its demands, and faces without flinching the possible penalties of wilful failure; makes glorious the horizon towards which men journey with the splendour of a certain hope; sets before them a definite goal of ultimate perfection in the achievement of a great destiny; and promises and secures to all alike in their temporal progress such stimulus and help by the co-operation of "conquering Good" as each may need. At the same time, she is too true to the facts of life to ignore the possibility of failure; too sane not to realise that the loss in such a case must be great and terrible in proportion to the grandeur and glory of success. Yet she is more than tender and cautious in her judgments; she will use these dire possibilities to brace and stimulate her children to more strenuous and courageous effort rather than to reprobate their seeming failures or to crush their hopes.

That no man is altogether and wholly good or bad; that no man can attain perfection in this life; that it is futile to attempt to pass final judgment upon any man in the dim twilight of the ignorances and misconceptions of to-day; that beyond this life there are "many mansions"—mansions of purification and cleansing—mansions of joy and peace—

mansions of progressive Revelation and enlightenment—culminating in the contemplation of the Beatific Vision of the Absolute Good in God Himself, whereunto all men, whatever their inherent weaknesses or hindrances of circumstance, may ultimately attain—these truths she holds for sure, and in her grasp upon them maintains the unfaltering optimism of her steadfast outlook upon life!

Yet she recognises as a possibility, that there may be found, in that strange and complex mystery which is man, a power of obstinate resistance to Good and of invincible aversion to truth, which may ultimately render the individual inaccessible to every moral influence which, without prejudice or violence to the integrity of his freedom as a morally responsible agent, can be brought to bear upon him; and she sadly acknowledges both the justice and necessity of the exaction of the penalties and sanctions of that Law which alike gives and demands nothing less than perfection, wherever it has been persistently rejected in the beneficence of its promise, and as obstinately defied in the prerogative of its power. She may hope, she must pray and strive, that there may be but few such losses; she is too sane and too honest, too brave and too true, to deny or ignore the possibility that there may be some.

And why should we resent and cavil at this final self-assertion of the Law of Life and Goodness any more than at the operation of the same law in the material universe? We believe that all things move onwards towards an Ideal Perfection. But is this Ideal never to be realised? Or can it ever be realised, until all that hinders is taken away, and all that mars or tends to mar a single feature of its perfect beauty is eliminated? We believe in this steady upward progress, and we understand somewhat of the Law under which all things thus move together toward a perfect end, which shall be indeed not an end, but the initiation of a new era of unhindered development.

So, then, we may surely find postulates more rational and more moral than those which Mr Dickinson commends to us on which to base our optimistic outlook on life.

These are his postulates:

(1) That the world is not eternally good, but embodies a real (not merely an apparent) process in time towards a good end.

(2) That this end is one in which all individuals will somehow participate.

(3) That therefore individual souls must be immortal, and must all of them ultimately reach heaven.

On the first we are agreed; only I would say an "eternally good end." It goes to one's heart to have to reject the delicious vagueness and cheerful irresponsibility of the second; while of the last, what can we say but that it is calculated to lull conscience to sleep, paralyse all effort, and put a premium on a life spent in playing the concertina beneath umbrageous trees in a languid acquiescence in the ultimate benevolence of things?

So let us try to amend them; and the three will stand thus:



(1) That the world is not eternally good, but embodies a real (not merely an apparent) process in time towards an eternally good end.

(2) That this end is one in which all individuals may participate if they will ; and

(3) That individual souls must be, at least, potentially immortal, and may all of them ultimately reach heaven.

Here, then, is the amendment proposed. The last two words ring upon the ear with something of the note of anti-climax ; but we know what they are meant to mean ; and it is, I think, almost axiomatic that in moving an amendment one should not unnecessarily depart from the language of the original resolution, so let them stand.

And here we have three postulates upon which with a better assurance we may base our optimistic outlook upon life. For they are built upon a due consideration of all the facts ; they take account of the principle of indefectible morality in the progress of mankind towards a perfect and eternal end ; they allow for the claims of Justice, and acknowledge implicitly the Majesty of Eternal and Immutable Law ; they provide for the ultimate satisfaction of man's highest aspirations—for the insatiate hunger for eternity — for the passionate though inarticulate demand of humanity for the touch of some perfect thing ; they point to a destiny more august than can conceivably be compassed within the short span and narrow limitations of this life ; they look to where beyond this darkness there is clearer light, surer knowledge, and an incomparably wider range of opportunity ; they take account of man's moral responsibility, and make their appeal to his sense of the greatness of his destiny, to his own personal dignity, honour, and courage ; they refuse to ignore or allow him to ignore the possibilities of failure which belong to and are involved in the splendid adventure to which he stands committed ; they include within the scope of their optimism every man whose life is honest and characterised by steady loyalty to the truth that he sees and is convinced of in his heart ; and if they contemplate the awful alternative of failure, yet they exclude none save the ultimately self-excluded ; and they only contemplate it because one dares not so tamper with the fundamental and elementary principles of morality as to obscure the infinite distinction between Good and Evil, or to ignore the deep and immutable relation in which are bound up with these both Life and Death.

ARNOLD PINCHARD.

ST JUDE'S, BIRMINGHAM.

## REVIEWS

*Studies in Theology.*—By J. Estlin Carpenter, M.A., and P. H. Wicksteed, M.A.—London: J. M. Dent & Co., 1903.

IN this interesting and kindling book we have another link in the long and representative series of Oxford Essays. For nearly a hundred years Oxford has been speaking to the educated English world in this form. In the old days *Tracts for the Times* were succeeded by *Essays and Reviews*. For a later and less original generation, *Lux Mundi* has been followed by the *Contentio Veritatis*; and now in these *Studies* we have the expression of men who are not endeavouring either to enhance the authority or to widen the bounds of an established church and of recognised creeds, but rather returning, with Butler, to the root of all things, to the "religion of conscience," which is now indeed, all over the religious field, being carried to a height of power and calling out a range of emotion of which Butler scarcely dreamed. Nothing is more interesting to follow in the modern religious debate than the manner in which the ethical method of the eighteenth century, the "reason" and "reflection" of Butler, have returned upon us, but invested with a fire, a mysticism, a passion once supposed to be the special possessions of an Evangelical or Neo-Catholic faith, as contrasted with the "legalism" of an earlier time. According to Butler, there is that in the "constitution of our nature" which affords a man light enough to live by, and to live well. He will not admit, that is, that the sceptic as to revelation has any excuse for vicious conduct. Whether he believe the Incarnation or no, the inward light is there; and if he does amiss, no plea of ignorance can be set up in mitigation of penalty. Butler, as we all know, supplemented the *Sermons* by the *Analogy*, and added revealed religion to the moral law. But the eighteenth century insistence upon "conscience" and "reason" passed on to meet the rising tide of history and science on the one hand, and of German speculation on the other. Kant and Hegel, Schleiermacher, Strauss and Baur have intervened between us and Butler, between us and Locke. A revival of mediæval ideals, a vast rehabilitation of "authority," seemed at one time to have taken all the savour and life out of the eighteenth century appeal to reason. But what, in truth, has been the common mark of



religious thinking in very diverse camps during the last generation? Surely the triumphant return of "conscience" and "reason" to a position in the sphere of religion far more commanding even than that which the eighteenth century assigned to them. They were the props and adjuncts; they have become the foundations. They were the rivals and enemies of enthusiasm." They have come back to us "touched with emotion," the only justification of our deepest hopes, the "master-light of all our seeing." In the breakdown of miracle and revelation, the moral experience of man has become at once infinitely more important, more mysterious, and more awful.

And in harmony with this changed position of things, the language of moral speculation constantly tends, as in this book, to lose the stoic calm which once belonged to it, and to take on the note of mysticism, of deep and passionate feeling. The life of conscience has become, for so many of us, the life with and in God; and the "Imitatio" of our age will take shape when, with the same self-effacingness and the same whole-heartedness, a man of equal religious genius is able to draw for us the daily experience of a faith, the daily conversation of a spirit, which knows nothing of the Christian creeds as such, while based deep upon the fundamental experiences which produced them.

Of this transformation, as one might almost phrase it, of "reason" into "enthusiasm," this new book of Oxford Essays is an interesting example. It may be taken as representing the best current thought and culture of the Unitarian body, especially as this thought and culture have been influenced by Oxford, through the foundation of Manchester College. Of its thirteen essays, seven have been contributed by Mr Estlin Carpenter, who till recently was Professor and Vice-Principal of the College, and the remainder by the well-known Dante scholar, and successor of Dr Martineau in the Little Portland Street Chapel, Mr Philip Wicksteed, who delivered several of these addresses as Lecturer in Sociology at Manchester College. They deal with such subjects as "The Education of the Religious Imagination," "The Place of Jesus in History," "The Place of Immortality in Religious Belief," "The Liberal Faith," "Sociology and Theology," "The Place of the History of Religion in Theological Study," and so on: subjects, all of them, of perennial importance, on which the succeeding Oxford generations will and must spend themselves as long as Oxford lasts.

If we compare the volume with *Lux Mundi* on the one hand, and the striking essays by the "Six Oxford Tutors," or such a volume of liberal theology as Dr Rashdall's Oxford Sermons, on the other, we shall find, it seems to me, more real kinship between the High Church and the Unitarian collections than between the Unitarians and the Broad Churchmen. The High Churchmen, entrenched behind authority and revelation, against the "wild living intellect" of man, feel the same certainty, speak with the same unction and glow, as do the representatives of Unitarian thought, who have let in the enemy and made their peace with him,—no less and no more.

While the preachers of a "Vermittelungs-theologie," wavering between two radically inconsistent ways of explaining life and thought, may write indeed with elevation and charm, but not, it seems, with the missionary ardour either of the man who stakes his all on revelation and dogma, or of his fellow, who, having frankly abandoned all that is commonly meant by these great words, throws himself on the moral and intellectual life of man, on the history of the world and of conscience, as the only sources of religious knowledge. The latter, to his evident amazement and joy, is finding himself supported as he had scarcely dreamt to be. New powers seem to issue from the world itself, from the common course of history and daily life, to meet his appeal, and they are producing on ground that appeared to have been laid waste a new bloom and promise of faith.

For it cannot be too plainly emphasised that what we are now witnessing in the religious life around us is the emergence of a fresh religious conception, exercising the same thrilling and vivifying power as the older beliefs in Incarnation and Sacrament. For large numbers of religious minds, as has been already said, conscience has *become*, has taken the place of, revelation. Its witness is not to any external "scheme" or isolated history, but simply to its own laws and their implications, looked at in the light of experience and history. This witness may be far yet from being intellectually complete; but now it is not merely a theory, not merely a psychology, it is a *faith*,—that is the important point. Christianity was a faith, long before it was dogma or philosophy. And in this new awe which says "Reverence Thyself," as all the sages have said it, but adds "For in thyself alone is the message of God," there is a power of infinite development, of which the throb and impulse are to be felt in essays like these. It is as though the human mind, freed from a number of dead conceptions, were drawing nearer than ever before to things primal and ineffable; and in a wholly new sense, what was ethic is seen to be religion,—religion, moreover, that no longer feels itself in danger, as all liberal varieties of dogmatic Christianity must and do perpetually feel themselves in danger, from science, history, and criticism. Rather it knows in science and criticism its best friends; and the tone of exultation that is beginning to ring through it is the tone of those who already foresee an approaching unification of experience and faith, no less far-reaching and commanding than the great unification elaborated by mediæval thought, whereof the ruins lie around us.

Compare, for instance, the well-known sentences from the *Apologia*:—"Starting, then, with the being of a God"—says Newman—"I look out of myself into the world of men, and there I see a sight which fills me with unspeakable distress. The world seems simply to give the lie to that great truth of which my whole being is so full. . . . If I looked into my mirror and did not see my face I should have the sort of feeling which actually comes upon me when I look into this living busy world and see no reflection of its Creator. . . . I am far from denying the real force of the arguments in proof of a God drawn from the general facts of human



society and the course of history, but these do not warm me, or enlighten me."

And then follows the eloquent and famous passage in which Newman surveys the world in its length and breadth, its history, races, governments, and faiths, and finds in it only "a vision to dizzy and appal," producing the conviction that "*if there is a God, since there is a God,*" the human race must be "implicated in some terrible aboriginal calamity," and is "out of joint with the purposes of its Creator."

There, in one of its classical expressions, is the pessimism which is the real foundation of all religions of authority. Mr Balfour follows on the same track in the *Foundations of Belief*. But if you turn over these "Studies," you will find that the authors of them are moved by the spectacle of the world to a precisely opposite conviction. To them it is clear that "in man, his history and power, his thoughts and aspirations, his conscience, affections, will, lies the clue to the interpretation of his place in the world, and the ultimate source and seat of all religion." Morality, no longer imposed from without, "is discerned as a part of the social order, because involved in the constitution of humanity itself. And there the unique character of man's moral judgments has been clearly disengaged as the very centre and essence of his life; they cannot be reduced into any other terms of quantity or kind; and that good which he recognises as having authority over him . . . is seen to be no other than the reflection in his own soul of the infinite purpose which enspheres all our being."

Thus the power which in science meets and bears witness to our intelligence, in the moral life, personal and social, meets and bears witness to conscience. For thousands of educated men at the present day *there* is the whole of faith. And as in the writers of the book before us, so in the educated mind generally, it is a point of view not dependent only on the weakening of tradition, but much more on the general enriching and strengthening of our historical culture. These "Studies," although full of attraction and spiritual charm, have not the "natural magic," the exquisite mind-play of the *Apologia* or the *Grammar of Assent*; they show some redundancies and repetitions, inseparable perhaps from the spoken form; and their finest thoughts are not always finely or clearly put. But who, that looks carefully at the wealth of knowledge of the world's religious past shown in Mr Carpenter's essays, or at the loving and exact study of the Middle Ages implied in Mr Wicksteed's, can doubt that we have here the evidences of an historical culture far in advance of Newman's? These writers *know* more of man's history, both secular and religious, than Newman knew; and their belief in the God who speaks through it is no groundless optimism. As to optimism, indeed, let anyone read the fine essay by Mr Wicksteed on "The Fear of God and the Curse of Sin," if he desire to see with what courage, what determination "to do without opiates," this ethical creed, when it has been adequately tried and tempered by life, can meet the terrible things of human fate, and still hold firm. And it holds firm because of the mystical element, the element of

actual, personal communion with the Unseen and Divine which it contains. The man who knows nothing of Incarnation or Resurrection in the traditional sense may still be as passionately certain as St Paul that "neither death nor life, . . . nor things present nor things to come, . . . shall be able to separate us from the love of God,—which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."

"Which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." I carried the Pauline passage to its end, for naturally these Christian preachers deal not only with Theism, but with Christianity. In the two essays on "The Relation of Jesus to His Age and our Own," and "The Place of Jesus in History," we have an examination of what Christianity may and does mean for the conscience and heart when divested of its older claims and sanctions. "The transference of Christianity from the region of history to the region of psychology is the task of our epoch," said Amiel long ago; and these two essays, so far as they go, are a contribution to it. They represent a point of view more frankly historical and relative than that taken by Dr Harnack in the famous Lectures, and more likely to commend itself to critical minds than the interpretation given in Professor Wernle's *Anfänge des Christenthums*. Has even Dr Harnack sufficiently grasped the truth now fermenting among us—that once part company with the root doctrines of Christian dogma, the Incarnation and the Resurrection, and the whole edifice must go? Christian philosophy begins anew. What the greatness of Christ was and meant in itself, we can neither know nor measure,—no more at any rate and no less than in the case of all other human nature. But what Jesus Christ is to us Europeans, as Prophet, Teacher, and King of the ideal society founded by His life and death—that we can know and express in the normal terms of history and experience. And what we gain from the rallying point thus provided—from the living parable, the "simple and sensuous" embodiment of divinest truth, which lives deep in heart and conscience, however free and sharp may be the intellectual process with which it is connected—may be gauged from a comparison of these essays with much of the devout non-Christian ethic of our day, such a book, for instance, as *Les affirmations de la conscience moderne*, by M. Gabriel Séailles. "Without a parable spake he not unto them." And His own life is the supreme parable of history, possessed of the indestructible force, the endless adaptability, the *timelessness*, in fact, which belongs to the highest life of man, whether in its moral, or its intellectual, or its æsthetic aspect. Can the thought of our day, constructive and analytic, rescue Christianity sufficiently from its own decay to save for us this possession of the life of Christ, and bring it once more into vital contact with theistic philosophy on the one side, and practical ethic and organisation on the other? There lies for many of us, at the present moment, the question of questions.

At any rate, Manchester College, the only truly free school of religious history and philosophy that we possess, is manifestly—as these essays show—contributing with courage and high ability to a discussion of infinitely



greater importance to our English society than it knows. But essays and addresses are but fragmentary and fugitive. From this remarkable College, with foundations deep in English Puritanism and its doors open to the most recent knowledge, with its honourable and unfettered traditions, may we not hope for much more?—for some statement of the whole Christian position, philosophical and historical, which shall adequately express and represent the new religious powers in our midst? There will always be found in Christendom the forces that love with Sir Thomas Browne “to keep the road”; and beside them also will never be wanting the temper expressed by Sir Thomas Browne’s fellow-citizen, Dr John Taylor, one of the worthies of Manchester College in the eighteenth century, when he bade his divinity students “attend to evidence”—“constantly, carefully, impartially, and conscientiously.” But between those who “keep the road” and those who “attend to evidence,” the gap at the present moment is too wide, the waste of human energy too great. From many quarters and in many countries the new “authority” which is to supersede the old is being slowly built up—an ordered and reasoned whole. But in England, at any rate, we are sorely in want of such a “Life of Christ” as only a rare combination of learning with historical imagination can supply. Oxford has recently given us some memorable and weighty help towards Christian reconstruction in the *Exploratio Evangelica* of Professor Gardner. Will not the College of James Martineau complete its incorporation with the university life of England by carrying forward Martineau’s great task, upon lines no less largely and searchingly conceived? Unitarianism, through Martineau,—according to a dictum of Mr R. H. Hutton’s, lately quoted in these columns—contributed to English life “something that went below opinion—a revelation of spiritual character and power.” From the full historical culture, the free and sensitive temper shown in these Unitarian “Studies,” we venture to hope for such historical fruit in the future, fearlessly planned and massively carried out, as our English theological world—still bound by far too many of those restrictions against which Pattison protested—cannot very readily supply.

MARY A. WARD.

LONDON.

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*The Bible in the Nineteenth Century.*—By J. Estlin Carpenter, M.A.,  
Lecturer on the History of Religion, Manchester College, Oxford.  
Pp. xv, 512. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903.

THIS substantial volume is a somewhat expanded reproduction of eight lectures delivered in the provinces to general audiences during the years 1900–1903, and intended to arouse an interest in biblical studies by a sketch of the progress made in the century just ended, and an indication of some of the results attained. Of the eight lectures, two might be described as general; the first on “The Struggle for Freedom of Inquiry,”

and the last on "The Bible and the Church"; one deals with the history of the Revised Version; two with prominent topics in the criticism of the Old Testament ("Changed Views of the Law, and of Prophecy"), and three in like manner with the criticism of the Gospels as the central portion of the New. Questions of theology in the stricter sense have been intentionally kept in the background, except in the last lecture.

It will be seen from this outline of its contents that the character of the book reflects its origin. It has a degree of unity sufficient for its purpose, though not quite closely knit. It naturally does not attempt to cover the whole ground, but proceeds rather by following up typical questions and typical examples of the greater questions. We are not surprised to find a certain amount of illustration drawn from the writer's special subject, the comparative study of religions.

Mr Carpenter is in many ways excellently qualified for the production of such a book. His style is easy, graceful, and above all things lucid. He has the art of developing his exposition smoothly and pleasantly, and—what is especially valuable in a work of this kind—of interweaving precise dates and the like without the appearance of stiffness and woodenness that so often results from precision of statement.

One has rather the feeling that the knowledge of the various subjects treated is not quite evenly distributed; it is more marked in regard to some periods and phases of the history of the subject; and it is not always brought down quite adequately to the present time. I think that I should be inclined to say this especially of the lectures on the Gospels.

I know well how difficult it is in rapid surveys of this kind to make statements perfectly accurate not only in what is said, but also in what is suggested. Perhaps it would be hypercritical to take exception to the following sentence *apropos* of the Versions:

"In the East [the Christian Church in the fourth century] had long included the Syriac-speaking people in the upper valley of the Euphrates; in the South it was carried from Egypt into Ethiopia; north of the Danube, through the labours of Ulfilas, it touched the Goths" (p. 83).

Every statement taken by itself is strictly true. But might not an inadvertent reader think that the only Syriac version circulated in the neighbourhood of Edessa? To the best of my belief there is no mention anywhere of the Palestinian Syriac, not to speak of the later Philoxenian and Harclean. And might it not also be thought that "the labours of Ulfilas" had been mainly north and not south of the Danube (in Mœsia)?

A little further on we are told in reference to the so-called "conflate readings," that "the evidence of the recension of the Greek text of the Old Testament in the fourth century shows that this method of editing was then actually practised at Constantinople" (p. 86). The home of Lucian and the Lucianic recension is rather Antioch, though it is doubtless true that the Antiochene text largely took possession of Constantinople.

When it is said that Gnosticism came "into historic view first in Asia



Minor" (p. 253), one can see what is meant—the writer is thinking of Cerinthus. But I think that I should prefer the claims of Syria (Simon Magus, Dositheus, Menander, Saturninus).

A special danger of the descriptive survey is that of making summary statements too summary. I should consider the paragraph on pp. 282–3 a case in point, especially such a sentence as "Cambridge was largely under the spell of Simeon's influence, while Oxford was busy with the Fathers." No doubt Cambridge *was* under the influence of Simeon, and Oxford *was* busy with the Fathers; but there were other things besides going on at both Universities. It is an act of natural piety that no one would wish to blame, that Mr Carpenter should rather magnify the writers of his own communion; but the reader needs to be a little on his guard.

In regard to the substance of Mr Carpenter's position, there are two points more particularly that seem to me open to criticism. The first is as to the relation of the Law to the Prophets; and the second as to the treatment of the Fourth Gospel.

On the first of these I do not know that we greatly differ; but it seems to me that Mr Carpenter (like many other writers) rather exaggerates the antithesis. Indeed, I much doubt whether the language that he uses is consistent with itself. One half of it I can cordially accept. For instance, this: "The Law was the vehicle through which the truths of the higher Prophecy were preserved and adapted to the national life" (p. 153). And this: "It was prophecy which gave to Israel's religion the strength needful to endure the tremendous catastrophes which befel it, and it did this by translating its ideal actions into a definite code of individual and national duty" (p. 192 f.).

But if this be so, what becomes of the opposition between Law and Prophecy as it is stated (*e.g.*) on p. 180? And what becomes of the "glaring contradictions" that are discovered in the priestly code itself?

"On the one side is its whole scheme of holy things—vessels, robes, furniture, and sanctuary; its holy persons . . . its holy days. . . . On the other hand is the picture of the holy God symbolically dwelling in His chosen Israel's midst. He demands that His people shall resemble Him, and what has this to do with special objects, seasons, men? The two views were no doubt fundamentally inconsistent; yet one was for a time necessary to the other" (p. 152 f.).

How can two things be at once "fundamentally inconsistent" and for a time "necessary" to each other? I would invite Mr Carpenter to cross-examine himself a little on this head. It is in the phrase "fundamentally inconsistent" that the fallacy lies. That others besides the author would use it does not make it true.

The chapter in regard to which I should have the greatest number of questions to raise, would be that on the Fourth Gospel.

Of course there are things in this chapter which I am glad to see. I am glad to see various points in the statement of the external evidence in regard to which Mr Carpenter seems to me to take the reasonable view.

I am glad to see that he demurs to the 'rigour' with which M. Jean Réville (in what I must needs call his one-sided and over-rated book) exploits the Prologue. I am glad, still more, to see recognised (p. 421) the note of impassioned conviction that runs through the Gospel. I read with real pleasure the description of the appeal to Christian experience on p. 424.

But, on the other hand, I should greatly deprecate the use made of two not very well considered passages in *Contentio Veritatis*, as though they represented the latest word of modern criticism. I cannot derive any hope from the hypothesis, to which Mr Carpenter appears to incline, of dual authorship. The new reasons alleged for this seem to me very slight and insufficient. Many a detail in the comparison of the Fourth Gospel with the Synoptics reminds one of Bacon's *advertunt eventus ubi implentur, negligunt ubi fallunt*. And the old traditional objections reappear without any attempt to test them and see how far they are valid.

When I turn to the broader characteristics of Mr Carpenter's book, I again find myself moved to make two criticisms—two, which are really different aspects of one.

If I were asked what is the chief underlying fault of the whole, I should say its dominant intellectualism.

This intellectualism takes two main forms. It treats as though it were the history only of ideas, what is really the history of much more than ideas, the history of great providential facts. And in like manner it appears to hail the critical process as though it were an end in itself, to be contemplated with complete satisfaction, however barren it may be of any real advance in religion.

This, as I have said, is the dominating character of the book, and in some parts (as, *e.g.*, in the last chapter) it is specially prominent. And yet every now and then the writer lets himself go and seems to touch something really deeper. This happens especially when he is following the lead of some definitely biblical conception.

Thus on p. 208 he writes as follows:—"As Yahweh rose into the majestic grandeur of the Lord of the world, king of the forces of earth and heaven, the scene of his energy expanded, and the prophet saw the scope of his working correspondingly enlarged. For one power conceived one purpose, and made for one goal. A new sense of the unity of history rose dimly in Israel's mind; the past was no haphazard succession of incidents, it was bound together by a continuous thread of moral convention; all its changes were seen continuously marching to one end, the establishment of the reign of God over man, as His sovereignty was already acknowledged by nature. Israel thus became the depository of a great trust for the world's welfare; and to this conception of a divine idea destined to be worked out by the nation for the good of man, the prophetic spirit dedicated itself with enthusiastic devotion."

Nothing could be more admirable—if only we may take it not merely as an idea in the minds of the prophets but as literal truth of fact, a truth



that the prophets held and proclaimed, not as a vague guess of their own, but because God willed that they should hold it, and because He caused them to hold it. The strong conviction that a divine purpose runs through the whole of history, embracing the twentieth century after the Christian era as much as the millenniums before it, is the very foundation of the Christian religion, not the less valuable or the less certain because it descends to us from ancient Israel.

By the side of the last passage representing the Old Testament I should like to quote another, to which I have already referred, as representing the New.

"To us Christianity is often something abstract and impersonal. In one aspect it is a great historical generalisation. But the early believers spoke of Christ, and they thought of a person, not a movement. To them Christianity was a life, not an organisation, or a tendency, or the impalpable spirit of an age. They looked upon the changes which Christ had wrought, and they saw in them a mighty manifestation of the moral and spiritual forces which held the world together, which gave consistency to the outward universe, and shaped the destinies of history" (p. 423 f.).

Again, excellent. But once more the question is as to this experience of the early Christians: is it one that we can afford to lose? Can we afford to regard it as a mere curiosity in the cabinet of the past, which we take out from time to time and look at with a certain amount of rather patronising praise? Or is it not rather an intense reality which we in the twentieth century are called upon to make our own, just as much as an Ignatius or a Justin? Which is the better worth having—this, or the poor, pale anæmic thing described in the first two sentences of the quotation?

Really I feel that I can claim Mr Carpenter as on the right side in spite of some appearances to the contrary. I have alluded to his optimism as to modern critical conclusions. In his last chapter he passes in review a number of these and pronounces them all very good. The chapter on the Fourth Gospel shakes one a little in that easy faith. But for the time our author seems to acquiesce in it; and not only to acquiesce in it as part of the discipline which accompanies progress, but as though the critical theories themselves carried with them nutriment, equally grateful and comforting. But as he approaches the end of his book the writer suddenly turns round upon himself, and after all his corrections of the Bible, once more comes to it in the attitude of a learner.

"In insisting that the Bible must be interpreted in the light of historical imagination, modern study has not made it an easy book for the casual reader. It sometimes requires us to realise antique forms of belief from which the thought of to-day has moved far away; it carries us among distant peoples who interpreted life in terms often widely different from ours. Much of it, moreover, presupposes an elevation and an intensity of spirit which we are only able truly to approach in rare moments of clearness and trust. Behind its familiar language lie conceptions and appeals to which we cannot respond without efforts of sympathy and aspiration. To

read the Bible aright is to rise to its standards and appropriate its truths. But this involves more than its mere literary appreciation. Its understanding demands of us a certain strenuousness of apprehension; we are called to serious endeavours if we would reach its lofty altitudes of faith. For its great sayings enshrine the highest attainments of human insight, when the veils that hinder our vision have been for a season withdrawn" (p. 511).

This is the kind of note on which the book ends, and it is also the note on which I should like to end this review. There are "two voices" in the book, as in so many others, and both have in them an element of truth. The other voice is the more insistent; but this is the more congenial, and I believe that at bottom it will be found to be the more deeply and permanently true.

W. SANDAY.

CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD.

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*Modern Views on Matter.*—The Romanes Lecture for 1903, delivered by Sir Oliver Lodge, June 12th, 1903. [Published by the University Press, Oxford.]

THE problem which has always been of predominating interest in Physical Science is that of explaining the structure and behaviour of matter in terms of its ultimate constituents. Regarded from the standpoint which has now been gained by science, the problem can be seen to fall into four fairly clearly defined stages. In the first stage, all matter is regarded as composed of molecules, and the varying phenomena of nature are explained, in so far as it is possible to explain them, as caused by the movements of these molecules. This view, limited though it is, is capable of explaining the phenomena of heat and cold, evaporation, solidification, and other thermal processes. The second stage of the problem lies in the domain of chemistry. The molecules are regarded as composed of a number of atoms, and the various kinds of molecules are obtained by combining different kinds of atoms. The number of different kinds of units of matter required for the explanation of nature has been reduced from the enormous number of different kinds of chemical substances to the comparatively small number of the chemical elements.

These first two stages of the problem are ancient history. It has, however, always been tempting to speculate as to whether there was a further stage in which the various kinds of atoms could all be explained as combinations of a still smaller number of different units. As an instance of such speculations may be mentioned Prout's hypothesis, which attempted to interpret the atoms of the different elements as combinations of various numbers of a single fundamental unit, the hydrogen atom. This hypothesis would require the atomic weights of all the elements to be exact multiples of the hydrogen atom, and, as experiment has shown this not to be the case, the hypothesis has long been discarded.

Sir Oliver Lodge's message in the Romanes Lecture is that a third stage



in the problem is now almost completed, and that physicists have obtained a solution to the question of the structure of the atom for which there is an overwhelming mass of experimental evidence. Briefly stated, the proposed solution is as follows. Electricity is a substance: further than this, it is the only kind of substance, and all matter is merely an accumulation of electric charges. Going further into detail, it appears probable that these electric charges are all of exactly the same amount, although some are positive and some negative; and that the atoms of the chemical elements are formed by varying numbers and arrangements of these charges, or electrons, as Sir Oliver Lodge calls them. There are, for instance, about 700 electrons, 350 positive and 350 negative, in the hydrogen atom; there must be about sixteen times as many in the oxygen atom; and about 225 times as many, say 160,000, in the radium atom, which is the heaviest atom at present known.

To estimate the probability that this proposed solution is the true one, we must glance over the experimental evidence which has led to it being formulated. There are three pieces of evidence which show that the second stage in the problem is not the final stage, or in other words, that the atom of chemistry is not the ultimate unit of matter. The first of these is afforded by the observed laws of electrolysis, and is "that every atom of matter can have associated with it a certain definite quantity of electricity called the ionic charge; that some atoms can have double this quantity, some treble, and so on; but that no atom or any piece of matter can have a fraction of this quantity, which therefore appears to be an ultimate unit, a sort of 'atom' of electricity." The second piece of evidence is drawn from the study of spectrum analysis: it is found that each kind of atom emits a characteristic spectrum, and this spectrum can only be interpreted as evidence of vibrations of the different particles of which the atom is composed. In brief, spectrum analysis shows that the atom is not, as was at one time thought, indivisible. The third piece, or rather mass, of evidence is supplied by experiments on the cathode rays, studied by Hittorf, Crookes, Lenard, and others. These rays consist of swarms of flying projectiles, and it is the sudden stoppage of these projectiles which gives rise to the X-radiation discovered by Röntgen. "At first these cathode rays were thought to be atoms of matter, though their extraordinary penetrating power rendered such a hypothesis difficult of belief, and caused Crookes to speak of them as matter in a fourth state." It has now been definitely established, by the researches of Professor J. J. Thomson and others, "that these flying particles are not atoms of matter, but are bits chipped off the atoms, fractions of an atom as it were, the same identical kind of bits being chipped off every kind of chemical atom."

It has been the triumph of experimental and theoretical physics in the last decade to combine these three pieces of evidence, and to show, so to speak, that the three sign-posts point in the same direction. It was found in 1899, by Professor Zeemann of Amsterdam, that the characteristic spectrum of an atom could be altered by suitably arranged magnetic forces.

This, as was shown by Professor Lorentz of Leyden, could only mean that the vibrating particles in the atom were charged with electricity. And finally, as the result of a long and intricate series of experiments and calculations which cannot be described here, it turns out that the charges on these vibrating particles are all equal to the "atom" of electricity, of which the existence was suspected from electrolytic phenomena; and that this charge of electricity is also equal to the charge on each flying particle of the cathode rays. Also, that the mass of each of these vibrating particles is equal to the mass of each particle of the cathode rays, being equal to about one seven-hundredth of the mass of the hydrogen atom.

"In all these and other ways," to quote Sir Oliver Lodge, "the electron has become a familiar object. . . . Multiples of it, but no fractions, are possible. . . . It is the most definite and fundamental and single unit which we know of in nature.

"It has thus displaced the so-called atom of matter from its fundamental place of indivisibility. The atom of matter has been shown capable of losing an electron, of having at least one chipped off it. The electron has been shown to possess in kind, though not in degree, the fundamental properties of the original atom of which it had formed a part; and it becomes a reasonable hypothesis to surmise that the whole of the atom may be built up of positive and negative electrons interleaved together, and of nothing else; an active or charged [atom] having one electron in excess or defect, but the neutral atom having an exact number of pairs."

As to the exact manner of this interleaving there is, so far as the present writer is aware, very little evidence, but Sir Oliver Lodge hazards the suggestion that the electrons are to be thought of as flying about inside the atom, as a few thousand specks like full stops might fly about inside the Sheldonian Theatre. To support this suggestion, however, some means will have to be thought out by which it is possible for an atom to possess a characteristic line spectrum, and to abstain from immediately frittering away all its energy in the form of radiation.

There is a difference, although not very clearly defined, between a charge of electricity and a body charged with electricity. The justification for provisionally identifying the electron with the former rather than the latter lies in the fact that a charge of electricity possesses inertia of its own, quite apart from that of the material body, if any, with which it is associated. As Sir Oliver Lodge remarks: "There *may* possibly be two different kinds of inertia, which exactly simulate each other, one electrical and the other material"; but this is extremely improbable. "It is possible, but to me very unlikely, that the electron, as we know it, contains a material nucleus in addition to its charge. . . . In that case a portion of its mass would be otherwise accounted for. I say 'accounted for,' but it would be equally true to say 'unaccounted for.' The mass, which is explicable electrically, is, to a considerable extent, understood; but the mass which is merely material (whatever that may mean) is not understood at all. We know more about electricity than about matter." However



paradoxical this last sentence may sound, it is in a sense undoubtedly true, and the reader cannot but be struck by the rapidity with which this knowledge has been gained. The key to the structure of the material universe, if Sir Oliver Lodge's position is accepted, has been found to lie in the laws of electro-dynamics, and these are hardly a quarter of a century old. On the other hand, the Newtonian law of gravitation still remains unexplained. In another sense, however, it may be asked if the distinction between electricity and matter is not largely a matter of definition. Granted that matter and electricity, as we know them, are both reducible to electrons, in what way does it matter whether we regard the fundamental electrons as matter or as electricity, or as both? Or rather it might be asked whether it is logical to do any one of these three things. Matter and electricity have been explained and reduced to their simplest terms by the new conception of the electron, and to explain the electron we must go forwards, not backwards.

If this interpretation of matter is accepted, and there seems to be little doubt that in the main it must be accepted, the fourth stage of the problem now lies open. The electron is not ultimate, for it does not account for radiant light or heat, or for electric and magnetic forces. It is, however, known, thanks to the genius of Maxwell, that everything in physical science that is not accounted for by the electron is accounted for by the luminiferous ether postulated by physicists. The fourth stage of the problem of physics is to explain the electron in terms of the ether, or what comes to the same thing, to explain both in terms of the single ultimate medium of which the material universe is constructed.

The lecture concludes with an account of the recently discovered phenomena of radioactivity. If the atoms of the various elements differ only in being different groupings of the same fundamental electrons, it ought to be possible to fulfil the ambition of the alchemists and transmute one element into another. In the radioactive processes investigated by Rutherford, Curie and others, it seems probable that a transmutation of this kind is spontaneously taking place. The nebular hypothesis has made us familiar with the possibility of a structure becoming unstable and regaining its stability only after throwing off a part of itself. The radium atom appears to be capable, under certain conditions, of throwing off a part of itself, and so subdividing into two new atoms—a primary and satellite, so to speak. This is no mere fanciful speculation, for Professor Rutherford has determined the size of the “satellites” with considerable accuracy, while Sir W. Crookes has designed an apparatus by which the individual “satellites” can be seen impinging upon a suitably chosen target as they are thrown off from the parent atoms. This property, although most marked in the case of radium, is by no means confined to this single element; and it is possible, the lecturer suggests, that the chemical elements are all subject to a process of evolution, similar to the evolution of living species.

J. H. JEANS.

*On an Inversion of Ideas as to the Structure of the Universe.*—The Rede Lecture, June 10th, 1902.—By Osborne Reynolds, M.A., F.R.S., LL.D. (Cambridge University Press.)

A HYPOTHESIS which claims to be the only possible hypothesis for the structure of the Universe might surely have been presented in a more comprehensible way. Only after reading again and again does the hypothesis emerge in connected form. How bewildered the audience must have been when told that they might have the fullest confidence that the structure of the Universe is purely mechanical, and that there is one and only one conceivable purely mechanical system, a system described by the lecturer in terms which they could not follow! How dejected they must have felt, as they left the Senate House with the assurance still ringing in their ears that they were all mere waves—waves of empty nothingness passing through a space packed with infinitesimal billiard balls! Even a materialist, if such chanced to be present, must have felt his self-esteem lowered. He had imagined that, at the least, he was composed of little, hard, round lumps, but now he was told that he must resign that constitution to the ether and be content, himself, to consist of a region of little vacuums between the lumps.

We must put aside these extravagant claims of the lecturer for reality and truth, and examine the hypothesis from what I believe is the only permissible point of view—its success in connecting known facts and its suggestiveness in the search for new facts. We can never in our experiments get down to the ultimate structure of matter, but can only watch its manifestations on the large scale as it affects our senses. It appears obvious, then, that as new types of mechanical system are discovered, so new structures of the Universe may be imagined. To say that one and only one construction is possible, and that this is the one, is to put oneself on a level with a clockmaker who, examining the outside of a clock which he cannot open, asserts that such and such wheelwork is the only possible machinery by which the clock can go. At the best, as has often been pointed out, our imagined ultimate structures are but working models, and to claim that they are more is as if a man, devising the strings and rods to work a puppet show, were to assert that similar but invisible strings and rods worked the living actors in the scene which he seeks to represent.

Ruling out the lecturer's claims for uniqueness and reality as quite inadmissible, and considering his hypothesis as nothing more than the description of a working model, let us attempt to follow its construction and see what phenomena it will represent; for a mechanical model devised by a physicist of such insight and such brilliant achievement as Osborne Reynolds is sure to be worthy of careful examination.

If a number of shot are put into a cup and shaken well, they tend to settle down into closest packing, an arrangement in which each one is touched by twelve neighbours placed symmetrically round it. Professor



Reynolds terms this "normal piling." Any disturbance from this arrangement results in larger interspaces of air, and the shot fill a larger volume in the cup. They are then said to be in "abnormal" or "strained piling." It is easy to represent the corresponding cases in two dimensions with counters on a table. The increase in volume when the piling changes from normal to abnormal is termed "dilatancy." Many years ago Professor Reynolds explained a well-known phenomenon of the sea-shore by dilatancy of the grains of sand. His explanation is so admirably clear that I quote it in full. It serves as an excellent illustration of the principle.

"When the falling tide leaves the sand firm, as the foot falls on it the sand whitens, or appears momentarily to dry round the foot. When this happens the sand is full of water, the surface of which is kept up to that of the sand by capillary attraction; the pressure of the foot causing dilation of the sand, more water is required, which has to be obtained either by depressing the level of the surface against the capillary attraction, or by drawing water through the interstices of the surrounding sand. This latter requires time to accomplish, so that for the moment the capillary forces are overcome; the surface of the water is lowered below that of the sand, leaving the latter white or dryer until a sufficient supply has been obtained from below, when the surface rises and wets the sand again. On raising the foot it is generally seen that the sand under the foot and around becomes momentarily wet; this is because, on the distorting forces being removed, the sand again contracts, and the excess of water finds momentary relief at the surface." (*Phil. Mag.*, xx. p. 475.)

Here we have the raw material of the new hypothesis—grains and dilatancy. We are to suppose that space empty of ordinary matter, space containing nothing but ether, is filled with minute, round, equal grains. The grains are perfectly hard and rigid, so that if two collide, their exchange of momentum takes place absolutely instantaneously. (By the way, it may be fairly argued that we have here a subtle form of "the conception of action at a distance," in the instantaneous transfer of momentum through finite lengths, a conception which Professor Reynolds characterises as metaphysical, and which he says is forever displaced by his new ideas.) The grains are arranged in normal piling—very nearly, not quite, for they are not quite tightly packed. Each is knocking about among its neighbours, pressing them back so as to make just a little more room for itself. The grains have no mutual attraction, but only repulsion when they collide with each other. Hence there must be pressure on the outside boundary, if we think of a limited region, to keep them from scattering. Such a system will transmit waves. If we imagine, for example, all the grains in a vertical plane to receive simultaneously a jerk upwards, this upward jerk will be transmitted on and on to every plane parallel to the original plane. If each grain is a two million billionth of an inch in diameter and has on the average a billionth of its diameter play to knock about against its neighbours, if its average speed of knocking about is 16 inches a second, and if the external pressure is 750,000 tons to the

square inch, then the waves will travel with the speed of light. So light is accounted for.

So far, the ether. Now let us turn to the constitution of matter. Let us imagine that a group of grains is, as it were, grasped, and let us think of it as being turned a little way round while still maintained in normal piling except for the little play allowed. There will then be a surface, or rather, a region, of misfit between the group and the grains outside it, a region of somewhat larger interspaces. Outside this region of misfit the grains will be slightly displaced from normal piling, but less and less displaced as we move away from the group. The corresponding case in two dimensions can, again, easily be illustrated by counters on a table. Such a group will, according to Professor Reynolds, possess individuality, in that the number of grains constituting it will remain constant. Grains may be continually crossing the region of misfit or greater gaps, and entering the group, but an equal number will leave the group at other parts of the region. The group, then, is constant in volume and persistent in the number of its contents. While the individual grains remain quivering, each nearly about the same point, the region of misfit may travel on like a wave through space. Here we have the molecule, a sort of thin closed shell, the region of misfit, in which there are greater interspaces and fewer grains. Matter, then, is defect of grains. Absence of matter is full complement of grains. In the water molecule the total defect is of the order 1 in 10,000. In the mercury molecule it is of the order 10 in 10,000, and so on.

Outside the group the piling is, we remember, slightly abnormal. The external pressure is, as it were, striving to reduce the abnormality, but the motion, the to and fro quivering of the grains, prevents the reduction, and the system is persistent.

If two molecules, however, are near each other, the abnormality in piling may be reduced by their approach, for, as they come nearer, their abnormalities overlap, the same disarrangement serves to some extent for the two, and the total abnormality is reduced. Hence the external pressure forces them towards each other. We may compare this with the rushing together of two bubbles on the surface of water, when the approach relieves the total strain of the water surface. This approach of the molecules represents gravitation, and Professor Reynolds, calculating the rate of approach of two groups of molecules, finds that it is just that observed in gravitating matter. The hypothesis also gives an account of electrical actions which we need not enter into.

If careful study of the full mathematical theory, recently published, warrants the conclusions which I have described, this hypothesis is a very great achievement. It is the first working model of the Universe which will make bodies gravitate, and will by the same machinery transmit the waves of light. Should it prove to be mechanically sound, it is certain to be a useful guide to research.

J. H. POYNTING.



*The Church and the Ministry in the Early Centuries.*—By T. M. Lindsay, D.D. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1902. Pp. xxii+398.

THIS is probably the best book on its subject, at any rate in English. It is so in virtue of a certain breadth and manysidedness of religious sympathy and outlook, enabling its author to unite in a higher synthesis the excellences of its chief predecessors at home and abroad. Success is here due not so much to scholarship and knowledge of early Christian literature; nor even to the rare common-sense and sanity of judgment conspicuous in the book; but rather to full comprehension, on the one hand, of the spirit and genius of primitive Christianity, and on the other, of the analogies afforded by the experience of Christian missions in our own times. "In the early centuries and on the mission-field we are studying origins. . . . A visit to the mission-field, especially to one among a people of ancient civilisation who have inherited those original speculations which were the fertile soil out of which sprang the earliest Christian Gnosticism, is the magic carpet which transports one back to the times of primitive Christianity. The visitor sees the simple meaning of many a statement which seemed so hard to understand, with nothing but the ancient literary record to guide him. He learns to distrust some of the hard and fast canons of modern historical criticism. . . . He learns that the modern Western mind cannot so easily gauge the Oriental way of thought as it persistently imagines" (p. xi, *cf.* 101 f.). Such perceptions give a peculiarly vital quality to Dr Lindsay's picture of conditions; and this happy result is furthered by the conception he has of his task and the method he takes to achieve it. In both he shuns the abstract, and strives to view phases and stages of the Church's past in their concrete reality. Thus he would "pourtray the organised life of the Christian society as that was lived," long ago, in little communities dotted about the Roman Empire. "The method of description has been to select writings which seemed to reveal that life most clearly, and to group round the central sources of information illustrative evidence, contemporary or other." Such central authorities are selected as "reveal the greatest number of details." Surely this is the right way to avoid artificial or subjective combinations; and though the writings available are not in all cases of equal value as typical and homogeneous records of the periods which they are used to illustrate, yet, on the whole, the method can be applied, and is here applied, to good effect.

Thus much has been said on our author's general attitude and method, because these go far to make or mar any discussion of such a subject. His more special attitude to his central themes is summed up frankly in the following terms: "My first postulate is this. I devoutly believe that there is a Visible Catholic Church of Christ . . . ; but I do not see any Scriptural or even primitive warrant for insisting that catholicity *must* find visible expression in a uniformity of organisation, of ritual, of worship, or

even of formulated creed." As to its continuity, "its basis is the real succession of the generations of faithful followers of their Lord and Master, Jesus Christ." "My second postulate concerns the ministry. There is and must be a valid ministry of some sort in the Churches which are branches of this one Visible Catholic Church of Christ; but I do not think that the fact that the Church possesses an authority which is a direct gift from God necessarily means that the authority must exist in a class or caste of superior office-bearers . . . , and that it *cannot* be delegated to the ministry by the Christian people." Dr Lindsay goes on to lay bare "the fallacious antithesis" between the "dogmatic truth" that the authority comes "from above," and the historical fact that under certain conditions it comes "from below," *i.e.* from the membership of the Church itself. "Why not? May the Holy Spirit not use the membership of the Church as His instrument?" To the state of mind which insists, on the contrary, that "the principle of the historical continuity of the Church" implies what is claimed by the ambiguous phrases "apostolic succession" and "historic episcopate," he pertinently replies, that this is analogous to the Judaizing limitation of the "security of the Divine Covenant" to the sphere of "the circumcision"; it is "to destroy the real for a limited, though more sensibly visible, universality"—a result which St Paul so passionately opposed in the interests of a larger and truer unity.

Coming to the contents of these eight lectures, one observes in the first, that on "The N.T. Conception of the Church of Christ," the essentially positive, constructive, and comprehensive spirit of Dr Lindsay's interpretation. "Such is the N.T. thought of the Church of Christ—a Fellowship, a United Fellowship, a Visible Fellowship, a Fellowship with an Authority bestowed upon it by its Lord, and a Sacerdotal Fellowship whose every member has the right of direct access to the throne of God, bringing with him the sacrifices of himself, of his praise and of his confession." Nor are these mere empty or rhetorical phrases, without definite and natural content for our author. Rather, he shows how thoroughly their meaning for him reflects their meaning for the N.T. writers and for Christians at large, down to the time of Cyprian, in whom he first traces "the conception of a mutilated sacerdotalism, where one part of the Christian worship is alone thought of as the true sacrifice, and a small portion of the fellowship—the ministry—is declared to be the priesthood." Particularly good is the account of the N.T. idea of the Church, an "ideal reality," which "*is* what it is to be"; which is so essentially a unity, in virtue of the relation of all its members to their Head, that the same term "can be used to denote communities of varying size, from the sum total of all the Christian communities on earth down to the tiny congregation which met in the house of Philemon." This "oneness of an ideal reality" can be present in many places at the same time, and in such a way that, as Ignatius says, "Where Jesus Christ is, there is the whole Church" (*ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία*). . . . It is in this One Body, present in *every* Christian society [*cf.* 1 Cor. xii. 27, *ὁμοίς δέ ἐστε σῶμα Χριστοῦ*, read in its context], that our Lord has



placed His "gifts" or *charismata*, which enable the Church to perform its divine functions; and all the actions of the tiniest community . . . are actions of the whole Church of Christ." Herein lies the sure warrant for the autonomy of the Apostolic Churches and their ability to authorise men of requisite "gifts" to exercise a valid ministry in their midst.

On the basis of this determinative chapter the successive stages of the Church's life are pictured in vivid and genuinely historic fashion. First, under the heading, "A Christian Church in Apostolic Times," we have a careful synthesis of the data afforded by 1 Cor., as illustrated by other primitive writings. In some points the evidence is perhaps outrun a little; in others (*e.g.*, the meal of sacred fellowship, as gathered from 1 Cor. and the *Didache*), different types of it are too readily combined; while in an incidental reference to the Lord's Supper several authorities are wrongly cited for the Eucharist as *following* a common meal (p. 51, note). But the main lines are truly drawn, as when it is shown that the Pauline letters "are not consistent with the existence within the community of any authority whose power comes directly from a source outside the brotherhood" (p. 59); even the "prophetic" ministry of various types had to authenticate itself to the local Church as "speaking the Word of God." In the chapter on the "Prophetic Ministry of the Primitive Church"—which was analogous to prophecy under the O.T.—the distinctions between it and office proper are duly indicated. Thus, while both types rest ultimately on "gift," the former—whether in apostle, prophet or teacher—needed no appointment or ordination to ratify the divine call, which came to the man personally and immediately; but the latter soon came to depend (though not at first in Gentile Churches, *e.g.* 1 Thess. v. 12 f., 1 Cor. xvi. 15 f., 17) on regularisation by a formal act of the local community. In the chapter entitled "The Churches creating their Ministry," our author develops what is perhaps his most distinctive idea, *viz.*, that there originally existed in different localities different types of organisation, and that it was by diverse lines of approach that the final, more or less uniform, type was reached about the fourth century. The patriarchal dynastic idea, which found expression in the headship of James and his first successors in the Jerusalem Church; the relation of *patrona* to *clientes*, re-appearing in the persons of *ποῖσται* at Thessalonica; the organisation of the Jewish Synagogue and of the heathen confraternity; the "seven" leading men of the Jewish village community (like the Indian *Punchayat*)—all these may have contributed to the final result. The chapter entitled "Changing their Ministry" sets forth the life of the Churches of the second and third centuries, in relation to the natural development by which the twofold collegiate ministry of the first century became threefold, first in certain regions, and then throughout the Empire at large. Here, for the first time in English, full use is made of the older elements in what Dr Lindsay misleadingly calls the *Apostolic Canons*, meaning the "Ecclesiastical Canons," edited by Harnack as *Apost. Kirchenordnung*. "Order, not orders," is the spirit of most of the literature of

this period, including Ignatius; and what the Church altered in the third and fourth centuries, that it had power to alter back again in the sixteenth century—and may alter still further in the twentieth.

Long after local official ministry was unified by the rise of the single bishop at the head of the presbyteral college, traces of the older order lived on in the collegiate idea of the ministry, the non-clerical character of the office of presbyter, and in certain survivals of the principle of personal inspiration as distinct from official authority. But the influences tending during the second and third centuries to an ever completer supersession of the primitive idea of the Church and its ministry, are made to appear in the chapter on "The Fall of the Prophetic Ministry and the Conservative Revolt" (in Montanism and its Western equivalent, Tertullianism). Already the change of attitude is marked in Irenæus, who tests prophecy by its subservience to the rulings of presbyters, whereas the *Didache* had made prophecy subject only to the judgment of the Spirit in the local Church. But even early in the third century, Church life, as reflected in the *Canons of Hippolytus*, has a distinctly primitive spirit. This can no longer be said of it after the middle of the century, in certain circles in the West of which Cyprian is the chief spokesman. Here the change was really complex in character and due to the influence of several factors, notably Roman institutions and the Roman spirit itself, legal and objective in its conceptions; while the revolution was facilitated by O.T. legal analogies, once the mind became thus susceptible to them. But the net result, at a time when the increase of numbers had of itself set in operation tendencies to depart somewhat from the earlier idea of the Church as a Fellowship in saintliness, was a new conception of the Church—more collective, external, and political than of old; and this had as its correlative a new notion of the ministry as a priesthood, with the bishop as normative type. This "maimed sacerdotalism," as compared with the original Christian idea of the priestly people, led on to a steady increase of collective episcopal action, in Synods that showed their real affinities by assimilating themselves more and more to the organisation of the Empire. The later stages of this process, by which Christianity replaced the Roman state religion, not without becoming largely acclimatised to the heathenism with which it had constantly to effect compromises (often most deadly when unconscious on both sides), are studied in the last lecture, a lecture which deserves the more attention in that it probably contains most of its author's original work.

But our space is exhausted. We can only note appreciatively the appendix on the History of modern controversy on early Church organisation, before turning to the less grateful duty of indicating certain defects which mar the accuracy of this fine book, and will probably lessen its proper effect in the very quarters where its main lessons are most needed. We refer to them partly in order to make clear that our estimate of the work in its main outlines has been formed in full view of such defects, which do not really affect its firmly-laid foundations. First, then, it falls far short of a



proper standard in the domain of proof-reading, both in text and notes. Next, its exegesis of single passages in extra-biblical authorities is not always as careful as could be desired—especially as certain critics seem never to see beyond shortcomings of this class. Finally, in more weighty matters, exception is to be taken not only to certain literary judgments as to dates, e.g. of *Barnabas*, the *Didache*, *De Aleatoribus*, and perhaps the *Canons of Hippolytus*, but far more to the too easy-going way in which the integrity of this last, in its late Arabic dress, is practically assumed, to the neglect of comparison with the largely parallel *Egyptian Church Ordinances* and the closely related canons published by Hauler, along with the Latin fragments of the *Didaskalia* (lying behind *Apost. Const.*, i.-vi.)—a third-century witness of prime importance, yet of which no use is made. But though some features in his vivid pictures of Church life in the second and third centuries may be invalidated by too uncritical a handling of certain documents, Dr Lindsay has done signal service in working up the materials so far as made available by other scholars. Thus he has produced a most telling and generally trustworthy synthesis of what, after all, can only be seen truly when it is seen in relation to a living society, interpreted in the light of its inner ideals, difficulties, and endeavours to attain the best *modus vivendi* amid the sum total of existing conditions.

VERNON BARTLET.

MANSFIELD COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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*Encyclopædia Biblica*.—Edited by T. K. Cheyne, D. Litt., D.D., and J. Sutherland Black, M.A., LL.D.—A. & C. Black, Vol. iv., 1903.

### I. OLD TESTAMENT.

WITH this volume the end is reached of a truly remarkable work, for which scholars will long be grateful. Its general characteristics are by this time well known, and need not be described again. Many hard things have been said, and said with abundant warrant, about the extravagance of criticism shown by some of its contributors in their theories, and of course by this time everyone knows Jerahmeel, if only by name. But it would be unfortunate if the whole work were to be condemned on account of the excesses of a few contributors, even though the chief sinner in that respect be also the chief editor. There is a very great deal in this volume which is of substantial value, as affording a survey of the materials and the results of critical inquiry up to the present time. Concerning Jerahmeel I will say little. Professor Peake, in the first number of the *HIBBERT JOURNAL*, pointed out the arbitrary manner in which the evidence (?) for the theory is obtained, and I would only add the question, "Why Jerahmeel?" If the text of the O.T. is to be dealt with as Canon Cheyne deals with it, an equally good theory could be worked out for any assigned name. One is reminded of

Goldsmith's parody of the critical method of his day, "The Emperor Ki is certainly the same as King Atoes; for if we only change *K* into *A*, and *i* into *toes*, we shall have the name Atoes." Whatever may be the worth of the Jerahmeel theory, it would surely have been better to expound it in a book devoted to the subject rather than in an encyclopædia. Meanwhile the reader of the present volume, who is dismayed at the havoc wrought upon the Hebrew text in the interest of Jerahmeel, may take comfort from a passage at the end of the article on "*Texts and Versions*," by F. C. Burkitt. He says: "It is always wholesome to remind oneself of the comparative soundness of the text. That there are blots, especially in the O.T., some of them probably irremovable, must be admitted; but they are not enough seriously to obscure the main features of the narratives related or the ideas expressed." Turning now to the less debatable and more generally acceptable contents of the volume, mention should be made of the article by Professor Addis on "*Right and Righteousness*," wherein is traced the development of the idea of "conformity to a norm" up to its highest ethical and theoretic significance. Professor G. F. Moore deals with "*Sacrifice*" in a long and exhaustive article which is of especial interest in its exposition of the beliefs and ideas for which sacrifice was the recognised expression. The prevailing conception of sacrifice and offering is that of a gift to God, and it does not appear that the idea of self-denial on the part of the person who makes the offering is implied. That which will be most acceptable to God is not necessarily that which is hardest to part with. Whatever may have been the origin of the elaborate ritual of sacrifice in the O.T., it appears there as a means of obtaining the favour of God, according to the circumstances of the worshipper, and, on the whole, without reference to his moral condition. The use of this divinely sanctioned means of winning the favour of God was open to bad men as well as to good ones; hence the denial of the efficacy of sacrifice on the part of the prophets. That they distinctly entertained the ideal of a purely spiritual worship is, as the author says, improbable. But they denied that sacrifice had any value or efficacy with God. What He required of men was not cult, but conduct. The prophetic teaching did not to any great extent modify the ritual of sacrifice, still less abolish it; but in the later literature it is rather the prophetic than the priestly idea of sacrifice which prevailed. The general Rabbinical theory, to which, however, there were some exceptions, was that repentance was a *sine quâ non* of all sacrifices. Naturally, after the Temple service had been abolished, sacrifices, whether in themselves sufficient or not, were impossible; and by force of circumstance the ethical principle prevailed over the ceremonial. The subject of sacrifice in the N.T. is dealt with in a separate section, and does not fall under notice here.

The name, history and opinions of the *Sadducees* are discussed by F. C. Cowley. He offers a derivation of the name from the Persian *zindik*, a term for an unbeliever, said to have originated in the third century A.D., but necessarily much older. The conjecture is ingenious, but rests, so far



as I can see, upon no positive evidence whatever. If the name Sadducee had been, in ordinary usage, a term of abuse, it would be easier to understand how a Persian word should have been chosen to denote something felt to be specifically un-Jewish. But the Sadducees themselves used the name, and certainly did not admit that their Judaism was less genuine than that of the Pharisees. The derivation from Zadok, or rather the implied reference to the sons of Zadok, the traditional holders of the priestly office, seems to account for the use of the name. And it is no objection that the particular opinions ascribed to the Sadducees are not connoted by the name. The name is historical, not doctrinal. The account of Sadducean history, what there is to be told, is good; and their doctrinal peculiarities are clearly set forth. With this article should be read that on "*Scribes and Pharisees*," which, however, does not come within the scope of the present notice.

In the article "*Satan*," stress is laid upon the view that both the name and the idea are native to Jewish thought, and owe less to Persian influence than has been usually maintained. The name is unquestionably Semitic; and as for the idea, the position of Satan, in the earliest Hebrew passages, is quite different from that of Angromainyu in the Persian dualism. The most that can be said is that the Persian belief may have influenced to some extent the later development of the Jewish doctrine of Satan. It is suggested that "the Satan" owes his origin as a distinct figure among the "sons of God" to the "growing tendency, manifest both in Zech. and Job, and even as early as Ezekiel, to distinguish Yahwé's attendants by their functions. And may not the main reason why he gained a more distinct and enduring individuality than, *e.g.*, the 'man with the measuring line,' or the 'interpreting angel' (Job xxxiii. 23), be found in the constant presence of evil and the increasing desire to dissociate it from God? The Satan . . . may be one of those figures due to the crystallisation of temporary functions which had long before been recognised as performed by Yahwé or one of his spirits, into permanent personalities. . . . There is much to be said for Marti's suggestion that he is the personification of the self-accusing conscience of Israel."

Canon Cheyne's article on "*Saul*" is chiefly a Jerahmeelisation of the data furnished by the Hebrew text, convincing to those who have accepted the premisses of that theory, but to less instructed readers not very helpful.

It is, of course, impossible to give account of all that is interesting in this volume, and that interest is by no means confined to the critical treatment of historical or legendary personages. One of the best features of the *Encyclopædia Biblica* is the prominence which it gives to archæology, using the latest results of research obtained from inscriptions and the observations of expert travellers. The articles *Shekel*, *Trade and Commerce*, *Weights and Measures*, contain a vast amount of information of the utmost value to scholars, and are perhaps with more right included in an encyclopædia of the Bible than a good deal which this volume contains. In the article *Shekel* it is shown how "the Jews were, as a rule, content

or obliged to use silver coins of foreign origin, and the two series of silver coins issued by them belong to periods of revolt against their rulers." These two are the shekels usually ascribed to Simon the Hasmonean, and those coined by Barcocheba. The former, however, are by many modern scholars assigned to the time of the first war against Rome. The invention of coinage dates from the seventh century B.C. "No coins were issued in districts from which they would be likely to penetrate to Palestine before the time of Darius Hystaspis (522-485 B.C.). All biblical references to shekels or any kind of money before the return from the exile, must therefore be understood of uncoined metal, for which the scales were used."

The article on *Trade and Commerce*, by G. A. Smith, extends to twenty-five pages, and is admirably done. Full use has been made of Assyrian, Babylonian and Egyptian records, and the result is given in a survey of all the trade routes of Western Asia, an account of all the commodities exchanged in trade, where they came from and where they were taken to, and a most useful list of all the trade terms in the O.T. The whole is illustrated by a good map showing the various caravan routes. An exhaustive survey such as is here given is an invaluable help to the study of the archæology of the Bible, and the inclusion of this article I should consider one of the chief merits of the *Encyclopædia Biblica*. But it is remarkable how very small, by comparison, is the proportion of purely Hebrew or Israelite trade to the whole volume of commerce here described. As the writer points out, it was the great empires which made trade; and thus the relation is reversed between Israel and the surrounding nations. In order to understand the social development of Israel, that of the other nations is studied, with the result that the commercial affairs of Israel are almost lost sight of in those of Egypt and Assyria. And even the trade that was carried on within the borders of Israel was chiefly due to enterprise outside. Of course, no one ever supposed that the pre-eminence of Israel was commercial; but in studying the O.T. one is apt to take for granted that the centre of gravity, so to speak, is always to be found within the limits of Israel and Judah. It is therefore all the more instructive to be shown how, in certain respects, the Jewish people were an insignificant element in the population of Western Asia.

Among the other archæological articles should be noticed that on *Tabernacle* by Benzinger, in which, after a careful examination of the description in Exod., the conclusion is reached that the Tabernacle never really existed. What is described as a portable sanctuary, to serve the purpose of the worship of Yahvé before the Temple of Jerusalem was built, was in reality a fiction based upon that very temple. "The whole historical tradition from the period immediately following the settlement down to the date of the building of Solomon's Temple, has no knowledge of any tabernacle. . . . It was not the Temple that was built on the model of the Tabernacle; it was the Tabernacle that took its shape, character, and importance for worship and the theocracy from the Temple." This conclusion is based partly on the fact that the details of construction,



as given in Exodus, are not consistent and could not have been embodied in an actual building, and partly on the fact that such a structure is not mentioned in the older Pentateuch sources, and is inconsistent with what is mentioned there. All that really was carried about, according to the older sources, was a simple tent-sanctuary, which was not the seat of an elaborate organisation of priests and guarded by a host of Levites, but had a single minister or attendant, viz., Joshua, who was not a Levite at all.

The mention of the Tabernacle naturally suggests the Temple; and a full account is given of the building and the services conducted in it, in two articles, one by Benzinger, the other by Box. The first includes descriptions, so far as the data allow, of the Temples associated with the names of Solomon, Ezekiel, Zerubbabel and Herod. Of course, that described by Ezekiel was only an imaginative construction; but as Ezekiel was a priest and presumably knew something of the earlier temple, his theoretical sketch is not without value. The site of all the temples is identified by Benzinger with that of the present dome of the rock, as against the view of W. R. Smith and others, who place it in the south-west of the present Haram. This latter might be possible for the Temple of Herod, but only on the improbable supposition that the latest temple was built on a different site from that of the previous ones. Exact information upon all points is not attainable in regard to the details of plan and construction of any one of the temples. For that of Solomon, the O.T. is the chief witness. For the Herodian temple we have the description given by Josephus, and the tractate Middoth in the Mishnah. Benzinger gives most weight to that of Josephus, and regrets that the statements of the Mishnah are not always consistent either with themselves or with Josephus. Probably Benzinger has done the most that is possible with the available data, at all events in the space at his command.

For the Temple service, as conducted in the Herodian Temple, the chief authorities are again Josephus and the Mishnah (tractate Tamid). Here the authorities are on the whole in agreement, and a detailed description is given of the whole day's work in the Temple. A good account is given of the various officials from the High Priest downward. It would be interesting to know the origin of the term *High Priest*, which does not represent either the Hebrew or the Greek words. The point, however, is not mentioned. The officer called the "*sekan*" is usually considered to have been the deputy of the High Priest. Schürer argues against this, on the ground that a substitute was annually elected, a week before the Day of Atonement, to act for the High Priest on that day if required. But a deputy might be needed on other occasions during the year; and it is not impossible that the "*sekan*" was appointed annually. In the Talmud, however, the full title of this officer is "*sekan* of the priests," not of the High Priest alone. Schürer identifies the "*sekan*" with the captain of the Temple; it seems more probable that the latter is represented by the title "*ish ha-birah*," or (as it occurs later), "*sar-ha-birah*," i.e. "man"

(or "prince") of the fortress. The total number of persons employed about the Temple must have been very great. Josephus says that the priesthood in his day amounted to twenty thousand men, and apparently this does not include the Levites. Of course, it was seldom if ever that the whole of the priests were present at once. But it has to be remembered that the Temple was the seat of all the official life of the Jewish people, so far as their relation with the Roman government allowed. There appears to have been even a kind of banking business carried on, of which the money changing referred to in the Gospels was only one department. It is certain that the Temple had an enormous revenue, both in money and goods, and employed a host of officials whose only connection with things sacred was their rank as priest. The description of the several ceremonies in the daily service is clear and minute, and leaves little, if anything, to be desired.

Before leaving the archæological department of the *Encyclopædia* a word should be said about the maps, which are very good. They include Western Asia, with the Trade Routes already mentioned, also those of Palestine and Phœnicia on a larger scale; further, a map of Syria, Mesopotamia, etc., for the Assyriologist; a map of Syria and Palestine according to the Egyptian monuments, and also according to the Amarna Letters. Lastly, a map of Trachonitis Hauran, etc., which is particularly welcome, as a detailed map of that region has not hitherto been easily accessible. I am indebted to it for the identification of a site mentioned in the Mishnah which I had been unable to locate. It is not too much to say that the maps are a small encyclopædia in themselves.

The article "*Texts and Versions*," by F. C. Burkitt, has already been mentioned, but deserves more special attention. Here I have to deal only with the O.T. portion, which, rather curiously, is placed after the N.T. section. First comes the account of the Massoretic text, and in view of the severe judgments passed upon that text by many critics, it is refreshing to find here a cordial recognition of its considerable merits. Of course it does not present an exact transcript of the original text; but it certainly is not the hopelessly confused wreck that it is sometimes considered to be, as, e.g., by Canon Cheyne, in the interest of Jerahmeel. And if it be said that the present Massoretic text is a fairly consistent one, but that it was produced by various editors who transformed an earlier and, as we might say, Jerahmeelite text, that would be only to replace one difficulty by another much greater. Conjectural emendation is a legitimate means of attempting to recover the original text, but not when it is applied on the assumption that the Massoretic text is everywhere untrustworthy. Where it is so applied the result is mere guesswork, and Jerahmeel is a fancy portrait. The chief method for the recovery of the original text is the study of the versions, and of these the most important for the O.T. are the Greek (LXX, Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion), the Latin (Old and Vulgate), and the Syriac.

Of all these, and their chief recensions and editions, an admirably clear



account is given in this article, which is distinguished throughout by moderation and common sense, as well as by expert scholarship.

Of other articles in this volume, in themselves well worthy of attention, it must suffice to name those on "*Wisdom Literature*" and "*Wisdom Book*," by Professor Toy; "*Writing*," by Professor Bevan, and on "*Week*" and "*Year*," by Professor Marti.

The various articles briefly noticed above are only a few specimens from the mass of material contained in this volume, to the whole of which, or even to that part of it which deals with the O.T., it is quite impossible to do justice in a few pages. The only verdict that can fairly be passed upon the work is one of emphatic praise, even in spite of its occasional extravagances. These are at least amusing. But it would be very unfortunate if a work so elaborate, so rich in information not easily accessible elsewhere, and so scholarly, were to be condemned on the ground of a few startling eccentricities. Of its merits in the field of N.T. criticism it is not within my province to speak; but to all (or nearly all) who have contributed to the O.T. portion, students of the Hebrew literature owe beyond all question a very great debt of gratitude.

R. T. HERFORD.

STAND, MANCHESTER.

## II. NEW TESTAMENT.

ON the Old Testament the *Encyclopædia Biblica* exhibits a certain unity, the Graf-Wellhausen theory being generally assumed. On the New Testament no such unity has been aimed at. In the very frank and interesting note included by the publishers in the last volume this is plainly stated. The editors have been free to choose the best available scholar to write each article, to whatever country he belonged, and to whatever Church. Among the contributors are Jews, Episcopalians of various schools, Methodists, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and Baptists. The editors had no views of their own to further, and thought it right to give a true reproduction of the present state of theology by seeking the co-operation of writers of various tendencies and views. The book, therefore, while highly fitted to inform the English-speaking public as to existing theological movements, is little in the interests of any system. A work thus planned and executed deserves a hearty welcome. It is a great gain that positions in theology which hitherto have been but vaguely known to English readers, are now set forth in English by their principal advocates or by able scholars who have adopted them. On the other hand, the consequences of the policy thus adopted by the publishers and editors may be of various kinds. The views of the Churches will have to be sought elsewhere than in the *Encyclopædia*. Many readers will feel it hard to decide between the contradictory views the *Encyclopædia* sets before them;

theology must appear more difficult, perhaps less attractive. As an instrument of education, the *Encyclopædia* will not be in great favour. It must also be found as time goes on that some of the new views put forward will fail to maintain themselves, so that the *Encyclopædia* will come to appear as a collection, not of facts only, but also of curiosities of speculation. Still, publishers and editors are entitled to the gratitude of all honest people for what they have done. It was time that such a book should be published, and there is no doubt that its appearance will mark an epoch in N.T. studies in Britain, and will enable a new start to be made in the effort towards that higher religious unity which can only be based on a full knowledge of the truth about the Christian Scriptures.

The task of the critic of such a work is not easy; he is called to review the most important inquiries now going on in N.T. study. We shall content ourselves with less than this, and shall, in the first place, point out some general features of the *Encyclopædia* on its N.T. side, and then comment on some of the more notable articles.

The *Encyclopædia* arose out of O.T. rather than N.T. study. The light now shines, owing to the splendid success of Semitic studies, from the O.T. on the New, not, as formerly, in the other direction; and it is noticeable how many Hebrew scholars here undertake to light up matters found in the Gospels and Epistles. This is the natural order, and it is a matter to be thankful for that it should thus prevail; but in certain cases the O.T. point of view has led to omission in the treatment of the N.T. When an article deals with a subject occurring in both Testaments, it often happens that the O.T. part is full and satisfactory, but the N.T. part inadequate. The article "Slavery," by Benzinger, is all on the institution among the Hebrews; of the slavery of Greece and Rome there is no mention; the student of Corinthians or Philemon is not helped even by one of the cross-references which are so admirable a feature of the work. In the articles "Robe" and "Rain," more might have been done for the N.T. student. Under "Righteousness" and "Reconciliation" the said student finds hardly anything for him; even without going into Biblical theology, a field the *Encyclopædia* is not meant to cover, more might have been done. Rabbinical study also does not get much attention; one finds no explanation how the Scribes of the time of Jesus were so different from those of the earlier and also of the later time. The student feels doubtless that the antiquities of the N.T. are in their origin O.T. matters, and that from this point of view the *Encyclopædia* provides much. The article "Synagogue," by Professor I. J. Peritz, is an excellent short statement as to the building, institution, and service; and there is a very interesting new derivation of the name "Sadducee"; see the article by Mr A. E. Cowley.

On the side of classical studies also we notice some defects. Professor Gardner's "Quirinius" is a very fair and well-balanced statement of the subject of the taxing, justice being done to Professor Ramsay's contentions; and the geographical articles by Professor Woodhouse are models of clearness



and brevity. The article "Stoics," on the other hand, tells hardly anything of the striking affinities between Stoic and Christian thought, on which the views of B. Bauer and of the Dutch school are largely based, and of which one may see a most suggestive statement in Pfeiderer's Introduction to Paulinism in the new edition of his *Urchristenthum*. The *Encyclopædia* has little to say of the Gentile belief and practices with which Christianity came in contact after it set out from Palestine.

On coming to what may be called the great articles, on which, as much as on the careful editorial work and the able scholarship of the writers in general, the public estimation of this *Encyclopædia* must depend, we notice a wide dissimilarity of method on the part of the various writers. Some of them accept the books of the N.T. on the whole, and are guided by the text as settled by criticism, though with the necessary attention to variants, in the endeavour to sift out the historical facts. Others are disposed to make their way by emendation, by dissection of contexts, by the rejection of passages, or by setting whole books aside. That the latter method, followed till now chiefly in Holland and in Germany, is being adopted by English writers also, we here find ample evidence. The application of such methods to the O.T. is, as every one knows, a notable feature of the *Encyclopædia*, but in the N.T. also there is much of it. As a curious example of difference of method, one may look at the article on the Temptation of Jesus, written in part by Dr Moffatt, in part by Canon Cheyne. Dr Moffatt comes first and regards the narrative, as has generally been done of late, as a parabolic account of a real occurrence in the earlier experience of Jesus. "The difficulty of Jesus at the outset naturally was to see and choose the true method; his subsequent trial, recurring at frequent stages, was to adhere to the choice made in this initial hour of insight. The logia passage on the temptation thus represented the disciples' memory of Jesus' memory." The great O.T. scholar deals with the incident in another way — in fact, in two other ways. First he proposes to illustrate it from some Oriental custom or observance, which existing in early times might naturally have led men to postulate such an event as the threefold trial at the opening of Jesus' ministry, and with this view repeats a story recently communicated to the Oxford Society of Historical Theology. A philosopher of Ispahan told Professor Browne of an attempt he had made at the outset of his career to obtain control over the jinns. Forty days spent in a solitary and dismal spot, a diminishing quantity of food, the appearance of a lion, these are some of the incidents. This particular philosopher was not successful in his attempt, but the point is to be seen in the existence in the East of some such initiatory ceremony. Does not this, Cheyne concludes, give plausibility to the view that the early Christians held their Master to have obtained control over the demons by performing this rite at the outset of his ministry? The temptation story accordingly is a piece of "mythic embroidery"; but we are also invited to consider, as throwing light on it, the temptations of Zarathustra and of Gautama. And the view

stated by Dr Moffatt at the beginning of the article is spoken of with reprobation. "We need not indulge the pleasant fancy that Jesus himself may have given the impulse to the production of the narrative by giving some of his nearest disciples glimpses of his early soul history. The fancy is not only unnecessary but also unwise." As an example of divergent methods of interpretation it will be hard to match this article. There is an explanation in the first paragraph that the three methods are not exclusive of each other; but surely they are so.

Dr Moffatt gives us a number of very good articles in which he shows the wide knowledge of the literature on each subject which we expect from him, and exercises a sober and careful judgment. His article on the "Sermon on the Mount" is an admirable piece of criticism on a difficult subject. There is nothing nearly so complete in English. Dr Moffatt holds that the sermon was really spoken by Jesus in its original form, and that it bore the title "To Disciples." With the latter conclusion many will not be able to agree. His "Stephen," and his articles on the "Pastoral Epistles," we can only mention; they are all thoroughly wrought and of great interest.

A word on Canon Cheyne's contributions to our knowledge of the N.T. They are always arresting. He offers several emendations of text, as on Matt. iii. 11, where the notion of bearing the shoes of a great man has been felt difficult by many scholars. The mighty one, he thinks, is neither God nor the Messiah; he is a warrior, and it is his weapons that the Baptist says he is not strong enough to carry—a Hebrew (not an Aramaic) word misread occasioning the confusion. Of the "Raca" passage he offers a rearrangement and exposition, following, but improving on, an American scholar. Some of Canon Cheyne's short articles, such as those on "Saints," and that on "Truth," are very fine examples of the softening and deepening influence of O.T. scholarship on N.T. study, and will have effect.

The articles of Professor N. Schmidt on "Son of God" and "Son of Man" are probably those in this volume which raise the deepest questions, and will take longest to find general acceptance. They belong to the newer treatment of the Gospels by the help of Aramaic; to the fascinating endeavour, that is to say, to find out how the sayings which have reached us only in Greek, and after being handed down among all manner of influences, sounded when first spoken. Some of Professor Schmidt's conclusions can be and have been reached by others, and without Aramaic, such as that Jesus did not use the title "Son of God." It is possible to hold this and yet to think that Jesus felt himself to stand in a special relation to God which others did not occupy. To this Professor Schmidt will not consent. The pronouns used with the word Father by Jesus when he speaks of "your Father," and "my Father," but never except once of "our Father," have been held to prove that he felt his own Sonship to be a different thing from that of his disciples. But Professor Schmidt assures us that these pronouns would be entirely absent in Aramaic; they belong to the Greek



version, not to the original, in which Abba would stand alone—a very important statement. The passages which speak of a special Sonship, such as “No man knows the Father but the Son,” and the parable of the vineyard, are all ruled out of court as not being original. If there is no passage where he called himself the Son of God, neither will Professor Schmidt allow that he was thus addressed by the demoniacs or by his disciples. The narratives of the trial our writer follows Brandt in considering unhistorical, and he adopts the view of Wrede (“Das Messiasgeheimniss Jesu”) that Jesus did not regard himself as the Messiah, and when afterwards identified with that figure had to be represented as concealing his Messiahship. It was from the Greek side, not the Semitic, that the title Son of God accrued to him. On the title “Son of Man,” Professor Schmidt writes a treatise of which it is impossible to give any idea here. The occurrence and meaning of the phrase in Semitic dialects is fully set forth, and a very full account is given of the modern discussion. The writer adopts the conclusion of Wellhausen and Lietzmann, that the Aramaic *bar-nasa* which must underlie the Greek *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, is incapable of such emphasis as to fit it for a Messianic title, and was never used by Jesus with any Messianic intention. In the Greek Gospels it is always Messianic, but this is due to misapprehension of sayings of Jesus. He spoke of what was due to man generally, to any man. Man could forgive sins, would rise again, etc., this was the nature of the claims he made; but he was early taken to have been making claims for himself, and the simple Aramaic *bar-nasa* changed into the enigmatic Greek title.

It may be well to regard these articles of Professor Schmidt's with a suspended judgment. As for the Aramaic question, Dalman, while not regarding “Son of Man” as a Messianic title, holds that it cannot have meant simply “man.” The passages explained by Professor Schmidt by the key he has provided seem in some instances flat and unemphatic. “Man has power to forgive sins,” will do, and “Man is Lord of the Sabbath,” and “Man came eating and drinking”; but in most of the passages, even those allowed by Schmidt after a careful examination, to go back to the original teaching of Jesus, this rendering gives a poor sense. “So must a man suffer of them,” and “Man has not come (into the world) to be served but to serve.”

These articles contain an immense amount of work on the various elements of the problems, but they raise more questions than they answer. The acceptance of the conclusions of Brandt and of Wrede, which cannot be regarded as established, endangers the position taken up to a serious degree. If Jesus made no Messianic claim and was a teacher of humanitarian doctrine, conscious of no special religious position, how is the opposition of his fellow-countrymen, and how is the crucifixion to be accounted for? The holders of the new views will have to set to work, like Dr Abbott, to construct a doctrine of Christ which will explain the extraordinary hold he had on his followers, and a life of Christ accounting for his fate.

The great articles of Professor Schmiedel on the Resurrection and

Ascension narratives and on Simon Magus and Simon Peter are to be regarded as constructive. Some of the stones of which they are built up have been recently discovered, like the fragment of the Gospel of Peter ; some have been brought into their true light by recent discussion, and now comes the great architect to put them in their true relation to each other, and to set forth the whole process to which they belong. The writer appears as a true continuer of the Tübingen theology ; he is guided by the canon that the great Pauline Epistles are earlier than the Gospels, and show an earlier stage of tradition, so that statements in the Gospels found to be inconsistent with those of Paul must yield to them. As Paul speaks of visions only of the risen Christ, and not of any hearing of his words, the reports of the speeches at the Christophanies must be given up, and those of touching and eating. As Paul makes the vision of Peter first, and it undoubtedly took place in Galilee, the vision of the women at Jerusalem must be given up, with the empty tomb, and all the appearances on the third day at Jerusalem. The three days between the death and the resurrection are connected, on the one hand, with the Jewish belief that the soul hovered so long after death near the body it had left ; on the other, with the journey to Galilee, which would take three days, and at the end of which the first vision may have taken place. The article shows a masterly faculty of method, and like a good workman, the writer always seeks to explain those elements of the tradition which he does not accept as historical. The way in which a motive is found for each representation sometimes produces the impression that the writer claims to know more than man can know of literary processes so remote and so obscure. A matter which ought to receive notice is the style of translation of this and of Schmiedel's other articles. The writer's German style is highly argumentative, and the translator shows insufficient acquaintance with the logical force of German adverbs and conjunctions, so that the article is made needlessly disagreeable to read. The other translations in this volume are good. If an opportunity occurs, the articles of Professor Schmiedel ought yet to be translated into English idiom.

The article "Simon Peter" contains a great amount of matter on the pillar apostle ; in the Gospels, in the period of the Acts, and in church legend. Here, too, Paul's statements are preferred to those in Acts, or the representations of 1 Peter. One cannot always agree with the writer. When he states that Peter could have put a stop to the Judaistic persecution of Paul, and cannot therefore have altogether sympathised with the latter, one remembers that at Antioch he does not appear in a position of such ascendancy, and that the Pauline Epistles deal with him, except in the Antioch affair, in a friendly tone. Full justice is done to Peter's moral qualities, especially his noble attachment to his Master (col. 4588). The most noticeable part of the article, however, is that dealing with the Peter legend. There has been so much playing of late with Peter at Rome and founder of the Church there, that one welcomes a thoroughgoing proof that Peter never was at Rome. The use made by Schmiedel of the



apocryphal Acts of individual apostles, which have recently come more fully into the scholar's hands, and the origin of which is now better understood, has enabled the proof to be made more convincing than it could before. The development of the Peter legend is now clear. Peter never appears at Rome apart from Paul. Sometimes it is Paul under the caricature of Simon Magus, with whom he is at Rome, sometimes Paul in his own character. (In the article "Simon Magus" the impersonation of Paul as Simon Magus is fully explained.) Peter then comes to Rome, firstly to confute Paul, the "deceiver," the "enemy," as he himself tells us he was called; then as Paul rises in the estimation of the Church, Peter and he are at Rome side by side working together. Lastly, Peter is put first, and the foundation of the Roman Church ascribed to him.

In Professor Schmiedel's article "Silvanus," the second Thessalonian Epistle is rejected as not by Paul. Many will prefer the verdict of Professor McGiffert in the article on the Thessalonians (Epistles to), who inclines to consider this Epistle genuine, though scarcely worthy of Paul. Neither scholar mentions Askwith's *Introduction to the Thessalonian Epistles*, 1902, which is a solid contribution to the subject.

On the Pauline Epistles we have in this volume Professor v. Manen's articles on "Romans," and on Rome (Church of). The point of view here taken up is known from the writer's earlier article on "Paul" in vol. iii. The great argument for denying the traditional data and authorship of the principal Pauline Epistles is, that they do not appear to have influenced Christendom before Marcion. The early *Apologies* know them not; the creed does not acknowledge them; it can be argued with much force that they were not written till late in the second century. For the reply to the Dutch view the reader has to turn to the article on Galatians by Professor Schmiedel; and readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL will remember "Did Paul write Romans?" by Professor Smith in No. 2, and Professor Schmiedel's reply under the same title in No. 3 of this Journal. For a statement of the ordinary view as to Romans, the reader must look outside the *Encyclopædia*; we notice that Hort's excellent little book on Romans and Ephesians is not mentioned, even in the bibliography. It is unnecessary to repeat arguments so recently given in these pages, but attention may be called to v. Manen's complaint at the end of the article that no complete discussion of his views has yet been published. It might be found possible to supply this want. No doubt it is met in great part by the demonstrations which are found in books on early Christianity, that the new religion could not pass in its Jewish form to Gentile lands, and that Paul supplied it with a form in which it could so spread. Much, no doubt, remains to be done to make this argument complete; in particular, it is necessary to realise what Paul's oral presentation of the Gospel to Gentiles must have been, as distinguished from his learned statement of it in the Epistles, and how it would compare in the mind of a Gentile hearer with the teachings and the rites in which he had been brought up. Again, v. Manen insists that the Paulinism of the Epistles is a developed faith, and cannot have

been attained so early as 59 A.D. "A man does not become at one and the same moment the adherent of a new religion and its great reformer" (col. 4139). This surely is begging the question, and it may admit of demonstration that Pauline thought, so consistent and uniform, as careful study finds it to be in the various Epistles, must be the work of one mind and belongs to the situation presented in the first century and not to that of the second.

In his article on the Early Church of Rome, v. Manen gives an admirable sketch of the social conditions in which that Church grew up. His contention that Acts knows of no Christian Church at Rome before Paul's arrival in the city, and that the "brethren" who came to Appii Forum and the Three Taverns to meet him, are not Christians but Jews, may be doubted. The inconsistencies of the last chapter of Acts, no doubt, go far to justify a dissection of it into separate narratives of different tendencies.

Students of the textual history of the N.T. will be grateful to Mr F. C. Burkitt for his great article on "Text and Versions," an independent treatise bringing the subject up to date in a way much needed. His proof of the real occurrence of the Syrian revision, the hypothetical character of which was the great weakness of Hort's system, is specially to be welcomed.

ALLAN MENZIES.

ST ANDREWS UNIVERSITY.

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*Babel and Bible.*—By Friedrich Delitzsch. Edited, with an Introduction, by C. H. W. Johns, M.A. Pp. xxix + 226.—Williams and Norgate. Price 5s.

THE sensation which Professor Delitzsch's first lecture aroused in Germany is somewhat startling. Of course it was the presence of the Emperor and the consequent wide publicity given it by the newspapers which brought it prominently before the public. Apart from this it would, no doubt, have attracted comparatively little notice. But what is surprising is that it should have called forth so large a number of replies, in which long antiquated views of the Bible should be hotly defended. This whole side of the controversy throws a rather unpleasant light on the deep cleft between the Church and Biblical science that appears to exist in Germany. As it excited so much attention, it was natural that numerous Old Testament scholars should also have expressed their judgment on the lecture. We have, accordingly, a whole series of pamphlets, several of which are of real value. I name here simply those of Budde, Giesebrecht, Löhr and Gunkel. The first lecture contained many points to which exception might be taken, but nothing which touched any fundamental article of the orthodox faith. Much of it was the merest commonplace. That the Pentateuch had been successfully analysed into several documents, that some at least of its earliest narratives,



especially the Deluge story, had been ultimately derived from Babylonia, that it is lost labour to attempt harmonies between Genesis and physical science, all this has been recognised long ago by most theologians. But though every contention of Delitzsch were to be granted as to the debt of Israel to Babylon, or even as to the development in Babylonia of a monotheistic faith, there is here nothing at all that need disturb us. But much that is said is very disputable. The Babylonian origin of the Sabbath is perhaps probable, but it can hardly be regarded as proved, and the character of the Babylonian unlucky day is far removed from the Jewish Sabbath, and still more so from the Christian Sunday. Neither can it be said that the meaning of El, the primitive Semitic word for God, is at all so clear as Delitzsch affirms, and even were his view, which substantially coincides with Lagarde's, that it means "goal," made out, it would remain questionable whether he does not altogether over-estimate its significance. Further, that the name Yahweh was current among the Northern Semites a thousand years before the origin of the Hebrew nation is quite probable. The fact is, indeed, still disputed, but it is intrinsically probable that the name had a long history before the time of Moses. It is not the name, however, that is so important, but the character of the deity who bears it. And in view of the large number of theories still defended by many scholars as to the significance of the name, it is rash to say that Yahweh, as the Existing and Enduring One, was the spiritual possession of these nomad Semitic tribes. Greater exception has been taken to the utterances on Babylonian Monotheism. Delitzsch asserts "that free and enlightened minds taught openly that Nergal and Nebo, Moon-God and Sun-God, the Thunder-God Ramman, and all other Gods were one in Marduk, the God of Light." This statement is based on an inscription published by Mr Pinches in the twenty-eighth volume of *The Journal of the Transactions of the Victoria Institute*. In this inscription Merodach is identified with thirteen other Gods, and in the original tablet, which is now broken, was probably identified with many more. Mr Pinches gives some other intimations of a tendency to Monotheism in the Babylonian religion. Some points, however, require to be borne in mind in estimating the importance of the inscription. Its date is not given by Delitzsch, and Mr Pinches speaks only vaguely. On page 11 he refers to it as possibly later than 650 B.C., but at the close of his paper he suggests the possibility that Persian and Hebrew influences may account for it. To these Delitzsch does not refer, but when he quotes the inscription as proving that Babylon as well as Israel succeeded in attaining a pure Monotheism, this possibility ought to have been discussed. Besides, we have in this inscription nothing more than a piece of esoteric speculation, which at present seems to stand quite isolated, possibly, indeed, nothing more than the enthusiastic utterance of some fanatical devotee of Marduk, who wished to claim for his deity the honours of the whole Pantheon. Moreover, this had, so far as we can see, absolutely no influence in checking the crass polytheism of the religion, whereas in Israel Monotheism triumphed and became the common

property of all. And of one thing we may be quite certain, that Hebrew Monotheism was not borrowed from abroad. The second lecture shows, especially in its introduction, marked traces of the controversy which the first lecture had excited. We have quite belated attacks on the old-fashioned doctrine of revelation, without any realisation that with the old doctrine the fact of revelation does not stand or fall. Equally belated is the attack on the blood-thirstiness of Yahweh exhibited in several Old Testament narratives. In fact the lecturer, whatever his merits as an Assyriologist, when it comes to theology occupies much the same position as the man in the street. He talks like an eighteenth-century rationalist. When, further, he belittles the religion of Israel in comparison with the religion of Babylon, one can only account for the strange forgetfulness of patent facts on the assumption that the one-sidedness of his opponents has provoked him into an attitude equally one-sided. It is as absurd for cuneiform scholars to deny the originality of the Hebrew prophets as for Jewish scholars to deny the originality of Jesus. What sort of an idea of revelation can any one have who urges against a recognition of the Old Testament as a religious canon, a revealed book of religion, "that it includes such literature as the Book of Job, which, with words that in places border on blasphemy, casts doubt on the very existence of a just God"? Or what is the reader to think of a statement like this: "To be quite frank, beyond the revelation of God that we, each one of us, carry in our own conscience, we have certainly not deserved a further personal Divine revelation"? To prove this by reference to the treatment of the Decalogue in the Lutheran and Roman catechisms is surprising enough, especially in view of the fact that Delitzsch himself misquotes it; but to make our deserts the measure of God's grace is still more so. Some other points may be just mentioned. One may share the feeling that of late, conjectural emendation has run riot in the Old Testament text, without believing for one moment that Assyriology has re-established the credit of the traditional text. In agreement with Kuenen, though without mentioning him, Delitzsch thinks that the tree of knowledge is a later addition to the original story of the Fall. In spite of the fact that the tree of life has parallels in myths of the golden age, while the tree of knowledge has none, Budde's view that the tree mentioned in the original story was the tree of knowledge seems to be preferable. [The latter part of Gunkel's note in *Israel und Babylonien*, p. 47, n. 23, is a little perplexing, at any rate if I am right in believing that Kuenen did take the view adopted by Delitzsch.] I content myself with the bare mention of the strange reference to cremation on p. 120, and of the irrelevant padding in the account of the Mohammedan Paradise. The editor has prefixed an introduction which, while interesting, pays rather undue deference to the lecturer, and betrays little consciousness of his defective equipment outside Assyriology. On page 223 there is a misprint in Hengstenberg's name.

ARTHUR S. PEAKE.

WHALLEY RANGE, MANCHESTER.



*Critical Questions.*—Being a Course of Sermons delivered in St Mark's Church, Marylebone Road, N.W. By Rev. A. F. Kirkpatrick, D.D., and others. With Preface by Rev. James Adderley. Pp. 204, crown octavo.—London: S. C. Brown, Langham & Co., Limited, 1903.

Co-OPERATIVE literature is one of the marks of the present age. I speak not now of the great encyclopædias, dictionaries, and works of reference generally, to which many scholars have contributed their several researches, but rather of collections of essays written by different authors from a common standpoint. Oxford has been especially prolific in these joint productions. The fashion was set by the now historical Essays and Reviews, which provoked a number of joint replies, among which was *Aids to Faith*. *Hellenica* was on the less controversial subject of Greek thought. More recently we have had *Lux Mundi*, *Contentio Veritatis*, and *Personal Idealism*. "*Critical Questions*" is a pre-arranged series of sermons preached in St Mark's Church, Marylebone Road, by some of the best scholars of the English Church. It is interesting as part of a process which began within the memory of men now living, but of which few of us are likely to see the end. The process is not confined to the Anglican Church, but is actively going on also within the Roman Communion. It is the attempt of men of light and leading within the Church to accommodate the Christian Faith to the mind and spirit of the age. So long as Science was dominated by a dogmatic materialism there was little hope for success in any such undertaking, but now that this attitude has been in great measure abandoned, the auspices are more favourable.

Professor Kirkpatrick leads off boldly with the statement with which all must agree, that "Truth has nothing to fear from frank and reverent investigation of its title-deeds." But then Pilate's awkward question—*Quid est veritas?*—still presses for its reply; and the anagrammatic answer which is so often given to it,—*Est vir qui adest*,—is more stimulating than satisfactory; since the problem really is—What propositions about this man are to be accepted as true? Are we, for instance, to accept the statement that he was born of a virgin? Professor Sanday challenges us to the consideration of this question, and we must not shirk the issue. Let us begin by admitting that we have no right to deny any alleged fact because of its extraordinary nature. Parthenogenesis in the case of man may be among the secrets of the universe for aught we know to the contrary. The question is therefore one of evidence. Now the evidence for this alleged fact is to be found in the early chapters of the first and third Gospels. The first two chapters of Matthew by Canon Sanday's own admission "appear to belong to that portion of the First Gospel that is latest and least certain" (p. 148). It is therefore on the early chapters of Luke that he bases his defence of this article of the Christian Creed. From the Jewish tone of the Canticles, especially of the *Benedictus*, he

concludes that they cannot be the composition of St Luke. Moreover, the stress laid upon the Jewish law in the narrative setting (222-24) "is very unlike St Luke, the disciple of St Paul, the great opponent of everything legal, and very unlike the date, 75-80 A.D., when the Christian Church had long given up these Jewish usages" (p. 135). Canon Sanday is therefore driven to the conclusion that "in these chapters St Luke was using an older writing." In this older writing he notices two special characteristics—

(1) There is about it a certain womanliness of tone.

(2) It appears to stand in some special relation to the Virgin Mary.

How, then, did such a document come into the historian's hands? "St Luke had some special source of information connected with the court of the Herods." This was doubtless derived from Joanna, the wife of Chuza, Herod's steward (Lk. viii. 3). She was one of the women who found the stone rolled away from the sepulchre, and reported to the disciples a vision of angels (Lk. xxiv. 1-10). She doubtless remained a member of the Church in Jerusalem, where she and Mary, the mother of Jesus (Acts i. 14), would have been likely to have been thrown much together. To her in a moment of quiet confidence the mother of the Lord imparted the wondrous events which she had so long kept in her heart. Through her they somehow found their way in a written form to St Luke.

Such is the evidence offered us for "the strange and awe-inspiring story of the wondrous Birth," with regard to which Canon Sanday, with his usual candour, admits that it was not "included in the public teaching of our Lord Himself or (for some time, we may believe) of the apostles." St Paul certainly had either never heard of it or else deliberately rejected it. But against "the partial silence of the apostolic age" Canon Sanday thinks we may set "the very marked emphasis of the age that immediately succeeded that of the apostles."

Now when the clergy appeal to reason, surely the laity ought to exercise their reason. When we are asked to accept any fact on testimony, the first question is as to the character of the witness. What, then, do we know of the character of Joanna? Positively nothing but this, that she was one of "certain women which had been healed of evil spirits and infirmities" (Lk. viii. 2), of whom Mary Magdalene, "from whom seven devils had gone out," was another.

On this subject the clergy have the great advantage that arguments on the contrary side to their own are regarded as profane and irreverent. But if we would appreciate the force of this evidence, we should look upon it in some such way as this. Suppose Mark Twain's prophecy to be fulfilled, and Mrs Mary Baker Eddy to figure to after ages as the foundress of a great religion. And suppose that some future historian of Christian Science were to incorporate into his work a document, partly in prose and partly in verse, containing startling revelations with regard to this gifted lady's birth—a document of which no account could be given, but which was surmised to contain the whispered confidences of Mrs Eddy's mother



to a female friend of neurotic temperament, I think we know already what would be Professor Sanday's own judgment as to the amount of credence to be attached to these belated revelations. Surely men of learning and enlightenment would do more real service to truth and piety by protesting against a semi-Pagan accretion to Christianity, even though it was accepted by Ignatius, than by attempting to bolster it up by arguments however subtle and ingenious. Professor Sanday says that we run no danger now of "losing sight of the full humanity of our Lord." Let us ask him in parting—How can a being possess full humanity if he has only one human parent?

ST GEORGE STOCK.

OXFORD.

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*Life and Letters of Brooke Foss Westcott, D.D., D.C.L., sometime Bishop of Durham.*—Two vols.—By his Son, Arthur Westcott. Macmillan & Co., 1903.

THOSE who had the privilege of coming into contact with Dr Westcott, however slightly, or who have known him even through his writings alone, will hear of his published *Life* with eagerness, and with a little apprehension. With eagerness, for if they ever knew a little of him they are certain to wish for a fuller acquaintance: and with some slight fear, lest a character wonderfully beautiful, but set (in all save the closing years) in surroundings which lacked dramatic features, should seem in printed pages less winning or less worthy of reverence than it truly was. They may at once be reassured. Mr A. Westcott has carried out the task which he evidently loved, so as to satisfy the eagerness of those who desire to learn more of the bishop, and yet with a reverence and a reticence which offer nothing that can jar. He is to be thanked heartily for giving us so much, and for giving it with so little of the author intruded that one is left in the silent society of the great soul which is portrayed. To read these pages is to receive something of the blessing of such intercourse.

By most readers the *Life* will not all be found of equal interest. That was inevitable; for it took years to bring out into sight all the power and goodness that lay at first concealed in that retiring and humble nature. The brilliancy of school and college careers gave promise for the future, and those most closely associated with him never doubted the real greatness of the man, even in early years. But few had the opportunities for seeing this, save when now and again a prize won, or a book published, gave evidence of ability, thoroughness, and nobility of mind of more than a common order. So the years at Cambridge passed away, leaving J. B. Lightfoot, the friend and pupil of Westcott, occupying the larger position in the University, while the latter was lost to the general view for eighteen years as an assistant master at Harrow. Of that long interval there is comparatively little to record; not because the time was in any sense lost, but because the life was that of a student not easily known, and wanted

incident to make it memorable. Work was strenuous all the time, and it was carried on with a faith in its unseen consequences which never wavered, and which the later years only illustrated on a larger scale, and crowned to sight. The revision of the text of the new New Testament was already going on by the two friends Westcott and Hort, although the publication of their Greek text was not to come for many a year yet. And besides the school work, which was always done most conscientiously, wide and exact reading was all the time furnishing Westcott with that wealth of knowledge which enabled him later on to handle every subject he approached as a master, and continually surprised people who supposed his greatness to be that of the theologian alone.

This stage was ended by the offer of an examining chaplaincy, and shortly after, a canonry, at Peterborough, by Bishop Magee, at the close of 1868. Westcott accepted this without hesitation, but not without some anxiety, for it involved a loss of income to give up the large house he now had at Harrow; and though he was the last man to care for money on its own account, he felt it might be difficult to provide for the education of his large family of sons. But neither faith nor resolution wavered if duty seemed clear; and so Westcott entered on another stage which led on to his life's work. He retained his canonry at Peterborough fourteen years, but during the greater part of this time his main work lay at Cambridge, and he resided at Peterborough during the Christmas and long vacations.

While at Peterborough, Westcott arranged the Paragraph Psalter, at first only in MS. for the use of the cathedral chanting, though it was subsequently published in 1879. It is greatly to be regretted that during the score of years since that date this Psalter has not become more widely known and used in churches. It owes its title to the fact that the psalms are divided into their natural paragraphs, over which are set brief headings. These afford real assistance in the intelligent and devotional use of the psalms, besides ensuring the proper variation of the musical settings where this is required. But the merits of the Psalter do not end with these advantages. With the thoroughness which characterised everything he did, Westcott revised the Prayer Book Psalms minutely, and pointed them anew in such a way as to make the emphasis of the words and of the music accord; while in a few cases where this is urgently required, he separated clauses which have been wrongly grouped as a single verse, or grouped others which have been mistakenly divided. To ears accustomed only to the Psalters in common use, chanting from the Paragraph Psalter sometimes appears rather difficult or strange at first. But it is not really harder, and it is far more beautiful and devotional. It is not too much to say that there is no English Psalter which deserves to stand even second to this one, and none which makes music interpret the psalms so well.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Years later, after a visit to Peterborough again, Westcott wrote: "I was delighted with the psalms at Peterborough. I am very proud of having helped in that work. I often wished that King's would have followed."



In the letters written from Peterborough one begins to catch glimpses of the wisdom and insight with which Westcott threw the spell of his influence over his own boys as they grew. What could be more healthy, or really more profound advice for a letter to a boy at school to carry than the following?—"Keep fresh all your good resolves, and while you work, work with all your heart. At other times, if home thoughts can happily mix with all you do, you will be happy and do what we all wish." Or again: "I hope that you will have a very happy time, and you know well how to make it so. Don't be hasty to make friends. For the first time you can look quietly about and see what boys are really like. . . . A boy's language is a sure sign of his character, and I should say quite certainly that you should have nothing to do with a boy who uses words which you would not wish your mother to hear. This is a very simple rule, and a very good one."

When in 1861 the Hulsean Divinity Professorship at Cambridge had fallen vacant, Westcott had thought of becoming a candidate for it. But he found that his friend Lightfoot was entertaining the same idea, and believing that the latter stood the better chance, renounced his purpose, notwithstanding Lightfoot's desire to stand aside in his favour. Lightfoot was then elected, and resolved to bring Westcott back to Cambridge also when another opening offered. This occurred in 1870 with the vacancy of the Regius Professorship, when Lightfoot used all his influence for his friend, and Westcott was elected. He had now found his right place, and his influence was soon felt in Cambridge, where during the next twenty years his main work lay, although he held his canonry concurrently with his Professorship till 1882, and from 1883 a canonry at Westminster. At Cambridge the three lifelong friends, Westcott, Lightfoot, and Hort, were together, and this in itself was an encouragement and a power. The spirit in which Westcott entered upon his work is shown in words he wrote to Professor Maurice in reply to his welcome: "If an unbounded faith in the reality of the spiritual work which Cambridge can do, and an intense love of Cambridge, can give any power, that power I think I can claim. For the rest, I know my weakness too well. . . ."

The *Life* contains an interesting reminiscence of these years by Professor Stanton; and to many a reader whose own recollections go back to Cambridge between the years 1870 and 1890, these pages must call up memories which one is glad to cherish, even if they are not of more than comparatively distant contact with Professor Westcott. A mere attendance at the lectures which he gave to candidates for Holy Orders was enough to make one feel the sunny purity of the ethereal soul which seemed half out of place at the lecturer's desk. What an expressive face his was! Met in the street when hurrying along, the mind drawn within, it would look grey, and set, and dried, the broad brow hidden partly by the cap, and the small stature and nervous movement claiming no notice. But during the lecture, in which a verse and a half of St John's writings would be discussed, unfolded, and illustrated by many another passage, till it became plainly

impossible within the hour to reach further than these few words, or to touch upon five-sixths of the section which had been intended, there would break from time to time a light over the face and in the deep expressive eyes, which one knew was a reflection of the light of Heaven that was shining upon the lecturer's own soul.

To chronicle here the steps by which Professor Westcott worked out the ideal ever before his eyes for Cambridge, is not necessary; they may be traced adequately enough in the *Life*. Nor need one stay to dwell on his work on the Revision of the English Bible, which began almost with his residence at Cambridge, and did not cease till after its close. The publication of the Revised New Testament in 1881, and almost at the same time that of the Westcott and Hort Greek Text, brought the stress of this particular work to an end, though weekly meetings still continued of the Cambridge committee at work on the revision of the Apokrypha. The immensity of the labour involved in the Greek Text alone, the revision of which was carried out with unexampled minuteness and completeness through twenty-eight years of toil by the two friends, and with a single-hearted quest after truth which has never been questioned in either of the workers, would by itself suffice to make Westcott's name memorable for ever. But Cambridge owes him more than any mere enumeration of achievement or results accomplished can express. For while many men earn gratitude of others for what they do in their service, the noblest characters deserve this chiefly for what they are. Westcott did far more than most men; but what he did was not noticeable chiefly on its own account. His acts were but the expression under the conditions of the time, of himself. His life lived for twenty years in Cambridge was an influence and a blessing; and Cambridge men felt that they were uplifted by having him among them. It is always more blessed to give than receive, and Westcott was one of those who can confer the greater benediction by drawing those around to give their best—the veneration of their hearts. This feeling found some expression in the movement to procure a portrait of him for presentation to the University. Sir W. B. Richmond was commissioned to paint this in 1887, and the portrait now hangs in the Fitzwilliam. But the painter has left us another portrait in words, hardly less vivid, which may be given here:—"It was delightful to watch the ever-moving face, like the seasons, for its variety,—how those clear grey eyes flashed, and the brows became almost knotted with the intensity of a thought growing behind them; and then, when the thought was brought to birth, the wrinkles were smoothed out, and, like the cloudless sky of a summer day, his splendid domed forehead exposed a serenity and calm almost godlike. There was no part of his face which did not illustrate emotion: worn with thought, puckered with conflicting struggles, the whole countenance told the history of a temperament wearing itself away with conflict. The spiritual expression was prevented from being sentimental by the virility in the man's nature. One could see under that sweet face the possible presence of a great storm, and under that restrained



nature a fire and a passion burning the very life. And it was this sort of perfection of human attributes which gave the charm as well as the force to his character. One felt in the presence of a man that knew the fire, but whose spiritual nature knew how to use it for good."

During the last seven years of Cambridge life Westcott was also Canon of Westminster. The appointment was doubly welcome for its own sake, and as coming almost immediately after his resignation of the canonry of Peterborough, which was due to a painful and perplexing action on the part of Bishop Magee, borne by Westcott with striking dignity and generosity. He became also at this time examining chaplain to his old friend and pupil Archbishop Benson. Several of his smaller books are the outcome of work at the abbey, where he threw himself into the preaching that fell to him, though he found it very exhausting. He loved the abbey himself, and delighted in leading others to know and love it. In these years, too, Westcott began to take a prominent part in dealing with social and international problems, though they had held his interest from quite early life; he thus found fresh lines of usefulness opening out to him. If any place would have drawn him from Cambridge it would probably have been the abbey, which he preferred to three deaneries that were offered him. But it was no voluntary step which eventually broke the tie of twenty fruitful years, and when an imperious call came, it required him to say farewell to Westminster as well as Cambridge.

This summons was of course the offer in 1890 of the Bishopric of Durham, vacant through the death of Bishop Lightfoot. To Westcott the greatness of the burden and of the opportunity were alike apparent. On a later occasion he spoke with some indignation of the opinion which slighted the work of a "real spiritual statesman" in comparison with that of a scholar. But his humblemindedness, and, one may perhaps add, the habits of the student through forty years, made him shrink from undertaking such an office. The thought of taking up his friend's work, however, and confirming what he had begun at Durham, gave a sacredness to this offer which made it a clear duty, and Westcott, though he paused, did not hesitate. The spirit in which he faced his new work cannot be expressed better or more simply than in his own words written to tell his eldest son of his decision:—" . . . I was bound to obey 'a clear call' even in evening time. In the prospect of such a charge every thought of fitness vanishes. There can be no fitness or unfitness, but simply absolute surrender. I think that I can offer all; and God will use the offering." It was a constant faith with him which he expressed in connection with the Archbishop's great office later on: "If your work did not bring the needed strength, I should be afraid. But happily work that is offered as a sacrifice always does." And one gets a glimpse of the simple reality of the self-sacrifice in his own case in a letter written after eighteen months at Durham to an old friend and fellow scholar who sent him his latest publication:—"The experience of constant action and constant speaking is new to me. Books are practically inaccessible. My heart often fails me, yet I try not to look backward."

The story of the ten and a half years spent at Durham forms the most striking part of the life of Westcott, and that which will prove the most interesting to such readers as had no personal acquaintance with him. This is partly because the closing years were far more filled with incident, and contained some notable acts, such as the settlement of the great coal strike by the bishop, whose courage, wisdom, and saintliness, neither Masters' Federations nor Trades Unions could resist. Partly it is because the full maturity of Westcott's nature was only reached in his old age. He was still young at heart, still growing, when, several years after the allotted limit of three score years and ten was passed, he laid down the burden of toil and entered on his rest in the summer of 1900. It is rare indeed to meet with anyone so old in wisdom and in work, so young in hope, in wonder, in simplicity of heart, as he. Partly, too, this section of his life being the most recent, is the best remembered. For this last reason it may be passed over more rapidly here, while it is fully told in the *Life*. There one sees the bishop's unfailing activity though he was "generally tired"; the simplicity with which he regarded nothing in his palace, or even in himself, as his own, but consecrated with himself to his office; the lowliness of heart which only grew the fairer as it was set upon the pinnacle of a great position, and surrounded by the honour and the veneration of men. Wherever he went, his influence rarely failed to reach, and never reached without ennobling. Alike on his clergy, on the captains of industry in the diocese, and on the masses of the Durham miners, his spell was cast for good. And as he set himself increasingly to face the social problems of the age, its national difficulties, and its international tasks, whether in the way of missionary extension or of political obligation, his hold upon the mind of the country at large increased. Without tracing the particular steps he took, the real character of Westcott's life during these years, and something of the secret of his power, may be sufficiently indicated here by three quotations. The first is a letter to a clergyman:—"Since I am called upon to impose a burden, I dare not shrink from laying it on him who will, I believe, by God's help bear it best; and in doing this I think that I follow the guidance of the Spirit. God grant that you too may see your own duty plainly! To His counsel and love I commit you." Who can wonder that a bishop who ruled thus was obeyed, and that with reverent and joyous service? The second quotation voices the thoughts of many a layman in this north country diocese, who like the speaker was one of a crowd that listened to the bishop as he spoke on some occasion to further what was being done for the wellbeing of the suffering of the poor, or for the better manhood of the hardy toilers:—He was "the grandest ould man fer taaken ivver aa cam akross yit—wen y'eer 'im taak et's just like reeden a byuke—clivver! He tyuk his hat off i' th' blazen hot sun, an aa thowt he lukt th' varry sowl o' gudeness. He wanted nee bishop's hat te mak 'im luk gud wi' that gud, onnest, upreet and smilen fyes. Aa mebbis canna discribe things as aa out te dee, but there's nee mistak aboot et,—th' Bishop's a gloryus ould man. Aa's setisfised this koonty 'll loss a



bonny gud man wen Bishop Westcott's gyen." The third quotation must be that of a title only. A dozen pages of the *Life* are filled by a sketch of "Bishop Westcott as Diocesan," contributed by Archdeacon Boutflower, who was his domestic chaplain throughout his episcopate. They are among the best in the book, and should by all means be read, as giving with much insight a very concise and beautiful account of the bishop by one who had singular opportunities of observation, and evidently the capacity for both estimating and venerating the great character with which he lived in close and daily contact.

"Call no man happy till his death" is a maxim of ancient prudence which in Westcott's case had an application of a different kind. For while there was much in every stage of his career which deserved this description, it is perhaps not too much to say that he was happiest of all in his death. This came at the last with a certain swiftness, for he was only ill a week, and even then had little suffering. So to the very verge he continued the strenuous self-forgetting course which had found delight in work for others all through a length of more than ordinary years. His last public act was to preach to a large gathering of miners in the cathedral. But it was not this alone which made the moment of his passage a happy one. Just two months before, he had said farewell to the wife who had been his closest companion for eight and forty years, and had in his thoughts borne the name of *φιλτάτη* since she was a little girl of twelve sixty years before. It is plain enough to any reader how desolate those two months had seemed in spite of all the bishop's courage and faith, and notwithstanding his gratitude for her sake that he had proved the survivor. That rest should come just when life first grew really weary, exactly a year after his youngest son had gone before, and two months after his wife was taken from him, when hardly any of his earlier friends were left, was surely the happiest crowning of a long and noble life. Six months before, when preaching the Commemoration Sermon in his old college chapel, Westcott used words which give so beautiful a review of his own life that one cannot forbear to quote them, characteristic as they are:—"In this chapel, and in these courts, fifty-six years ago, I saw visions, as it is promised that young men shall see them in the last days,—visions which in their outward circumstances have been immeasurably more than fulfilled. I have had an unusually long working time, and I think unequalled opportunities of service. When I have failed, as I have failed often and grievously, it has not been because I once saw an ideal, but because I have not looked to it constantly, steadily, faithfully; because I have distrusted myself and distrusted others; because again and again I have lost the help of sympathy, since I was unwilling to claim from those 'who called me friend' the sacrifice which I was myself ready to make. So now an old man I dream dreams of great hope, when I plead with those who will carry forward what my own generation has left unattempted or unaccomplished, to welcome the ideal which breaks in light upon them, the only possible ideal for man, even the fullest realisation of self, the com-

pletest service of others, the devoutest fellowship with God : to strive towards it untiringly, even if it seems 'to fade for ever and for ever as we move.'"

One lays down the *Life of Westcott* feeling thankful, but unsatisfied. It tells one much of a man of whom one is glad to know all one can, and it never tells too much ; so one is thankful. But might it not have told rather more ? How little is said of Westcott's relations with the Archbishop when his friend Benson had been replaced by the Old Stalwart whom we have lately lost ! Hints occur in some of the letters to Mrs Westcott that there were other matters written, both on men and things, which would have been full of interest, and not unfitted for a wider reading, but they have not been given in these pages. It is curious, again, that while Westcott's early life was spent in Birmingham, with which he never quite lost touch, and while his interest in social and political affairs from first to last was a keen one, there is never the faintest reference to one whose position both in Birmingham and in English public life is so dominant as that of Mr Chamberlain ; surely this can only result from intentional suppression. But enough : let us lay down the book with thankfulness ; and if there be any unsatisfied feeling intermingling, let us turn with hope to wait the further instalment of the great scholar's teaching which his publishers already promise, in Westcott's "Notes on the Epistle to the Ephesians."

E. P. BOYS-SMITH.

HORDLE VICARAGE.

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*The Virgin Birth of Christ.*—A Historical and Critical Essay.—By Paul Lobstein, Professor of Dogmatics in the University of Strasbourg. Translated by Victor Leuliette, with Introduction by W. D. Morrison, LL.D.—Pp. 138. London : Williams & Norgate (Crown Theological Library), 1903.

IN 1890 Professor Lobstein of Strasbourg published in French a brief study of the doctrine of the Virgin Birth, which he revised and enlarged for a German edition in 1896. An English edition is now issued with his approval, and he has contributed fresh matter to the notes and references, especially with regard to the recent English literature of the subject. In his new Preface he goes quickly over Dr Randolph's recent lecture, point by point, but he regards this as only a popular presentation of the results of Bishop Gore, whom he considers "the worthiest and most eminent exponent of the traditional doctrine in England to-day." But controversy always gains in real interest by increase of intimacy and mutual regard between those engaged in it, and it is not surprising to find that in the body of the essay Lobstein addresses himself with most interest to the apologia of another French Protestant, Godet. Perhaps, therefore, we may say that in the ample



stream of literature upon this subject we may take this essay (representing also, as it does, Sabatier and Albert Réville) on the one side, and Godet's treatment in his *St Luke* on the other, to give us the discussion as treated in the circle of French Protestant theology.

The main intention of Lobstein's essay is construction: he desires to support Christian faith and piety. When he has to refuse credence, it is done without a shadow of reproach for those who originally put forward the narratives which lie at the basis of the doctrine or those who uncritically accepted them and passed them on; and he is himself especially concerned to supply a genetic account which will be in a true sense a history of the belief as a human phenomenon. And, still more, he is deeply anxious to secure all the factors which he takes to be valuable for the religious consciousness.

In the negative work of removing the veridical character from the narratives Lobstein takes the view that the two narratives are not only different but contradictory, both as to general character and as to particular facts; that in the Gospels in which they appear they are not really incorporated, but are in fact irreconcilable with the main body of the succeeding narratives; and that they stand completely aloof from other presentations of the Gospel within the New Testament—the silence of St Mark, of the early sermons of the Apostles, of the Johannine Gospel, and especially of St Paul, being taken by him to be inexplicable by supporters of the Tradition. On the critical side his conclusion is so definite that to himself "it does not seem to admit of doubt"; and yet when we remember that Godet was as emphatic in the opposite direction, we feel the hopelessness of expecting a solution of the question in this region, with our present material at least.

But if the narratives are not veridical, there must be some reason for their appearance, and Lobstein gives his theory of their construction. It is the mythical method which he adopts; but he uses it in a sober and considerate way, objecting to the rough use of it by "a rationalism bereft of the religious sense" in opposition to "an orthodoxy bereft of intelligence" (Note 16). Between Jewish and Pagan factors in the construction of the mythical narratives he is entirely in favour of the Jewish: the factors he relies upon are the Messianic expectation, giving "a theocratic sonship"; and the speculative theses of pre-existence and the Logos. By Jewish, therefore, he means not only Palestinian Judaism, but the Alexandrian schools. The original Evangelic narratives he refers to the work of popular imagination in Palestinian circles intervening between the apostolic preaching and the operation of the speculative engrafting of a physical sonship of God upon the theocratic or spiritual sonship. He opposes resort to Pagan factors as unnecessary and as inadmissible; and, less definitely, the reference to ascetic tendencies of thought.

On the theological side, the significance for Christology and Redemption, Lobstein regards the doctrine as "a translation of a religious interest of the utmost importance." But he considers that a true Chris-

tology has no need for the translation. As to the provision for sinlessness, he holds that the Evangelists make no use of the Virgin Nativity for this purpose, nor does St Paul; and for the supremacy of Christ and the efficacy of His work it is similarly unnecessary, indeed in his view entirely inappropriate. Of course, Lobstein's treatment depends upon theological tenets which are not those of the theology of the Creeds. His view of Paulinism is evidently not the usual one in either Roman or Protestant theology, relegating to Augustine what has been generally referred to St Paul. And his Christology is expressed in terms of such elevation—"a new creation," "a new personality," "the head of humanity," and the like—that there would be appropriateness at least, one would think, in finding the mode of its commencement signalised in some extraordinary, if not supernatural, way. All theologians will readily agree with him that the primary appeal is to the ethical and spiritual side of personality; where the difference comes is that many are not prepared to depart from the older view which extends the lines of personality to include the physical nature, and the lower ranges of soul dependent thereupon. These factors of our complex nature the Virgin Birth recognises; and though we are unable to say that it is indispensable, or even to explain how it incorporates the lower nature into the plan of redemption, it stands as a reminder which has proved effective in the past, and of which the disappearance would cause a sense of loss to those who regard human nature as a whole as the subject of the redemption effected by Christ.

Comparing Lobstein with Godet, it is obvious that we have two discussions which cannot be brought into contact. In the area of critical inquiry Lobstein resorts to a mythical method of reading history which recasts the narratives, while Godet is satisfied that they are the product of minds moving on the whole in the sphere of historical narration; in the theological sphere Godet's Christology and plan of Redemption find an appropriateness in the Virgin Birth which is remote, if not absent from, Lobstein's purely ethical and spiritual doctrine.

It should be added that Lobstein falls behind no one of those who have refined the tone of modern controversy, that his attitude to those whose views he opposes is considerate, his own purpose constructive for faith, and his tone impressively reverent.

Mr Leuliette's translation is in admirably clear and good English. In a brief introduction Dr Morrison emphasises the opportuneness of the publication of an English edition, an opinion which will be endorsed by every reader.

A. CALDECOTT.

KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON.



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*White, Bouc* Quo vaditis: a call to the old moralities. 203p. N.Y., Civic Press, 1903.

14 *Bosanquet (B.)* Hedonism among Idealists, ii. Mind, July 1903.

[Continuation of Criticism on M'Taggart's Chapter, "The Supreme Good and the Moral Criterion." As against M'Taggart's contention, that "the idea of Perfection cannot give us any criterion of moral action," it is urged that we test courses of action, not indeed by the abstract metaphysical idea of the supreme good, but by the tests by which that idea itself is attained,—and which therefore form the rule of the entire process of practical experience,—the dialectic of desire. Morality depends on metaphysics not in the sense that it works with explicit determinations of the absolute, but that it operates through conceptions of unity, which only metaphysical investigation can elucidate or justify.]

20 *Amadori-Virgilij (G.)* L'Istituto familiare nelle Società primordiali. vi and 286p. Laterza and Figli, 1903.

*Belot (G.)* La Vérité. Rev. de Meta. et de Mor., July 1903.

[Morality cannot be regarded as based on reason alone; it is dependent also on the emotional and social life. In the evolution of the moral consciousness, veracity appears first in the form of a social virtue; intellectual veracity comes later, because at first true knowledge possesses no social character. Three causes have helped in the development of intellectual veracity, (1) science making for the improvement of human life, (2) the spread of education, and (3) the division of labour in scientific research.]

*Mauclair (Marcel)* Les Éléments et L'Évolution de la Moralité. Rev. Phil., lvi., July and August 1903.

[Moral progress must not be identified with the progress of the social organisation. When analysed, the moral ideal is found to consist of three classes of elements, perfectly distinct, though usually closely connected, (1) elements of the æsthetic order, (2) logical or rational elements, and (3) sympathetic or altruistic elements. One or other of these predominates in races as in individuals—the first in Greece, the second in Rome, the third in India. The evolution of these is severally traced, up to their amalgamation, through slow progress and many retrogressions, in the triple ideal of moral beauty, greatness, and love.]

*Fickler (W.)* Unter welchen philosophischen Voraussetzungen hat sich bei Hegel die Wertschätzung des Staates entwickelt und wie ist diese zu beurteilen? Z. für Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxvii., 1903.

[In this first part of his article author gives a careful statement of Hegel's conception of the state in relation to reality generally and to the spiritual life, and subjects the theory to thoughtful criticism.]

*Goldscheid (Rudolf)* Zur Ethik des Gesamtwillens. Eine sozialphilosophische Untersuchung. Bd. 1. 558p. Reisland, 1902.

[Author attempts to establish an Ethic, as a theory of worth, on the basis of the philosophy of Avenarius and in accordance with the doctrine of Evolution.]

*Le Bon (Gustave)* The Crowd. A Study of the Popular Mind. 239p. Unwin, 1903. [A fourth edition of a work which has many claims to recognition as an attempt at a scientific study of a difficult and neglected subject.]

*Schinz (A.)* Philosophie des Conventions sociales. Rev. Phil., lv. 6, June 1903.

[Author rejects the philosophy of Thoreau as a return to animal nature rather than to the spiritual. Food, clothing and dwelling, which Thoreau despises, have been and are means that make for the intellectual progress and spiritualisation of man.]

*Stuckenberg (J. H. Wilbur)* Sociology: the science of human society. 2 V. 764p. N. Y., Putnam, 1903.

[The author some years ago published the "Introduction to the study of sociology." This work opens with chapters on "Definition and scope of sociology" and "Relation of sociology to the special social sciences." Afterwards the work is divided into three divisions, namely, "The nature of society," "Social evolution," "Sociological ethics."]

*Willey (Freeman Otis)* Education, state socialism and the trust. 127p.

N. Y., National Economic League, 1903.

*Willey (Freeman Otis)* The laborer and the capitalist. 319p.

N. Y., National Economic League, 1903.

*Perry (R. Barton)* The Practical Man and the Philosopher.

Inter. J. Eth., July 1903.

[He who lives is, *ipso facto*, a philosopher. His highest ideal represents what he conceives to be the greatest worth or value in the universe. And his conception of the greatest worth is based upon the largest generalisation that he can make or borrow. The complete justification of his ideal would involve a true knowledge of the essential character of the universe.]

*Ely (R. T.)* Studies in the Evolution of Industrial Society (Citizens' Library). 497p. Macmillan, 1903.

*Westcott (the late Bish.)* Christian Social Union Addresses. 76p. Macmillan, 1903.

*Marshall (A.)* New Cambridge Curriculum in Economics. 34p. Macmillan, 1903.

21 *Kant (Immanuel)* Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay. Tr. M. Campbell Smith, with preface by Prof. Latta. 214p. Sonnenschein, 1903.

23 *Potter (H. C.) (Bp.)* The modern man and his fellow man. (Bull Lectures, 1902.) Phil. Jacobs & Co., 1903.

[Four lectures: The situation; The working man; The capitalist; The consumer.]

*Sorley (W. R.)* Betting and Gambling. Inter. J. Eth., July 1903.

[Treats of the theory of the subject in its ethical aspect. Three applications of "betting," in the wider sense, are discussed under the heads (1) the wager of life; (2) the wager of strife, and (3) the wager of play. The latter can only be morally judged by considering its effects on character and on society. Betting attaches itself to sport and business, and it changes the

nature of both. It makes a business of sport and a sport of business.]

24 *Miller (W. Galbraith)* The Data of Jurisprudence. 486p. Green & Sons, 1903.

[Author more anxious to state the problem, "What is Right?" "What is Law?" than at present to offer any solution. He has in general adopted the standpoint of the commonsense man. In the matter of method, the view taken is that law gives abundant matter for a metaphysic of its own as much as theology or physical science.]

27 *Adams (John)* Primer on Teaching, with Special Reference to Sunday School Work. 129p. T. & T. Clark, 1903.

*Aristotle* on Education: Extracts from the Ethics and Politics. Tr. and ed. John Burnet. 148p. C. J. Clay, 1903.

*Barth (Paul)* Die Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer Beleuchtung, ii.

Vierteljahrsschr. f. wiss. Phil., xxvii. ii., 1903.

*Compayré (G.)* History of Pedagogy. Fifth ed., with Intr., Notes, Index, by W. H. Payne. 624p. Sonnenschein, 1903.

*Dewey (J.)* Ethical principles underlying education. 30p. Univ. of Chic., 1903.

*Jankalevitch (S.)* Quelques Arguments philosophiques en Faveur de la Liberté de l'enseignement. Rev. de Phil., July 1903.

*Palante (G.)* Une Idole Pédagogique: L'Éducationisme. Rev. Phil., July 1903.

[A protest against Educationalism, or the theory of the infallible virtue and unlimited power of Education. Mere education tends to bring about conformity instead of individuality, and it is a mistake to suppose that it is only necessary to train and develop the rational faculty in order to form intelligent and moral men.]

*Ruyssen (Th.)* Le monopole universitaire. Rev. de Meta. et. Mor., July 1903.

[Arguments in favour of free instruction in the Universities.]

*Varnum (H.)* Character: a moral textbook; for the use of parents and teachers in training youth in the principles of conduct and an aid to self-culture. Jacksonville, Florida H. Varnum. 21p. 1903

65 *Bosanquet (Helen)* The Administration of Charity in England.

Inter. Quar., June-Sept. 1903.

[A very thorough treatment of the subject, containing many useful suggestions and recommendations.]

## F PASTORALIA 2 Sermons.

*Smith (Gerald Birney)* Practical theology: a neglected field in theological education. 21p. Univ. of Chic. Press, 1903.

[An examination of consequences of the adoption of critical and historical methods in dealing with the material of theology, with special reference to the question whether such methods are adequate to the end for which theological seminaries exist, i.e., the equipment of ministers.]

1 *Anderson (Galusha)* The elements of Chrysostom's power as a preacher. 16p. Univ. of Chic. Press, 1903.

*Ford (H.)* Decadence of Preaching: Indictment and Remedy. Pref. by Archdeacon of London. 84p. Stock, 1903.

2 *Dr A. B. Davidson's Sermons.* Ch. Q. R., July 1903.

[A notice of Davidson's *The Called of God.*]

*Jowett (J. H.)* Thirstings for the Springs.

208p. Allenson, 1903.

[Twenty-six addresses republished from *Examiner.*]



*Mackennal (Alex.)* The Eternal Son of God and the Human Sonship. 166p.

Stockwell, 1903.

[Fourteen sermons delivered in Bowdon.]

- 6 *Clark (F. E.)* Christian Endeavour Manual: Text-book on History, Theory, Principles, and Practice of the Society, with complete Bibliography and several Appendices. 306p. Melrose, 1903.

## G BIOGRAPHY

*Salomon (Michel)* Joffroy inconnu.

Rev. de Phil., July 1903.

[Deals with Adolphe Lair's Essay on Joffroy and the different impression conveyed by it from that by Saint Beuve's study.]

*Lawrence (W.)* Phillips Brooks: A Study.

57p. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1903.

[Author is Brooks' successor in the office of bishop, and his book consists of an address in Trinity Church, Boston, on Jan. 23, 1903.]

*Salter (W. M.)* Emerson's Views of Society and Reform. Inter. J. Eth., July 1903.

[Paper read at Emerson Memorial Meeting, Chicago. To Emerson there were no limits to what man might do under the influence of ideas. The practical man urges that it is impossible to construct a heavenly society out of foolish, sick, selfish men and women; true enough, but these men and women may be transformed.]

*Devey (John)* Emerson, the Philosopher of Democracy. Int. J. Eth., July 1903.

[Paper read at Emerson Memorial Meeting, Chicago. Critics who blame Emerson for absence of continuity and lack of method write down their own incapacity to follow a logic that is finely wrought. The idealism which is a thing of the academic intellect to the professor, a hope to the generous youth, an inspiration to the genial projector, is to Emerson an accurate description of the facts of the most real world in which all live.]

*Falckner (Justus)* Mystic and scholar, devout Pietist in Germany, hermit on the Wissahickon, missionary on the Hudson: a bicentennial memorial of the first regular ordination of an orthodox pastor in America, done November 24, 1703, at Gloria Dei, the Swedish Lutheran church at Wicaco, Philadelphia; comp. from original documents, letters and records at home and abroad. 144p. Phil., Julius F. Sachse, 1903.

- 1 *Ward (Wilfred)* Leo XIII.

Fort. R., August 1903.

Leo XIII. 34p. Ch. Q. R., July 1903.

*Görres (F.)* Papst Honorius I.

Zeit. f. wiss. Theol., 2nd No., 1903.

- 2 *Hootson (J.)* James Martineau and Frederick Robertson. Expositor, Sept. 1903.

[Traces the influence of Martineau's *Endeavours* in Robertson's Sermons.]

*Butcher (S. H.)* The late Dean Bradley.

Fort. R., July 1903.

*Kelman (J.), jun.* Faith of Robert Louis Stevenson. Revell, 1903.

*Ormond (A. T.)* James M'Cosh as Thinker and Educator.

Princeton Th. R., July 1903.

Wesley Studies. By Various Writers. With Examples of Unpublished Letters, Diaries, and Journals, June 17, 1703, June 17, 1903. 238p. C. H. Kelly, 1903.

*Sorabji (Cornelia)* Benjamin Jowett: Some Recollections. 19th Century.

Aug. 1903.

*Jane Austen* and her Biographers.

A. R., July 1903.

*Hutton (E. H.)* Walter Pater.

Mont. R., Sept. 1903.

*Sanday (W.)* Robert Campbell Moberly.

J. Th. St., July 1903.

## H HISTORY 1 Religious Orders 2 England

*Genep (A. Van)* Notes sur le Domovoi R. de l'Hist. des Religions. Mar.-April 1903.

- C *Biglmaier (Andreas)* Die Betheilung der Christen am öffentlichen Leben in vorcon-  
stantinischer Zeit. 358p. Lentner, 1902.  
[Deals with the position of the Christians (1) in public affairs, and (2) in Roman society during first three centuries.]

The Age of the Fathers.

Ch. Q. R., July 1903.

[A review of the late Dr Bright's book under that title.]

- M *Görres (F.)* Die Synode von Elvira.

Zeit. f. wiss. Theol., 1903c.

[Discussion of a few canons.]

*Thatcher (Oliver Jos.)* Studies concerning Adrian IV. 88p. Univ. of Chic. Press, 1903.

[Contents: (1) An investigation of the Grant of Ireland by Adrian IV. to Henry II. (2) The Bull *Laudabiliter*. (3) The congratulatory letter of Henry II. to Adrian IV. (4) A letter of Gerhoh of Reichersberg to Adrian IV., concerning the heresies of the time.]

- v The History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. Church Q. R., July 1903.

- x *Kattenbusch (F.)* Der Märtyrertitel.  
Z. f. neutest. Wissensch., iv. ii., 1903.

- y *De Foye (E.)* Introduction à l'étude du Gnosticisme au 2<sup>e</sup> et 3<sup>e</sup> siècle.

Rev. de l'Hist. d. Relig., May, June 1903.

[A study based on Gnostic documents. The earlier Gnosticism, that of the great masters, was a philosophy, and could exist within the Church. The later is to be classed with the "Mysteries" as a system of secret rites and arts—a religion therefore, and a dangerous rival to Christianity.]

- 1 *Lake (K.)* The Greek Monasteries in South Italy, II. J. Th. St., July 1903.

*Steels (Francesca M.)* Monasteries and Religious Houses of Great Britain and Ireland. App. on the Religious Houses in America. Pref. by Bishop of Clifton. 284p. Washbourne, 1903.

- 2 *Gairdner's English Church History.*  
Ch. Q. R., July 1903.

[A laudatory review.]

- M *Dowden (Bp.)* Notes on the Succession of the Bishops of St Andrews, I.

J. Th. St., July 1903.

[From 1093 to 1571.]

- 4 *Sommerville (Maxwell)* Joliffe: incidents of peculiar beliefs in meridional France; il. by the author. 213p. Phil., Biddle, 1903.

[A narrative of travel, embracing stories of peculiar religious beliefs.]

- 4 *Wilde (A. H.)* Decadence of Learning in Gaul in the seventh and eighth centuries. 9p. Amer. J. of Th., July 1903.

[Viewed especially in the Lives of the Saints.]

- 50 *Gulick (Sidney)* Evolution of the Japanese—social and psychic. Revell, 1903.

# I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C *The Fathers* 2 R. C. Church 3 Anglican, etc.

A *Hilgenfeld (A.)* Die Ignatius-Briefe und die neueste Verteidigung ihrer Echtheit. Zeit. f. Wiss. Th., 1903 b.

*Nau (F.)* La Didascalie, c'est-à-dire l'enseignement catholique des douze apôtres et des saints disciples de notre sauveur. Traduite du syriaque pour la première fois. 172p. Lethielleux, 1902.

C *Bayard (L.)* Le Latin de Saint Cyprien. 405p. Hachette, 1902.  
[A careful examination of the grammar and vocabulary of Cyprian's authentic works.]

*Behmer-Romundt (H.)* Über den litterarischen Nachlass des Wulfila und seiner Schule.

Zeit. f. wiss. Theol., 2nd and 3rd Nos., 1903.  
[Discusses origin, authorship, etc., of works sometimes ascribed to Wulfila. (1) *Commentary on Luke*, date between 390 and 450, author unknown, possibly Auxentius. (2) *Certain Bobbiansian Fragments*, which are described and dated about 380. (3) *Pseudo-Chrysostom's imperfect Work on Matthew*. The author analyses contents and dates it between 425 and 450. Its origin is Pannonia; author uncertain, possibly the Arian bishop Maximin.]

*Capitaine (Wilhelm)* Die Moral des Clemens von Alexandrien. p. vi and 371. Schöningh, 1903.

*Clausen (O.)* Die Theologie des Theophilus von Antiochen.

Zeit. f. wiss. Theol., 2nd No., 1903.

[This concluding article describes T.'s conceptions of Revelation.]

*Corssen (P.)* Zur Chronologie des Irenæus. Z. f. neutest. Wissensch., iv., ii., 1903.

*Delehaye (H.)* La Passion de S. Théodote d'Ancyre. Analecta Bollandiana, July 1903.

[Tries to show that, contrary to views of Lightfoot and Harnack, the work is not from the hand of a contemporary.]

*Dräseke (J.)* Zu Apollinaris' von Laodicea. "Ermunterungsschrift an die Hellenen." Zeit. f. wiss. Th., 1903 c.

[Author maintains, in reply to Gaul's attack, that the pseudo-Justinian *Cohortatio ad Græcos* is the work of Apollinaris of Laodicea.]

*Dräseke (J.)* Noëtos und die Noëtianer in des Hippolytos Refutatio IX. 6-10.

Zeit. f. wiss. Th., 1903 b.

*Srawley (J. H.)* Gregory of Nyssa. — The Catechetical Oration (Patristic Texts). 232p. C. J. Clay, 1903.

*Harnack (A.)* Ueber verlorene Briefe und Actenstücke die sich aus der Cyprianischen Briefsammlung ermitteln lassen. Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der althristl. Literatur. N.F., Bd. viii., Hft. 2. Hinrichs, 1902.

*Hilgenfeld (A.)* Origenes und Pseudo-Clemens. Zeit. f. wiss. Theol., 8rd No., 1903.

*Schermann (Th.)* Die griechischen Quellen des heiligen Ambrosius in De Spir. S. iii. 115p. Lentner, 1902.

[Ambrose's speculative theology is almost wholly Greek, yet he possessed the historical spirit of the Latin race.]

*Warfield (B. B.)* Sanctifying the Pelagians. Princeton Th. R., July 1903.

M *Thurston (H.)* Visio monachi de Eynsham. 78p. Analecta Bollandiana, v. 22. fasc. 3, July 1903.

[The Latin text of the Vision from Ch. lii. to Ch. lviii.]

3 *Holden (G. F.)* The Special Bases of the Anglican Claim. 218p.

De La More Press, 1903.

7 *Methodism*, op. G 2 Wesley Studies. *Sutherland (A.)* Methodism in Canada: its Work and its Story: 33rd Fernley Lecture, delivered in Penzance, July 31, 1903.

354pp. C. H. Kelly, 1903.

*Fitzgerald (W. E.)* Roots of Methodism. C. H. Kelly, 1903.

## M MYTHOLOGY. RELIGIONS. 7

*Judaism*. 12 *Occultism*, etc. 20 ... *Semitic*.

*Severus*, Sixth Book of the Select Letters, Vol. i. Syriac Text, Vol. ii. Translation, pt. i. Ed. and Tr. by E. W. Brooks. (Text and Trans. Soc.) Williams & Norgate.

*Robertson (John M.)* Pagan Christs. Studies in Comparative Hierology. 460p. Watts & Co., 1903.

[Review will follow.]

1 *D'Alviella (Goblet)* De quelques problèmes relatifs aux Mystères d'Eleusis: iv. Les survivances des Mystères (4<sup>e</sup> article).

R. de l'Hist. des Religions, Mar.-April 1903.

*Picavel (F.)* Plotin et les Mystères d'Eleusis.

Rev. de l'Hist. d. Relig., May-June 1903.

[Shows how Plotinus substituted Neo-platonism for Stoicism as the philosophy of the Mysteries, and through them influenced Christianity.]

5 *Ivanovski (A. O.)* Sur une traduction chinoise du recueil bouddhique "Jâtakamâtâ." Rev. de l'Hist. d. Relig., May-June 1903.

[Gives the substance of fourteen stories of the collection, and appends comparative notes.]

*Rhys Davids (T. W.)* Buddhist India [Story of the Nations Series]. 332p.

Unwin, 1903.

[A first attempt to describe ancient India, during the period of Buddhist ascendancy, from the point of view, not so much of the Brahmin, as of the Rajput. Review follows.]

7 *Hilgenfeld (A.)* Die Essäer ein Volkstamm. Zeit. f. wiss. Th., 1903 b.

*Hirschfeld (H.)* The Arabic portion of the Cairo Genizah at Cambridge.

Jewish Q. R., July 1903.

*Hyamson (A. M.)* The Lost Tribes, and the influence of the search for them on the Return of the Jews to England.

Jewish Q. R., July 1903.

*Levy (S.)* Is there a Jewish Literature?

Jewish Q. R., July 1903.

[No; for there is no Jewish language. There is Jewish history and a Hebrew Literature.]

*Oort (H.)* De verbintenissen met "Korban." Th. Tijd., July 1903.

[Deals with Montefiore's article in HIBBERT JOURNAL, vol. i., on Jewish Scholarship and Christian Silence, and with Abraham's art. on Schürer's Life under Jewish Law in Jewish Quarterly for July 1899.]

*Schaff (David S.)* The Treatment of the Jews in the Middle Ages.

Bibliotheca Sacra, July 1903.

*Stiles (W.)* Curtis. Out of Kishineff; the duty of the American people to the Russian Jew. 395p. Dillingham, 1903.

[This book has grown out of the recent massacre of the Jews at Kishineff. Stiles dis-



- cusses the Jew in the light of past history and in his present condition.]
- Yellin (D.) and Abrahams (Israel)* Maimonides, 247p. Phil. Jewish Pub. Soc. of Amer. (Jewish Worthies, 1st No., 1903.)
- [A biography of Moses Maimonides, Jewish scholar, philosopher and writer of the Middle Ages. Born at Cordova, Spain, in 1135: died in 1204.]
- 8 *Castrics (H. de)* Une Apologie de l'Islam par un Sultan du Maroc. R. de l'Hist. des Religions, Mar.-Apr. 1903.
- 20 *Lüncke (Karl F. A.)* Samaria und seine Propheten. Ein religions geschichtlicher Versuch. J. C. B. Mohr, 1903.
- [Mit einer Textbeilage: Die Weisheitslehre des Phokylides.]
- P PHILOSOPHY** *A History*, 10 " *Metaphysics*, 21 " *Theory of Knowledge*, 40 " *Psychology*, 60 " *Logic*, 80 " *Philosophers*.
- Marvin (Walter T.)* An Introduction to Systematic Philosophy. ix+572p. Macmillan, 1903.
- [An attempt to state and explain the chief problems of philosophy as problems actually existing to-day. The standpoint of the book is a rationalistic idealism. By idealism is meant the doctrine that denies the existence of a transcendent world, and that, therefore, limits all problems to the world of experience. By rationalism, the assumption of *a priori* truths in the effort to interpret experience.]
- Hyslop (J. H.)* Problems of Science and Philosophy. Phil. R., July 1903.
- [A logical and serial classification of the sciences, recognising both territorial and relational facts. Three main groups:—(1) Phenomenological, dealing with the world of events; (2) Ideological, dealing with the world of worths or ideals; (3) Aetiological, dealing with the world of causes.]
- De Vorges (Domet)* En quelle langue doit être enseignée la philosophie scolastique? R. Néo-Schol., No. 39, Aug. 1903.
- h *Baummann (J.)* Deutsche und ausserdeutsche Philosophie der letzten Jahrzehnte. viii+533p. Perthes, 1903.
- Turner (William)* History of Philosophy. 684p. Ginn & Co.
- [Written from Roman Catholic standpoint. The purpose of the writer has been "so to set forth the succession of schools and systems of Philosophy as to accord to Scholasticism a presentation in some degree adequate to its importance in the history of speculative thought."]
- 10 *Schiller (F. C. S.)* The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics. Inter. J. Eth., July 1903.
- [A presentation of the leading principles of *Pragmatism*, defined as the thorough recognition that the purposive character of mental life generally must influence and pervade also our most remotely cognitive activities. *Pragmatism* awards to the ethical conception of *Good*, supreme authority over the logical conception of *True*, and the metaphysical conception of *Real*.]
- Woodbridge (F. J. E.)* The Problem of Metaphysics. Phil. R., July 1903.
- [The Problem of Metaphysics is fundamentally the problem of individuality, the definition of reality is primarily the definition of the individual. If individuals are ultimate, we can never hope to show how they originate or what the laws of their occurrence are. We can define them only denotatively, and exhibit in many ways their presence. The second basal problem of Metaphysics is that of continuity. Individuality and continuity are bound together in all our thinking.]
- Carus (P.)* The Surd of Metaphysics: an Inquiry into the Question, "Are there Things in Themselves?" Paul, 1903.
- [A discussion under three headings:—the elimination of the metaphysical surd from philosophy; the metaphysical residue in the systems of modern thinkers; the soul as a thing in itself.]
- 13 *Metchnikoff (Élie)* Études sur la Nature Humaine. Essai de Philosophie optimiste, ii+393p. Masson, 1903.
- [Review will follow.]
- Weiss (Berthold)* Gesetze des Geschehens, v. and vi. Archiv f. system. Phil., ix, 2, 1903.
- [Author proceeds to investigate in the light of the ten laws of cosmic process previously enunciated the meaning of "process" generally.]
- 14 *Isserlin (Max)* Eine neue "Lösung des Raumproblems" (Schluss). Z. für Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxvii, ii, 1903.
- Poincaré (H.)* L'espace et ses trois Dimensions. Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., July 1903.
- [Continuation and conclusion of previous article in May number.]
- 15 *Leo (O.)* Folgerungen aus Kants Auffassung der Zeit in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Vierteljahrsschr. f. wiss. Phil., xxvii, ii, 1903.
- [Author contends that a consistent working out of the Kantian theory involves rejection of the view that time is merely a form of sensuous intuition. The imagination as an activity presupposes temporal sequence. The empirical reality of time is only possible on the basis of transcendent reality of time.]
- 17 *Charonnet (A.)* Le problème métaphysique du Mixte. Ya-t-il des "changements substantiels" dans le monde minéral? Rev. de Phil., June and August 1903.
- Lodge (O., Sir)* Modern Views on Matter: the Romanes Lecture, 1903. Frowde, 1903.
- [See p. 166.]
- 18 *Hartmann (E. von)* Mechanismus und Vitalismus in der modernen Biologie, i. Archiv f. system. Phil., ix, 2, 1903.
- [An exposition of the views of Johannes Müller and Liebig, Du Bois-Reymond, Lotze, Virchow and Rindfleisch, Wundt, von Baer, von Bunge and Hamann, Kassowitz and Hertwig.]
- Ostwald (Wilhelm)* The Philosophical Meaning of Energy. Inter. Q., June-Sept. 1903.
- [Energy is an immaterial agency, and in science the idea of energy may be substituted not only for that of force but also for that of matter. Author is of opinion that it is possible also to subordinate to the idea of energy the totality of psychical phenomena. He deems it likely that future investigation will be able to show that with the appearance of psychical energy a corresponding quantity of another kind of energy has disappeared.]
- Tschisch (W. von)* Das Grundgesetz des Lebens, i. Z. für Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxvii, ii, 1903.
- [In this first part of his article, the author endeavours to determine the characteristics of living matter as distinguished from non-living.]
- 21 *Wentscher (Else)* Phänomenalismus und Realismus. Archiv f. system. Phil., ix, 2, 1903.
- [A defence of phenomenalism against the criticisms of Freytag in his work *Der Realismus und das Problem der Transzendenz*. Freytag's argumentation fails to establish the realism for which he contends, and is wholly irreconcilable with the

admittedly subjective character of the so-called secondary qualities.]

- 25 *Lechthal* (G.) *Le hasard*.

R. Néo-Schol., No. 38, May 1903.

- 26 *Bolliger* (A.) *Die Willensfreiheit*.  
iv + 125p. Reimer, 1903.

- 30 *Strong* (C. A.) *Why the Mind has a Body*. vii + 355p. Macmillan, 1903.

[Review will follow.]

- 33 *Bennett* (E. T.) *The Society for Psychological Research: Its Rise and Progress and a Sketch of its Work*. 57p.

Brimley Johnson, 1903.

[A useful and carefully compiled account.]

- Lodge* (Sir Oliver) *Presidential Address to Society for Psychical Research*, 1903.

Proceedings S.P.R., xviii. 46. June 1903.

[Dislike of science and mistrust of scientific inquiry persisted well into the Victorian era, and dislike and mistrust of the validity of psychical inquiry persists still. Myers' new work compared to the *Novum Organum* of Bacon. Need of additional funds for fresh research. Practical results of psychical investigation. Telepathy and action at a distance. Bearing of inquiry on religion.]

- James* (William) *Myers' Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death*.

Proceedings S.P.R., xviii. 46. June 1903.

[Too early for any one to pass dogmatic judgment on theory as a whole. The imperfection in Myers' survey of the subliminal life is its failure adequately to account for the subliminal being so impartially the home both of evolutive and of dissolutive phenomena. The parasitic ideas of psycho-neurosis, and the fictitious personations of planchette-writing and mediumship reside there side by side with the inspirations of genius, with the faculties of telepathy and telesthesia, and with the susceptibility of genuine spirit control.]

- Lodge* (Sir Oliver) *Myers' Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death*.

Proceedings S.P.R., xviii. 46. June 1903.

[The adjective "subliminal" contains no reference to what is beneath, except in the sense of foundation and support; in every other respect the subliminal is probably the most real and more intelligent self, of which the supraliminal development is but a natural and healthy and partial manifestation. The subliminal has a cosmic existence, which may play a part in terrestrial evolution hereafter, but at present only shows signs of doing so, as, for instance, in the supernormal uprushes which are known as the inspirations of genius.]

- Leaf* (Walter) *Myers' Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death*.

Proceedings S.P.R., xviii. 46. June 1903.

[Can the "subliminal self" be called a part of my personality, in any sense in which such a belief will influence my life? My subliminal self is something of which I am not conscious. I am barely aware, through the experience of others, of its existence; how, then, can the continuance of it be the continuance of what I am in the habit of regarding as my personality? The book awakens in the present writer a hope which Myers would have regarded as a rejection of his life's work. To a large part of the human race personality means something crippled by surroundings, or smirched with sin, or distorted by hereditary taint, beyond hope of cure. It is for the writer a hope and not a fear that the dissolution of the body may mean the dissolution of this spiritual crust as well; that one day the infinite within us all may have freer play, and mingle with other spiritual elements equally purged of earthly dross, through channels clearer and more translucent than the imperfect organs of the mortal frame.]

- Flournoy* (Th.) *Myers' Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death*.

Proceedings S.P.R., xviii. 46, June 1903.

- Muirhead* (J. H.) *The Survival of the Soul*. Cont. R., July 1903.

[Myers' case for the possession of the living body by souls of the departed comes to rest in the main on the two instances of Stainton Moses and Mrs Piper. Of the first admittedly, the evidential value is small and ambiguous; and of the second it is not clear that the subconscious factors would not suffice to account for the phenomena. All that Myers aims at establishing is the survival of some form of psychical life; what is actually established (granting it is), seems rather to the writer a prolongation of death than of life. For the purpose of a new religious synthesis, the whole argument is a reversal of the true method. If you already believe in the spiritual nature of your world, these things may have significance for you. If you do not they cannot of themselves impart significance to life. They may even have the effect of bringing it to confusion by turning men's attention from what is simple and satisfying to what is ambiguous and delusive.]

- Lodge* (Sir Oliver) *The Survival of Personality after Death*.

Quar. R., July 1903.

[Review of Myers' work and Podmore.]

- Lang* (Andrew) "The Nineteenth Century" and Mr Frederic Myers.

Proceedings S.P.R., xviii. 46, June 1903.

[Reply to Mallock. Pre-occupied with Myers' theory, Mallock does not criticise his alleged "facts" with any fulness. But the facts, not Myers' interpretation of them, are the important part of the book.]

- Hyslop* (James H.) *Reply to Mr Podmore's Criticism*.

Proceedings S.P.R., xviii. 46, June 1903.

[Answers Podmore in regard (1) to accuracy in dealing with the record; and (2) to the application of general principles evidentially sustained in the case of Mrs Piper.]

- 40 *Aars* (Kristian B. R.) *Zur Bestimmung des Verhältnisses zwischen Erkenntnistheorie und Psychologie*.

Z. für Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxvii. 2, 1903.

- Angell* (J. Rowland) *The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy*. Phil. R., May 1903.

[Start from the psychological standpoint, and you cannot avoid certain functional statements. Once enter upon statements of function, and you cannot, save by a purely arbitrary limitation, stop short of a logic, an ethics, and an aesthetics. Furthermore, in the same movement of thought which carries you into logic, you will inevitably find yourself drawn back into Epistemology. The attitude is one and the same throughout, that of understanding the structure and function of consciousness.]

- Bardeen* (H. H.) *The Functional Theory of Parallelism*. Phil. R., May 1903.

[Distinction between mind and matter may be interpreted in a teleological or functional, rather than in an ontological or structural, sense. In connection with the former theory the three concepts of "function," "mental activity," and "unconscious mental states" are examined.]

- Royce* (Josiah) *Outlines of Psychology. An Elementary Treatise with some practical Applications*. 416p. Macmillan, 1903.

[The treatment of mental facts under the three heads of Sensitiveness, Docility and Initiative is especially characteristic of the plan of this book. The study of sensitiveness deals with psychical phenomena (sensations, images, feelings) in connection with the physical conditions upon which they depend: that of docility with the relations that bind the consciousness of any moment to previous experience (outcomes of habitual activity, assimilation and differentiation); that of initiative with the conditions of more or less novel types of activity. The usual distinctions of



- Feeling, Intellect and Will are entirely subordinated to these, as the author thinks, deeper distinctions.]
- Sarlo (F. de)* I Dati Esperienza Psichica. 425p. Firenze, 1903.
- 46 *Kossuth (H.)* Einige Bemerkungen zu Haeckels Welträtseln. Z. für Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxvii., ii., 1903. [A severe criticism of Haeckel's book. Haeckel tries to solve his problem from the standpoint of naive Realism, and fails miserably: his book is one mass of contradictions and absurdities.]
- Roustan (D.)* La Méthode mécanique en Biologie. Rev. de Meta. et de Mor., July 1903. [A discussion of F. Houssey's *La Forme et la Vie*.]
- 47 *Sanford (E. Clark)* The Psychic Life of Fishes. Inter. Q., June-Sept. 1903.
- 48 *Sinclair (S. Bower)* The possibility of a science of education. 130p. Univ. of Chic. Press, 1903. [A general defence of the theory that "educational science is not only possible, but that it is, in fact, an independent science, with a technique of its own, developed by an investigation of problems made from a purely educational standpoint."]
- Young (Ella Flagg)* Scientific method in education. 15p. Univ. of Chic. Press, 1903. [Endeavors to make clear the truth of two statements. (1) The general failure to reconstruct the method of the school in accord with the presuppositions and tendencies of modern philosophy is due to the influence of an erroneous conception of evolution in the theory of mental growth; (2) a right conception of the theory of evolution, as fundamental in a working hypothesis of education, would make the attitude of the teacher toward both the learner and the subject-matter scientific.]
- 49 *Stratton (G. M.)* Experimental Psychology and its bearing upon Culture. 331p. Macmillan, 1903. [Aims to present the character and value of laboratory psychology as bearing upon moral and philosophical interests. The doctrines of the reality and worth of the soul are in no danger from the modern scientific treatment of mind. Indirectly the latter ought to strengthen our interest in spiritual things. A very interesting account is given of recent experimental work.]
- M'Dougall (W.)* The Physiological Factors of the Attention—Process, ii. The Waking State of a Condition of Attention. Mind, July 1903.
- 51 *Swoboda (Hermann)* Verstehen und Begreifen. Eine psychologische Untersuchung. Vierteljahrsschr. f. wiss. Phil., xxvii., ii., 1903. [An important contribution to the psychology of cognition, in which the views of Bradley, Stout, Wundt and others are carefully stated and discussed.]
- 53 *Goedeckemeyer (A.)* Das Wesen des Urteils. Archiv f. system. Phil., ix. 2, 1903. [An examination of the views of Wundt, Sigwart, Brentano, Bergmann and others as to the nature of Judgment. Author contends that a real judgment consists not merely in the arbitrary relation of two ideas, but in the recognition of the truth or falsity of the asserted relation.]
- Laurent (Émile)* L'Illusion de fausse Reconnaissance. Rev. de Phil., July 1903. [Various examples of false recognition are given with psychological explanations as to the causes of them. Author regards Wigan's theory of cerebral duality and Lalande's of telepathy insufficient to account for phenomena.]
- 1 *Rageot (G.)* Les Forms Simples de l'Attention. Rev. Phil., lvi. 8, Aug. 1903. [A treatment of Attention in its most elementary stage in the animal and the child.]
- 3 *Piéron (H.)* L'Association Médiate. Rev. Phil., lvi. 8, Aug. 1903. [Mediate Attention can be conceived psychologically in an intelligible way. The theoretic difficulties felt in regard to it are due to an incorrect notion of what it is that constitutes association in general and mediate association in particular. An altogether undue influence has been attributed to contiguity.]
- 54 *Atkinson (W.)* Memory culture; the science of observing, remembering and recalling. Chic., New Thought Pub. Co., 1903.
- Bierliet (J. J. van)* Esquisse d'une Éducation de la Mémoire. Rev. de Phil., June 1903. [Gives examples of the failure of present system of learning "by heart" in the education of memory. Sketches a general plan for the education of memory based on scientific facts of attention, of the multiplicity of coexistent images, etc.]
- 59 *Mourre (C.)* La Volonté dans de Rêve. Rev. Phil., lv. 6, June 1903. [Second and concluding article.]
- 1 *Bonnier (P.)* Le Sens du Retour. Rev. Phil., lvi. 7, July 1903. [Deals with the sense of direction and faculty of orientation in animals and man.]
- 60 *Husserl (Edmund)* Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik in den Jahren 1895-99. Zweiter Artikel. Archiv für system. Phil., ix. 2, 1903. [A careful and useful exposition of Bergmann's theory of Judgment.]
- 61 *Reichel (Hans)* Darstellung und Kritik von J. S. Mills' Theorie der induktiven Methode. Z. für Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxvii., ii., 1903.
- Thilly (Frank)* The Theory of Induction. Phil. R., July 1903. [Induction may be proved by assuming the law of uniformity. The latter is a postulate of thought, not a clear conviction that nature as a whole is a unified system, subject to law, but the feeling in every particular case that this particular experience will come again. Our feeling of expectation here may be called a postulate of thought, and it becomes the psychological ground of our inductive inference.]
- 64 *MacColl (Hugh)* Symbolic Logic, v. Mind, July 1903.
- 71 *Bergmann (J.)* System des objektiven Idealismus. xii + 256p. Elwert, 1903.
- Calkins (Mary Whiton)* The Order of the Hegelian Categories in the Hegelian Argument. Mind, July 1903. [Aims at a rearrangement which will exhibit the parallelism of many pairs of categories and disentangle distinct lines of argument. As against McTaggart's view that Hegel's Absolute is an organic system of selves, authoress holds that according to Hegel ultimate reality is an absolute Personality that is self-differentiated into the variety of the world of nature and of finite spirit, yet always conscious of itself as distinct, not separate, [from these lesser selves and these natural phenomena.]
- Houison (G. H.)* Personal Idealism and its ethical bearings. Inter. J. Eth., July 1903. ["Personal Idealism," as conceived by the author, regards the eternal world as a world of minds falling under the two heads of (1) God, and (2) non-divine consciousnesses who yet in their eternal aspect constitute with God and with each other an indivisibly harmonious whole. God is not the Creator, or First Cause, of any mind as such, nor of psychic states or physical processes. As Final Cause, however, God is at

once the Logical Ground of existence and the Ideal Goal towards which each consciousness in its eternal freedom moves.]

Schiller (F. C. S.) On Preserving Appearances. Mind, July 1903.

[A criticism of Bradley's doctrine and an attempt to state true relation of reality to appearance. Bradley's principle of contradiction is not absolute. Only propositions are contradictory; nothing which exists can be contradictory. Harmony forms a postulate higher and more ultimate than that of non-contradiction, and is legitimately applicable to reality. Bradley's fundamental error is his *xapioyis*, the separation he has effected between reality and appearance by disrupting their continuity. All immediate experience is as such real, and no ultimate reality can be reached except from this basis.]

72 Krellin (F.) La Dialectique des Antinomies Kantienues.

Rev. de Meta. et de Mor., July 1903.

[A continuation of previous articles. In this the third Antinomy, relating to physical causation and freedom, is very fully discussed.]

Sänger (Ernst) Kant's Lehre vom Glauben, Eine Preisschrift der Krugstiftung der Universität Halle. Leitwort von Prof. Hans Vaihinger. 184p. Dürr., 1903.

76 De Craene (G.) Le positivisme et le faux spiritualisme. R. Néo-Schol., August 1903.

Defourmy (M.) Le rôle de la Sociologie dans le Positivisme (Suite et fin). R. Néo-Schol., Nos. 38 and 39, May and August 1903.

Ward (James) Naturalism and Agnosticism. (Gifford Lectures to the University of Aberdeen, 1896-8.) 2 vols. 2nd edition. Black, 1903.

[Numerous corrections and emendations are made in the text, and a number of "Explanatory Notes" added dealing with controverted points. Review will follow.]

80 Röck (H.) Der Unverfälschte Sokrates, p. iv. and 540. Innsbruck, 1903.

84 Döring (A.) Eudoxos von Knidos, Speusippos und der Dialog Philebos. Vierteljahrsschr. f. wiss. Phil., xxvii., ii., 1903.

[Author rejects Platonic authorship of the Dialogue and ascribes it to a younger member of the Academy, who was familiar with the controversy between Eudoxus and Speusippus as to the nature of pleasure and who was concerned to maintain as against both an independent theory of his own.]

89 Schmölter (L.) Die scholastische Lehre von Materie und Form. 174p. Kleiter, 1903.

Wulf (M. De) Méthodes scolastiques d'autrefois et d'aujourd'hui.

R. Néo-Schol., No. 38, May 1903.

90 Camerer (Theodor) Spinoza und Schleiermacher. Die Kritische Lösung des von Spinoza hinterlassenen Problems.

Cotter, 1903.

M'Gilvary (E. Bradley) Altruism in Hume's Treatise. Phil. R., May 1903.

[An examination of the position of the Treatise, with the object of showing that in it, no less than in the Inquiry, Hume admits the existence of an

original altruism. Author, therefore, differs from Green, who regards Hume as committed to egoistic principles in both works, and from Jodi and Pfeiderer, who contend that while the Treatise is fundamentally egoistic, the Inquiry is not.]

Hoffmann (H.) Die Leibniz'sche Religionsphilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Stellung. J. C. B. Mohr, 1903.

Mackintosh (R.) Hegel and Hegelianism. viii+291p. Scribner, 1903.

Hibben (J. Grier) Hegel's Logic: An Essay in Interpretation. 323p.

Scribner, 1902

[An attempt to render intelligible the fundamental Hegelian doctrines by means of simple statement and illustration. Author insists upon the Personality of Hegel's Absolute and emphasises strongly the teleological sections of the Logic.]

Kinkel (Walter) J. F. Herbart: sein Leben und seine Philosophie. viii+204p. Ricker, 1903.

Darroch (A.) Herbart and the Herbartian Theory of Education. vii+148p. Longmans, 1903.

Munro (R.) Schleiermacher, Personal and Speculative. 310p. Gardner, 1903.

93 Drews (A.) Friedrich Nietzsche's Philosophie. Heidelberg, 1903.

94 Balfour (Reginald) The Philosophy of James Martineau. Monthly R., June 1903.

Koenigsberger (L.) Hermann von Helmholtz, Bände ii. u. iii., 397p. u. 151p.

Vieweg, 1903.

Janssens (E.) L'apologétique de M. Brunetière. R. Néo-Schol., Aug. 1903.

## V ART 83 Sacred Music.

Davey (Richard) The Work of Botticelli. 64p. Newnes, 1903.

[Sixty-five illustrations fairly well done, and forming a useful compendium for reference.]

Landry (A.) L'imitation dans les Beaux-Arts. Rev. Phil., lv. 6, June 1903.

[Reasons given why artistic imitation cannot attain perfect objectivity. Artistic imitation is imitation not of particular objects but of general types. Distinction must be made between simple and complex objects; only of the former can one really speak of imitation.]

Gehring (Albert) The Expression of Emotion in Music. Phil. R., July 1903.

[“Formalists,” like Hanslick, are right when they maintain that music need not be expressive in the sense of a definite portrayal or denotation; and “expressionists,” like Hans and Ambros, may be right when they insist that it shall awaken, nurture, and harmonize with the feelings, and thus express them by contagion or sympathetic arousal.]

83 Fisch (A.) Le chant dans l'Eglise. R. du christianisme social, June 1903.

Neil (J.) Musical Service: Is it Right? 72p. Simpkin, 1903.

G. D. H.; G. H.; and J. H. W.



# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

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## PROGRESSIVE CATHOLICISM AND HIGH CHURCH ABSOLUTISM.

H. C. CORRANCE.

FATHER TAUNTON, in his answer to Mr Sidney in the last issue of this Journal, is no doubt right in asserting that the progressive movement in the Catholic Church is not concerned with the faith. It is not the faith which is in question, but its authoritative foundations. In the general evolution of Christian thought there is no detail more noteworthy or important than the development of the idea of the foundation. Throughout the whole course of the process the Christian consciousness has been instinctively seeking a firm basis for faith and practice, the conception of which has necessarily changed from time to time with the changing conditions of life and thought. After the death of the Apostles this want was supplied by the Old Testament Scriptures, to which the writings that now constitute the New Testament were gradually added as a co-ordinate standard. As the hierarchy was evolved, there grew up, concurrently with the growth of this new standard, the conception of ecclesiastical authority founded on tradition. The limits and relations of the two courts of appeal, the Scriptures and the Church, were at first ill-defined, but the latter was gradually thrust into prominence

as it became necessary to settle disputed points of Scripture exegesis. Another factor which assisted powerfully in determining the relations between the two was the necessity of defining the canon of Scripture by the living authority. It was thus seen that the Bible depended on the Christian Church, not the Church on the Bible, since, in spite of the efforts of Marcion, it had accepted and made its own the Old Testament, had preceded and conditioned the growth of the New and had finally closed its canon. The acceptance of the Old Testament as an absolute standard had brought about the Marcionite reaction, which, from that point of view, had much reason on its side. Marcion anticipated a difficulty, which was thereafter thrust into the background under the ægis of Church authority, only to become more prominent than ever when, Protestantism having made the Bible its sole standard, Luther used the Old Testament to defend the polygamy of a Christian king and the Puritans the murder of enemies whom "the Lord had delivered into their hands."

Not only was this absolute standpoint found to involve insoluble moral conundrums, but it also had to encounter increasing difficulties in almost every department of positive science, beginning with astronomy and ending with textual criticism. There was thus a deadlock between the religious and the scientific point of view until the theory of development came to the rescue. Yet there have been, and are still, a large number among the maintainers of the first who look upon this theory in the light of a surrender, as no doubt it is from the absolutist standpoint.

Meanwhile, throughout the whole of the history of the Church, the conception of ecclesiastical authority had been ever growing more definite and absolute, until this development reached its final term in the definition of Papal Infallibility, which was the natural, logical and inevitable result of the process. Yet it was equally inevitable that the process could not stop at the definition, which became the starting-point of a new evolution. It soon began to be realised that



the definition, so far from fulfilling the hopes of its extreme advocates, had actually imposed upon the idea, as it had prevailed in its earlier and cruder form, considerable limitations which the course of events and of thought have contributed to make more and more prominent; insomuch that the doctrine of Infallibility, in the absolute sense in which it is conceived by Protestant objectors, cannot be said to exist. Long before this development had reached its turning-point, at the time of the Protestant Reformation, the Reformers had harked back to what they conceived to be a more primitive stage, though the appeal to Scripture had never been so unconditioned and individualistic. In the result that appeal gave birth to new theological systems whose claims were enforced as absolutely as those of the old. It was only in comparatively recent years that men began to realise the weakness of the foundation on which they had been building, in accepting a book as inspired and authoritative, while ignoring the human conditions of its origin and growth.

This discovery, for such it amounted to, had a twofold effect in England conformably with the peculiar religious conditions that prevailed. The two streams of thought, parting from the same source, diverged in opposite directions. One branched out on liberal lines, and sought its basis in the individual consciousness only; the other, under the influence of the Tractarian school, still clung to the idea of an absolute external standard, and imagined it had found this in a certain stage of Church history. Such was already indicated, by the traditional Anglican acceptance of the first four General Councils, as limited to the first five centuries of the Christian era. By choosing this period of Christian thought as their standard, a period in which the canon of Scripture had been virtually completed, High Anglicans avoided the grosser absurdities of the orthodox Protestant position in accepting as an absolute authority that which had been shaped and conditioned by the Church which they rejected. On the other hand, they fell into an inconsistency which, if not quite so glaring, was equally fundamental.

The subsequent history of this mental attitude, after the early Tractarians had so strongly insisted and built so much upon it, is highly instructive, and makes evident its unstable character. The choice of this period being arbitrary, it could afford no permanent foothold. The next, and perhaps more reasonable, stage, was the selection of the period of the "Undivided Church," that is, before the schism between East and West. Later on, as the unsatisfactory nature of appeal to a dead past became plainer, the consensus of the living Church, East and West, was substituted. This, again, was abandoned as it came to be realised that no "consensus" between those that did not agree could be other than a mental figment; and the final development was reached in that theory, sometimes called "the Two-province" theory, which recognises the Roman Catholic Church as the one authority in faith, discipline and ceremonial, while York and Canterbury are two provinces but accidentally and temporarily severed from the obedience of the Holy See. Yet, though not so evident, the same fallacy is present here. The extreme Ritualist, while professing to obey the Catholic Church by believing and teaching her doctrines, and practising her discipline and ceremonial, so far as is consistent with the use of a prayer-book she does not authorise, and of Orders she does not recognise, makes no act of effective submission to her living authority; while, on the other hand, he is frequently brought into collision with the only bishops to whom he has promised allegiance, and who, on his own theory, are the actual representatives in this country of the authority of the Catholic Church. It is a typical instance of how the development of an idea on *a priori* lines may cause minds to create a situation entirely out of touch with living fact, and be blinded to what is obvious to all who are not obsessed with the notion. Such extreme examples of the absolutist standpoint are chiefly useful as exposing its essential weakness. If only the situation were external to him, he could see the absurdity of it readily enough — say, in the case of a Methodist clergyman who



should gravely submit to the body to which he belonged that he felt conscientiously bound to use and obey the rules of the Anglican prayer-book, and to carry out in his chapel any liturgical or other directions of the bishop in whose diocese he found himself, giving as his reason that the Methodist body owed allegiance to the Church of England, whence it had issued. There could be no well-grounded objection to any Anglican clergyman following the customs of the Catholic Church so far as he desired, subject to the approval of his congregation and bishop and obedience to the act of uniformity, these being the real factors in the situation. But it is quite a different matter, without any adequate recognition of these, to impose such customs as a matter of conscience in obedience to the decrees of a supposed external, but really imaginary, tribunal. Moderate Ritualists are really far more rational in this respect, since they recognise that such things are, in the Church of England, entirely matters of choice and not of duty or obligation. It was so originally in the Catholic Church itself. Ritual and ceremonial customs were of gradual growth conditioned by popular taste. Their authorisation and enforcement came later. This is the fundamental vice of the advanced High Church position—the arbitrary erection of what it proclaims as an absolute external authority to which all must bow. The matter is not allowed to rest in the theoretical stage, but this and that point is proclaimed as the teaching of “the Church”—as, *e.g.*, “fasting communion”—which is not ordered either in the prayer-book or by the Bishops in the Church of England. The complete subjectivity of the appeal is further emphasised by the bewildering number of differing standpoints of those who claim this “Church” as their authority: for when these standpoints developed from the original Tractarian germ, the last was not swallowed up, like the rod of Moses, by its successors; but each continued to claim, among the clergy, its body of adherents who inculcate the beliefs and practices which correspond to these various standards. But before this evolution had begun to take

place in the Tractarian party and to split it up into successively advancing sections, Cardinal Newman had cut the knot for himself by that theory, which no doubt represented not only what he found in history, but also a process which had been effected in his own mind. Thereafter it is interesting to note the development of the theory itself inside the Church and the conclusions to which it has led. One cannot tell if Newman realised how far this theory would lead, yet it is difficult to believe that so acute a thinker had not some inkling of it. He set it forth simply as a means of reconciling the facts of history with the faith of the Church, and as such only it was at first regarded. But it was soon seen that the series of facts explained by it was much more numerous, and led to more radical conclusions, than had been anticipated. Yet, while its acceptance amounts to a recognition of the non-existence of an absolute standard of authority, and is therefore unpopular with those who think the maintenance of such a notion still possible; those, on the contrary, who regard this latter as an exploded fiction, recognise in the theory chiefly its conservative force. Like other great generalisations, it has two aspects, opposite yet complementary: the destructive and the constructive. It has the former so far as it provides a convenient framework for the full recognition of the results of criticism; it has the latter as itself affording, or indicating, a surer and truer, because relative, basis of belief. The increasingly pressing dilemma urged upon the believing and thoughtful by the scientific spirit, has been that faith must either be surrendered or furnished with a new foundation. We have seen how the various schools of High Churchmen have endeavoured to find such a basis. On the other hand, we have the methods of Liberal Protestantism and of Progressive Catholicism, of which Professor Harnack and the Abbé Loisy represent most characteristically both the points of agreement and disagreement. Newman attempted to effect a compromise between the absolutist and relative standpoints by the retention of an



original "deposit of faith" from which the development took its start. Harnack also insists on an original minimum of theological metaphysics depending upon one text of the Synoptics.<sup>1</sup> But, instead of, like Newman, regarding this deposit as something indeterminate and vague in its origin, whose inner vital meaning subsequently became more clearly defined and explicated, he apparently looks upon it as a thing already clear cut and crystallised, which dogma afterwards surrounded and obscured as an alien growth.<sup>2</sup> Loisy's theory differs from both of these. He actually goes beyond Harnack in his insistence on the undogmatic and unmetaphysical character of the Saviour's teaching, pointing to the doubtful source of the one text on which Harnack relies for his view. On the other hand, he insists most strongly throughout his work, *L'Évangile et l'Église*, on the fact that though dogma clothed itself first in Hellenic garb, it was inspired and permeated throughout with the Christian spirit. Loisy represents the most advanced section of the Progressive school in the Catholic Church, whose theory of development, it is seen, leaves room for the full acceptance of historic and Biblical criticism. This theory in no way affects the faith of the Church, but it cannot be denied that it makes a very great difference to the commonly received conception of its foundations. And there are many who think this vital. Many good Protestants have been unable to tolerate scientific criticism because it overthrew the old-fashioned notions regarding the origin of the Bible and the value of some of its constituents. Similarly, to many Catholics such a theory of development has seemed destructive of the value of dogma. This is due to the idea that the basis is absolute, whereas an intelligent study of history shows it to be shifting, and therefore relative. One lesson which a great many need to learn is that the value of a belief does not depend upon its origin. Newman pointed this out when he

<sup>1</sup> St Matt. xi. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Harnack's view is more complex than this, but I think it is not an unfair description of it as a whole. Allusion is made to it again later.

wrote: "It cannot be denied that what is human in history can be divine as regards doctrine. The exterior development of phenomena must not be confounded with the intimate action of Providence; one must not argue as if the existence of the natural instrument excluded the operation of grace. When Providence would make a revelation it does not make a new commencement but uses the existing system; it does not send an angel visibly, but commissions and inspires one of our fellows."<sup>1</sup> And one of a very different cast of thought, Professor W. James, in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, insists equally strongly upon the fallacy of the common method of estimating the spiritual value of a religious state of mind, of a revelation, of Scriptures or dogma by a reference to their origin.

The idea of God may have had its origin in the rude fetishism of our primæval and half-human ancestors; the history of its evolution, on its main lines in the Jewish records, may contain many elements which now revolt the spiritual and moral senses, yet this does not affect belief in the resultant. Similarly, if it is found that old MSS. of the New Testament Scriptures have been systematically altered in the sense of later developments; if the Gospels are altogether innocent of metaphysical theology except in such texts as were inserted by later hands; if definitions often received their final form amid storms of *odium theologicum* which sometimes culminated in manual violence; if doctrines now accepted were once defended and supported by defective logic; if the dogmas themselves were conceived and fashioned by a philosophy which was local and temporal—such facts merely reveal the external process of theological development without touching the divine origin of the belief which it concerns. The homoeousion depends, not upon Greek philosophy, for its long life and present vigour, but upon the living idea of the God-man which it enshrines. Such a method of development is natural and inevitable, human

<sup>1</sup> *Essays, Critical and Historical*, ii. 230.



nature being what it is. The inorganic world, before it reached its present stage, "in tracts of fluid heat began." Society has been formed, civilisation has developed by a like process. Dogmatic development could not escape this law of life, if it were alive; and thus these very scandals of its formation are a proof of its life. There would have been no doctored texts or forged decretals except the faith they were intended to support had already been deeply rooted in the Christian mind. Bishops and monks would never have buffeted each other with theologic fury at the Latrocinium, except the disputed points had been very vital to them. The position of dogma will be strengthened the more it is made clear that it is not necessary to defend the methods by which it was supported at its various stages, nor to pretend that it embodies absolute truth when it has become increasingly evident that it reflects the thought of the age in which it was formed. Its position thus defined and limited, is sounder and stronger than before, because it is then detached from the maintenance of questionable or impossible claims. It can then be accepted as the resultant of the past development of Christian thought, through which men have learned, and still learn, to see, "as through a mirror in a riddle," the mysteries of God's being. And as thought is continually moving, its formulas necessarily receive new interpretations in the light of fresh knowledge, even as now their subjective acceptance differs necessarily to each mind according to education and temperament. And Loisy shows, in his book to which reference has already been made, how a theory can be at once destructive and conservative in the best sense of the latter word. It was Lammenais who first taught that the real authoritative basis of Catholicism was the broad one of Humanity. It remained for Loisy to develop this thesis and to throw it out in bold relief by exposing the contingent and transitory nature of the theological and philosophical scaffolding, which had long been supposed to be the chief supports of that system. It is not possible, within the space allotted to this

article, to bring together from Loisy's work the many passages in which, with great lucidity and eloquence, he vindicates this position. It must suffice to observe that he clearly indicates how the Christian spirit absorbed from its environment all the positive religious conceptions which had energised in the past, enduing them with a new life of Christian and moral significance. It gathered up into itself not only all that was best and highest in the religion of the Jews, but in that of the heathen as well; and, in the case of the latter, it Christianised not only the philosophy, but what are frequently classed as the superstitions of the heathen.<sup>1</sup> Its action was the

<sup>1</sup> The few words which Professor H. James, in his otherwise admirable book—*Varieties of Religious Experience*—devotes to the question of Catholicism, illustrate the difficulty which non-Catholics seem to find in appreciating our point of view, even when they desire to be impartial. In the first place, Professor James adopts the usual Protestant attitude in regarding the superstitions of the uneducated as peculiar to Catholicism. Yet, on further consideration, so broad-minded and sincere a thinker would, no doubt, admit that human nature is much the same whether Catholic or Protestant, and that in this particular phase of it the only difference is the method of manifestation. Professor James finds, and rightly finds, something more than a grain of truth underlying the fanaticism and charlatanry of the Christian science movement in America. Why, then, should he imagine that we think of our superstitions that they are only "innocent and amiable, and worthy to be smiled on in consideration of the undeveloped condition of the dear peoples' intellects"? May we not in turn be permitted to see a grain of truth and something more in the crude symbolism and extravagant devotions which suit such undeveloped intellects? A Catholic cannot help more than suspecting that this somewhat one-sided way of viewing the question is due, not to dislike of the superstition as such, but rather of the theology of which it is the popular adaptation or exaggeration.

What we say about the matter is, that the Church, by recognising and providing for this element, has kept it within certain bounds, with the result that it has not run so wild as outside her fold, while at the same time her uneducated have found in it something above the sordid round of material interests, which at least is a better state of mind than the blank animalism prevailing amongst the poor in large centres of population. I have no wish to deny that there are local instances of superstitions among Catholics which are neither beautiful nor useful. In most cases, however, there is some ground to fear lest the violent attempt to uproot them might result in complete unsettling of the religious belief. Such superstitions, except when fraught with evil consequences to life or morals, are best left to the modifying action, slow but sure, of education.

It is strange that Professor James should not recognise the kinship



double one of interpenetrating heathen ideas with the Christian spirit and of bringing them for the first time into their proper relation and harmony. To give one example, which is also the most important. The deification of man, common enough among the heathen, was given an altogether unique character in the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation by the uniqueness of the impression made upon His followers by the moral and spiritual personality of Jesus. Thus the worship of Christ, though, as Loisy says, no part of His original Gospel, is justified as the fulfilment of this universal instinct, which was one of the principal factors in bringing it about. In Christ, Humanity worships not only God, but Itself at its best and highest. The whole action throughout the process has been that of a conservative force in advancing, not by destroying, but by building on the past and fulfilling it with new meaning and life.

Here lies the real difference between Harnack and Loisy, between Liberal Protestantism and Progressive Catholicism. It is not a question of science or criticism: it is not a question of facts, but of the way of regarding the facts, of the theory concerning them. The facts are the same to all. None can dispute that the Catholic dogmatic system is the result of this historical process; but, while Harnack regards this resultant as, in the main, a separable accretion upon that kernel which constitutes the Gospel, or, at best, one which served its purpose by preserving it from worse degradation and by re-interpreting it to successive stages of thought; Loisy, on the other hand, sees rather that in it ideas common to Humanity have been permanently fused with the spirit of Christianity, albeit through the medium of a relative and passing philosophy. He sees, further, that, while it has stamped them with its own character, they have added to it the authority which comes between his own scientific view of the unseen universe and that of Catholicism, which, by its prayers for the dead, invocation of saints, and sacramental system, presupposes an invisible world in close conjunction with the visible. And his view as to the possible multiplicity of spiritual beings in relation with the human spirit is in harmony with the Catholic doctrine of intercessors.

from their extension and antiquity. Christianity has thus in Catholicism summed up in itself the religions of the world, imbuing them with its own peculiar spirit, and may thus rightly be termed the religion of Humanity, possessing the authoritative force of a world-wide revelation. It is the summary of the religious consciousness of mankind. Both Harnack and Loisy are believers in the action of Divine Providence. The one holds that this action was only exerted at special crises in the world's history; the rest of the development being, if not of a diabolical, at least of a pathological, order: the other that it was exerted at every stage of such development. The one believes it was exerted in preserving the irreducible minimum of faith in spite of the successive phases of corruption through which it passed: the other, that this minimum is a subjective fiction, and that the faith has been manifested only in its developments. To one holding this latter belief the whole process is the work of God under the inspiring direction of His providence, and comes therefore clothed with His authority. Harnack's view seems to indicate a dualistic tendency of thought, and to be similar to the idea long held in the Catholic world, and still held by some,—that Protestantism and all heathen religions are the work of the devil. The Humanitarian theory, on the other hand, sees God's work in all. The good work of Protestantism is self-evident, and all positive religious conceptions, not only of Protestantism but of Heathenism, have a relative value: it is only the negative, only those that conflict with or deny Catholic truths, which have none. Harnack, as already pointed out, is under the common impression that an absolute standard can be found for faith, though, in his case, this is limited to the precarious ground of one text of the Synoptics. Loisy has good reason for his opinion that this text is a later addition representing the working of very early Christian theological thought, and that Harnack's standard is purely subjective. In saying this the writer has no intention of implying that Harnack relies solely on the



contents of his own consciousness, for in that sense no doubt pure subjectivism is impossible. The actual process is that the facts of the religious consciousness are externalised, and when co-ordinated with similar experiences of others, are erected into a kind of objective authority. It is this always active instinct of externalising the inward that has given us the history of religion, the history of the Church. No man can live to himself; and the idea of God, with its concomitants, is one that has developed socially, not merely individually, and has thus become a common possession. Philosophy, says Professor James, has done little more than give these conceptions a common intellectual medium, yet it is surely impossible to over-estimate the value of this work, without which their corporate acceptance and evolution and general moralising influence would have been impossible. Though within the philosophically expressed Christian conception of Deity more and less vital factors are distinguishable, yet even the more formal and abstract of the scholastic attributes which that writer criticises have their use in making the idea symmetrical and satisfactory to the philosophical mind.

The danger of all positive definitions of Deity is the anthropomorphic narrowing of the conception, but this is avoided if their symbolic and relative nature is steadily kept in view. On the other hand, without any such, the idea of God is apt to evaporate or to become, as in the Buddhist system, little more than a synonym for universal and unchanging law. It seems to the writer to be a great defect in the scientific Protestantism of the present day that it deals with religion as if it were a subjective matter only. Professor James' treatment of the religious question is perfectly sound *on these lines*, but, as they represent only one-half, though the most important, of the phenomena, the results are bound to be one-sided. From this standpoint the peculiar and misty views about the Deity at which he arrives are inevitable. But he has omitted that which is their complement and correction, viz., the objectified idea of God evolved in the whole course of the history of

humanity; the result in this case being not less scientific than the other, besides being in harmony with the monistic view of nature which is a postulate of positive science.<sup>1</sup>

Even if the main factor in religious authority be the individual heart and conscience, yet the tendency to make this the sole factor is one-sided, and consequently unstable and liable to reaction. Man is a social animal, not only in secular but in religious matters. The notion that he makes churches by a kind of agreement or compromise, purely from utilitarian motives, is parallel to the exploded politico-philosophical theory of "the social contract." In both cases these notions have been displaced by the scientific theory of development through the mutual action and re-action of the organism and its environment. Just as Society, as nations, have grown instinctively and without taking thought, so, for the most part, have churches. Even when a sect has been initiated in which equality and individualism were the watchwords; creeds, the language of a common faith, and distinctions of office have sprung up and tended to crystallisation. Harnack laments what he calls this catholicising tendency in Protestant bodies. But why lament what is inevitable and natural, and not rather accept it as the dispensation of Providence? That well organised Churches should have a mechanical aspect is inevitable, for the same is true of all things living. There are philosophies which regard life exclusively on its mechanical side, and this negation is due, not to the life itself, but to the philosophy. And as life, in its various manifestations, so the Church, is far more than its mechanism. It is not the mechanism that does harm, for this is necessary to the Church's continuance, and the more perfect it is the better its work, but the tendency to stagnation and mere formalism which must

<sup>1</sup> It is not a little noteworthy how the Church, in her early struggles with Dualism in its various forms, which had so much to be said for it from a purely rational standpoint, should have clung steadily to the monistic principle. Nor is this the only instance in which she anticipated the point of view of positive science. Her recognition, as against Marcion, of the relation in which she stood to the religious past of Humanity, is another.



be guarded against. And that which does combat this tendency, observable also in secular societies, is the admission of new ideas, the closer correspondence with the fresh facts brought to light by advancing knowledge.

It is difficult to imagine what might have been had the Reformation never happened as it did, and the advanced and critical school in the Church of that age had its course without any disruption. One of the most immediate effects of the latter was to narrow Catholicism both by reaction and by the withdrawal of some of its best elements. As regards the present, the old barriers of bitterness, narrowness, and prejudice seem breaking down amongst the educated on both sides, and there seems some hope that eventually the scattered parts of Christendom may re-unite on broader lines than of old. No doubt, as things are, Protestants have the advantage in being able to pursue unhampered that necessary work of criticism which must precede any reconstruction. The reactionary elements in Catholicism are probably not larger in proportion than those in Protestantism; but they are better organised, and therefore more effective, at least apparently, in checking any forward movement. Yet, though the movement may be checked in some of its external manifestations, the new ferment of thought cannot be stopped; but must continue to work beneath the even and correct attitude of officialism, until this itself is gradually modified. So it has been in the past, and so, it is safe to prophesy, will it be in the future. And though the Church will thus, in her corporate capacity, have contributed very little to the critical process and will only have accepted its results; yet she will have retained, by the very force of her conservatism, some elements, lost for ever by Protestantism, which are of value to Humanity in fulfilling its religious ideals and aspirations. If, as the history of mankind proves, the religious spirit cannot work *in vacuo*, but must have a corresponding secular environment; it is fitting that such environment should be in accordance with the highest ideals of Humanity. If even the national spirit is ever stretch-

ing itself out towards imperialism, or to universal brotherhood, to world-federation; then surely the ideal for a religious environment should not be narrower. And though that ideal is only partially realised by the Catholic Church at present, it approaches it more nearly than any other religious body.

Again, if social revolutions and the growth of brand-new states have been unable to destroy man's ineradicable reverence for the past and for those institutions which thrust their roots furthest back into hoar antiquity—if this is, as it seems, a constant element in the human mind and closely associated with the religious sentiment; then an institution whose unbroken continuity extends back two thousand years and is the outgrowth of a still older religion, has something to satisfy this instinct. Add to these the unique order and harmony of its organisation, and we have an aggregate of qualities which, apart from other considerations, can be appreciated by all, and which, though they be but statical, form valuable factors for a future world-religion.

Continuity and progressive development being thus essential principles in the life of the Church, it is important to emphasise and explain them with the view of correcting a misunderstanding regarding them which was evident in some remarks made by Professor P. Gardner in the course of a review published in a former issue of this Journal, as it is conceivably not uncommon among non-Catholics. He there wrote:—"If it be a merit in the Church to adapt its life to fresh surroundings, why should not the Roman, like the Anglican branch, accept the principle of nationality, or, like the Presbyterian branches, accept the principle of representative government?" To which the answer is—because it is a principle of the Catholic Church to acknowledge no branches as such, but only one organic whole under one form of government transcending the shifting bounds of nationality. Therefore, if the Church were to do as he suggests, she would annul her essential constitution and cease to be; just as the Presbyterian body would cease to be such if it suddenly adopted the episcopal



form of government. Only, such a dismemberment as "nationalising" implies would be far more radical, being similar to that of a man who should attempt to "adapt" himself to living in several different countries simultaneously by the distribution among them of his severed members. The suggestion shows the difficulty experienced by even liberal and educated Protestants in understanding our position.

Granted that the organisation was formed by correspondence with its environment, that the monarchical episcopate and the Papacy were outgrowths of the presbyterate; yet the Church cannot reject what has once become a part of its organisation or its dogma, without breaking that phenomenal continuity by which each fresh stage in its development is affiliated with the preceding, and thus foregoing the positive claims it now has to the recognition of Humanity as the phenomenal Church in a world of phenomena. Modifications in theory of government, like explanations of dogma, are no doubt compatible with the retention of the form; but, if these come at all, it must be by a gradual and corporate evolution. It will be seen how far is such a view as that propounded in this paper, of the relation of the Church to the High Anglican party, from that of Mr P. Sydney in his article on "Liberal Catholicism" in the July issue of this Journal; and the writer contends that he represents much more nearly the views of advanced Catholics, though he does not wish to make the claim to speak for all. If it were the policy of any to conciliate the High Churchmen, as such, it could only be of those who had not realised the protean character of the Ritualistic movement, which makes it impossible to reckon with it as a single determinable factor.

We feel that we can afford to take up a wider position, with less contracted sympathies. We can afford to do this, whilst High Anglicans cannot. They have not, like ourselves, a single, world-wide and homogeneous Church, the heir of all the ages of faith, on which to rest their own. This is not written as a reproach, but to point out that the difference between us is essential and objective.

Their position, depending as it does upon a recent development of view in a section of a party in a national Church, lacks Catholicism's stable foundation in the past on unbroken traditions and in the present on its broad extension. They are bound, therefore, to attempt its justification in the old-fashioned way, from texts and patristic excerpts, and consequently cannot afford to relax the traditional view of the Bible and dogmatic history. They cannot boldly accept the main principle of the Higher Criticism, which consists in the recognition that the sacred text must be judged by the same critical canons as are works of profane writers; and that be the results of that criticism what they may, the authority of the faith will not be weakened thereby, but rather strengthened by being dissociated from ideas whose untrustworthy nature is constantly receiving fresh recognition. But this recognition can be made only by those who accept the principle of development in the sense advocated in this paper. And this their position forbids them to do, for to do so would be to cut the ground from under their feet.

To give one instance out of many—a vital one from their point of view, whose idea of the Church depends upon their Orders, not their Orders upon the Church—they are bound, if they believe in an authoritative priesthood, to accept apostolic succession as an historical fact. They could not hold the alternative theory—which is that of the best critics—that the Primitive Church passed through a period in which there was no settled ministry, developed a presbyterate and thereafter the episcopate.

From the Progressive Catholic standpoint, Ritualism, though it has done good in the prominence it has given to certain Catholic ideas, and in many other ways, is, in the main, a retrograde movement, and, so far as it has laid emphasis on the accidentals of Catholicism and thus diverted mental energy from more important matters and generated friction about comparative trifles, one actually harmful to spiritual and intellectual interests.

H. C. CORRANCE.

Hove, SUSSEX.



## THE ALLEGED INDIFFERENCE OF LAYMEN TO RELIGION.

### I.

#### SIR OLIVER LODGE.

THE allegation as worded seems to me untrue, unless by "laymen" is understood the great mass of the people. Even then I doubt if they are indifferent to real religion, or to reality and sincerity and lofty-mindedness of any kind. I do not think that they can be considered indifferent even to theology, of a sort, not to problems connected with apparent opposition between knowledge and faith, for instance, nor to questions of biblical interpretation and the nature of inspiration; nor are they unopen to the influence of a saintly life, or disposed to treat lightly such fundamental subjects as the existence of Deity and the relations between man and God.

I gather that they are not indifferent in this country to these topics, because they seem always willing to read about them or to discuss them. And if this refers chiefly to the more educated classes, it may be maintained on behalf of the masses that their perennial excitement about what doctrines shall be taught to small children, though it may lack lucidity, seems to argue anything but indifference.

In Germany and France, so far as I can judge, people in general do not care in the same way to discuss religious questions, and theological magazines are confined to specialists; there is little or nothing of general interest and wide circula-

tion on the subject. In those countries minds seem closed, either in the positive or in the negative direction, as regards religious beliefs. But here it is otherwise, and I have heard it maintained at a discussion society that there was really nothing except religion and politics which was worth the trouble of getting excited about.

Nevertheless there is a sense in which people in this country are indifferent to something allied to religion—at any rate to its outward and visible manifestations. To Ecclesiasticism they are indifferent, and they do not in any great number go to church. I take the title of the present symposium to intend to ask the question, Why is this? Why have the outward and visible forms of religion lost hold<sup>1</sup> of both educated and uneducated people?

I believe that over-pressure is one answer—a general sense of the shortness of life and the immense amount there is to be done in it. This holds true whether the press of occupation is caused by the demands of pleasure, or of business, or of investigation, or of work for the public weal. In each case time is all too short for what can now be crowded into it. As soon as our faculties are well developed, and our influence fairly active, it is difficult not to begin to think of being called to service elsewhere,—there is no time to expend in unprofitable directions.

Is going to church unprofitable, then? To some men often yes; to others, I suppose, always no: save in the sense that they have not profited by it. Perhaps to none is it quite unprofitable, but they may think it so. If it acted as a stimulus and an inspiration and a help to life, then surely people in general would not be so foolish as to be indifferent to it. But they may be mistaken; this is the age of strenuousness and high pressure, and it may be that a quiet two hours of

<sup>1</sup> I say “lost” hold, because I suppose I may assume, from the churches which they erected, as well as from the example of truly Roman Catholic countries at the present day, that, in say the twelfth century, observance of the outward forms of religion once really had a firm grasp of the majority of Englishmen.



peaceful meditation would be the very best sedative and rest-cure for many men whose activities are wearing them out. Some, and those the most strenuous of all, have found it so. Mr Gladstone, for instance, was a studious attendant at public worship, and I should not be surprised to hear that the German Emperor and President Roosevelt are so likewise: possibly in their case partly as an example, but also quite possibly as a private solace.

One cannot but admire men, to whom every five minutes is of value, who thus give up large tracts of time to religious exercises; and it is possible that many active men who ignore this help would be the better in every way if they too submitted themselves to the same discipline. It may be one of those cases where more haste is the less speed, and where the public assembling of ourselves together in a reverent and worshipful spirit would be a real contribution to vitality and power. Under certain conditions I feel sure that it would be so, but is it so under present conditions? The answer must depend partly on individual temperament, partly on the form of "service" available.

We must all be acquainted with the soothed and sympathetic feeling which is sometimes the result of attendance at a place of worship in company with others, even if nothing particular has been said worth carrying away: this is felt especially if the occasion is a symbolic one—a national thanksgiving, for instance, a demonstration of religious feeling by members of a scientific body, or other occasion of that kind; but if it is a mere everyday or weekly service, there must be some special harmony or congruity between the assembly and the words that have been said, or the ceremonies that have been performed, in order that the effect may be produced.

There appear to be some ecclesiastically-minded persons who can derive sustenance from what to others may seem extraordinarily commonplace, or even childish, proceedings. I have seen Mr Gladstone (the name of so great a man may

be employed as illustration without impertinence) in an attitude of rapt and earnest attention,—not to the words of the Bible, which anyone might be glad to read, nor to the words of the Prayer Book, which to those with a strongly-developed historic sense may carry with them a world of half-felt emotion—but to the utterance from the pulpit of a very ordinary discourse. To most of us, however, this patient self-contribution to what is going on is denied; and the feeling with which some go away from an average place of worship is too often a feeling of irritation and regret for wasted time.

I have known men of energy supply the needed intellectual exercise, and contrive to stimulate their historic sense, by using a Latin Prayer Book and a Greek Testament; and something of the sort is sorely needed if one is to attempt to keep one's attention fixed on the ancient formularies, so familiar from childhood, and recited or chanted in so meaningless a manner.

The greater number of men, I believe, cultivate the habit of inattention during the greater part of the proceedings; and it is possible, though less easy, to preserve an attitude of mental inattention even when reciting formularies with the lips. To strenuously attend to the meaning of the clauses, in a creed, for instance, or even in the Lord's Prayer, is an effort. I do not believe it is often made. The words are slipped through, and if an idea is caught every now and again, that is all that can be expected. There was a time when this inattentive recital of the well-known and familiar could be tolerated, and before the days of education it was probably useful. To some it may be useful still—to others it is tedious. The fact is, the conventional English Church Service, or eclectic admixture of combined services, is too long, and, as I think, too mechanical. The Psalter as a whole is oppressively tedious—I speak for myself; many of the chants one is weary of. Some of the prayers are beautiful, or would be if they were properly read and were not spoiled by such frequent iteration. The little song at the end of each commandment is gorgeous when one



hears it in the *Elijah*, but it gets tiresome at the ninth repetition. The "Confession" is historically interesting and sometimes perhaps appropriate, but as a rule it is excessive and unreal; and if ever true, it is not a thing one wishes to sing in public, nor indeed to *sing* at all, still less to pay a few illiterate boys and men to sing or monotone for one.

The *Te Deum*, on a national occasion, and sung slowly and emphatically, may be magnificent: as ordinarily treated it is almost useless, and seems only inserted as a convenient break between the Lessons; save occasionally when the setting and singing are specially good, in which case it can be enjoyed as an oratorio is enjoyed.

Some people may be able to utilise parts of the service which to others are tedious, and it may be contended that there is something for everybody; but for most people there must be long spells of dulness.

Length, however, is not the only objection: rapidity, which is perhaps a consequence of length, is another. Constantly and rapidly repeated formularies must surely tend to become mechanical. We jeer at the Thibetan water-worked praying-wheel as a mechanical form of prayer; and yet I can imagine a peasant joyfully going on with his labour in the fields, in the consciousness that his prayer was being periodically turned up to heaven by the forces of nature, and his soul might send an aspiration after it, without interfering with the industry of his body. I doubt if such a ritual is really more mechanical than some English services which I have attended. I know well that any liturgy—the bleakest as well as the most ornate—can elevate the soul of the truly pious; but this minority cannot be included among the laity of whom indifference to religion is even alleged.

As to the recital of a few incredible articles in the creeds, I say nothing: they are not numerous, and hardly act as a strong deterrent except to a few earnest souls; if there were reality about the procedure, some of the clauses would be repellent, but as it is, the Athanasian hymn can be chanted

through with the rest: it is an interesting glimpse into an ingenious mediæval mind to whom all the mystery of Divinity was expressible in words, with great positiveness of assurance and with arithmetical precision of specification. But so far as this creed and the Articles contain things to which we and our teachers, the beneficed clergy, are expected to adhere, they may be to some extent deterrent; and it must be admitted that they are rather out of date.

With all the enthusiasm for religion in the world, I would say to professional Churchmen, you really cannot continue to expect people to wade continually through so much mediæval and ecclesiastical lore. You must free the ship of official religion from incrustation: it is water-logged and overburdened now, and its sails are patched and outworn. I do not ask you to use steam or any new-fangled mode of propulsion. By all means keep your attachment to the past, but study reality and sincerity; strive to say what you really mean, and to say it in such way that others may know that you mean it, and may feel that they mean it too.

I trust that it is not an inseparable concomitant of a State religion that petitions should be tied and bound in rigid forms, that no audible prayer can be uttered except what is printed and authorised; it is pitiful when the only initiation permitted, even at times of stress, lies in the emphasis which may be thrown upon certain words, and the pauses that may be made after them. But at least the sermon is free. So let preachers realise their opportunities and make use of them, and let them no longer throw away their chance of moving the hearts of men towards a higher and more useful and unselfish life, by over-attention to the conventional arrangement called the Church's Year. The annual commemoration of everything is often made an excuse for laziness: it saves the trouble of choosing a subject. It provides a hackneyed theme ready to hand, to be treated in a conventional and hackneyed manner. Silently and patiently the people sit there, and are not fed.



Religion is one thing ; church services as often conducted are quite another thing. Modification will be resented and opposed by some singularly-minded lay Churchmen ; nevertheless, if more eminent ability is to be attracted to the service of the church, if the great body of the laity are to be reached in any serious and effective manner, modifications, excisions, and reforms are necessary. It is not religion to which people are indifferent.

OLIVER LODGE.

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## II.

SIR EDWARD RUSSELL.

ONE is encountered casually on the threshold by the consciousness that when we use the word "laymen," and especially when we use the word "laity," we are not thinking of the mass of the community ; and that if we desire to think of the great body of the people—that is to say, the handiworkers—as laymen, we have to do so by set resolve. This is significant, though we may not be quite sure what it is significant of. The workmen of towns have never been normally interested in religion ; the workmen in country districts may have observed religion more, and may have regarded it somewhat in illness and at death, but most of them may truly be alleged to be indifferent to religion. Such as have been touched by it in any permanent way during life have been affected by religion in its Methodist forms.

This brings us to the consideration whether laymen—and now we use the word in the sense most natural to us in such a discussion, that of non-ordained persons fairly educated—we are brought, I say, to another incidental consideration : whether laymen are alleged to be more indifferent to religion than they used to be. And are they ? These inquiries are prompted by the mention of Methodism ; by which I mean

every sort of experimental excitation by which interest in religion has been created, along with interest in the state of each individual soul. On the Continent of Europe, where experimental religion has mostly been rare and elementary, indifference to religion has been a product of unbelief. In this country—indeed among the whole English-speaking race—there is no such simple explanation, no such simple criterion of religious consciousness. Since the great revival of the ideas of redeeming experience in mid-eighteenth century, the word “believe” has never in British religion had the meaning of mere credence. “The devils believe and tremble,” but are understood by British “believers” to be none the better for their trembling or for their belief.

The idea of “saving faith” was indeed much dominant in Puritan as it had been in Lutheran times, but there was something chilling and formalising in the compromises of Anglicanism. And though members of the Church of England in the eighteenth century never got back to the merely mechanical processes of salvation from which the Tudor Reformers weaned them, their occupation with religious experience became tepid. The common criteria of safety in death—and, for the most part, only in this regard was indifference suspended—were spiritually perfunctory, and were not even expressed or expressible in terms of Christian theology or experience.

Among Nonconformists the usage of intellectual occupation with the theory and practice of religion was not laid aside so summarily, but the gradual modification of Presbyterianism into Arianism in many parts of the country, whatever else it did, did not quicken or warm the concern of religionists with religion.

In Scotland, after a century of Moderatism, Dr Chalmers did for actual religion pretty much what John Wesley did in England. And though many names may be recited in connection with the revival of Evangelical religion in the Church of England, from Wesley and from Methodism the original



impulse came. Noticeably enough, the same influence was felt and yielded to by Churchmen, lay and clerical, who were not of the Evangelical fold.

Let me give one illustration. Bishop Blomfield was not an Evangelical. Edward Bickersteth was effectively even more the chief of the Evangelicals than was Charles Simeon. Both these eminent Churchmen of the same day issued books of Family Prayers, a proceeding in which they appealed to the laity in daily religious life. This was before the new Oxford Movement had declared itself. In spite of the difference between the two divines, the similarity of the theological tone of the two manuals is notable; also the difference in tone and phrase from what would now be found in any book of English devotion. Bishop Blomfield's prayers were somewhat more "churchy." Mr Bickersteth's prayers were somewhat more effusive in Evangelical sentiment. But Bishop Blomfield's diction and thought were wholly devoid of what, by coining, I may call the sacramentality now current in Anglican expression; while they abounded in allusions to the Last Day, to conversion, to the future state, to the Second Coming, to the bringing in of the Jews, and to other ideas which were the sacred and heartfelt commonplaces of English religious life in all orthodox denominations, except the "high and dry" Church, before the great Newman and Keble revolution.

I mention these things because, though the Oxford Movement may have revived, in giving a new turn to, the interest of a proportion of the laity in religion, it depressed that interest among a far greater proportion of the laity, by transmuting the dialect and emotion of English religion out of its characteristic subjective condition into the objective condition of Sacrament, observance, and ritual miracle; which, I suggest, is alien from the English religious temperament. Another main influence was that of Maurice and Robertson, working contemporaneously or preliminarily in co-operation with *Essays and Reviews*; Colenso; the disappearance of Verbal Inspiration; grave doubts of eternal punishment; the suspicion that most of

the Isaiah passages in Handel's "Messiah" did not really refer to the Christ; another suspicion that the existing orthodox Christian religion is founded rather on the less Hebraic and more original portions of the Epistle to the Romans than on the Gospels, or any authentic proof of the intention or doctrine of our Lord; and the "Literature and Dogma" influence of Matthew Arnold.

Here, again, I may seem to be called upon to justify retrospective observations, made in dealing with a present-time question of fact. My justification is that the mood of the laity towards religion must have been affected by the two great agents of change, Sacerdotalism and Rationalism; and that the present-time question of fact, as to what the feeling of laymen is, is so difficult to settle by one's own evidence, that a sounder method may be to blend one's remembrances of what one has observed in laymen with a just estimate, *a priori*, of the inevitable effect upon laymen of the greatest influences that have been at work. Why is trustworthy evidence meagre, and why cannot it be offered with confidence? Because each witness lives more or less in a set, or assimilates best the opinions of a set. Because one man concludes from what he hears among his friends that no one is any longer orthodox; and another holds, on similar grounds, that Higher Criticism is not having the slightest effect; and another will talk as if no one was thinking of anything but golf or motors, and so on. Great care is necessary to avoid overweening impressions as to our fellow-creatures.

After much observation and some careful weighing, my persuasion is that, whatever ought to be, the greater indifference of laymen to religion, if it exists, is a not unnatural result of the impoverishment of religious exercises by formalism, and of the lessening, by Rationalism of various sorts, of the tragical grip which religious contingencies used to have even upon comparatively careless lay minds. It will be said that Sacerdotalism imparts zeal, and that Rationalism spurs interest. They do, but only in special minorities. In the majority,



Sacerdotalism is mechanical ; Rationalism, a reason for treating religion as a thing that does not press, and that, with a minimum of decorous worship and a sufficiency of instruction for children, may be left to experts, or to those who make it a hobby.

The tendency thus resulting, as I submit, from the two great changes of the past century, is increased by several contributory causes—or reflex effects. For example, owing perhaps to real improvement in society, and a consequent diminution of suffering and grievances in civilised life, things in general are looked at with an easier regard. If this is so with things in general, it is sure, *a fortiori*, to be so with religion. Mr Gladstone once said in Bickers & Bush's shop, that when a man began to find his income straitened, the first thing he retrenched in was his charities ; the second was his books. If an average Englishman feels less worried and more at ease, the first thing he slackens is his religion.

Then there is a fashion of saying—perhaps thinking—that you can worship God quite as well in the fields as at church. There is a discarding of what my dear old friend Longuet Higgins used to call altruistic worship—the observance of religious duties out of consideration for others, and for the magnetism which union in religious exercises brings to bear upon them. There is a considerable falling-off in preaching, and a still greater falling-off in the demand for preaching. There is a vastly prevalent idea that the chief good thing in connection with religion is “Christian work” : this distinctly lessens lay interest in religion, being really a mere patting of religion on the back on the score of its philanthropic appendages.

In the vagueness which new ways of regarding religion have produced, dogma has lost its ready hold. The old notion that if one did not attend to religion now, one would have to do so some day, and therefore might as well have one's ideas clear, has passed away. The theories of the Atonement which, by almost common consent among theologians, have taken the

place of the forensic theory, which, vital as were its faults, was phenomenally simple and intelligible, can neither be remembered nor even understood by laymen. Laymen cast away the forensic theory as condemned; they ignore the later theories as incomprehensible. They practically dispense with the Atonement altogether, so far as their intellects are concerned. If they take the sacrament, it is rather perhaps with a confused notion that something supernatural occurs than with a distinct appropriation of the soul-redemption typified. Often they stir themselves to a perceptible eucharistic emotion by some "intention," which has much more to do with a particular personal desire than with the great doctrine of the Supper.

There is a pretty general, either conscious or unconscious, inclination among persons averse from priestly ideas, for a much curtailed creed; and though this is good, so far as it indicates in well-meaning preoccupied laymen a worthy wish to recognise the simpler and deeper filial sentiments of their relations to the Divine, it is too often such a dismissal of the subject as estops rather than renders more profound their interest in religion.

I have been asked whether, in my judgment, it is a common state of mind nowadays for religion to be actually rejected as a thing not to be believed. I think not. I am asked whether it is a common attitude just to leave religion on one side, as a thing that never occurs to one. This is very common, but only among persons who are conspicuously votaries of pleasure or of (what to them is pleasure in its most real form) business. There are occasional, perhaps even many, cases of men by no means irreligious in mind or motives who shrink from actual association with any religious body, and especially from communicating, because they cannot perceive in, and think they cannot infuse into their lives and characters that serious devotion which they most exactly desiderate in religious men.

Is there any obvious disconnection, more conspicuous among



Christians than among members of other faiths, between their religion and their practically unavoidable daily lives? The reply is twofold: Firstly, this ought not to be—I mean there is little excuse for it—because Christian standards are generally recognised, and religiousness has certainly ceased to be a provocation for ridicule. But, on the other hand, secondly, an uncomfortable, illogical, unintelligent state of conscience is maintained by the growing up of, and acquiescence in, customs of business, practices of speculation, usages when in distant countries, and non-moral rules of peace and war and acquisition—to instance a few examples. Efforts should be made by Christian authorities to formulate and apply ethical Christian dicta in such matters. This would need to be done with great care and with specially cultivated sound casuistry. But it ought to be done, because “whatsoever is not of faith is sin,” and laymen know they cannot serve two masters.

Whatever Christianity really requires in such matters from Christians ought to be wisely ascertained and sufficiently laid before the laity, in order that their interest in religion may not be destroyed by its implied inapplicability to secular concerns.

I feel bound to guard myself from misconstruction by adding that I have restricted myself to describing—without qualification—without personal preference of doctrine or manner of devotion—what seem to me to be the actual phenomena of English lay religion during the last sixty years.

EDWARD RUSSELL.

LIVERPOOL.

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### III.

PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD.

IN a discussion like the present it is important to bear in mind the familiar distinction between religion as a state of feeling, interest in religion as a speculative attitude of mind, and the expression of religion as an overt act. If by the

alleged decay of religion it be meant either that men are less religious than they used to be, or that they show less interest in religious questions, I should be inclined to question the fact. There is no evidence to support either statement. On the contrary, our own day seems to be chiefly remarkable for a strong reaction against materialistic ways of thinking and a revived interest in all that "is and hath the name of God." If, on the other hand, be meant an increasing tendency on the part of large sections of the community, and especially of men, to neglect the use of the established forms of religious expression, there seems a general agreement amongst those best qualified to judge that this is so. This being so, it is in every way appropriate that the *Hibbert Journal* should use its wide circulation to call attention to the fact and inquire into its reasons. The question is one that merits the serious attention, not only of religious teachers, but of all who recognise the supreme importance of religion as an element in human life. For if there is one thing upon which the modern psychology of feeling lays more stress than another, it is the dependence of all forms of emotion upon expression, not only as their natural accompaniment but as the source of their proper nourishment and growth.

The answer to it will, I believe, be found in the fact that the churches have on the whole failed to realise the situation and to adapt themselves to changed conditions of life—intellectual, emotional, social.

(1) While there is no general decay of interest in religion, there is a very widespread decay of orthodoxy. Doctrinal statements no longer appeal to the great mass of laymen. This explains diminished interest not only in denominational differences and sectarian war-cries, but in narrow and exclusive interpretations of the inward meaning of Christianity itself. A new religious movement has come in like a flood, dissolving, confusing, unifying. On the other hand, church services, and as a rule church sermons, are still full of the sand and grit of dogmatic and sectarian religion. In a non-theological age they



are obtrusively theological, and have thus not only ceased to correspond to religious needs, but have become a stumbling-block and rock of offence to the religious spirit.

(2) While public worship has thus ceased to appeal to the intellect, there has been no counterbalancing gain in its power of appealing to the emotions. *Æsthetically* as well as intellectually it has lost its hold upon our generation. It has no beauty that men should desire it. Whether from the point of view of architecture and church decoration, or of music and order of service, modern Protestant religion is the slave of conventionality. How few of us love the churches or chapels where we worship! how little there is that is lovable in them! Take the church service itself. As a whole it is a noble tradition. To most of us it is bound up with some of our tenderest associations; yet how tedious, unrestful, conventional we often feel it! How gladly we settle down into the brief and doubtful respite of the sermon!

(3) While the attractions of public worship have thus failed to keep pace with the time, the resources of ordinary middle-class life to provide recreation and enjoyment have been greatly enlarged. The strain and excitement of business life has enormously increased within recent memory. In proportionate degree does the modern business man crave in his leisure for the peace and seclusion that his club and home provide. Do we realise sufficiently what the universal taste for reading, the abundance of the means and the increasing rarity of the opportunity for indulging it, mean in this respect?

But it is not only, as every one knows, with indoor enjoyments that the church has to compete. It is a commonplace that modern life, along with the necessity, has enormously increased the accessibility of outdoor recreation. The cheap train, the bicycle, the motor, the golf links, and the tennis court are rivals with which public worship on present terms will find it more and more difficult to contend.

That these are true causes may easily be proved by the

fact that where they are comparatively inoperative, as in the case of women, the effect is far less noticeable. Women as a whole are less influenced by the prevalent critical attitude towards church doctrines, while at the same time they are more under the influence of popular opinion and social custom. Church-going, moreover, presents attractions to women, sometimes quite unconnected with religion, which are comparatively unknown to men, while on the other hand remaining at home is usually far less suggestive of the restful spirit of the day. For obvious reasons, also, Sunday outdoor recreation is comparatively unattractive to women.

If all this, or anything like it, is true, it seems well worth the churches' while to consider how, in the interest of the general religious life, lost ground may be recovered. Two ways are suggested by the above enumeration. The attempt may be made to bring church services and church sermons more into line with religious beliefs or disbeliefs. This is the path along which some of the more advanced Nonconformist churches seem to be moving. I believe that it is a requirement of the situation; I do not believe that in itself it is in any way sufficient. This seems to be proved by the fact that the complaint of falling-off in attendance on public worship comes not less from the congregations where the intellectual level of the sermon is high, than from those where no special effort is made in this direction. And the reason is that the attempt proceeds upon the assumption, which there seems little to support, that intellectual stimulus is one of the main objects of churchgoing. Perhaps it may even be said that the less the preacher tries to compete with the lecturer and the journalist in these times of specialisation the better.

As contrasted with the rationalising, there is what may be called the emotionalising of public worship: as it seems to me, a far more hopeful method. It would consist in better and more varied music, more beautiful and less conventional decoration, including the glories of form, colour, and material. If you would have people love their religion, their religion



must be lovable. How much we have to learn from Catholicism in these respects is known to the traveller in France or Italy who has felt the thrill of religious feeling that the mere casual entrance into the great mediæval churches can give. We, too, have great churches and cathedrals in England, equal to the best as tabernacles of a great ritual and homes of great art, but the ritual and the art, with the reverence and spirit of worship which they feed, are still sadly to seek.

To this want the Church shows signs of awaking. But the introduction of art into worship is only the beginning. Other changes must follow, to meet changed circumstances. Along with it must go greater adaptability to religious needs—the shortening and variation of services; the opening of churches at other than set times for prayer and meditation; the utilisation of our great cathedrals and churches on special occasions for services of music, sacred drama, or devotion, which should unite all denominations in a common act of prayer and aspiration; the employment of the sermon, not as a part of the almost mechanical apparatus of the service, but on comparatively rare occasions, when the preacher's own convictions or the circumstances of the day call for some articulate and pronounced expression.

Whether all this would not involve a revolution in the training and functions of the clergy is a further question. It probably would. Released from the burden, which to some must amount to a nightmare, of preparing two or three weekly sermons, ministers might be expected to devote themselves far more than at present to the study of the social conditions amongst which they are called upon to live and work, to give needful time to the organisation of charity, and thus to become the leaders of social effort.

Of this, at any rate, we may be sure, that if the churches would take advantage of the great revival of religious interest which seems only at its beginning, if they would play their part in strengthening and deepening it, in rescuing it from

superstition, and in directing it into useful social and national channels, they will require to show themselves far more alive than at present to the changed circumstances of the time, to what I believe to be its deeper needs, its sincerer and more earnest temper.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

BIRMINGHAM.

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#### IV.

#### THE EDITOR.

SINCE the establishment of this Journal a mass of remarkable evidence, bearing on the subject of these papers, has been brought to my notice. Without endorsing any of the arguments offered, I propose in what follows to summarise the leading points.

Strictly speaking, the evidence indicates indifference not to Religion but to those forms of expression which the Christian Religion, under the guidance of its leading reformers, is now tending to assume. It would seem that the elements are gathering among enlightened laymen<sup>1</sup>—but not among them alone—for a serious and unexpected revolt, of which indifference is the first sign. And the remarkable feature of the case is that the revolt is directed, not against the assumptions of the traditional forms of Christianity, but against the latest positions to which the Liberal Movement is tending. The leaders of the Liberal Movement may justly claim to have carried many persons over the intellectual crisis in religion due to the advance of science and criticism. But if the evidence before me is to be trusted, they have, unknown to themselves, prepared the way for a moral crisis much further-reaching in its effects. They have sown dragons' teeth. And, unless I am much mistaken,

<sup>1</sup> Sir Edward Russell in the second paper rightly points out that working men are often excluded from our conception of the "laity." In what follows I wish it to be understood that I include working men.



the harvest has already begun to appear, not, perhaps, in the universities nor in the published literature of religion, but in the daily questioning of men who pass their lives in the great centres of industrial and political activity. It is in such places that new principles in religion and ethics are put to the final test of their application. This testing process has now commenced in regard to the main positions of Liberal Christianity, with results which few persons appear to have foreseen.

The change which, for good or ill, has passed over Christian thought during the last hundred years is perhaps best summed up in the saying that Christianity is not a Creed but a Life. In this connection the name of Harnack is representative. The Christian religion, he tells us, is "Eternal Life in the midst of time, by the strength and under the eye of God"; and the essence of this life is in the Higher Righteousness and the Law of Love.

On hearing Christianity thus described as a Life, on hearing, further, the terms of that Higher Righteousness and Law of Love in which this Life consists, plain-thinking men—laymen, that is, with no turn for the subtleties of present-day apologetics, but with a strong determination to call a spade a spade—frequently assert that they perceive this Life neither in the churches to which they nominally belong, nor in the society of which they are organic and responsible members, nor in the principles by which they guide, and intend to guide, their politics, their business, and their daily lives. The question "*What is Christianity?*"<sup>1</sup> being answered with the answer of Harnack and his following, immediately there springs up another question, viz., *Where is this Christianity? Where are the Higher Righteousness and the Law of Love to be seen in operation?* And the number of those who ask that question, and get either no answer, or only an answer which lacks both authority and clearness, is, in the opinion of the present writer, rapidly increasing.

<sup>1</sup> It is, of course, the English translator who has given this form to the title of Harnack's work.

WHERE is Christianity?<sup>1</sup> The question causes no perplexity so long as *doctrine* is the central fact. Christianity is then to be found in the faithful witness of the creed—in the Christian profession of the Christian Church. But, under the hand of the modern school, the doctrinal retires, and the ethical comes to the front; the theoretical fades, the practical stands forth in the light. Christianity is not believing this or that, but losing one's life in order to find it. It is a state of the Will in the first place, of the Intellect only in the second. *Where* is this Christianity, then? Is the Will of the Christian State, Church, or average individual validly a Christian Will? Does recent history, as read not in the books of the learned but in the works of nations, governments, parties, trade, finance, suggest that the Life is *lived*, or that it will be lived fifty years hence more than now? Does the nominally Christian world *mean to be Christian in fact*? Can this losing of one's life to find it be predicated of any of the great underlying forces and tendencies which are now making the history of the nations, guiding the policy of the churches, pointing the goal of the social activities, forming the individual characters of the millions of to-day? Is Christianity, thus interpreted, the name for anything characteristic or dominant in the Western World? Is it not rather the name of something arriving after the event, which tries to undo a small fraction of the havoc wrought by the forces which are characteristic? Shall society call itself Christian because, forsooth, after living all day by principles which turn the earth into a battlefield, it summons the ambulance in the evening and picks up the wounded, and sheds tears of pity over the dead? So asks the plain man who has no turn for the subtle arguments of the modern apologist. He remembers that he is a responsible unit in the society professing this Christianity, and the suspicion crosses his mind that in his personal profession of such a religion he may be something of a pretender. And he ceases to go to church.

The type of plain man we are considering wants a more

<sup>1</sup> In this connection see *The Letters of John Chinaman, passim*.



valid proof than has yet been offered that the world is *serious* when it professes the Christianity *which is a life and not a creed*. He doubts, moreover, whether he could seriously and honestly make such a profession himself. He is by all operative standards an honourable man; he deals honestly in trade, is a good husband and father, faithful to his friends (though perhaps a little hard on his foes), public-spirited, patriotic, munificent. But to pretend that the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount are his, even in their spirit, would be a flagrant falsehood. He admires the beauty, he may even admit the philosophic truth of the principle which bids him lose his life to save it; but he is an acting member of a community whose industrial life is based on the opposite principle of competition! He knows the danger of riches; remembers the saying about laying up treasure on earth; but willingly and eagerly takes his part in an economic system which rests on the accumulation of wealth. He is a firm supporter of the criminal law; holds that great armaments are necessary to the life of nations; takes pride in the majesty and power of the British fleet; upholds the Government when it shakes the mailed fist in the face of foreign nations, —and he will not sully his conscience by pretending that he who does these things is a believer, in any sense whatever, in non-resistance to evil, in unlimited forgiveness, or in the principle of turning the other cheek. If these commandments are involved in the Christianity which is a life, if obedience to them is required of the followers of Christ, then he is no Christian, and will not pretend to be. He is aware that the world's manners have been softened, its ethics improved, its grosser evils redressed, and the life, of some sections of the community at least, elevated by the influence of the religion of Christ. He may admit that but for Christianity he himself would be on a lower level of manhood. But all this falls infinitely short of what the case requires. It may be that, in spite of our rejection of His principles, we are all being influenced for good by Christ; but it does not follow that we are justified

in claiming to be His followers. Have we any serious intention of making our international politics, our trade and finance, our criminal codes, our social habits, our personal aims, conformable to that life which our new guides tell us Christianity is? The plain man may or may not think such conformity desirable; but until the attempt is more seriously made, the new Christianity appears to him to be something of a mockery. He is indifferent to a religion which, while interpreted as a Life, is yet so remote from the underlying motives and currents of the world where it is professed; and, in the name of honesty, he refuses to be publicly associated with it.

Thus the Liberal Movement has not brought the help to the intelligent man of the world which some of its promoters have expected it to bring. If it has diminished the intellectual contradiction, it has increased the moral. In this new interpretation of Christianity ideals have been revived with which the modern world seems to some to have drifted into hopeless antagonism, and the movement has so far overshot the real intention of the times that many plain men, confronted by its principles, feel themselves in the presence of unreality. They look back, not perhaps without regret, to the easy times before science and criticism had dissipated their dogmatic conception of religion. Then these ethical contradictions were not felt. And may we add the surmise that not a few, who still hold to Christianity as a *doctrine*, though aware of the intellectual risk, prefer to bear the ills they have rather than fly to others that they know not of?

The plain man will of course be told that his indifference to religion, when based upon reasons such as these, is due to a radical mistake. He is entirely wrong in identifying Christianity, even that which is a life and not a creed, with the ethical precepts of Christ. Christianity is a universal spirit, of which the precepts of Christ are but a particular embodiment—a religion whose high privilege it is “to adapt its shape to the course of history, free from all constraint.”<sup>1</sup> To arrive at a

<sup>1</sup> See Harnack, *What is Christianity?* Trans. T. Bailey Saunders, p. 96.



proper understanding of Christ's religion, we must study not alone its first expression in the Gospels, but its total manifestation in the history of the world from the beginning until now. He who forms his conception from the Gospel sayings alone shows himself blind to the essential truth which history and evolution have to teach.

When the plain man receives this not unmerited rebuke, he asks himself, in his unphilosophic way, "Where is this sort of thing going to stop?" A suspicion crosses his mind that he is being entangled in a metaphysical net. The term "universal," in which the gist of the argument against him lies, he finds especially bewildering—and not without reason. The word, indeed, is a wide-mouthed bag into which contradictions, and unconsidered trifles of that kind, are wont to be quietly slipped. And the plain man is aghast to find that by the skilful use of this word an apologist can prove the religion of Christ to be equally compatible with the principle of losing one's life to find it and with the principle of competition as applied to the industry of the modern world. His first instincts, which usually prevail in him in the end, would lead the plain man to suppose that the moral ideal which enjoined the one thing is the antithesis of the moral ideal which permits the other. Evolution is a term which he knows he ought to respect; he knows that oaks grow out of acorns, and has ceased to be astonished by analogous phenomena in the world of ideas; but when he is asked to admit that an ethical principle may evolve its own contradiction, he not unnaturally suspects that someone is playing him a trick! Besides, he has heard something of this "development" theory before. Was it not by an argument almost precisely analogous that Newman demonstrated the dogmatic system of the Catholic Church to be a legitimate development from the germ of doctrine left with the first apostles? In what essential respect do the two lines of argument differ? It is no harder to believe that the decrees of the Council of Trent are the rightful outcome of the first Gospel, than to believe that the ethical ideas of a conquering,

aggressive, wealth-based and wealth-accumulating empire have their roots in the Gospel. It is no harder to prove the Pope a successor of the Fisherman, than to prove the average worshipper in a Christian church to be a true follower of Jesus Christ—assuming always that Christianity is a Life. If it be true that all roads lead to Rome, most men would prefer to travel by one which has the destination plainly marked on the fingerposts. Both proofs fall back on the same assumptions, and advance by the same steps.<sup>1</sup> And the plain man is frequently indifferent to both.

In what has been said, the present writer is not defending a thesis of his own, but presenting an aspect of the case which has recently been brought under his notice from many quarters and in many forms. He has reason to believe he is expressing the views of many enlightened, strenuous, and highminded laymen who find that the latest developments of Christian thought have passed beyond the range of their sympathy, and may I add, of their comprehension. One would think that the definition of Christianity as “a life and not a creed” would bring religion into the closest touch with felt needs, felt experience, felt reality. There are those, however, for whom it has precisely the opposite effect. Rightly or wrongly, they feel such a Christianity to be foreign, distant, unreal, without counterpart in the Western World, and their attitude towards it becomes, at least, one of indifference.

THE EDITOR.

<sup>1</sup> On this point the reader is referred to the article by Mr H. C. Corrance in the present issue of the *Hibbert Journal*.



## THE GODS AS EMBODIMENTS OF THE RACE-MEMORY.

EDWARD CARPENTER.

THE current explanations of the genesis of the gods—as from generalisations of Nature-phenomena, or idealisations of heroic men and women, modified by traditions and memories and dreams, and complicated by mistakes in the meanings of words and names—are certainly suggestive; but it is widely felt, I think, that while they help us to understand the origin of the *forms* of the gods, they fail almost entirely to account for their astounding power and influence, or to explain why to the savage and untutored mind mere generalisations and abstractions should have acquired such intense reality.

When we read of the great god Pan appearing to Pheidippides, promising victory over the Persians, and of the joy and gratitude of the Athenians in consequence; or of Athené appearing to Achilles, or of Krishna to Arjuna; or of St Francis, who beheld the Madonna descend from the sky and place in his arms her Divine Son; or of Catherine of Siena, for whom heaven opened and showed her the Christ sitting upon the Throne; or consider hundreds and hundreds of similar stories, and how the presence and activity and profound influence of such figures and beings have been admitted and accepted and insisted on by millions and millions of human kind in all races and in all ages, and the belief in them has compelled men to every conceivable act of heroism and devotion, and terror of death and sacrifice;—it is impossible

not to see how intense was the reality with which these figures were credited, and difficult not to suppose that (whatever the apparitions actually were) they represented some real force or forces influencing mankind.

My object in this paper is to indicate in what direction we should look for this underlying force or actuality; and I will not delay to say that I think we shall find it in the supposition that the figures of the gods are *apparitions or manifestations of the conscious life of the Race in the mind of the individual*, and that they owe their main significance to this fact. The more exact meaning of this expression may appear later; but here I would only say that in using it I do not wish to be too exclusive. There may be, and probably are, other psychical elements involved in the genesis of the gods; but it is, I think, the action within us of some order of consciousness more extended than our ordinary consciousness, which gives to them their importance.

In studying any phenomenon of the past, it is always advisable to try and detect it in the life of to-day. And the moment we do so in this case we see that the gods are still living and real all around us. Allowing all one may for mere cant or custom, yet there are thousands and thousands round us to whom the figure of Christ, say, is an intense, a living, and an actually present reality. It is difficult to suppose that all these people are merely deceiving themselves. One must see that, whatever this figure is, or proceeds from, it is much more than the imagination of a fairy tale, and represents a profound and real influence there present and acting within the man. It is a thing of the same character as the deities of olden time.

Or again, who is there so unfortunate as not to have had the experience, in ordinary daily life, of seeing some features, perhaps those of a well-known person, suddenly transformed into the lineaments of a god—with the strangest possible sense of a transcendent presence, only to be described by some such word? Or why, on occasions, walking along the crowded streets, amid all the rubbish and riff-raff of humanity, does a



face suddenly appear, all glorified and shining, removed by a measureless gulf from those around—and disappear again in the stream? What is the meaning of these sudden halos and glammers?

Dr Bucke, in his *Memories of Walt Whitman*, describes the profound impression produced upon him by his first interview with the poet. "I remember well how, like so many others, I was struck, almost amazed, by the beauty and majesty of his person and the gracious air of purity that surrounded and permeated him. We did not talk much, nor do I remember anything that was said, but it would be impossible for me to fully convey by words or in any way to describe the influence upon me of that short and simple interview. A sort of spiritual intoxication set in, which did not reach its culmination for several weeks, and which, after continuing for some months, very gradually, in the course of the next few years, faded out. While this state of exaltation remained at its height, the mental image of the man Walt Whitman underwent within me a sort of glorification (or else a veil was withdrawn, and I saw him as he was and is), insomuch that it became impossible for me (I am describing the event just as it occurred, and as accurately as possible) to believe that Whitman was a mere man. It seemed to me at that time certain that he was either *actually a god, or in some sense clearly and entirely preterhuman*. Be all this as it may, it is certain that the hour spent that day with the poet was the turning-point of my life." These words of Dr Bucke are specially interesting as coming from no sentimental youth, but from a man of scientific and practical attainment, who at the time of the recorded experience was fully forty years old, and superintendent of a large insane asylum; and they show clearly enough his deliberate conviction that he beheld in Whitman the presence of a being divine and beyond the range of mortality.

Or again, we ask, why do the mountain-peaks and the thunder-clouds sometimes take on a mystic light, and stir us

with a sense of something unearthly? Why in the sylvan glades do we become aware, perhaps quite unexpectedly, of a breathless stillness and magic, and the trees stand as though the Wood-god himself were there, and the air exhales a mystery? What is this light which never was on sea or land? We see that these things are realities, in the sense that they profoundly influence us. We surmise that they are something more than phantoms or fictions of our own individual brains.

Perhaps the grandest effort of antiquity to explain this mystery was made in the philosophy of Plato.

Plato of course believed in a world of Absolute Forms and Essences remaining beyond the reach of Time. There, in company with the gods, dwelt—and for ever dwell—Justice and Temperance and Beauty and many other Forms. The soul of every man in some earlier state of being, carried round in the retinue of that special god to whom he may belong, has beheld in that heavenly world these divine Essences. But fallen now to Earth, it has well-nigh forgotten them. Only now and then, when the man sees some fair face or figure, witnesses some heroic deed or well-balanced action, or even perceives some well-formed object, is he *reminded* of that which is Eternal. For Plato the explanation of the Divine was easy enough. It was an *ἀνάμνησις*—a recollection, faint or powerful, of things once known and seen. When you set eyes—might Plato say—upon that face in the crowd, it was not so much the face itself that was divine (though it was certainly privileged so far to resemble divinity), but that it instantly recalled to your memory the form of some god seen long ago, or far down in the mirror of the mind—to which god, indeed, your adoration and worship were due, and not to the mortal; or if to the mortal, only so far as in him (or her) the image of the god were faintly visible. Of these celestial forms (and these are Plato's actual words in the *Phædrus*) "few only retain an adequate remembrance; and they, when they behold any image of that other world, are rapt in



amazement; but they are ignorant of what this rapture means, because they do not clearly perceive. *For there is no light in the earthly copies* of justice or temperance or any of the higher qualities which are precious to souls: they are seen through a glass dimly; and there are few who, going to the images, behold in them the realities, and they only with difficulty." Thus for Plato the explanation of "the light which never was on sea or land" was easy enough. It was a memory of that celestial light in which the divine Forms and the gods themselves were once seen by the soul, and indeed are (according to him) ever seen, whenso it may succeed in penetrating into that region where they dwell eternal.

But for us of modern mind, steeped in physical science and the doctrines of evolution, this assumption of Plato's is one we are very unwilling to entertain. We ask, if the gods dwell indeed eternal in the heavens, how is it that the mortal deities of the various races and peoples (memories presumably of the real celestials) *differ* so greatly, and in some cases entirely, from each other?—and we receive no answer. And yet, curiously enough, at the same moment when modern thought is dismissing one portion of the Platonic assumption—that, namely, which deals with this changeless heaven of essential Forms—as untenable, it is reinforcing the other portion, and insisting that memory, race-memory, plays a part of the greatest importance in the whole matter.

The Platonic *ἀνάμνησις*, indeed, has received curious illustration from the modern theories of heredity. The object we set eyes on does—so the modern philosopher maintains—remind us, if not of some timeless and transcendental Heaven, yet certainly of another world. It wakes in us countless memories—the memories of the race—delivered to us by inheritance, and stretching back, how far in time we know not. Here, science admits, is a real *ἀνάμνησις*; and the question now naturally occurs: Is it not possible also that the theory of heredity may receive illumination from the Platonic doctrine? Is it not possible that in the light of

racial memory both Plato and Darwin may be justified, and the modern and the ancient theories illustrate and assist each other? It is at any rate with this idea of mutual illumination between the two that I propose to make a few remarks.

We all know that the young of all animals act in a way which suggests that their psychical selves, their memory and experience, are in some way continuous with those of their ancestors. Young partridges, or the chicks of the barn-door fowl, only a day old, at sight of any large bird in the air, will instantly and instinctively crouch and flatten themselves on the ground. Their alarm, increased by the warning call of the mother, causes them to seek refuge under her wings. What definite form the sense of danger takes in the young chick's mind it is of course hard to say. But there it seems to be—the memory of a thousand and a hundred thousand occasions in the history of the chick's ancestors, when the dreaded claws and beak came from the sky and snatched or nearly snatched the cowering prey. So clear and oft-repeated has the association become, that now the vision of a bird above governs, so to speak, a whole plexus of nerves, not only in the chick, but even in the adult partridge or fowl, and sets in movement almost automatically a whole apparatus of muscles of defence or flight. The certainty and instantaneousness with which this happens is something astonishing. Personally I am never tired of watching my barn-door fowls on the occasions when the sweep comes to clean the chimney. On the moment when the brush emerges from the top of the chimney—whatever the fowls are doing, whether they are feeding or basking or foraging in far grounds—in that instant with shrieks and screams they rush in every direction seeking for cover, convinced that an awful enemy has appeared on the roof! A cap thrown high in the air has the same effect. It is not that a cap in form or movement is so very like a bird (in fact some of my fowls must know well enough in their hearts exactly what my cap really is), but that it wakes the memory of the bird of prey. The fowls do not really see



the cap or the chimney-sweep's brush, but they see the vision of the Ideal Hawk—*which is far stronger and more deeply imbedded in their very physiology* than any momentary or mundane object can be, and has a far more powerful influence on them.

All this is quite like the Platonic reminiscence. We do not really see the rather commonplace features which pass in the street, but we see some celestial vision or form (in the race-consciousness) of which they indeed remind us. And it is this vision, belonging to another order of existence, which agitates and transports us, not the mere mundane object seen with the ordinary eye.

But to attack the subject a little more in detail, let us take an important and definite instance. There is no class of mental impressions much more powerful and persistent through all time than those connected with the relation of the sexes. For ages, thousands of centuries, the Male has sought the Female, the Female has sought the Male. Take any individual man or woman now. Probably in his or her brain, in some nerve-plexus, an image of one of the other sex, wife or husband, loved or lover, presides. This image stands, like a god or goddess in a Temple, in one of the most important centres of the organic life; it rules the activities of love, and the emotions, thoughts, domestic habits, and other energies which more or less remotely group themselves round love. All these activities are referred to it. It does not necessarily follow that the same image presides during the individual's whole lifetime. Probably there is more or less of a succession; probably, too, there is a certain degree of similarity in the successive figures which thus come into the place of honour one after the other, and probably a certain amount of blending between them. But (and this is the important point) the same process has been taking place in the ancestors. Going back through the long succession, it is clear that countless images have been imprinted (each with great intensity in its time) and superimposed upon one another. As before, in the case of the

individual, so here in the case of the long succession of individuals who form a line of ancestry, we may expect a degree of similarity in these images ; we may expect a blending with each other ; and, as result, the formation of a great composite form or symbol, which, slowly modifying, will be inherited by each descendant, and which will lie there, perhaps for a long time, slumbering and unbeknown to the individual, in the centre of a most important plexus, at the very root and base of some of his most far-reaching activities.

This composite, like a composite photograph of many faces upon the same plate, does not show individual details and variations, except by implication, but rather the large outlines and features of the group which it represents. In the hundreds and thousands of images which go to form it, defects, disproportions, inharmonious details, will cancel each other out, leaving a total which will have the large outline of the race, balanced, averaged, proportioned, *idealised* (just as is the case with a composite photograph)—yet variant according to ancestry, in lines, families, branches. No two contemporaneous individuals obviously will inherit exactly the same ideals ; yet, according to their consanguinity in family, tribe, or race, may a degree of similarity in this respect be expected to obtain.

This great composite, I say, this total and compacted result and symbol of ages of human love-experience, with the immense emotions, the immense potencies, it holds stored within it, lies in hieroglyphic slumber in the brain of the youth or girl—as, indeed, so much of all that is greatest and deepest and most powerful in all of us, young or old, lies sleeping—waiting for its awakening. Then comes the hour when a chance face, a chance figure, seen perhaps in the most banal surroundings, give the cue. There is a memory, a confused reminiscence. The figure from without penetrates to its related figure within ; and there rises into consciousness a shining Form, glorious, not belonging to this world, but vibrating with the age-long life of humanity, and the memory



of a thousand love-dramas. The waking of this Vision intoxicates the man ; it glows and burns within him ; a goddess (it may be Venus herself) stands in the sacred place of his Temple ; a sense of awe-struck splendour fills him ; and the world is changed.<sup>1</sup>

“ He whose initiation is recent,” says Plato, “ and who has been spectator of many glories in the other world, is amazed when he sees anyone having a god-like face or form, which is the expression of Divine Beauty ; and at first a shudder runs through him, and again the old awe steals over him ; then, looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god, he reverences him, and if he were not afraid of being thought a downright madman, he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god.” And Lafcadio Hearn, who in his *Kokoro*, and in his *Exotics and Retrospectives*, has written much that is suggestive on this point, says this visionary figure is “ a composite of numberless race-memories, . . . a beautiful luminous ghost made of centillions of memories ” ; but he adds, somewhat in the spirit of Thomas Hardy, “ you will now remember the beloved seemed lovelier than mortal woman could be.”

In truth, as we have said before, the mortal object which wakes the Ideal in our minds, and the Ideal itself, though occasionally confused, are on the whole clearly distinct and separable in thought from each other. *They are perceived by separate faculties.* The object, so far as it is a mortal object, is perceived by the senses, by sight and touch and hearing ; but not so the inner Vision. Plato says that this state of mind in which Divine Beauty is seen (and which is associated with all real love) is a ‘ Mania,’ and that only in this condition of ‘ Mania’ can the heavenly facts be perceived or remembered. What he seems to indicate by this—and what we, in modern speech, should probably say—is that it is another

<sup>1</sup> The *degree* in which this Form comes into clear vision depends, of course, on the capacity of the individual for entering into a higher order of consciousness. In many cases the distinct vision is never realised, though its presence is indicated by the agitation and excitement, and by the halo which it throws round the mortal creature who evokes it.

*state of consciousness* which is concerned: that is, that while the objects of the outer world are perceived by us through the senses, co-ordinated under the conditions of the ordinary consciousness, these ancient (race) memories, and the feelings and visions which come with them, belong to another order of consciousness. Indeed, it almost seems obvious that it must be so. If the existence of race-memories, and of feelings and visions accompanying them, is allowed at all, it would seem that these things must belong in some degree to the consciousness of the race, to a less individual and local consciousness than the ordinary one. The terms 'mania,' then, or 'ecstasy,' which would indicate the passing out from the ordinary consciousness (into the racial or celestial, according as we adopt the modern or Platonic view), would seem quite appropriate.

There is one other point just here. I say the outer object and the Ideal Memory which it wakes in the mind, though separable in thought, are for a time confused with one another. The splendours of the Ideal are showered upon and invest the object. Yet dimly the mind feels that it *is* remembering something, and wonders to what previous experience the object is akin. Is this the explanation of that curious sense of familiarity at first sight, which is so often excited by the idealisation of another person? A memory is indeed awakened, and of a figure most intimate to oneself—slumbering deep in the recesses of one's mind.

To pass to other ideals. Love and War since primitive times have been among the most important activities of the human race. And as Love creates its ideal or composite forms in the consciousness of mankind, so we should expect War to. Among early and warlike races, probably far the greatest part of the activity of the male portion of the race, and of the love-longing of the female portion, has clustered round the figure of the mighty warrior. The man who towers head and shoulders above his fellows, who is a terror to his enemies and a fortress of strength to his friends, necessarily occupies a



commanding position in the minds of those around him, be they friends or foes—especially in the minds of the youth. His image is the object of their admiration and emulation, it is associated with the most thrilling exploits, it is the symbol of all they would desire to be, in themselves or their children. Every young man has had two or three such figures stamped on his brain. But in the race this grows to an immense Composite. Thousands of such images are in the memory of one ancestral line; and the youth who comes at the end of that line not only has the figure of a mortal (and perhaps in some respects very prosaic) Hero before his *bodily* eyes, but deep in the background of his consciousness is that other Figure which has come steadily accreting, enlarging and shaping itself through the centuries. And this figure, just because it is a composite, bears the grandest outlines. For while each mortal hero may be defective enough in one way or another, and one may be over lanky and tall and another short and fat, and one may squint and another have a club-foot, and one may excel by sheer weight and brute force and another by quickness and subtlety—yet in the total result these defects or excesses obliterate each other and are balanced; and there emerges a Form, harmonious, grand, and not far from perfect, as the warrior-ideal of the race—the result of the selection and chiselling, so to speak, of thousands of minds through the centuries. There in its appropriate nerve-plexus or brain-centre of the human body this image (or whatever represents it) dwells, bearing with it the blended memory of countless heroic actions, feats of bravery, struggles, defeats, triumphs, and governing in the individual man the vast congregation of powers and activities with which it is concerned. No wonder that when the sight of a living warrior wakes this slumbering centre within the youth, devotion and emulation, excitement and the ardour of heroic deeds, for him can know no bounds.

Hero-worship is not confined to that of the Warrior, though this is probably its earliest form. Worship of the

Athlete, the Saint, the King, come under the same head. In modern Europe, as in ancient Greece, the Athlete excites the mad enthusiasm of crowds. In India, as in mediæval Europe, romance and idealism gather at least as strongly round the Saint. These are matters of race and temperament. Everywhere, with the exception of a few peoples who have advanced beyond this stage, the King is granted divine honours. No one can witness the excitement produced by Royalty without perceiving that it is an instinct, like that of bees for their queen—that is, a *race-consciousness* or sentiment. The glamour is that of an Idea, an Ideal King, a figure composite in the memory of the race, and the centre of its age-long hopes and fears and growth and struggle and conquest, and the glamour is readily and easily transferred to the living and actual representative, however unworthy he may be. Almost everyone recognises that it is so. The word ‘King’ spoken to an Englishman wakens in his conscious mind a conjoint image of a succession of sovereigns from Alfred, say, to Edward VII.; but to his *subconscious self* it means far, far more than that. It means an epitome of the devotion, the fear, the awe, the confidence which every one of his ancestors felt towards the ruler of his day, and that not only as far back as Alfred, but into the almost unending past when the relation of every man to his chieftain was far closer than now—all this mighty mass of feeling concentrated in one great Vision of Kinghood, one instinct of devoted service. It is obvious that this mass of feeling being still there, and still centred and co-ordinated in that particular way, it must pour itself out at some time, and the particular Royalty of the day is only the excuse, as it were, for such outpouring.

But from this perception of a glow or halo round the figure of a king to his transformation into a god is but a short step. The actual mortal sovereign is identified with the immortal, ever-abiding race-memory, and the idealised figure of kinghood which dwells there. Everywhere we see this taking place. The Egyptian Pharaohs were exalted into



gods. To the Roman Cæsars temples were built and divine honours paid. The Aztec and Peruvian emperors the same. Even to-day, for the Russian peasant or the tribesman of Morocco, the glamour of absolute deity surrounds the Tsar or the Sultan.

And so of other gods and divinities. The Warrior-ideal or the Athlete-ideal, vibrating in the memory of the race, may easily become associated with actual men—say with a real Ares or a real Herakles. The names and figures, then, of these men, would become for after generations the symbols of the corresponding enthusiasms, and to them would be ascribed many exploits not only of their own, but of other heroes before and after.

This myth-making tendency of races, and the unconscious clustering of incidents and anecdotes from various sources round one or more definite figures, is of course well recognised, and explains how it is these legends often seem to contain so deep a sentiment and meaning. It is that they are the selection and affectionate preservation from the memorial life of the race of events and stories which illustrate and symbolise some deep instinct and enthusiasm of the race; such stories being gradually and unconsciously modified into more and more of expressiveness as time goes on. In this way many great epic poems, legends, myths, and traditions of the gods have been built up. And such things have inevitably a profound sentiment in them. They are wiser than any one man could make them—for they represent the feelings, the enthusiasms, the wonderments, the humour, the wit, the activities to which the race has responded for generations. If such legends and stories were merely *mental* ideals, if they were such handy little allegories and generalisations as any philosopher or literary person might make in his study, they would be very cheap and paltry affairs. The whole point of the argument will be missed unless it is seen that the ideals and enthusiasms which produce myths and legends and gods lie deep down in the very structure and

physical organisation of humanity, that they are things of age-long life and importance, principalities and powers (if we may so call them) which, in the form of these legends and figures, are slowly rising into recognition, but of which we can never become directly conscious except by means of another order of consciousness than that with which we are usually concerned.

It will perhaps be said that though this way of looking at the matter may account for those gods which are idealisations of human types, it does not explain why the mere things of Nature, like the Moon and the Sun, or the Darkness and the Dawn, should be personified. But the least thought shows that the anthropomorphic tendency is in some degree inevitable in us. The Moon and the Sun are to us what they are, only because they have appeared in human consciousness. Consider for a moment the latter. How many millions of times has the great Sun risen on our primitive ancestors after the dark and perilous night, with unspeakable sense of joy, relief, comfort? How continually has this sense grown, with reverberant intensity, in the successive generations?—till at last, in some more than usually subtle or sensitive soul, it has broken into a strange consciousness of a Presence—the *presence*, in fact, within that soul, *of the myriad life and emotion of those that have gone before*. The rising orb, the growing glory of the sky, have wakened a multitudinous memory—the memory and consciousness of mankind itself in its most adventurous and buoyant mood; and to this child of man, this primitive poet, the Sun has indeed appeared as not only a circle of light in the sky, but the symbol and reminiscent vision of a majestic and celestial being, going forth to his daily conquest of the world, hero of a thousand battles, and with the magic upon him of a life immortal.

Or similarly, how often has Night descended, with a mystic sense of human terror, doubt, and awe, a million times distilled and concentrated? Or seriously, can even we moderns, in tall



hat and patent leather boots, regard the young Moon in the clear sky of evening without a most foolish yet poignant tenderness and romance, and a sense as if within us and through our eyes sheer myriads of other eyes were watching her ?

In all these cases there is a personification truly ; but it is because what we are really coming into touch with is not the so-called Moon or Sun, or Darkness or Dawn, so much as the great sub-conscious mind of the race under its different aspects. It is in this immense world which comes down to us from the far past—that city of a thousand gates of which we *as* individuals are but the portals—that we must look for the gods, and for all the evidences of a life which, though greater than that we commonly call our own, belongs to us and is indeed ours.

And here there are a few points which must be briefly touched on. In the first place, all those deities I have mentioned—the gods and goddesses of Day and Night, the gods of War and of Love, the Hero-god or Saviour, the King-god or Lord of Heaven, and many more—represent very distinct centres and co-ordinations of feelings and activities in the race ; but they also represent very distinct centres of organic life in each human body, which is indeed an epitome of the race ; they represent such physiological centres as those of Love, Pugnacity, Sympathy, Sleep, and so forth. The gods in fact may be said not only to be aspects of the life of the race, but to dwell (or to be represented) in the organic nuclei and plexuses of the body, and to be the centres of command and service there. And that is perhaps why they are so distinct among themselves and have such definite outlines and functions, and why their temples and services exist so distinct and separate from each other. For the images of the gods dwell in the temples of a land, and are the objects of service and the centres of command there, just in the same way as the gods themselves dwell in the centres and sacred places of the body. The one thing is the symbol of the other ;

and it is the instinct of primitive humanity to express itself in this symbolic way.

In the second place, if in the race-memory, and therefore potentially in each of us, there dwell these sublime Forms and Images, they are, from the nature of the case, things that can only be beheld with distinctness by that other order of consciousness which belongs to the race, and into which we pass only in moments of exaltation. They cannot be directly seen (though they may be vaguely felt) by the ordinary consciousness, nor very well described in its terms. They are therefore only seen and seized in their fulness by the few, or if by the many, only in rare moments. For ordinary consumption, so to speak, they must be represented in the forms of the ordinary consciousness. And so it becomes the function of the inspired prophets, poets, artists to give these a definite form and name—as Moses did, who bodied forth Jehovah for the Jews, or as Pheidias the sculptor is said to have finally fixed and shapen the ideal of Athené for the Athenians. The many, when they see these forms bodied forth by the great seers, leap to them and accept them, feeling distinctly enough that they answer to something which is slumbering within them—though they cannot quite seize the latter directly. The actual figures and images of the gods, in fact, accepted and adopted by the various races, are not themselves realities, but are representatives (adapted to the ordinary consciousness) of real powers working in the race and profoundly moving and inspiring it.

In the third place, these real Powers and Forms (who dwell in our nerve-centres as the image-gods dwell in the temples) are themselves of course always growing—that is to say, that as the race grows and branches, *their* forms also modify and change—slowly, indeed, through centuries, but steadily. But as the *images*—the once-inspired forms which were embodied in stone or paintings, or in holy books and ceremonials—as these do not change, so in time *they* cease to correspond to the realities, they cease to be inspired or to waken inspiration, and become dry and dead conventions. On this subject, however,



of conventions as affecting the gods I will say no more here. It leads to the consideration of the change in religious forms and divinities which takes place as time and history go on, and the eternal conflict between letter and spirit.

Returning now to the general line of thought, I would say a few words on the subject of Christianity. In speaking of the genesis of the deities hitherto, I have dwelt more especially on the pagan gods of Greece and Rome. The appearance of Christianity on the scene marked a new growth—not exactly a new growth in the history of the world, because something much (though not quite) the same had appeared long before in India and Egypt—but new in the West. There was growing, in the races which gathered round Imperial Rome, a sense—partly due, perhaps, to reaction from the life of the day—a sense of the presence of death, a longing for some other life, a belief in the power of gentleness, meekness, chastity—things which had been comparatively little considered by the preceding Nature-religions. It surely might almost be said that a new centre of organic life was forming—a new plexus among the nerves of humanity. No one can visit India without being struck by what seems a *physiological* difference between the average Hindu and the average Westerner—the passivity of the former, the mildness, the meekness, the meditative transcendental temper, the sense of another world, the little fear of death. His organism seems to be differently keyed from ours; so that while the Anglo-Saxon masses are shouting themselves hoarse over a football hero or other athlete, the Hindu peasant is paying his profoundest adoration to an emaciate saint. That is to say, there seems to be some organic centre in each race so much more developed than in the other that it may be woken to delirium or frenzy or ecstasy by a spectacle which leaves the other unmoved.

I say some such changes in the organic constitution of humanity were taking place in the Roman Empire, and that quite independently of the little band of propagandists who

called themselves Christians. Under Marcus Aurelius a wider sense of *humanity* was growing up. Hospitals, orphan schools, hospitals for animals even, began to be founded. Oriental ideas and religions and (perhaps more important still) Oriental blood and heredity began to circulate. A new type of human being demanded new gods; and men and women whose hearts began to respond to the power of gentleness, the pity of Life, the presence of Death, who, as slaves or the descendants of slaves, knew well what it was to be despised and rejected, began to see a glamour in figures of a different complexion from those which had dominated their predecessors. Thus at length the personality and life of Jesus of Nazareth, or, at least, the picture of it drawn by Paul and the Evangelists, especially John, gave form and outline to this new ideal, and it took the shape of the gentle, loving, and crucified Christ, the God that above all has dominated the Christian centuries. Not that this ideal was (as I have said) absolutely new; for the glamour of it, or of something very similar (allowing for difference of race and longitude), had been embodied six centuries before in the figure of the divine Buddha, and doubtless for centuries in the human race these feelings had been registered in race-memory and had struggled for expression; but new as a recognised ideal this undoubtedly was in the history of the Western World.

And (what I wish to enforce) this figure of Christ—written about, pictured in canvas or in stone, or in words of living eloquence, through all these later centuries—has served to waken in the human mind the consciousness of a very real Presence: a Presence, at least, as real as that indicated by Apollo or Athené to a Homeric Greek: a definite individualised Power which has established itself living and moving in the Western races, and therefore also in each man or woman of these races. In this particular case we have the advantage of being able to analyse an actual and still operative conception of a god; and I take it that the intense reality which this figure carries with it to many people means a great deal. It means that the figure not merely represents a mental ideal of



desirable qualities, or the remembrance of a certain beneficent man who once lived, but that it represents a living focus of life in the European peoples of the last two thousand years, and the accumulated race-memories of a far longer period than that. And I take it that the inward Vision of this living power and presence has in some degree come to most people who have been Christians in anything more than name; while to some people it has come with such force and intensity that they have been persuaded that they beheld the veritable Christ himself surrounded with glory (*i.e.* seen in the luminous field of a superior consciousness). At any rate, to deny or utterly discredit all the stories of the Saints, from St Paul, who saw a great light and heard a voice, onward through endless cases to modern times, would be, as I have already suggested, a parochial and purblind view to take.

In the same way I think it seems very unscientific to regard the common stories of 'conversion' as mere fancies or fabrications. It is pretty clear that they represent a reality, a very real experience, to those concerned; and though the 'conversions' may not be as luminous or profound as that of St Paul, it seems to me that they are things of the same kind—cases, namely, in which, after long and silent preparation, new centres of life are suddenly disclosed within folk, accompanied by more or less of excitement, vision, and a complete change of outlook on the world. And the stories, often fantastical enough, which accompany such conversions, must be looked on simply as the lame effort of uncultured minds to picture and interpret the cosmic facts experienced. (See two interesting chapters on "Conversion" in Professor William James's book on *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, in which he calls conversion a shifting of centres of consciousness, and compares it to the changes of equilibrium in a polyhedron, resting on one facet after another.)

On the other hand, if we regard the Vision of Christ—as it comes to many people even nowadays—as indicating a real power and presence living and working within them; so we must

of course regard the Vision of Athené or Apollo or of any other god that came to men and women of old, as indicating a very real and living power within *them*. These are names which humanity through the ages has given to its own powers and faculties ; and every individual, as far as he has truly revered and identified himself with the God that moved within him, has so far identified himself with the life of humanity.

If we were to go to India, we should find this appearance and presence of the gods everywhere acknowledged and believed in. The vision of Siva, or Vishnu, or Brahma, or of Kali, or Krishna, or of one of the many popular saints who having once been men are now become divinities, is common enough. I may give one instance, which will help to remove the matter from the region of mere vulgar fantasy and superstition. Among the Gñānis and Teachers (*gurus*) who carry on the tradition of the ancient wisdom-religion from very remote times, and some of whom are among the most emancipated, keen-minded, and inspired of human beings, it is said that a pupil (*chela*), after all instruction by the *Guru*, may spend a long time before his initiation is quite complete ; then, in the ripeness of time and of his growth, one day (or night) the God (*Siva*), awful and glorious in light, will appear to him, *clothed in the form of his Guru* ; and the *chela*, overcome with amazement and emotion, will leap up, and seeking out his Teacher, will throw himself, in a flood of tears and of gratitude, at his feet. After which his initiation is fulfilled, and he is received into the long line of those who are followers of the god.

Cases of this kind I have personally heard of (the reader also will remember the quotation from Dr Bucke on an earlier page). And there is no reason, I think, to doubt that the above is at least a fair account of what usually happens in the Indian initiations. If so, it illustrates remarkably what has been said all through—namely, that when the Vision in the supernal consciousness, with its accompanying blaze of splendour, takes place, it clothes itself generally in the shape of some figure



which is known to the ordinary consciousness, and which is, as it were, the best representation it can get for the purposes of the latter consciousness.

Looking back, then, at what has been said, we see the gods arising as humanity's direct consciousness through the ages of its own life and faculties (called into play, no doubt, through contact with Nature). The life and memory of the human race, or (from another point of view) the vast accumulations of experience in the slowly-evolved nervous organism of mankind, form the Olympus whereon the gods dwell. The general human body and mind, through the ages, are the field of a consciousness which trembles into light at times on every child of man, and to which all, along their different lines, have some access. Each unit mind is an offshoot of the racial mind; each unit body an offshoot of the racial body; and as far as, for each individual, his mind and body register the memory of the race, they form a gate of entry to this other world.

In this view Plato's heaven of eternal Forms might be compared to the racial memory which each individual inherits. In the latter, Forms are seen in the inner light which to the momentary apprehension *seem* eternal—immense composite figures and centres of life and activity, mountainous in grandeur (which yet, like the mountains, may be really in slow flux and change); great gods of life and death, of justice and pity and heroism and beauty—the outcome and epitome of ages and ages of human experience, and having immense weight and majesty, even though not identically the same for all races and peoples.

Well might Plato say that every soul born into the world has had a glimpse of eternal verities. From the modern scientific standpoint, the Soul bears with it a dim memory of vast race-experience, which at any moment may be wakened into illumination. Trailing clouds of glory does it come. And though these Forms are not absolute, still grand is the destiny which gives to each individual the power to behold these, to share their life, and perchance to add a chisel-touch to their outlines.

EDWARD CARPENTER.

HOLMESFIELD, SHEFFIELD.

# THE EVIDENCE OF DESIGN IN THE ELEMENTS AND STRUCTURE OF THE COSMOS.

WM. PEPPERRELL MONTAGUE, PH.D.,

Lecturer in Philosophy in Columbia University, New York.

THE value to be attached to the "argument from design" depends very considerably upon the way in which the Deity is conceived. Our inquiry, therefore, may properly begin with an attempt to make clear the sense in which we shall use the term God.

I. There are two kinds of things that command the respect and attention of the mind, and that move it to action; first, particular facts of sense-perception, things that actually exist; second, ideals of reason, things that ought to exist. The mind, through its Understanding or interest in nature, seeks to comprehend the first kind of objects, while through its Reason it seeks equally a knowledge of the second kind. The one faculty concerns itself with the world of facts, the "natural order" of events in space and time; the other is addressed to the realm of meanings and values, whose logical and ethical relations constitute the "ideal order." The natural order expresses ideals, but it expresses them imperfectly, because in a distorted relation to one another. It is the business of a person, as a member of both these orders, to effect a more perfect harmony between them. He does this by abstracting from his passive or sensuous nature the ideals that are there both concealed and revealed, only to



re-embody them later in their corrected order, in his active nature or character. To bring about this interpenetration of the two orders, the person must have some knowledge of each. In order to comprehend the realm of norms or values, we form the conception of an absolute norm, a supreme or perfect ideal, by comparison with which the worth of each particular ideal may be estimated. In the same way we seek to make nature intelligible by comprehending her lesser unities in the light of unities that are broader and deeper; nor can the process of explanation become complete until all facts and forces are viewed in the light of their dependence upon a supremely real first cause. An absolutely ideal perfection, and an absolutely real power or world-ground, are thus the two conceptions which Reason and Understanding place at the summits of their respective systems of truth. Now the same tendency which leads the person to explain the objective aspects of experience by these abstract conceptions tempts him to explain his own subjective nature by a third conception, the conception, namely, of a single being uniting in his supreme personality the perfection of the ideal and the power of the real. Is the highest ideal perfection one with the deepest physical reality? Is the *ens realissimum* also the world-ground? Do the "ought" and the "is" coincide at the heart of things, despite their divergence in the world? Religious faith answers in the affirmative, and the being in whom the infinite power and the infinite perfection are believed to be perfectly united it calls God. The conception of God is thus the conception of a being whose essence and existence are infinite and identical; a being absolutely infinite, or one than whom no greater could be conceived.

II. It follows from the dual infinity of God's nature that there are two lines along which we may argue for God's existence. We may, first, consider the ideal of perfection in the abstract, and endeavour to show that what we call actuality or existence is involved in it. This argument, from the essence or ideal possibility of God to his existence as the ground of

the natural order, is the ontological proof. Whether it be accepted or rejected depends upon whether we incline to a Leibnitzian or a Kantian interpretation of existence. For Leibnitz a possibility became a reality, not indeed by being consistent with itself or with a finite number of other possibilities merely, but by being "compossible," that is, compatible or consistent with the absolute meaning or infinite totality of possibilities. God, conceived as the ideally perfect being or *ens realissimum*, embodies all positive possibilities; hence there is nothing conceivable that could be incompatible with his essence, and so prevent his existence. Kant, on the other hand, regarded existence as an unknowable something transcending even the totality of possible thoughts, and hence of course not to be derived from that totality.

The second of the traditional proofs is in a manner the converse of the first. Instead of deriving the existence of God from his ideal possibility, the cosmological argument proceeds from the existence of an infinite world-ground or first cause to infer its ideal perfection. Here the issue turns, not upon the conception of existence, but upon the concept of perfection. If we think of consciousness as a correlate of self-determination, and of a spiritually perfect consciousness as the correlate of self-determination complete (all that is unconscious or imperfect being ascribable to absence or limitation of activity), then the cosmological argument will be valid. For the world-ground as physically infinite could not be limited by anything except itself, and the essence or perfection of God would thus follow from his existence.

These metaphysical proofs of God do not satisfy us even when we accept them. The mind craves premises that are more concrete than the *a priori* conceptions of either an *ens realissimum* or an infinite and self-sufficient world-ground. And so we find that both the ontological and the cosmological arguments are supplemented by inductive proofs which embody the principles of their deductive prototypes, but which start from experience. The inductive version of the ontological



argument is based upon inner experience. There is a voice in each of us that bids us regard the spiritual side of things as not only higher, but, in some mysterious ultimate sense, as more real than the material. We *feel* that, at the heart of things, spiritual truth must be perfectly actualised in a divinity. This argument was most clearly stated by Kant, who (though rejecting the ontological argument) claimed that the dignity and efficacy, in the natural order, of the idea of duty was the most certain and fundamental fact of our experience; and that we therefore had a right to believe in the reality of the spiritual kingdom which was implied, even though our understanding should be forever unable to connect that reality with objective nature. This which Kant called the ethico-theological, or, more simply, the moral argument, is probably the most directly consoling of all the theistic proofs. It is not, however, so easy to formulate as the inductive supplement to the cosmological argument, known as the argument from design. While the moral argument proceeds from the partial or dynamic reality of the ideal in our own life, to infer its complete reality in the life of God, the design argument, on the other hand, proceeds from the partial ideality or purposiveness in nature to infer the complete ideality of nature's cause.

III. Nature is wide, and if we are to examine it for evidence of a creator, we should have some notion of what sort of evidence to look for and of where to look for it. Supposing, then, that there were a God, in what ways, if in any, should we expect his creation to testify to his existence? According to our conception of God as the world-ground, we should expect to find, first, some evidence of the *origin* of natural objects from a single source. And we should expect to find the evidence stronger in the simpler and more elemental objects than in those which were composed of them. Again, if we believe God to be the entire ground of the world, we cannot believe him to have created it from anything outside of himself; both the matter and the pattern of creation must have issued from

the creator, hence we should expect to find the elements of the world giving evidence not only of an origin, but of the divine nature of that origin. But now, inasmuch as God is conceived as everywhere present, there could exist no place outside of himself in which he could put the world after he created it, hence the world must be conceived as in God as well as originating from God. There is no contradiction in this notion of creation from and within a creator. Indeed, our own minds furnish us with a perfect analogy.

Our actions and our reasonings are partly our creatures. We are the matter from which our deeds are made; we are the place in which they are; they spring from us and have their being within us. As material cause of his creation, the creator is the place in which it is as well as the source from which it springs. There is nothing other than God that could encompass God's creation. Yet when (with St Paul and Spinoza) we speak of God as the enfolding whole in which his creatures live and move, we must guard against a misinterpretation.

Every *finite* whole is an aggregate of its parts, composed of them, dependent on them, secondary to them. An infinite whole, on the other hand, is precisely that which is not dependent on its "parts," but they on it. It is one, single and individual. The contradictions and paradoxes associated with infinite space and time all spring from the absurd assumption that these things are compounds of that which is in them. A person may make himself quite giddy with trying to define the infinitely high order of infinity which would describe the number of points in a line of only one inch, and it shall not avail him a whit, for you can immediately show exactly as many points in a line of half an inch by establishing a one to one correspondence between the two. It is useless to attempt to escape by saying that space is unknowable, while it is one degree worse than useless to say that it is subjective, for space is space whether subjective or objective or in any other relation. When we say that evil is an illusion,



we have but doubled our difficulties, for we have to explain why there should be an illusion, as well as why the illusion should be an evil one. So when we say that space is subjective, we have to explain why it should be subjective, and second, why it should be infinite, that is, not describable in terms of what it contains. But if we reflect a moment, we can see not only the negative and baffling side of the infinite, but its true and positive meaning. The parts of space not only cannot constitute the whole, but they cannot themselves be constituted without it. A point could not be unless it were somewhere; a moment could not be except at some time. Space and time are thus as infinite wholes presupposed by the existence of their points and moments.<sup>1</sup> But because the infinite whole is not expressible in terms of what it is not, we must not fall into the error of thinking it either unintelligible or subjective; an infinite being would have no difficulty in comprehending itself. If this be doubted, let the reader consult his own consciousness as to whether any number of its thoughts could either exhaust its capacity, or exist anywhere but in it. But if consciousness with its infinite *room* for thoughts and deeds is not intelligible, there is nothing which is.<sup>2</sup>

Now our thoughts and deeds, in so far as they are reproductions of the self, within the self, express in their forms and relations the nature of the self. And as the creation cannot

<sup>1</sup> For enlightenment on this point the writer is indebted to the article by Professor Royce in the first number of the *Hibbert Journal*; and also to M. Jean Jaurès' recent work, *De la Réalité du Monde Sensible* (Alcan, Paris), pp. 350-360.

<sup>2</sup> We are to our acts and thoughts somewhat as God is to us. If the reader be a transcendentalist, I beg that he imagine himself in the following position: Suppose one of his own thoughts to have a little consciousness of its own, and suppose that thought to address him as follows: "O thou whom a 'plain thought' would call my creator and my thinker, my universe and my place, I find myself unable to measure or to exhaust in any degree thy capacity for a tri-dimensional order; I can comprehend it neither in terms of my own being nor in that of my fellows, however infinitely numerous. I am therefore compelled to regard thy capacity (and thyself in that capacity) as an unreality, a subjective illusion of my own and of my brothers." May the crude realist be allowed to wonder as to the feelings of a transcendentalist if he were thus addressed by a fellow transcendentalist in the person of one of his own thoughts?

have its *being* or existence outside of the creator, it follows that a creator must express his *meaning* and essence in his creation. God is formally or immanently present in creation just because creation is materially present in God. We should then expect to find a creation exhibiting, in its relations or "structure," the presence and the nature of its creator. And just as a person's actions may give a very poor indication of his character if taken piecemeal, apart from their total context, so we might expect to find less evidence of God's immanence in the smaller portions of the cosmos than in the larger. We have seen then that a creation would give evidence of its origin from and presence in a creator, as its material cause, by the character of its elements; that, secondly, it would give evidence of the immanent presence of the creator in it, as its formal cause or meaning, by the relations or structure of its elements.

There is a third way in which a creation could testify to its creator, namely, in its trend or evolution. Creation is self-repetition; it follows that the first and central creature in a creation must be the creator himself. Every other creature would indeed be by definition a repetition or expression of the creator, but not as he was in himself, rather as he is in relation to the first member of his creation. In the nature of things there could be but one created being that could depict the creator exactly as he was; all others would depict him in a quite different and wholly *secondary* manner. Here again we have the analogy of the self. The thought of the self is certainly a thought, one among others. It is just as certainly different in "position" and nature to all other thoughts. It is the first and central thought with reference to which all other thoughts have their place, their order and their meaning. The thought of ourself as it truly is, with all its possibilities, is the final cause of all our thinking. The thought of the self *we have it in us to become* is the guiding, saving thought in the presence of temptation. Whatever development we may achieve by ourselves is due to this one thought of our real,



total, or ideal self. So a creator would always be a first incarnate member of his own creation. He would be present not as an efficient or forcible cause of his creatures' acts, for creatures of a free creator would be free, and would freely win or lose their goal; he would be present rather as a final cause, an example, an opportunity for imitation, never withdrawn, never forfeit.

But with the way in which an incarnate God could reveal himself as the redeeming brother of his creatures, and the final cause of Nature's trend, we are not in the present paper concerned. I have spoken of it only that we might better understand the manner in which creatures who are their own efficient causes could testify (1) in their own natures to the material causality of a transcendent God as their origin and place; and (2) in their relations or structure to the formal causality of God as their immanent meaning.

IV. When we turn outward to Nature herself, to verify the hypothetical conclusions which we have drawn, the outlook appears gloomy. Organic nature, "red with tooth and claw," and the infinitely vaster world of matter and energy, a world at once chaotic and mechanical, unintelligible and unintelligent. Design there is in plenty, but of what a baffling and imperfect kind! The miraculous fertility of disease bacilli, apparently designed for the preservation of a species otherwise weak, in its struggle with higher organisms; the claws of the cat so perfectly designed to hold and tear the mouse; the swiftness of the hare designed for its escape, and the softness of its skin equally designed to make it an easy and satisfactory prey. All this and much more makes us shrink from our task. We are glad for the possibility of the "moral argument," leading us by the kindly inner light to see, though darkly, that ultimately right is might; and even the abstract *a priori* reasoning of the ontological and cosmological proofs seems preferable to the dreary search for God through nature. And yet the four proofs of necessity stand together, and we cannot reject one and keep the others. Moreover, there are two considerations

that may give us courage. We should remind ourselves once more that while God is the material, formal and final cause of the world, he has left it to us to be, after creation, the efficient causes of the world's evolution. The world as we find it is therefore a joint product of creator and creatures, and we should expect it to show in large and obvious measure the sad marks of our handiwork. And secondly, not only is the present world imperfect, but our knowledge of it is also imperfect. From both of these considerations it follows that we can hope at best to find here and there some positive indications of God, and may count ourselves fortunate if we find nothing that would seem absolutely to preclude his presence.

Science has found it convenient in the past to regard bodies as made up of small parts called molecules whose different inter-relations account for the different "physical" states of the body, such as its solidity or fluidity. Furthermore, the striking fact that different substances combine with each other in definite and multiple proportions has been most simply explained by supposing the molecules to be composed of still smaller parts known as atoms. Of course the atoms may be quite finite in size and may even be aggregates of corpuscles still smaller; but if they are thus composite they are compounds of a simpler and very much more stable sort than molecules. Now a most interesting feature of the world as thus interpreted is the presence, in enormous number, and in very widely separated parts of space, of the same kind of atoms. The spectra of the sun and of the most distant stars give as unmistakable evidence of hydrogen as does the spectrum of the hydrogen flame in the laboratory. It is Clerk-Maxwell, I think, who somewhere says that things such as these, atoms of the same substance, and exactly resembling one another, give evidence of being "manufactured articles."

If we should find a very large number of pins or bullets that were as similar as are apparently the different atoms of the same substance, we should not hesitate to regard them as either directly or remotely sprung from one source. And if



the atoms should turn out to be composed of still more ultimate elements, "prime atoms," "electric corpuscles," or what not, there would be still stronger reason to regard those more ultimate elements, which were present everywhere in space, as dependent upon one ground. The logical basis for this postulate of "one ground for similars" is simply this: The ways in which perfectly unconnected things could differ are numberless, while there is only one way in which such things could perfectly resemble one another; hence that an indefinitely great number of things should quite of their own accord *happen* upon precisely the same form, is a probability so unimaginably small as to be negligible. If, on the other hand, those elements were not independently formed, but were co-effects, their similarity would follow as a matter of course.

There is an objection that may meet us at this point. What right, it may be said, have we to extend the principle of "one ground for similars" beyond phenomena, *i.e.* things the like of which we know to have an origin? An axiom that was valid for the relative or finite might be quite invalid for such absolute things as cosmic elements. To this objection I would answer that if we have to reason about the absolute at all (and we have), we should reason according to the only principles we possess, *viz.*, the principles valid in the field of our knowledge. Then if someone asserts that the principles applicable to the absolute are different from those we use, we might perhaps admit (though I should doubt the propriety of doing even this) that while that was indeed possible, it was what Mr Hobhouse would call an "unmotivated possibility," a purely gratuitous assumption.

Atoms are not the only elements which the physicist is accustomed to postulate. The fact that material bodies communicate their vibrations to one another without, as well as with, the mediation of other bodies, makes necessary the assumption of a medium of some sort pervading all space. This medium is known to us simply as a capacity for transmitting light waves; we may call it ether, but it might, so

far as we can see, have no character other than that of simple extended being. The fact, however, that all bodies so far as yet known attract each other in proportion to their masses and inversely as the square of their distance, makes it reasonable to suppose that the medium which is the bearer of light waves is also, perhaps by its condition of chronic strain, responsible for gravity. But irrespective of the possibility of gravity being *due* to the condition of the medium, one thing seems certain, namely, that a body cannot transmit a motion or anything else to another body without transmitting it through the intervening space. [We may follow Newton in feeling quite sure that there are no absurd sub-spatial passages or secret short-cuts (such as the believers in "action at a distance" —whatever that might mean—would seem to suppose) by means of which an influence could, as it were, *jump* from one body to another without passing through the distance which separated them.] From the fact that every particle of matter attracts in every direction, and gives off light in every direction, through an unlimited distance, it follows that *at every point in space*, and not merely the points occupied by matter, there is energy or influence of some sort being given to and being received from every other point. In short, by gravity directly and instantaneously, and by light directly or indirectly, sooner or later each part of the universe is in this physical and dynamical sense perfectly *en rapport* with each and all of the other parts. And between the totality of happenings at any one place in the universe and the totality of happenings in any and in all of the other places there is established a one to one correspondence. Thus there is not a sparrow falls to the ground but what the event is recorded everywhere by a change of condition everywhere. Nor is there a flower in the crannied wall, nor any least part of such flower or of anything else, but whose states, if we knew them, *all in all*, would not represent the states of each and every other thing that is.

But this is not the half; for so far we have been considering



only a cross-section of the world, the world of one moment as it is depicted at each of its points. Now our first and central premise is that each point is acting upon, or transmitting its condition of disturbance and of strain to the points next to it, and through them to every other point; and in so far as each acts upon all, each is acted upon by all. Suppose now energy of any sort, and of a given intensity, to be present at some point in space; that energy will tend to be all dissipated or transmitted to the surrounding points, and the rate at which the energy is dissipated will depend upon the rate, *i.e.* the intensity, of the disturbance exemplifying it.<sup>1</sup> But each of the surrounding points when it receives the energy transmitted to it will in its turn transmit it to the points surrounding it; one of these latter, however, is of course the *original point*, from which we are supposing the energy to start, which thus inevitably receives back some portion, no matter how small, of what it gave. There follows from this recoil or reflection of a part of the energy given to an environment a very remarkable consequence, namely, this: *Whatever has at any time happened at any point of an extended being is happening there still, and will always happen there.*<sup>2</sup>

We are familiar with the idea that the present condition of

<sup>1</sup> As energy flows away fastest from the points at which it is "fastest" or most intense, it follows that more energy flows from points of greater to points of less intensity than from the latter to the former—in short, energy, like water, always seeks a level.

<sup>2</sup> The amount of energy received back by a vibrating corpuscle must bear a fixed proportion to the amount given out; so the amount of its original energy remaining to a particle after a given time would depend upon the number of oscillations that had taken place during that time; thus if  $\frac{1}{m}$  was the fraction of the energy of each oscillation which was given back from the environment, and there were  $n$  oscillations per second, there would remain at the end of  $t$  seconds an oscillation of the original form, but of  $\left(\frac{1}{m}\right)^{nt}$  of the original intensity. The fact that the energy-trace of an event is in most cases quite inappreciable and ineffective in an *inanimate* object should not make us overlook its supreme significance. The astronomer neglects to take account of the change in the motion of a planet, resulting from the readjustment of his telescope, yet the former is a calculable quantity.

the universe is the result of all that has taken place in the past, that causes are perpetuated vicariously in their effects, and that in this general way nothing is ever lost from the universe. But from the conclusion which we have now reached, we see that over and above the "vicarious" preservation of events in the form of other events in other places, there is also a direct and specific preservation of events as they were and in the substances in which they were. Each point of matter or ether thus depicts at every instant not only the rest of the universe but also its own past states. And even this is not all, for the past states of a point depicted in the present were, and hence are, the depictions of the past states of other points. And finally, each being in depicting the universe depicts that which is depicting it, hence each being depicts itself indirectly, in so far as it depicts others. In short, each point, or each element in space and time, is a perfect "microcosm" or *world in little*, a mirror on which is projected and reflected all other points in space and time, and so (indirectly through them) itself, in an infinite number of ways.

Let us bear in mind, however, the fact that no aggregates, but only elements, are truly microcosmic; and that even the elements have a microcosmic nature that is perfect only in a mechanical sense. That is to say, the intensity of any influence upon a microcosm is measured by the proximity of its source rather than by its real importance. Consider, for example, our own consciousness; values there appear quite disproportionately great when they pertain to us and are imminent, while a great good, if it is far in the future, or if it is to come to someone else, appeals to us as pale and insignificant. As in the little range of our appreciable consciousness the senses present us with meanings and values, but in an enormously distorted (because mechanical) perspective, so in the microcosm, the events of the cosmos are indeed completely projected upon it, but not in the cosmic perspective, rather in the absurd mechanical perspective in which influences are important for the reason that they happen



to be near at hand. The evolution of a microcosm would consist in the correction of its mechanical perspective; just as the growth of a consciousness consists in the gradual conquering of the mechanical perspective of the senses and the flesh, and the substitution of the universal perspective of the active reason and spirit, for which the meaning or implication of a thing supplants its mere intensive force, as a measure of its value.

The similarity of the cosmic elements makes it necessary to infer their origin from a single cause. Their self-active and self-depicting nature makes it necessary to believe in a correspondingly self-repeating and self-depicting character in their cause. But what, we may ask (beyond the mere fact of origin), is the nature of the relation in which they stand to the material cause in which (as well as from which) they are?

The relations of the cosmic elements require us to assume their position in a cosmic whole which is not an aggregate but a unity. What we call *particularity* or individuality is only definable by reference of a being to this whole. What makes a thing "this and not that" does not consist wholly in its relations to other particular things, for we always conceive it as retaining its identity though changing its relations and its states. On the other hand, the uniqueness or particularity of a thing cannot be absolute and underived, for in that case we could not see how the thing could have originated or how it could stand in relation to other things. Moreover, if each thing's uniqueness consisted merely in being this and not that, if, in other words, it was a purely negative and undefinable characteristic, it would be the same in all things, and all things would be the same in the very respect in which they were supposed to differ. The only escape is to regard the individuality of a thing as due neither to itself merely, nor to its relation to other things merely, but to its relation to the whole. For the whole is the only generic notion or class of which there can be but a single member; hence

whatever is directly related to the whole will be itself one and induplicable, for no two things could stand in the same relation to the whole.

This state of relationship to the whole is the primary state of a thing, the state which is the subject of which all other states are predicates. It is the thing "in itself," and we refer to its fundamental nature when we say, "A thing must be before it can be related"; "A substance is not constituted by its states"; "The particular cannot be derived from the universal." This relation of a thing to the whole, considered in itself, will be individuality or substance; considered in relation to other things, it will appear as the *absolute position*<sup>1</sup> which each thing (as distinct from all others) has in time and space. But though things are differently related to the same whole, and therefore different, yet as it is the *same* whole to which they are related, their differences will be comparable and continuous. Hence from the fact that things stand related to the same whole and have their individuality determined by that relation, they will stand related to each other and will have their individuality determined by that relation, though always to a degree secondary to that in which it is determined by the whole. Thus is the interaction of all creatures as microcosms in one and the same order of nature made possible by the material causality of a transcendent God, as the macrocosm in whom and from whom they are.

V. Though every being in the natural order differs eternally (though comparably and continuously) from every other, yet the *relationships* between these different beings may themselves be absolutely the same.

The numbers 1, 2 and 3 are different, yet the relation (2-1) is precisely the same as the relation (3-2); or again, 20, 10 and 5 are different, yet  $20 : 10 = 10 : 5$ . The comparability of elements in the *order of nature* makes

<sup>1</sup> Why the order of relations between substances which ultimately can differ only *numerically* should have the form of time and of tri-dimensional space is a problem which we must pass by.



possible the identity of relations in what will prove to be the *order of meanings*. Each relation can be exemplified in more than one place; and at any one place there can be exemplified more than one relation. The relation is the duplicable or universal, just as the thing is the induplicable or particular. But we must notice that every relation is dependent upon terms of some kind, though not of any one kind exclusively. Thus, I cannot express the relation  $\frac{1}{2}$  without the use of particular integers, e.g.  $\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\frac{2}{4}$ , or  $\frac{3}{6}$ . On the other hand, in so far as we confine our description of the relation to any particular set of terms, we fail in so far to express its most typical characteristic, the characteristic in virtue of which it can be exemplified by another set of terms. If the relation  $\frac{1}{2}$  was simply a relation between 1 and 2, and nothing else whatever, it would not be the same as the relation between 2 and 4. Every relation thus has a character which is not expressible by reference to its terms, though that very character will always be correlated with the particular terms related. But what is there besides the particular terms that can give to their relation the element of universality which they cannot give? The answer is, *the whole*, of which the particular terms are members. For the whole is the only other thing besides the particulars, and we have seen that it was necessary to assume the whole in order to explain the existence of the particulars. Correlated with every disposition of particulars relative to one another is a disposition or state of the whole, which is therefore absolute and determinate, though from its very nature capable of multiple exemplification.

Let us now turn for a moment to the concrete world which we experience. We experience *qualities*, simple unanalysable qualities of sense, such as colour, sound, and pain, as well as qualities more complex. We have the best of reasons for thinking that each of these qualitative contents is correlated with a particular modification of our brain. But every modification of a physical thing is its disposition relative to some other physical thing. Every brain state is thus

nothing but a dynamic or spatio-temporal relation of one element in the brain to the elements with which it is in contact. This is the mystery that confronts all who would offer a mechanical explanation of consciousness. Mechanism is nothing but relation between particular elements in space and time; and though the materialist should prove again and again that every conscious state or presented quality depends upon a particular physical relation of motion or strain, his opponent could always reply with perfect assurance that it was not at all, no, not in the least, the molecular vibrations or etheric strains in his brain that he perceived, but something quite incomparably different, viz., red, green, pain, and the like. How reconcile the indubitable parallelism of physical relations and psychical states with their still more indubitable difference of nature? I venture to think that our analysis of the concept of relation makes possible the answer. Every relation depends on its particular terms, and is in so far merely relative to them and hence nothing in itself; it has also, however, a peculiar character of its own that is not explicable by reference to particular terms but only by reference to the whole. It is a state or aspect of the whole as truly as it is a state or aspect of the particular members of the whole. In so far as each conscious individual depicts in its relations or states other individuals it is a microcosm, while the whole in which and by which the individual is, and is in relation to others, is the macrocosm. We define content of consciousness, or presented quality, then, as *the macrocosmic aspect of a microcosmic relationship, as the absolute and universal aspect of every disposition of particulars*. Where two or three are gathered together there will be present to them another. In so far as we are microcosms we depict qualities, or aspects of the whole, in the act of depicting our relations to one another, and in so far as qualities are presented to us, we are conscious.

Qualities are God's aspects, his relations to our relations. Under the form of quality we see God immanent in all things as their meaning. As particular beings we are materially in



God; as universal or conscious beings, God is in us, and in our relations, as formal cause. As the whole has no particular place, being that in and in virtue of which all things have place, qualities or aspects of the whole have not in themselves any one place, though they are always exemplified or presented at some particular place. The placelessness of qualities as such does not, however, mean their lack of relation to one another. But the relations between qualities as qualities does not constitute the order of nature but the order of meanings.<sup>1</sup> In so far as through our substantial relation to God we are related to our fellows as things, we are members of the natural order, while in so far as through these natural relations to our fellows we become again related to God as conscious of him, we are members of the order of meanings; and hence are also again related to our fellows, not as things but as persons. To bring about, by our free will, a harmony of these orders, to incarnate, in the particular life that God gives us through nature, the ideals which he gives us through consciousness, is our reason for being.

WILLIAM PEPPERRELL MONTAGUE.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

<sup>1</sup> Any one quality is by itself a mere fragment of the one and infinite meaning which is God. If we would fulfil the ideal implicit in all consciousness, we should estimate the worth of qualities by their meaning or implication, *i.e.* by their context, and not accept them merely at their *face value*.

## THE NEW POINT OF VIEW IN THEOLOGY.

REV. J. H. BEIBITZ, M.A.,

Vice-Principal, Lichfield Theological College.

IT is sometimes said by way of depreciation of Theology that, unlike other branches of human knowledge, it is essentially unprogressive. To bring such a charge is only to prove one's own hopeless ignorance of the subject. It would be truer to say that no science is more progressive, advancing with more rapid steps to new and higher views of truth, than Theology. For the particular and distinguishing characteristic of this study is that it is the *scientia scientiarum*, not merely in the sense that as the *scientia Dei* it necessarily holds the first place in the hierarchy of the sciences, but that it incorporates into itself, and makes part and parcel of its very being, all the results achieved throughout the whole realm of human knowledge. And in particular, there is no discovery in any of the sciences of Nature which has not some bearing, direct or indirect, on the methods or the results of theological study. And nowhere is this more true than in regard to the fundamental problem of Theology, as it is also the fundamental problem of all human thought—the knowledge, and the possibility of the knowledge, of God.

What are the real grounds of belief in God?

It is here important to realise the distinction between belief and faith. Belief—we have the authority of St James for the statement—may coexist with the entire absence of



faith. And I think a good case might be made out for the converse proposition, that faith may coexist with the absence of, at any rate, conscious belief. For personal adherence to anything that is really good—to a great ideal, to a conviction of human progress, to the possibility of righteousness—is ultimately, whether consciously or unconsciously, faith in God. Belief is a particular attitude of mind; faith is a particular attitude of the whole man—in the Christian sense, his personal allegiance to Jesus Christ. Normally, however, belief may be viewed as the intellectual foundation of faith. Belief apprehends the existence of God as a fact; faith lays hold of Him as a Person. “The faculty by which the soul lays hold of reality, of the reality of realities, the fact behind the shows of life, the substance behind the shadow, is faith.”

Belief in God, then, is important rather as a means to an end, namely, to faith in God.

But the fundamental article of the Christian creed, “I believe in God,” may be approached in various ways. And it is with these different avenues of approach to belief—with a problem that is intellectual rather than moral, or, at any rate, intellectual in the first place—that we are now concerned.

The object of this essay is to consider how far we have moved, at the present day, from the methods and arguments of the older school of apologists. For they founded their conclusion of the existence of God, the most tremendous conclusion to which the human mind is capable of attaining, on those facts of Nature which, in their day, appeared inexplicable by natural causes. It is not too much to say that in each and every such case, the facts, if not actually traced, are at any rate shown to be traceable, to natural causes. For this part of the subject, I would especially refer to the first two lectures in Professor Ward’s brilliant work on *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, and to Professor Romanes’s *Thoughts on Religion*, and, as I shall have in a moment to refer to the scientific doctrine of evolution, perhaps I may mention also Le Conte’s work on *Evolution and Religious Thought*, and introduce the subject

by a quotation of an admirable passage from the late Canon Curteis: "We may, therefore, decline to argue (as is frequently done) that the evolution theory remains at present in a very precarious condition, though the allegation is true (1885). For I hold it unworthy of Christians to show any slight, or seem to record any reluctant acceptance, to the only theory of Creation which has hitherto thrown any light on this mysterious subject. Nor is it sufficient to assert, with the ancient Hebrews, that 'Jehovah spake the word and all things were made.' The question now raised by science is the further question, 'What, precisely, did Jehovah speak? What were the laws which proceeded out of His mouth?' And if it should be ascertained, as it promises to be, that the creative laws, which have produced all this marvellous complexity we find around us, were the same on a vast scale as those which we see with our own eyes at work on the small scale; if it should appear that growths, not startling apparitions, have throughout been God's method; that His laws have been always laws of growth (as we know it in the crystal, the plant, the animal), not of abrupt finality; and that steadfast continuity of plan has characterised creation, not a fitful and feeble caprice; surely all these discoveries come home to us as in the highest sense human, rational, intelligible. The conception of the primal creative 'word' is now expanded into that of a majestic stream of legislation permeating and controlling all things; the creative 'fiat' is rescued from humiliating comparison with a magician's potent spell; and the statement becomes for the first time clear and comprehensible, that 'by the Word,' the Logos or intelligible reason, of God 'all things' in heaven and earth 'were made.'"

These are indeed words of wisdom. And it would be difficult, nay impossible, to express the change which has passed over theology, as a result of recent science, with greater lucidity, or with a more felicitous charm of expression.

But if the great thought which they embody is true—nay, if we are to attach any value to the work of the keenest



intellects incessantly engaged in the study of God's revelation of Himself in Nature—then this necessitates a total abandonment of many of the older arguments which seemed to lead up from the world to the Creator of the world. I refer to those which were based, after all, on the existence of “gaps” in our knowledge of Nature. And one by one these gaps have been filled up, or are being filled up, as one by one the phenomena of Nature are seen to exhibit not “fitful caprice,” no “magician's potent spell,” but the action of constant and uniform laws.

Let us take a few examples of the filling up of these “gaps” on which the older apologetic rested the tremendous conclusion of theistic belief.

(1) The movements of the heavenly bodies were held to show the direct and (to speak popularly) the “miraculous” action of God. But the existence of the heavenly bodies, as we know them, and their movements, are explained on the nebular hypothesis to be due to the action of laws regulating motion and heat which can be experimentally verified in the laboratory.

(2) A great deal was made of the “design” argument—of the nice adjustment of organ to function. Now we believe that, in another form, the design argument is still of very great strength. But in the form which it assumed in the hands of Paley, it can be shown to be, in the light of modern knowledge, untenable. That is to say, it is no longer possible to argue that the eye is a structure ready made for the purpose of seeing—not merely because we can trace the organ of vision from the lowliest beginnings right up to the eye of the eagle and of man, but because every such step may be accounted for on the principle of natural selection, based as that is on (a) the endless variability of individuals and structures, and (b) the inevitable results of the struggle for existence in eliminating unfavourable and preserving favourable variations. I quote here from Romanes: “We have the eye beginning, not as a ready-made structure prepared beforehand for the purpose of

seeing, but as a mere differentiation of the ends of nerves in the skin, probably in the first instance to enable them better to discriminate changes of temperature. Pigment having been laid down in these places to secure this purpose (I use teleological terms for the sake of brevity), the nerve-ending begins to distinguish between light and darkness. The better to secure this further purpose, the simplest conceivable form of lens begins to appear, in the shape of small refractive bodies. Behind these, sensory cells are developed, forming the earliest indication of a retina, presenting a single layer, and so on, step by step, until we reach the eye of an eagle."

(3) A conspicuous "gap" in Nature appears when we compare man with the animals which stand even next below him in the scale. But step by step, again, this gap has been filled up, and the latest word of science on the subject is this: "The differences between man and the greater apes are not so great as those between the man-like apes and the lower monkeys." We need scarcely add that the endless similarities in present structure between man and the anthropoid apes, and the real and manifold, though less striking, points of likeness between man and other animals, only constitute a part of the case for his descent from them. This animal descent is proved by (a) the curious instances of reversion to ape-like structure in individuals, (b) the existence of rudimentary organs, and (c) the facts of embryology. The embryo of each individual passes through most of the stages of the historical evolution from the simple cell—through the various grades of animal life—up to man.

(4) The existence of separate species is, of course, for the evolutionist, the result of the working, through vast periods of time, of the laws which are in actual operation "on the small scale" around us in the world to-day.

(5) A gap which still remains to be filled up is that between dead matter (as we call it) and the same matter become the vehicle of life, between the inorganic and the organic. As a matter of experiment, no scientist has yet produced life from



inorganic materials (*cf.* Sir Oliver Lodge in the October 1902 issue of this Journal). Protoplasm has indeed been analysed and found to consist of various proteids of complex composition, yet—as I once heard a scientific man say—any fool can break up protoplasm into its constituent proteids, but no one has been able to reverse the process. One hypothesis—at present—is that life appears as the result of excessively complex changes in the structure of the molecules of which protoplasm is composed. Anyone may hold the contrary theory—of biogenesis—without contradicting one single ascertained fact of science. But we do well not to build any argument on this latter view—that life can only come from life. For at least the contrary supposition is neither in itself inconceivable, nor is it opposed to the ideas we may form of the general course of the physical development of the cosmos.

What we are anxious to point out is not the truth or otherwise of any scientific hypothesis. Such questions lie outside the range of our subject. The all-important point is this, that we have come to see that a theology which builds a theistic argument on the gaps in our knowledge of Nature, is a radically bad theology. For consider this—which is absolutely independent of the acceptance or rejection of any theory, or, if we will, of all the theories of science. It follows from the method of apologetics which we have been describing, that the more we know of Nature, the less we know of Nature's God. I repeat, "it follows"—it follows by a logical necessity from the hopelessly wrong-headed position that, when we have ascertained the natural cause of a thing, we have thereby removed it from the direct action of God. That is an assumption which has in past times been made alike by theologians and by scientists. On this assumption all past conflicts of theology and science have been based.

The net result of the marvellous advance of the natural sciences has been to lead us to a new, a deeper and higher theism. And the principle which lies at the basis of this new thought of God is simply the denial of the position that God

is not directly concerned with natural causation. In other words, the higher theism consists in the strongest possible assertion of the Divine immanence in Nature. To put this thought again in another way: the distinction between the First Cause and secondary causes is a perfectly unreal distinction. The proof of this statement cannot now be entered into—owing to the necessary limitations of our space. But, put briefly, it depends on a thorough-going analysis of the idea of causation. It may, I think, be shown that the concept of “cause” itself necessarily involves the existence of a mind which thinks and wills—a mind whose thinking and willing are in some degree analogous to our own thinking and willing. If this be so, then secondary causes are not causes at all. They are simply symbols which serve to foreshadow the uniform action of the Divine Will.

We are not, then, to seek for God in the gaps of our knowledge of Nature; but we are to seek and to find Him in Nature, in a knowable and rational order. No longer is it true to say that each advance of science, by contracting the sphere of the unknown, narrows the province of religion. We refuse the suggested partition of territory which leaves the known to science, the unknown, and perchance unknowable, to religion. For it is just in Nature as known, as an object of experience, and therefore rational, that we see God. Each fresh discovery of natural causes is in effect a fresh revelation of God. The old distinction between “miraculous” and “non-miraculous,” “natural” and “supernatural,” vanishes in the light of the truth that God is at work in each and every case of natural causation. It has been finely said: “The opening of a rose-bud and the resurrection of Jesus Christ are facts of the same order, for both alike are revelations of the one Motive Power which is at work in all phenomena.” We no longer think of God as *outside* His universe. He is in it—in the tiniest insect which spreads its wings for a single day to catch the summer sun, in the tender blade as it pushes its way through the soil, in the mind of the child as its powers open up towards man-



hood's prime, in the courses of the stars, in the endless changes of organic matter on our planet—the one force which moves all things, the one life which lives in all things, the one thinking principle active in all thinking beings. Nature is the thinnest of veils which hides from us the face of the living God.

“Earth, these solid stars, this weight of body and limb,  
Are they not sign and symbol of thy division from Him?”

I regret that I have been only able to touch on the very fringe of the subject. I can scarcely claim to have done that. I offer a brief analysis of a study of “the ultimate basis of theism.” Such a study would consist of (1) a review of the agnosticism of Huxley and Spencer; of the pantheism of Haeckel; of the deism of the old deists; of the thorough-going idealism of the subjective idealists. (2) A statement of “the ultimate basis of theism,” which is based on an analysis of (a) the presuppositions of our experience of the material world; (b) the real nature of causation; (c) what is involved in our moral consciousness. (3) The exhibition of the proof of Christian theism—by showing how it includes in itself all the true elements of the other theories of the universe, by which alone they live. (4) The reconciliation of the doctrine of Divine immanence with the relative independence of created spirits.

In asserting the truth of the Divine immanence in Nature and man, as what is *really* characteristic of Christian theism, we are in effect returning to the intellectual standpoint of the great Greek teachers of the Alexandrian Church. Nay, we are after all only being led back to St John himself: “In the beginning was the Word. That which has come to be *in Him* was life, and the life was the light of men.” The doctrine of the Logos is the one synthesis of all the conflicting views of an age of intellectual unrest, the one reconciliation of all oppositions inherent in human thought, the one foundation of a true Christian philosophy.

J. H. BEIBITZ.

## SACRIFICIAL COMMUNION IN GREEK RELIGION.

LEWIS R. FARNELL, D.LITT.

THE evolutionary doctrine of heredity has been applied by modern research not merely to the phenomena of physical life, but with equal success to the world of ideas, and here most fruitfully, perhaps, to the growth and development of religious forms and concepts. To the comparative study of Religion, the most recent product of modern philosophy and science, we owe the suggestion, and shall owe the recognition, of the truth that a certain law of evolution, and the influence of environment and ancestral conditions, can be discovered even in the most revolutionary and epoch-making changes of creed, that seem at first sight to break away most violently from the traditions of the past. The new religion may be the immediate creation of the genius of the Founder; but its propagation is affected by its *milieu*, and its ultimate growth by the soil on which it is grafted; and this is sure to be full of germs and deposits of earlier belief, which will reappear, transformed, perhaps, but functionally active, in the new organism. Thus the complete history of the origins of the essential Christian dogmas and liturgy is not presented by our sacred books: it will be attainable, if ever, only when the anthropological statement of the great rival creeds it supplanted in the Mediterranean area—a geographical expression that may include Persia—approaches completeness. Our English anthropologists have, on the whole, been occupied



too deeply with the phenomena of savage thought and ritual to contribute much to the historic problem of Christianity. Important clues are more likely to be discovered from the fuller research into Iranian, Anatolian, Egyptian, and Hellenic systems of ritual and belief. If we find striking resemblances of these to our own in certain essential traits, we should be allowed to conclude at least as much as this, that the presence and potency of kindred ideas in this area facilitated the propagation over it of the new but not alien religion. And this is sufficient gain at present for our historic imagination.

The work that has given the greatest stimulus to this inquiry is Professor Robertson Smith's now celebrated treatise on the Religion of the Semites. Its value is perhaps somewhat impaired by some premature theories concerning Totemism: he is one of those responsible for the exaggerated importance that has been assigned to this interesting social institution as a factor in religious history. But if we ignore or reject his totemistic hypotheses, his book remains an important and brilliant exposition of certain sacramental and ritualistic concepts that he finds among pagan Semitic peoples, and which present themselves to us, in however crude and materialistic forms, as the ideas that have been spiritualised into Christianity. His leading conception is the distinction between the view of sacrifice as a gift to bribe the divinity, and the view that regards it as a sacramental ritualistic act whereby the worshipper passes into actual and corporeal communion with the Godhead: this may be effected by partaking sacramentally of some divine food or drink—that is, some substance in which the divinity is supposed to be immanent either permanently or at the time of the sacramental ministration. This latter is evidently the view of a more fervent and “mystic” religious consciousness, and reveals a vista of higher religious thought concerning the unity of Manhood and Godhead, and may disclose the conception of the divinity's divine death and resurrection. The former theory of the sacrifice, which is evidently colder and more

utilitarian, he tends to regard as later, and as a degenerate derivative of this.

His theory is supported chiefly by evidence from Semitic lands, but he does not ignore that which can be gleaned from Anatolia, Greece, and Egypt.

The "sacramental" concept is certainly widespread, and may be shown to have survived in the contemporary or recent harvest-ritual of Europe and Asia. It has not yet been found in its purity among the savages of our own time, though we now have some evidence of quasi-sacral eating of the "totem": it is not discovered in Vedic ritual, nor does it seem to have been familiar to the Teutonic stocks in the pre-Christian period. It flourished chiefly and germinated in the Mediterranean area and in Mexico, and in the latter country its chief ritualistic product was a sacramental cannibalism.

It would be interesting and valuable to track it round the world, but this paper can only deal directly with the facts of pagan Greek religion that bear on this and kindred questions; and the statement, even thus limited, can only be very summary.

We may begin with questioning the Homeric poems, to discover whether these two distinct aspects of sacrifice are recognisable in the earliest Hellenic ritual. The usual answer appears at first sight justified, that the poet knew nothing, or at all events says nothing to show that he knew, about the mystic act of the sacrament: the deities are propitiated, or their presence and aid evoked, by gifts, by offerings of animals, cereals, and wine, by dedication of altars, temples, and also, though very rarely, of anthropomorphic images, and finally by sacred dance and song. All these—the liturgical act of prayer being left for the present discussion out of sight—may be regarded in the light of *ἀγάλματα*, things in which the deity delights, or depreciatingly may be called bribes, or more appropriately in certain cases "spells" of greater or less efficacy to charm and to bind. The gods have indeed communion with men, but in a free, capricious, non-mystic fashion: the kinship of men with



the divinity—faintly indicated as a common inheritance in one passage—is rather the privilege of a few heroes, and is purely physical, not apparently brought about by any mystic act, such as the partaking of divine food at a sacrifice. In fact, it is true to say that mysticism in its proper sense is alien to Homeric speculation, which, though often earnest and even profound, represents in the intellectual history of the race a high level of sanity and clearness, from which the later periods in many respects receded.

But now, with our fuller knowledge of pre-Homeric religion, the first word no longer lies with Homer; nor can we with security regard his work as even a complete exposition of contemporary belief. Again, there may have been more meaning in certain parts of Homeric ritual than at first sight appears. The distinction between the two kinds of sacrifice, though real, may not always have been so sharply defined as it is presented by Robertson Smith and his followers. It is probable that in the Homeric and earlier period certain external objects used in ritual were regarded as mysteriously charged with divinity, so that those who handled them were brought into temporary communion with the deity through physical contact. The altar and the idol were both derivatives from an earlier pillar-cult; and as a divine power was supposed to be immanent in the sacred pillar or stone, which could produce certain supernatural effects upon those who touched them, the same efficacy was imputed to the altar and the idol, and the persons or things that were put into contact with them were regarded in some sense as consecrated to the deity. This, then, is one form of divine communion, through contact established between the worshipper and certain sacred objects, and is so far analogous to the sacramental ritual: also we may be convinced that it was prevalent in the Homeric period, if we weigh the evidence from legend and Mycenæan cult-objects. And in fact Homer shows himself in two important passages familiar with the idea that a sacred animal could establish a quasi-mystic *rapprochement*, or serve as the medium of

communion between the mortal and the god. He describes Antilochus as clearing himself by oath from the charge of unfairness in the chariot-race, and laying his hand on his horses while he swears by Poseidon. Now Poseidon was the horse-god, and the horse was his incarnation. Similarly, again, in the ritual of the oath which the chieftains of the Achæans and Trojans take before the combat, a black lamb is offered to the Earth, and the warriors who swear hold each in his hands a hair of the victim. In such ceremonies the oath-taker puts himself into communion with the divinity through physical contact with a consecrated animal, and we may be allowed to see in this at least an embryo form of the sacramental concept.

Again, in order to beget and to maintain the feeling of kinship, or the physical communion of God and man, something less esoteric and mystic than the advanced form of the sacrament might be adequate. Professor Robertson Smith regards it as essential to this end that the worshippers should partake of some sacred food in which the deity is immanent, whereby they and He become "of one flesh," an expression for the most intimate union that ancient society could imagine. But those who simply partake of the same food become in a certain sense "of one flesh" also, which was probably the ancient idea concerning the bridal pair, who in the marriage ceremonies of Greece and Rome ate the meal-cake together; and Homer presents us with scenes of sacrificial ritual, where the worshippers are cheerfully feasting on the burnt-offering, and the deity may be supposed to be a fellow-banqueter; and from some simpler view such as this the more mystic theory may have grown. That the members of the clan should feast on certain solemn occasions with the clan-god, whereby the sense of sacred fellowship was strengthened, was a ritualistic rule drawn directly from secular life; it was maintained by the institution of the *παράσιτοι*, or "fellow-banqueters" of the deity, in the later worships, for instance, of Apollo or Heracles. But there is nothing in this that is immediately analogous to the mystic sacramental idea of modern creeds, which only



begins to glimmer through when we examine certain legends and statements concerning ritual, of late record, perhaps, but often suggesting an antiquity more remote than Homer's.

We have to distinguish at first sight between the blood-sacrifice, in which an animal, or even man himself, is slain at the altar, and the harmless oblations of cereals, fruits, or liquids; between the sacrifice of Abel and that of Cain. The latter kind, which the author of Genesis deemed the less acceptable, and which was designated by the Greek phrase *ἄνυρα ἱερά*, or "offerings without fire," was regarded by certain Greek thinkers from the fifth century downward as the more pious of the two; and philosophers such as Porphyry, who had a vegetarian theory to maintain, affirmed that it was also the older, descending from the primitive period of man's innocence. How this distinction in the ritual of Greek polytheism arose, and which of the two kinds may be believed the earlier, are questions that do not here arise: for the purposes of the history of the Greek religion both may be assumed to be of equal antiquity. And we may first consider whether the properly sacramental concept is discoverable in the bloodless oblation.

We may find it more difficult to imagine that the divine nature should be immanent in inanimate substance than to believe in animal incarnation; but the further we can trace backwards the psychologic history of our race, the more vanishing becomes the distinction between the animate and the inanimate world; and the phenomena of Fetichism in every society of the world bear full testimony to the prevalence of the ancient idea that the inanimate, often inorganic, thing can be as readily charged with divine potency as the prophet or wizard or animal. Nor was this mode of thought alien to the Greek of even the later period. The speculations of Plato and Aristotle concerning the divine nature are adequate to the most advanced modern thought; but the superstitious man of their time was still pouring oil and setting garlands upon his holy stone, even as his prehistoric ancestors had done. Early and

late, it was credible to the lower popular faith that the idol—the fetich of higher art—could be animated with divine life and power if it was smeared with the blood of the victim.

The sacred boughs, or κλάδοι, borne in the hands of the Bacchic Mystæ are themselves called by the very name of the god, Βάκχοι. The Pythoness at Delphi and the prophet of Klaros enter into the divine communion which induces ecstasy by drinking of the sacred water in which the spirit of the divinity is thought to reside. Wherefore it would not surprise us if some crude concept of transubstantiation were to be discovered in the old Hellenic view of the bread and wine offered upon the altar, so that the worshippers who partook imagined themselves entering into a physical communion with the deity by partaking of a divine substance. And no doubt the sacramental eating of sacred cereals was occasionally part of the harvest-ritual of European and other peasants, as Mannhardt and Dr Frazer have laboured not in vain to prove. We should recognise it, or at least infer its existence in Hellenic ritual, if we found that they worshipped the corn-sheaf, for instance, or identified Demeter or any other corn-divinity with the corn itself; whence might spring the belief that when they were eating the consecrated bread or cake they were eating the very body of their deity. But this is more than we know. We have no real trace of the worship of the corn-sheaf in Hellas, still less of “a corn-totem”; nor was Demeter, like John Barleycorn, ever identified with the actual corn in any ritual or genuine religious phrase that has been recorded.<sup>1</sup>

If, then, the cereal oblations were really regarded as of one substance with the divinity, a different explanation might be more appropriate. We are informed by Jamblichus that the usual sacral objects, such as stones, herbs, animals, spices, were marked out for the service of the gods because they were

<sup>1</sup> I have endeavoured to demonstrate this, in opposition to some current views, in my chapter on Demeter in the forthcoming third volume of the *Cults of the Greek States*.



things in nature that appeared to be specially akin to the deity, and were specially charged with his spirit. We might in certain cases be nearer the truth if we reversed this formula, and said that such things as cereals might be temporarily charged with the presence of the deity because they were offered in ritual. The altar, as we know, belonging by origin to the pillar-cult of the pre-iconic period, was believed to be the abode of an indwelling spirit. What touched the altar, therefore, whether inanimate offerings, animal, or man, was temporarily sacred or "tabu." Starting from this idea, we can penetrate to the inner meaning of the sacrificial act described by Homer as *οὐλοχύτας προβαλέσθαι*, which long continued to be in vogue in blood-offerings: the barley-ears that were placed on the altar were then taken and thrown on the head of the animal; from their contact with the altar they were able to infect the victim with the spirit of the divinity, so that it was now sacred flesh. This idea appears clearly in the legend that explained the origin of the Bouphonia at Athens, that most archaic and interesting ritual of the Attic state-religion, to which we shall soon recur again. The first who ever dared to slay an ox in sacrifice was a certain mythic Sopatros, who was offering cereals on an altar to Zeus, when an ox approached and devoured some of them, whereupon Sopatros in anger smote it with an axe. And it was an actual practice in the ritual of certain Greek states to place corn on the altar, then to drive a herd of victims round, and to select for sacrifice that one which was tempted to approach and eat.

If, then, the altar was able to impart this potency to the food placed upon it, we can imagine that those who partook of the altar-cakes or *pain bénit* might be conscious of a real sacramental communion, especially if these cakes were marked, as some occasionally were, with some symbol, or the actual effigy of the divinity.

Looking at the liquid oblations in the Greek sacrifice, if we find in them any idea akin to that which attaches to the sacramental cup, we cannot apply the same explanation

as has just been suggested for the possibly sacramental character of the food-offering. For naturally the libation that had been poured out on the altar was not drunk by the worshipper; and though he might drink in the ritual, his cup was not brought into any contact with the altar, as far as we are told.

Nor have we any ground for believing that the sacrificial milk, honey, and water—the liquids in common ceremonious use—were ever identified in any sense, mystic or other, with the life or blood of the divinity, though occasionally the water from some sacred spring used for prophecy might be impregnated with the divine spirit. It may have been otherwise with wine, which long retained in the Hellenic world a semi-sacred character. The god himself is sometimes identified with the juice of the grape, as when Teiresias, in the *Bacchæ* of Euripides, declares that “the god Dionysos is offered in libation to the other gods”; and a man under the influence of wine might be popularly said to be full of the god. In Thrace we have reason to suppose this transubstantiation of the wine to have been a reality in religion; for here Dionysos was himself called “the Vine-cluster,” and his prophets drew their inspiration from him by copious draughts of wine; but in Greece it may be doubted whether it was much more than a *façon de parler*. Doubtless wine was drunk in the Greek festivals religiously, that is, as part of the ritual, but I cannot anywhere detect a mystic or sacramental use of it. If anywhere, we should expect to find this in the Dionysiac festivals, such as the Attic “Xóες”; the whole people in this solemnity drank to the sound of the trumpet, and he who drained his goblet first received a crown of leaves, and a goat-skin full of wine. They drank in honour of the god, who would be regarded as present at the feast, attracted by the trumpet-call, and no doubt the champion drinker was supposed to stand temporarily in the special favour and communion of Dionysos; but there was no proof, though we cannot dogmatically deny, that they were at all conscious of



“mystically drinking the god.” The ceremony did not take place round an altar, and has merely the air of a religious boon-companionship. Nor is there any hint of the transcendental power of wine in the sacred liturgy of the Orphic mysteries of South Italy which promised the nearest and deepest communion with the divinity. Still less could any mystic sacramental concept attach to the ritualistic wine-drinking in the other worships: the Attic Ephebi, on the special occasion when their long hair was clipped, offered libations from a large wine-jar to Heracles, and all drank together with him, and we may regard this rite as a non-mystic communion, but not in the strict sense a sacrament.

But it is believed that the cereal oblations and libations bore a deeper significance in some of the mysteries of the Greek world. All these were alike in promising to the catechumen a nearer and more perfect communion with the deity than could be attained by the ordinary state-religion. It has been recently discovered that there was a mystic ministration of bread and liquid in the rites of Samothrace: the priest “broke the cake and poured out the cup for the Mystæ.” The resemblance to our own communion service is most striking; but we know too little of the nature of the Samothracian divinities to venture to affirm that to this ritual was attached any articulate idea of transubstantiation. The partaking of the blessed bread and cup was no doubt an essential act in the Samothracian mysteries, as was the drinking of the famous *κυκεών*—a compound of meal and water—in the Eleusinian. Concerning this latter, an impressive and ingenious theory has been in recent years propounded by Dr Jevons in his chapter on the Mysteries in his *Introduction to the Study of Religion*, in which he maintains that the great power and attractiveness of such mysteries as those of Eleusis arose from their conservation and development of the more ancient and the higher idea of sacrifice, of a communion service, in which the worshipper partook of the very substance of the divinity, and thus became “of one flesh” with him or her; while the public

ritual of the state had everywhere degenerated into a lifeless ceremony of gift-offerings. If we accept this view, we must admit that the Eleusinian Church anticipated one of the fundamental forms of the Christian service. The full consideration of the question is impossible within the present limits, and I hope to be able to set forth elsewhere my reasons for rejecting it. For the present I must be content with stating that I see no reasons for regarding Demeter as an Eleusinian corn-totem, or for believing that the *κυκεών*, made from the corn, was supposed to contain her divine substance, or that the importance attached to the drinking of the cup in the whole ministration was as great as Dr Jevons imagines. The drinking may have been sacramental in the less mystic sense: the worshipper drank of the cup that the goddess had drunk of, and shared in her sorrow; but there is no trace of the idea of transubstantiation, and the fullest divine communion at Eleusis was obtained, not by eating or drinking sacred food, but by seeing a sacred sight.

But the mystic idea that we cannot clearly discern in the Eleusinia emerges more into view in the Attis-Cybele mysteries of Phrygian origin. Here the fusion of the mortal with the divinity, which was so far accomplished as that the priest was himself called Attis and the votary *κύβηβος*, the male counterpart of Cybele herself, was brought about mainly by a blood-ritual and rites of coarser symbolism, but partly also, it appears, by a sacramental meal of bread and wine or some other liquid: "I have eaten from the drum, I have drunk from the cymbal, . . . . I have become one of the mystic brotherhood of Attis," was the ecstatic formula of a religion so transcendental, and, in spite of its impurities, so like in certain features to our own, that Firmicus Maternus, who has preserved these words, is startled into exclaiming, "Truly the devil has Christians of his own." He does not tell us what they ate and drank from the drum and the cymbal; but we may be sure that it was a sacrament of cereals or fruits. Ovid tells us that bloodless oblations, the tokens of man's



primitive innocence, were specially dear to the Great Mother; and we learn from Arnobius that her priest during the period of fasting specially abstained from bread, "because in the violence of her grief the goddess had done the same." Now this implies that when the fast was over, and the joyous period that commemorated the resurrection of Attis began, bread would be taken ceremoniously and sacramentally. And we can say more of this than we could of the Eleusinian *κυκεών*: the bread could be eaten by the Attis-votary as the very substance or body of his divinity, for in the liturgy of Attis he was himself called the "Cornstalk"; he was then the mystic Bread, in a sense in which Demeter is never found to have been. And this is a close pagan parallel to the dogma of Transubstantiation.<sup>1</sup>

We can now consider whether we can trace the sacramental idea in the blood-offerings of Hellas. We need not occupy ourselves any longer with the simplest form of it that prevailed from the pre-Homeric time down through all the periods of Hellenic paganism, the form of a sacred banquet at which the deity and the worshipper feast together on the flesh of the victim. We may confine ourselves to the question whether we have proof that the victim was ever regarded as the actual incarnation of the deity. If it was, and if the worshipper partook of its flesh and blood, its sacrifice was a "mystic" sacrament, and a fact of great importance for the history of the higher religions.

The question is easier than the one that has been hitherto discussed, for the evidence is clearer. The problem of human sacrifice, which was one form of blood-offering common in the prehistoric and by no means extinct in the later period, concerns us, but not so as to complicate the inquiry. The full significance of the oblation of human victims in Greece needs most careful reconsideration, and no department in the

<sup>1</sup> A recently discovered Egyptian papyrus in the British Museum, containing the mystic formula "I have eaten the bread of Ra," seems to reveal the same transcendental idea in early Egyptian religion.

anthropology of Greek religion would repay it better. But the only question relevant to this paper is whether the human victim was ever offered sacramentally in our strict sense—that is, whether, after he or she had been slain as incarnating the deity, the worshipper partook of the flesh or blood literally or symbolically.

Now cannibalism as a secular practice marks the lowest grade of savagery, and if it had ever been in vogue among them, had been left far behind when the Aryan races emerge into the dawn of history. But religious cannibalism may accompany a comparatively high stage of civilisation, as we see in the Aztek religion, where it appears to have been worked up inexorably, but without any unnecessary cruelty, into a complete form of sacramental communion. To the historic Greeks, no doubt, anything that savoured clearly of this unnatural practice was abhorrent and impossible. Yet the shadow of it remains in certain myths of which the significance is hardly disputable. A careful examination of the Arcadian legend of King Lykaon, who kills and serves up in a banquet his infant son to Zeus Lykaïos, brings the conviction that it preserves a reminiscence of a real cannibalistic communion-sacrifice, in which the son of the god-king or the god-priest dies sacramentally, and his flesh is tasted by the worshipper; and possibly an allusion to the original practice was still preserved in some symbolical ritual on Mount Lykaon down to the days of Pausanias, who saw the ceremonies, and evidently knew more than he reluctantly tells us. That the king or the king's child or the priest was regarded on certain religious occasions as the incarnation of the deity is a fact which is familiar to the students of Greek religion, and which has influenced certain Christian ideas concerning the regal and sacerdotal office. Another legend which arose probably from the same ritual as the last is that which relates the slaying and the cooking of Pelops, who was eaten in a banquet of the gods; and it is possible that the cannibalistic story attaching to the house of Atreus grew from the same



source. These are dark and dim records of prehistoric Greece, and the legends themselves attest the loathing which the foul sacrament excited in God and man.

But at some later period than that which they mark, the Greek world was invaded by the orgiastic Thracian worship of Dionysos, and this brings with it a legend of cannibalism which we must regard as sacramental. The myths and the forms of ritual that long survived show clearly that the deity, incarnate in some animal or human form, was slain and devoured literally or symbolically in some wild communion-sacrifice. Hence grew the well-known story of Zagreus and the Titans, of the Minyan women devouring their own children in a fit of Bacchic madness, the Theban women dismembering Pentheus; and we can scarcely doubt that the Chian ritual in honour of Dionysos *Ὠμάδιος*, "the devourer of raw flesh," where a human victim was torn to pieces at the altar, had descended from the cannibal-sacrament of Thrace. If any sacramental trait survived in the worship of Chios, it would survive in symbols only, no doubt: the worshippers may have touched themselves with the blood. But in the history of religion it is an axiom that what at a later period is symbol or metaphor, in an earlier is literal fact; and human flesh appears to have been sacramentally devoured in Thrace, even in the Roman period.

If we turn now to the records of animal-sacrifice in the various states of Greece, we discern clearly that the victim was often regarded as the temporary incarnation of the deity, and if in this case it was eaten by the worshippers, we must interpret this as a mystic ceremony of communion with the godhead. The most salient example is the ritual of the Bouphonia at Athens, upon which many theories have been built, and which I have discussed at some length elsewhere. The record reveals this at least, that the ox was regarded as half human, half divine, as a "theanthropic" animal, to use Robertson Smith's quaint term: he comes voluntarily or as chosen by the god to the sacrifice: the sacrificer flees as if guilty

of kindred-murder : yet the whole community eat its flesh, and the stranger who partakes becomes of one flesh with them and with the city-god : finally there is a symbolic resurrection of the ox after death.

A Thessalian story narrates that on an occasion when the Thessalians were about to join battle, a mad bull "with golden horns" rushed before the host, and the men slew it and devoured it greedily, seeing in it an incarnation of their national goddess Hekate, and each believing that "he was participating in a mystic and divine ceremony." This is nothing less than the ministration of the sacrament to the warriors before battle.

The ritual we are considering is most clearly presented by the legends and practices of the Dionysos-cult. The Bacchic poetry that describes the mythic Mænads frequently speaks of them as falling upon the living goat or bull, rending it and devouring it, "exulting in the joy of raw flesh"; and this is not poetic fiction merely. The goat and the bull were well-known incarnations of this god. The Cretans, in a Bacchic mystery where the whole tragedy of the god was performed in ritual, were wont to rend a living bull with their teeth, and to bewail the death of their divinity. The object of such ritual is clearly to fill oneself with sacred blood, and thus to attain ecstatic communion with God : even as in the genuinely Hellenic cult of Apollo, the priestess at Argos was inspired with the power of prophecy by drinking the blood of the lamb that was sacrificed to him. Instances could be multiplied, but only one more, perhaps the most striking of all, need be given. In Tenedos, a pregnant cow was consecrated to Dionysos and reverentially tended ; when the calf was born it was dressed in buskins and solemnly sacrificed ; the slayer immediately fled as if guilty, and was pelted with stones. The buskins belonged to the conventional costume of the anthropomorphic god, and we can only understand the ceremony if we suppose that the victim was eaten sacramentally. The incarnation of the deity—and in a sense the deity himself—dies for the people, that



they may attain a nearer communion with him : nevertheless, his death is a guilt to the slayer.

Before estimating the general results of this evidence, we may note that certain animals are potentially permanent incarnations of certain deities—the bull and the goat, for instance, of Dionysos, the horse of Poseidon. And we may discern here and elsewhere traces of the survival in Greece of direct animal-worship, and may consider these facts in relation to the totemistic hypothesis. These speculations may be relevant to the present inquiry, but are far too intricate to be dealt with in the limits of a short paper. We may believe that the deity was imagined to incarnate himself in a certain animal, because in the pre-anthropomorphic religion it happened to be sacred in its own right. But to many of these instances I should apply a simpler hypothesis, which we know at least to be a *vera causa*—namely, that a purely secular animal could obtain a sacred character for a particular occasion merely by contact with the altar, whence the divine spirit passes into it : thus it becomes competent to serve as a vehicle of divine communion for the worshipper who partakes of it ; and even after its death, its skin, hallowed by the sacrifice on the altar, can serve various religious purposes, securing purification and divine protection for the worshipper who kneels on it or wears it ; and all these uses are explained by and imply the idea of communion with the deity thus established.

We may conclude, then, that from the period before Homer downwards throughout Greek history, the concept of sacramental communion, whether in a non-mystic or mystic sense, was familiar to the Greek worshipper ; it was not a secret of Eleusis, but found in the state-religion, though it may not have always been clearly articulate, nor assigned so prominent a place as it has been in the Churches of Christendom. It was more articulate and more vitalised in the semi-Hellenic mysteries of the Orphic-Dionysos and Attis-Cybele.

And its influence was potent upon moral and spiritual growth. For communion with the deity was associated with

a certain ritual of purification, and the idea of ritualistic purity both in the Hellenic and Judaic society gave rise by slow incubation to the idea of a clean heart and a pure soul. We can trace this process specially in the study of the Apolline cults. The Thracian orgies of Dionysos, when stripped of their savagery by the Hellenic spirit of sanity and restraint, and spiritualised by the Orphic brotherhoods, bore as rich fruit in the religious sphere as in the sphere of art and literature: by them and their sacraments the privileges of divine communion were offered to all mankind, regardless of race, and belief was propagated in the death and resurrection of the divinity, in the possibilities of spiritual re-birth and regeneration, and of a higher life beyond death. How far the national morality was elevated by these mystic societies is a difficult question. An ancient writer maintains on behalf of the Samothracian mysteries that participation in them resulted in an increase of righteousness, and the fragments of the Orphic liturgy discovered in South Italy reveal a potency of religious conviction that must in some way have reacted upon conduct.

Be this as it may: we are at least able to discern that, on the theological side, some of the leading ideas of Christianity would not have presented themselves to the later Hellenic world as wholly alien and unfamiliar. We know what Hellas received: what she herself contributed still awaits a careful and judicious estimate. But we may now hold that the cleavage between the old and the new was not so violent as has been hitherto supposed.

LEWIS R. FARNELL.

EXETER COLLEGE, OXON.



# THE JOHANNINE PROBLEM.

## II. DIRECT INTERNAL EVIDENCE.

B. W. BACON, D.D.,

Professor of New Testament Criticism and Exegesis  
in Yale University.

EXTERNAL evidence shows the wave of acceptance of the Fourth Gospel to start *ca.* 170 A.D. on the orthodox side, and to follow the assertion of Johannine authorship. Previously no trace exists of such a claim, though the authority of the son of Zebedee is invoked by the orthodox for Revelation, and by Gnostics for Docetic *Acts*. Also those who advance it show by their phraseology that they rest upon the so-called appendix, Jn. 21.

The veil with which in the Gospel the figure of "the beloved disciple" is purposely shrouded, in Jn. 21 is lifted. "The sons of Zebedee" are frankly introduced, and an obvious elimination exhibits to the reader the Apostle John as the individual meant. Verse 24 declares outright, "This is the disciple which testifieth these things and wrote these things." Here, then, is the point of tangency between external and internal evidence. Shall we class the appendix with the later *argumenta*? To do so would prejudge the case. We must start from the assumption that it was added by the author himself, distinguishing this type of testimony as the "direct" internal evidence.

But other material of this type demands consideration

before discussion of the appendix. All ancient tradition dates the apocalypse before the gospel, and Revelation is by much the first to be known and attributed to the "Apostle." This book, too, has both an introduction and epilogue, positive, direct, and circumstantial in their account of the Apostle's whereabouts and occasion for writing. With the appendix the case is otherwise. We may have become accustomed to read in certain geographical relations, but the author has nothing to say of any change of residence. *Peter* is "carried away" (v. 18) to martyrdom, but John remains for another kind of "witness-bearing" (*μαρτυρία*). Nothing appears of his going to tend "other sheep, not of this fold." Why should the *Muratorianum* be thought absurd in taking as the sense that John wrote from the midst of the apostolic group, before the date of Paul's epistles?<sup>1</sup>

We must begin, then, with the book which brings John to Patmos to address an authoritative message to the Seven Churches of Asia, carefully avoiding the confusion produced by later prejudiced attempts to father a book grown doctrinally obnoxious on "some other John at Ephesus." For even such names as Harnack and Bousset should not blind us to the real history of this theory.

It originates with Dionysius, the successor of Origen, who in his controversy with the chiliast Nepos, perhaps taking a hint from the attacks of the Alogi, endeavoured to cut away the ground on which his opponents stood by denying the apostolicity of Revelation. But even Dionysius confesses his inability to find traces of any other John in Asia,<sup>2</sup> and we have already seen<sup>3</sup> by what fallacious reasoning Eusebius endeavours to supply the lack, the very name he cites from Papias belonging to a Palestinian worthy.

<sup>1</sup> Cohortantibus condiscipulis . . . . revelatum Andreæ ex apostolis, ut recognoscentibus cunctis Johannis describeret. . . . Apostolus Paulus sequens *prodecessoris* sui Johannis ordinem scribit.

<sup>2</sup> The plea of the "two monuments in Ephesus" only emphasises his lack of real evidence.

<sup>3</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, Apr. 1903, p. 516, n. 2.



In short, before we entertain suggestions that in Rev. i. 1, 4, 9, xxii. 8, "some other John" may be meant, there must be *some* evidence earlier than the third century (!) for a person of the name, other than the Apostle, whom the Seven Churches of Asia could imagine to be thus addressing them. That the writer of these verses actually *was* the Apostle John is a very open question. That he *intends to be so understood* is simply axiomatic until the required evidence is adduced.<sup>1</sup>

Evidence of an Elder John *in Jerusalem* is not lacking. Eusebius names him in the Jerusalem succession, midway between James († 60–62 A.D.) and Jude (bishop until A.D. 135). Epiphanius dates his death in 117. There is evidence of nameless "Elders" in Ephesus (Irenæus, *Her.*, i. 15, 6; *cf.* 2 Jn. 1, 3 Jn. 1). But the challenge of fifteen centuries brings forth no trace of any Elder John of Ephesus. In view of the fruitless search of both Dionysius and Eusebius, it is safe to say it never will appear. Until it does the spectre must be boldly exorcised. He is a mere Frankenstein of embarrassed critics, a Will-o'-the-wisp John-o'-lantern, who guides only into morasses of confusion.

Rev. i.-iii. and xxii. 8–21 is written, then, as from the *Apostle* John, commending the apocalypse to the Churches of Asia as "things which he saw and heard" while in the adjacent island of Patmos, and was commissioned by the Spirit to communicate to them. This is the direct internal evidence of Revelation, as the readers addressed must and did understand it.

Its bearing on the Johannine problem is two-fold: (1) If the claim be admitted, it creates at once a formidable if not a fatal objection to the Johannine authorship of the other four

<sup>1</sup> The fact that John is not cited in Revelation as ἀπόστολος has no weight. It is not his authority as "apostle" (*i.e.* travelling delegate, Διδ. xi. 3–4) that is wanted, but as "prophet," "apocalyptic seer"; *cf.* Theophilus' designation πνευματοφόροι). As soon as he comes to be regarded as the chief transmitter of evangelic tradition the favourite title becomes μαθητής (not ἀπόστολος) τοῦ κυρίου.

writings attributed to the same Apostle *at the very same period*; for the date of Irenæus for Revelation (95 A.D.) is now almost an axiom, whereas the doctrinal position of the other four on the chief questions involved (eschatological) represents the opposite extreme of orthodox opinion. The contrast of language, style, phraseology, standpoint on almost every doctrine, is equally great, as was shown in detail by Dionysius himself.<sup>1</sup> Every day of improvement in the historical appreciation of Revelation makes it more needless to emphasise this difference, so that we may pass at once to the second alternative.

(2) If the claim of Revelation be denied, there is swept away the very foundation of the tradition of the Apostle's residence in Ephesus, without which a literature so clearly Asiatic as the Gospel and Epistles (to avoid prejudgment of the case we shall term this the X literature) cannot (by moderns) be attributed to him. But as this point is not likely to be conceded, it becomes needful here to consider, even at some length, a question thus far held in abeyance, viz., *The tradition of John in Asia*.

To show the feeling in earlier writings as compared with later regarding the residence of John, and his relation, if any, to the X literature, we must glance at them in order, adopting dates such as to cover the widest extremes of criticism.

1. Colossians and Ephesians (A.D. 60-80) develop a Logos doctrine against heresies of this region, but have no trace of acquaintance either with the X literature or the intervention of John.

2. First Peter (64-80) addresses encouragement to these churches, but maintains silence as to John.

3. Mark (68-85) and Matthew (75-100), the latter in

<sup>1</sup> Harnack endeavours to break the force of this objection by adopting the theory of his pupil Vischer, which makes his Elder responsible for no more than the *translation* of the mass of the book, and the addition of the introduction and epilogue, with a few editorial touches. But the weakness of the contention is obvious, and the theory moribund.



earlier form, have a prognostication of the fate of John (Mt. xx. 23 = Mk. x. 39). Both conceive him as having fallen, or to fall, a martyr, like his brother James (Acts xii. 1).<sup>1</sup> All the Synoptic traits of John are such as agree with Gal. ii. 6-9 and the basis of Revelation. To compare them in detail with those of the author of the X literature would anticipate, but the difference is notorious.

4. Acts xx. 18-35 (80-110) reviews the career of Paul in Ephesus, and prognosticates the growth of heresy "after his departure" (vv. 29-32), but offers no prospect of apostolic accessions. Jerusalem, with its body of "witnesses," its "apostles and elders," its "eye-witnesses and ministers," its "companions from the beginning," is this author's seat of authority in religion (Acts i. 21-23, xv. 2, etc.; cf. Lk. i. 2-3).

5. The Epistles to Timothy (62-100?) deal with the Asiatic heresies, but ignore relations with Jerusalem.

6. Clement of Rome (95-120) comes to the aid of the conservatives in Corinth, appealing to the counsels of Paul. He does not allude to a surviving apostle in Ephesus; and yet Ephesus was far closer than Rome to Corinth.

7. Ignatius writes (110-130) to the Smyrnæans, the Ephesians, the Magnesians, the Philadelphians, the Trallians, and to Polycarp, mainly concerned to strengthen the apostolic succession against the same Docetic Gnosticism antagonised in the X literature, and presenting a similar, though cruder, Logos doctrine. He, too, appeals to the authority of Paul; but even in writing to the Ephesians and to Polycarp has no mention of John.

8. Polycarp, reputed a personal disciple of John, writes (110-130), partly to warn the Philippian against the same Docetic Gnosticism, a letter saturated with echoes of the New

<sup>1</sup> Cf. J. Weiss, *Das älteste Evangelium*, 1902, p. 64. But the alleged statement of Papias that this prediction was fulfilled, in that "John was killed by the Jews," is untrustworthy. See below. But Mt. xx. 23 = Mk. x. 39 indicates the currency of an earlier tradition of the fate of John, quite irreconcilable with Jn. xxi. 20-24. Papias (?) and the later legends attempt to harmonise the earlier with the later.

Testament writings, especially 1 Peter and the Pauline letters, and exhorting to the study of the wisdom in the epistles of "the blessed and glorious Paul." He echoes against the Docetists a phrase characteristic of the X literature,<sup>1</sup> "For everyone who shall not confess that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is Antichrist; and whosoever shall not confess the testimony of the cross is of the Devil, and whosoever shall pervert the sayings of the Lord to his own lusts, and say that there is neither resurrection nor judgment, that man is the firstborn of Satan; wherefore leaving the vain talk of the multitude, and the false teachings, let us turn to the word handed down to us from the beginning." In one breath Polycarp shows acquaintance with the X literature, and a method of meeting the heresy identical with that of "Luke" and his "friend" (ἑταῖρος) Papias.<sup>2</sup>

But here we must delay a moment, for the witness of Polycarp is a vital point. And first of all we note that in spite of his attitude thus defined he clearly does not regard himself, nor is he regarded by his contemporaries, as a witness to be cited in their conflict against Docetists and anti-Chiliasts for apostolic tradition and interpretation of the Lord's words. Irenæus can indeed remember as a boy hearing him discourse "about his intercourse with John, and with the rest who had seen the Lord, and how he gave their words, and what kind of things he had heard from them about the Lord, and his miracles and his teaching." But Polycarp himself does not mention John in his letter, and neither Ignatius nor Papias,

<sup>1</sup> The deutero-Isaian theory has been humorously defined as the view that Is. 40-66 was "not written by Isaiah, but by another man of the same name." It should be remembered that the *name* of the author with whom Polycarp shows acquaintance is the question in debate.

<sup>2</sup> The preface of Papias might almost be considered written on the basis of this passage. Cf. the perversion of the λόγια τοῦ κυρίου, the ματαιότης of the multitude (Papias: "Unlike the multitude I did not take pleasure in those who have so very much to say"), the false teachings (Papias: "Those who relate alien commandments"), the "word handed down from the beginning." With the latter phrase compare also Luke (Lk. i. 2-3), whose sources are demonstrably Palestinian, and Hegesippus, as quoted below.



nor even Justin, seems to have thought of him as a witness for their purposes. In reality Polycarp's importance as a witness came later, and in connection with a wholly different controversy. It was when Victor, bishop of Rome, A.D. 189-198, attempted to suppress the custom peculiar to the churches of Asia, of celebrating annually the Fourteenth Nisan, independently of their Sunday observance, and regardless of the day of the week, as "the true Passover of the Lord." Led by Polycrates of Ephesus, then sixty-five years of age, the Asiatic bishops rallied to the defence of "the ancient custom handed down to them," defying the excommunication of Victor. Polycrates balanced the fame of Peter and Paul at Rome by Philip of Hierapolis (whom he considers to be the Apostle) and "John, who was both a witness and a teacher, who reclined on the bosom of the Lord, and being a priest, wore the sacerdotal plate. He fell asleep at Ephesus."<sup>1</sup> Irenæus, who himself "maintained that the mystery of the resurrection of the Lord should be observed only on the Lord's day," wrote from Gaul "admonishing Victor that he should not cut off whole churches of God which observed the tradition of an ancient custom." Polycrates cited seven bishops of his kindred who "always observed the day when the people (ὁ λαός = the Jews) put away the leaven." Both, however, rest supremely upon the witness of Polycarp. Irenæus in particular appeals to Polycarp's visit to Rome, A.D. 154, when Anicetus could not persuade him "not to observe what he had always (*sic*) observed with John the disciple of our Lord and the other Apostles with whom he had associated."

It is improbable that Irenæus and the other defenders of

<sup>1</sup> The description of John (*cf.* Hegesippus' designation of the Elders of the Palestinian church as "witnesses and leaders in every church") and the reference to his wearing the high priestly *πέταλον*, suggest that Polycrates, like Irenæus, confuses the Elder John of Jerusalem with the Apostle (see below). Acts iv. 6 mentions a John of Jerusalem who was "of the kindred of the high-priest," and in vi. 7, records the conversion of "a great company of the priests" (*cf.* Jn. xviii. 15). Of course in Polycrates' time Asia had long since learned to claim the tomb of two Apostles.

the Asiatic "Passover" were mistaken in their fundamental contention, or their chief witness. Polycarp had been eighty-six years in the Lord's service at his martyrdom in 155-6 A.D. He was therefore born of Christian parentage, *ca.* 69, and may well have celebrated "the true Passover of the Lord" with "John and other Apostles" in his boyhood. But we have no need, with Irenæus and the Quartodecimans of 190-200, to subpœna the whole group of "apostles," "witnesses," and "elders" to "Asia" (!). The Jerusalem church is that which will have perpetuated the observance of "the fourteenth day of the moon, on which day the Jews were commanded to sacrifice the lamb," observing it as "the feast of the Saviour's Passover."<sup>1</sup> With this church alone could Polycarp enjoy the experience described. After its overthrow in the war of Bar-Cochbar, the influence of men like Papias and Polycarp made Ephesus the heir of many of its precious "traditions." But bodily transfer of the group of "witnesses" to Asia has only late and prejudiced testimony in its support.

9. "The elders, the disciples of the apostles," often quoted by Irenæus, are shown by his formulæ of citation to be the same as those whose "traditions" were cited by Papias. Irenæus simply borrows the citations, in one instance only subjoining, "These things Papias, who was a hearer of John and a companion of Polycarp, an ancient worthy, witnesseth in writing in the fourth of his books." He also confounds the two Johns of Papias, and obliterates, as we have seen, the distinction between direct discipleship and report from travellers. But *the traditions themselves*, two of which have special relation to "John," bear the stamp of their real origin.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> According to Epiphanius, they employed the "saying of the law (*sic*), Cursed is everyone that keepeth not the Passover on the fourteenth day of the month."

<sup>2</sup> Irenæus calls them "The Elders," "Elders the disciples of the Apostles" (*cf.* Eusebius). Papias obtained his traditions not from Apostles, but from "the disciples of these," and Papias (*vera lect.*) οἱ τούτων [*sc.* the Apostles] μαθηταί, "Elders who in Asia (*sic*) conferred with John the Lord's disciple," and "who saw not only John, but others also of the Apostles."



According to Irenæus (*Her.*, ii. 22, 5) "the Elders" reported as a deliverance of "John" that Jesus when he taught was of the *ætas* senior, which begins after a man has reached his "fortieth or fiftieth year." Of course this cannot be the *Apostle* John, as Irenæus thinks; though he may be right in claiming for the tradition the support of "the Gospel."<sup>1</sup>

The other tradition regarded by some as "Johannine," though given only as from "the Elders the disciples of the Apostles," is a chiliastic interpretation of Mt. xiii. 8 (*cf.* Mk. iv. 8) which well accords with the descriptions of Papias' "interpretations." It explains that there are three places of heavenly reward, Heaven, Paradise, and "the City" (*i.e.* Jerusalem). Those who have "brought forth a hundred-fold" will be taken up into Heaven. Paradise (Ezek. xxviii. 13; *cf.* Lk. xxiii. 43) will be for those who brought forth sixty-fold; "the City" for those who "brought forth thirty-fold." Jesus referred to this when he said, "In the places belonging to my Father<sup>2</sup> there are many mansions." The three degrees were also symbolised in the triclinium of the wedding-feast.<sup>3</sup>

It is scarcely needful to inquire in what region men spoke of Jerusalem as "the City,"<sup>4</sup> nor what church interpreted "the times of the kingdom" after this manner. We are concerned with the *logion* supposably derived from Jn. xiv. 2. Yet the Elders have both a different phraseology, and a different and apparently more original sense.<sup>5</sup> If, then,

Luthardt's assertion that "Papias understands Apostles by *πρεσβύτεροι*" has become chronologically untenable since the publication of De Boor's new fragment (*ἕως Ἀδριάνου ἔζων*). Papias means by "Elder" (πῑ) one who forms an earlier link in the chain of tradition, especially the disciples of the Apostles. He also employs the term to distinguish the John (of Jerusalem?), who is his own contemporary, from the Apostle John. Aristo, of course, though an Elder (Cod. arm. *eritsu* Aristo), had no need to be distinguished by it.

<sup>1</sup> *Cf.* Jn. viii. 57. Possibly the tradition is an outgrowth of the *logion* Jn. ii. 19; *cf.* ii. 20-21.

<sup>2</sup> *Ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς μου*, as in Luke ii. 49, against Jn. xiv. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Mt. xx. 28, β text.

<sup>4</sup> See below on the usage of Revelation, and *cf.* Mt. v. 35.

<sup>5</sup> The *πολλαί* has no appropriateness in Jn. xiv. 2.

Irenæus takes the quotation from Papias, and Papias from "John," this again cannot be the author of the Fourth Gospel. It may well be a Palestinian "Elder."<sup>1</sup>

10. Papias of Hierapolis vouches for his *Expositions of the sayings of the Lord* (140–155) as of the type desired by Polycarp, orthodox and historically authenticated. He had long made it his practice to gather them from travellers who came his way. In direct discourse he gives the very questions he was wont to put to learn the deliverances of the Elders:— (1) What (by the Elders' report—*τοὺς τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἀνέκρινον λόγους*—) did the Apostles say, Andrew, Peter, Philip, Thomas, James, John, Matthew, and the rest? (2) What are their<sup>2</sup> disciples, Aristo (of Pella?) and the Elder John (of Jerusalem?) now saying? By such questions Papias felt that he gained more than from books on the true interpretation of the Lord's sayings.

As we have seen, the exigencies of his theory lead Eusebius to locate in Ephesus Papias' group of Apostles and Elders (*cf.* Acts xv. 2), the authorities for evangelic tradition. But the material itself is opposed. To the rule that Irenæus does not specifically state his "traditions of the Elders" to be drawn from Papias, there is one exception. It is a Jewish *midrash* on Gen. xxvii. 28 (Irenæus cites this verse), and is found also, in slightly variant form, in the *Apocalypse of Baruch*. Irenæus says that the "Elders who saw John, the disciple of the Lord, relate that they had heard it from him as a teaching of the Lord concerning the times of the kingdom." It is a description of the miraculous fertility of the soil in Messiah's kingdom, interpreting "plenty (רַב) of corn and wine" (Gen. xxvii. 28) as if it read "10,000 (רַבּוּ) of corn and wine." That it is not a teaching of Jesus, but a Jewish

<sup>1</sup> The alleged saying, a "winged word," is (in the Elders' sense) one of the commonplaces of current apocalypse (*cf.* *Secrets of Enoch*, lxi. 2. "In the world to come there are many mansions prepared for men"; also *ibid.*, ix. 1, *Baruch* iii. 24, and *Eth. Enoch* xxxix. 4, 7, 8, xli. 2).

<sup>2</sup> Reading *τουτω* for *του κυ*. The oldest (Syriac) text omits the clause and has the form Aristo (not Aristion).



*midrash*, is perfectly obvious.<sup>1</sup> Irenæus adds that he cites from Papias.

It is almost superfluous, after this, to point to the Palestinian stamp of Papias' traditions regarding Matthew and Mark. "The Elder's" endorsement of Matthew and apology for Mark points in this direction, as well as the possession of the data. Also the fact that Papias should have no more intelligible rendering for *Methurgeman* than ἐρμηνευτής, since only the bilingual Palestinian church had room for such a functionary.<sup>2</sup>

Matthew and Revelation<sup>3</sup> are thus Papias' two apostolic writings. His crude chiliasm, complained of by Eusebius, Maximus Confessor, Photius and others, is not more indicative of Palestinian derivation than the local colour of his traditions. In short, Papias shows whence he draws his material by his whole purpose, which is (1) to historically authenticate the received tradition; and (2) to carry through, against Greek deniers of the (fleshly) resurrection and (apocalyptic) judgment, the strong, crude eschatology of Jewish Christianity.<sup>4</sup> The daughters of Philip, formerly of Cæsarea (Acts viii. 40, xxi. 8), later of Hierapolis, are specifically named, and are doubtless representative of those "who came his way."

<sup>1</sup> It is possible that the Jewish formula of citation may account for the *midrash* being attributed by "John" (of course, not the Apostle) to Jesus. Thus in Eph. v. 14 Paul cites from the *Apocalypse of Elias* (so Epiphanius) by the phrase "he (or "it," i.e. Scripture) saith" (διὰ λέγει). The Elders freely employ literature of the class of the *Apocalypse of Baruch* (Schlatter, *op. cit.*, finds traces of *Enoch*, *Assumptio Mosis*, 2 Esdras, and *Pseudo-Jeremiah*), and in quoting the *midrash* would be apt to use an equivalent phrase. The subject Ἰησοῦς would be later supplied.

<sup>2</sup> *Anglice* "dragoman." Mark was Peter's subordinate in the ministry. In Syriac the stem (*turgam*) still means "to preach."

<sup>3</sup> Eusebius passes over his use of Revelation with a mere generality; but the fact is indisputable. Andreas of Cæsarea not only tells us he vouched for its ἀξιώπιστον but cites from him "word for word" a quotation of Rev. xii. 9 employed by Papias in exposition of Mt. xii. 22-29 (not Lk. x. 18 [Lightfoot]; cf. "Heads against Caius" *Hermathena*, vi. 397-418, July 1888, Irenæus, *Her.*, iv. 27, 1-28, 1, and Apollinaris ὁ δῆσας τὸν ἰσχυρόν). The interpretation of the "Elders" of Rev. xiii. 18 cited by Irenæus is also probably from Papias.

<sup>4</sup> See Luthardt, *St John* (transl. of C. R. Gregory), pp. 130-132.

But Papias is also acquainted with "books" in line with his own, though he "did not think he could learn so much" from them as by his inquiries. What, then, were these books? The language and structure of Papias' preface and the purpose he professes suggest acquaintance with (1) the writings of Luke. Papias, however, takes rather the attitude of reinvestigating the sources than of employing this predecessor in the field. (2) Eusebius credibly informs us that he echoed a passage from 1 John, perhaps the same which pleases the ear of Polycarp. Use of the X literature is suggested also by the phrase "commandments derived from the Truth itself" (*cf.* 3 John 12).

If we ask then, finally, what Papias thought of the residence and literary work of the Apostle John, it will be apparent from the foregoing that John is for Papias (1) one of the distant (probably Palestinian) group of eyewitnesses of the Lord;<sup>1</sup> (2) the source of certain highly chiliastic traditions of distinctly Palestinian stamp; (3) the *authority* for (author of?) the Book of Revelation.<sup>2</sup> With this exception there is no ground to suppose that Papias ever thought of John otherwise than as a deceased member of the group of "witnesses" in Palestine. That he ever dreamed of connecting John's name with the X literature is improbable.

10. Of Justin's appeal to the "Apostle John" as the seer of Patmos, to support his own chiliasm, but neglect to even employ him as an evangelist, or teacher of the Logos doctrine, we have already spoken.

11. Hegesippus the Palestinian (175-189) treats that church with its group of "witnesses," especially the "kindred of the Lord" who survived "until the reign of the Emperor

<sup>1</sup> *Cf.* the Lucan use, as above (p. 327) and Acts xiii. 31 (τῷ λαῷ).

<sup>2</sup> The alleged statement of Papias that the Lord's saying Mt. xx. 23 was fulfilled in that "James and John were killed by the Jews" would be fatal to the tradition of Ephesian residence, but is wholly untrustworthy. (See Harnack, *Chronologie*, p. 666). We can only infer that Papias felt the difficulty of reconciling Mt. xx. 23 with Rev. i. 2, 4, 9, xxii. 8, and met it with an "interpretation" compatible with the ἀξιόπιστον of the latter.



Trajan" (and, so far as appears, that church alone), as the faithful custodian of apostolic tradition. The church in Palestine long remained free from heresy, because of those who "took the lead of every church as witnesses and as kindred of the Lord." Ephesus as a seat of tradition seems unknown.

12. Leucius Charinus the Docetist (A.D. 160–180?) sets afloat his heretical *Acts of John* by means of a legendary account of the Apostle's coming to Ephesus and activity there "after his exile in Patmos," but betrays no knowledge of any connection of John's name with the X literature. Thereafter legendary tales of the Apostle John in Ephesus rapidly multiply in connection now with Papias' "Elders," now with the unexplained "we" of Jn. xxi. 24.

This review of early as against late second century tradition regarding John in Ephesus surely bears out the statement that "if the claims of Rev. i. 4, 9, xxii. 8, be denied, the very foundations of the tradition are swept away."<sup>1</sup> In fact this expresses but half the truth; for if Revelation be indeed pseudonymous, it could never have obtained its currency in Asia, with John himself recently in residence there.

The claim must be judged by its correspondence with the book itself. If true, the authorship will be hard to reconcile with that of the X literature. If false, we have come upon the *πρώτον ψεύδος* of the whole problem. The editor who furnishes this Asiatic setting for a Palestinian apocalypse doubtless, like Papias, conceived John to hold this Jewish, chiliastic type of eschatology. He may even be supposed to

<sup>1</sup> See Scholten (*Het Apostel Johannes in Klein-Asië*, Leyden, 1871). But Scholten's argument suffered greatly from two defects. (1) His radicalism led him to almost wanton denials of the authenticity of the very documents that should have supported his case, such as the epistles of Ignatius and Polycarp, together with an arbitrary rejection of the epistle of Irenæus to Florinus. (2) Tübingen influence led him, while rejecting the Johannine authorship of Revelation, to treat the book as a unit, an anti-Pauline polemic, and to date it A.D. 68–69. On both points modern criticism reverses Baur's opinion, and thus nullifies the chief grounds of Hilgenfeld's attempted refutation of Scholten. The rest disappear when Polycarp is admitted to have "seen Apostles" in Palestine.

have had some tradition, more or less credible, connecting the visions with John;<sup>1</sup> but to make the Apostle John himself directly responsible for the representations now in dispute, is something which the contents of the book must prove true or false.

The motive of the setting is unmistakable. The Gnostic heretics referred to in ii. 6, 9, 14, 15, 20–22, 24, iii. 9, who “denied the resurrection and the judgment,” are to be confuted by the voice of the surviving pillar-Apostle, who accordingly is brought to Patmos long enough to receive and deliver his prophetic message, any change in which is threatened with a direful curse (xxii. 18–19). The location was well chosen. Patmos was near enough to account for the appearance of the book in Asia with its message of “John to the Seven Churches,” remote and inaccessible enough to forestall the objection, “But we never knew of the Apostle’s having been in our vicinity.” The occasion also is made conveniently vague. The Apostle had been there, at a time not stated, “for the word of God and the testimony of Jesus.”

But the main contents of the book, purporting to be received in vision “after” the messages to the Seven Churches, is an apocalypse, or rather agglomeration of apocalypses, which plant themselves squarely in Palestine. The Hebrew *gematria* (xiii. 18), the angelology and demonology (“Michael and his angels warring with the Dragon and his angels,” xii. 7), might be accounted for as mere Jewish habit of thought. But the Hebrew terminology and geography, Euphrates the barrier against invasion, ix. 14, xvi. 12, Armageddon (*i.e.* Megiddo, ער מנור, *not* הר) as the great battle field, Mount Zion as the place of Messiah’s appearing, the valley of Hinnom as the scene of the vintage of blood, xiv. 20, “oil and wine” as the principal fruit products, “wheat and barley” as the grains, vi. 6, and the like, show that the work itself was composed for Palestinian readers. Moreover, the prophet speaks of Jerusalem

<sup>1</sup> So my *Introduction to the New Testament*, 1900, pp. 235–239. Further study convinces me that the book, like nearly all of its class, is pseudonymous.



as "the City,"<sup>1</sup> xi. 13, xiv. 20, "the great city," xvi. 19, xi. 8, "the holy city," xi. 2, "the beloved city," xx. 9. He speaks of "the rest of mankind which . . . worship devils and idols," ix. 20, of Gentile Christians as "the rest of the seed" of the Daughter of Zion, xii. 17, of Messiah as "the man-child who is to rule all the Gentiles with a rod of iron," xii. 5, xix. 15, depicting in fact the whole apocalyptic drama from a narrow Palestinian-Jewish standpoint; giving frequent occasion to the editor to interpret for non-Palestinian readers (iv. 5, v. 6, ix. 11, xi. 4, 8, xii. 9), and to adapt for later times (xvii. 10-11), and a wider circle (vii. 9-17, xv. 3, xvii. 6, 14, etc.). The seer speaks of "the Apostles" objectively (xviii. 20, xxi. 14), whereas the editor will have him to be himself the Apostle John. But in reality the Christology of the editor is by far the more developed and metaphysical, not to say loftier of the two (*cf.* i. 18, xix. 13b, xxii. 13, 16, with i. 8, v. 5, xii. 5, xix. 11-21 except 13b); and but for the mitigation of some of the later passages, we should find it even harder than now to reconcile the savage vindictiveness of the prophet against Rome and the heathen generally, with "the meekness and lowliness of Christ." As for the Ephesian editor being himself the Apostle John, lately come from Patmos, where he "saw and heard these things," that is hard to reconcile with the fact that "these things" are not what any seer, apostolic or other, ever saw in Patmos, or, for the matter of that, in Palestine either. They are certainly elaborate compositions of the highest artificiality, full of calculation, allegory, adjustment, adaptation, typical specimens of their class in being woven together of earlier material, both literary and traditional.<sup>2</sup> Thus the framework of alleged vision is an undeniable fiction, which should not be lightly laid to the charge of the Apostle John. Literary fictions of the kind were customary, however,

<sup>1</sup> *Cf.* the tradition of "the Elders, the disciples of the Apostles," above (p. 330), and Mt. v. 35.

<sup>2</sup> "It seems to be settled that the Apocalypse can no longer be regarded as a literary unity. Against such a view criticism finds irresistible considerations." (W. Bousset, art. "Apocalypse," in *Encycl. Bibl.*, sect. 32.)

and one can easily see why the authority of the Apostle John should have been thus invoked.

From the direct internal evidence of Revelation we must return to the claims of the appendix to the Gospel. If by rejecting the former we leave the tradition of the Johannine residence defenceless against the negative evidence of all early writers, at least the appendix is not involved; for, as we saw, it favours, if anything, John's continuance at the head of the group of "witnesses" in Palestine. Moreover, the most serious objection to its claim is decidedly diminished. Instead of the formidable evidence of Revelation itself, directly exhibiting a type of culture, mind, doctrine, language, and style in extreme contrast with the X literature, the author of the appendix confronts now only the testimony of some unknown Ephesian editor of 95 A.D., borne out indeed by Papias and his Elders, but conceivably wrong, concerning the type of doctrine maintained by John. Clearly the first step must be to investigate the date and value of the statement Jn. xxi. 24.

It is commonly argued that because we have no manuscripts of John which lack the appendix, the Gospel can have had no considerable circulation before this was attached. The truth or falsity of the argument depends on the strictness with which the word "the Gospel" is taken. Too much is made of the plea in any sense; for it is clear that a very slight variation of the chances of survival and destruction might have left us equally without manuscript evidence of the circulation of Mark without either its longer or shorter appendix,<sup>1</sup> or of Romans without the appended doxology. But the absence of manuscript evidence does tend to prove one thing, viz., that if the Gospel ever circulated without it, it was so different as not to create the impression of being the same book in different form, so that transcribers were not tempted to perpetuate the variants.

<sup>1</sup> The suppression of Mark in the original form indicates how easily such writings might be superseded by a more acceptable type.



To admit, then, that "the Gospel" never circulated without the appendix,<sup>1</sup> is not to admit that the X literature did not circulate; nor even that we have not evidence for *some form* of the Gospel not accompanied by the appendix; for this we have. Papias and Polycarp show acquaintance with the epistles; but acquaintance on their part with the Gospel *as we have it* has been shown to be improbable.

Recently evidences multiply of early Johannine narrative tradition other than our Gospel. What was the nature or possible relation to the X literature of the newly-found Gnostic Gospel of John cannot be known until its text is published. But it is at least likely to be connected with that found by Epiphanius' Jewish convert Joseph in the house of the hereditary Patriarch of the sect in which Joseph himself was an elected "Apostle." Epiphanius describes it as "the Gospel according to John translated into the Hebrew tongue, and the Acts of the Apostles." This writing (or writings) appears from Epiphanius' further statements to have been a heretical production having resemblance to Luke-Acts, but also to John, and the latter close enough for blundering Epiphanius to call it a "translation."<sup>2</sup>

More important is the fact that *all* the evidence of acquaintance with the X literature previous to 170 A.D. is of a character to suggest that the Gospel circulated, if at all, in a different form; in particular *minus* the appendix. Resemblances in the few passages claimed as "employments" even so late as Justin are much more remote than in "employments" from the other Gospels, and their derivation is disputed.<sup>3</sup> Jn. xxi. appears unknown.

<sup>1</sup> Were the statements true of Smith's *Bible Dictionary*, 1869, article "John, Gospel of," that "There is an early tradition recorded by the author of the *Synopsis Scripturæ* in Athanasius that this Gospel was written many years before the Apostle permitted its general circulation," this would radically affect the case. But it appears to be a simple blunder.

<sup>2</sup> Epiph., *Her.* xxx. 6; cf. 14 and xxviii. 5. Quoted by Wilkinson in the *Crit. Rev.*, Jan. 1902.

<sup>3</sup> An instructive instance, usually overlooked, is found in Justin's (?) treatise on the Resurrection (A.D. 150-180 [Harnack]), where the material is

Perhaps the earliest of all employments (of the Fourth Gospel?) is that found in Mk. xvi. 9–20. This appendix to Mark, Zahn, in his *Kanongeschichte*, ii. xiv. 1a (1892), had already proved to rest, at least in the latter part, upon a Gospel narrative directly or indirectly accessible to Jerome,<sup>1</sup> but unknown to us, when F. C. Conybeare announced the discovery of an Armenian manuscript which gives it under the separate title, “From the Elder Aristo.” Even if this be not the Aristo of Papias, and even if neither be identified with Aristo of Pella, author of the *Dialogue of Jason and Papiscus*,<sup>2</sup> it is certain that we have in this appendix the abstract of a document belonging to the period of Papias and Justin. Moreover, either the maker of the abstract or “Aristo” himself<sup>3</sup> combined material now found partly in Luke, partly in John,

derived from sources unknown to us. “When his disciples did not believe that he was really risen in the body, as they gazed on him and were divided in mind, he spake unto them, saying, ‘Have ye not yet faith? See that it is I myself.’ And he bade them handle him, and showed them the prints of the nails (Jn. xx. 25) in his hands, and when they had recognised by every test that it was he himself in the very body, they invited him to eat with them, that they might learn by this also that he was really risen in the body; and he ate a honeycomb and fish, and thus proved to them that there really is a resurrection of the flesh” (τῆς σαρκός). Cf. Mk. xvi. 9–20, Lk. xxiv. 37, 42, Acts i. 3, 4, x. 41, and Ignatius, *Ad Smyrn.*, iii. The *logia* Jn. iii. 5 and xiv. 2 have already been spoken of.

<sup>1</sup> Jerome in quoting adds after Mk. xvi. 14, *Et illi satisfaciebant dicentes. Saeculum istud iniquitatis et incredulitatis substantia (v. l. sub Satana) est, quae non sinit per innuendos spiritus veram Dei apprehendi virtutem: ideo jam nunc revela justitiam tuam.* This, as Zahn shows, belongs to the original context. See his *K.G.*, p. 935 f.

<sup>2</sup> We have independent information from Jerome himself that he knew and employed the *Dialogue of Jason and Papiscus*. Origen (*Ctr. Cels.*, iv. 52) informs us that the *Dialogue* contained “allegorical explanations and interpretations” (ἐξηγήσεις) of Scripture “proving that the predictions regarding Christ fitly apply to Jesus.”

<sup>3</sup> The latter is more probable; for Celsus, employing besides the Synoptic Gospels the *Dialogue of Jason and Papiscus* (Origen, *Ctra. Celsus*, iv. 52), declares that confessedly the only resurrection appearances of Jesus were “to a hysterical woman and to his table companions, wholly in private.” Cf. Mk. xvi. 9–11 and Jn. xx. 1–18. The employment of “John” by Celsus is highly improbable. Alleged instances have the same bearing as the other early references we adduce.



partly outside the canon. Now in Mk. xvi. 9–20 the form of the tradition characteristic of Mark's Gospel, and principally followed in Matthew, viz. the Galilean, *is ignored*. The post-resurrection scenes are restricted to Jerusalem. Notoriously this exclusion of the Galilean tradition is a striking peculiarity of Luke as against the earlier Gospels. But the contrast is greater still in John. Here Judæa is the original and the principal scene of Jesus' ministry, and Jerusalem the home of his adherents generally (vii. 3, xii. 17–19). The three<sup>1</sup> resurrection appearances, including the great commission (xx. 21–23), are all in Jerusalem. But this is true only of John *without the appendix*. In the appendix a fourth appearance is added purporting to be a "third" (xxi. 14), while the contents themselves prove it to be originally a first.<sup>2</sup> Thus John *as we have it* represents the third stage, in which the tradition, having first been of the Galilean type of Mark, Matthew (except the doublet, xxviii 9–10), and (in part) the *Gospel of Peter*, next of the Jerusalem type of Luke and Jn. i.–xx., is made to include a combination of both. Of these three types it is not the last, but the *second* which is known and employed in Mk. xvi. 9–20. Had its author known the combined (third) form, he would surely not have chosen that which involves his work in self-contradiction, besides leaving the promise of the angel, "Ye shall see him in Galilee as he told you," unfulfilled, and Peter, his hero, under the unlifted cloud of disgrace! To suppose that he had before him our Fourth Gospel's account of the appearance to Peter and the rest in Galilee with the miraculous draft of fishes, and the beautiful story of the rehabilitation and induction of Peter into the office of chief shepherd, yet passed this all over for the sake of material so ill-adapted to his purpose as Jn. xx. 11–18 *plus* Lk. xxiv. 13–35, is to make him out incredibly unfit. What really seems to lie

<sup>1</sup> The arrangement of the material in threes and sevens is a well-known characteristic of this Gospel.

<sup>2</sup> So in the *Gospel according to Peter*. On the appearance in Jn. xxi. having been originally a first, see below. The same is true of Lk. xxiv. 36–43; cf. xxiv. 34 with xxiv. 41.

before him is neither our Luke, which he contradicts (Mk. xvi. 13-14 against Lk. xxiv. 33-34), nor our John, which represents the third stage of the tradition, but either an earlier form of John, or a narrative of the type employed by Ignatius,<sup>1</sup> Justin on the Resurrection,<sup>2</sup> Celsus (?), and Jerome.<sup>3</sup>

Thus the appendix to Mark and the appendix to John both represent adjustments of the two streams of tradition regarding the resurrection. In the one case the Galilean has been suppressed in favour of the Jerusalem tradition; in the other the Jerusalem tradition has been supplemented by the Galilean.

But as with the Gospel itself, so with the appendix. External evidence can present negative proof, but only in the form of an argument from silence. Internal evidence alone can be decisive as to date and authority. And the internal evidence of the appendix agrees with the apparent ignorance of all early writers of its claim.

1. Furrer, writing on the "Geography of the Fourth Gospel,"<sup>4</sup> refers to the consensus of critics that the words τῆς Τιβεριάδος in John vi. 1 are a gloss attached before the diffusion of our manuscripts. Jewish writings of the second

<sup>1</sup> Origen declared the quotation to be from the *Preaching of Peter*. Eusebius did not know. Jerome found it in his *Gospel according to the Hebrews*.

<sup>2</sup> Mk. xvi. 14 ("he upbraided them because they believed not them which had seen him") disagrees with Lk. xxiv. 34. The feature was naturally omitted by Luke after verse 37, its place being taken by xxiv. 25. But the "upbraiding" and the eating with the disciples are both found in Justin's source (see above, p. 339, note).

<sup>3</sup> The same inference (temporary survival of the narrative in earlier form) may be drawn in regard to other parts of the Gospel from the additions of later manuscripts after Jn. v. 30, and from Tatian's manipulation of the material in his *Diatessaron*. The textual evidence proves v. 3b-4 to be foreign to the Gospel in its ultimate form. But the "angel troubling the water" is no invention of scribes, for it is presupposed in verse 7. Its reinsertion in the text can be accounted for only by its survival in some cruder form of the narrative. In my article, "Tatian's rearrangement of the Fourth Gospel" (*Am. Journ. of Theol.*, Oct. 1900), I have suggested a similar explanation for the improved order adopted by Tatian and the Syr<sup>sin</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> *Zts. f. n. t. Wiss.*, November 1902.



century and Pausanias afford, as he shows, the first evidence of the superseding of the old name, "Sea of Galilee," or "Gennesareth," after Tiberias had acquired its later predominant importance.<sup>1</sup>

But the appendix has "the Sea of Tiberias" pure and simple. Furrer, therefore, dates it "bedeutend später."

2. The tendency of Mark xvi. 9-20, of Luke, of John i. 20, is progressive towards suppression of the Galilean form of the tradition of the resurrection, in favour of that which denies the "scattering of the sheep,"<sup>2</sup> and beginning with Mt. xxviii. 9-11 (= verses 7-8) builds up an account which starts with an appearance to Mary Magdalen, and ends with an overcoming of the incredulity of the disciples in *Jerusalem*.

The appendix to John follows the still later tendency to reinstate the Galilean tradition, harmonising in xxi. 14, and presenting it in a form similar to the *Gospel according to Peter*, wherein the same tendency to combination appears. A similar adjustment seems to be attempted toward the relative claims of Peter and John, those of John being really a later growth.<sup>3</sup>

In the appendix Peter is the Lord's φίλος; John his ἀγαπητός (xxi. 15-17, 20). The function of witness-bearing (μαρτυρία) is divided between the two. Peter receives, besides the office of chief shepherd, the crown of "martyrdom"; John becomes the μαρτύς who abides until the second coming, the "witness of Messiah."<sup>4</sup>

3. The conception of the function of John as against Peter, just referred to, almost reverses synoptic tradition. Martyrdom

<sup>1</sup> The only mention of Tiberias in the Gospels is John vi. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Mark xiv. 27-28, omitted by Luke, and contradicted by his account of events.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Mt. xvi. 18, Lk. v. 1-11, xxii. 32, xxiv. 12, with Gal. ii. 9, Lk. xxii. 8, Acts iii. 1, 11, iv. 13, 19, viii. 14, Jn. i. 35-42 (John the first follower of Jesus, earlier than Peter), xiii. 23-25, xix. 25-27, 35, xx. 1-9 (against Lk. xxiv. 12, John the first to believe in the risen Lord).

<sup>4</sup> On the animus of the appendix, see Klöpper, "Joh. K. 21," in the *Z. f. nt. Th.*, 1899. But his views are pushed to an extreme

(suffering) there is the part of John (Mk. x. 39). If Peter suffered such a fate, the first trace of it is in Clement of Rome. New Testament writers (except 2 Peter, 150 A.D. (?)) ignore it. The specific application to John of the *logion* regarding the "witnesses of Messiah" (Mt. xvi. 28; cf. 2 Esdr. vi. 26, Rev. xi. 3-13) testified to in the "saying" alluded to in xxi. 23, comes in after Mt. xx. 23 = Mk. x. 39. It may have grown up in consequence of the long survival of this Apostle. At any rate it is much later. The scoffs alluded to in 2 Peter iii. 4 are met in the Leucian-Prochorus legend by the story of John's *metastasis*, or miraculous survival in the grave. Our appendix meets them by giving a conditional form to the *logion*, and making the witness-bearing the point in question. Not only, as with Papias, must there be found an acceptable "exegesis" of Mk. x. 39, but of Mt. xvi. 28 as well. This latter *logion* has not only received its specific application to John, but the current interpretation of this must be corrected, because this Apostle, too, has "fallen on sleep."

These three considerations may perhaps be reconciled with a date for the appendix shortly after the death of John. But what we know of the disputes in Asia concerning the Second Coming and the Resurrection corroborates the much later date suggested by the lack of early acquaintance with the appendix.

What, then, finally of the authority of the statement Jn. xxi. 24?

The similarity of style and language between the appendix and the Gospel is not too great to be fully accounted for by simple imitation, *plus* a revision of the Gospel itself by the supplementing hand. Were it otherwise there might be force in Lightfoot's contention for attributing at least verses 1-23 of the appendix to the author himself. As it is, marked differences both in style and doctrinal conception have been pointed out repeatedly from Scholten to Schmiedel, of which, perhaps, the most important, in view of the debates of the period, are the return of the appendix to synoptic usage



regarding the resurrection (Jesus "is raised"—*ἐγείρεται*—not "rises"—*ἀνίστησι*—from the dead) and the Second Coming (with xxi. 23 *cf.* xiv. 22–23). But difference of authorship is implied in what has already been shown regarding the relation of the Galilean tradition of chapter xxi. to the Jerusalem tradition of chapter xx. The writer of chapter xx. did *not* stultify his own work by representing the disciples as returning to their occupation on the "Sea of Tiberias," ignorant of the Lord's resurrection (xxi. 4), after he had previously related the overcoming of all their doubts and the equipment of them with their great commission (xx. 22–23). He did *not* conceive himself to have related but *two* appearances "to his disciples," merely because "he was manifested first to Mary Magdalen." He did *not* first forget that Peter was under disgrace, then, recollecting himself, give him his reinstatement at "the *third* time that Jesus was manifested to the disciples." These are additions by one whose conception of events and of doctrine are different, tending to revert toward the synoptic type.

Unquestionably this editor adjusts his own style to that of the book he is supplementing (xxi. 7*a*, xviii. 19), and the converse is also probable (ii. 22, xii. 33); but he draws his material from new and alien sources, destroys the symmetry of the Gospel by adding an eighth to its cycle of seven "signs," and a fourth to its three "manifestations," and closes with a travesty of its conclusion. Unless we attribute the misunderstandings in ii. 20–22 (iv. 44–47), xii. 29–30, xviii. 9, to some other hand, he shows himself repeatedly unable to penetrate the real sense of the book he edits. Such testimony has no inherent authority. Its reliability or the reverse depends wholly upon the sources of its information.

From Clement of Alexandria and the Muratorian fragmentist to Matthew Arnold, critics have yielded at this point to the temptation to give the rein to fancy. It was easy to combine in thought the "we" of xxi. 24 with Papias' group of (Apostles) Elders and Witnesses, and to talk of John's "fellow-disciples and bishops," his "friends" or "the presby-

tery of Ephesus," in spite of the self-evident fact that the redaction is the work of a single hand. But an ounce of tangible evidence is worth pounds of fancy, and there is evidence in the unmistakable relation of xxi. 24 to a favourite phrase of his predecessor, especially as found in xix. 35 and 3 Jn. 12. Not even Zahn believes that we have here identity of authorship. The writer of xxi. 24, who is certainly responsible for the whole appendix, simply takes up and interprets the phrases of xix. 35, 3 Jn. 12. He speaks for himself and the body of orthodox believers who agree with him in accepting the embodied "testimony and writing" as "true"; but his "we" gives no more real reason to think of a publication committee of Ephesian elders than in 1 John i. 1-4, iv. 12-16, v. 18-20. He regards the phrase "the disciple whom Jesus loved" as a veiled reference to John (in which he is probably correct), and draws from xix. 35 the inference still drawn by so many (though even Zahn rejects the exegesis), that the writer is the "witness" himself, the son of Zebedee.

But to raise the question of the true inferences to be drawn from the X literature itself, would be to transgress our present limits. The direct internal evidence of the appendix lacks both antiquity and authority. It appears to be quite innocent of the taint of pseudonymity which clings to the editorial *cadre* of Revelation; but as regards credibility, is even harder to reconcile with all early tradition regarding the Apostle. The motive in both cases is manifest. The authority of the chief surviving Apostle was required in the one case to support the Palestinian eschatology against deniers of the "resurrection and judgment," in the other to support a Pauline Logos doctrine, faithful to historic tradition as understood in Pauline circles, against an ultra-Pauline, Docetic dualism, which "denied that Christ was come in the flesh," "perverted his teachings," and forgot the law of love, the "new commandment which he gave unto them."

B. W. BACON.



## ZOROASTRIANISM AND PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY.

(Concluded from *Hibbert Journal*, July 1903.)

THE REV. JAMES MOFFATT, D.D.

FURTHERMORE, the Babylonian background of Rev. xii., upon which Gunkel<sup>1</sup> has laid excessive stress, discloses the possible presence of additional conflate elements. For the presence of a so-called Babylonian feature does not necessarily involve direct and simple Babylonian influence. The question is not so much, Where did this come from? as, How did it come? It is a problem of conveyancing. Behind both Parsi and Jewish thought, as Cheyne has excellently urged (*Jewish Religious Life after the Exile*, pp. 259 f., *Encycl. Biblica*, i. 167, 1073, iv. 5439), Babylonian ideas lay. Consequently, when the Mazdean element does occur (as is often the case) in combination with some Babylonian feature (see Cumont, i. 233 f.), the former may be the direct historical medium, whilst the Babylonian element may form an ultimate source

<sup>1</sup> The Hellenic, Egyptian, and Zoroastrian elements in the apocalyptic traditions underlying Revelation are too plain to be disregarded, and it is idle to plead (*Schöpfung und Chaos*, pp. 283 f.) that Palestinian Judaism was unlikely to assimilate such modes of thought. The Apocalypse is a product not of Palestinian but of Asiatic Jewish Christianity, and in a forthcoming edition of the book I hope to indicate the religious bearing of these elements in its situation. In a recent article (*The Monist*, April 1903), which supplements as well as recapitulates his former work, Gunkel still ignores unduly Zoroastrian influences on the Apocalypse. Calmes (*Revue Biblique*, 1903, pp. 52-68) practically follows suit, deriving "les symboles de l'Apocalypse" wholly from reminiscences of Babylonian mythology.

incorporated by the later religious development, just as Assyrian art in the Achæmenian age influenced Iranian (*cp.* Spiegel in Geiger's *Ostiranische Kultur*, E. Tr., ii. 252 f.). When the spread of Zoroastrian ideas can be demonstrated, is it not legitimate to conjecture that they were the immediate means of carrying into Judaism or early Christianity what may be described as infusions of the Babylonian or Accadian faith? The conflate eschatology of the Essenes, with its Persian Hades and its Babylonian myth of the happy island (unless this be Hellenic): the Amshaspands with their analogue in the seven planetary spirits of Babylonian mythology (Stave, 217): the combination of the Zoroastrian *fravashis* with the characteristic<sup>1</sup> Babylonian star-lore in Rev. i. 16–20: these are cases where the conception is dual or conflate, whilst the medium of historical influence on Judaism and primitive Christianity appears to have been Zoroastrian.<sup>2</sup> Possibly Rev. xxii. 16–17 echoes also the Iranian conception that water and light were connected, a cosmological myth (not unknown to Egyptian and Babylonian astro-theology) according to which “the bright and glorious star Tistrya,” who prevails over his evil opponent, was “the seed of the waters” (see Yasht, viii., xii. 29; *S. B. E.*, iv. 225, 227).

The principal cause of this fusion of ideas lies in the prevailing syncretism of the age. No doubt “syncretism” is a term

<sup>1</sup> The *fravashis* were occasionally associated with stars by the Persians; but it was Babylonian (*cp.* Rawlinson's *Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia*, ii. 49, iii. 54, 59, etc.) to assign certain stars to certain lands, with whose fate and fortunes they were supposed to be bound up.

<sup>2</sup> A similarly conflate feature occurs later in Gnosticism (*cp.* Anz., “Zur Frage nach dem Ursprung des Gnosticismus,” *Texte und Untersuchungen*, xv. 4, pp. 85 f.), where the ascent of the soul is due probably to Persian theology (*cp.* Böhlen, 31 f., 59), whilst the seven doors are Babylonian (κλῖμαξ ἐπτάπυλος). For the Persian and Babylonian background to the term “Son of Man,” *cp.* Gunkel's *Schöpfung und Chaos*, p. 331, and Hommel's article in *Expos. Times*, xi. 341 f. Völter, in Preuschen's *Zeitschrift* (1902), pp. 173–174, finds a parallel and clue to the “Son of Man” figure in Dan. vii. 13, in the Amshaspand *Khshathra vairyia*, who is a personification of the divine kingdom (*cp.* Rev. xiv. 14) to be established after the downfall of evil.



liable to abuse; like the Genoese term *altro*, which Dickens found so conveniently ambiguous and elastic, it can play many parts; it may be stretched unscientifically to cover gaps in our knowledge of that obscure region, the Oriental religious mind in Asia Minor, or the East generally, during the first and second centuries A.D. Yet no other term is adequate to describe the motley, seething situation in culture and religion. The soil was porous, the atmosphere radiating. The later Jewish literature and to a large degree the early Christian writings in the second century show rich and often miscellaneous deposits of expression and belief, evidently filtered down from the varied tides of Oriental culture that surged across the Roman empire, and especially Asia Minor, at that epoch (*cf.* Bousset, pp. 467 f. and Harnack's *Ausbreitung*, pp. 16 f., 355 f., 461, etc.). Assimilation in conception and expression was the order of the day. Give and take was a prevailing tendency. Nor did the more definite beliefs of Judaism (see Bousset in Preuschen's *Zeitschrift*, 1902, 23-49) and Christianity utterly discard elements of alien origin if the latter could be refashioned to serve their own purposes. *Spoliaverunt Ægyptios, profectique sunt.*

The Sibylline oracles form one brilliant example of this religious syncretism, and the lost Hystaspes-prophecies (known to Justin) were in all likelihood a blend of Iranian and Jewish theologumena. But a rather apposite example of specially Avestan eschatology, assimilated and adopted for messianic purposes, appears to be afforded by the Jewish source underlying Rev. xi. 3-13, where the two powerful prophets who usher in the latter days (xi. 14 f., xii. 1 f.) with Messiah's birth and entrance on the scene, correspond vaguely in one or two features to the Iranian reformers Hushêdar and Hushêdarmah (*S. B. E.* xxiii. 195 f.). The latter also appear after a temporary triumph of the evil spirit (*cf.* Rev. xi. 1 f.), act each for a millennium on earth, and serve as precursors and heralds of their Lord, the final Sosioch or Saviour (the Persian Messiah), whose debut is contemporaneous with the final outburst of evil (*cf.* Rev. xi. 7, 15 f., xii., xiv. 14 f.). As Persian experts demonstrate

(*cf.* Hübschmann, p. 227), this Iranian conception is much older than the books in which it occurs; and as no exact equivalent for Rev. xi. 3-13 is visible in Jewish eschatology, it seems not unreasonable to seek a clue for it in this ethnic environment of Mazdean messianic doctrine. Stimulated by the kindred elements of the latter, the conception of Rev. xi. 3-13 probably arose on definitely Jewish soil, to be exploited by the Christian prophet afterwards in his vision of the future. Only the uncertainty about the document in question and the age of the ideas which it reproduces, makes one hesitate to find the sequel (Rev. xx. 1-4)<sup>1</sup> anticipated by the tradition of Bund. xxix. 7-9, according to which Dahak or the serpent is first captured and "confined in Mount Dimâvand [a volcanic peak near Teheran]; when he becomes unfettered, Sâm [a latter-day hero] arises and smites and slays him."

Let me also throw out the suggestion that a further Iranian touch, hitherto undetected, occurs in Rev. xiv. 18, where a proleptic vision of judgment (probably a Jewish apocalyptic source edited) describes the final horrors which precede the righteous reign of God. These are set in motion by an angel "with power over (the) fire." Why this reference to fire, when the context alludes to a bloody vintage or a true Senlac (*sang lac*) of grim, exultant retribution? In view of viii. 3-5, where, as here, the altar is introduced, the fire may mean the heavenly wrath that sets judgment afoot on earth. But it is surely more than a fortuitous coincidence that in Iranian theology Asha Vahista, the Amshaspand of Righteousness or the Moral Order, is the angel of fire (especially the

<sup>1</sup> At anyrate the analogous myth of a double judgment upon evil spirits, which underlies Jude 6, 2 Pet. ii. 4 f., reminds one of Hellenic Titan-speculations as much as of a post-exilic tradition like that of Isa. xxiv. 21-22 and Enoch x. 4; though Grill (pp. 8 f.) points out the Hellenic affinities of certain later Persian speculations. In Bund. xxxiv. (*S.B.E.*, v. 149 f.) the millenia are reckoned by the Zodiac, the sign of the 8th being that of Scorpio (*i.e.* Dahak, the adversary). This flows from the Babylonian inclusion of astronomy in theology (*cp.* Anz., pp. 65-68), and its astro-theological belief that "the signs of the Zodiac had once been the monster allies of the dragon of chaos" (Sayce, *Gifford Lectures*, 1902, p. 481; *cp.* pp. 234 f., 479 f.).



sacrificial fire). When it is remembered that the seven Amshaspands<sup>1</sup> (Yasht, xiii. 82–84) suggested the seven spirits of Rev. i. 4, iv. 5 (the latter passage being also illustrated from the sevenfold burning altars and the *septem pii sacerdotes* of Mithra<sup>2</sup>), the probability of this allusion in xiv. 18 to the “crushing ascendant of Asha” is greatly heightened. Other Zoroastrian parallels to the language of John’s Apocalypse might be found in the frequent Iranian invocation of the deities as “high-girt” (*i.e.* ready for action), corresponding to the description of Christ as “girt about his breasts with a golden girdle” (Rev. i. 13; *cp.* Yasht, xv. 54, 57, “O great Vayu, thou who art high-up girded, firm, swift-moving . . . Vayu of the golden girdle”); in the custom of the Mithraic initiates who refused to be crowned (Rev. iv. 10; see Tertullian’s *de Corona* 15, where he points Christians to his example — “statim creditur Mithrae miles, si deiecerit coronam, si eam in deo suo esse dixerit”); in the entrance of plague and famine upon earth as a token of the end (Plut., *de Isid.* xlvii.; *cp.* Rev. vi. 8, Luke xxi. 11, etc.), and the removal of mountains (Rev. vi. 14; “the earth being made plain and level,” Plutarch) which as “the work of the evil spirit disappear

<sup>1</sup> They aid God in punishing evil and bringing about the final restoration, so that the angelology of the Book of Revelation roughly corresponds to the Iranian scheme and to the dominant factors of Jewish eschatology which, as Dr Köhler argues (*Jewish Encyclopædia*, i. 582–579), consisted in the ideas of “the celestial throne with its ministering angels, and the cosmos with its evil forces to be subdued by superior angelic forces.” Unlike the Iranians, however (Bund. xxx. 23, etc.), the Christians offer no praises to these archangels or spirits; adoration is strictly reserved for God and Christ.

<sup>2</sup> Tertullian complains of this deity marking his soldiers on their foreheads (*cp.* Rev. xiii. 16), and among his favourite titles were *æternus*, *invictus*, *δικαίος θεός*, *sanctus* and *secularis* (“God of the ages,” *cp.* 1 Tim. i. 17). The worship of this *μειστήρ*, born amid the rocks, adored by shepherds, victor over life and death, judge and saviour of his people (who were born again, *renati in æternum*), has left its traces even in Britain, thanks to the popularity of the creed among the officers and men of the Roman legions. Three temples of Mithra, dating from the second and third centuries, have been found in this country, one at High Rochester in Northumberland (*cp.* *Harvard Classical Studies*, xi. 1900, 46 f.), and by the last quarter of the first century he had a footing in Rome itself besides his hold of the Eastern Mediterranean.

with him" (West, on Bund. xxx. 33); in the tripartite division of the world (Rev. viii. 7 f.), an Iranian view founded originally (so Darmesteter; *cp.* Yasht, xiii. 3; Yasna, xi. 7; Farg. xliii. 63 f.) on the division of the universe into earth, air, and sky; and so forth. Light also is thrown on "the three unclean spirits like frogs" (Rev. xvi. 13) if we turn to the evidence for the Zoroastrian's peculiar hatred of these as creatures of Ahriman (Plut., *de Isid.* xlv. ; Farg. v. 36, xiv. 5, xviii. 73, with Darmesteter's<sup>1</sup> notes) who occasion plagues and death to men. The fierce doom of Rev. xix. 17-18, where birds are called to devour the flesh of Messiah's foes, is paralleled by the supreme penalty inflicted on the carcasses of those who resist Mazdeism, namely, that they be given over to corpse-eating birds (the ravens, Vend. iii. 20, ix. 49); although the Assyrian "stele of the vultures" (before 3000 B.C.) offers an even closer coincidence, with its corpses of the foe lying bare on the field and devoured by vultures. With Rev. xx. 14 ("and death and Hades were thrown into the lake of fire"), compare Plutarch's sentence "at last Hades fails" (*ἀπολείπεσθαι*, or "perishes" if we read with Bentley *ἀπολέσθαι*, with Markland and Reiske *ἀπολείσθαι*). Böklen, however, ingeniously pleads for "is emptied or bereft" (*i.e.* of its inhabitants) as the true rendering, in which case the parallel would be Rev. xx. 13.<sup>2</sup> Finally, in the late Bund. iii. 25 f., the war in heaven (Rev. xii. 7 f.) is illustrated by a description of the vain onset made by demons and planets against heaven and the militant angels, with the ensuing tribulation upon earth. Compare further with Rev. xii. 12, Ahura's warning (Bahm.

<sup>1</sup> "The frog is a creature of Ahriman's, and one of the most hateful; for in the sea Voura-ka-sha, it goes swimming around the white Hom, the tree of everlasting life, and would gnaw it down." *Cp.* Hübschmann, pp. 230-231. Gunkel (p. 387) less successfully explains that these amphibious creatures would be the natural missionaries on earth for Tiāmat, whose seat is in the waters—which is true, but not the total explanation.

<sup>2</sup> One curious parallel in favour of this interpretation, which he has not noticed, is Plutarch's derivation (earlier in the same essay, ch. 29) of Amenthes, the Egyptian Hades, as meaning "to receive and to give up" (*τὸν λαμβάνοντα καὶ δίδοντα*).



Yasht, ii. 54)—“that wicked evil spirit, when it shall be necessary for him to perish, becomes more oppressive and more tyrannical.” And the special punishment of the air (Rev. xvi. 17), when taken with passages like Eph. ii. 2, vi. 12 f. (where the air is the arena and haunt of demons), corresponds to a favourite<sup>1</sup> tenet of Zoroastrianism which assigned the activity of evil to the atmosphere between the earth and sky (Yasht, xiii. 13; *cp. S. B. E.* iv. p. lxiv). It is noticeable that Ephesians, whether an epistle of Paul or not,<sup>2</sup> reflects the Western Asiatic situation from which the Apocalypse of the prophet John arose at a somewhat later period, and that the language of this epistle is occasionally distinguished by echoes not simply of the peculiarly Iranian imagination<sup>3</sup> that a struggle between two worlds, the upper and the lower, was inherent in the moral conflict of humanity (Stave, pp. 180 f.), but also of the cognate belief in a Satanic opponent of God and God’s people, who, like Angra Manyu, has a hierarchy of subordinate demons at his command (*cp. Matt. xxv. 41, Rev. xii. 8*).

Upon the other hand, the conceptions of heavenly clothing (Lueken, pp. 122 f.), and of the heavenly books,<sup>4</sup> do not enter our present purview; for, although these were originally

<sup>1</sup> But not, of course, distinctive; see Philo, *de gig.* § 2; Plut., *de Isid.* 26; also Rohde’s *Psyche*, pp. 415 f., 548 f., 609 f. The cognate belief in Beliar as the prince of the firmament had entered Jewish apocalyptic at an earlier stage (see Everling’s *Paulinische Angelologie*, pp. 105 f., Stave, pp. 227 f.). Originally a god of the under-world, he may have been (as the allusions in some Greek writers suggest to Bousset) equivalent to the Iranian Ahriman.

<sup>2</sup> Here, as so often in such historical inquiries, we find ample corroboration of the principle, enunciated by George Eliot with reference to Savonarola and his faith in visions, that “the relative greatness of men is not to be gauged by their tendency to disbelieve the superstitions of their age.”

<sup>3</sup> This is allied, of course, to the Gnostic or Hellenic depreciation of the material as the unspiritual, which is overheard in the Fourth Gospel also—another document of Western Asiatic Christianity. Such vague allusions, in Ephesians at any rate, meant rather more to its original circle than the mere imaginative arabesque and “quasi-poetical representation” of the faith (Denney, *The Death of Christ*, 196 f.) which is all their modern significance.

<sup>4</sup> Professor Horn (p. 10) sees in this one trace of that “kaufmännische Sinn des Persers,” which other phrases and ideas of Iranianism occasionally exhibit. Mithraism, too, had its *album sacratorum* and its divine ἐντολαί.

Zoroastrian, they seem to have filtered into primitive Christianity through the Jewish apocalyptic in which, for over two centuries, they had been incorporated and modified. A similar remark probably suffices for the idea of millennial periods which in some later strata on the circumference of primitive Christianity (Rev. xx. 1 f., 2 Pet. iii. 8) we see beginning already to emerge. It is not, however, until beyond the limited period of our survey that signs appear of early Christian myths, corresponding roughly to those of pre-Christian Jewish apocalyptic, upon originally Iranian notions such as the heavenly food or the heavenly fragrance (see Weinell's *Wirkungen des Geistes*, pp. 197–198), or the fiery stream in the next world, for of course passages like Rom. xiv. 17, or Rev. ii. 7, etc., are as irrelevant to the first of these realistic ideas as are 2 Co. ii. 14–16, Phil. iv. 18, Eph. v. 2 to the second, whilst the myth underlying the words of 2 Pet. iii. 10, like the fiery lake of the Apocalypse, belongs to a different cycle of tradition. Indeed, the majority of eschatological Avestan reminiscences in the New Testament, even in the apocalypse of John, give one the impression of being indirect. Jewish apocalyptic has demonstrably mediated nearly all of them. And, in some cases,<sup>1</sup> coincidences between primitive Christianity and Zoroastrianism, which are at first sight plausible, turn out to be either superficial or dependent for their effect upon the adroit uncritical isolation of certain features in systems broadly and essentially incongruous. Historical truth in a matter of this kind eludes the eyes that peer through anti-Christian spectacles or level at her the sorry telescope of verbal prepossessions.

Such reservations and qualifications are necessary to this,

<sup>1</sup> The New Testament allusions to Christ as the heavenly "leader" (*ἀρχηγός*) are an instance in point (*cp.* Heb. ii. 10, etc., Acts iii. 15, v. 31). They warrant no hypothesis of a reference to the Iranian functions so richly assigned to Sraosha as the conductor, the Persian Hermes, of the departed. Yet as for Mithra, he "was—to use the philosophical terminology of the period—the Logos attested by God, who shared the divine omnipotence and, after creating the world as demiurgus, continued to watch over it" (Cumont).



or indeed to any similar inquiry in the field of comparative religion. To suspect resemblances is a wonderfully safe rule here, and many keys must be tried before one fixes upon filiation as the means of unlocking the problem at any point. But in the case of primitive Christianity, where the susceptibility to Iranian influence was at once traditional and contemporary, inherited through Judaistic eschatology and historical (at least in certain circles of the faith), the most discriminating soul need not feel great hesitation in postulating the existence of an influence exerted, however impalpably and fitfully, along the lines and in the degree already defined, by Iranian theologumena upon subsidiary outworks on the circumference of early Christianity. Internal and external evidence here kiss one another. Familiarity on the part of some early Christian writers with Mazdean thoughts must, I think, be granted. More than familiarity now and then. No doubt, even in eschatology (where, like Judaism, the new faith naturally had most in common with Avestan belief), vital differences are patent, both in principle and in detail (see Dr R. H. Charles, *Crit. Hist. of Eschatology*, pp. 135 f., and Söderblom, pp. 151 f.). As a religious system, Zoroastrianism was, at several points, diametrically opposed to Judaism, and much more to early Christianity. The latter could learn little from a religion which had become burdened with such superstitions as that of the Haoma and fettered by ceremonial purity and externalism, exposed, too, by its endless reiteration of certain chants and high estimate of repeated prayers, to the rebuke of Matt. vi. 7. Yet the finer spirit of the Avestan cult was singularly akin (shall we say, attractive) to that of Christianity in several of its phases. For example, the Zoroastrian conception of God is never sensual or freakish, like the Hellenic sometimes. Crude it may be, but never is it stained with vice; and this salient feature, together with its hot emphasis on personality,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "Persian religion is, if we sum up its tendencies in a single word, the religion of will—the religion which seeks everywhere to impress personality on the world of things" (Julia Wedgwood, *Moral Ideal*, p. 58).

must have commended it to Jewish Christians no less than to Jews who chanced to come across it. The Gâthas, too, are full of a sturdy optimism with its passion for an end which means the advent of the Messiah and the triumph of God's kingdom, and this involves a puritanic attitude of the saints, whose goodness is identified with an eager propaganda (Yasna, xxxi. 3, etc.) and incessant warfare against evil.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, the practical piety of the Iranian<sup>2</sup> was nourished not simply on personal decision and effort, but on what may in one sense be termed a belief in revelation (*cp.* H. O. Taylor, i. 107; Yasht, i. 1-7), although, as Darmesteter has pointed out (*S. B. E.*, iv. p. lxxxv), it is man's wish and not, as in the Bible, God's spontaneous desire that prompts all revelation in the Vendidad. The Iranian God speaks, but his speech is not voluntary. "My name is The One of whom questions are asked": obviously the initiative is on man's side, so that the Iranian *torah* or Law becomes a series of questions put to God with their due answers. On the subject of retribution, the affinities between Zoroastrianism and Judaism or early Christianity were much closer (see Yasna, xliii. 5, a striking passage), and the same holds true of the belief in a bodily resurrection—the latter being, as the evidence of Theopompus and the early Avesta (*e.g.* Yasna, xxx. 7, and Yasht, xix. 11, 89) indicate, a pre-Achæmenian doctrine, born of the Mazdean's intense feeling

<sup>1</sup> There is much that would incline one to support the verdict of so cautious and competent a Zend scholar as Professor Moulton, that, with regard to demonology in general, "the doctrine of the New Testament might be broadly enunciated in terms which would accurately describe Zoroaster's own teaching" (Hastings' *Dict.*, iv. 992).

<sup>2</sup> "The Zarathustrian doctrine is the first serious attempt to conform material interest and duties with the spiritual needs and longings of mankind, and to reconcile the temporal with the eternal by regarding the former as reflecting and preparing for the latter" (C. P. Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion*, i. 192). Compare the cognate idea of the saints as fellow-workers with God, who by their good life and works promote his cause on earth (Yasna xxviii. 4 f., xxx. 9, xxxiii. 14, etc.). This runs through Iranianism. The fravashis of the saints even co-operate in the final overthrow of the wicked nations (Yasht, xiii. 12-19, 48, *cp.* Rev. xvii. 14, xix. 14, 19).



for personality and aversion to anything like extinction or absorption. Jewish and early Christian opinion fluctuated on the question whether God or the Messiah was to raise the dead, but Persian eschatology (Stave, 149 f.) seems to have favoured the latter view. The curious thing is that, in contrast to the author of the Fourth Gospel (and to Enoch li. 1-3), the prophet John, though elsewhere influenced (as we have seen) by Mazdean traditions, prefers to omit his Messiah from the scene of resurrection and judgment (xx. 11 f., yet see xxii. 12), whilst at the same time he agrees with Iranian belief (Yasht, xix. 89, Bund. xxx. 7) in postulating a general, instead of a particular, resurrection. But most impressive and striking of all,<sup>1</sup> perhaps, is a double analogy between the judgment-scene of Mazdeism and that of early Christianity; viz., in the beautiful unconsciousness of their own goodness shown by the righteous (*cp.* Matt. xxv. 37 f.), and in the earnest emphasis laid upon beneficence or charity as the criterion of character (*ibid.*, 34-36; see Plato's *Republic*, 615b, where Zoroastrian influence has been conjectured). In the eschatological Yasht, xxii. 9 f., the soul of the departed faithful is met by a fair, bright maiden, who informs him, to his naïve surprise, that she is his own good conscience<sup>2</sup>: "I was lovely and thou madest me still lovelier . . . through this good thought, through this good speech, through this good deed of thine." And what is the particular definition of the goodness which thus ensures a man's entrance into future bliss? He is told: "When thou wouldest see a man making derision<sup>3</sup> [of

<sup>1</sup> I pass over the remarkable Zoroastrian anticipation of Christianity which meets us in its wonderful doctrine of heaven and hell as mental states and not localities (*e.g.* Yasna, xxx. 5)—a belief which deserves all Dr Mills' glowing words (*S. B. E.*, xxxi. p. xx). This was one of the glories of primitive Zoroastrianism; but a tinge of abstractness probably robbed it of popularity, and its spiritual inward truth became externalised and degraded in the subsequent development of the faith.

<sup>2</sup> Miss Frances Power Cobbe aptly compared Bunyan's fine vision of *Mr Good Conscience* being trysted to meet old *Mr Honesty* at the river of Death.

<sup>3</sup> Seydel (p. 266) cites a Buddhistic parallel to this. I cannot help adding the felicitous anticipation of Jas. i. 27 in Yasna xxxiv. 5, where Zarathustra

holy things] and practising idolatry, or rejecting (the poor?) and shutting his door [on them, *cp.* Luke xvi. 20 f.], then thou wouldest sit singing the Gathas and worshipping the good waters and Âtar the son of Ahura Mazda, and rejoicing [with alms] the faithful that would come from near or far." Similarly Yasht xxiv. 36: "Thou art entreated (for charity) by the whole of the living world, and she [*i.e.*, the law of Ahura Mazda: see the striking parallel in Matt. xxv. 40] is ever standing at thy door in the person of thy brethren in the faith" (*cp.* Vend. iii. 35, xviii. 33 f., xix. 29, with Tobit iv. 7-11, and Slav. Enoch ix).

Lack of space prevents me from deploying any further analogies and affinities of this kind, or from attempting precisely to explain how and why such of them as represent Iranian influence came to their very subordinate rank inside the early Christian array of doctrines that bordered on demonology, angelology, and eschatology in general. But enough evidence has been led, I trust, to justify the present tentative essay. The subject of Mazdean impact on primitive Christianity<sup>1</sup> has been vitalised by recent researches in comparative religion, partly through the study of Zoroastrianism and Judaism, partly through the new light thrown upon the propaganda and diffusion of the later Mithra-cult<sup>2</sup> within the Roman Empire. The data which I have selected and sub-

cries, "What is your kingdom, O Mazda?" It is no ritual or material splendour but charity—"to care for your poor in their suffering," and also, from a sense of gratitude, to consecrate one's soul and body to God and to God's purposes (*ibid.*, 1-2).

<sup>1</sup> J. Weiss, in his *die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes* (2nd ed., 1900), pp. 30-35, for example, inclines now to admit that the religious dualism (see Volz: *jüdische Eschatologie*, 1903, sect. 23), visible in such writings as the *Assumptio Mosis* and Rev. xii., or in such sayings of Jesus as those preserved in Matt. xii. 25-29, may have been derived from phases of the later Judaism which had been coloured by Persian ideas.

<sup>2</sup> The Teylersche Theologische Gesellschaft, at Haarlem, have just reset, as one of their prize-theses for 1904, the question of the relationship between Mithraism and the early Christian legends and beliefs. Those who cannot consult Cumont's large work may find convenient résumés of it in his German abbreviation (published by Teubner), or in his authoritative article in Röscher's



mitted bear only upon a restricted portion of the inquiry. Still, their bearing is a factor which is neither to be exaggerated nor *a priori* to be waved aside. Not unfairly it may demand to be estimated in any historical study of Christianity's genesis and growth during the first two centuries of our era. Fortunately, at this time of day, it is superfluous to premise that such researches do not necessarily presuppose, as they certainly do not encourage, any crude indisposition to appreciate the seal and accent of originality, of uniqueness, of essential independence in the spirit of primitive Christianity. To be convinced of the latter truth is entirely compatible with the sense which grows upon almost anyone who investigates the new faith in juxtaposition with Zoroastrianism or any other contemporary cult of the ancient world—the sense that even inside the valley of the New Testament certain Christian doctrines or ideas, with charm and appeal for modern eyes, resemble water-lilies which, on the surface of the stream, lift white and golden cups to face the sunlight, while far below their stems are rooted in the mud and ooze brought down from many a distant alien soil.

JAMES MOFFATT.

DUNDONALD, AYRSHIRE.

*Lexicon d. Griech. und Rom. Mythologie*, ii. 3028–3071 ; whilst Mr J. M. Robertson, in his books on *Christianity and Mythology* and *Pagan Christs*, has popularised many of the leading facts in a manner which—apart altogether from his polemic and fantastic conclusions—must be admitted to deserve rather more notice than has yet been generally accorded him by English writers.

# SOME THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE ICONOCLASTIC CONTROVERSY.

ALICE GARDNER.

THE Iconoclastic Controversy is one of those theological conflicts which have had results in other than theological regions so momentous as partially to obscure the main points at issue. There have been many iconoclastic controversies in the history of religion, and there are likely to be many more, but that known as the Iconoclastic *par excellence* is that which was begun by the Emperor Leo the Isaurian in or about the year 726, and which came to an end in 842, on the first "Orthodoxy Sunday," the anniversary of which remains as a perpetual festival in the Eastern Church.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A few of the chief dates in the Controversy may be useful :—

716. Accession of Leo III. (the Isaurian).

726. First edict against images.

729. Deposition of the Patriarch Germanus.

741. Accession of Constantine V. (Caballinus).

754. Iconoclastic Council at Constantinople (anathematised in 769 by Council of the Lateran).

775. Accession of Leo IV. (Chazar).

780. Irene the ex-Empress (Athenian and Iconodulist), regent for Constantine VI.

787. Synod favourable to images. (Second of Nicæa.)

795. Beginning of controversy concerning Emperor's marriage.

797. Constantine blinded. Irene sole ruler. Restoration of exiles.

802. Irene deposed. Nicephorus I. Emperor.

806. Controversy respecting restoration of the priest Joseph.

811. Emperor Nicephorus killed in battle against the Bulgarians. Michael Rhangabe succeeds.

813. Leo V. (the Armenian Iconoclast).



All historians of the Middle Ages, even the least ecclesiastically inclined, have been obliged to dwell on the results of this movement in its political results, in so far as it put a stop to the three-cornered game in Italy between Popes, Lombards, and Exarchs, and brought about the final catastrophe in which the Frank ended the unstable equilibrium by throwing his sword into the scale.<sup>1</sup> Or, again, we may view the conflict as an episode in the rivalry of East and West, as one of the causes which, by breaking up European unity, opened a way for the entry of the Turk. And yet again, it exhibits on a large scale and in a clear light the antagonistic claims of the ecclesiastical and the secular power, especially in regions where the secular authority had not met with much effectual resistance from those who held spiritual sway. And even apart from its general historical bearings, the controversy attracts us by the striking characters of some of the leaders on both sides. Yet amid all the political and the dramatic interest of the struggle, we must not forget the principles for which it was maintained, seeing that they involve rival conceptions as to the authority of Christian tradition, the essential nature of Christian worship, and the most fundamental doctrine of the Christian creed, while beyond all this they summarise opposite views as to the whole manner and disposition in which human nature should endeavour to reach after that which is divine.

It is not necessary for our purpose to inquire into the difficult and obscure question as to how the iconoclastic movement first arose. We are told that the edict of Leo III. against

814. Renewed persecution of Iconodulists.

815. Partial recall of exiles. (Theodore of Studium remains a prisoner.)

820. Murder of Leo. Michael II. succeeds. Another council proposed.

826. Death of Theodore of Studium.

829. Theophilus Emperor (conciliatory).

842. Michael III. Regency of Theodora. Restoration of images.

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps some persons only know of the controversy from a frequently quoted letter, now almost universally regarded as spurious, in which Pope Gregory II. tells the Emperor Leo that if he were to come into the schools in Rome, the children would throw their books at his head.

images was preceded, three years earlier, by a similar movement on the part of the Caliph Jezid, and that the Emperor was induced to follow his example under the influence of Oriental heretics (especially of the Montanists) and of fanatical Jews. Yet we know that the earlier iconoclastic Emperors compelled the Montanists to be rebaptized, persecuted the Jews, and waged successful warfare against the Mahometans. Thus much of truth may lie at the bottom of the story: that Leo III. and Constantine V., in their wars with the Arabs, had come in contact with a religion which existed on a minimum of symbolism, asceticism, and mystic contemplation, and that this type of religion was proving itself excellent for fighting purposes. The religion of Byzantine monks, on the other hand, tended to withdraw from the service of the State that mental and moral energy just then so desperately needed. The popular religion of the day tended rather to multiply causes of verbal strife at home than to unite all parties in patriotic resistance to an alien foe. The irritation which Constantine Caballinus is said to have felt whenever he heard a pious or superstitious ejaculation from any of his courtiers may have been due to a contempt for personal timidity. But, so far as we can judge, the course of the innovating princes was determined not by a moral idea, but by motives of practical expediency.

The Iconoclastic movement was notably unfavourable to learning, and it certainly was not propitious to art. On this aspect of the subject, however, we cannot now dwell,<sup>1</sup> except to remark that the artistic side of the question was even less likely than the philosophic to meet with adequate attention from contemporaries. If art in the ninth century—in spite of the rise of Byzantine architecture—cannot be said to rank very high, art criticism had sunk still lower. It is a curious fact that in the whole controversy very little distinction is made between good pictures or statues and bad ones. Thus the Iconoclasts never urge what would seem to us a natural

<sup>1</sup> It has been taken up by Kondakoff, in his *Histoire de l'art Byzantin*.



argument: that the best representations of which contemporary art was capable could only give inadequate or even perverted conceptions of forms that religious feeling would fain clothe with majestic beauty. To them a picture, in so far as it was a picture, was like the original. The measure of success with which the artist had attained his object was irrelevant. But the voice of history, if the anti-iconoclasts could have heard it, was all on their side. For a religion which forbids all attempts to use imagination and manual skill in representing objects of veneration, must in time stifle all the nobler kind of art, or at least thwart and arrest true artistic development. The art of Mahometan peoples, with all its glory of colour, is lacking in form, and is regarded by most good critics as poor and debased. The defenders of images were, even from the æsthetic point of view, not merely the preservers of the stiff Byzantine icons. In the principle that art can and should be hallowed to the service of religion, they sowed a seed that was hereafter to spring up into a glorious and fruitful life.

There is one more view of images not entirely theological which may be noticed before we pass on: the notion of pictorial representations as a concession to the weaker brethren and a boon to the illiterate. This conception is well set forth by Gregory the Great in the frequently quoted letter which he wrote to Serenus, bishop of Marseilles. This prelate had been taking strong measures against images at least a hundred and twenty years before the edict of the Emperor Leo, and Gregory considered his conduct worthy of a reprimand.<sup>1</sup> "It is one thing to adore a picture, another to learn, through representation in a picture, what is worthy to be adored. For what the faithful who read receive from books is given to the simple in pictures; since by them the ignorant are instructed in their duty, and in them the illiterate can read." This view is not exactly that of the Greek champions of icons, who, as we shall see, take up

<sup>1</sup> St Greg., lib. xi. ep. 13

higher grounds. And indeed, when Gregory of Nyssa could be quoted<sup>1</sup> as to the tears which arose to his eyes in contemplating a sacred picture, it seemed improper to relegate such pictures to the conditions of aids for the weak and ignorant.

The arguments of the iconodulists are, of course, to be found in a multitude of patristic writers, and recur with tedious monotony. It is generally impossible to say of any disputant that the line which he follows is peculiarly his own. There is, however, some ground for preferring to study their arguments as set forth first in the writings of John the Damascene, and afterwards, more completely, in those of Theodore the Studite, whom Schwarzlose calls<sup>2</sup> “Der Scholastiker der Bilder.” Both of these men represent the cause of monasticism and of learning. John of Damascus, also called Mansur, had been well instructed, according to his biographer,<sup>3</sup> in all Greek learning, though it must be allowed that his description of the Greek sects or schools does not show a deep and first-hand knowledge of their greatest representatives. Thus he writes of the Πυθαγόρειοι ἤτοι Περιπατητικοί, and his account of the Platonists would make them socialists after the fashion of Plato’s Republic. Yet he wrote an elaborate *Dialectica*, and also an account of one hundred heresies, prevalent in his own or in earlier days. As seen through the haze of pious romance which gathered about his person, the Damascene appears even more as monk than as philosopher. He refused, it was said, all the enticing offers of the Caliph who ruled over Syria in order that he might lead a monastic life in Palestine. His opposition to the iconoclasts began early, and was based on firmly laid theological principles.

A yet more attractive and commanding figure is that of Theodore of Studium.<sup>4</sup> Born of an official father and an

<sup>1</sup> By Theod. Stud., lib. ii. ep. 36.

<sup>2</sup> *Der Bilderstreit*, kap. iv. s. 180.

<sup>3</sup> Viz., John of Jerusalem. The biography is in the first volume of the Migne edition of John of Damascus.

<sup>4</sup> See his two biographies in Migne,—especially that by Michael the Monk. For his arguments against the iconoclasts see especially his three



ascetically pious mother, and trained by an uncle who was always in opposition to the ruling authorities, Theodore united the characteristics of a recluse, a diplomatist, a leader, and a dialectician—yet above all things he was a theologian. As controversialist, he is not above the fierce tone of his times. Some of the disputes in which he was involved were about matters that seem at first sight trivial and personal. Thus his second exile was the result of his objection to the restoration, without sufficient canonical penance, of the miserable priest who had been used as cat's-paw by the Patriarch Tarasius to celebrate the illegal marriage of Constantine VI. But even there Theodore was asserting a principle, and to his puritanic cast of mind no principle was indifferent. His greatness as organiser appears in the fortunes of the two monasteries over which he presided in succession—Saccudio in Bithynia, and Studium in Constantinople. His catechetical addresses to his monks are a perpetual trumpet call to toil, to fasting, to prayer, to suffering, resonant with stern and triumphant joy. But he appears greater still and more versatile in his voluminous correspondence. His respect for reason marks him as a Greek. In no letter is he more scathing than in one<sup>1</sup> addressed to a presumptuous young member of his flock who had plunged into the arena of the conflict without the equipments of grammar and philosophy, and who was using and misusing the technical terms of the controversy without an adequate appreciation of their significance. He was not, however, a stickler for mere verbal definition. His enemies accused him of the heresy of the Gnosimachi—one of the sects described by John of Damascus, which seems to have been based on some kind of supposition that theological disputes are futile, and that "he can't be wrong whose life is in the right." This charge was

Antirrhetical Discourses, and among his letters lib. i. 35, 65, 161, 199, etc.,—though in all his writings the thought of the icons and of the indignity to which they are subjected is never far from his mind. Theodore is the subject of a monograph by C. H. Thomas, Leipzig, 1892. See also Marin: *De caenobio Studio*, Paris, 1897.

<sup>1</sup> Lib. ii. ep. 151.

made when his opposition was on a moral question, that of the Emperor's marriage, but it may be said that the image question was equally a moral one to him. His opponents did not differ from him in the articles of the creed which they accepted. But their principles of action seemed to him to be inconsistent with the doctrines underlying the formulæ they professed, while he and his followers were ready to suffer all things for the sake of righteousness and truth.

The main interest of the theological defence made for the sacred pictures by John, Theodore, and the others seems to lie in three points. Their views involved: first, an interpretation of Scripture according to the spirit rather than the letter, with a respect for tradition such as might perhaps be said to involve belief in a progressive revelation; secondly, an assertion of the humanity of Christ, which, as they said, the iconoclasts would practically deny; and thirdly, incomplete in development, yet discernible beneath the phrases and thoughts of the protagonists, is the mystic or sacramental view of the universe, the conception borrowed by Greek Fathers from Neo-Platonic philosophers, that the whole sensible world is a reflex, or, in a sense, the image of a world supersensual and divine. Let us look a little at these three points in order.

(1) Any reader of John and of Theodore will observe that they are supporters of tradition and accretion as against a literal interpretation of Scripture texts, delivered once for all. In reply to those who urged the Second Commandment as prohibiting images, John of Damascus<sup>1</sup> quoted the words of St Paul: "the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life." Similarly Theodore, in answer to the objection that the Scriptures do not enjoin any reverence to the image of Christ, points out how many other practices and beliefs of Christians are not directly based on biblical commands and statements. These principles might, of course, be carried much further than was contemplated by those who at that time set them forth, and

<sup>1</sup> *Contra Icon.*, i. 5.



indeed it is not clear what kind of authority they would accept without appeal. In two of Theodore's letters<sup>1</sup> the arguments are based on four grounds: Nature, Patristic writings, Decrees of Synods, and Universal custom. The Fathers most frequently quoted are Basil and the two Greek Gregories. The citations from the Areopagitic writings will concern us later on. Passages brought forward on the other side are sometimes rejected as spurious, or as coming from theologians of doubtful orthodoxy, though certainly the quotations made by the iconodulists themselves are in many cases diverted from their primary significance, or are derived from treatises of uncertain authorship.<sup>2</sup> Decrees of councils are often cited, notably the eighty-second of the Quinisext or Trullan Synod, which ordered that crucifixes should henceforward bear the human figure of Christ, not, as formerly, that of the Lamb. But no synod seems to have been regarded as binding in its acts unless supported by the five great patriarchs<sup>3</sup>; and where these are divided, we have a diffusion of powers fatal to any consistent theory of conciliar authority. In the interpretation of Scripture, scope was allowed for the exercise of human reason. Thus the present force of the Second Commandment was modified by an attempt to go back to the original interpretation of the Commandment, which was to prevent the worship of the creature rather than the Creator, and the setting up of *false* gods. The icons, it was said, were not liable in either respect to lead men astray, and the prohibition had no force with regard to images of the incarnate Logos. The charge of idolatry was met in two ways: by a distinction between λατρεία and προσκύνησις, and by an explanation of the act of worship as directed to one Divine Object only. The text: "Thou shalt *worship* the Lord thy God and Him only shalt thou *serve*" was appropriately quoted, though the

<sup>1</sup> In lib. ii. 72 to Nicolas, and in ii. 199 to the Emperors, of which the latter is an expansion of the former, if both are genuine.

<sup>2</sup> Thus Basil is often quoted as author of *Barlaam and Joasaph*.

<sup>3</sup> Of Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem.

interpretation may seem somewhat forced. There is as yet no notion of one infallible interpretation of Holy Writ. Even the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff, however strongly asserted by Theodore in his campaign against imperial claims, appears to differ rather in degree than in kind from the dignity of the other four patriarchs, whose co-operation he anxiously sought to secure. One negative point as to the seat of authority comes out clearly: it does not rest with the secular power. Yet when the secular power intervenes in favour of orthodoxy, it is not reminded of its limitations.

(2) Far more interesting and important is the position taken up by John, Theodore, and the other iconodulists with regard to the doctrine of the Incarnation, which, as they contended, was practically denied by the opposite party. The arguments of their opponents point to a field of conceptions in which the real humanity of Christ had no place. In fact, the phraseology and many of the views of all the writers of the time show that though Monophysitism had been crushed, yet the human and historical element in Christianity had retired into the background of the religious consciousness. The title ἀδελφότης given to St James, and the tenacity with which, in opposition to the Nestorians, men clung to the name Θεοτόκος, as applied to the Virgin, show this tendency on the physical side. In all thought concerning the intellectual and moral being of Jesus, there seemed even less trace of a natural humanity. Yet so long as some craftsmen endeavoured, to the best of their ability, to represent pictorially the events of the Saviour's life, the world could not entirely lose the sense that He had grown up from infancy to manhood and had endured pain and death. To deny the right to represent such events was to withdraw the conception of Christ from all connection with human life. So it was regarded by John, Theodore, and their fellow-combatants. The arguments they used may seem to us too self-evident to need stating. It may appear to us impossible for any man in his senses to doubt whether human existence does or does not involve the posses-



sion of a body under conditions of space and time, and having three dimensions, or whether visibility does or does not imply possibility of pictorial representation. Again, it may seem a waste of logical subtlety to insist that the fact of bearing a personal name must imply something more precise than generic existence; that Christ could not be adequately described as 'man in general,' καθόλου ἄνθρωπος, seeing that He was one particular man. But here the Iconoclasts had to be withstood in the same manner as the Manichees, or rather, the doctrinal basis of Iconoclasm, so far as it existed, is borrowed from that source, and Manichæism always dies hard. John of Damascus, in a very un-Platonic passage, reproaches those who despise matter, which is, after all, a creature of God. With the boldness of a Greek Father, he converts the great proposition of the Fourth Gospel into ἡ σὰρξ λόγος γέγονεν.<sup>1</sup> To Theodore the question is one of supreme importance. If, after employing many modes of argument, he finally falls back on denunciation, and declares "if any man denies Christ depicted in the body (circumscribed or περιγραπτὸς is the more frequent word) let him be anathema," he is moved not by petty spite but by deep indignation. With his conception of Christianity as an imitation of Christ,<sup>2</sup> and with the constant memory of "Christ made like unto us," he felt that in this question of possible "circumscription" his personal religion was at stake.

It may be noticed that the arguments both for and against the use of icons representing Christ had no force as applied to the pictures and statues of saints and martyrs, which were equally prohibited by the imperial edict. It is certainly the case that these icons of undoubted human creatures do not figure very largely in the controversy, though, as we shall see, they are by no means left out. The indignation felt by the iconodulists against those who would remove the images of

<sup>1</sup> "The Flesh was made Word." John Dam, *De Imag.*, Orat. i. 4.

<sup>2</sup> οὐδὲν οὖν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ὁ ἀληθὴς χριστιανὸς ἢ χριστοῦ μίμημα καὶ ἀποσφράγισμα. Lib. ii. ep. 122.

saints was directed chiefly to the glory of Christ. The iconoclasts were more severely rebuked for depriving the Lord of His attendant ministers than for refusing to good and great men the honour that they deserved from posterity.

(3) But there is yet another aspect of the controversy which possesses great and permanent interest. Some passages of the Scriptures or the Fathers quoted by the image-defenders seem to have nothing to do with the matter in hand, except in the way of parable. They deal, in fact, with icons of a very different kind from any that emperors or soldiers could cut down from walls or from pedestals, that the people who passed by could salute or spurn. Yet those who cited those passages were well aware that even the most sacred of the Byzantine icons stood or fell with the conception of the whole material world as a figure and type of that which is spiritual; with the belief that through symbolic representations the human soul can attain to the contemplation of the Divine Glory.

This theory of the universe was not derived by our eighth and ninth century theologians directly from its Platonic or even from Neo-Platonic sources, but from those of the Greek Fathers, who had drunk from the ancient wells without imbibing any doctrine of a suspicious kind. John of Damascus was, as we have seen, anything but a Platonist. Theodore was much read in philosophy, but it is not easy to say whether he had ever handled any Platonic works in their original form. He may or may not have read that splendid passage at the end of the *Timæus*: "This universe hath come into being living and visible, the image of its maker, most fair and perfect, even this one and only-begotten world that is."<sup>1</sup> But we cannot regard him either as a diligent student or as a Christian interpreter of the doctrine of Ideas. Yet, as we have seen, he greatly respected the authority of the Greek Fathers, including

<sup>1</sup> Mr Archer-Hind's translation, p. 345. If the other reading (*νοητὸν* for *ποιητὸν*) be adopted, we have a yet closer approximation to Neo-Platonic ideas, both Pagan and Christian.



that of the mysterious pseudonymous writer who, more than any other, opened a channel from Platonic thought and imagination to mediæval theology, Dionysius the Areopagite.

Perhaps the services rendered by the Neo-Platonists to Hellenic thought in its later phases and to Christian doctrine in its early development have hardly met with adequate appreciation. Their elaborate and complex system, with its vague Oriental accretions, the want of actuality it presented to practical minds like Augustine's, the ease with which it lent itself to manifold abuses, have obscured the fact that those who devised it were at least consistent in maintaining two great principles, which, during that period, were but feebly held in most of the schools and sects. These were: the limitations of the human intellect, especially in relation to the transcendent nature of Divinity, and—closely allied to this—the spiritual education afforded by religious symbolism. If, as Dionysius was constantly saying, the Deity can never be correctly described except in negative terms, still man, who is made in the Divine Image, may receive through sensible things some impression of the supersensual, which are, for him, of the nature of revelation. Thus in this philosophy all ecclesiastical institutions are sacramental in character, and all human virtue and strength partakes of a symbolic nature, since it is what it is only in so far as it shadows forth that Divine glory which was chiefly manifested in the Incarnation of the Logos.

It would be very misleading to say that this mystic theology had been adopted by the Studites or by any of their companions. Theodore can hardly have read the treatise "On the Divine Names," or his theology would have borne some trace of it. Yet he regarded Dionysius, and rightly, as one of the greatest champions of the cause he had so much at heart. However far removed from orthodox Christian thought, the Dionysian writings were respected among ecclesiastics because of the basis they gave to the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. And among the iconodulists they held an exalted rank, because they

assigned to images<sup>1</sup> an indispensable function in the spiritual life of man.

It may be said that so extensive a connotation as must needs be given to the word *εἰκών* or *image* in order to surround it with the halo which it wears in the mystical theology would have spoiled it for controversial purposes. But Theodore at least would not have objected to such an extension of its meaning. He would have applied the term *image* both to natural emanations which possess the qualities of their source—like the rays of the sun—and to works of conscious imitative art. In both cases “the archetype appears in the image.” When he speaks of Christ as having an artificial image,<sup>2</sup> he seems to mean by the word that combination of physical properties which makes sensual perception possible. The passage most frequently quoted in favour of the icons is that from St Basil’s treatise *De Spiritu Sancto*, in which he says: ἡ τῆς εἰκόνης τιμὴ ἐπὶ τὸ πρωτότυπον ἀναβαίνει,<sup>3</sup> which is applied in the first place to the relation of the Son to the Father, but is evidently transferable to other kinds of relations between image and archetype. Theodore charges the iconoclasts with inconsistency because they reverence certain symbols of a non-imitative kind—such as the eucharistic elements, the cross, the book of the Gospels—whilst they forbid the erection of pictures and statues. If his opponents had been well read in Neo-Platonism, they might have retorted that both Christians like Dionysius and Pagans like Julian had dwelt on the special advantage of τὸ ἀνόμοιον in symbols, as leading the mind to rise to the thing signified rather than to rest contented with the sign. To this the modern anthropologist might answer that fetishism is a lower and more primitive form of religion than idolatry. But we must not expect controversialists always to see the full bearing of the principles which they assert.

<sup>1</sup> The word *εἰκών* is used very sparingly by Dionysius, but its equivalents are constantly recurring.

<sup>2</sup> Especially in *Antirrheticus* iii.

<sup>3</sup> The honour paid to the Image ascends to the Prototype.



The relation between prototype and image is thus regarded by Theodore as an exceedingly intimate one. It does not amount to unity in essence (*οὐσία*), though it generally involves identity of name. Thus we say of the picture of a palm tree, "this is a palm"; of the effigy on a coin, "this is the king"; and so forth. Here we seem to have some foreshadowing of the advent of Nominalism. For the controversialist's purpose the close connection is important, because it obviates the necessity of distinguishing between image and prototype as separate objects of worship. The worship is one—that of the prototype—while the reverence paid to the image is only relative (*σχετική*). Thus it was easy to refute a charge brought against the iconodulists, that in venerating the image of Christ they added a fourth person to the Trinity.

It may be observed that Theodore fully allows to his opponents the impropriety of attempting any imitative or even symbolic representation of the Deity, except as revealed in the human Christ. The popular mode of depicting a *Trinita* would have been as repulsive to his feelings as to those of the staunchest Protestant. He even disapproved the practice of artistically representing certain personified attributes of the Divine Nature.<sup>1</sup> Symbol-making run riot was altogether out of keeping with his religious ideas. But he seems to have recognised some symbolical element in all religious act and ritual. This ritual was regarded as a divine gift to man. Even in the early Jewish history, the Almighty had instructed His people by means of visible signs. Thus John of Damascus says: *Αὐτός ὁ Θεὸς πρῶτον ἐποίησεν εἰκόνα*.<sup>2</sup> For God created man to be His image, and by images was man first instructed in his duties towards God.

It must not, of course, be supposed that the image-defenders always occupied such high ground. They were capable of descending to the level of the multitude, and of telling puerile stories about wonder-working pictures and terrible retributions on sacrilegious scoffers. But their party was a large and varied one, and it was no easy task to keep it together.

<sup>1</sup> Lib. i. ep. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Lib. ii. ep. 67.

In fact, both parties in this controversy seem to have combined heterogeneous elements. On the one hand we have zealots for an unattainable purity and simplicity of worship working with secularists impatient of any recognition of religion in morals or in art. On the other, we see votaries of the most grovelling superstitions allied with high-souled philosophers, to whom the Image of the Invisible is the one object to be sought through all earthly shows. Whether or no the alliance was conscious we cannot tell. We have a curious instance of it in a letter from Theodore of Studium<sup>1</sup> to a certain John the Spatharius, who had taken a statue of St Demetrius to act as a sponsor for his child. The act, which seemed to the iconoclasts an instance of degraded superstition, was praised by Theodore as showing a faith worthy to rank with that of the Centurion in the Gospel. For the Centurion believed in the power of a divinely uttered word to heal without bodily touch, while the Spatharius believes in the power of the Martyr, as prototype, to act through his image. How much of materialism may have been blended with this spiritual faith is a doubtful question fit for the modern psychologist.

Yet let us give honour where honour is due. John of Damascus, Germanus of Constantinople, Theodore of Studium, Theophanes the Historian—these and many more were willing to suffer persecution or even death for their convictions. And some at least of their convictions were well worth dying for. The man who is zealously faithful through good and evil fortune to one side of the truth may sometimes show a nobler character and do more good to mankind than he who maintains a calm attachment to a perfectly reasonable cause. The defeat of the iconoclasts may seem to have strengthened the tendency to materialism which degrades the religious life. Yet, looked at more closely, was not the cause of the images at that juncture the cause also of the most purely spiritual faculties of man?

ALICE GARDNER.

NEWNHAM COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

<sup>1</sup> *Contra Icon.*, ii.



## DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

### DR EDWARD CAIRD ON ST PAUL'S ANTITHESSES.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1903, p. 1.)

DR CAIRD has given a very keen analysis of the psychology of St Paul in his recent article on "St Paul and the Idea of Evolution." The writer does not present St Paul's idea of evolution, but rather his own idea of St Paul's evolution. And the Master of Balliol considers that St Paul was unjust to his own past when he described the change wrought in him at his conversion, and that he exaggerated the difference between the Law and the Gospel.

Dr Caird is a consistent advocate of the development of religion. Holding that unity and continuity lie deeper than differences and contradictions in life and history, he is led to believe that St Paul was mistaken in drawing the sharp contrasts found in his autobiographical passages, and in his comparisons of Judaism and Christianity.

From the general position of the evolution of religion, this critical examination of St Paul's mental "limitations" is suggestive and satisfactory. The continuity of the two Covenants is thereby emphasised. A broader platform is provided for meeting modern Jewish scholarship than is found in the antagonistic declarations of St Paul. And Dr Caird's position also suggests a proper reaction from the exaggerated estimate of the Pauline forms of thought found, for example, in Bernard's *Progress of Doctrine*.

To establish his point, Dr Caird draws a broad indictment against a great class of minds, and St Paul is really presented as a conspicuous example of this influential, but erring, band. This is the class of "anti-thetic writers," and their error lies in "massing their facts under opposite and contrasted points of view." In an apt illustration Dr Caird says that these writers illuminate their subject, not with "clear impartial sunlight," but rather as by "an electric beam which throws an intense brilliance upon certain of the elements of existence and leaves the rest in shadow." So it would seem that these "antithetic" minds present truth in a series

of artificially forced and exaggerated contrasts. St Paul, at least, must do so, for "his primary thought is always of division and antagonism."

It is a question whether Dr Caird's class of antithetic writers may not prove to be so large as to include all writers, even the critics of antithesis. For, in the last analysis, antithesis is not the distinctive mark of a limited class of minds, but a necessary form or category of thought itself.

Can anything of truth or morality be known except by relation and contrast? Can good be known as good except in contradistinction from evil? The knowledge of both good and evil has ever come from the forbidden act. Thought is definite and realistic in proportion to its sensitiveness to diversity and contrast. The accusation against St Paul that he thinks in antitheses may only be testimony to the fact that he really thinks.

In the opening of this article, the Master of Balliol is himself found in the class of "antithetic writers." For a very sharp contrast is drawn between Christ's attitude towards Judaism and St Paul's. Christ (says Dr Caird) regarded the transition from Judaism as a growth, in which each stage continuously passes into the next, and as a movement toward a higher and stricter fulfilment of the law. St Paul, on the other hand, viewed the transition as a drama, accompanied by opposition, collision, and revolution. While this striking antithesis illuminates the argument, possibly the light which it throws on the subject resembles an "electric beam" more than "impartial sunlight." At any rate, the contrast shows how easy it is to fall into antithetic modes of thought, even when arguing against the limitations of antithetic writers.

But it is at least debatable whether the attitude of Christ toward Judaism was not as antithetic as that of St Paul. The Sermon on the Mount is full of contrasts between what "ye have heard that it hath been said," and what "I say unto you." Almost all of the beatitudes are contradictions of conventional religious thought. Christ's words abound in intentionally exaggerated statements. And looking at the New Testament as a whole, St John is more radically antithetic, even dualistic, than St Paul.

But granting the necessity for antithesis in thought, it may be held that the question at issue pertains to the abuse, or over-use, of this mode of thinking. The question then becomes merely one of proportion or propriety, and may perhaps be stated thus: Did St Paul indulge in extreme or exaggerated statements as to the differences between the Law and the Gospel, and between "Saul" the Pharisee and "Paul" the Christian, to the neglect or obscuration of the underlying continuity beneath the contrasts? It may be granted that this basal continuity is often assumed and not always clearly expressed, but the reason for this is obvious—the conscious purpose of his argument is to emphasise the importance of the distinctions. St Paul certainly never doubted his own continuous, personal identity, although he undoubtedly considered the change wrought in him on the Damascus road as both abrupt and revolu-



tionary. St Paul also assumed the historic progression or evolution from the Law to the Gospel, as Dr Caird, in the last pages of his article, is not reluctant to recognise.

It is, however, no easy matter to determine whether a statement of contrasts is exaggerated or not. For to each mind this question is determined by one's personal position and perspective. Scylla and Charybdis appear to Æneas in direct contrast, when he stands between the two. To a distant shepherd on the Sicilian shore, Scylla and Charybdis melt together in a mellow haze of synthesis. So, when Dr Caird declares that St Paul was mistaken in his interpretation of his own experiences, it is not necessary for us to decide which of the two is correct. An impartial jury of plain men would probably bring in a verdict for St Paul. But it is clear, at any rate, that Dr Caird is looking at St Paul's life from a very different perspective-point from that occupied by the Apostle himself. It is also clear that distance does not necessarily lend omniscience to the view, and that sharpness of antithesis is not always exaggeration. It may only be the proof that the soul is actually between the issues contrasted, and not standing impartially aloof.

Dr Caird is willing to admit that St Paul has high companionship in his class of antithetic writers. Along with the Apostle he finds Æschylus, St Augustine, Dante, Milton, Luther, and Pascal. In the contrasted group of impartial, contemplative intelligences, he names Homer, Shakespeare, and Goethe. If one chose to be wrong with St Paul, he need not be ashamed of his associates. Suppose we enlarge the band of the devotees of antithesis. History presents a myriad candidates, drawn from every age and land. Zoroaster, St John, Savonarola, Knox, Jonathan Edwards, Carlyle—these are all hopelessly antithetic. The impartial advocates of "sunlight" can never match them in numbers or in power. St Paul has on his side well-nigh every name that stands for righteousness, and that is significant in the development of religion. The reason for this is plain. Ethics is essentially dualistic, while speculative philosophy inclines toward monism. Just so far, therefore, as a writer is moved by ethical motives rather than by speculative ideals, he tends inevitably to view all life and history as a series of deep, if not irreconcilable, contrasts.

HENRY GOODWIN SMITH.

LANE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,  
CINCINNATI, O., U.S.A.

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#### ENCYCLOPÆDIA BIBLICA IV. (OLD TESTAMENT).

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1903, pp. 177-183.)

I FULLY recognise Mr Herford's kind intention towards the *Encyclopædia Biblica* as a thing with a life of its own which he would not willingly mar. Still, as an intimate friend of that living thing, which cannot speak for

itself, I venture to say that it can hardly accept such kindness without a protest that something more is requisite. Kindness and fairness are two different things, and it is fairness in which Mr Herford's article (which I only refer to as representing a numerous class) seems to me to be conspicuously deficient. *Malice prepense* I am sure there is none; Mr Herford is but acting according to his judgment of what a review ought to be, and according to his idea of the situation of Biblical criticism. I am sorry that he has written it, partly because it may make it more difficult for him to turn round on a future day.

As I conceive the functions of a reviewer of a critical work, he has first of all to set forth the point of view and the object of the work, and to state whether the point of view is well maintained, and the object in any high degree achieved. Next, if his own point of view differs, he has to mention it, and to show how much more fully the object might have been attained had this better point of view been adopted. And lastly, if the work noticed has any originality, the reviewer ought, in justice to himself, to give a few specimens of the superior results to be reached by his own better mode of criticism. It is of course not necessary that every review should be mechanically divided into three parts. But the spirit of this threefold division should, I venture to think, always be perceptible. I believe that it always was so in the reviews of the fairest critic known to me—Abraham Kuenen.

I cannot see this spirit in Mr Herford's article. It is only by patiently entering into an unfamiliar point of view, and working as hard at it as if it were a new language or branch of science, that injustice can be avoided. Mr Herford will hardly claim to have done this. In the forefront of his article he puts an attempt to turn my own critical methods into ridicule. But how can this be done without having previously learned what these methods are, and what the constructive results of the application of these methods have been? Mr Herford is really no better than Dr Salmond, who, in the *Critical Review* for July, actually credits the present writer with applying the textual methods of Dr Winckler. He appears to have no accurate conception of the state in which the textual criticism of the Old Testament is, and of the urgent necessity for continuing the work of eminent predecessors. I refuse to be drawn by any of my reviewers into a criticism of individual scholars who have worked on the old system; and with a considerable deduction from his general estimate of the Massoretic text, and apart from questionable details, I can accept the last section of Mr Burkitt's article "Text and Versions" as a good account of things so far as it goes, which is in my own eyes not stinted praise. But "hitherto shalt thou come, and no further," is not to be said to any historical study, and progress is not to be vetoed on the implied ground that certain scholars have summed up all that can be said at the present time to be worth putting before teachers and students of the Old Testament subjects.

The question at issue is not how to correct this or that probably corrupt passage, but how to renovate a group of critical structures forming



together the history of the old Israelitish and Jewish life, in accordance with new facts. These facts are not all before us, but many are, and by a study of the phenomena of the Hebrew text which has been more special than—so far as I know—any other living scholar has as yet made, I have been able to discover some of those which most affect the textual basis of the historical study referred to. These new facts, as well as the facts of history and archæology due to Assyriologists and others, had to be made use of, however imperfectly, in the new *Encyclopædia*. The editors of this work have set forth the idea of their work in the general preface. An encyclopædia such as Biblical teachers and students require to-day is one which represents the present state of Biblical research; it is in fact a substitute for the best oral teaching, not only of the ordinary class-room, but of the *Seminar*. It will, of course, contain much that is derived from predecessors, but its most honourable distinction will be that it introduces the student into the workshop of original investigators. No genuine investigator can dream of ignoring the scholarship of the past, but no truly progressive scholar can fail to apply new methods as well as old in the treatment of problems which had not emerged in the time of his predecessors. Hence an *Encyclopædia* of the Bible fitted for progressive students in our day will contain much that is new. The new will often not be completely true, but it will be on the line of truth, and to wish to supersede it by theories which are not less hypothetical and take account of fewer facts, is no proof of wisdom.

I venture to lay some emphasis on the provisional character of most conclusions respecting the great Biblical problems. As fresh evidence appears, critical results must of necessity be modified. My chief complaint of Mr Herford and those of his fellow-reviewers in England who may fitly be called scholars, is that they cannot bear the critical dogmas of their school to be called in question. They must, however, be called in question, and it is better that this should be done by one who, with whatever tendencies to critical "extravagance," formerly belonged to their own school, than by an outsider. The present writer has no desire to propound new dogmas, but he must be allowed to state the conclusions to which his own researches have led him. These conclusions are based on facts which cannot be wholly denied, and though they are doubtless capable of much improvement, and in so far as they deal with political events need the corroboration of external evidence, yet in the main seem to give us a clue to the earlier Hebrew tradition. To say the very best, they are critical; and if we take up any of the current handbooks of Israelitish history and examine their statements, we shall be struck by the scanty range of the criticism applied both to the form and to the substance of the Hebrew texts. If my reviewers can solve the new problems, let them do so, and from no one shall they receive a more attentive audience than from the present writer. But let them see to it that their criticism is not less but more searching, not less but more disinterested.

T. K. CHEYNE.

## DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A MIRACULOUS BIRTH.

(Hibbert Journal, October 1903.)

IN one respect Mr Beeby's article may be hailed with satisfaction even by those most opposed to the position for which it contends, and that is, that it helps to bring the doctrine of the Virgin Birth into direct relation with the idea of objective revelation and Church authority. It has been customary for "liberal," but generally orthodox, theologians to regard the acceptance of that doctrine by the Church, and its embodiment in the Creed, as merely the crude expression of a sound intuition,—an expression which, though not literally true, does not commit the consciousness of the divine society, with the documents to which it appeals, to any material error, or invalidate its testimony to substantial truths. But Mr Beeby maintains that this doctrine militates against the vital fact of Christ's perfect humanity; and surely he is right,—if the Virgin Birth is the crude miracle it is held by opponents to be. There is here no neutral ground of harmless speculation. If this particular tenet will not fit into the scheme of truth, its inclusion can only strain and dislocate the whole structure. If it be not a fact, its fitness can only be maintained on a basis of misconceptions which cannot be harmless and isolated. If it be not a fact, then serious and material error has found its way into the primary deposit of the Church's faith. Of course, this will be no difficulty to many, and I have no comment to make upon it here. Only let not the significance of the question be missed.

But to proceed to the point under discussion. Mr Beeby, it seems to me, shows at the outset his failure to grasp its real bearings. He begins with miracles in general, and impugns the idea of them altogether. Now there is no need to discuss what he says about miracles, because its relevance depends upon the sense in which the miraculous birth can be called a miracle. Is it, in fact, properly so called? Mr Illingworth says (truly, I think) that the Incarnation is not strictly a miracle, because *ex hypothesi* it could only be expected to happen once; and the same must therefore be said of the physical occurrence through which it is recorded to have taken place. It was abnormal only in the sense in which Redemption was abnormal; and for those who accept the fact of Redemption, the only reasonable course is, not to argue from below upwards, but to ask whether or no the unique spiritual movement should prepare us to expect a unique physical phenomenon. Whether Mr Beeby's conclusion is right or wrong, his procedure is unsound.

He quotes Bishop Gore's words: "Humanity in its ordinary course could not have produced a sinless man." On which he unwarrantably comments: "Nature is apparently conceived as acting and producing apart from God." But what the words really express is simply that such production *would not be natural*—that Nature (that is, God) must be expected to take an extraordinary course in producing this extraordinary result. Of course, if Mr Beeby does not accept the testimony of the Christian conscience, when it



declares that sin has infected the very humanity in each of us, the springs of life in the race itself, he will not admit such a proposition. But this I pass by, my object in this paper being merely to point out, as against Mr Beeby, the real significance of the doctrine he attacks, not to maintain its plausibility when considered apart from the doctrinal system to which it belongs.

Mr Beeby is faced by the fact of the first manifestation of life on the earth, which he admits was an "exceptional and unusual event." But, he adds, "it did not happen suddenly by a Divine interposition; it arose out of the ordinary course of Nature's laws and operations." So too the first appearance of man; this "by the hypothesis did not require a miracle in the sense in which a miracle is asserted of the introduction of Christ into the world." This distinction appears to me absolutely unreal. No doubt we do not usually speak of these events as miracles, but that simply shows that an exceptional event is *not* necessarily external to the normal course of Nature, but of a piece with it, and this Mr Beeby explicitly admits. But why not allow the application to the Virgin Birth? The objection to so doing rests on the sharp distinction between a new departure that takes place "within the order of Nature" and one which is "miraculous." But what has become of Mr Beeby's anxiety to vindicate the Divine immanence? If all Nature is simply God in action, shall an event be rejected as a mere "miracle," because by its very character it points directly to the agency of God? What intelligible meaning can be attached to the phrase "within the order of Nature," except "within the sphere of Divine action regarded as a coherent whole?" And that the doctrine he impugns introduces any incoherence, he does not prove, but merely assumes. And such an assumption is quite invalidated, as it seems to me, by a consideration already urged, namely, the uniqueness *ex hypothesi* of the alleged occurrence—invalidated, that is, except upon presuppositions which perhaps even Mr Beeby would not entertain. It is only with narrow and question-begging theories of evolution that the doctrine refuses to come to terms. Evolution, except in forms which philosophy as well as religion condemns, has full recognition from the Christian standpoint, which views all things in the unity of God; but a theory of evolution which, drawn from the lower categories, claims to dominate the higher, is an inversion of the true order, and stands self-condemned from the outset.

But now let us pass to the second division of the article. Mr Beeby urges that Christ was physically and intellectually limited, and that owing to "the intimate connection between the spirit character and the physical organism," His moral nature must also have been limited: thus we read that He "learned obedience." And "such an account of Christ's life in the flesh seems quite inconsistent with the conception of it as the simple unfolding of an already perfect nature." Now this is an old question, and it is strange that Mr Beeby should have ignored—however little he might approve of—the common-sense answer to it. In what sense was Christ imperfect? Not in the sense that there were in Him any seeds of evil. Sensual sins, evil temper, and the like, even in the germ, it would be

blasphemy for a Christian to attribute to Christ. And if Mr Beeby holds that the liability to commit such sins is inseparable from human nature as such, and not a consequence of its fall, I can only repeat that my object is not to decide between the claims of two widely sundered systems of theology. Of course, it is easy enough to show the inconsistency of the doctrine in question with certain views of sin that are now widely current.

The temptation that our Lord undoubtedly faced was not a temptation to anything that the most perfect spiritual instinct could condemn as inherently evil. There was nothing in the character of His temptations which implied any antecedent imperfection except of a negative kind, anything like the defiled tastes, the blunted spiritual instincts, the unholy disposition, which the race has acquired, and the ordinary child inherits.

But this brings us nearer to the root of the matter. Mr Beeby now raises the whole question of our Lord's Person. "When my mind is directed to a beginning of the life in time and space, known in human experience, and understood in science, the statement that the human life came out of the half-life of a single parent represents nothing to my mind." Nor to anyone else's. *Ex hypothesi* the life of Christ, His personal being, did not "come out of" the life of Mary. His birth was the "becoming flesh" of the eternal Son of God, the Logos: it was "the taking of the manhood into God." Perhaps Mr Beeby would deny the pre-existence; but it is futile merely to ignore it, when attacking a doctrine which presupposes it.

Then Mr Beeby goes on to object to the attribution to our Lord of a half-humanity, a nature differing organically in some vague sense from ours; for such a consequence, he holds, is involved in the idea of the Virgin Birth.

Now, I have two remarks to make upon this. Firstly, Mr Beeby is not consistent in bringing forward such an objection. He has already deprived himself of the right to do so, by classing the Virgin Birth as a miracle. He might as well say of the Feeding of the Multitudes that the bread so produced could not have been ordinary bread. In dealing with an alleged miracle, whatever you may think of it, you are not entitled to say that the action performed must have produced such and such a result. To say that the product of such a birth would be a demi-god is to place the event back again into the order of nature, where the effects of given causes can be estimated beforehand. Mr Beeby may adopt either of his methods of attack, but not both.

But, secondly, we can do without this *argumentum ad hominem*. For the idea that our Lord's human nature, if conceived by the Holy Ghost, must, as such, be on a different plane from ours, whatever support it may receive, or seem to receive, from so honoured a theologian as Bishop Gore, is by no means necessary. And here again we find Mr Beeby, after his almost pantheistic commencement, falling back on a deistic presupposition. What! are God and man so alien that the personal entrance of God into the sphere of human life must involve the production of a half-human demi-god? Shall the Logos take upon Him a human organism, and enter the earthly environment, and yet not be fully man? What then is man?



To supply what particular element was a male parent required, when the Logos became flesh?

Of course this raises the question of the connection between the Virgin Birth and the Johannine statement of the Incarnation; but, though it is a tempting subject to deal with, it would take us outside the scope of this article.

At this point it may not be amiss to quote a striking remark of Charles Secrétan: "Does not the man represent individual initiative, progress, the particular, in human society; and the woman, tradition, continuity, the general, the species? The Saviour could not be the son of this or that man in particular; He had to be the son of humanity." (Quoted by Godet, *Gospel Collection and St Matthew*, p. 233.) This, at least, must be insisted on: granted the Catholic conception of the Lord's Person, we already believe what is really essential in the birth narratives, and need therefore find no fundamental difficulty in accepting them. We are forbidden by the Law of Sufficient Reason to assign such an effect to the ordinary cause of human generation. And to suppose a subsidiary intervention of Divine grace would be not only inadequate, but a crude hypothesis really deserving of Mr Beeby's censure.

Mr Beeby's own theology, I am quite prepared to admit, does not require the Virgin Birth. But let him first get rid of the theology that does. Nay, let him first understand it. "I cannot but think," he says, "that the most anxiously orthodox theologians must often experience a strong wish that they might be able to say, 'See what Nature has produced! Not a theoretical Nature apart from God, but Nature as we know it, instinct with Divine Power, has produced Christ. He was fore-ordained before the foundation of the world; God predestined Him, a kind of first-fruits, that is, best fruits, of creation' . . . the foretaste and prophecy of what God will do 'at last far off, at last to all,' for all men and for all humanity." I venture to take upon myself to say that orthodox theologians have no such hankering. Christianity for them brings assurance because it resolves a spiritual and logical contradiction, a deadlock in the very data of conscience; because it pledges Redemption by accomplishing it; because it has shown them the key of hope at the bottom of the lowest pit of pessimism: and those on whose hearts such a religion has laid hold, have no need for the crutch that Mr Beeby offers for their faith.

A. R. WHATELY.

MANCHESTER.

## THE LIBERAL CATHOLIC MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1903, p. 704.)

FATHER ETHELRED TAUNTON in the last issue of this Journal publishes an interesting answer to my paper on the Liberal Catholic Movement, but out of the four pages of printed matter covered by his article only one is

devoted to the task of replying to me, and the other three are filled up with speculations of his own concerning a novel system of Educated Catholicism.

Father Taunton glories in the accident of birth, whereby he is entitled to call himself "an hereditary Catholic," and refers to me as "a convert received after the very smallest amount of instruction." This apparent attempt to deride converts strikes one as being rather illogical, when we consider how very few "born" Catholics have signally distinguished themselves in England during the last sixty years. Not enough in numbers, I venture to assert, as can be counted on the fingers of one hand. What names have the "born" Catholics to array against such as Newman, Ward, Spencer, Manning, Allies, Faber, Morris, Dalgairns, Mivart, Maturin, Lord Brampton, and the late Lord Bute? The intellectual superiority, therefore, is surely on the side of the converts, without whose accession the Church of Rome in our midst would be occupying to-day a very insignificant position. Moreover, when Father Taunton stigmatises me as "received after the very smallest instruction," he hazards a conjecture which is incorrect.

"Mr Sidney," says Father Taunton, "seems to be at sea altogether about the subject of Infallibility and Anglican Orders," but he makes no attempt whatever to show how or why I am at sea, and starts off on another tack altogether. Now, so far from regarding myself as being at sea concerning these two questions, I am even bold enough to quote below one or two additions to the extracts which I made in my previous article from the works of modern Catholic writers, whose views on the subject of Infallibility tend to prove that the decision of the Vatican Council of 1870 was, and is, looked upon as "a mistake" by the majority of the Roman clergy engaged on the English Mission. The earlier editions of that widely-circulated and official "Catechism" compiled by Father Stephen Keenan, in answer to the question "Must not Catholics believe the Pope in himself to be infallible?" say "No: this is a Protestant invention; it is no article of the Catholic faith; no decision of his can oblige, under pain of heresy, unless it be received and enforced by the teaching body; that is, by the Bishops of the Church." Again, the Irish Catholic Bishops, shortly before the passage of the Emancipation Act, in a "Pastoral Address to the Clergy and Laity of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland," stated "on oath their belief that it is not an article of the Catholic Faith, neither are they hereby required to believe, that the Pope is infallible." The Roman Catholic Church has, therefore, somewhat changed her doctrine since 1870, if up to that date, in Great Britain and Ireland, Catholics were actually allowed to believe that the theory of Papal Infallibility was "a Protestant invention!" No wonder then that Father Taunton has omitted to answer me upon this point, except by an unsupported "*ipse dixit*," for it is manifest that, in the words of Mr Gladstone, by the decree of 1870, "Rome has substituted for the proud boast of 'Semper Eadem' a policy of violence and change in faith." Well,



indeed, might the late Lord Acton protest (when asked if the decision of the Vatican Council would cause him to turn Protestant) "Why should I change my religion because the Pope has changed his"! Father Taunton too, has, in his biography of Cardinal Wolsey, expressed himself on this very point in somewhat strange language. "Wolsey," he writes, "knew that in the immediate action of the Episcopate lies the strength of the Church. He would have had but little sympathy with those who try to exalt the Papacy at the cost of the Episcopate. The greatest Pope of the Renaissance, Nicholas V., had said the Roman pontiffs had extended their authority too far, and had left no jurisdiction to other Bishops."

With regard to my criticisms on the procedure adopted by the Holy See in the election of English Bishops, Father Taunton, after claiming that my ideas on this question are erroneous, asserts that "Canon law is a subject which it would be unfair to expect an ordinary layman to know anything about." Here speaks the priest! Laymen must not be allowed to speak, or learn for themselves, about the internal affairs of their Church, but must, as in pre-Reformation days, rest content with obtaining such information as the clergy may choose to give them from time to time. But why a layman should not be competent to master the intricacies of canon law, I fail to comprehend! In refutation of Father Taunton's surmise that in only one instance known to him has Rome refused to ratify the choice of the English electors, I can but reply that, if the latest news from the Vatican be reported correctly in our daily press, a prominent cardinal has had the candour to confess that the process of listening to the recommendations from England has always been regarded at headquarters as merely formal, and that the Holy See has really constituted both the jury and the judge. During even the negotiations which immediately preceded the appointment of a successor to Cardinal Vaughan, the excellent candidate selected was the one by far the least favoured by the English electors, and the courageous efforts of the monks to capture the arch-diocese ended in defeat.

In conclusion, I would like to mention that I must plead guilty, in my former article, to having used rather too harsh a term in referring to the scandal associated with the existence of "bogus relics." I should not have used such a word as "sale." Many English churches and religious houses, however, like those on the Continent, contain relics of dubious authenticity. Pieces of the wood of the "True Cross" abound, and the noise of the merriment occasioned by the discovery that the bones of a Saxon king, deposited with extraordinary ceremonial at Arundel, were not genuine, has hardly yet died away. The excessive veneration of "relics" constitutes, indeed, one of the most degrading and distressing features of Roman Catholicism, and by Liberal Catholics the cult is as much abhorred to-day as it was by Erasmus and Colet of old.

PHILIP SIDNEY.

LONDON.

## REVIEWS

*Autour d'un petit livre.*—Alfred Loisy.—Paris :  
Alphonse Picard et fils, 1903.

*L'Évangile et l'Église*, the “petit livre” of the present work, was condemned, it will be remembered, in January 1903, by the Archbishop of Paris, after consultation with a commission of theologians, on the ground that it had been published without “the *Imprimatur* required by the laws of the Church,” and was calculated “seriously to trouble the faith of Catholics in certain fundamental truths of their religion,—in particular, the authority of scripture and tradition, the Divinity of Jesus Christ and His infallible knowledge, the redemption wrought by His death, His resurrection, the Eucharist, and the divine institution of the Papacy and the Episcopate.” Seven other French bishops—in all, eight out of eighty-four—prohibited the book in their dioceses. Rome took no action in the matter. The author withdrew neither his book nor his opinions. He postponed, however, indefinitely a second edition, which was in the press; and, his object having been to defend on historical grounds, and against Protestant criticism, the very tenets which he was accused of attacking, he explained his position in a letter to the Archbishop. “Il va de soi que je condamne et réprouve toutes les erreurs que l'on a pu déduire de mon livre, en se plaçant, pour l'interpréter, à un point de vue tout différent de celui où j'avais dû me mettre et m'étais mis pour le composer.” By some this “retractation” was thought insufficient; by others excessive. The fact is—and surely it is sufficiently obvious—that it was not a retractation at all. It was a disavowal of certain conclusions drawn from the book by those who had mistaken an essay in historical construction for a theological treatise; and an act of deference to the authority of the Archbishop, which, in itself—whatever may be thought of the propriety of its exercise—was beyond question. M. Loisy could have done neither less nor more.

Between this and then, the book—now once more in circulation—and its author have been the object of a persistent and acrimonious attack to which “the *Imprimatur* required by the laws of the Church” has not been refused. M. Loisy's orthodoxy, and even his good faith, have been called in question. “Ses flottements,” says a clerical writer quoted with



approval by Cardinal Perraud, "produisent sur le lecteur quelque chose d'analogue au mal de mer." His Eminence enlarges on the pleasant simile. "On voit trouble, on a la nausée, on se sent mal au cœur,—et le reste . . . ." Humour of this description is the strong point of his assailants. One thing they have not attempted—but it is the *unum necessarium*: to dispute his facts. In view of these personalities M. Loisy has at last broken silence. His reply is not an apology: neither he nor his book needs an apology. It is a discussion in greater detail of certain subjects touched on only in the former volume,—the Biblical question in general; the Synoptic problem, and that presented by the Fourth Gospel; the Divinity of Christ; the foundation and authority of the Church; the origin and content of dogma; the institution of the sacraments; and a comment on the reception given to the previous work.

The preface in which this comment is contained offers a marked contrast to the author's habitual style. Ordinarily his style is impersonal almost to coldness. The reserve is unbroken; one is brought into contact with the writer, not with the man. Here every line is instinct with feeling. The reader is conscious of the emotions—pity, indignation, amazement,—at work under the impassive exterior; the

"ignes

Suppositos cineri doloso."

"Car, il faut bien le dire une fois pour toutes, c'était un sort terrible, il y a quinze ou vingt ans, que celui d'un prêtre appelé à étudier et à pratiquer scientifiquement l'exégèse biblique, si ce prêtre avait l'esprit ouvert et la parole sincère. . . . Spectacle peu glorieux pour l'Église de France que celui de cette poursuite où les travailleurs désintéressés semblent traqués comme des bêtes dangereuses! Depuis une dizaine d'années, sans appui du côté au monde, qui aurait pourtant quelque raison de les soutenir, ils lèvent les yeux vers les trônes où siègent les Évêques préposés par l'Esprit-Saint au gouvernement de l'Église de Dieu: sous la croix pectorale n'y a-t-il pas le cœur d'un père, et sous la mitre d'or l'intelligence d'un docteur? Ils se demandent si ces princes de la sainte cité ne compatiront pas à leur angoisse, s'ils n'encourageront pas leurs efforts, s'ils ne comprendront pas les aspirations du siècle qui marche, laissant l'Église loin derrière lui. A des rares et honorables exceptions près, ceux qui sont assis sur les trônes restent immobiles et froids, comme si le prêtre homme de science leur était devenu étranger et suspect. Il ne leur vient même en pensée de l'interroger. 'Un évêque ne discute pas, il ne réfute pas, il condamne.'" And these men are the successors of the apostles, the representatives of the Good Shepherd Christ. "Credibile est, quia ineptum est; certum est, quia impossibile est." The faith of those who, knowing them, believe it, borders on the heroic. It is "the evidence of things not seen."

The main lines of M. Loisy's teaching have been described in this *Journal*: the sharp distinction between theory and fact, the abstract and the concrete; and the insistence on the relativity of human knowledge as

such, revealed as well as natural, dogma and dogmatic formula as well as perception. These, with the principle of development, constitute his philosophy of religion: truth, morality, religion, are dynamic, not static; they are always becoming, they never are. Professor Harnack—to whose influence among Catholics he bears remarkable testimony (pp. 1-6)—takes, he thinks, Lutheran theory for evangelical fact; after the fashion, *mutatis mutandis*, of Catholic theologians who, confounding fact with formula, falsify the one and empty the other of content; while, by their denial of evolution in religion, they make the Roman system too tight for men to breathe in; the overstrained bow snaps. Harnack's theology is neither so individualistic nor so incompatible with Catholicism, taken largely, as M. Loisy supposes. "Das Evangelium kann sich mit allem verbinden, was nicht Sünde ist . . . ja mit dem Papste, wenn dieser sich nur nicht in das Evangelium setzte" (*D. G. I.* 305); and his own significant definition of the teaching Church—"la conscience collective et permanente du christianisme vivant" (p. 59)—might serve as the basis of a common understanding. But the Harnacks and Loisy are few. On both sides, among leaders and rank and file alike, the presuppositions of a Formula of Concord are wanting: the union of hearts and understandings must precede that of hands.

The conclusions of scientific theology with regard to the origin of Christian doctrines and institutions are startling to traditional orthodoxy. But these conclusions, based as they are on history, are passing slowly but surely out of the province of opinion into that of fact. They are no longer seriously disputed: a retrospect over the last two generations shows an unbroken advance all along the line. On points of detail, differences exist among scholars; but these are matter of domestic, not of foreign, policy: the substantial issue is no longer between criticism and tradition, but between those who know and those who do not know. What is open to question is the bearing of these conclusions on religion. It is not surprising that a tendency to Naturalism should have characterised the generation on which the conviction of the inadequacy of the traditional standpoint forced itself. Newly acquired knowledge is apt to be seen out of focus; in religion, as elsewhere, novelty is often error, on account of the "refraction," as Newman calls it, with which it enters into the mind. But as men accustom themselves to this refraction the illusion is discounted. The merit of the Ritschlian school, in particular, is to have dissociated philosophy from religion, theory, even legitimate theory, from fact. It is because Harnack, more than any one man, has made this distinction living that he seems to so many of us the greatest religious teacher of our generation: he has taught us at once to know and to believe. The truth appears to be that the facts on which theology rests are, in themselves, indifferent to this or that theology; they may be made to support any, or none. For faith and science differ in content as in origin. Their relationship to one another is negative: it is enough—but it is essential—that there shall be no contradiction between the two. M. Loisy has done for



Catholicism what Harnack has done for that *Wesen des Christentums* which is common to Protestantism and Catholicism. He has done it with singular ability, with singular sincerity, and with singular success. He is the one writer of our time who has stated the Catholic position scientifically, showing its sufficient reason in history and in the human mind. From this point of view his writings are of the first importance; no criticism of Catholicism can be taken seriously which leaves them out of account. Whether they commend themselves to the authorities, or the average opinion, of his Church is a matter of small importance: ultimate acceptance, not immediate popularity, is the test of truth. But while he has shown that Catholicism is, in itself, a possible, perhaps a legitimate interpretation of the facts, he has not shown that it is their only legitimate interpretation. The Gospel, when all allowance has been made for the time and place colour which necessarily enter into it, is sufficiently recognisable: an interpretation which obscures it, or identifies it with alien matter, is "another Gospel which is not another." Neither of the two great divisions of Christianity is beyond reproach in this respect. Protestantism, though not necessarily individualistic, has a tendency to degenerate into individualism, and so lose sight of the social side of the Gospel: Catholicism, though not necessarily "another Gospel," has a tendency to become one—to make the word of God of none effect by its traditions, to substitute the letter that killeth for the spirit that giveth life. "Le développement d'un tel régime a pu se justifier par le besoin d'une barrière contre l'anarchie théologique et l'émiettement individualiste du christianisme protestant. Il n'en prête pas moins facilement à de graves inconvénients; oppression des individus, obstacle au mouvement scientifique et à toutes les formes du travail libre qui est le principal agent du progrès humain" (p. 183). Such causes as these brought about the Reformation, and constitute the *raison d'être* of the Reformed Churches. The ideas for which these stand have their place in religion, to which truth is as essential as tradition, and movement as law. A Christianity which shall unite these elements, found too often in separation, which shall be neither of Paul nor Apollos nor Cephas, but of Christ—this is what M. Loisy discerns and pleads for. They mistake him, be they who they may, who regard his work as one of negation: "bien loin d'être une œuvre de scepticisme et de mort, le petit livre était une œuvre d'espérance et de vie. A peine avait-il un regard pour ce qui décline et s'en va, pour des choses qui ne sont ni l'Évangile ni le Catholicisme, à savoir la fausse apologétique de la Bible, les Vies de Notre-Seigneur qui ne sont pas des histoires de Jésus, l'Église politique, la superstition de la formule, le mécanisme rituel. Ce qu'il contemplait, ce qu'il montrait vivant dans le passé bien compris, et impérissable dans l'avenir que tout croyant sincère doit préparer, c'était la Bible, œuvre divine dont une critique respectueuse pénètre le secret et révélera de plus en plus la grandeur; c'était le Christ, dans la simplicité de son existence terrestre, où étaient cachés les trésors de la Divinité, et dans la puissance infinie de son action permanente, où ces trésors viennent

successivement au jour; c'était l'Église catholique et romaine, cité spirituelle, patrie des âmes, foyer perpétuel de justice, de vérité et de sainteté; c'était la foi des siècles, toujours la même et toujours nouvelle, et sachant se reconnaître dans tout ce qui est vrai; c'était l'immense vie du culte chrétien, qu'anime l'esprit de Jésus. Le petit livre était, malgré ses défauts, et dans son aridité didactique, un hommage au Christ-Dieu, et à l'Église, corps vivant du Christ immortel " (p. 21).

ROMANUS.

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*Les Religions d'Autorité et la Religion de l'Esprit.*—Auguste Sabatier.—  
Paris: Fischbacher, 1903.<sup>1</sup>

Or this posthumous work of the late Dean of the Faculty of Protestant Theology in the University of Paris it may in all seriousness be affirmed that it will mark a step of progress in the interpretation of religious experience. It is unnecessary here to enter upon any discussion of that new theological school, Symbolo-fideism, of which Dean Sabatier was one of the founders and its most convincing exponent. Professor Stevens of Yale University, in his interesting study of "Auguste Sabatier and the Paris School of Theology" in Vol. I. of the *Hibbert Journal*, has sufficiently covered that ground, and many English readers are familiar with Sabatier's *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, from which the present volume issues as a flower from its stem. Though it makes no allusion, except in the preface, to the previous treatise, all the strong argument of the introductory chapters of the present volume is based upon the *Outlines*.

The method of this work is the method of that which preceded it, historical and psychological; its foundation, as stated in the opening words, is the position that "in religion the really grave matter is not opposing doctrines but antagonistic methods." The method of historic Christianity has been the method of authority; the method of Christ was autonomy, the liberty of the human spirit. Autonomy is the necessary basis of any true advance in religious experience; but here at the outset Sabatier guards his position (p. 3). "To say that the mind is autonomous is not to hold that it is not subject to law, but to say that it finds the ultimate norm of its ideas and acts, not outside of but within itself, in its very constitution." Therefore, the consent of oneself to oneself is the first condition and the foundation of certitude. Such a position justifies the historic method of criticism; the failure to apprehend this has carried distress and distrust into the camp of Christian believers. To set fear at rest, and to redeem theology from the fatal inconsistencies of the method of authority, is the purpose of the book. "In the eyes of the majority the problem of authority becomes a question of life or death for theology, and even for religion . . . . Let us first of all point out to troubled minds that a

<sup>1</sup> An English translation of this work will be published immediately by Messrs Williams & Norgate, and form a volume of the "Theological Translation Library."—Ed.



change of method does not necessarily entail the destruction of a science. The latter can disappear only if the object of its study vanishes. Now, the religious phenomenon is the permanent object of theology. . . . The experimental method destroyed the astrology and physics of ancient days, but it created a new physics and a new astronomy. Why should the same method, introduced into theology, not have the same fruitful and rejuvenating effect? And if this transformation is not logically impossible, why should it not be justified to the Christian conscience as well as to philosophy and history? To this question the studies collected in this volume are meant to reply, and for this radical revolution it is their purpose to prepare."

Professor Stevens has told us how Sabatier safeguards religious experience from the vagaries and instability of excessive individualism, of extreme self-consciousness, which seem to be inherent in a system of autonomy. "We control and complete these convictions [born of the inner witness of the Spirit] by the witness of the Spirit in the believing community": or, as Sabatier here expresses it (p. 14), "Humanity does not exist outside of or apart from the individual, nor the individual apart from humanity." And again (p. 15): "Social authority and individual autonomy are not more hostile and can no more legitimately be opposed to one another, than the final destiny of man to that of humanity." The religion of the Spirit thus gains objectivity and has a true criterion. "Individuality does not exhaust the phenomena of consciousness. In every consciousness there is a new principle of unification, the germ of an order grander and more beautiful than a material order maintained by physical laws."

The history of the Christian consciousness, the order unfolded from this germ, is the history of the Christian Church regarded from the view point of psychology. The natural expression of this order will be the religion of the Spirit. But "it must be clearly understood that the passage from one system to another has as its inevitable condition the passing from the animal life to the life of the Spirit. . . . As the reptile may not hope to soar in upper air before growing wings and becoming a bird, so the man who continues to live a merely animal life may not aspire to a true autonomy. . . . The animal can but serve or disappear."

The limits of space forbid a detailed examination of Books I. and II., about two-thirds of the whole work, devoted respectively to a critical history of the dogmas of authority in Roman Catholicism and in Protestantism. Both the Church, which is the Roman Catholic basis of authority, and the Bible, which is the basis of authority in Protestantism, are necessary to Christianity. They are powers of fact, they have been "the form and matter of divine truth," and are therefore aids to faith. Their pedagogical value is beyond cavil, as this examination shows with singular clearness, but their divine authority is another question, and entirely proper for critical discussion: "Every dogma has a history, and its history is its judge."

A peculiarly admirable feature of Sabatier's study is the close connec-

tion established between the historic and the psychologic development of Christianity. Church history is the history of a psychological evolution, that of the religious consciousness, leading to the ultimate Christianity, which is religion as Jesus Christ practised and taught it, the religion of the Spirit.

Another feature of the historical study is its spirit of sympathy, as large as its sense for logical cause and effect is acute. "History resembles but does not repeat itself," says Sabatier, and he shows how the authority of the Church in Roman Catholicism and of the Bible in Protestantism were alike natural developments from original conditions, with the difference, that while the dogma of Papal infallibility was the logical and necessary outcome of the Roman Catholic doctrine of authority, that of the infallibility of the Bible can by no process of logic be deduced from the premisses of Protestantism, but is in fact an anti-protestant dogma reflecting the influence of Romanism.

The conclusion reached is this (pp. 400-402): The Roman Catholic system of authority triumphed with the Vatican decree. The Protestant system of authority has gone to pieces. But we are not to judge these events by appearances. Catholicism is in fact dying of its victory; Protestantism is rejuvenated by its defeat. The attempt to fasten upon the latter the external authority of an infallible Bible has failed, because it is inconsistent with Protestantism. Luther and Calvin distinctly recognised the Christian consciousness as autonomous. Protestantism cannot take up the yoke which is only a survival of the deeply imprinted influence of Catholicism. It has only "the alternative of going back to Catholicism, or of rising up joyfully and manfully to the religion of the Spirit. The near future will reveal the choice."

Unquestionably there will be many in both branches of the Christian Church who will take exception to Sabatier's conclusions as to the ultimate outcome of any system of external authority. Criticism from either side, however, will but serve to draw attention to the irrefragable character of his historic premisses. Scarcely a statement stands unauthenticated by evidence. The constant reference to authorities is only less important than the relevancy of the citations and the justice of the inferences drawn from them, the latter leading to conclusions which seem to be irresistible when considered in a spirit of fairness.

In Book III., which embodies Sabatier's appreciation of the religion founded by Jesus, and his prevision of the contents of that religion for which the experience of nineteen centuries has prepared the Christian consciousness of the twentieth, the method is the same as that of the first two books. It is a close and critical study of the documents from which we learn the character of the teaching of Jesus. Jesus was the founder of the religion of the Spirit, but not by bringing to man a new doctrine of God. His notion of God was that of the Old Testament. The new element in his teaching was the insistence upon the inward attitude of man toward God. By this inward attitude the title Father, already applied in the Old Testa-



ment, "became the proper name of God." But herein was not a shadow of metaphysical monopoly or exclusiveness. Being revealed to Jesus as Father, God was so revealed to men in general. The guide, strength and sustainer which Jesus gave to his disciples was the Spirit of the Father, that abode in him and would abide in them. The dogma which makes a metaphysical entity of the Holy Spirit paralyses that spirit and thwarts its dynamic influence in the Christian life. In the Old Testament as in the New there was represented the divine principle in the human soul, the immanent influence of the living God. In the dogma of the Trinity God has become transcendent, separate from the world and needing a mediating organ—Church or Scripture—to reveal him; and Christians who claim to be led by the Holy Spirit are suspected as mystics.

Jesus himself, however, claimed a real authority, and the chapter (ii. of Book III.) in which the character of that authority is examined, presents an instance of searching historical and psychological analysis. The authority of Jesus was not only that of his teaching, but also that of his person, so far as the latter incarnates itself in his Gospel and in the conquering charm of his love. Like the authority of God it was internal, moral, and by that fact sovereign; the authority of the Spirit which giveth life. Here the crucial question (p. 455), "In what sense is the person of Christ the object of Christian faith and love?" is subjected to a thorough treatment to which it is impossible to do more than allude, but which is summed up in the God-consciousness of Jesus, the shining forth of the presence of God in him.

Admitting, however, that the personal religion of Jesus was all inward, with no external authority, does this apply to sinful man? Sabatier's answer is (p. 459) that the Gospel blots out sin and redeems sinners. Yet this gives no ground for the position of "mystical anarchists" like Tolstoy. The solidarity of humanity forbids such an error. Christian institutions stand on the Christian principle of the duty of the strong to help the weak; but to substitute them for the authority of God, and to assume that they are mediators between him and the human soul, is anti-Christian.

There is nothing mystical in the religion of the Spirit. The Spirit which Jesus promised to his disciples is the most historically determined power imaginable (p. 464). "It is the Spirit of the Father which was in Jesus Christ, and it manifests itself as a spirit of truth, of moral sincerity, of perfect righteousness, and of universal love of others." It is the Spirit of Jesus by which he remains ever present with his own. Therefore, everyone who claims the Spirit may be judged by the conformity of his inspiration with the inspiration of Christ.

What place, then, has the New Testament, if it is not the supreme authority of the Christian? Sabatier safeguards its importance while disputing its supreme authority. It is the charter of the religion of the Spirit, the witness of the new covenant, promised by Jeremiah, and "forever concluded between God and man in the very consciousness of Jesus Christ" (p. 467). "The divine law . . . put in organic relations with the human

conscience, . . . the ancient heteronomy becoming autonomy, the moral ideal ceasing to be a commandment of despair and menace, the holiness of Jehovah appearing more august under the form of the love of the heavenly Father, the faith and confidence of the child becoming an inward light, a secret force which from within outwards renews the soul, exalts its powers, and sanctifies the whole life ; this is the new gospel, the religion of the Spirit." Thus is apostolic Christianity presented from cover to cover of the New Testament.

The central contention of all that follows is that inspiration is the note of the Christian life everywhere, at all times. The criterion of revelation is not that it is found in a book or in a church, but that it must be able to repeat and continue itself as an actual revelation and an inward experience in the consciousness of every Christian. Peter at Pentecost so insists (p. 471): "That which had been the privilege of a few has become the right of all. . . . The Church and theology have singularly fallen from this high position. Having reduced inspiration to the theory of intellectual infallibility, they have separated it from the Christian life, forgetting that the gift of the Spirit which regenerates and enlightens is organically bound up with the living faith of all Christians."

The Christian is one who has received the Spirit as a life principle (p. 474). "There is no simple addition of human and divine forces in the Christian life. The Spirit of God identifies itself with the human Me, penetrating and animating it ; God individualises himself, so to speak, in the new moral person which he creates. It is a sort of metamorphosis, and, if the word be permitted, of trans-substantiation, operative in the human being. From carnal the latter becomes spiritual. A 'new man' emanates from the old man, by a creative act of the Spirit of God."

Sabatier admits that his is a new religious ideal, but justifies it historically. Furthermore, this ideal is by no means opposed to theology. "Nothing," he says, "appears to be more urgent than the constitution of a truly scientific theology." Doubtless he would not have endorsed the recent utterance of Dr Francis Patton of Princeton University, that as between life and dogma, the latter is more an essential of Christianity than the former ; but while elaborating that distinction between faith and belief which is fundamental to his Symbolo-fideistic system, Sabatier strongly insists upon the importance of a sound theology. A penetrating chapter, abounding in acute analysis and illuminating interpretations, is devoted to a study of the "content of the religion of the Spirit," and another to "Scientific theology, its matter and method," with a view to the theological construction which in the development of the religious consciousness he deems to have now first become possible. These chapters show that the religion of the Spirit does not hang in the air as a mere subjective experience, but is closely related to history and to scientific thought. But scientific theology must be the intellectual expression of a true Christian experience, which is explicable and translatable by it (p. 544). "I am aware that for souls foreign to the inner life, the words Christian experience repre-



sent something vague and indefinite. . . . Far from being vague and obscure, Christian experience is for every consciousness that has known it something morally very clear, strongly determined, which every such an one finds not only in himself but also . . . in the inner life of all Christians great or small, illustrious or obscure, in all ages, in the collective soul of all Christendom. This experience first arose in the consciousness of Jesus Christ, and thence was propagated to every consciousness which inherits from him. . . . The wholly religious and moral content of the filial consciousness of Christ constitutes and determines what in Christian language is called the Spirit of Christ, as the Spirit of God in the history of humanity."

The Christian consciousness is formed by the antithesis of the sense of moral separation from God and that of a happy reconciliation with him. The passage from the one to the other is the passage from darkness to light, from death to life, and the religious consciousness of Christ, becoming ours, works in us this change, which is a true moral resurrection. The analysis of the sense of sin is especially interesting, examining as it does the metaphysical as well as the moral cause of the conflict between man and God. It is complemented by a study of the development of the notion of God, the metaphysical conception in the early thought of him as the Strong God (אל), the moral conception in the later recognition of him as the Covenant God (יהוה), leading up to the spiritual apprehension of him as the God of love, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, in which both antitheses are resolved in the union of God and man in the person of Christ.

Thus Sabatier answers the question whether or not, as Kuenen said, Christianity is simply one of the great religions of the world, "nothing less and nothing more." Even Canon Liddon was reluctant to take the position that Christianity is certainly the ultimate religion, the highest possible realisation of communion with God. Sabatier has no such hesitation. For him the existing form of Christianity is not ultimate, but the Christian religion as Christ taught it is ultimate, for it is impossible for the mind of man to conceive a higher degree of communion with God than the perpetual indwelling of his Spirit in the human soul.

In this profound exposition of the highest development of the religious ideal there are points, more or less casual, with which the reader may feel compelled to disagree; for example, Sabatier's teaching in regard to the idea of the Kingdom of God and of the end of the world entertained by the apostles and even by Jesus, his view of the value of the Old Testament for Christians, and other matters. Be that as it may, the originality and suggestiveness of Sabatier's main contentions cannot be doubted. The book is especially valuable for its vitality; it is marvellously alive, as coming from the pen of a dying man. "My work is done; I may die now," said Sabatier, when he had written the last word. He died soon after, in April 1901, at the too early age of sixty-two. Perhaps in this volume he had reached the limit of his own thought, but assuredly not of the line of thought in which he is only a pioneer, or, more properly, a prophet.

LOUISE SEYMOUR HOUGHTON.

*The Religion of Plutarch.*—By John Oakesmith, D.Litt.  
London : Longmans, 1902.

DR OAKESMITH has an exceedingly interesting subject, and his book is a good sound piece of work. Necessarily he has to stop on the threshold of many promising inquiries. Sometimes, though seldom, he nods. For example, he expresses regret that Plutarch, when speaking of the paintings of Polygnotus at Delphi, does not take the opportunity of describing them, forgetful of the elaborate descriptions left us by Pausanias. Again, when discussing the demonology of Plutarch, he speaks of "the ancient doctrine of Dæmons, emanating from some obscure source in antiquity," whereas it is, of course, common to all mankind at a certain stage of civilisation. But generally he is as exact as he is suggestive.

It will be suitable in the present place, following the excellent lead of Dr Oakesmith, to touch on a few of the noteworthy points in the history of religion which are brought before us by this study of Plutarch, and which deserve wide consideration.

Dr Oakesmith in his third chapter insists on the injustice done by modern preachers, who, in their desire to glorify Christianity, paint in staring colours the wickedness of the Roman world in the days of the Cæsars. "There can be no doubt that the establishment of the Empire had been accompanied by a strenuous moral earnestness." Courts have seldom in any age been remarkable for virtue: but that the middle classes at the beginning of our æra lived at a high level of respectability and civic virtue, Virgil and Lucan, Seneca and Dio Chrysostom, are witnesses, as well as Plutarch.

It is quite astonishing how closely parallel many of the ethical and religious questions raised by Plutarch are to those for which twentieth-century Christians are still seeking a solution. The common cant, which draws a hard and fast line between Pagan and Christian ethics and beliefs, would not maintain itself in the mind of anyone who read Plutarch. Jeremy Taylor, we are told, refers to Plutarch 256 times; and a modern theologian who has edited the *De sera numinis vindicta* writes: "I am not aware that even Christian writers who have attempted to defend the same truth (of the personal character of the Divine goodness) within the same limits of natural theology, have been able to do anything better than to reaffirm Plutarch's position, and, perhaps, amplify and illustrate his argument."

In Plutarch we find a very interesting mixture of monotheism and polytheism. The monotheism came primarily from the Greek philosophers who tended towards the recognition of a Deity of thought, exalted, and not in direct contact with men, so that a mediator of some sort was necessary. But Plutarch was not only a philosopher but a moralist, to whom some way of approach to the divine was a necessity. The way which he found was twofold. First, like all later Paganism, he made of the sun-god, Apollo



or Helios, a mediator. In Apollo the divine nature seemed to assume personality, and to come in contact with man through oracle and inspiration. Second, he brought in, at a lower level, the ministration of Dæmons to form a bridge between heaven and earth.

In the treatise *De E apud Delphos*, Plutarch puts forth his views as to the higher worship of Apollo which later inspired Mithraism and the attempted revival of Paganism by Julian. In this treatise and in the *De Pythiæ oraculis* are very interesting discussions of two important subjects—the nature of divine inspiration and the possibility of prophecy. In regard to both he takes a line very similar to that of modern divines. "The soul is God's instrument. Now the virtue of an instrument consists in imitating, subject to its natural limitations, the power that makes use of it." So the oracles at Delphi, though divinely inspired, yet partook of the human weakness of the Pythian prophetess. So much for inspiration: as regards prediction, nothing exists without a cause, and thus the future is wrapped up in the present; so that Apollo, knowing the natural causes of all things, can foretell the future. Here the great difficulty in the theory of prophecy, the power of free-will in man, is set aside. It is on the side of the will that all the great philosophers of Greece are weak; and this weakness prevented the schools of philosophy from ever becoming churches or remoulding society.

But the defects of the Pythian oracle were in Plutarch's view not due merely to the human weakness of the Pythia, but also to the intervention of Dæmons. The demonology of Plutarch is perhaps the most interesting point in his writings, and in a sense the most modern. For there can be no doubt that dæmonic views have of late years revived, especially among the spiritualists; and in the last number of the *Hibbert Journal*, Professor Stout accuses Mr Myers of reviving the theory of the guardian angel.

Seeing how long dæmonic theories have held sway among men, one may be fairly sure of two things: first, that they are based upon actual experience; and second, that they afford a popular and plausible explanation of facts. Among the facts, one which especially weighed with Plutarch is that among those inner monitions which mankind have agreed to attribute to a spiritual source, by no means all are good, and even those which are good are seldom entirely good. Turning to history, we see that the impulses which we commonly regard as due to a divine source are mingled in the recipient not only with intellectual ignorance, but even with baser elements. Now, as Plutarch observes, it is nothing but the most childish folly to look upon God as a sort of ventriloquist; but putting aside verbal inspiration, it is possible to regard the inferior element in inspiration as due either to the perversions and limitations of the human instrument, or as due to the spiritual intermediary, who moves between the perfect and omniscient divine nature and this instrument. Both of these explanations are found in Plutarch. He seems to think that the oracles, for example, are controlled by Dæmons, as very few men have the power of direct communion with God, and those who have this power

become after death Dæmons, to communicate the divine inspirations to men. Thus the theory of dæmonic agency serves to explain how God may be in all respects perfect and yet be a source of imperfect inspiration to men. We see at once how small was the difference of belief between later Paganism and early Christianity, which accepted the good Dæmons as saints and angels, and evil Dæmons as Satan and his sprites.

The union of monotheism with polydæmonism is expressed by Plutarch in a fine passage quoted by Mr Oakesmith from the *De Iside et Osiride*: "There are not different gods among different peoples, not Barbarian gods or Greek gods, not gods of the south or gods of the north; but just as the sun, the moon, the earth, the sky, and the sea are common to all, but receive different names among different peoples, so likewise are different honours assigned and different invocations addressed to the gods in different places according to the customs there established. Yet it is one Reason which admonishes, and one Providence which directs, while subordinate powers have been appointed over all things."

It is interesting to examine, with Mr Oakesmith, the attitude which Plutarch takes towards other phases of ancient religion. As regards Myth, he is far less drastic than Plato, and would rather expurgate and explain myths of the gods than expel them from the republic. As to the Mysteries, he says little; he regards them as valuable for the explanation of some of the cruder legends: but he does not appear greatly to trust to them as regards the assurance of a future life.

One wonders when the time will come when it will be possible to read in churches passages from the moral writings of Plutarch or the Manual of Epictetus, instead of such stories as those of the treachery of Jael and the massacres of Jehu. It is obvious that the former writings are not only of higher moral tone, but also far more in the line of descent of modern Christianity. But the history of religion proves that ritual is far more conservative]than religious belief.

PERCY GARDNER.

OXFORD.

*Eleusinia: de quelques problèmes relatifs aux Mystères d'Eleusis.*

By Le Comte Goblet d'Alviella.—Pp. 154. 1903.

THE author, who is Professor in the University of Brussels, and has already won reputation as a writer<sup>pro</sup> in the department of the comparative study of religion, has certainly undertaken in this monograph an ambitious and important task. It has been evidently prompted by the intellectual movement so significant of our present age, when we are tending to look for the sources of Christian dogma and the origins of much Christian ritual in later Hellenism rather than in Judaism proper or in the New Testament. Count d'Alviella wishes to present to us not so much "a work of erudition or a complete history of the mysteries of



Eleusis," as an outline of their developement, a summary of their moral and philosophic character, and an estimate of their "influence on the formation of the Christian liturgy." His project is evidently a delicate one, especially in a country where ecclesiastical feeling is so intense as it is in Belgium. But after all, Belgium has produced, and we trust appreciates, M. Cumont; and Count d'Alviella disclaims any intention of theological polemic, and by his tact and good taste, avoids the possibility of offending even the most susceptible sectarianism.

Obviously the problems that he has set himself to solve cannot be handled with authority, even in outline, except by those who have been willing to devote themselves to an arduous and critical research both into the Hellenic and Christian evidence. But classic and theologic scholarship are not often combined in sufficient power to deal adequately with both. The present treatise shows considerable learning on both sides of the question; and Hellenists, as well as other students of early religion, will be glad to have the author's opinion concerning some of the leading problems that arise about Eleusis. The statement of these occupies by far the larger part of the work; yet, even so, the space that he allows himself for their exposition is very limited; so that much has to be omitted, and many controversial judgments are passed without adequate argumentation, as for instance on the Thracian origin of Eleusis and on the personality of Iacchos. The main conclusions of his study may be summarised thus: the "Eleusinia" were originally "sacra gentilia" of certain Eleusinian families of Thracian descent in the prehistoric days when Eleusis was independent of Athens: their object was agrarian magic, in this respect resembling the widely prevalent vegetation-dances and harvest rites of uncivilised societies: in their primitive form they consisted (a) of a preliminary initiation, which included a visit to the world of the dead; (b) a mimetic representation of the destinies of the corn-sowing, of which Kore was a personification, and an exhibition of certain sacred objects of a talismanic value, followed by incantations and invocations: later, perhaps owing to the absorption of Eleusis by Athens, the "sacra gentilia" become "mysteries" in the proper sense, secret rites, to which strangers might gain admission by adoption and preliminary initiation: from the eighth century onwards, though the agrarian ritual remains, the view of the life after death, which had hitherto touched only the preliminaries of initiation, becomes the cardinal idea, and regeneration, with the hope of posthumous salvation, rather than agrarian prosperity, becomes the object of initiation, the hierophant giving rules similar to those contained in the Egyptian "Book of the Dead," whereby the initiated could be safely guided through the dangers of the Inferno: in the fifth century, Orphism invades the mysteries, and superimposes upon the old ritual that which becomes known as the *ἐποπτεία*, which displayed a *ἱερός γάμος* or Sacred Marriage of Zeus and Demeter, the incestuous union of the god with his own daughter, the birth of Dionysos-Zagreus, his murder by the Titans and subsequent resurrection; the archaic conception of merely ritualistic purity

tends to become moralised, and a moral doctrine strives to establish itself in the mysteries by the side of the "magical" view that lustrations and initiation are all-powerful to effect salvation: finally, the mysteries become permeated with the philosophic views of the Stoa and of later Platonism, which the hierophant of the time can always embody in his exegesis of the *ιερά*; the mysteries incline towards a vague Pantheism, a form of service that could easily be adapted to a new religion: hence, and owing probably to the large number of Hellenic converts to Christianity who had been communicants at Eleusis, the Eleusinia left a deep impress upon Christian ritual, and were partly the cause why Christianity in the third century assumed a "mystic" character, which it lacked in the beginning.

A treatise of this small compass dealing with such wide and intricate questions cannot expect to rank as an original and decisive work of the first order; it can be only of importance as assisting to propagate a new and important theory of the continuity of the civilised religions of Europe. It contains, as we should expect of Comte d'Alviella, many interesting pages and well-expressed ideas; a salient example being his account of the legal and moral developements of the primitive concept of "ritualistic" purity. And he is well versed in the current methods of anthropology; which, however, so far as they tend to deal mainly with the phenomena of savage ritual, have thrown no light whatever on the higher problem of the Eleusinia; for instance, the Pawnee story, quoted in very much the same way by our author (p. 49), and by Mr Andrew Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, ii., pp. 270-272, interesting as it is in itself, does not appear to be relevant, as it does not disclose an agrarian ritual or the hope of posthumous salvation for men. It is singular that he has missed, in spite of his anthropological reading, the right explanation of the *βαλλήτης*, the ritualistic stone-throwing on the Eleusinian fields, which took the form of a fight between two parties for the purpose of shedding blood as a vegetation-charm, and which finds its parallel in the Argive *λιθοβολία*. In fact, the author does not show himself sufficiently familiar with the whole field of Greek cults; and further study in this special domain would have probably modified considerably his somewhat crude theories concerning the origins and developements of Demeter and Dionysos, and perhaps his views (which are not very clearly expressed) as to the causes which gave a "mysterious" form to a particular cult.

But the salient defect of the treatise, and one which vitally affects his essential position, is his careless citation of ancient authorities and his uncritical application of ancient texts. One cannot help feeling that the distinguished author has been led astray by trusting the dangerous Lenormant too implicitly, and disregarding the whole of Lobeck's sceptical work. It has been in vain apparently that the latter protested against the assumption that the invective of every Christian Father or late Christian Scholiast was based on accurate knowledge of the Eleusinia, and that wherever "mysteries" are mentioned the Eleusinia are necessarily intended. It is strange indeed that in a treatise on the momentous question of the rela-



tions of Christianity to the mysteries, the spurious formula of *κόγξ ὁμπαξ* should be invoked as evidence (p. 145): we had thought that Lobeck had laid the ghost of this absurdity: or again, that a statement of Diodorus, to the effect that the *mystæ* became more just, pious, and in every way better through initiation, should be quoted to the credit of Eleusinian *morale*, although in the original context it refers in the clearest words to the Samothracian mystery. His theory that Eleusinian exegesis was influenced by contemporary stoicism may be true; but we have the right to complain of the manner in which the texts are handled which he quotes by way of proof (p. 110). A citation in the *Etymologicum Magnum* (s. v. *τελετή*)—"Chrysippus declares that discourses on divine matters are naturally called initiations" (as the soul needs long prior training and initiation before it can receive them)—is quoted as asserting that "Chrysippos attributed to the mysteries the merit of furnishing exact notions about the divinity." A passage in the *Præparatio Evangelica* (iii. 1) is referred to as "*une appréciation d'Eusèbe*" (p. 110): one would scarcely gather from this that the passage in question is a quotation from Plutarch which Eusebius gives as an illustration of the symbolic method of mythic interpretation—a method to which the Bishop is wholly hostile. And we feel the same weakness in the appreciation of textual evidence in his attempt to reconstruct the scheme of the mystic drama from such useless material as Claudian's *De Raptu Proserpinæ*, 1, 11–18: and again, in the enunciation of the theory, which he strongly maintains, that the *mystæ* in the hall of the *τελεστήριον* were obliged to perform a subterranean journey through Hell. The literary evidence would have to be very strong and clear to convince us of this in defiance of the archæological facts which speak loudly against it. But, on the contrary, it is very weak and vague, as even Lenormant saw; and our author gives us—without criticism—only one passage as his authority, the well-known fragment of Plutarch's *De Anima*, preserved by Stobæus, from which a more exact analysis could not extract much definite information concerning the Eleusinia.

But the need for verification and reconsideration of the texts is most imperative when we come to that which is the central idea of Comte d'Alviella's treatise: namely, that the Eleusinian *ἐποπτεία* was an invention of the fifth-century Orphism and consisted in a dramatic presentation of the begetting and birth, the death and resurrection of Zagreus. As he states it, we can only understand him to mean that before this conquest of Orphism there was no *ἐποπτεία* at all at Eleusis. This is by far the boldest and most original statement in his monograph; but he adduces no kind of evidence in its support. It contradicts his own account of the primitive form of the mysteries, it contradicts the Homeric hymn, in which it is clear that the essence of the ritual was something shown and seen; and it is *a priori* improbable, for it seems that some action, some revelation to the sight of *ιερά* or sacred things, that is to say, an *ἐποπτεία*, was essential to a Greek mystery. But it would be sufficient for his main account if he merely asserted that Orphism captured the stronghold in the fifth century

and modified the *ἐποπτεία* or substituted or superimposed one of its own, namely, the Zagreus-story, an incestuous *ἱερός γάμος*, the birth, death, and resurrection of Zagreus-Dionysos. This would be at least a possible thesis to maintain, and if proved or shown probable would be of great importance for the demonstration of the parallelism between the religious concepts of the Eleusinia and Christianity. But the author does not appear to be aware that the theory, though it still has adherents besides himself, has been rejected by many modern scholars and archæologists on very weighty grounds: others like Lenormant and Professor Ramsay, who accept it, regard it as true only of the latest period, when the Eleusinia were contaminated with Sabazianism and Attis-cult from Phrygia. Doubtless if this was true of the later days, it would not affect our view of the "classic" period of the Eleusinia, but it would still be a fact of great importance for the question of their relations with Christianity. But the texts on which the whole theory depends demand severe criticism, which our author does not give them. His main authority (pp. 23-24) is a passage from the *Philosophumena* of Hippolytus, which is confessedly drawn from Gnostic sources, and in which, after the fashion of the Gnostic *θεοκασία*, Eleusinian ritual is inextricably combined with the cult-legends of Attis. The whole context excites the highest distrust and suspicion. More important are the chapters in Clemens, *Protreptica*, 2, 15-22 (pp. 13-19, Pott), which he quotes in a note on page 23 (n. 5), with the comment that "it is not certain that Clemens may not have deliberately confused the ritual and myths of different mysteries." If Clemens has done so, as it is probable that many other Christian writers frequently did, so much the worse for our author's position. But a careful reading shows that Clemens has not done so, but has given us a valuable and clearly distinct account of separate mysteries and separate mystic legends of the Eleusinia and Thesmophoria, with their story of the abduction of Kore and the sorrow of the mother, of the Phrygian Sabazios-mystery, and of the Zagreus-Dionysos mystery, and he nowhere imputes Sabazianism to Eleusis. And it would have been his cue to have mentioned such "contamination" if it had been true. At the same time the negative evidence of Clemens agrees with certain passages in Arnobius and Firmicus Maternus. The only other authority quoted in the treatise in support of the theory is the scholiast on Plato's *Gorgias* (497 C), whose statements are far too vague to prove anything, and sound like a faint echo of the invective of some Christian Father who may have believed that the Hall of Eleusis was the scene of an immoral Phrygian Passion-play. A more important citation is one that our author omits, Tatian in *Græc.* 8; but the sentences there are so arranged as to defy exact analysis, and it is not clear for what the evidence of Eleusis is cited, and they merely leave the impression that for Tatian, as generally for later Paganism, "Orpheus" and "Eleusis" had become almost synonymous terms, and that every myth read in Orphic literature was supposed to be part of an Eleusinian mystic drama. This need not surprise us. The Orphic books dealt specially with Eleusinian



myth and the Orphic claim to have founded the mysteries imposed upon people from the fourth century downwards. And a great number of the Eleusinian communicants were no doubt members of private Orphic brotherhoods, and may have interpreted the scene for themselves by means of Orphic ideas, may for instance have identified the Eleusinian Pluto with Dionysos. But the prominent Orphic ideas are not discoverable in Eleusinian dogma, and recent archæological discoveries tend to prove that Dionysos-Iacchos, in spite of the enthusiasm of his votaries, remained an external and subordinate figure in the mystic ritual.

If then we reject the Orphic hypothesis, we are not at liberty to say that the Eleusinia embodied such tenets of belief as a divine birth, death, and resurrection; and the parallelism between the great Attic mysteries and the Christianity that silenced them must be looked for, not in these vital concepts, but generally in the religious temper of mind which they evoked, and specially in the ideal of a *Madre Dolorosa* and in their hopes of posthumous salvation, and on the ritualistic side in the ideas associated with baptism, purification, and sacrament, and in the organisation of the ceremonial. It is the last point that chiefly occupies the concluding portion of Comte d'Alviella's treatise. He draws much from Dr Hatch's Hibbert Lectures, and amply acknowledges his indebtedness, also from Duchesne, *Origines du Culte Chrétien*. His account is here interesting and on the whole judicious, nor does he overstate his case. A more searching discussion would have been welcome on the exact position of the sacrament in Eleusinian ritual; and the author is put somewhat at a disadvantage by limiting the question as to Christian origins to Eleusis. The inquiry would be more fruitful still, and in some ways less perplexing, if it included the other Mediterranean mysteries which may have contributed directly or indirectly to the developement and propagation of later Christianity. This wider task has been attempted by Professor Dieterich's memoir, recently published, on the Mithras liturgy. Meanwhile, in spite of certain defects in criticism, the treatise of Comte d'Alviella is valuable as likely to stimulate investigation on a very important track.

LEWIS R. FARNELL.

EXETER COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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*The Silesian Horseherd*.—By F. Max Müller. Longmans, Green & Co., 1903.

*The Silesian Horseherd* contains, or perhaps rather consists of, a statement of the late Professor Max Müller's position with regard to religion and philosophy. As it was intended, however, as a popular exposition, and not as a philosophic treatise, we get in it rather a statement of conclusions arrived at, than a philosophic argument in support of the conclusions. Any criticism, therefore, of the philosophic position adumbrated in the book, if it is adverse criticism, must take the form of indicating difficulties which appear to be suggested, and which might perhaps have been disposed

of in a more formal treatise, even though they remain unsolved in the *Silesian Horseherd*. It is the purpose of this notice to indicate one of these difficulties, which, as long as it stands in the way, seems to make it impossible to accept the philosophy which is the foundation of the book. That philosophy may be summed up, in Professor Royce's terms, as the Unity of Being and the Mystical Interpretation thereof. The one and only Being is the âtmân (the divine Self), "the oldest and truest word for God," "the eternal One, the eternal Self, that lives in us all without beginning and without end." The world in which we appear to live is purely phenomenal; it is a world of ignorance, avidyâ, or delusion, mâyâ. Philosophy and religion consist in attaining "a true self-knowledge," that is, in learning that "the person or so-called 'Ego' has a beginning, a continuation, and an end," and is therefore not the âtmân. The âtmân "for a time is blended with the body, till it attains a true self-knowledge, and then, even in life, or later in death, by liberation from its phenomenal existence, or from the body, again comes to itself." Such liberation was attained, even in life, by Jesus; and either in life, or later in death, must be attained by all men, for their phenomenal existence is pure delusion—there is only one Self, the âtmân. Jesus was the Son of God, not in the sense implied by the popular misconception of the Virgin-birth, but inasmuch as he attained this liberation in life; and we are all Sons of God, inasmuch as this liberation will also come to all of us, in life, or later in death. The notion that we exist, or shall exist, in addition to the âtmân is pure delusion. Such a notion is involved in the idea that union or communion between man and God can be established and can be maintained for ever. If this idea were true, the unity of Being would be for ever false. There is no room in the âtmân for God and other beings, or for union or communion between them. "The unity, not the union, of the human soul" with God, is the fundamental truth of the doctrine of the âtmân. Self-knowledge and liberation from phenomenal existence consist precisely in realising that the âtmân alone is, and that the person or so-called ego is a delusion. In strictness, therefore, the term Son of God, the reader must suppose, does not imply that there are any distinctions of personality within the âtmân itself. The unity of Being is the essential truth: multiplicity of beings is mâyâ, and a single step from unity towards multiplicity lands us in delusion. The individual, therefore, who attains "a true self-knowledge" may be called, by the onlooker, Son of God; but in very fact he is, in virtue of that attainment, God. There is only one Self or âtmân; and in it there is no trinity nor any plurality of beings. But, while there are no distinctions of personality within the pure Being of the âtmân, "the Self can only be thought of as self-knowing." And if we inquire as to the nature of this knowledge, we are not put off by the mere iteration that the Self knows itself. On the contrary, we are told that the eternal Self has "divine ideas," and that there are things in themselves "which are and always remain, as far as we are concerned in the outer world, transcendent." Corresponding to this world of pure Being, there



is the world of *mâyâ*, of phenomenal existence. Here we may recognise the "person or so-called ego," having perceptions, which, "imperfect as they are, exist only in us, for us, and through us"; and also having ideas "composed of our sense-perceptions."

At this point, however, the difficulty arises. I have in the last sentence of my attempt to summarise Max Müller's position, spoken of the "person or so-called ego" as having perceptions and having ideas. And there seems at first to be some justification for so speaking: if our ideas are composed of "our" sense-perceptions, and those perceptions exist in "us," it is natural to jump to the conclusion that the subject having those ideas and sense-perceptions is a "person or so-called ego." It is true that those perceptions and ideas are *mâyâ* or delusion; but someone must have them, in order to be deluded. If no one is deluded, there is no delusion. It is not within the bounds of the discussion to inquire whether we are deluded, or how we came to be deluded: "the origin of this ignorance, this illusion, or the world of appearance, is a question which no human being will ever solve." Granted that illusion exists, we will ask no question about its origin: we will simply ask, who it is that is deluded; and at first we are tempted to say that it is the "person or so-called ego." But the temptation must be rejected, for the so-called ego is never subject, but always object. "All that man is as an object, or appears to be for a time on earth, is his organic body with its organs of sense and will, and with its slowly developed so-called ego." The so-called ego, which exists solely as object, is evidently the "empirical self" of Kant: it is not the subject of thought, but it is what that subject remembers of its past, and takes as object of its thought. The so-called ego is part of the delusion or *mâyâ* which is presented to the subject of whom we are in search. If we take it, as we may safely do, that the "so-called ego" is always object, never subject, then we still require to know to whom are presented those sense-perceptions and ideas which are *mâyâ*, and which are said to be "ours," and to exist for "us" alone. Formally, according to the theory, there is only one subject, viz., the Self or *âtman*; and it certainly does appear in some passages that it is the *âtman* which suffers delusion. It is definitely stated that "the Self came into this ignorance, *avidyâ*, or *mâyâ* (illusion or the phenomenal world)," and that it is "by liberation from its phenomenal existence" that the self "attains a true self-knowledge." From these quotations taken by themselves, it might be inferred that the *âtman* is subject to *mâyâ*; and this inference is doubtless corroborated by various passages in which the distinction between the world of *mâyâ* and the world of pure Being disappears altogether. Thus, if we take it that the *âtman* is liable to *mâyâ*, in the first place, we get a subject to whom the ideas and sense-perceptions which constitute *mâyâ* can be presented; and in the next place, we can understand the statement that "the divine ideas pass into human perception, and thereby into objective reality," and the further statement that "we recognise [the divine ideas] by reflection in the objective world." But it is obvious that

in the train of thought constituted by these quotations, the hypothesis of a world of delusion is abandoned altogether: the ideas and objects which "pass into human perception" are no longer delusions which exist for us alone and in us alone; they are "divine ideas" having "objective reality" in an "objective world." In other words, the first consequence of seeking in the Eternal One a subject of *mâyâ* is that the *âtman*, or Self, being the subject to which pure Being is presented, is incapable of being deluded; and not only so, but its "divine ideas" and the "objective reality" to which they give rise "pass into human perception," which therefore ceases to be a field of phantasmagoria. The alternative consequence of supposing the *âtman* to be the subject of *mâyâ* would be to maintain that it is really the victim of delusion, and that the objects which, in this state of *avidyâ* or *mâyâ*, it supposes to be presented to it, are truly non-existent, and really delusions. But this is logically offensive, if the *âtman* be considered as a purely philosophic conception; and offensive to the religious consciousness, if the *âtman* be regarded as "the oldest and truest word for God." We may be sure that it is no part of the *mâyâ* doctrine to allow it to be supposed that God can be the victim of delusion; and we have the express statement that these delusive sense-perceptions, out of which delusive ideas are generated, "exist only in us, for us, and through us." This statement can only mean that delusion exists not in the *âtman* but in "us." We may therefore feel compelled to understand that by "us" is meant neither the *âtman* (which is a subject, but not subject to delusion), nor the "so-called ego" (which is object only), but a human subject. And this derives some corroboration from the statements, already quoted, that "the divine ideas pass into human perception," that "we recognise [the divine ideas] by reflection." It is supported by such a passage as that "we learn to think the thoughts which the Thinker of the world has first thought"; and it seems clear that "we" who learn to think, or who recognise the divine ideas, or in whom alone sense-perceptions (which are delusion) occur, are both distinguished from the Thinker or *âtman*, and are subjects, having sense-perceptions and ideas. If we hesitate, the hesitation seems done away by the positive assertion, "man is not only an object but a subject also. All that man is as an object . . . is his organic body . . . with its slowly developed so-called ego." But though it is a position, intelligible if not correct, that man may be a subject having ideas, some of which embody truth, and some error, it is clear that this is not a position which Max Müller intended to take up. It starts from the very assumption which the theory of pure Being and the one Self is there to deny, viz., that individuals exist, and that union or communion with God is their highest aim, whereas the essence of the theory is that the unity of pure Being excludes individual existence. But we are not reduced to any inferences on the point: we have the explicit statement, touching man as a subject, that "to man belongs, together with the visible objective body, the invisible subjective Something which we may call mind or soul or *x*," and this *x* = *âtman*. Thus, once more, it appears that there is only



one subject; and though it is stated that man is a subject, it appears that man is âtmân.

This, then, is the difficulty which appears to be suggested, and not allayed, in the *Silesian Horseherd*: who is the victim of mâyâ? who is it that is deluded? If there is, truly and really, only one subject, only one Being, the âtmân, then it is God who is the subject of mâyâ. If that conclusion is repellent, and if we admit that delusion does occur, then there must be more subjects than one—the doctrine that there is only one Self collapses. Perhaps, then, we ought to infer that man, who is not merely subject but object also, is as much a phenomenal subject as by the theory he is a phenomenal object. But, first, a phenomenal subject would be a non-existent subject, and unless some one is deluded there can be no delusion—the theory of mâyâ cannot start unless a real subject is postulated. Next, it is explicitly stated that the subject who is deluded is the “mind or soul or *x*,” that is to say, is the âtmân. Or, if it be urged that the âtmân is incapable of being deluded, by the very terms of its definition, then either there is no subject to mâyâ, and therefore there is no mâyâ, or there must be other subjects in being than the âtmân; and the fundamental truth must be that they seek union with God, knowing that they are not God.

F. B. JEVONS.

UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM.

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*The Conflict of Duties, and other Essays.*—By Alice Gardner, Lecturer and Associate of Newnham College, Cambridge; Author of *Julian the Philosopher*, *Studies in John the Scott*, etc. Pp. xii. 307.—T. Fisher Unwin, 1903.

IN the short preface to this volume, Miss Gardner explains that all except two of the eighteen Essays which it contains were “read at the Sunday afternoon meetings of a society of students of Newnham College.” Nothing could be better adapted than most of these Essays to stimulate independent reflection, while at the same time there is no failure to appreciate the sacredness of that which has been hallowed by the thought and custom of the past, and they are marked throughout by an utter absence of dogmatism. In a spirit that is both reverent and inquiring, the author discusses such topics as the religious needs and moral ideal of the intellectual life, sectarianism, theological reading for non-theological readers, hatred and charity, denominational teaching in schools, the grounds of religious liberty, the moral teaching of history, man’s responsibility for his beliefs. There is one Essay (VII.)—“Professor Seeley as a Moral and Religious Teacher”—which is to some extent biographical, and one (Essay XVIII.)—on “Early Christian Mysticism as set forth by Dionysius the Areopagite”—which is almost wholly historical. But while Essay VII. seems to me one of the most attractive in the book, that on Early Christian Mysticism, though interesting and suggestive, and among the longest (if not the longest) of

all, strikes me as somewhat incomplete. Probably this is because the subject is so large and difficult that the historically uninstructed reader feels the need of a fuller and more elaborate treatment.

The great value of the book is due to its combination of accurate scholarship and wide culture with independence of thought and sympathetic understanding of a more restricted intellectual outlook, of high ideals and the eager quest of truth with judicious conservatism, of ready humour and keen criticism with a large tolerance and that blessed charity of imagination that enables the possessor to "think no evil." It is well calculated to further the cause of "sound learning and religious education." There are one or two delightful stories—e.g., that of the poor woman who had to go out, leaving her paralysed husband alone at home, and who, asked how she managed when she went to her morning's work, replied, "I trust to Providence and am always in a fidget." For the most part, Miss Gardner attempts rather to show the aspect or element of truth in different views, or their underlying harmony, than to adopt one among competing solutions of a difficulty to the exclusion of the others. For instance, in Essay XVI., "Man's Responsibility for his Beliefs," after contrasting the denominational view of education or influence, that the person to be affected should be brought "into a *psychological climate* favourable to the formation of good habits, and of feelings of approbation or the reverse towards noble or disgraceful actions"—with the *undenominational* view, that we should "appeal directly to the conscience, and try to arouse in the individual soul the will and the power to choose the right and refuse the wrong in all cases where the two are presented to it,"—Miss Gardner remarks that "if we bear in mind the importance of the 'climate' as disposing the young mind to acquiescence, and as rendering easier the progress towards assured belief, and, on the other hand, the essentially individual character of such belief in its matured state, we may acknowledge that both 'denominational' and 'undenominational' educators have a real case and a grasp on at least half of the truth."

The Essays as a whole bring home to one very strongly the necessity of wide knowledge—and perhaps, in particular, of historical knowledge—for enabling a thinker to view any doctrine, opinion, or fact in right perspective, and the hopeless absurdity of "one-sidedness" in theory or practice. Miss Gardner gives us true discussion, the kind of discussion that clears up confusion and leads to a wider outlook. She does not at all profess not to have formed definite views in many cases, and does not shun the expression of them; still, the aim of the book is to emphasise a method and spirit of procedure rather than to assert, or even prove, a set of opinions, though those opinions may be the ones which she has been led to hold; she shows how to go to work in order to track out confusion in one's thoughts and reach valid ground for choice in opinion and action. But though perhaps the crowning merit of the book is due to this line which the author takes up,—the line of comprehensive discussion, sifting of questions, weighing of difficulties, dispassionate recognition of truth or value wherever



found,—still the persistent tarrying in this “middle region,” this “place of intermediate ethical generalisation,” in which men “who are undoubtedly plain and think themselves honest” habitually dwell, leaving to “men of leisure” the further inquiries into “the great principles of morals,” seems to be made impossible at the same time that it is recommended; for the author’s candid exhibition of difficulties, and scrupulous allowance of some reason to each party in the dispute, seem to drive us on inevitably to those further inquiries. For instance, in the first Essay, that which gives its title to the book, I am convinced that no one could read it without being impelled to demand just some one “great principle” by help of which to allay, or at any rate explain, the conflict that experience seems to show, not only between duties but also between ideals. Miss Gardner, indeed, while she seems to admit (p. 10) that there is some difficulty in the way of holding that “the most important and undoubted duties of man cannot collide,” is rather inclined to think (p. 12) that we can get relief by substituting *ideals* for *duties*,—which I should dispute. She does, it is true, waver a little, allowing that “the universal duties” are “implied in the pursuit of any great ideal,” and even that “ideals are incompatible.” However, my point is, that whether we refer our difficulties to duties or to ideals, we *do* find difficulties arising from conflict or incompatibility between them; and the mind that has been stimulated, as in these Essays, to recognise difficulties and seek for light, can hardly fail, at such a crisis, to go on in the same path and urgently demand some great rational principle, the search after which it is here recommended to leave to professed moralists (for it is they, I suppose, that Butler means by his “men of leisure”). As to the vagueness of our ideals (*cf.* p. 15), this is to be removed by answering the question *what* (not *whence* or *why*); if we can say *what* our ideals are, we escape vagueness. But the removal of vagueness does not necessarily carry with it the removal of conflict; and if there is conflict between accepted duties or ideals, this surely can only be removed by some wider principle which transcends and harmonises them. Similar need of such a principle is felt in other Essays, *e.g.*, in Essays II. and III., on the religious needs and moral ideal of the intellectual life. The author inclines, I think, to a mystic conclusion, and on the mystic view, the demand for some one great harmonising principle, some final and all-embracing criterion, loses its acuteness. For my own part, however, I am unable to see how to reconcile a “mystic” conclusion with a “rational” starting-point; if we appeal to Cæsar, is it not to Cæsar that we must go?

If the limits of space did not forbid, I should like to go through the Essays in detail. Only so would it be possible to do justice to the wealth of keen thought and practical good sense and the charm of feeling and expression which recommend this book so strongly to the reviewer. But as this is impossible, I will conclude by merely drawing attention to the paper on “Sectarianism,” and that on “Wear and Tear,” which seem to me particularly admirable in different ways. E. E. CONSTANCE JONES.

*Pagan Christs: Studies in Comparative Hierology.*—By J. M. Robertson.—Watts & Co., 1903.

THE present volume, or the greater part of it, claims to be a synthesis of the real lines of growth of the Christian cultus, introduced by a discussion of the principles of hierology. Assuming that the character of Christ is imaginary, the author develops his theory of Christian origins under the following main heads.

The central fact of Christianity, the Crucifixion, is to be traced back to an original human sacrifice, which, as we gather from allusions in the Old Testament, as well as from specific survivals in ritual, was practised by the Jews, like other ancient peoples, at some stage of their history. There is, it is true, no trace of such a rite among Palestinian Jews of the later period, but there is a Semitic and probably Israelitish tradition of an annually offered victim, "Jesus Barabbas, the son of the Father," and we may surmise the contact of dispersed Jews with such a sacrifice in Hellenistic Eastern towns. Further, it is probable that a Jesuine cult existed before the rise of Christianity. It is only by supposing him to have represented the deity of an earlier myth, that we can account for the prominence of Joshua or Jesus, the son of Nun, who is quite certainly unhistorical. After the return from exile, the name Jesus came to be associated with the doctrine of a Messiah—not at first, we may note, of a suffering Messiah. That this was so, can be seen from the Book of Revelation and the Book of the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, which are evidently Jewish, though re-edited for Christian purposes. The Lamb-God Jesus of the Apocalypse is found to be pre-Christian and Judaic. So too is the Jesus of the Twelve Apostles, who is not mentioned as crucified or otherwise sacrificed.

Moreover, in the latter work, chapter vii., we find a certain eucharistic formula which is not Christian attached to this non-crucified Jesus. As the Eucharist represents an original sacramental meal, and so stands in close relation to the sacrifice, it is surprising that it is not so related in the passage in question. Yet this very phenomenon points to an inference which we seem entitled to draw on other grounds. The numerous Gentile precedents for the eucharistic rite, and the fact that it was connected with the Lord's Day, independently of the story of the Lord's Resurrection on the first day of the week, make it easy to assume a weekly bread and wine sacrament of long standing, among the Jews of the Dispersion. It is this Jewish Eucharist which appears in the Book of the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, ascribed to a strictly Judaic Jesus, not crucified or otherwise sacrificed.

Such are the elements of rite and doctrine which fused together to form the historic Christian cultus. The most likely and natural means of such a fusion, according to our author, was that of dramatic representation, and he assumes, in conclusion, that the Gospel story of the Last Supper, Passion, Betrayal, Trial, Crucifixion, and Resurrection is a transcript of a Mystery Drama, and not originally a narrative.

Mr Robertson, as we have seen, proceeds on the assumption that the



historicity of Christ is a myth. His reasons for so doing do not appear until his main theories have been set forth. They practically reduce themselves to this, viz., that Paul, or the writer of the Pauline Epistles, ostensibly the first witness, shows total ignorance of the teachings and miracles ascribed to Jesus in the Gospels. The contention of Professor Schmiedel, that he did not allude to the details in Christ's life because they were not of interest to him, is dismissed as futile. It can easily be shown that Mr Robertson's position is untenable. First, it is clear that, in admitting the Epistles as evidence, he admits what they imply—the hostility, for instance, to their writer of the Jews throughout the Mediterranean. But if this is granted, the historicity of Christ must necessarily follow. We can hardly believe that the Jews would have been hostile towards a myth; they would have retorted that Jesus never even existed.

In the next place, we need only read the Epistles to see how useless it is to ignore the force of the contention that for Paul or the "forger" the details of Christ's life possessed no interest. We are surprised, we confess, that in the face of such a passage as Galatians i. 11 *sqq.* Mr Robertson should make the silence of the writer as to the teaching and miracles of Christ the ground for rejecting his historicity. It not only affords an explanation of this silence—namely, that the Apostle regarded it as his mission to preach not the living but the risen Christ, from whom he had received his gospel by a special revelation—but it implies the existence of Christ as a teacher, with disciples who maintained his cult. Our author, indeed, refuses to admit the historicity of the disciples; he is clearly inconsistent in so doing, for the Epistles imply it, and he admits the Epistles.

Again, though Paul or the "forger" does not allude to the teaching or miracles of Christ, he frequently refers to what he regards as the great facts of Christianity—the Crucifixion, the Resurrection, the Institution of the Eucharist. How does Mr Robertson account for this? He explains away the reference to the Eucharist in 1 Cor. xi. by assuming that the passage is interpolated. For the rest, he assures us that Paul or the "forger" believed in a crucified Jesus as to whom he had no biographical record, and he finds him in the person of a certain Jesus ben Pandira, a false teacher who, according to the Talmud, was hanged on the eve of the Passover in 100 B.C. We shall scarcely be guilty of scepticism if we refuse to accept this solution. Mr Robertson has failed, and signally failed, to justify his attitude of negation. It is in the nature of things that this should be so. Had he followed Van Manen implicitly, and rejected the Epistles, his case might have been different. As it stands at present, he has shown no valid cause why we should cease to believe in the historicity of Christ.

The constructive part of Mr Robertson's work, as might be expected, is erudite and suggestive. He arranges his facts well; incidentally, he sheds much light on the history of religion. We venture to think, however, that in his hostility to traditionalism, he not infrequently allows himself to build up unsubstantial theories, to draw conclusions not warranted by his

premises. Thus, his theological position requires that he should deny the historicity of the Crucifixion, and he proceeds to show, mainly on the strength of similarities between its ritual and that of certain forms of human sacrifice in ancient and modern times, that it is a mere symbolical modification of an original practice of that kind. Now this inference is not inevitable. On his own showing, executed persons were held to be devoted to the god as well by the Jews as by other nations, so much so that in certain human sacrifices, *e.g.* the Thargelia, prisoners were regularly utilised as victims. This being so, the alleged similarities of ritual need not excite surprise; they do not in themselves justify him in supposing the Crucifixion to be symbolical, with no foundation in fact, nor in elaborating the theory of a late Semitic tradition of human sacrifice which might have been known to the Jews of the Dispersion.

Again, it is imperative that he should explain away the cult of the, to him, unhistorical Jesus, and he sets out to prove that the name had divine associations even in pre-Christian times. He tells us that if we are to account for the prominent part assigned to Joshua or Jesus, the son of Nun, a hero whom prophets and psalmists do not mention, we must suppose him to have been an original deity. That is to say, Mr Robertson is reasoning from probabilities, and this although we are entitled to demand something more substantial than probabilities from a writer who aims at superseding long-established beliefs. It is not enough for him to say that Joshua must have been an original god, or he would not have been placed on a level with Moses. What we require from him is positive evidence, whether documentary or otherwise, that at some period the Jews had a god Joshua who was the object of a cult.

Equally characteristic is his attempt to show that the New Testament story of the Passion is a transcript of a Mystery Drama. He does not point to a single recorded instance of the representation of such a play among the early Christians, or of its transcription by them. He relies entirely on what he calls the theatrical character of the Gospel story,—that of St Matthew more especially,—the compression of action in time, the abrupt transitions, the scantiness of biographical and descriptive details.

Here again his premises are inadequate. Granted that the incidents succeed one another with rapidity, that St Matthew's story is terse and dramatic, this does not warrant our regarding it as a regular drama, framed on Aristotelian principles. We could point to works which exhibit some of, if not all, the peculiarities here singled out as theatrical, but which are in no sense dramatic compositions. In default of external evidence, we cannot rest a proof on internal indications of this kind; something more tangible is required to substantiate so novel a theory as the one under consideration. Speaking generally, we can only deplore that so much that is suggestive and instructive should be impaired by logical defects such as those we have had occasion to point out. Grouped alongside of the main work are two studies dealing with the great pagan religions. They are placed here with a view to the comparative elucidation



of Christianity. The one on Mithraism claims to be the first treatment of the subject in English. Not the least interesting part of the study on the religions of America is the note on the Passion-Play of New Mexico, which offers striking confirmation of one of Mr Robertson's main theories.

MYVANWY RHYS.

JESUS COLLEGE, OXFORD.

*Some Thoughts on the Incarnation*: with a Prefatory Letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury.—By J. Armitage Robinson, D.D., Dean of Westminster.—Pp. xvi + 48. Longmans, 1903.

*The Virgin Birth of our Lord*.—By B. W. Randolph, D.D., Principal of Ely Theological College.—Pp. 59. Longmans, 1903.

*Our Lord's Virgin Birth*: and the Criticism of To-day.—By R. J. Knowling, D.D., Professor of New Testament Exegesis in King's College, London.—Pp. 95. S.P.C.K., 1903.

THE Dean of Westminster's volume is not addressed to those who have made a study of the question, but to such Christian believers as feel uneasy when the Christmas season approaches, and they are conscious of some uncertainty as to the character of the Incarnation, and in particular of the Nativity, as narrated in the Gospels of St Matthew and St Luke and placed as an article of the Creeds. It is not a formal treatise like Lobstein's, therefore, and it covers a wider field. But as the Virgin Birth occupies the most conspicuous place, and a judgment in its favour is expressed, there are some elements for a useful comparison with Lobstein's volume.

Dr Robinson insists that priority should be given to consideration of the *fact* of the Incarnation before the *mode* of its accomplishment is dealt with. To any one who has accepted the position that "the Son of God was made man" in the Nicene sense, there is a manifest appropriateness in a supernatural Nativity; the infinite significance of the event might well be signalised by miracle. And the Dean frankly acknowledges that apart from this appropriateness the mind is scarcely open to the acceptance of evidence for a supernatural mode of birth. His position, therefore, comes to this, as compared with that of Lobstein: he is predisposed to accept evidence if it is forthcoming, though perfectly prepared to subject it to a serious and severe scrutiny, while Lobstein is predisposed to reject evidence and to receive with favour suggestions for reference of the narratives and their subsequent endorsement by the Church to the work of the religious imagination, proceeding with sincerity and with pious intention, yet after all fictional in its product.

In a few broad strokes Dr Robinson indicates the grounds on which he forms the judgment that the evidence is good, relatively good at least, and adequate for conviction in his own mind. He has not space for more than a few indications of his view of the controverted points in the evidence, but the value of his paper lies in its recording the judgment

of one who has attained eminence as a student in the history and the literature of the early Church, and is therefore specially competent to discriminate between historical and imaginative narratives in that particular phase of human history.

In the light of the judgment formed by Dr Robinson himself, it is all the more notable that he prefaces these lectures with a letter appealing to the English Bishops not to make any official pronouncement which would exclude this subject from further inquiry and discussion on the part of English Churchmen.

Dr Randolph's is a defence of the traditional view, on both the historical and theological grounds. It is brief, terse, and well-ordered; giving expression to the results of what has recently been put forward by Oxford and Cambridge scholars, especially by Bishop Gore. In stating the case, it is certainly an impressive apologetic method to begin with the situation in the second century, for our attention is called to the definite appearance of the belief before the Church had had time to go far in developing doctrine; especially difficult, as Dr Chase argues, being the admission within so short a period of foreign influences such as Schmiedel and Usener rely upon. Dr Randolph then carries the line of defence back to the Gospel narratives. Doctrinally, he holds that the Nicene Christology almost necessitates the Virgin Birth; and definitely maintains the reverse proposition, that the denial of the Virgin Birth is, as matter of fact, at least usually accompanied by departure from Nicene Christology. Mr Beeby, in the October number of this *Journal*, certainly illustrates this, his reading of the doctrine of the divinity of Christ rendering him able to take the historical evidence as wholly without force: "When we consult the records they seem to bear out our presumptions"—of a natural process of birth—"in every respect." Dr Randolph's book and Mr Beeby's article join issue at every principal point of doctrine.

Professor Knowling's volume is occupied with a vindication of the doctrine on historical and critical grounds, and is of special interest because he applies himself chiefly to the recent essays of Schmiedel and Usener in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* and elsewhere. On the theological side he takes his stand on the Creeds, and does not include more than a brief glance at the Christological issues or predispositions involved. It will suffice, therefore, to indicate the principal points of criticism with which he deals.

On the question of the birth at Bethlehem he has the advantage of the recent work of Professors Ramsay and Adam Smith; on the reference of the narratives to the Virgin Mary, to the work of Professor Sanday. He gives close attention to the proposal of Schmiedel and Usener (and of Mr Conybeare in this *Journal*) to delete verses 34 and 35 from the first chapter of St Luke; and to their use of the Sinaitic palimpsest, which he himself considers to be explained by the necessity of recording the social status of Joseph, as Mrs Lewis claims. For the genealogies he accepts the reference of both to Joseph, and accounts for this by the same consideration. The passage in Isaiah vii. can have had no share in inducing belief in a Virgin Birth as it is



now recognised, since it was not applied to the Messiah at the time when the narratives were written. The argument from silence he cannot allow to lead to an inference to nescience, after an examination of each principal case. And *per contra* he insists on the significance of the rapidity and practical completeness of the acceptance of the Virgin Birth by the different Christian communities. The point made that it did not appear in the first version of the creed of Nicæa he considers capable of explanation.

A reader of Lobstein will feel most interest in Dr Knowling's discussion when the constructive theories of Schmiedel and Usener are brought up; for he will find that in that quarter the Jewish factors on which Lobstein relied are disallowed, and the Pagan factors which Lobstein set aside are regarded as the operative agencies. Not only Greco-Roman influences but the Buddhist parallels brought out by Seydel are regarded by them as the sources of the belief, and Dr Knowling scrutinises them with the same result as Lobstein and Harnack, and against Schmiedel and Usener.

Dr Knowling closes with a protest against the mythical method common to Schmiedel, Usener, and Lobstein. The "translation" of historical facts into symbols of spiritual truths he regards as unjustifiable, and takes his stand on the necessity of historical fact for a valid basis of Christian doctrine.

Still another variation of attitude is presented by Canon Hensley Henson in a *Note* (pp. 43-46) in *Sincerity and Subscription: a Plea for Toleration in the Church of England* (Macmillan, 1903). Taking the Nicene Christology, Mr Henson is very cautious in his judgment upon the historical evidence for the Virgin Birth, and he desires that its connection with Christology should not be pressed beyond the simple expression of the human nature of our Lord. Acceptance of the evidence as proving more, or of the Nicene Christology as requiring more, he desires to see left open, without impairing the sincerity of subscription to the Creeds.

Reflecting on these utterances appearing simultaneously with the translation of Lobstein noticed in the October number of the *Hibbert Journal*, the present situation seems to offer no near prospect of agreement. Of the Nicene theologians, the majority find the doctrine of a Virgin Birth so appropriate that they are prepared to accept it in spite of acknowledged deficiencies in the evidence. Dr Randolph embodies the recent strengthening of the evidence in some respects by Bishop Gore, and Professors Sanday, Swete, and Chase; and Professor Knowling contributes a definite strengthening in view of Schmiedel and Usener. All of these draw still closer the bond between this doctrine and the Christology and Soteriology of Catholic tradition. The Dean of Westminster is prepared to see this bond relaxed by those who lean that way, though he does not require it for himself, but re-endorses the evidence from his own studies in early Christian history. Mr Henson admits a diminished theological significance and a weaker estimate of evidence for himself, and pleads for entire openness for others. On the other side, the liberal theologians represented by Lobstein, Schmiedel, and

Usener, find the doctrine unnecessary, indeed wholly inappropriate, for their theology; and as to the evidence, they offer counter-theories of the genesis of the doctrine, largely speculative, and, as matter of fact, in irreconcilably opposite forms.

There are many Christian believers who have welcomed the present prominence of this discussion as likely to relieve them from the necessity of defending a difficult article of faith, and as enabling them to meet the late Professor Sidgwick's challenge to take it as the test question for conformity and subscription in Christian communities which stand upon the Creeds. They have looked with eagerness to see whether this article, in its literal sense, is fairly separable from the Creeds. But in the discussion, so far as it has gone, they will find but a thin stream of support for isolability: as compared with the volume of opinion that the Nicene Christology must be re-cast, and with it this particular doctrine; and the counter-volume of fresh contention that the evidence for it is good, and its theological import indispensable.

It is matter of profound satisfaction that the temper of the discussions on all sides is so religious that there is abundant ground for Lobstein's confident hope that "a deep and intimate concord" among theologians will be fostered, not hindered, by mutual consideration of each other's views.

A. CALDECOTT.

KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON.

*Recollections of James Martineau, with some Letters from him, and an Essay on his Religion.* By the Rev. Alexander H. Craufurd, M.A.—Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1903.

MR CRAUFURD appears to have had two very different objects in view in composing his *Recollections of James Martineau*. In the first place, he has sought to impart to the general public the opinions "of our great Theistic teacher" on the more eminent of his contemporaries, and on the present condition of religious thought in this country. This object he has very successfully achieved. In a pleasant, chatty style he has added something worth having to our knowledge of Martineau's judgments concerning many of the leading minds of the last century. What Martineau thought about such men as Kingsley, Cardinal Newman, and Benjamin Jowett; why he was disgusted with Dean Mansel's teaching; on what grounds he disliked Hegelianism on the one hand, and, on the other, regarded the Prime Minister's *Foundations of Belief* as profoundly unsatisfactory; why he liked *David Grieve* better than *Robert Elsmere*, and had a high opinion of Mrs Humphry Ward as "a genuine and thorough student of the origins of Christianity"; all this, and much more of the same kind, forms very interesting reading.

Had Mr Craufurd confined himself to this aim of giving to the world the cream of about a dozen conversations with Dr Martineau, his book



would have deserved nothing but praise and thankfulness. Most unfortunately, however, along with this laudable purpose, another and very dissimilar one impelled our author to his task, the purpose, viz., of endeavouring to prove that Dr Martineau's religious life was continually marred by inner discord; that while his *intellect*, being unable to free itself from the deistic prepossessions of his early training, always kept him within the Unitarian pale, his *heart* was ever yearning for participation in the ideas and the faith of those semi-orthodox Christians among whom Mr Craufurd appears to class himself, and to whom he tells us in his preface, "this little book will chiefly appeal." Repeatedly throughout the volume we are assured that "James Martineau followed his intellect to the very end, even though it kept him back from that light and warmth and nourishment which he discerned from afar in the more fertile regions of liberalised orthodoxy."

Now such statements as these constitute a most serious reflection both on the internal unity of Dr Martineau's religious life and on the completeness of his contentment with the Unitarian conception of Christianity; and being, as I believe they are, nothing but misunderstandings and misrepresentations, they cannot fail to be most painful and offensive to all persons who are in sympathy with Dr Martineau's religious ideas, and more especially so to those most nearly related to him who knew his inmost heart, and who are well assured how entirely throughout his long life he found both intellectual and spiritual satisfaction in that Unitarian form of Christian belief which he had imbibed in his Norwich home.

The striking contrast between Mr Craufurd's pictures of the real Martineau and his pictures of the imaginary Martineau of his own creation is highly curious. As an instance of the former, the following passage may serve:—"Out of this noble master's three volumes of sermons one might compile a splendid manual of devout thought, lit up by piercing moral insight, and pervaded by the very finest spiritual judgment, a manual which might well be to our age what the *Pensées* of Pascal have been to former ages"; while of the imaginary Martineau we read, "His formal creed tore him up by the roots from the soil that was most congenial to his loftiest instincts. The deep-souled mystic within him often sat down and wept in the Babylon into which earlier intellectual convictions had led him." The imaginary Martineau appears to have never attained in this life to spiritual equanimity; "in the bleak land of chilling and semi-Deistic Unitarianism, died one of the noblest spiritual leaders of our bewildered age. . . . His sad experience has plainly disclosed to us the unsatisfying nature of Deism and ordinary Unitarianism."

It is evidently worth while to seek to understand why an able writer like Mr Craufurd, who certainly greatly admired Dr Martineau, should have fallen into the serious error of thinking that Dr Martineau's profound sympathy with the deeply spiritual minds in every church meant that he was a reluctant Unitarian, who was ever wishing that his intellect would allow him fully to appropriate the treasures of "liberalised orthodoxy." This egregious mistake appears to me to have arisen in part from the

fact that my friend Mr Craufurd did not know Dr Martineau until the latter was far on in the "eighties," and that during their later conversations Dr Martineau's increasing deafness caused him at times to apparently assent to statements which he had not clearly heard and understood.

But a far more potent cause of this grievous misunderstanding was Mr Craufurd's failure to discriminate between Dr Martineau's judgment about the Unitarian form of Christianity and his judgment about particular Unitarians. Dr Martineau most firmly held that the original form of Christianity in the mind of its Founder was emphatically Unitarian, and his conviction was that in all the churches there is at present a growing tendency to revert to Christ's own conception of the uni-personality of the Godhead, a tendency the strength of which the late Mr Spurgeon clearly discerned, and because of which ultra-orthodox preachers, such as Dr Forsyth, are now uttering such loud notes of alarm. Dr Martineau also remarked, as a most hopeful sign of the times, the increase in the present day, and especially in Mr Craufurd's own church, of the number of Sabellian preachers, like Canon Wilberforce, whom he regarded as being Unitarian Christians in everything but the name. And so far was he from thinking that his own belief in the uni-personality of the Deity prevented him from fully appropriating the precious food for the soul which he found in many of the most spiritual writers of the orthodox denominations, that, on the contrary, he felt assured that his Unitarian conception of Christianity enabled him more fully to realise and enjoy the most inspiring hymns and the best devotional literature of all the churches; for the deepest experiences of the mystic always imply the felt relationship and intercourse of the individual soul with *one* indwelling Eternal; and to introduce the thought of a triune Being into this direct relation was, he conceived, to bring a discordant element into the divine music of spiritual communion with the Supreme Presence within the soul.

And as to Dr Martineau's occasional dissatisfaction with his co-religionists, this was not, as Mr Craufurd seems to suppose, a dissatisfaction with their Unitarianism. What did disappoint him was that he sometimes failed to find, especially among the older Unitarians, that vivid and abiding consciousness of the soul's present relationship with the living God, which he recognised with delight in many mystical and evangelical poets and preachers. He gives his explanation of this in a letter quoted by Mr Craufurd, in which he says that "the escape of the Congregationalists in England and the Presbyterians in Scotland from the old orthodoxy is by a better path than ours." And for the following reason. The orthodox doctrine of the co-presence of a divine and human nature in Christ, though intended by the framers of the creeds to imply an essential difference between Christ and his brethren, gradually but inevitably led to the conception of, and belief in, a similar Divine relationship between the indwelling God and all His rational offspring. "This interpretation," says Dr Martineau, "of Christ's life on earth carries the Divine essence



claimed for him into our nature as his brethren." Many of the older Unitarians, on the other hand, especially those of the Priestley and Belsham school, by thinking of Jesus as a "mere" man, had largely missed the essential truth that in every soul there is the living presence and partial self-revelation of the eternal God. Hence it was that in Dr Martineau's forecast of the religious future of mankind he pictured the formation ultimately of a Universal Christian Church in which the rational doctrine of the uni-personality of God shall blend with the fullest realisation of felt personal intercourse with the indwelling Father.

This explanation will, I hope, make it clear that Mr Craufurd's repeated descriptions of the discord in Dr Martineau's mind between his intellect and his heart—between the "Deistic Unitarianism" from which he could not free himself and the "liberalised orthodoxy" for which his soul pined—have no basis save in the writer's own fertile imagination. Space does not allow of a discussion of Mr Craufurd's criticism of such important matters as Dr Martineau's "extreme individualism" and his doctrine of Divine forgiveness, but the present writer's impression is that, along with some just and valuable remarks there is a good deal of misconception, and that, in fact, Dr Martineau's views on these subjects are by no means so remote from Mr Craufurd's as the latter supposes them to be.

CHARLES B. UPTON.

OXFORD.

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*The Secret of the Universe, and other Essays.*—London :  
Sydney C. Mayle, 1903.

IBN TOFAIL, the precursor of Averroes, composed a philosophical romance in which he described the experiences of a human being who grew up absolutely alone, without intercourse with his kind and therefore without speech, but with all his intellectual powers fully developed. This "self-taught philosopher" reached all the essential truths at which the wisdom of the ages has arrived, by simple and direct communion with the material and spiritual facts by which he was surrounded. He was ultimately discovered by the ripest and most spiritual philosopher of the time, and as soon as he had acquired from him the art of speech he was able to communicate with his new friend; and they discovered that they had arrived at identical conclusions and shared each other's spiritual experiences in all essential respects. *The Secret of the Universe, and other Essays*, recalls this story in a far-off way; for though there is very little that is new in it, there is a great deal that is original, that is to say sincerely and directly experienced. It is written quite simply and modestly, yet it assumes throughout the assured tone of a direct and authentic communication of things known. It is an exposition, not a demonstration. But we could wish that the parallel between the author and Ibn Tofail's hero were closer than it is, or not so close. In other words, we could wish that the author had read more or read less; for where he attempts to handle

the thoughts and systems of others he is seldom successful. Scientific and philosophical terms, when they appear, rather disturb than further the exposition, and had the author lived and thought without reading philosophy or science, he would probably have written a better book of exhortation and practical guidance. On the other hand, had he read more deeply he would have known of the thousand forms in which his leading ideas appear and reappear throughout the history of thought, and would also have seen the insufficiency of the critical and historical basis of his examination of the teaching of Jesus. As it is, the strong vein of originality which runs through the work may give it personal significance and value, but cannot secure it an independent place in the literature of thought. The germ idea is that since we cannot in any way enter into relation with the absolutely unknown, or indeed become aware of it or feel it in any shape or form, the "unknown" of which we speak must consist in some aspect or portion of things known, so that we always have a certain ground of vantage from which to attack it. We can only deal with it by hypothesis (conceived imaginatively, by intuition, or how you will) and then test such hypothesis and confirm or reject it. Now, the most important aspect of all speculation as to the unknown is concerned with the realities that lie behind all phenomena; and these are inaccessible to the intellect though penetrable by the reason. Faith is the faculty which secures to us the vision of the vital ideas that speak in the phenomenal world, which world is unintelligible without them. This vision of the reality of things must clothe itself, not, like scientific truth, in a system, or like artistic beauty, in material forms, but in life. Its supreme embodiment, hitherto, is in the life of Jesus. This vision, reading the secret of the universe, or the vital idea that lies behind phenomena, reports thinking and willing love as the ultimate reality, and man as the incipient form of its highest expression;—incipient, for only in rare instances, as yet, has man realised his affiliation to the divine love. Hence self-assertion and craving; which appear to make the self-consciousness of man an element of discord, introduced in the harmony and beauty of the preconscious forms of existence. When man's self-consciousness is fully developed into self-renunciation and into a wider consciousness of life, then man as we know him will give place to his nobler offspring, and the "Son of Man" will appear.

PHILIP H. WICKSTEED.

CHILDREY, WANTAGE.



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- 7J Robinson (J. A., Dean)** St Paul's Ep. to the Ephesians: rev. text and tr., with expos. and notes. 324p. Macmillan, 1903.
- 7M Wohlenberg (G.)** Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, bd. xii., Der 1<sup>ste</sup> u. 2<sup>te</sup> Thessalonicherbriefe. 214p. Deichert, 1903.
- 7S Bartlett (V.)** The Epistle to the Hebrews as the Work of Barnabas. Exp., Nov. 1903.  
 [Barnabas wrote the Epistle in 62 A.D. from Italy (Brundisium?) to a Jewish-Christian community (in Caesarea?).]
- 7U Kirm (D.)** Ein Vorschlag zu Jakobus, IV. 5. Theol. St. u. Krit., 1st No., 1904.  
 [Proposes to read *πρὸς τὸν θεόν* instead of *πρὸς φθόνον*.]
- 7Y Findlay (G. G.)** Studies in the First Epistle of John. I. The Advocate and the Propitiation. Exp., Nov. 1903.
- 9** Apocryphal Gospels: the Whole Body of Extra-Canon. Literature on Life and Words of Christ; with notes, etc., by J. de Quincy Donehoo. 531p. Macmillan Co., 1903.
- Charles (R. H.)** The Book of Enoch.  
 Amer. J. of Theol., Oct. 1903.  
 [Review of Flemmings' *Das Buch Henoch*.]
- C CHURCH** 14<sup>..</sup> Social Problems, 20<sup>..</sup> Piety, 42<sup>..</sup> Liturgical, 50<sup>..</sup> Sacraments 60 Missions.
- 14 De Ramburges (Marquise)** L'Église et la pitié envers les animaux. 2nd ed., with preface by Robert de la Sizeranne. 352p. Lecoffre, 1903.
- Gast (F.)** Après le Congrès des diaconats. Rev. du christianisme social, Sept. 1903.  
 [An inquiry instituted by two Protestant societies into the housing of indigent and assisted Protestants in Rouen.]
- Messines (H. J.)** La misère et l'Évangile. Rev. du christianisme, Sept. 1903.  
 [The remedy for misery is to be found in personal regeneration, the Christianising of the individual.]
- 15 Dickinson (G. Lowes)** Ecclesiasticism.  
 Indep. R., Oct. 1903.  
 [There is an antagonism between ecclesiasticism and reason, different in kind from that which exists between reason and any ordinary prejudice; it is the object of an ecclesiastical system, not merely to create an atmosphere, but to paralyse beforehand the faculty by which that atmosphere might be disturbed.]
- Ward (Wilfred)** Problems and Persons. 431p. Longmans, 1903.  
 [Review will follow.]
- Wimmer (R.)** My Struggle for Light. Confessions of a Preacher [Crown. Theol. Lib.] 216p. Williams & Norgate, 1903.
- 21 Hauschildt (H.)** Πρεσβύτεροι in Aegypten im i-iii Jahrhundert nach Chr.  
 Zeitschr. f. neutest. Wiss., 3rd No., 1903.  
 [These "elders" are not so called in reference to their age. They appear to be elected business committees of priestly (non-Christian) and other communities.]
- Stone (B. N.)** The Distinctive Work of the Ministry in the New Church.  
 New Church Rev., July 1903.
- Strack (Max. L.)** Die Müllerinnung in Alexandria.  
 Zeitschr. f. neutest. Wiss., 3rd No., 1903.  
 [A study of guilds, brotherhoods, unions, with their presbyters and priest, in the centuries just before Christ.]
- Whitley (W. T.)** Church, Ministry and Sacraments in the N.T. 286p. Kingsgate Press, 1903.  
 [Sacerdotalists have their only biblical defence in the O.T. A self-absorbed Church, an intrusive priesthood, a magical worship, find no countenance in the N.T.]
- 27 Bugge (C. A.)** Das Gesetz und Christus im Evangelium. Zur Revision der Kirchlichen Lehre "de lege et evangelio." 94p. Dybwad, 1903.
- 42 Bannister (H. M.)** Some recently-discovered Fragments of Irish Sacramentaries.  
 J. of Theol. St., Oct. 1903.

- 43 Prayer Book of Edward VII. Designs by C. R. Ashbee. (Essex House Press series.) E. Arnold, 1903.  
*Reynolds (B.)* Handbook to Book of Common Prayer. 514p. Rivingtons, 1903.
- 43r Church Worship and Church Order. Church Quar. R., Oct. 1903.  
 [An eirenicon on the ritual controversy.]
- 50 *Lye (A. L.)* Faith and Sacrament; or the True Key to Holy Living. 182p. Skeffington, 1903.
- 53 The Holy Eucharist: An Historical Inquiry. Part VIII. Ch. Q. R., Oct. 1903.  
*Ebersolt (J.)* Essai sur Bérenger de Tours et la Controverse sacramentaire au XI<sup>e</sup> siècle. Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., July-Aug. and Sept.-Oct. 1903.
- 58y *Rabeau (Gaston)* Le Culte des saints dans l'Afrique chrétienne d'après les inscriptions et les monuments figurés. 83p. Fontemoing, 1903.
- 60 *Carmichael (Amy Wilson)* Things as they are: Mission Work in S. India; pref. by E. Stock. 320p. Morgan & Scott, 1903.  
*Smith (A. H.)* Rex Christus: Outline Study of China. 263p. Macmillan, 1903.
- 73 *Candwell (E.)* The Cross in Dark Places and among all sorts and conditions: recollections of thirty years' work in North and East London. 152p. Wells Gardner, 1903.
- 90 *Cabantons (J.)* De la controverse dans l'Évangélisation.  
 Rev. du christianisme social, Sept. 1903.  
 [Deprecates anything but the most limited use of controversy in evangelising work.]
- 94 *Harcourt (F. C. V.)* The Bible on the Battlefield. 846p. Marshall Bros., 1903.  
 [The author, a layman, describes his experiences with the troops in the South African War.]

#### D DOCTRINE 10 "God, 22 "Christ, 60 "Eschatology, 70 "Faith, 90 Apologetics.

- Daxer (G.)* Zur lehre der christlichen Gewissheit. Theol. St. u. Krit., 1st No., 1904.
- Groenewegen (H. J.)* Wetenschap of dogmatisme. Theol. Tijd., Sept. 1903.  
 [Examination of the arguments used by Dogmatism to recover its old position as against scientific theology, especially in regard to the teaching of theology in the Universities. Vindication of scientific undogmatic theology.]
- Kaftan (Prof. J.)* Zur Dogmatik III. 4. Mögliche Standpunkte. 5. Schrift und Bekenntnis. Zeitsch. f. Theol. und Kirche, 6th No., 1903.
- Seewall (F.)* The Restoration of Theology. New Church Rev., Oct. 1903.  
 [An address to Swedenborgians, urging the claims of theology as an intellectual pursuit.]
- h *Baker (J. F. B.)* Early History of Christian Doctrine to the Council of Chalcedon. 458p. Methuen, 1903.
- Macpherson (Hector)* The Evolution of Scotland. Indep. R., Oct. 1903.  
 [Traces the development of theological thought in Scotland with the object of explaining the present condition of orthodox conservatism. A modern Hume would have no more chance of being elected to a University chair than his great prototype had in the 18th century.]
- Mellone (S. H.)* Converging Lines of Religious Thought. 179p. P. Green, 1903.  
 [An attempt to trace the main lines of growth

in that change of religious thought now proceeding in the modern world.]

- 1 *Rauschen (Gerhard)* Grundriss der Patrologie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Dogmengeschichte. 244p. Herder, 1903.
- 22 *Hendrix (E. R.)* The Religion of the Incarnation: Cole lect. bef. Vanderbilt Univ. 271p. Nashville, Tenn., 1903.
- 30 *Moberly (E. C.)* Sorrow, Sin, and Beauty. 184p. Murray, 1903.  
*Tennant (F. R.)* Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin. 378p. Clay, 1903.
- 40 *Gottschick (J.)* Die Heilsgewissheit des Evangelischen Christen im Anschluss an Luther. Zeitsch. f. Theol. u. Kirche, 5th No., 1903.  
 [This essay sets forth the historic form of Luther's teaching on Assurance of Salvation, as well as the shape in which it may claim significance for the present day.]
- 60 *Francken (W.)* Psychologie de la Croissance en L'Immortalité. Revue Phil., Sept. 1903.  
 [The most fundamental motive for the belief is desire for personal conservation; a second source is the power of imagination in reference to the phenomena of dreams; a third source is the moral motive.]
- Volz (P.)* Jüdische Eschatologie von Daniel bis Akiba. 428p. Mohr, 1903.
- 65 *Caillard (E. M.)* Individual Immortality. 148p. Murray, 1903.  
 [The writer's aim is to show how far more reasonable from the scientific and philosophic points of view, and how far fuller from the Christian point of view, the belief is than the greater number of those who accept or deny it at all realise.]
- Snell (B. J.)* Sermons on Immortality, etc. 158p. Stockwell, 1903.
- 70 *Headlam (A. C.)* Sources and Authority of Dogmatic Theology. 49p. Macmillan, 1903.  
 [Inaugural Lecture at King's College, London.]
- Sanday (W.)* The Obligation of the Creeds. Indep. R., Oct. 1903.  
 [An examination of the positions of Dr Moberly, Dr Rashdall and Canon Henson.]
- 90 "Centurion" Christian Dogma. 61p. Stockwell, 1903.  
 [Author has "endeavoured in a humble way to stimulate attention to this subject by showing how false many accepted views of Bible truth really are."]
- Knob (G. W.)* Direct and Fundamental Proofs of the Christian Religion, an essay in comparative apologetics (Lect. given before the Div. School of Yale Univ.). 206p. Scribner, 1903.
- Müller (F. M.)* Silesian Horseherd (Das Pferdebürla): questions of the hour answered; tr. O. A. Fechter; pref. by J. Estlin Carpenter. 230p. Longmans, 1903.  
 [See p. 403.]
- Routh (W.)* Some Elements Towards the At-onement of Knowledge and Belief. Stock, 1903.
- E ETHICS 1-9 Practical Theology, Christian Ethics, Transition to General Ethics, 10" Theories, 20" Applied Ethics, Sociology, 23" Economics, 27 Education.
- Darwinson (W. J.)* Quest of the Simple Life. 286p. Hodder & S., 1903.



- 4 *Novalis*. Disciples at Sais, and other fragments; tr., with intro., by Una Birch. 180p. Methuen, 1903.

- 7 *De Montmorand (B.)* L'Erotomanie des Mystiques Chrétiens. Revue Phil., Oct. 1903.

*Eckhart (Meister)* Mystische Schriften.

Ed. by G. Landauer. 246p. Schnabel, 1903.

- 10 *Scheerer (P.)* Döring's rein menschliche Begründung des Sittengesetzes. Vierteljahrssch. f. wiss. Phil., xxvii., iii., 1903.

[The two main positions of Döring's theory that (1) all human action arises out of the wants of the agent, and is directed towards satisfying the same; and (2) the fundamental motive of moral action is to satisfy the requirements of a worthy estimate of the Self (Selbstschätzungsbedürfnisse), defended against the objections of Petzoldt.]

*Moore (G. E.)* Principia Ethica. 259p.

Clay, 1903.

[All ethical propositions are defined by the fact that they predicate a single unique objective concept. Such propositions are divided sharply into two classes; those which express the kind of things which ought to exist for their own sakes, and those which express the kind of actions we ought to perform. The first class are incapable of proof; from no other truth except themselves alone can it be inferred that they are either true or false. Evidence for the truth of propositions of the second class can be furnished, and must consist (a) of truths with regard to the result of the action in question—of causal truths; and (b) of ethical truths of the first or self-evident class.]

*Duprat (S. L.)* Morals: a treatise on psycho-sociological bases of ethics; tr. W. J. Greenstreet (Cont. Science Ser.). 398p.

W. Scott, 1903.

*Brierley (J.)* Problems of Living. 364p.

J. Clarke, 1903.

- 20 *Oppenheimer (Franz)* Skizze der sozial ökonomischen Geschichtsauffassung. i. Vierteljahrssch. f. wiss. Phil., xxvii., iii., 1903.

[As against the theory of the influence of heroic personalities, author contends that historical movements are always due to economical causes.]

- 20 *Blanc (A.)* La morale sociale d'Ulrich Zwingli.

Rev. du christianisme social, July 1903.

*Fickler (W.)* Unter welchen philosophischen Voraussetzungen hatsich bei Hegel die Wertschätzung des Staates entwickelt und wie ist diese zu beurteilen? i.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxviii., i., 1903.

[Author criticises Hegel's intellectualism from the point of view of Ethics, Art, Religion and Psychology. In dealing with the relation of the individual to the state, Hegel treats the great personalities of history as mere unconscious instruments in the service of the Idea, and ignores the consideration that from a great personality a whole period obtains its deepest life.]

*Sloops (J. D.)* Three Stages of Individual Development. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1903.

- 21 *Sidgwick (Henry)* The Development of European Polity. Ed. by Mrs Sidgwick. 480p. Macmillan, 1903.

[Cambridge lectures to students of history and of moral science. The work forms a sequel to the *Elements of Politics*, and is a study of the development of polity within the historic period in Europe, beginning with the earliest known Græco-Roman and Teutonic polity, containing a full treatment of medieval cities, and carried down to the modern state of Europe and its colonies as the last result of political evolution.]

- 22 *De Roberty (E.)* Le Concept sociologique de Liberté. Revue Phil., Nov. 1903.

- 23 *Booth (C.)* Ed. Life and Labour of the People in London. 2nd series. Industry. 5. v. Macmillan, 1903.

*Cassel (G.)* Nature and Necessity of Interest. 202p. Macmillan, 1903.

*Laughlin (J. L.)* Principles of Money. 568p. Murray, 1903.

- 25 *Hayford (C.)* Gold Coast Native Institutions. Sweet & Maxwell, 1903.

- 27 *Armstrong (H. E.)* Teaching of Scientific Method, and other Papers on Education. 490p. Macmillan, 1903.

*Baumgarten (O.)* Neue Bahnen. Der Unterricht in der christlichen Religion im Geist der modernen Theologie. Mohr, 1903.

*Du Bois (Patterson)* The Natural Way in Moral Training. 328p. Revell, 1903.

*Henry (Alice)* The Special Moral Training of Girls. Inter. J. Ethics, Oct. 1903.

*Jeanjean (P.)* L'Éducation d'après le catholicisme. Rev. chrétienne, Sept. 1903.

[A Protestant Report, very condemnatory of Catholic Education in France.]

*Mark (H. T.)* Outline of Hist. of Educational Theories in England. Sonnenschein, 1903.

*Nicoll (S. A.)* How to bring up our Boys; pref. by F. B. Meyer. R. T. S., 1903.

*Wells (H. G.)* Mankind in the Making. 440p. Chapman, 1903.

- 30 *Smith (W. Robertson)* Kinship and Marriage in early Arabia; new ed. with add. notes by the author and by Prof. Ignaz Goldziher; Ed. S. A. Cook. 346p.

Black, 1903.

- 98 *Watson (J.)* The Homely Virtues. 176p. Hodder & S., 1903.

## F PASTORALIA 2 Sermons.

- F *Bodington (C.)* Notes on Prayer. 96p. S. P. C. K., 1903.

*Andrewes (L., Bp.)* Preces Privatae; tr. F. E. Brightman, with intr. and notes. 456p. Methuen, 1903.

[Henceforth the indispensable edition. Carefully edited and printed, furnished with refs., and admirably arranged for actual use.]

*Westcott (B. F.)* Common Prayers for Daily Use. 36p. Macmillan, 1903.

*Bogatzky (C. H. von)* God's Paternal Heart: a Devotional Commentary on the Lord's Prayer; tr. (London, 1761) from German; ed. J. Laidlaw, with note by Alex. Whyte. 250p. Oliphant, 1903.

*Newbolt (W. C. E.)* The Church Catechism: the Christian's Manual (Oxf. Lib. of Pract. Th.). 342p. Longmans, 1903.

- 2 *Bowen (W. E.)* Parochial Sermons. 242p. Nisbet, 1903.

*Bramston (J. Z.)* Fratribus: sermons preached mainly in Winchester College Chapel. 218p. E. Arnold, 1903.

*Edmunds (L.)* Sunday by Sunday: a year's Sermons preached in a Northern Church. 362p. Skeffington, 1903.

- Gibson (T. S.)* Along the Shadowed Way: thirty-eight plain-spoken Sermons. 300p. Skeffington, 1903.  
*Knight (H. T.)* Rational Religion: some Addresses to Men. Rivingtons, 1903.

## G BIOGRAPHY 2 English.

- Hello (E.)* Studies in Saintship; tr. fr. French, with intr. by Virginia M. Crawford. 226p. Methuen, 1903.  
*Celier (Léonce.)* S. Léonce honoré en Périgord. Analecta Bollandiana, Oct. 1903.  
*Delahaye (H.)* SS. Jonæ et Barachisii Martyrum in Perside: Acta Græca. Analecta Bollandiana, Oct. 1903.  
*Galante (A.)* De Vitæ SS. Xenophontis et sociorum codicibus Florentinis. Analecta Bollandiana, Oct. 1903.  
*Poncelet (A.)* La vie de S. Willibrord par le prêtre Egbert. Analecta Bollandiana, Oct. 1903.

[An attempt to fix how much of his work is really Alcuin's.]

- Poncelet (A.)* Sanctæ Catharinæ virginis et martyris translatio et miracula Rotomagensia, Sæc. XI. Analecta Bollandiana, Oct. 1903.

[Introduction and Latin text.]

- Poncelet (A.)* Treverensia? Analecta Bollandiana, Oct. 1903.

[Reply to some strictures of Father Krones on the Acta Sanctorum of the Bollandists.]

- Van den Gheyn (J.)* Translatio sanctæ Reineldis in Monasterium Laubiense. Analecta Bollandiana, Oct. 1903.

[Introduction and Latin text.]

- 1 *Zwingli (Ulrich)* Life of the Swiss Patriot and Reformer, by S. Simpson. 303p. Hodder & S., 1903.

- 2 *Morley (John)* The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, 3 vols. 671, 672, 654pp. Macmillan, 1903.

[An article on this book by the Bishop of Ripon will appear in our next issue.]

- Russell (G. W. E.)* Mr Morley's Life of Gladstone. Indep. R., Nov. 1903.

See also *Birrell (Aug.)* in Cont. R., Nov. 1903; *Anon.* in Blackwood Mag., Nov. 1903; *Anon.* in Quar. R., Oct. 1903. *Judge O'Connor Morris*, in Fort. R., Dec. 1903.

- Forster (Francis Arnold)* Studies in Church Dedications; or, England's Patron Saints. Skeffington, 1903.

- Bruce (Mary L.)* Anna Swanwick. A Memoir and Recollections, 1813-1899. 271p. Unwin, 1903.

[A most interesting account of a very able and remarkable woman.]

- Brown (Dr John)* Biography and a Criticism, by J. T. Brown. Ed. with short sketch of the biographer by W. B. Dunlop. 262p. Black, 1903.

- Collingwood (W. G.)* Ruskin Relics. 242p. Isbister, 1903.

- Hutton (W. H.)* Samuel Rawson Gardiner. Cornhill, December 1903.

- Crawford (A. H.)* Recollections of James Martineau. 252p. Simpkin, Marshall & Co. [See p. 416.]

- Bernstein (Archd.)* Some Sayings of Bishop Westcott. Cont. R., Dec. 1903.

- Ray (C.)* Life of C. H. Spurgeon. 506p. Isbister, 1903.

- 4 *Allier (L.)* La morale et la politique de Renan. 31p. Rev. chrétienne, Sept. 1903.  
*Joan of Arc.* Ch. Q. R., October 1903.

- Rose (J. Holland)* The Religion of Napoleon I. Quar. R., October 1903.

- Tallentyre (S. G.)* Life of Voltaire. 2 vols. 750p. Smith & Co., 1903.

- 5 *M'Intyre (Lewis)* Giordano Bruno. 368p. Macmillan, 1903.

- Fahie (J. J.)* Galileo: His Life and Work. Murray, 1903.

- 73 *Finnay (C. G.)* Autobiography (unabr. reprint). 414p. Salvation Army, 1903.

- Keller (Helen)* Story of my Life. 458p. Hodder & S., 1903.

[The blind deaf-mute, an account of whose education is given fully.]

- Curtis (W. S.)* The true Abraham Lincoln. 410p. Lippincott, 1903.

## H HISTORY x Persecutions C Christian M Mediæval R Modern 2 English.

- M'Murray (C. A.)* Special Method in History. Macmillan, 1903.

- Thoyts (E. E.)* How to Decipher or Study old Documents: a guide to reading Ancient MSS.; with Intr. by C. Trice Martin. 2nd ed. 166p. Stock, 1903.

- Bardenheuer (Otto)* Geschichte der alt-kirchlichen Literatur. Vols. 1 and 2. 604 and 679p. Herder, 1902, 1903.

- Chabot (J. B.)* Synodicon Orientale Recueil des Synodes Nestoriens, publié, traduit, et annoté d'après le manuscrit syriaque de la Biblioth. Nat. et le manuscrit, K. vi. 4, du Musée Borgia. Klincksieck, 1903.

- Creighton (M.)* Historical Lectures and Addresses; ed. Louise Creighton. 356p. Longmans, 1903.

- Green (S. G.)* Handbook of Church History, from Apostolic Age to the Dawn of the Reformation; with Chron. Tables and Index. 640p. R. T. S., 1903.

- Harnack (Adolf)* Reden und Aufsätze. 2 vols. 359 and 387p. Ricker, 1903.  
 [The contents of vol. i. are arranged so as to form a survey of church history; those of vol. ii. refer chiefly to the ecclesiastical problems of our own times.]

- Schubert (H. von)* Grundzüge der Kirchengeschichte. J. C. B. Mohr, 1903.

- g *Collins (W. E.)* The Study of Ecclesiastical History (Handbks. for Clergy). 182p. Longmans, 1903.

- w *Granderath (Theodor)* Geschichte des Vatikanischen Konzils von seiner ersten Ankündigung bis zu seiner Veragung nach den authentischen Documenten dargestellt. Vols. 1 and 2, 556 and 768p. Herder.

- Von Skibniewski (Corvin)* Geschichte des römischen Katechismus. 163p. Pustet, Rome, 1903.

- x *Choisy (E.)* Le procès et le bûcher de Michel Servet. 23p. Rev. chrétienne, Oct. 1903.

- Loyson (Hyacinthe)* Michel Servet brûlé vif à Genève. Rev. chrétienne, Oct. 1903.

[An exposition, with commentary, of the



- doctrinal differences between Calvin and Servetus, touching also on the ethics of religious persecution.]
- Delehaye (H.)* Un fragment de ménologe trouvé à Jérusalem. Analecta Bollandiana, Oct, 1903.
- [A note on the martyrological fragment from Jerusalem of which E. J. Goodspeed has treated in the *Amer. J. of Philology* (1902), referring apparently to the martyrdom of S. Asterius.]
- Max (Prinz von Sachsen)* Der heilige Märtyrer Apollonius von Rom. Eine historisch-kritische Studie. 95p. Kirchheim, 1903.
- Poole (R. L.)* The Earliest Index of the Inquisition at Venice. J. of Theol. St., Oct, 1903.
- Veen (Van)* Is Dominicus Guzman de eerste inquisiteur geweest? Theol. Tijds., Nov, 1903.
- [The alternative is that the title properly belongs to Peter of Castro-novo. Author reviews the evidence and decides in favour of Dominic.]
- A *Souttar (R.)* Short History of Ancient Peoples; intro. by A. H. Sayce. 752p. Hodder & S., 1903.
- Steindorff (G.)* Urkunden des Aegyptischen Altertums. Bd. i. Th. 1:—Urkunden des Alten Reichs, i. Ed. by K. Sethe. 73p. Hinrich, 1903.
- C *Alcais (A.)* La vie à Carthage au second siècle et la propagande chrétienne. Rev. chrétienne, Sept, 1903.
- Harnack (Adolf)* Der pseudocyprianische Traktat de singularitate clericorum: ein Werk des Donatistischen Bischofs Macrobiius in Rom. Die Hypotyposen des Theognost. Der gefälschte Brief des Bischofs Theonas an der Oberkammerherrn Lucian. [Texte u. Untersuchungen, N.F., ix. 3.] 117p. Hinrichs, 1903.
- Henderson (B. W.)* Life and Principate of the Emperor Nero (3 maps, 16 ill.). 544p. Methuen, 1903.
- H *Schubert (Hans von)* Der sogenannte Praedestinatus. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Pelagianismus. [Texte u. Untersuchungen, N.F., ix. 4.] 147p. Hinrichs, 1903.
- M *Ficker (Gerhard)* Das ausgehende Mittelalter und sein Verhältniss zur Reformation. 55p. Barth, 1903.
- Huber (P. Michael)* Beitrag zur Visionsliteratur und Siebenschläferlegende des Mittelalters. Eine literargeschichtliche Untersuchung. 1. Theil, 1903.
- Huck (Joh. C.)* Ubertin von der Fides implicita innerhalb der Katholischen Kirche. 412p. Hinrichs, 1903.
- [Ein Beitrag zum Zeitalter Dantes.]
- Viser (G.)* Humor en godsdienst in der Middeleeuwen. Theol. Tijds., Nov, 1903.
- [Illustrates from literature the combination of seriousness with burlesque apparent in mediæval art. Examples from sermons and popular tales.]
- R *Kügelgen (C. von)* Die Gefangenschaftsbrieife des Johann Hus. R. Wöpke, 1903.
- [After the original of 1536.]
- Ward (A. W.) and others.* The Cambridge Modern History: vol. vii., The United States. 882p. Clay, 1903.
- 1 *Stoddart (A. M.)* Francis of Assisi (Little Biographies), ill. 262p. Methuen, 1903.
- Doreau (L'abbé P.)* Saint Francois d'Assise et son œuvre ou le triomphe du Christ, de S. Francois d'Assise et de l'Eglise en 1920. 651p. Périsse, 1903.
- Germain (Alphonse)* L'Influence de Saint Francois d'Assise sur la civilisation et les arts. 64p. Bloud, 1903.
- Henry (Paul)* Saint Francois d'Assise et son école, d'après les documents originaux. 227p. Tequi, 1903.
- De Selincourt (Basil)* A Study at Assisi. Monthly R., Oct, 1903.
- Holzappel (Heribert)* St Dominicus und der Rosenkranz. 47p. Lentner, 1903.
- [No. 12 of the Veröffentlichungen aus dem Kirchenhistorischen Seminar München.]
- Lake (K.)* The Greek Monasteries in South Italy. III. J. of Th. St., Oct, 1903.
- Okey (Thomas)* Venice and its Story. 332p. Dent, 1903.
- 2 *Armitage (Ella S.)* Intro. to English Antiquities; ill. 156p. Dent, 1903.
- 2H *Bede (Venerable)* Ecclesiastical History of the English Nation (Temple Classics). 396p. Dent, 1903.
- 2M *Church (C. M.)* Chapters in the Early History of the Church in Wells, A.D. 1130-1333 (Somerset Top. Lib.). Bannicott, 1903.
- [Drawn from unpublished documents in possession of the Dean and Chapter.]
- Geoffrey of Monmouth*; tr. Seb. Evans. 374p. Dent, 1903.
- 2T *Henson (H. H.)* Studies in English Religion in the 17th Cent. (St Marg. Lect., 1903). 286p. Murray, 1903.
- Hutton (W. H.)* The English Church, 1625-1714. 378p. Macmillan, 1903.
- V *Thureau-Dangin (P.)* La Renaissance Cathol. en Angleterre au XIX<sup>e</sup> Siècle, 2<sup>e</sup> Partie: De la Conversion de Newman à la mort de Wiseman, 1845-1865. 456p. Plou et Fils, 1903.
- 2-6 *Dowden (Bishop)*. Notes on the Succession of the Bishops of St Andrews, II. J. of Theol. St., Oct, 1903.
- 3R *Albrecht (O.)* Mitteilungen aus den Akten der Naumberger Reformationsgeschichte. Theol. St. und Krit., 1st No., 1904.
- [Among other things, an account is given of the earliest Reformed use of the canonical hours in the Dom at Naumburg.]
- Berbig (Dr.)* Urkundliches zur Reformationsgeschichte. Theol. St. u. Krit., 1st No., 1904.
- [Business documents relating to Spalatin, chiefly in the form of quittances and letters from him.]
- 4 *Balau (L'abbé Sylva)* Étude critique des sources de l'histoire du pays de Liège au moyen-âge. 735p. Bruxelles, 1902-1903.
- 5 *Gregorovius (F.)* Tombs of the Popes: landmarks in Papal History; tr. fr. 2nd and enl. German ed., with memoir of the author, by R. W. Seton-Watson. 216p. Constable, 1903.
- 7 *Davitt (M.)* Within the Pale, the true story of Religious Persecutions in Russia. 314p. Hurst, 1903.
- Deutsch (L.)* Sixteen years in Siberia: some experiences of a Russian Revolutionist; tr. Helen Chisholm. 385p. Murray, 1903.
- 60 *Leipoldt (Joh.)* Shenute von Atripe und

die Entstehung des national ägyptischen Christentums. [Texte u. Untersuchungen, N.F., x. 1 Heft.] 223p. Hinrichs, 1903.

- 73 *Schinz (A.)* La religion dans la société aux États-Unis. Rev. chrétienne, Nov. 1903.

[Strongly controverts M. Barge, who maintains that dogmatic religion is decaying in the U.S. and being superseded by the teaching of practical morality.]

# I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C Fathers 2 R. C. Church 3 Anglican.

- C *Harris (J. Rendel)* The Dioscuri in the Christian Legends. 64p. Clay, 1903.

*Hoppe (H.)* Syntax und Stil. d. Tertullian. 235p. Teubner, 1903.

*Lake (K.)* Some further Notes on the MSS. of the Writings of S. Athanasius. J. of Theol. St., October 1903.

*Meyboom (H. U.)* Tatianus en zijne apologie. Theol. Tijds., Sept. 1903.

[Postscript to a previous article. Author notices briefly Aimé Puech's *Recherches sur le discours aux Grecs de Tatiën.*]

*Ryan (John A.)* Were the Church Fathers Communists?

Inter. J. Eth., October 1903.

[An examination of the views of St Basil, St Ambrose and St Jerome. They condemned not the institution but the abuse and exaggeration of private ownership.]

- M The Golden Legend. Ch. Q. R., Oct. 1903.  
[An account of a mediæval collection of ecclesiastical legends under the above title due to Jacobus de Voragine.]

- 2 *Franche (Paul)* Saint Hildegarde (1098-1179). 212p. Lecoffre.

- 2V *Leo XIII.* Life, with extracts from pastorals and encyclicals, by R. H. Clarke. 656p. Phil., Ziegler & Co., 1903.

*Leo XIII.* Encyclical Letters (tr.). 580p. N.Y., Benziger Bros., 1903.

*Leo XIII.* Life by B. O'Reilly; intr. by Card. Gibbons. 2 v. 974p.

Phil., J. C. Winston Co., 1903.

[Authorised memoir revised in the Vatican before the Pope's death.]

*Anon.* Pope Leo XIII. and his successor. Quar. R., Oct. 1903.

*Barry (W.)* Leo XIII. A Retrospect. Dub. R., Oct. 1903.

- 3·8 Some Notes on the Church in Australia. Church Quar. R., Oct. 1903.

- 4 *Beveridge (J.)* "Against the Stream." J. of Theol. St., Oct. 1903.

[An account of the conflict between theological liberalism and conservatism in the Norwegian Church.]

*Buisson (F.)* and *Wagner (C.)* Libre-Pensée et Protestantisme Libéral. 197p.

Fischbacher, 1903.

*Luther (M.)* Works, standard ed. v. 1, comm. on Ps. 1-22, tr., ed. and corr. J. N. Lenker. 462p. Minneapolis, 1903.

- 5 *Foster (F. H.)* Park's Theological System. Biblio. Sacra, Oct. 1903.

[Park was a follower of Jonathan Edwards and Professor in Andover.]

*Meyer (F. B.)* Religious Basis of the Free Church Position. T. Law, 1903.

- 6 *Williams (C.)* Principles and Practices of the Baptists; Baptist Directors. 206p. Kingsgate Press, 1903.

- 7 *Tillet (W. F.)* and *Atkins (J.)* Doctrines and Polity of Meth. Ep. Church, South. 176p. Nashville, 1903.

Welsh Methodism: Its Origin and Growth. Ch. Q. R., Oct. 1903.

- 9 *Sevall (F.)* The New Church and the New-England Transcendentalists.

New Church Rev., Oct. 1903.

# L LITERATURE. 2 English 3 German 5 Italian 9 Classical.

Mary of Magdala: a chronicle; by E. Saltus. 204p. Greening, 1903.

Mary of Magdala. An historical and romantic drama, in 5 acts, by Paul Heyse; tr. fr. German prose into Eng. verse by W. Winter. 135p. Macmillan Co., 1903.

Life of St Mary Magdalen; tr. fr. Italian of an unknown 14th cent. writer by Valentina Hawtrey; intr. by Vernon Lee.

308p. Lane, 1903.

- 1 Hymns of the Christian Centuries; compiled by Mrs Perceval Mackrell. 296p.

G. Allen, 1903.

- 2 *Courthope (W. J.)* A History of English Poetry. Vols. iii. and iv. 564, 505p.

Macmillan, 1903.

[Vol. iii. Intellectual Conflict of the 17th Cent. Vol. iv. Development and Decline of the poetic Drama (Shakespeare, etc.).]

*Whitney (H. M.)* Study of English Literature as an instrument of Christian Culture. Biblio. Sacra, Oct. 1903.

*Harrison (J. Smith)* Platonism in English Poetry. 335p. Macmillan, 1903.

A Puritan Utopia. Ch. Q. R., Oct. 1903.

[An Account of the work *Nava Solyma* which Begley brought to light, and ascribed to Milton.]

- 2V *Lee (Vernon)* Studies in Literary Psychology. i. The Syntax of De Quincey; ii. The Rhetoric of Landor.

Cont. R., Nov. and Dec. 1903.

*Rebec (George)* Byron and Morals.

Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1903.

[Wordsworth deliberately does not, whereas Byron does, refuse comfortable illusion and comfortable acquiescence. The business of poetry is not consolation, but truth; and Byron's unflinching perseverance in the cause of reason, and utter rejection of truce with make-belief, is the higher moral attitude.]

*Birrell (Aug.)* Emerson. (Essex Hall Lecture.) 50p. P. Green, 1903.

*Hutton (J. A.)* Guidance from R. Browning in Matters of Faith. 148p.

Olipphant, 1903.

*Whibley (C.)* Thackeray. (Modern English Writers Series.) 270p. Blackwood.

- 2W *Couch (A. T. Q.)* Hetty Wesley. 312p. Harper, 1903.

[This striking novel abounds in biographical sidelights on the Wesleys.]

*Watson (W.)* For England: poems written during estrangement. 64p.

Lane, 1903.

[Poems written during the South African War.] *Anon.* Mr Watson's Poems.

Edin. R., Oct. 1903.

*Webb (P. G. L.)* William Watson. West. R., Nov. 1903.

*Binyon (L.)* Death of Adam, and other poems. 104p. Methuen, 1903.

- 3 *Herder.* Werke. Mit Herder's Leben,



- Einleitung und Anmerk. Herausg. v. Prof. Th. Matthias. 5 Bände. 1903.  
*Sichel (W.)* The Time Spirit in German Literature. Quar. R., Oct. 1903.
- 3x *Sokolowsky (Rudolf)* Ein neuer tragischer Held. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxviii., Heft 1, 1903.  
 [A treatment of Ibsen's "Emperor and Galilean." The real tragical hero of the drama is not Julian, but the World and Humanity in their unity, of which Julian and all individual men are but phases. In the whole of dramatic literature, this is the single instance of a poet venturing upon the representation of a metaphysical system by means of symbolism upon the stage.]
- 4 *Anon.* Pierre Loti: an Appreciation. Edin. R., Oct. 1903.  
*Loisy (Alfred)* Le Discours sur la Montagne. 146p. Picard et Fils, 1903.  
 The High History of the Holy Graal; tr. from O. French by Seb. Evans; dec. drawings by Jessie M. King. 398p. Dent, 1903.
- 5 *Dante*, the Dream of. An interpretation of the Inferno; by H. F. Henderson. 186p. Oliphant, 1903.  
*Dods (Marcus, jun.)* Forerunners of Dante: Account of some of the more important Visions of the Unseen World from the Earliest Times. 284p. Clark, 1903.  
 The Imperialism of Dante. Ch. Q. R., Oct. 1903.
- Verrall (A. W.)* "To Follow the Fisherman." A Historical Problem in Dante. Indep. R., Nov. 1903.  
 [Deals with Dante's treatment of Statius in 2nd part of the *Divina Commedia*.]
- 7 *Van den Bergh van Eysinga (G. A.)* Aeneis vi., 724-751. Theol. Tijd., Sep. 1903.  
 [Virgil made use of an Orphic poem, with a strong infusion of Stoical thought, as his source for the doctrines of this passage.]
- 8 *Warren (T. Herbert)* Sophocles and the Greek Genius. Quar. R., Oct. 1903.
- 9 *Hardie (W. R.)* Lectures in Classical Subjects. 355p. Macmillan, 1903.  
 [Deals, *inter alia*, with the feeling for nature and the beliefs concerning a life after death in Greek and Roman poets and with the Supernatural in ancient Poetry and Story.]
- 10A *Oldenberg (H.)* Die Literatur des alten Indien. 300p. Cotta, 1903.  
 [An exhaustive and critical survey of the literature of the 3000 years from the Rigveda to the Gitagovinda.]
- 15 *Abu'l-Ala*, The Quatrains of. 164p. N.Y., Doubleday, Page & Co., 1903.  
 [The quatrains, now first tr. into Eng., contain the ideas of a man who was one of the foremost thinkers of his time (974 A.D.), "the rediscovered forerunner of Omar Khayyam."]
- M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4**  
*Hinduism. 7 Judaism. 9 Demonology, 12 Occultism.*
- Tylor (E. B.)* Primitive Culture, 2 vs. 4 ed. revised. 502, 471p. Murray, 1903.  
*Conard (Lastitia M.)* The Idea of God held by North American Indians. Amer. J. of Theol., Oct. 1903.  
*Cumont (Franz, Prof. in Univ. of Ghent)* The Mysteries of Mithra; tr. fr. 2nd rev. French ed. by T. J. McCormack. 243p. Chic., Open Court Pub. Co., 1903.  
*Dieterich (Albr.)* Eine Mithrasliturgie. 340p. Teubner, 1903.
- De la Grasserie (R.)* De la sexualité chez les divinités. Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., July-Aug. 1903.  
*Renel (Ch.)* Le lion mithriaque insigne de légions romaines. Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., July-Aug. 1903.
- 1 *Harrison (Jane Ellen)* Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion. 702p. Clay, 1903.  
 [An attempt to approach a scientific understanding of Greek Religion through an examination of its ritual. Review will follow.]
- Radermacher (L.)* Das Jenseits im Mythos der Hellenen. Untersuchungen über antiken Jenseitsglauben. 152p. Marcus & Weber, 1903.  
*Toutain (J.)* Bulletin archéologique de la religion grecque, 1st art., 1893-1902.  
 Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., Sept.-Oct. 1903.
- 4 *Grill (Julius)* Die persische Mysterienreligion im römischen Reich und das Christenthum. 64p. J. C. B. Mohr, 1903.  
*Haigh (H.)* Some Leading Ideas of Hinduism; 32nd Fernley lecture. 158p. Kelly, 1903.
- 5 *Aiyar (C. N. K.)* Life and Times of Sankara. With an account of his Philosophy by Pandit S. Tattvabhushan. 140p. Natesan, 1903.
- 7 *Adler (A. N.)* Auto de Fé and Jew (with facsimiles). Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1903.  
 [The article gives a supplementary list of Portuguese Autos.]  
*Büchler (Prof.)* Die Schauplätze des Bar-Kochbakrieges und die auf diesen bezogenen jüdischen Nachrichten. Jewish Quar. Rev., Oct. 1903.  
*Cowley (A.)* Hebrew and Aramaic Papyri. Jewish Quar. Rev., Oct. 1903.  
 [Description, with facsimiles, of several Grenfell and Hunt and Bodleian MSS.]
- Friedländer (M.)* Geschichte der jüdischen Apologetik. 480p. C. Schmidt, 1903.  
*Hirschfeld (H.)* The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at Cambridge. Third Article. Jewish Quar. Rev., Oct. 1903.  
 Jewish Historical Society of England Transactions, v. 4, 1899-1901. Macmillan, 1903.
- Dubnow (S. M.)* Jewish History. An Essay in the Philosophy of History. From Authorized German Translation. 160p. Macmillan, 1903.
- Jellin (David) and Abrahams (Israel)* Maimonides. (Jewish Worthies Series, vol. 1.) Macmillan, 1903.
- Magnus (Laurie)* A Conservative View of Judaism. Jewish Quar. Rev., Oct. 1903.  
 [An attack on Liberal Judaism.]
- Margoliouth (G.)* A Florentine Service-Book at the British Museum. Jewish Quar. Rev., Oct. 1903.  
 [I.e., a service-book of the Synagogue.]
- Phillipson (D.)* The Reform Movement in Judaism, II. Jewish Quar. R., Oct. 1903.  
 [A historical account. This article deals chiefly with the work of Geiger and his friends in German Jewry between 1830 and 1845.]
- Simon (M.)* Some Poems of Jehuda Halevi translated. Jewish Quar. Rev., Oct. 1903.

- Schwarzfeld (E.)* The Jews of Moldavia at the beginning of the Eighteenth Century. Jewish Quar. Rev., Oct. 1903.
- 7-9 *Rappoport, La Liturgie Samaritaine*; texte samarit. et trad. arabe, précédé d'une étude sur la liturgie samarit. Leroux, 1903.
- 9 *Staerk (W.)* Ueber Ursprung der Grallegende. Ein Beitrag zur Christlichen Mythologie. 57p. J. C. B. Mohr, 1903.
- 20 *Curtiss (S. I.)* Ursemitische Religion im Volksleben des heutigen Orients. Preface by Prof. Baudissin. 396p. Hinrich, 1903.
- 26 *Cook (Stanley A.)* The Laws of Moses and the Code of Hammurabi. 325p. Black, 1903.
- Lehmann (Carl)* Hammurabi's Code. 19th Cent., Dec. 1903.
- Hunger (Johs.)* Becherwahrung bei den Babyloniern. [Leipziger semitistische Studien, Bd. 1.] 80p. Hinrich, 1903.
- 27 *Budge (E. A. Wallis)* The Gods of the Egyptians; or, Studies in Egyptian Mythology, 2 v. 525, 431p. Methuen, 1903.
- 70 *Riley (J. W.)* The Founder of Mormonism. 462p. Heinemann, 1903.  
[A psychological study of Joseph Smith, jun.]
- P PHILOSOPHY** 10 *Metaphysics*, 21 *Epistemology*, 33 *Psychical Research* 40 *Psychology*, 60 *Logic*, 70 *Systems*, 90 *Philosophers*.
- Schiller (F. C. S.)* Humanism: Philosophical Essays. 326p. Macmillan, 1903.  
[Review will follow.]
- Jacks (L. P.)* The Strenuous Life in Relation to the Study of Philosophy. [Manchester College Address.] 21p. Rawson, 1903.
- 10 *Taylor (A. E.)* Elements of Metaphysics. 425p. Methuen, 1903.  
[Review will follow.]
- Lindsay (James)* Metaphysical Needs of our Time. Biblio. Sacra, Oct. 1903.
- Gurewitsch (A.)* Die französische Metaphysik der Gegenwart. Archiv f. system. Phil., ix. 4, 1903.  
[A discussion of Bergson's attempt to ground a conception of moral freedom upon an epistemological investigation of the nature and relation of Space and Time.]
- 12 *King (Irving)* Pragmatism as a Philosophic Method. Phil. Rev., Sept. 1903.  
[Pragmatism does not give an adequate account of the relationship between thought and action. Thought seems, on the one hand, to be more or less a copy of the reality to which our conduct must conform, and, in so far as it is a true copy, it affects conduct. But, on the other hand, it seems that the world of action is the only reality in which thoughts of otherwise apparently equal validity must prove their worth.]
- 13 *Weiss (B.)* Gesetze des Geschehens, iii. Archiv f. system. Phil., ix. 4, 1903.  
[Applies the results of previous articles to the sciences of Astronomy, Geology, Biology and Sociology.]
- Mercer (L. P.)* The First Aura and the Plane of the Limbus. New Church Rev., Oct. 1903.  
[A study in Swedenborgian cosmical philosophy.]
- Wallace (A. R.)* Man's Place in the Universe; Study of Results of Scientific Research in Relation to the Unity or Plurality of Worlds. 342p. Chapman & H., 1903.
- 14 *Smith (Walter)* The Idea of Space. Phil. Rev., Sept. 1903.  
[Space is subjective in the sense that there are only the spaces of percipient subjects, but since the universe is made up of these subjective experiences, the spatial form characteristic of them is objective. It is necessary to conclude that subjective states are extended, that the finite soul is extended, and that God is extended.]
- 17 *Thomson (J. J.)* Conduction of Electricity through Gases, 572p. Clay, 1903.  
[The interest of this great work extends far beyond the special field of physics. In it the author has worked out his theory of electrons and of the structure of the atom with much fulness, and presents a striking body of evidence in favour of his view.]
- Anon.* The Revelations of Radium. Edin. R., Oct. 1903.  
[Review of Rucker's Presidential Address to Brit. Assoc. in 1901, and other papers on the Structure of Matter.]
- Burke (J. B.)* The Radio-Activity of Matter. Monthly R., Nov. 1903.
- Sorel (G.)* Sur Divers Aspects de la Mécanique. Rev. de Meta et de Mor., Nov. 1903.
- 18 *Tschisch (W. von)* Das Grundgesetz des Lebens (Schluss). Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxiii., Heft 1, 1903.  
[Living material is distinguished from non-living by the fact that it appropriates nourishment from its environment; in organic nature there is not merely a "struggle for existence," as in the inorganic, but a struggle for propagation. Living material is as such immortal; the germ of death is not in the living cell itself, but arises accidentally in consequence of external influence. Life in and for itself is eternal and infinite.]
- 21 *Milhaud (G.)* Poincaré's La Science et l'Hypothèse. Rev. de Meta et de Mor., Nov. 1903.  
[Author finds a tendency manifest through the whole book to separate the domain of knowledge into a number of air-tight compartments, and thus to destroy the unity of science.]
- Gibson (W. R. Boyce)* The Relation of Logic to Psychology. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., iii., 1903.  
[A criticism of Bosanquet's treatment of the question. If the psychical life, as psychology studies it, is made up of a mere stream of mental states, then psychology becomes purely sensationalistic, and cannot deal with the problem of psychical development. And, on the other hand, the epistemological problem becomes wholly insoluble. Reply from Dr Bosanquet appended.]
- Hodge (W. H.)* Intuitive Perception presented by a new Philosophy of Natural Realism. Sonnenschein, 1903.
- Managé (F. E.)* L'Idee de Quantité. Revue Phil., Sept. 1903.  
[A discussion of the views of Bergson, Couturat, Cantor, and others.]
- Sturt (Henry)* The Logic of Pragmatism. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., iii., 1903.  
[By truth is meant the correspondence of a statement or thought with reality; but it is futile to inquire how far a statement corresponds with reality till we know what the interest was which caused the statement to be made. The degree of truth ascribed to a statement does not depend merely on its correspondence with reality; it depends also on the degree to which it satisfies the interest.]
- 27 *Hodgson (Shadworth H.)* Time, Necessity, Law, Freedom, Final Cause, Design in Nature. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., iii., 1903.  
[To oppose natural law to free activity is, *in pao facto*, to attribute activity or agency to it, to hypostatise it as an agency of a particular or



uniform kind. What the agent does in the cerebral process of volition is to re-mould the material offered by the other cerebral processes, and then re-issue it, in the shape of acts of choice. And it is just this re-moulding and re-issuing power that is meant, or ought to be meant, when we speak of free-will.]

*Goblot (E.) La Finalité en Biologie.*

Revue Phil., Oct. 1903.

[Deals with discussion between Richet and Sully-Prudhomme. Author agrees with both in rejecting teleology as legitimate in biology. He disagrees, however, with the latter in the view that the idea of a final cause implies that of free-will. Necessity, so far from being an obstacle to the theory of final cause, is rather an inevitable condition of it.]

*Richet (Ch.) La Finalité en Biologie.*

Revue Phil., Oct. 1903.

[Final Cause does not mean deliberate intention. It suffices for the conception that there should exist a general tendency to progress.]

*Espinass (A.) L'organisation ou la machine vivante en Grèce au IV<sup>e</sup> siècle avant J. C.*

Rev. de Meta et de Mor., Nov. 1903.

[The Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of Mechanism as a category in biology.]

28 *Geissler (K.) Ist die Annahme von Absolutem in der Anschauung und dem Denken möglich?*

Archiv f. system. Phil., ix, 4, 1903.

33 *Anon. Modern Spiritualism.*

Edin. R., Oct. 1903.

[Adverse criticism of Myers, Wallace and others.]

*Croskell (T.) Modern Spiritualism; its psychological phenomena.*

Dub. R., Oct. 1903.

*M'Dougall (W.) Myers' Human Personality.*

Mind, Oct. 1903.

[A criticism of the theory of the "Subliminal Self."]

*Leuba (J. H.) Empirical Data on Immortality.*

Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1903.

[A discussion of Prof. Hyslop's Report on Sittings with Mrs Piper.]

34 *Bramwell (J. M.) Hypnotism: its history, practice, and theory.*

Richard, 1903.

37 *Paulhan (F.) La Simulation dans le Caractère. Quelques Formes particulières de Simulation.*

Revue Phil., Oct. and Nov. 1903.

40 *Stout (G. F.) The Groundwork of Psychology.*

Clive, 1903.

[The aim is to present a general view of mental process and mental development which shall be comprehensive and yet not vague and sketchy. In the chapter on "The World and the Self as known through ideal construction," the author develops the view that Self-consciousness and the consciousness of an external world unfold concurrently in the most intimate union and interdependence.]

*Melchneff (Elie) Nature of Man. Studies in optimistic philosophy; tr. ed. by P. Chalmers Mitchell.*

Heinemann, 1903.

[Review will follow.]

*Lee (Vernon) Psychologie d'un écrivain sur L'Art.*

Revue Phil., Sept. 1903.

[Autobiographical study written in the hope of calling forth similar confidences from others.]

43 *Latta (R.) The Significance of the Sub-conscious.*

Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., iii, 1903.

[The notion of the sub-conscious is a hypothetical construction which derives all its meaning from the conscious, and its real significance con-

sists in its indication, however negative, of the systematic unity of consciousness. The utility of the notion is destroyed when the sub-conscious is regarded as a mysterious independent region, the relation of which to consciousness is wholly inexplicable in terms of thought.]

44 *Daiches (S.) Ueber das Verhältniss der Geschichtsschreibung Humes zu a. prakt. Philosophie.*

Edelmann, 1903.

*Moore (G. E.) Experience and Empiricism.*

Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., iii, 1903.

[No implication with regard to the position of experiences as causes or as premises of all our knowledge will suffice to define empiricism. What empiricism really implies is that all the truths we know are of the same kind as the objects of experience.]

47 *Vaschide (N.) and Pelletier (M.) Recherches expérimentales sur les signes physiques de l'Intelligence.*

Revue de Phil., Oct. 1903.

*Thompson (Helen Bradford) The Mental Traits of Sex.*

Univ. of Chic. Press, 1903.

[“Report of a series of experiments carried on 1898-1900.”]

48 *Sully (J.) Studies of Childhood.*

New ed., corr. and enl. 536p. Longmans, 1903.

49 *M'Dougall (W.) The Physiological Factors of the Attention-Process.*

Mind, Oct. 1903.

*Paulsen (F.) Parallelismus oder Wechselwirkung?*

Z. f. Phil u. Phil. Krit.,

cxliii, Heft 1, 1903.

[Author disputes Busse's contention that the doctrine of Parallelism is inconsistent with an idealistic Monism, according to which the material world is phenomenal of a reality in essence spiritual.]

50 *Lachelier (J.) L'observation de Platon.*

Rev. de Meta et de Mor., Nov. 1903.

[Discusses Platon's observations in 1785 upon the spatial knowledge of a subject born blind.]

51 *Suoboda (Hermann) Verstehen und Begreifen.*

Eine psychologische Untersuchung, ii.

Vierteljahrssch. f. wiss. Phil.,

xvii, iii, 1903.

53 *De Vorges (Domest) L'Abstraction scolastique.*

Revue de Phil., Oct. 1903.

[The exact meaning of abstraction; of what it consists; its mode of action; its consequences. Copious extracts from Aquinas.]

*Ross (G. R. T.) The Disjunctive Judgment.*

Mind, Oct. 1903.

[Disputes the theory of Bradley and others that in the disjunctive judgment properly interpreted, the alternatives are exclusive of each other.]

*Kisch (W.) Beiträge zur Urteilslehre.*

Hirschfeld, 1903.

*Stout (G. F.) Bradley's Theory of Judgment.*

Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., iii, 1903.

[Author contends (1) that the subject of judgment, so far as it is other than our immediate experience, is always determined for thought by a qualification which is not a content of our immediate experience; (2) that if in all judgment the content of our immediate experience which is used as a predicate must be cut loose from its existence, we could have no experience of mental states at all; and (3) that so far from its being impossible in thought to determine any individual as such, save one, the absolute whole of being, we constantly do determine finite individual existences.]

*Binet (A.) De la Sensation a l'Intelligence.*

Revue Phil., Nov. 1903.

[Results of experiments made with instruments somewhat different from Weber's upon various

classes of subjects to determine the relation between touch discrimination and capacity of attention.]

- 59 *Subatier (Armand)* Philosophie de l'Effort. Essais Philosophiques d'un naturaliste. Fischbacher, 1903.

- 60 *Husserl (E.)* Deutsche Schriften zur Logik in den Jahren 1895-99, iv.

Archiv f. system. Phil., ix, 4, 1903.

[Discusses the views of following writers on the nature of Judgment:—Jerusalem, Kinkel, v. Kries.]

- 61 *Reichel (Hans)* Darstellung und Kritik von J. S. Mill's Theorie der induktiven Methode, ii. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxiii., Heft 1, 1903.

- 71 *Moore (G. E.)* The Refutation of Idealism. Mind, Oct., 1903.

[The proposition that *esse is percipi* is essential to idealism, and implies for the idealist that *what is experienced* is identical with the *experience of it*. The existence, however, of any sense quality is related to my experience of it in precisely the same way as the existence of my own experience is related to my experience of *that*. Of both we are merely aware; if it is true that my experience can exist, even when I do not happen to be aware of its existence, we have exactly the same reason for supposing that 'blue,' for example, can do so also.]

- 72 *Hicks (G. Dawes)* A Re-statement of some features in Kantian Transcendentalism.

Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., iii., 1903.

[Kant expressly repudiates the Cartesian doctrine of the priority of Self-knowledge. Pressed to its legitimate outcome, this Kantian argument involves the position that in knowing we are never aware of our mental states as such, any more than in seeing we see the organ of sight. Mental states are ways *in* and *through* which we become aware, not themselves objects of which we are aware; they are existing processes or occurrences, whereas the content known neither exists nor occurs. The latter has indeed a reality of its own, but it is the reality of meaning, validity and worth, not the reality of existence. Knowledge is not a copy of that which exists.]

- Evellin (F.)* La Dialectique des Antinomies Kantienues.

Rev. de Meta et de Mor., Nov., 1903.

[A continuation of previous articles. Author pursues his inquiry into Kant's opposition of Necessity and Freedom.]

- Walsh (C. M.)* Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism.

Mind, Oct., 1903.

[Two doctrines of Empirical Realism in Kant. According to the one the empirically real is only either the by us experienced or the by us experienceable. According to the other, there is *one* experience and *one* consciousness, and therein phenomenal objects may be real even though no individual human being or terrestrial animal ever sensibly perceived or thought of them.]

- 85 *Mansion (P.)* Aristote et les Mathématiques. Revue de Phil., Oct., 1903.

- 91 *Bakewell (C. M.)* The Philosophy of Emerson. Phil. Rev., Sept., 1903.

- 93 *Hayward (F. H.)* and *Thomas (M. E.)* The Critics of Herbartianism. 280p.

Sonnenschein, 1903.

- 94 *Bruhl (L. L.)* Philosophy of Auguste Comte; auth. tr., intr. by F. Harrison. 378p.

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# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

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## THE MORAL ASPECT OF THE FISCAL QUESTION.

HENRY JONES, M.A., LL.D.,

Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow.

It is a common if not a universal belief that there is a very strong case against any action of government which comes into conflict with public morality. Any political gain secured at the expense of the national character we should consider to be too dear at the price; and, however much we desire the material prosperity of our country, we are not willing to seek it by methods which are detrimental to public morals.

Nevertheless, when a new policy is projected comparatively little is heard, either in Parliament or elsewhere, of its moral aspects. There are many reasons for this, but probably the most potent of them all is the opinion that many, if not most, of the actions of government have little to do with morality, at least directly. The function of the legislator is to conduct the business of the nation; the aim of government is to protect the persons and property of the citizens; and the state itself is merely an organ of secular force, and a pledge of lawful dealing between man and man. It has no directly moral or religious function. It cannot undertake to inculcate morality by direct enactment, nor employ compulsory powers to make

the people religious, without both travelling beyond its province and defeating its own aims. For morality and religion cannot come by constraint. The *rôle* of the state stops short of the inner life of its citizens, and ends in securing for them a free field and favourable circumstances for the practice of the virtues.

Owing to these opinions, the practical man is very reluctant to subject political projects to moral criteria. Ethical considerations, weighty as they are in their own proper province, are deemed to be somewhat remote from the ordinary business of Parliament. We do not desire that our statesmen should complicate their task by raising moral problems. If they are contemplating a change of our fiscal policy, for instance, their duty is simply to discover the system which conduces most to the industrial and commercial prosperity of the country. Morality will take care of itself: and, in any case, it is a concern of the people themselves rather than of their political representatives; and the national character is lost or won on the broad arena of public life, and not on the floors of the Houses of Parliament.

Nor is the task of the politician the only one that is to be pursued without raising moral questions. "Business is business" everywhere, we say; meaning by this, not that the business man recognises no moral restraints, but that business has its own province, maxims, and methods, which, though they are not immoral, have nevertheless no moral purpose. Artists say something similar regarding art, and the scientific man or the philosopher regarding knowledge. Moral considerations are irrelevant to these provinces. A work of art must be judged by the canons of beauty and not by the laws of morality, and a mathematician or physicist does not ask what are the ethical aspects of a problem in geometry or of Kepler's laws.

In the last resort, no doubt, all these different provinces may be found to touch upon that of the moralist; for the world is one, and so is the human soul which deals with it. Other



things being equal, a good man, whose powers are well in hand, will perform any work he undertakes better than a man whose will is weak, whose aims are low, and whose life is confused and distracted by warring passions. But this is all that can be said. And if the moralist seeks to interfere beyond this, and introduce theories as to the ethical aspects of such work, there is no option but to take him reverently by the hand and lead him out of court as a most respectable but irrelevant witness.

Now, this view is regarded as holding in a pre-eminent degree of international business. Considerations enter here which remove this province still further from that of ordinary morality. For states are not considered to be moral agents, and in their relations to each other the ordinary moral maxims are supposed not to hold. Statesmen, while engaged upon international business, must neither act nor be judged in the same way as when they are occupied upon their private concerns. "Lying, indifference to human suffering, rapacity, cruelty," says Lord Lytton (in his Rectorial Address in Glasgow in 1888), "do not lose their essential character because they are incidental to public actions. And yet we are not, I think, to judge statesmen as we should judge private persons." He maintains that, as between nations, the sixth and the eighth commandments do not hold, at least in the same way; that self-sacrifice, which, in some circumstances, is the duty of an individual, is never the duty of a state; that a state is both entitled and bound to be more selfish in its relation to other states than is morally permissible to individuals; and that *national* selfishness ceases to be selfishness in any proper sense of the word, and becomes patriotism.

Indeed, when patriotic considerations enter, problems seem to change their aspect even for the ordinary citizen. The love of humanity must not be allowed to obscure his duties to his own country. "I address you," says one of our political leaders, "as Britons, and address you as patriots." Other "great nations consider, and rightly consider, their own

interests first. . . . I want that Britons, all over the world, should learn the lesson that they should treat each other better than they treat anyone else."

Now, what is to be said of this view? That it is easily caricatured is obvious. We have only to say that great statesmen may act like kings and think like emperors, leaving the minor moralities to the minor prophets and the little men; and that there is room enough for affection on our own national hearth, and time enough for philanthropy out of business hours. But this does not dispose of the truth that lies in the doctrine. For it *is* true that business is business; that patriotism has its obligations as well as its privileges; that statesmen must not be judged in their public capacity precisely as when they are engaged upon their private affairs. Nay, we may state the fact quite generally, and say that each of the different relations between men demands a different response. We should be neither wise nor good if we behaved in the same way amongst our children and amongst our clerks, on the charitable board and in the council chamber, in the pulpit and in the senate.

We may concede further that some relations in life lend themselves more naturally and easily to moral purposes than others do, and are fitted to call forth some of the virtues rather than others. The profession of the minister or physician, for instance, naturally gives more scope for the benevolent virtues than the trade of the retail dealer. It is probably easier for a professor to tell the truth than it is for a politician—even though he should be a professor of Political Economy. He has nothing else to do; his constituency cannot throw him off, nor his party leaders call him to account; and the public applause is not likely to turn his head.

But to allow that some walks of life are more favourable to the exercise of the virtues than others, is very different from admitting that there are some circumstances in life which call for the exercise of none of the virtues. It does not follow that we can divide the trades and professions into two classes, and call some of them moral and some of them immoral or



non-moral, placing the ministry, say, in the former, and politics and international statesmanship—and horse-couping—in the latter.

The truth is that no province of life, no form of occupation, has *in itself* any ethical character. A man's station in life furnishes him with the *opportunity* of doing right and wrong, but it does nothing more; and it can do nothing more. That opportunity he may either use or throw away; and his profession derives its moral character entirely from the way in which it is handled, and the personality he throws into it. Intrinsically there is no legitimate business of any kind which is moral or immoral, and none which is not capable of being made either the one or the other.

Hence, so far from regarding the province of politics, national or international, as having no ethical significance, I should say that, like all occupations, down to that of selling tape, it *furnishes the means* of both learning and teaching goodness. The only difference between the business of the statesman and that of his humbler neighbour is that it gives him opportunities of doing right and wrong on a larger scale. The consequences of his actions reach illimitably further: the welfare of a whole people may lie in his hands, and the destiny of nations hang upon his lips. There is here more call than anywhere else for the wise mind to conceive, and the resolute will to realise great ends. It may be more difficult for the statesman to recognise the good he should strive to do, for duties collide and obligations are frequently inconsistent, and his wisdom and rectitude are more sorely tried. But that right and wrong are irrelevant, that morality does not count, that the nation is not safer in the hands of the wise and good than in those of clever tricksters whom moral considerations do not bind nor moral ideals move, is certainly not true. Men, placed in such situations, stand for a nation's character as well as for a nation's might; and an enlightened people will not separate the two, nor willingly see either the one or the other betrayed.

But great as are the consequences that may flow from a statesman's action, and vast as are the possibilities of good and evil at his command, he still cannot directly touch the nation's inner life. He cannot *make* it righteous, any more than a father can *make* his children good ; for moral character is a peculiarly individual possession, and must be built up entirely from within. In this respect the statesman's function, like that of every individual, is entirely secular : he can touch, not life, but its outer environment.

On the other hand, however, there is an environment which is favourable to a good life and an environment that is unfavourable. There are circumstances which promote the rectitude of a people and circumstances which provoke the opposite. And these the statesman can affect, making it easier for his people to be good or bad. Indeed, he cannot avoid affecting them ; and, in this respect, there is no act of statesmanship which has not its moral meaning. Every law inscribed upon the statute-book alters the conditions under which someone lives ; it establishes rights, defines duties, and creates opportunities of a better life, or places obstacles in its way. That the state does not directly inculcate morality, or cannot compel the people to pray,—that it can best serve both religion and morality by letting them alone,—does not touch the truth that it ought to foster the conditions favourable to the good life.

In so far as the state is progressive and its legislative action wise, it can hardly be said to be doing anything else ; for it is only in this way that it can provide for the larger and freer life of its citizens. But to do this is to act as a moral agent, and the private individual can do no more. Hence it is a wrong to the state to regard it as a mere organ of secular force, and its policy as having no ethical character. It never is a mere secular force, and its might, in reference to its own citizens, is always measured by its moral right ; for it itself is nothing else than the embodied conscience of the people.

It is the story of a moral agent, ameliorating the conditions



of a worthy life for its citizens, that we read in the history of our own country. "A state," says Professor A. C. Bradley, "which, in however slight a degree, supports science, art, learning, and religion; which enforces education, and compels the well-to-do to maintain the helpless; which, for the good of the poor and the weak, interferes with the 'natural' relations of employer and employed, and regulates, only too laxly, a traffic which joins gigantic evil to its somewhat scanty good; . . . a state which does all this, and much more of the same kind, cannot, without an unnatural straining of language, be denied to exercise, in the broad sense, a moral function. It will seek not merely 'life,' but good life. It is still, within the sphere appropriate to force, a spiritual power,—not only the guardian of the peace and a security for the free pursuit of private ends, but the armed conscience of the community."<sup>1</sup>

Our statesmen have been building better than they knew. Amidst the turmoil of debate and the strife of parties they have been engaged upon a great moral enterprise. By legal enactments that often seemed, even to themselves, to be merely secular in character and to affect the mere material environment within which we live, they have diminished the opportunities of doing wrong and increased the opportunities of doing right; they have made straight the paths, filled the valleys, brought low the hills and mountains, and made the rough ways smooth for the feet of those who follow them. And the one question we have now to answer is, not whether, at this supposed crisis of our history, the purposes of our legislators have an ethical meaning, or are out of touch with right and wrong, but whether they tend in the same progressive direction. Moral significance those things *must* have which propose to change the fundamental conditions of our industrial and commercial life, and to alter the relation of Britain both to its colonies and to foreign states.

It has been necessary to dwell at some length upon this apparently preliminary matter. For, judging from the great

<sup>1</sup> *Hellenica*, pp. 242, 243.

mass of opinions expressed in the recent controversy, two assumptions of cardinal importance have been tacitly made: first, that moral considerations do not enter in a vital way into the question of our material prosperity; second, that the state, being an end to itself, cannot be regarded as a moral agent, nor its relations to other states be subject to moral criteria. I propose to examine these assumptions more closely, for the crux of the whole situation seems to me to lie in their truth or falsehood. And I shall try to show that, on account of these assumptions, the problem of our material prosperity has been wrongly stated, and that, in consequence, the remedy proposed is in some respects inadequate to secure our national welfare, and in other respects directly contradictory to it.

Now, it will be conceded at once that our national prosperity depends both upon material conditions and upon our national character. But while the first truth has been discussed in all its bearings, the second has been either overlooked altogether or treated as a matter of little weight in determining our future policy. It is no doubt true that an occasional statesman has proposed to meet the present crisis—if, indeed, crisis there be—by seeking to raise the personal efficiency of the people rather than by changing the conditions of trade. They have suggested better public education, especially on the technical side, and they have called for social reforms which shall make our lives less wasteful and more sober and simple. But their words have fallen flat upon the national ear, and the remedies which they have proposed have seemed stale, commonplace, practically insignificant and negligible. As a people, we have been behaving precisely as if moral considerations were either too remote, or too irrelevant and slight, to have any practical bearing in determining the method of averting the decline or securing the progress of the nation as a producer and distributor of wealth. We have puzzled over the increase and decrease, relative or absolute, of our exports and imports; we have traced economic causes and effects; we have accumulated statistics, true and false, just as if human



qualities did not count, and as if the problem from beginning to end were purely material. And, of course, our diagnosis has dictated the remedy; the terms in which the problem has been stated have determined the character of the solution.

Now, when we turn from the business of the nation to our own, we see and recognise the value of these human qualities clearly enough,—I mean their purely economical value. What sum, for instance, would one of the great Clyde shipbuilders, harassed by the ignorance, the stupidity, the intemperance, the irregularity, and the untrustworthiness of the workmen in his employment, who keep his machinery idle, dislocate his plans, and frustrate his contracts, be willing to pay in hard cash for some magic invention, legislative or other, which secured for him, and for him alone, that every man in his yard shall henceforth be sober, intelligent, punctual, industrious, slow to assert his rights, and sensitive to his duties? I venture to say that as a practical man he would consider that such an invention would give him an inestimable advantage in the competitive struggle. And if such a change could be brought about in every yard and workshop, in every counting-house and office throughout the land, is it likely that we should need to trouble much to protect ourselves behind tariff walls? On the contrary, if this could be done in part, and even in very small part, if the level of public life amongst masters and men were raised but a little, we should increase our industrial efficiency as a nation much more than by any meddling with our fiscal policy. And, besides, the gain of the latter method is doubtful as well as exiguous, while that of the former method is indisputably certain. But we have not thought this moral aspect of the question worthy of serious consideration.

Let us look at this matter for one moment from another point of view. It is a common saying that "Money breeds money," and I think it is a common opinion that wealth increases by spontaneous generation. But the economists tell us that wealth, whether national or personal, is maintained only by constant reproduction. Apart from that portion of

our wealth which is in a relatively permanent form, such as roads, machinery, houses, cleared land, etc., we consume it all and recreate it all within the year. And we do that, of course, in virtue of our personal qualities. Deprive us of these, strike the community with a wand so as to stop its activities, or make a free gift of the business of the nation as a going concern to a rude people, and what would be left of our prosperity at the end of six months?

The wealth of a nation is the product of two factors, neither of which can be left out of account. One of them is the material means, the other is the intelligence and rectitude, the industry and the skill that employ them. And if I were forced to distinguish between these, I should say that the latter is by far the larger factor of the two. I should much prefer to share the destiny of a people which is great in the qualities of its men, even although their hands were empty, than that of a wealthy nation whose citizens had lost their manhood.

If it is urged, in reply, that these are familiar truths, I answer, "Undoubtedly. But their familiarity seems to have obscured their significance. They are, so far as our practical diagnosis and our legislative remedy are concerned, outside our thoughts; our assent to them has been merely theoretic and academic." We have stated the problem of our national prosperity with one of the supreme conditions left out, and in politics, as in mathematics or science, the solution must be either impossible or wrong. The problem has to be stated over again. It is a primary requirement of the present situation, now that the question of our national ways of doing business has been raised, to state the problem with a greater breadth of outlook, and with strict fidelity to *all* the fundamental facts of the case.

This has not been done. We may admire the boldness, whatever we may think of the wisdom, of the statesman who is primarily responsible for shattering our national complacency, challenging our familiar ways, and pointing us back to dis-



carded methods of trading. So far as he has roused the nation to self-inquiry he has done well. But the inquiry has stopped short at the surface. It has reached neither the real needs of the country nor their true remedy. By an error which is natural to a mind supremely equipped both by natural endowment and by experience for the arena of the competitive industries, but sustained and enriched by no historical or philosophical background, he has treated the state as if it were a business concern and nothing more; and he has confined the thoughts of the people, as well as his own, to the question of commercial methods. The result is that both sides of the great controversy have immensely exaggerated the significance of these methods, extending them all round our mental horizon.

The state, said the wise Burke, "ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary or perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living but between those who are dead and those who are to be born."<sup>1</sup>

Like the contemporaries of Burke, we seem to lack this larger vision and to have lost the larger courage which always inspire a progressive nation to seek prosperity by the long and hard road which leads through a reform of manners. We seem to be looking for shorter cuts to imperial welfare than that of moralising the people. And we are likely to lose our labours. For, whatever may be said of those who stir in the political waters, the better mind of the people of this country knows

<sup>1</sup> *Reflections on the Revolution in France.*

full well that human history, as it raises up and pulls down the nations of the world, teaches one fact plainly amidst all the confusion of its errant ways—the fact, namely, that national welfare, like individual well-being, rests in the last resort upon moral foundations, and that the value of a policy, old or new, fiscal or other, depends upon the way in which it tells upon the morals of the people. Many of the measures proposed in Parliament are such as not to involve great consequences, or to imply new departures; they continue or perfect existing conditions. In such cases disregard of the wider ethical issues is proximately harmless. But when, as in the present instance, questions are raised which, as we are told, involve our whole material welfare, our rank and place amongst civilised nations, and even the unity of the Empire, it is not good or wise statesmanship to leave out of consideration the most fundamental of all the conditions of our imperial well-being. The importance of a change in our methods of international trading is in no wise denied. For my part, I believe that to set up artificial barriers against free trade would bring deeper poverty to the poor, widen the chasm between them and the rich, bring more bitter social differences with the greater social inequalities, and complicate our relations both with our dependencies and with foreign nations. But, all the same, our ultimate destiny as a people lies not in this fiscal province. France has been prosperous under protection, and it would be prosperous were its trade free; for its people are thrifty and industrious. And I should say the same of the British Empire: it will survive its policies, if it keeps its character. But we have been forgetting the human elements in the problem, and dealing with affairs of state as if they were questions in abstract economics. The result is a distorted view of the whole situation and a change in the true perspective of things. The whole picture is false, for the focus is wrong. Imperial Britain is pictured by our orators as a fiscal unit, held together by economic bonds, pitted against other fiscal units in a competitive conflict in which what one gains



the other loses. The unity of the Empire is represented as consisting of two strands—unity of sentiment and a unity which privileged commercial relations are expected to bring; good feeling *plus* sound business. But the unity of sentiment is thought of comparatively little moment, as if it were feeble and fragile as well as intangible; while all the emphasis is thrown upon the material bond, if bond it be. And lastly, the obligations of the citizens to the Empire correspond; for the meaning of patriotism depends upon the conception we have formed of our country, and if the latter is superficial the former will be shallow.

It was this shallow, "property" view of patriotism which was rebuked by the old blue-gown Edie Ochiltree, when the Antiquary suggested that he had not much to fight for. "Me, no muckle to fight for, sir!" was the reply. "Is na there the country to fight for, and the hearths of the gude-wives that gie me my bit bread, and the bits o' weans that come toddlin' to play wi' me when I come about a landward town? De'il! an' I had as gude pith as I hae gude-will and a gude cause, I should gie some o' them a day's kempin'."

This homely picture of his "country" drawn by a humble patriot seems to me to imply more than kindly sentiment towards a fiscal unit—the wooden idol of our times. And grave philosophers and statesmen, in all ages of the world,—Pericles and Pitt, Aristotle and Hegel and Burke,—agree in this with Edie Ochiltree rather than with our more modern prophet. Their conception of their country is more human, their obligations to it are more deep. For what is the individual to them apart from the state, and outside of its great social partnership? He is, in strict truth, nothing but a name. Heir to no social inheritance, sharer in the destiny of no people, his soul is blank and his hands empty; he stands refused by the moral order, without a duty to perform or the power to conceive it. For he has veritably nothing of his own which he has not borrowed. "The tongue that he

makes his own is his country's language, the ideas and sentiments that make up his life are the ideas and sentiments of his race." He is, continues Mr F. H. Bradley in one of his intense passages, "penetrated, infected, characterised by his relations with his fellows. . . . The soul within him is saturated, is filled, is qualified by, it has assimilated, has built itself up from, it *is* one and the same life with the universal life; and if he turns against this, he turns against himself; if he thrusts it from him, he tears his own vitals; if he attacks it, he sets the weapon against his own heart."<sup>1</sup>

The ancient philosophers recognised this inexhaustible debt of the individual to society, and especially to the highest form of human society, namely, the state. No fairer destiny was possible to man than to be a citizen of a good state, and they identified the whole duty of man with that of the citizen. The magnitude of the modern state, the stability and permanence and variety of its institutions, the multiplicity of the interests which it in some way reconciles, and the very freedom with which it has endowed its members, conceal from us the political significance of our private station and duties. The good citizen goes forth to his labour in the morning and returns at eve, and he knows not that by fulfilling the duties of his station he has been strengthening the structure of his state, and serving purposes which far outspan his own. He is a patriot unconscious of his patriotism; for he does not realise that in fulfilling his function he has contributed his quota to the progress of his country. He does not carry with him the consciousness that his good is its good, and that its good is his good; nor does he consider that he is a sharer in its common life, that he has no other life, and that no other purposes beat like a pulse in his veins. But the fact is as undeniable in the modern imperial state as it was in the Athens of Pericles.

It is thus no matter for wonder that the dissolution of the state has always proved to be the ultimate tragedy of

<sup>1</sup> *Ethical Studies*, pp. 155, 156.



human life. The decay of the Greek municipal states, the decline and disintegration of the Roman Empire, the Revolution in France, all show the same spectacle. When a state "crumbles asunder and is disconnected into the dust and powder of individuality," the bonds of private morality themselves are loosened, and man is deprived of his very humanity. The wise, during periods of great political corruption, have sought a refuge in a noble inner life; but that inner life itself is a gift of social institutions, and, severed from them, falls into inevitable decay. Even Christianity, with all its sublime ardour for the spiritual life of the individual, contributed to the corruption of the ancient world in so far as it released its adherents from the obligations of citizenship. For in a man's relations to his neighbours in the state lie the conditions of all the virtues.

But there is a deeper wrong to the state than even this disregard of the obligations of citizenship. It is that of turning the privileges of citizenship against the principle from which they have sprung, and perverting the powers of the state to private uses. And this, unfortunately, is a wrong not unknown in our own day and country. From direct corruption and misappropriation of the personal kind we are now happily free, at least in comparison with other times. But men will do in the interests of their class what they would scorn to do directly in their own. Sustained by the consciousness of the common ends of a class, men otherwise estimable in the eyes of their neighbours become unconscious enemies of the public weal. Disregarding the fact that the state is the common guardian of all just interests, and that its stability and strength depend upon its power to reconcile those interests in one harmonious whole, seeing no wrongs except those of their own industrial or religious sect, and devoted to no other rights, they press these blindly upon the state. In doing so they strike at the heart of the common good, no matter who aims the blow, nor for what abstract cause. For when we see a class of men, be they the aristocracy or the common people, capitalists or

working men, or the blind devotees of a religious sect or social cause, employing the powers granted them by the state in order to gain one-sided ends, without respect to others, we see them engaged upon an enterprise which, if it succeeded, would bring the state in ruins about their heads.

It is true, no doubt, that the legislature must always seek particular forms of the common good, removing now this and now that inequality, and advancing step by step in establishing rights. Nevertheless, in so far as statesmanship is wise it aims at the good of the whole in seeking that of the part, and maintains the social equilibrium. And similarly the desires of the good citizen are always checked and chastened by wider and more generous conceptions than those of his class and sect. To him there are few mottoes which rank in moral turpitude with that with which one of the most powerful organisations within the state has disgraced the standard under which it fights—all too successfully—and which reads, “Our Trade, our Politics.”

And it is here that the policy of protection, in all its forms, stands utterly condemned. For, in spite of all the reckless assertions and negations of these days, one finds no one who has had the hardihood to assert that this policy would further public rectitude. On the contrary, it is too plain that, by something like natural necessity, it would lead thousands more to inscribe upon their banner the badge of social wrong-doing, “Our Trade, our Politics.” Artificial tariffs, amongst a people endowed with the genius for combination, like our own, and keen in its pursuit of wealth by organised methods, would convert the lobbies of the Houses of Parliament into an arena where trusts and combines contend for their conflicting interests. Such a business is degrading to those engaged upon it, and its indirect moral and political results are deplorable. The guardians of the state, in whose probity lies the immediate security for our social well-being, would be distracted from their high duty, and who will dare to assert that they may not be torn away from it; or that from the high places of the



nation's social will the waves of corruption will not roll back upon the nation itself?

Our social needs are many in these times, and some of them are grave and urgent; but, amongst these, I cannot reckon the need of creating larger opportunities and greater temptations to political and industrial corruption. And whether we should succumb to these temptations or not, it is certainly no wise statesmanship that calls them forth. We may be losing our commercial and industrial pre-eminence,—it is not proved; we may be on the way to national poverty,—I do not believe it; but we are certainly not, as yet, at that point in the game where we must throw our national character amongst the stakes.

It is not relevant to say that our neighbours have done this. The question is, have they done it without loss? And there is only one answer to the question, and that answer is so well known and certain as to make proof supererogatory. To the mass of evidence we already possess I shall add only that of one witness—the testimony of an American citizen, a leading lawyer and financier, who has been president of a large railway company, and concerned in other large business operations. “If Chamberlain’s opponents,” he says, “would only study the American results of protection, and the inevitable consequences of creating an artificial profit by misuse of taxation, bringing a feverish desire in the business world to get by legislation an advantage over other trades, they could present such a picture as would save England from following him. . . . You *must* win, or civilisation takes a backward step. No body of legislators, from Parliament down to city councils and boards of select-men in towns, can be safely trusted to use the powers of taxation for any other purpose than that of merely raising money to cover the expenses of government. Throughout the political structure in America to-day, shrewd people everywhere struggle to legislate in some way money out of their neighbours’ pockets into their own, and this feverish desire is the real source of the municipal corruption which

pervades all our civic organisations. . . . Protection in America is the mother of corruption ; and to fight Chamberlain is simply to fight for common honesty."

These are strong words, but I doubt if it is possible to say that they pass beyond the truth. That the motives of Mr Chamberlain, and of those who have supported him, may be as pure as his effort has been strenuous, I do not doubt. Great efforts for great causes are hardly ever inspired or sustained by selfish motives. But neither ardent patriotism nor the generous dream of a greater empire has saved him from committing himself and his followers to a political method which, if applied, would put a strain upon the private morality and the political honour of British citizens and upon the rectitude of their representatives, from which we have all inherited the right to be free.

But the prospects are not really alarming. We shall not barter our political purity for the promised millions. Just for the moment, the mind of the multitude may be confused and dazed. But once quiet comes, and more sober reflection on the larger and forgotten issues, the dust of the battle will settle down and we shall see with a new clearness and pronounce with a new conviction that no dreams of gain shall lead us to risk our loyalty to those permanent conditions of our welfare which lie in the national character. Our present methods have, amongst other causes, been instrumental in extending the Empire beyond the dreams of patriotism ; and yet the accumulated responsibilities have not broken our strength, nor left us bankrupt at home. As yet, at least, we hold a place of honour amongst the great nations of the earth ; and though we should stand alone for years yet to come in guarding by the freedom of our marts and our open ports the purity and strength of our political life, we shall hold it no cause for shame nor source of weakness.

But I must pass on to the still wider question—that of the manner in which the new fiscal policy concerns the relation of the British Empire to other independent states. It is not



possible for me to deal exhaustively with this aspect of our problem; but I shall try to make clear one fact that seems to me of cardinal importance, namely, that the decisive and dominant conceptions do not belong to the province of pure, or mere, economics. If there exist any reasons at all for departing from our free-trade methods, these spring from the political province.

This becomes evident when it is considered that there is no economic difference between international and any other trade. In strictness there is no such thing as international trade. All trade is between individuals (or their business equivalents), and, apart from political considerations, it is a matter of perfect indifference whether these do or do not belong to the same nation. The strongest adherents of preferential or protective tariffs do not dream of advocating interference with the freedom of interchange of goods between England and Scotland, although these countries compete with one another not less keenly, and in more ways, than with France or Germany. They tell us that, were it only practicable, they would establish free trade throughout the British Empire, and presumably, therefore, throughout the world, if all the nations formed one state. In a word, were it not for political and patriotic considerations, London would trade with Berlin, New York, and Paris to-day as freely as with Dublin or Glasgow.

How, then, do political and patriotic considerations affect the situation, so far as it depends upon ourselves? Why should they make any difference in our method of interchanging goods? If our fiscal reformers took the trouble to examine their own presuppositions, their answer would be something of this kind:—A political state stands under peculiar obligations to its own citizens, and places them under peculiarly intimate relations to itself. In their interests it seeks and has a right to seek to enlarge its territory and strengthen itself up to the limits of its power. For, ideally, a state ought to be self-sufficient, and be strong and resourceful enough to provide its own citizens with all that is required to satisfy their wants; for

incompleteness implies weakness and dependence, and these carry with them insecurity for all those to whom it ought to be an adequate refuge. Hence, there is nothing to limit the self-assertion of a state, for as self-sufficient it is an end to itself; and if it recognises any restraints, they are all prudential in character. If it had the power, as it has the right and the will, it would rule the world. All that other states are and possess are simply things which, so far, it has not been able to make its own.

Now, as all states have ideally the same obligations to their citizens, and therefore the same unlimited rights, they are natural rivals; and the normal relation between them is that of mechanical strain. The expansion of the domain or the power of any one of them is a menace to its neighbours. Any increase of its industrial or commercial efficiency is secured at their expense. For it is quite evident that, the greater the mass of goods which it is able to produce, the more restricted is the sphere of the industrial activity of the others; and the more it floods their markets with these goods, the more confined are their own markets and the less the demand for their labour.

And just as the obligations of a state to its own inhabitants are primary, so the duties of the citizen to his country must override all others. His sentiments may be cosmopolitan, but his practice must be patriotic. For as states are natural rivals, seeing that each seeks to be self-sufficient, he cannot do anything to serve other states except, directly or indirectly, at the expense of his own. In so far, for instance, as by his commercial or industrial enterprise he employs the workmen of a foreign state or otherwise contributes to its prosperity he relatively weakens his own. He ought to bewail its success and rejoice in its failure. If his own country is losing its relative pre-eminence, whether through greater prosperity abroad or through less prosperity at home, he must regard it as an evil, and, like a true patriot, look for the best methods of averting it. What other states do is work taken out of our hands;



the markets they supply are shut against ourselves. Economically, as well as territorially, the different states are sections of a closed circle, and the expansion of the province of the one is an invasion of the province of the others. Hence a man cannot, at least so far as concerns material things, be a citizen of the world without neglecting, or at times violating even, his duties to his own country. We are entitled to suspect the patriotism of the humanitarian: *angel pen ffordd, a diawl pen pentan*. "We must distinguish between a blood relation and a business competitor. We decline to regard the colonies as coming in all matters upon exactly the same basis as foreign competitors." These words of Mr Wyndham are indefinite, but if one is to translate and apply them to the present situation, they seem to mean that we must give to our colonies better bargains than to other countries, we must compete with them more softly—mitigating the heat for them, as some of the old theologians desired to do for lost infants. We must be less annoyed against them if they carry off our trade; we must give them preferential tariffs; we must tax our food and raw material for their sakes.

Whether this is not patriotism degraded into impractical sentimentalism I shall not inquire; nor whether it be not better for our colonies and dependencies, as for ourselves, to allow them to hold their own, rather than mix sentiment with business. Nor shall I discuss the matter from the point of view of pure economics. Otherwise I should try to show that it is not the prosperity but the poverty, not the strength of foreign countries but their weakness, that hinders and limits our trade. I should also try to prove that so long as trade exists between two countries the country which gains most from the free interchange of goods, other things being equal, is the country which is economically the weaker.

It must be admitted that, from the point of view which represents the various states as natural rivals, and sets our duty to our country against our duty to man, such results are not only unaccountable but impossible. *But is the point of view*

*right or wrong?* This is the fundamental question to which we must now turn.

It is plain that this view of the nature of international relations is a particular form of a wider doctrine, which distinguishes and opposes regard for self and regard for others, egoism and altruism, private good and the public or common good. Moralists will recognise in it the familiar doctrine of Individualism (applied to states) to which Thomas Hobbes gave the classical expression. In our day we are more familiar with it as applied to the relation of individuals to society, and as illustrated in the discussions of the advocates of Individualism and Socialism. And although the problem of the relation of the individual to the state is not identical with that of the relation of independent states to each other, we shall find it profitable to dwell upon this matter for a moment.

There is one point on which Individualists and Socialists agree. They all desire both the solidarity of society and the independence of the individual; they all desire the maintenance of the social order and the freedom of its members; and they all desire that both society and the individual should, each in its own province, be active and efficient. But they despair of reconciling them, except by either subordinating the one to the other, or by a mutual compromise which shall delimit and fix their boundaries; and they differ as to which should be end and which should be means, or as to the limits that should be set to their respective functions. The Socialist, weary of the strife and strain of competing private interests, would take away the occasion of these, so far as it lies in private property, and would restrict the possession of it. The Individualist, regarding the development of corporate social enterprise as "interference" with that of the individual, and fearing the mechanisation of society, would reduce the functions of society to the minimum. Both admit that the recent development of state and municipal activity has had the result of invading the province of individual enterprise. But they differ in that the Socialist welcomes this



invasion because it limits the individual's power of doing wrong; while the Individualist bewails it because it limits his power to do right. It is tacitly assumed by both alike that individual and commercial action are antagonistic, that one can be extended only by limiting the other. For is it not plain that when the state or municipality undertakes a business it ousts individuals, and that the more the former does in an organised capacity the less room is left for private enterprise? How can it be otherwise? it is asked. How is it possible that the state or the city can do more and more for its members, and at the same time enable them to do more and more for themselves?

And yet this apparent impossibility is precisely what has taken place. The history of the growth of civilised society is one continuous illustration of the concomitant increase of social organisation and of individual freedom. The civilised state does more for its citizens than the barbarous state, and at the same time enables them to do more for themselves. A comparison between the civic state of Athens or Sparta and the earlier and cruder Eastern despotisms on the one side, and the modern state or municipality on the other, shows this at once. So numerous are the functions which the latter have undertaken, that we are told that "Socialism has already come." And this is true if it means that the organised services of society have been multiplied; but it is altogether false if it is meant to convey, as it generally is, that the individual's sphere of activity has been contracted. That he competes against society on its own lines is, of course, not true; nor can it be asserted that a state or municipality can take up a business without affecting those already engaged in it. But if it proceeds wisely, as on the whole has been done in this country, the general result is that the work is placed in the hands which can do it best—namely, general progress.

Owing to higher organisation and the enlarged functions of the modern state, the individual is a much more powerful agent than the member of a crude community. In

other words, owing to the system of institutions which the state comprises and sustains, he can conceive and carry out purposes utterly beyond the reach of the latter: he is a deeper and more effective personality. The modern state is a rich treasury of resources upon which he can draw, and its organisations constitute a most powerful machinery on which he can lay his hands. It supplies him with the means of a larger life, and extends and deepens the significance of his individuality.

Now, this fact, which is illustrated in our daily lives as well as in the history of the growth of civilisation, implies that the surface view, which represents the individual and the community as rivals and their good as mutually exclusive, is radically false. Individual and social activity are coincident, and their prosperity is but two sides of the same fact; so that to limit the one for the sake of the other is absurd. Instead of seeking a fixed line of demarcation, or setting up artificial barriers, the enlightened citizen will entrust to each those enterprises which are most suited to its powers, feeling his way in doing so and learning from experience. He knows that the vital issue is that the work be well done, and that the question by whom it is done is relatively an indifferent matter. For work well done benefits all alike, there being no social good which is not individual good, and no individual good which is not a social good.

Turning now to the relation between independent states, we must first concede that it is not in all ways identical with that of individual citizens to their own nation. It is easy to show that the individuality of a state is intrinsically much more rich, concrete, and strong than that of any private person; and, at the same time, that the larger society of mankind is a far more empty and impotent universal than any single state is in relation to its members. Hence it follows that the mutual obligations of individuals within a state are much more numerous and significant than those which states can recognise in relation to one another, or have



been able to express in international laws and customs. And obligations are, of course, opportunities ; duties are means of self-realisation. So that the different states, as matters are at present, can do far less for each other than individual citizens within the same state ; or in other words, cosmopolitan or humanitarian ideals are far less articulated into systems of definite duties than those of patriotism.

But to represent the good of a state as antagonistic to that of humanity, or to set patriotism and cosmopolitanism against each other, is as wrong in theory and as mischievous in practice as it is to oppose the good of the individual citizen to that of his state. The attempt to do so arises from the same shallow individualism, and the same ignorance of the coincidence of private and public good. But the teaching of history is as clear in respect to the community of states as we found it to be in the case of a community of individuals. The failure or the prosperity of a particular state has always communicated itself to its neighbours precisely in the same way. Every wrong deed on the part of an individual state is a wrong to humanity, and every action that is right and good for itself is in the last resort a contribution to the stability and prosperity of its neighbours. The British Empire, by its political and social progress, by its science and inventions and industrial enterprise, has benefited every country with which it has held intercourse. And other nations have done the same to us. Their good is ours, and ours theirs. Even in international trade, where self-seeking seems to be at the same time both most evident and most justifiable, our best neighbour is our strongest neighbour ; for it buys most from us in order to supply its own needs, and sells most to us so as to supply ours. We cannot profit by its decay, nor it by ours. When Rome destroyed Carthage it destroyed a great part of its own prosperity ; and any "hitting back" upon our part, if that means weakening our neighbours, weakens ourselves as well. The utmost that can be said for any such policy of retaliation is that it may conceivably lead our neighbours to mend their

ways, although it must be admitted that force very rarely brings about that change of mind which we call repentance. But to justify retaliation on this ground is to concede the principle to which it is opposed. It is to admit freedom of interchange as the true end, while seeking to bring it about by the doubtful method of compulsion. It is the method of the "natural man."

But the progress which civilisation has so far achieved has consisted in abrogating the methods of the "natural man." Instead of rivalry and antagonism there has arisen, step by step, co-operation in common ends and mutual service. There exists still between states, as between individuals, that self-assertion which is one aspect of self-realisation, and there is no question in either case of a sentimental altruism which sacrifices rights. The egoistic element remains, and must remain; for the whole cannot be strengthened at the expense of the parts. But the egoism is gradually becoming an enlightened egoism, which recognises that the good which is exclusive is a false good. The antagonism is giving place to *a competition in efficiency*, to a method by which each part, whether it be an individual or a state, discovers more and more clearly its own station and round of duties, by fulfilling which it shall realise best both its own and the common good. And nowhere is this more conspicuous than in international trade, whose foundation is just the interchange of services; for nothing has ever either established or developed trade, whether between individuals or between states, except this principle of mutual help.

This progress in intercommunion has, no doubt, brought with it some disadvantages. We have lost some trades and been obliged to turn to others, and so also have other nations. But this is incidental to the process by which each discovers its proper function; and it must not be forgotten that it liberates as well as dislocates, and brings with it the benefits of a better division of labour. International commerce has, further, made us more dependent upon our neighbours, and



our neighbours upon ourselves. But interdependence is, in normal conditions, not weakness but strength, for it implies mutual utility. In abnormal conditions, as in times of war, it is, of course, mutual loss. For if war breaks out between interdependent states it assumes for each of the combatants alike the most dangerous of all forms; for the closer the tie the more fatal the rupture. But this argument tells against the comity of nations only in the same way as it does against the union of citizens, or of provinces in an individual state. The risk is worth the running, for it is only the risk naturally entailed in the establishment of social institutions and in moralising man.

The intercommunion and consequent interdependence of states may be said, further, to increase the opportunities of disagreement; for neither states nor individuals quarrel with those with whom they have nothing to do. But if they increase the opportunities of disagreement, they take away the disposition to it; for amongst interdependent states injury to one is recognised as injury to all. And besides, isolation is not amongst the practical options. Intercourse there must be, and it is well that it should be. By means of it, and by means of *commercial* intercourse perhaps more than by any other, the civilised nations are gradually building up and realising the conception of a common good. And that conception, wherever it is operative, acts after the manner of a moral imperative and binds those who come under it through their own conscience, which is the only bondage that is also freedom; and it transfigures natural into moral relations, converting antagonism into competition in the arts of peace, the successful pursuit of which is at once the good of each and the good of all.

From this point of view it is difficult not to regard a policy which places obstacles in the way of the free interchange of benefits amongst nations as a crime against civilisation. And, though there may be circumstances which render such a course imperative, just as there are circumstances in which an individual must assert his rights against his country,—for the

narrower and nearer loyalties sometimes come first,—still it is a wrong and a folly to invite the collision. And it is not possible to maintain that it is forced upon this country, either by its poverty or by any other unhappy fact. On the contrary, the political insight of our forefathers, and their wise regard for the welfare of their country, led them to open its ports to all the world, with advantages to itself that it is not possible to measure, and of which those which are material are not the greatest; and by a law that seems to be written in the very nature of things, its own good has spread in an ever-widening circle to other great communities, and most of all to those which share its enterprising spirit most fully and are its worthiest rivals.

To ask us to change all this is as supererogatory a task as ever an eminent politician took in hand. To change our open into restricted markets, to set up barriers against the free interchange of utilities so far as that lies in our power, to adopt methods of antagonism to other nations, to endanger our own larger patriotism by making our colonies an unwelcome burden to our citizens at home, to lay aside a powerful instrument of amity and good-will amongst the peoples of the earth, and all for the sake of a limited and still more doubtful material gain, is a wrong against humanity which we ought not to have been invited to commit. And we shall not commit it. We shall not turn back upon the methods that have made our Empire great, nor shall we weaken the moral foundations on which alone it can securely rest.

HENRY JONES.

THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.



## SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS THE RE-INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

SIR OLIVER LODGE, F.R.S., D.Sc.

I. Now that religion is becoming so much more real, is being born again in the spirit of modern criticism and scientific knowledge, may it not be well to ask whether the formal statement of some of the doctrines which we have inherited from mediæval and still earlier times cannot be wisely and inoffensively modified? There is usually some sort of forced sense in which almost any statement can be judged to have in it an element of truth, especially a statement which embodies the beliefs of many generations. But when the element of truth is quite other than had been supposed, and when the original statement has to be tortured in order to display it, it may be time to consider whether without harm its mode of expression can be reconsidered and redrafted,—to the ultimate benefit indeed of that religion of truth and clearness which we all seek to attain.

No doubt the crudity of popular statements of doctrine is recognised by many modern theologians and experts, who have travelled far beyond the original intention and superficial interpretation of their creeds and formularies; and these may be ready and anxious for revision, although their responsible utterances on fundamental subjects are duly restrained and cautious, lest they offend the ignorant whose minds are not yet ripe. In that case it may be permissible for laymen to show that they at least are ready for a doctrinal revision—a

kind of stocktaking such as is necessary from time to time in all living and expanding subjects, and is especially necessary now after a century of notable advance in natural knowledge.

It may be objected that revision of religious formulæ is no concern of mine; and there is force in the retort. I find that I have said below that harm is liable to dog the footsteps of a well-meaning fanatic or a blatant fool. Possibly it is in something akin to the spirit of the fanatic that I take the risk of entering upon what may prove a thorny path, though I earnestly trust that very little pain to others need accrue from any errors of mine.

Consider, then, the doctrine of the Atonement, and let us ask whether the expression of that doctrine traditionally and officially held or supposed to be held by the churches to-day is satisfactory.

In days when the vicariousness of sin could be accepted, and when an original fall of Adam could be held as imputed to the race, it was natural to admit the possibility of a vicarious punishment and to accept an imputed righteousness. In the days when God could be thought of as an angry Jehovah who sent pestilences until He was propitiated by the smell of a burnt offering, it was possible to imagine that the just anger of an offended God could be met by the sacrifice of an innocent victim.

The fall of man and the redemption by blood therefore in a measure go together, and may be said to constitute the backbone of Evangelical Christianity, which in some of its crude and revivalistic forms always lays great stress upon blood and its potent redeeming efficacy.

But all this is much older than Christianity, and it is clarifying to realise how these strange doctrines, preached even at this day, represent a survival of religious beliefs held five or six centuries before the Christian era.

In those admirable translations of Euripides with which Professor Gilbert Murray has delighted the heart not only



of scholars but of at least one student of science, we find in his notes on *The Bacchæ* the following passages:—

“A curious relic of primitive superstition and cruelty remained firmly embedded in Orphism—a doctrine irrational and unintelligible, and for that very reason wrapped in the deepest and most sacred mystery: a belief in the sacrifice of Dionysus himself, and the purification of man by his blood.

“It seems possible that the savage Thracians, in the fury of their worship on the mountains, when they were possessed by the god and became ‘wild beasts,’ actually tore with their teeth and hands any hares, goats, fawns, or the like that they came across. There survives a constant tradition of inspired Bacchanals in their miraculous strength tearing even bulls asunder—a feat, happily, beyond the bounds of human possibility. The wild beast that tore was, of course, the savage god himself. And by one of those curious confusions of thought, which seem so inconceivable to us and so absolutely natural and obvious to primitive men, the beast torn was also the god! The Orphic congregations of later times, in their most holy gatherings, solemnly partook of the blood of a bull, which was, by a mystery, the blood of Dionysus Zagreus himself, the ‘Bull of God,’ slain in sacrifice for the purification of man.

“It is noteworthy, and throws much light on the spirit of Orphism, that, apart from this sacramental tasting of the blood, the Orphic worshipper held it an abomination to eat the flesh of animals at all. . . . It fascinated him just because it was so incredibly primitive and uncanny; because it was a mystery which transcended reason!”<sup>1</sup>

Professor Murray seems to think it hard for a modern to contemplate the victim and the priest as in any sense one person, but orthodox religious people will experience no difficulty, as is evidenced by the line they are accustomed to sing:—

“Himself the Victim and Himself the Priest,”

which, it must be admitted, forms a curious parallel; though the meaning is simple and legitimate enough, namely, that the sacrifice is voluntary: else, indeed, were it mere execution. But a few strange hymns are more worthy of the worship of Dionysus, at least in some of its older and more primitive and purer forms, than of a place in a church-service (A. & M.) collection of to-day. These hymns emphasise, for the edification of the laity, the more barbarous concomitants of sacrificial and vicarious redemption, by blood drawn from and pain inflicted on an innocent victim who is likewise a god.

<sup>1</sup> The Editor has called my attention to an interesting article on a similar subject, by Dr Farnell, in the last number of the *Hibbert Journal*, p. 320.

Sometimes the blood is represented as being used for cleansing purposes :—

“ Oh, wash me in Thy precious blood.”

Sometimes it is described as a vivifying draught :—

“ May those precious fountains  
Drink to thirsty souls afford ” ;

but pagan precedents are closely followed, and pagan survival is clear.

The idea of sacrificial suffering judicially self-inflicted by a wildly vengeful Deity is an essential element in popular theology :—

“ He, Who once in righteous vengeance  
Whelmed the world beneath the flood,  
Once again in mercy cleansed it  
With His own most precious Blood,  
Coming from His throne on high  
On the painful Cross to die.

“ We were sinners doomed to die ;  
Jesus paid the penalty.”

It is more like a legal fiction or commercial transaction than a natural process.

“ Scourged with unrelenting fury  
For the sins which we deplore,  
By His livid stripes He heals us,  
Raising us to fall no more.”

“ Had Jesus never bled and died,  
Then what could thee and all betide  
But uttermost damnation ? ”

This sort of crude materialism naturally leads to a kind of idolatry :—

“ Faithful Cross, above all other,  
One and only noble Tree,  
None in foliage, none in blossom,  
None in fruit thy peer may be ;  
Sweetest wood, and sweetest iron ;  
Sweetest weight is hung on thee.

“ Thou alone wast counted worthy  
This world's ransom to sustain,  
That a shipwrecked race for ever  
Might a port of refuge gain,  
With the sacred Blood anointed  
Of the Lamb for sinners slain.”



Suppose, however, that the belief in the efficacy of sacrifice is old, and that our form of it has a long ancestry which may be traced : that need not undermine its essential truth ; it will only mean that humanity had glimpses of truth earlier than the full revelation, and the familiar doctrine of “types” will be appealed to.

In certain beliefs, such as that of immortality, I should myself allow the argument to have weight, and should not be unwilling to appeal to the antiquity of human tradition as tending in favour of some sort of truth underlying this perennial and protean faith ; and so in the matter of vicarious punishment and bloody atonement by an innocent victim or by an incarnate god for the sins of humanity, if we could feel a real and helpful truth underlying it, we might admit that the antiquity of the tradition was even in its favour. But it cannot be that *all* religious creeds, without exception, which are inherited from barbarous times have a true ethical significance : some of them must surely be mistaken, and it becomes a question which of them we may retain and from which we must gradually seek to emancipate ourselves. I would not be in the least dogmatic in such a matter, but surely it is generally recognised that although the sufferings and violent death of Christ were natural consequences of His birth so far in advance of His age, and although the pity and horror of such a ghastly tragedy has a purifying and sacramental influence, yet we are now unable to detect in it anything of the nature of punishment, nor do we imagine for a moment that an angry God was appeased by it, and is consequently disposed to treat more lightly the sins of men here and now, or any otherwise than as they have always been treated by a constant, steadfast, persevering Universe.

Nor can we suppose that leaders of theologic thought are able to derive satisfaction from the more modern doctrine (perhaps, for all I know, a heresy) that it was not so much an infinite punishment as an infinite repentance that was efficacious ; so that, adequate repentance having been achieved

once for all long ago, sinners have nothing further to do but to believe and acquiesce in it.

As a matter of fact, the higher man of to-day is not worrying about his sins at all, still less about their punishment. His mission, if he is good for anything, is to be up and doing,<sup>1</sup> and in so far as he acts wrongly or unwisely he expects to suffer. He may unconsciously plead for mitigation on the ground of good intentions,<sup>2</sup> but never either consciously or unconsciously will anyone but a cur ask for the punishment to fall on someone else, nor rejoice if told that it already has so fallen.

As for "original sin" or "birth sin" or other notion of that kind, by which is partly meant the sin of his parents, that sits absolutely lightly on him. As a matter of fact it is non-existent, and no one but a monk could have invented it. Whatever it be, it is not a business for which we are responsible. We did not make the world; and an attempt to punish us for our animal origin and ancestry would be simply comic, if anyone could be found who was willing to take it seriously.

Here we are; we have risen, as to our bodies, from the beasts; as a race the struggle has been severe, and there have been both rises and falls. We have been helped now and again by bright and shining individual examples—true incarnations of diviner spirits than our own,—notably by one supremely bright Spirit who blazed out nineteen hundred years ago, and was speedily murdered by the representatives of that class whose mission it appears to be to wage war against the prophets, and to do their worst to exterminate new ideas and kinds of goodness to which they are not accustomed. Fortunately for the race, they are only able to kill the body; the soul, the inspiration, the germ of a new and higher faith, seems for ever beyond their grasp.

But now that orthodox people enthusiastically recognise His supreme goodness, they take steps to deny that He

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xxiv. 46; xii. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. xxv. 25.



was effectively man,—only half man say some, only quarter man say others: human only on one side they feel He must have been, else He could not have been so good, so wise, so patient. So the hope of a higher humanity is to be taken from us, in order that man's sins may be superhumanly atoned for and an angry God illogically appeased.

Well, well! demi-gods were common enough in those days; and again it may be said that the antiquity of the belief is to its credit, and that the tales of the gods<sup>1</sup> were but crude heraldings of a divine truth some day to be made clear.

But why, why, what is the good of it? Can a divine spirit not enter into a man born of two parents? Is divine inspiration to be limited to a being of exceptional parentage? If we grant that it is a physiological condition towards or at which the race should aim, if we suppose that some day we shall have one parent only, and that that is to be our apotheosis, there would be meaning in it. In that case Christ would indeed be the first-fruits, and would represent some unknown possibility in our physical nature. But do people think that? And if not, what is the virtue of semi-parentage? If for a Divine Incarnation we admit human parentage at all, we may as well admit it altogether. If a taint is conveyed by inheritance from or dependence on human flesh—grossly built up by daily food of terrestrial materials and grossly cleared of refuse—that taint appertains not to fatherhood only, but to motherhood also; and the only way to avoid the imaginary stain is to postulate a being sprung like Pallas from the brain of Zeus—a pure embodiment of thought, a true psychological “conception.” That Christ possessed a divine spirit in excess, to an extent unknown to us; that He was an embodiment of truly Divine attributes,<sup>2</sup> which as thus revealed we worship, may be

<sup>1</sup> Familiar to the Jews during their Babylonian captivity and the Roman conquest.

<sup>2</sup> John xvi. 28; xvii. 4.

willingly admitted; that He represents a standard or peak towards which humanity may try to aim, is a tenable and helpful creed; but that His body was abnormally produced, even if it be the fact, seems to give no assistance. I derive no sort of comfort or intellectual aid from an idea of that kind.

For what is virgin birth? merely a case of parthenogenesis. It has been asserted, perhaps erroneously, that X-rays have the power to produce parthenogenetic development in some lowly kinds of ova.<sup>1</sup> It is doubtless thinkable enough. I would not say it is impossible, but that it is ethically useless. The lowest organisms multiply by fission, sexual reproduction comes in later as an improved form; but it comes in very low down—as low down as the higher plants—and exists throughout the main animal kingdom. Possibly at some other stage, or by some other process, it may be dispensed with. If so, it will be a biological fact of scientific interest, and, if ever applicable to man, a development of astounding social significance, but nothing more. There is no virtue in multiplication by fission, any more than there is vice in multiplication by sex. Both are superlatively interesting facts, like many other facts of science, and no one can say that we understand the extraordinary truth that a gentle warmth applied for a certain time to a sparrow's egg will result in a live creature breaking forth, which had not existed before, endowed with power to live and feel and grow and propagate his kind to the third and fourth thousandth generation. For some reason—a wise and good social reason—mankind, living in a crowded state, has surrounded the multiplication process with ritual and emotion and fear. No doubt this is absolutely justifiable and right, and, by experience, necessary; but it may in some cases have gone too far; and it seems to me to go too far when it denies that a divine spirit can enter into any body except one that has been produced in an exceptional way. Whatever the mysterious phrase “Son of God” means, and it probably

<sup>1</sup> *British Medical Journal*, 13th February 1904, p. 383.



means something mighty and true, it cannot mean that. A belief in that is materialism run rampant.

And yet even materialism need not be a term of abuse; for if matter be the living garment of God, as it certainly is the temporary raiment of man, and if the Divine Spirit be immanent in everything that exists, I do not say that a glorified materialism may not enshrine some elements of truth, when properly understood; nor would I seek to deny the benefit of sacraments, in spite of their curiously material character. But the vicarious expiation, the judicial punishment of the innocent, and the appeasement of an angry God, are surely now recognisable as savage inventions; though they have left their traces on surviving formulæ, which accordingly have to be explained away. And so likewise the superior virtue of a one-sided human origin, for any redeemer or exemplar of mankind, seems to me unworthy of a period of spiritual awakening, of a cleansing acceptance of the facts of nature, of a purification of the material universe by the recognised permeance of an immanent energising God, of whom we too are fragmentary, struggling, helpful portions.

II. What, then, are the Truths underlying the great mysteries connected with the appearance and work of Christ? Here I approach the positive part of my task, entering a region already flooded with literature; yet must I not shrink from an attempt to supplement negative criticism by such provisional and tentative positive judgment as I have been able to form, from the scientific point of view—the only kind of judgment to which I am entitled,—concerning the underlying Realities. No justification of this course should be necessary, because a fine jewel only flashes the brighter when turned about so as to expose every facet to the light; so I proceed without hesitation, though as briefly as is consistent with intelligibility, to set them down:—

1. Incarnation with Pre-existence.
2. Revelation or Discovery.
3. Continuity and persistent Influence.

The utterance of science on these heads is not loud and is not positive, but I claim that at least it is not negative. No science asserts that our personality will cease a quarter of a century hence, nor does any science assert that it began half a century ago. Spiritual existence "before all worlds" is a legitimate creed.

No science maintains that the whole of our personality is incarnate here and now: it is in fact beginning to surmise the contrary, and to suspect the existence of a larger transcendental individuality, with which men of genius are in touch more than ordinary men. We may be all partial incarnations of a larger self. Incarnation of a portion of a divine spirit therefore involves no scientific dislocation or contradiction, nor need it involve any material mechanism other than that to which we are accustomed.<sup>1</sup> For only the germ is derived from others; the body is built under the guidance of the indwelling, living, personal entity: it is adapted to and serves to display the features of that entity under the limitations and disabilities of a material aspect; as the epiphany of an artist's conception is restrained by the limitations of his medium, as well as by his lack of executive skill.

Granting, then, the advent of as lofty a Spirit as we can conceive, perfectly human on the bodily side, with all that that implies, and perfectly Divine on the spiritual side, whatever that may mean; what sort of result may be expected to follow?

Consider the position. Here is mankind, risen from the beasts, making gods in the likeness of its ancestors,—in something worse than its own likeness,—cruel, jealous, bloody gods, who order massacres of helpless non-combatants and cattle, the courts of whose temples and tabernacles are a shambles, served by a greedy self-seeking priesthood and by professional religious people who play to a gallery.<sup>2</sup> Into such a world, that is to say, a world with these general characteristics, in spite of occasional bursts of brightness and much homely

<sup>1</sup> John i. 12-14; 1 John iii. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. xxiii. 5.



virtue, imagine the thorough incarnation of a truly Divine Spirit, and what would be the consequences?

The immediate consequences we know. On the part of the priests, hostility and murder; on the part of the peasantry, curiosity growing into sympathy; on the part of a few earnest souls, love and adoration. But what in the long run would be the permanent consequences? Surely a discovery of the truer nature of God: one of the veils would be drawn aside from the face of Deity, and there would partially emerge, not Jehovah any more than Baal, but a Being whom it was possible to love, to serve, to worship; for whom it is possible to live and work, and, if need be, die. There would be the beginnings of a real at-one-ment between man and God.<sup>1</sup>

Observe that the influence exerted is exerted wholly on man. The attitude of God has changed no whit; there never was any hostility to be washed out in blood; He had felt no stupid wrath at the blind efforts, the risings and sinkings, of men struggling in the mire from bestial to human attributes; there was nothing to appease. But there was plenty to reveal: an infinitude of compassion, an ideal of righteousness, the inevitableness of law, the hopelessness of rebellion,<sup>2</sup> the power of faith, the quenching of superstitious fear in filial love; a real and not a mechanical salvation, no legal quibble, but a deep eternal truth. Let man but see the face of God, so far as it can be revealed in the flesh, and he will catch a glimpse of a Holy of Holies such as he had not conceived. The savage inventions of a jealous God who resents the worship of anything but himself, who thinks more of his own glory and dignity than of the creative work of evolution, who arranges that if people do not theorise correctly here and now they shall suffer eternal pain—all these ignorances fall into the region of blasphemous fables, henceforth to be promulgated by fanatics alone.

And yet let us be fair. The worship of Jehovah was based on a recognition of the majesty and sacredness of Law; an element nevermore to be destroyed. And as to punishment

<sup>1</sup> John xiv. 7; Mark xv. 38.

<sup>2</sup> John xvi. 8.

for wrong belief,—the notion of an eternal penalty attaching to discordance or dislocation between ourselves and the Universe of which we are a part is a true and luminous idea. When our beliefs are out of harmony with facts, when our theories are false, we are liable to act erroneously, and accordingly to suffer by conflict with inevitable law, even though we act in accordance with our faith, and so are not consciously wicked or infidel. The connection between true theory and right action is real and close, although very likely the commonest faults of men are due less to wrong notions than to weak wills; but the sins due to wrong theory are liable to be much more really deadly<sup>1</sup>; there is no wickedness so violent as that organised by the fanatic who thinks he is doing God service, nor is there any harm worse than can follow the footsteps of a well-meaning blatant fool. And the penalty is in a sense eternal, or at least æonic, for it is incurable except by mental and spiritual revolution. So long as wrong beliefs continue, so long there must be a sense of dislocation, a feeling of friction and of grit: the only remedy is to get right with the Universe. The sin and the damnation are co-eternal.

The law thus stated is no theologic dogma, it results from no arbitrary *fiat*, it is the commonplace expression of a natural fact. It is exemplified in the running of every piece of human machinery and in the working of our own bodies. Anything out of gear is a source of disquiet, of inefficiency, and of pain; health and happiness result from a restoration of harmony.

How the grit got into the cosmic organism may be a hard question; perhaps it has never yet been out: a narrow, temporal way of conceiving the matter—let it pass for the present. We could not have become what we are without it; and the word “grit” has acquired a forcible psychic connotation. After all, grit is only matter out of place; it has no intrinsic or absolute quality. Anyway we did not put it there; but it is our privilege to help to remove it. We are the artisans of creation, at least in this outlying planetary

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xxiii, 30, 34.



district, and a magnificent co-operation is our highest privilege.<sup>1</sup>

Almost every widespread doctrine has a meaning and enshrines a truth, visible when freed from its blasphemous accretions; and the doctrine of æonic damnation, even as too specifically interpreted by Athanasius, is a glimpse of the truth that whosoever will enter into the joy of the Lord must endeavour to understand rightly the cosmic scheme,<sup>2</sup> and that except a man get into harmony with Truth and Reality he cannot ascend to the destiny in store for him—he cannot be “saved.”

In the same way a germ of truth can be detected in that persistent element of popular theology, the idea of sacrificial suffering self-inflicted,—there *must* be such a germ, else the belief could not have proved itself of such “saving” power;—and even the current crudities of expression may have had their use, in this transitional age of the earth’s history—the geological epoch during which the evolution of man has been beginning—that uneducated age out of which we cannot yet be said to have emerged. The essence of truth contained in it would appear to be that the responsible task of evolution from animal to higher man, the struggle *humanam condere gentem*, could not be undertaken and carried through even by Deity without grievous suffering and agonising patience<sup>3</sup>; and this sympathetic shudder through the whole of Existence might well be parabolically expressed in terms of current altruistic sacrificial legend. Subject to proper interpretation, the legend has a meaning: the mistake lay in imagining it an expiatory transaction, instead of a natural and necessary process, quite unlike the alternate moods of fury and affection sometimes exhibited by a chief to slaves.

It was not a *bare* necessary and natural process, however; the aspects of Deity are so infinite that they cannot be grasped simultaneously. The personal aspect is as vivid as any of the others (*Hibbert Journal*, January 1903, p. 215),

<sup>1</sup> John v. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. xxii. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Rom. viii. 22.

and, from this point of view, the genuineness of Divine suffering, no matter how inevitable,<sup>1</sup> has always been recognised as a revelation of Divine and Fatherly love. The redeeming and elevating efficacy of such a conviction is manifest. The perception of something in the Universe which not only makes for righteousness, but which loves and sympathises in the process; and yet is no mere indiscriminate charity, weakly relieving man from the consequences of his blunders or stealthily undermining his powers of self-help, but a true benevolence, which healthily and strongly and if need be sternly convinces him that the path of duty is the path of joy,<sup>2</sup> that sacrifice and not selfishness is the road to the heights of existence,<sup>3</sup> that it is far better to suffer wrong than to do wrong:<sup>4</sup>—such a perception inevitably raises man far above “the yelp of the beast,” “saves” him, saves him truly, from æons of degradation, and enables him to “stand on the heights of his life with a glimpse of a height that is higher.” Selfishness long continued must lead to isolation, and so to a sort of practical extinction:<sup>5</sup> it is like a disintegrating or repulsive force in the material cosmos, while love is like a cohesive and constructive force. All this is no new doctrine, thank goodness! it has been preached and practised by the prophets and saints of the human race for generations—by some mighty ones even before the advent of Jesus of Nazareth. For that love is the quickening force of the spiritual universe, and that its fruition would lead to super-humanity, had been clearly stated before it was in the Fourth Gospel supremely emphasised; and the words put by the Socrates of Plato into the mouth of Diotima the prophetess of Mantinea<sup>6</sup> have a deep and growing meaning for those who have ears to hear.

<sup>1</sup> Luke xv. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. xxv. 21, 30.

<sup>3</sup> Matt. xvi. 25; John xii. 32.

<sup>4</sup> Plato, *Gorgias*, 469, conversation with Polus; and elsewhere.

<sup>5</sup> *Cecilia de Noël*, by Lanoe Falconer.

<sup>6</sup> *Symposium*, 192–212. Best translation in Myers' *Human Personality*, vol. i. p. 113.



A discovery once made by the human race is permanent : it fades no more, and its influence grows from age to age. We are now beginning to realise a further stage in the process of atonement ; we are rising to the conviction that we are a part of nature, and so a part of God ; that the whole creation—the One and the Many and All-One—is travailing together towards some great end ; and that now, after ages of development, we have at length become conscious portions of the great scheme, and can co-operate in it with knowledge and with joy. We are no aliens in a stranger universe governed by an outside God ; we are parts of a developing whole, all enfolded in an embracing and interpenetrating love, of which we too, each to other, sometimes experience the joy too deep for words. And this strengthening vision, this sense of union with Divinity, this, and not anything artificial or legal or commercial, is what science will some day tell us is the inner meaning of the Redemption of Man.

OLIVER LODGE.

# THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CHRIST.

THE REV. CANON HENSLEY HENSON, B.D.

I. THE historical criticism of the Bible has passed out of the hands of the specialists, and this, inevitably, for two reasons. On the one hand, the specialists have long abandoned the obscurity of "a learned language," and have described their methods and written out their conclusions in the vulgar tongue. On the other hand, they have brought under treatment not merely what may be called the outlying portions of the sacred heritage of Christendom, but the very citadel and treasury of the Faith. Accordingly, their work has become deeply interesting to multitudes of religious folk to whom critical discussions are uninteresting, if not repulsive, and who, under ordinary conditions, would never concern themselves with such questions as those now forced on their reluctant attention. We must add also that historical criticism has drawn into its service men who are not merely eminent specialists, but also bold and conscientious thinkers, and, not less, writers of exceptional skill and brilliance. The subtle charm of literature has united with the distinctive attractions of science and learning to commend to the notice and acceptance of the general body of more or less educated people the procedures and conclusions of Biblical criticism. Renan, Matthew Arnold, Robertson Smith, Wellhausen, Loisy, and Harnack (to name scholars who at once occur to mind) have invested even technical discussions with rare literary grace, and woven out of the immense accumulations



of knowledge which the modern savant has at his disposal, theories and narratives which, for their own intrinsic interest, can secure general acceptance in quarters where theology as such is sufficiently discredited. It needs no argument to demonstrate that, of all educated men, the official teachers of Christianity are most deeply interested in the conclusions, and therefore in the methods, of the critical specialists. In some sense they are themselves properly specialists, and they stand publicly pledged to advocate the cause of the Christian religion.<sup>1</sup>

The present writer has no other claim on the attention of

<sup>1</sup> I may be permitted to recall the words which I used nine years ago, when preaching before the University of Oxford in St Mary's. All that has happened in the interval but confirms the opinions I then confessed:—

"It will be sufficiently evident that Biblical criticism, in so far as it represents the honest application to the problems of Scripture of those intellectual faculties which are the only agents we possess for the solution of those problems, so far from meriting the suspicions of those who, as disciples of Christ, have the best cause for undertaking the study of the Scriptures, has manifest claim to their cordial acceptance. They seek the witness of Scripture: they cannot seek to any effect until the preliminary critical questions have been settled. Every approximation to such settlement helps their search. Biblical criticism is the true handmaid of interpretation. It is no dangerous ally, too powerful to be treated as an enemy, but an essential element in the Christian treatment of Holy Scripture. We who are religious teachers ought to accept it frankly and gladly. Nor need we be greatly disturbed if such acceptance involve the abandonment of many traditional beliefs. Every generation is responsible for its treatment of its own opportunities; it cannot shelter itself behind the decisions of the past. Thus it appears altogether irrelevant to object to the conclusions of modern research and legitimate criticism, that they do not coincide with theories of former ages, in which men neither possessed the knowledge nor were afflicted with the problems of the modern Church. 'Jesus Christ is the same, yesterday and to-day, yea, and for ever.' The vicissitudes of human history cannot affect the core of religion. 'Because I live ye shall live also,' He said. Discipleship finds its security where it found its inspiration, in conscious relation with the living Lord. The literary fortunes of the Canonical Scriptures cannot touch the life of Christianity."\*

In 1895 I seemed to be uttering platitudes. I have lived to discover in 1904 that some leaders of the Church of England and the whole of the clerical press regard such utterances rather as the shameless confessions of a dishonourable laxity.

\* The sermon on "The Church and Biblical Criticism" was included in the volume called *Ad Rem*, published by Wells, Gardner, Darton & Co.

anybody than that which may be permitted to a Christian teacher, set in no obscure place, but almost daily forced to bring his teaching into some kind of reconciliation with the knowledge which both his hearers and he himself possess. He makes no claim to any special acquaintance with critical science, but offers the few observations which are here set out to the candid consideration of fair-minded men, and especially to those who combine that character with the tenure of office in the Church of England.

II. The resurrection of Jesus Christ has, from the start of Christianity, been preached by the Church as the corner-stone of the Faith. "*If Christ hath not been raised, then is our preaching vain, your faith is also vain.*" St Paul's words stand at the very beginning of the history; they have been continually echoed throughout its course; they are reaffirmed with unlessened emphasis by the most conspicuous and authoritative representatives of Christianity of our own time. Schmiedel will command the general agreement of Christians when he opens his remarkable discussion of the "Resurrection and Ascension Narratives" in the *Encyclopaedia Biblica* with the statement that "the resurrection of Jesus is held to be the central fact upon which the Christian Church rests." He speaks the truth when he says that on that basis Christians build their conviction that the death of Jesus has saving power, that His supremacy over the Church is secure, and that all believers may look forward with confidence to an ultimate resurrection to a life of everlasting blessedness. Few, if any, will question his logical inference "that if at any time it should come to be recognised that the resurrection of Jesus never happened, the Christian faith with respect to all these points would necessarily come to an end." When, however, he proceeds to say that the basis on which Christians rest their belief in Christ's resurrection "consists in an affirmation regarding a fact in history which is known to us only through tradition, and accordingly is open to historical criticism just as any other fact is," then some of us are prepared to demur



to his statement as seriously defective. We ask for a delimitation of logical frontiers, and a definition of religious issues.

Bishop Harvey Goodwin, in his *Foundations of the Creed*, adopted the convenient plan of indicating the respective shares of Reason, History, and Faith in justifying the articles of Christian belief by setting against the clauses of the Apostles' Creed the capital letters R., H., and F., as the case demanded. The fifth article—"He descended into hell; the third day He rose again from the dead," and the sixth article—"He ascended into heaven; and sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty," are both marked H. F. "It may be maintained," writes the Bishop, "and some writers do maintain, that in this article history stands alone; that the resurrection may take its stand as a simple historical fact, certified by testimony as any other fact may be. And undoubtedly this view of the case may be speciously maintained, nor has the present writer any desire to weaken the historical testimony: let it be marshalled in all its strength, and the most sceptical will be compelled to admit its strength is very great indeed. But, when all has been said and done, we have to recognise the supernatural transcendental character of the fact with which we have to do; we have to acknowledge that we are in a miraculous region, and that ordinary historical testimony may therefore fail to manifest its full power of conviction, unless it can be supplemented by arguments belonging to a different department of thought, arguments resting upon that which is described as faith."<sup>1</sup> The Bishop, in a halting and circuitous fashion, is indicating that distinction between the task of the historian and the task of the theologian with which Loisy has made us all familiar. That distinction appears to me fundamentally reasonable, and upon its frank recognition must in the future depend the possibility of a self-respecting use of the traditional Creeds of Christendom.

<sup>1</sup> *Foundations of the Creed*, pp. 173, 174 (London, 1889).

Schmiedel draws the whole doctrine within the domain of history: his orthodox opponents draw everything within the domain of faith; but these domains are properly distinct. The Christian doctrine includes elements belonging to both; and necessarily, since historical investigation has no inherent connection with religion, and can at best but be ministerial to it, the essential element is within the domain, not of history, but of faith. Moreover, inasmuch as that element is essential, it is also unchanging and unchangeable. In the concluding paragraph of his article, Schmiedel comes near to admitting the distinction which is here insisted upon; and, if his language appears to fall short of what an honest belief in the Christian Creed requires, yet it may be argued with much force that it also falls short of what his discussion of the historical evidence properly implies. Be this as it may, I am here concerned not with the doctrinal inferences which may be drawn by Schmiedel or any other student from the historical evidence on which the fact of the resurrection of Jesus is affirmed, but with the bearing of that evidence on the doctrine of the Creed, which as a Christian man I profess, and as a Christian teacher I am required to expound.

In so far as that doctrine implies a statement of fact, it must be elucidated, not by ecclesiastical authority in any form, but by the patient and impartial labour of historical science. Whatever conclusions are by that method definitely reached are, in the only sense which the word can have in this connection, true, and being true, they must necessarily have a place in the Christian man's belief.

In so far as that doctrine is matter of faith, it must be elucidated by the spiritual experience of Christian believers, accumulated through nineteen centuries, and expressed in the tradition of the Christian society, and bringing fresh illumination to individual Christians throughout the course of their own lives. The Creeds would seem to have their most authoritative character as summaries of spiritual experience; so regarded, their antiquity and wide acceptance add greatly



to their religious authority, but these circumstances can add nothing to their value as statements of fact. That value is wholly determined by their fidelity to the evidence, which historical criticism must recognise and appraise.

The Christian Creed, then, may be regarded from two points of view: on the one hand, it is a summary of historical fact; on the other hand, it is an authoritative statement of religious truth; and these two aspects necessarily lend themselves to different treatment.

The authority of any historical statement, we repeat, entirely depends upon its character as a satisfactory inference from the evidence upon which it must be presumed to rest.

The authority of a statement of religious truth must be determined by its correspondence with, and fidelity to, religious experience. This distinction appears to be vital when the modern Christian attempts to appreciate the effect upon his belief of some recent developments of historical science. When he repeats the Creed, is he to hold himself as bound equally by the historical statement and by the doctrinal affirmation? Is he to recognise in the Creed a final decision on questions of historical fact, as well as an authoritative declaration of religious truth? It is this question which we propose to discuss in this article.

Christianity is often described as a historical religion. The specifically Christian part of the Creed is indeed mainly a list of historical facts, the facts of the life of the Founder of Christianity.<sup>1</sup> Now, if it be meant by the statement that Christianity is a historical religion, that, alone of all religions, Christianity has its essence and exposition in a Life, then the statement is true; but if it be meant that Christianity stands or falls with certain conceptions of the Founder's history which have undoubtedly been general within the Christian society,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Bishop Westcott, *The Gospel of the Resurrection*, p. 301 (5th edition). "Christianity is described as a historical religion because its teaching—in regard to its doctrines, its motives, its promises—is conveyed in facts. In this respect the Gospel is absolutely unique."

then the statement may be very misleading. We must ask what precisely we mean by historical fact, and we can but answer that historical fact is an actual occurrence certified by sufficient testimony. In the absence of sufficient testimony there may have been an actual occurrence, but it is incapable of being certified as historical; it may be affirmed on other grounds, as, for instance, grounds of theological inference,<sup>1</sup> but it cannot be proposed for acceptance as historical. It is evident that no official authority, whether sacred or secular, no consideration of sentiment, however natural, no ecclesiastical interest, however considerable, can possibly take the place of testimony in securing the historical character of any alleged occurrence. Now testimony, when it is to be collected and weighed after a very long interval, becomes an exceedingly doubtful basis of affirmation at best. No candid observer of human life can be under any delusion as to the intrinsic insecurity of human testimony, even under the most favourable circumstances. It may be satisfactory in every formal respect, and yet it may be vitiated by other considerations. When, however, the testimonies for any alleged occurrence are distant no less than eighteen centuries, the task of appraising them justly becomes extraordinarily difficult. It is, of course, a highly technical matter, and, as we all know, historical criticism has become during the last century, and especially during the latter part of that century, a distinct science with principles and methods of its own. Moreover, this science has become an essential part of the equipment of civilised mankind. It has been tested over a very wide area, and everywhere it has emerged successfully. All ancient literature is subjected to its methods, and only so is held to deliver its true witness.

It is not superfluous to emphasise all this, for there is too much vagueness of thought and of speech with respect to historical criticism and the legitimacy of its frank application

<sup>1</sup> This, perhaps, is the case with the Virgin Birth of Christ. The basis of the orthodox belief is theological inference, not historical evidence. In the nature of the case the latter could not be sufficiently provided.



to the sacred literature. Where results of such application are clear and final they have an absolute claim on acceptance; where they are doubtful, they can at least exact from a reasonable man suspension of judgment. In so far, therefore, as the Creeds are statements of fact, they are properly subject to the testing and, perhaps, the revision of historical criticism. In so far as they are definitions of doctrine, they have no direct connection with historical science, and must stand for judgment at another tribunal.

III. Is the resurrection of Christ a fact of history? The answer will be perhaps "Yes" or "No," according to the definition of "resurrection" which we accept. That Jesus Christ, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate, survived death in no impoverished ghostly state, but in the fulness of personal life, enfranchised from terrestrial limitations, and that He made His presence known to His disciples by convincing evidences, cannot successfully be disputed. Christianity itself attests with ever-increasing authority the resurrection of the Divine Founder, whose personal influence within the Church has been continuously shown by many infallible proofs, and is being shown still in the experience of believers. It needs but to read the New Testament in order to see that this fact of Christ's resurrection dominated the whole horizon of the earliest Christian Church. It is implied in all the original institutions of the Christian society—the Apostolic Ministry, the Sacraments, the Lord's Day. It has remained the core of the Christian religion ever since, and never more apparently than at the present time. No language could be excessive to describe the importance of this conviction, that Christ is living in the fulness of personal life. Now history can give to that conviction all the support which the nature of the case permits; it can certify the primitiveness, universality, and moral force of the Christian belief. It can trace its effects in a hundred directions on the life, literature, and institutions of mankind. Beyond that it cannot advance. Must more be insisted upon in the interests of the Christian religion? Is more really

needed in order that Christians in the future, as in the past, may hold fast to the truth of Christ's resurrection?

Unquestionably, it has been generally assumed that history is capable of certifying much more than this. Not merely the emergence, character, and effects of the belief, but also its origin in a miraculous occurrence in the region of physical fact, and many circumstances of that occurrence, have been regarded as historically certified. It seems to me that, with the application of historical criticism to the primitive Christian documents, much that has hitherto passed as fact may very probably be found undeserving of that description. It must be laid down as an axiom of discussion that the Creed can add nothing to the weight of the testimonies contained in the New Testament, which are not only prior in point of time, but also are admittedly the basis upon which the affirmations of the Creed ultimately rest. Now, when we examine the New Testament, we find ourselves confronted with conflicting evidence. There can be no doubt at all on this point.

Let any candid Christian read through the accounts of the New Testament evidence, regarded from very different standpoints, given, say, in the three great Bible Dictionaries which within recent years have been offered to the English public.

Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible* may be taken to represent a conservative standpoint.

Dr Hastings' *Dictionary* is not unfairly described as a "half-way house" between conservatism and an acceptance of critical conclusions. The *Encyclopaedia Biblica*—as all the world knows—stands frankly on a liberal basis. These Dictionaries will be found to offer different answers to the same questions, but in all of them there is no concealing the common agreement that the authorities are conflicting.

Professor Schmiedel's article on the Resurrection and Ascension of our Lord is certainly the most careful, learned, searching, and satisfactory discussion of the three.

Dr Sanday, in Hastings' *Dictionary*, gives the impression of shrinking from the real question, and his discussion of the



evidence is so cursory and slight that it is scarcely possible fairly to infer from his article anything as to his decision on specific questions at issue.

Dr Plummer, in the older *Dictionary of the Bible*, writes as a thoroughgoing conservative, and accordingly we know in advance what his conclusions will be.

The candid Christian, we say, when reading these statements cannot escape the inference that the evidence for the quasi-historical statements of the Creed is of a highly complicated, dubious, and even contradictory character.

Now this fact alone properly invalidates the position of these rigid theologians who would insist upon an acceptance of such a doctrinal definition as that contained in the fourth Anglican Article: "Christ did truly rise again from death, and took again His body with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature, wherewith He ascended into heaven, and there sitteth until He return to judge all men at the last day."

No man can be fairly asked to believe contradictory propositions, and, inasmuch as the same Articles require the three Creeds "thoroughly to be received and believed, for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture," it must be supposed that the intention of the Church of England is that belief of the statements of the Creeds should be conditioned by the evidence of Scripture, and that in those cases where the evidence of Scripture is doubtful or contradictory, the measure of assent implied in a formal repetition of the Creed should undergo a corresponding diminution. We say this must be assumed to be the intention of the Church, but we do not for one moment forget that the Church has never as yet consciously realised, still less openly confessed, that intention.

In truth, the necessity for doing so has never really arisen before the present age. Historical criticism is the youngest of the sciences,<sup>1</sup> and it cannot claim even such a measure of

<sup>1</sup> I do not forget that there is a sense in which, as Harnack suggests,

recognition as that which the older sciences have succeeded in wresting from the Christian Church; but the analogy between the course of events by which the conclusions of astronomy, geology, and biology have, one after the other, been, so to say, domesticated within the theological sphere, and the course of events by which the conclusions of historical criticism must undergo the same process, is, at every point, complete.

There are, we know, inevitably, three stages to be passed through: first, the stage of holy horror, righteous indignation, unjust procedures, oppression of individuals. The next, the stage of uncertainty, half-confessed doubt, a troubled conscience, an aspect of general confusion over the whole area of Christian teaching. Finally, a stage of dignified assurance, in which the tombs of the prophets are built, and a new Christian Apologetic is developed and energetically pressed.

We are, perhaps, hardly out of the first stage yet, but we may be sure that the whole cycle will be traversed, and that, within a shorter or longer period, historical criticism of the narratives of the resurrection will be found as compatible with Christian conviction with respect to the truth of Christ's victory over death, as we all now find the conclusions of what are called the "natural sciences" to be with respect to beliefs which at first they seemed altogether to overthrow. But we must come a little closer to our subject, and make our meaning perfectly clear by specific examples of the alteration in the current notion of Christ's resurrection suggested, if not required, by historical criticism.

IV. The earliest testimony to the resurrection of Jesus is that of St Paul in 1 Corinthians xv. There we have a list of six Christophanies culminating in that which effected the Apostle's conversion, and, following upon this, an elaborate discussion of the conditions under which resurrection had taken place in

historical criticism of the Bible is as old as the Gnostics of the second century, but for all the purposes of modern theological discussion, it is the case that historical criticism is a new thing.



Christ's case, and would ultimately take place in the case of all Christ's disciples. St Paul repudiates a materialistic conception of the resurrection, and develops his own notion of a "spiritual body," which shall have towards the "natural body" a relation comparable with that which exists between the seed and that which grows from it. He is meeting the objections of Greek thinkers, to whom the materialism of contemporary Judaism was disgusting, and he speaks with decision. "*Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God: neither doth corruption inherit incorruption.*" It is evident that St Paul considers Christ's resurrection to represent the norm of resurrection. Christ is "*the first-fruits of them that are asleep.*" We may legitimately, nay, we must inevitably, reverse the argument, and learn something of the conditions of His resurrection from what we know about our own.<sup>1</sup> The dissolution of the physical body in the grave will not, we are assured, hinder the process of resurrection in the case of Christ's disciples: must we, then, maintain that it would be *necessarily* incompatible with the same process in the case of Christ Himself? We turn to the Gospels, and we find ourselves confronted with another conception altogether. In St Luke's Gospel, for example, the risen Christ is described in terms which might seem to imply the precise contradiction of St Paul's teaching. The narrative is curiously detailed, as if designed to counteract an antagonistic theory. "*And as they spake these things, he himself stood in the midst of them, and saith unto them, Peace be unto you. But they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they beheld a spirit. And he said unto them, Why are ye troubled? and*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Milligan: "Our Lord's resurrection is the type and model of our own. . . . Whatever is told us of our own destiny must have had its analogy in Him. Were it not so, the whole argument of the Apostle Paul in 1 Cor. xv., and other similar passages of his Epistles, would be undermined" (v. p. 18). Cf. also Archbishop Temple: "It is quite possible that our Lord's resurrection may be found hereafter to be no miracle at all in the scientific sense. It foreshadows and begins the general resurrection; when that general resurrection comes, we may find that it is, after all, the natural issue of physical laws always at work" (*Bampton Lectures*, p. 197).

*wherefore do reasonings arise in your heart? See my hands and my feet, that it is I myself: handle me, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones<sup>1</sup> as ye behold me having. And when he had said this, he showed them his hands and his feet. And while still they disbelieved for joy, and wondered, he said unto them, Have ye here anything to eat? And they gave him a piece of a broiled fish. And he took it, and did eat before them."*

The question cannot but suggest itself, Is it possible that the author of 1 Cor. xv. believed all this? And if, as can hardly but be the case, the answer is that he certainly did not, then it follows that, to his mind, resurrection was quite conceivable apart from physical resuscitation, and that, so far as his doctrine goes, there was no importance in the empty tomb, which has figured so prominently in later Christian apologetics. Moreover, St Paul must be held to represent the teaching of those older apostles from whom he drew all the knowledge he possessed of the earthly life of Christ. Can we avoid the inference that the earliest account of the resurrection which circulated among disciples of Christ did not include the materialistic details which are so prominent in St Luke's narrative? But, it may fairly be pleaded, St Paul does refer specifically to some circumstances of the Lord's resurrection. He names as included in his preaching to the Corinthians both the burial and the rising on the third day, and he clearly asserts that these particulars were included in the tradition which he received. "*For I delivered unto you first of all that which also I received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures; and that he was buried; and that he hath been raised on the third day according to the Scriptures.*"

Is it therefore to be inferred that St Paul believed in "the empty tomb"? and does his mention of "the third day" really close the discussion as to that detail? At least it must be

<sup>1</sup> As an example of frankly irrational exegesis, the reader may read and weigh the curious note to Dr Milligan's well-known book, *The Resurrection of our Lord*, p. 241 (4th thousand).



conceded that the emptiness of the tomb does not seem to be required by his theory, and it is certain that, unlike later apologists, he gives it no place in his teaching. What bearing has "the empty tomb" on such an appeal as that which we find in Colossians iii. 1: "*If then ye were raised together with Christ, seek the things that are above, where Christ is, seated on the right hand of God*"? We are, it is true, often asked to accept the emptiness of the tomb in the garden as sufficiently proved by the procedure of the Jewish authorities, who could not have omitted to make use of so crushing a weapon against the Christians as that which the production of Christ's body would unquestionably have been. But a little reflection will show how trivial that kind of reasoning is. Not only does it assume the very point at issue—for, clearly, if the earliest belief in Christ's resurrection did *not* imply the resuscitation of His crucified body, then there could be no question of any such action on the part of the Jewish hierarchy as is suggested,—but also it misconceives the historical situation altogether.

"As a matter of experience," observed Bishop Westcott, "the popular conceptions of a carnal Resurrection very speedily overpowered the teaching of the New Testament in the early Church."<sup>1</sup> It would be truer to say that this victory of materialism had gone to great lengths within the New Testament itself. The emptiness of the sepulchre might conceivably be as little worthy of credence as the materialistic details in St Matthew xxviii. 9 ("*They came and took hold of his feet and worshipped him*") and St Luke xxiv. 36 f. (*cf.* Acts x. 41). But this is not all, or nearly all, that may fairly be urged against an insistence on the historical character of "the empty tomb." The serious Christian, seeking the authority for the assertions of his traditional creed where alone that authority has to be found, viz., in the Bible, has to make his count with formidable discrepancies between the resur-

<sup>1</sup> *The Gospel of the Resurrection*, p. 287. The essay quoted was written as long ago as 1877.

rection narratives. "The most important difference is as to the chief scene of the appearances. Was it Jerusalem and the neighbourhood, or was it Galilee? The authorities are divided. St Paul and the Gospel according to the Hebrews make no mention of locality. Mt. and Mk. throw the stress upon Galilee. . . . We have besides a Galilæan appearance described in Jn. xxi., and clearly implied at the point where the fragment of the Gospel of Peter breaks off. . . . On the other hand, all the scenes of Jn. xx. are laid in Jerusalem; and Jerusalem or the neighbourhood is the only locality recognised in Lk. xxiv."<sup>1</sup> Dr Sanday refuses the natural course of regarding these two versions as alternatives, and makes an attempt (which, however, he himself appears to regard as unsuccessful) to combine both in a single coherent narrative. Suppose that the serious Christian prefers what we must needs think is the more natural course of adopting one or the other of the localities as being the scene of the recorded appearances, and suppose, further, that, with Schmiedel, he selects Galilee rather than Jerusalem, following Matthew and Mark rather than Luke and John, can he be fairly blamed? And in the case we have conjectured, ought he to find in his Creed (or rather in its current interpretation) a prohibition of Schmiedel's inference, which for the rest seems sufficiently obvious, that "if the first appearances of Jesus were in Galilee, the tidings of them must have arrived at Jerusalem much too late to allow of examination of the sepulchre with any satisfactory results"? Finally, if so much be conceded, what becomes of the argument based on "the empty tomb"?

If we turn to the other Pauline detail we shall find a similar situation. "The 'third day,'" writes Dr Sanday, "is hardly less firmly rooted in the tradition of the Church than the Resurrection itself. We have it not only in the speech ascribed to St Peter (Ac. x. 40), but in the central testimony of St Paul, and then in the oldest form of the Apostles' Creed. It is strange that so slight a detail should

<sup>1</sup> Hastings, *D.B.* vol. ii. p. 640.



have been preserved at all, and still stranger that it should hold the place it does in the standard of the Church's faith." With the utmost respect I must demur to this statement as excessive: the resurrection pervades the whole of the apostolic writings, and to adduce the passages in which that fact is either directly affirmed or indirectly advanced would involve transcribing most part of the New Testament. The "third day" is once mentioned by St Paul, and, apart from that mention, is never alluded to throughout the Epistles. Nothing, however, turns on this. What concerns us is the nature of the authority of the statement in the Creed. Is the Christian, by virtue of his baptismal profession of faith, prohibited from questioning the historical character of this affirmation? It can hardly be denied that a strong adverse case can be made out. Schmiedel has arrayed the arguments with his usual lucidity, and although Dr Sanday omits them from his discussion, they are certainly cogent. Probably almost everybody would admit that no serious religious interest is at stake when historical criticism disallows this statement of the New Testament, but the principle implied in an acceptance of the critical conclusion, in spite of the specific assertion of the Creed, is of the first importance. The denial of that principle raises the gravest issues conceivable. Is the Christian teacher to enter on historical and critical inquiries with the tacit understanding that he must always make his results accord with the authorised tradition? That would imply the total prohibition of such studies in the case of every self-respecting man. It is nothing to the point to enumerate examples of critical conclusions which have been disallowed by subsequent research. There is no finality, and there can be no finality, in the results of a science which is ever accumulating new materials and perfecting its own methods; but the first condition of progress is a severe loyalty to truth wherever it is perceived. Orthodoxy is always confronted by the dilemma, Either it can stand the test of free inquiry, or it cannot. In the one case it

stands in no need of external authority; in the other it has no title to its aid.

V. We have heard much in recent years of the restatement of Christian doctrine in terms acceptable to the modern intelligence and tolerable to the modern conscience. Perhaps there is some need for vigilance against a new hypocrisy which simulates liberal thinking by the easy disguise of vague speaking. It might be well if, in this respect also, Christian teachers cleared their minds of cant. Is the vital truth of Christ's religion really bound up with what have been oddly called "unambiguous historical statements," declared by historical science to be either doubtful, or false? Is the resurrection really inconceivable apart from the materialistic notions which current Judaism contributed to the earliest literature of the Christian Church? Is an honest belief in the resurrection really inconsistent with a reverent agnosticism as to the historical circumstances out of which in the first instance that belief arose? Is the faith of the Church in a Divine Christ, living, present, active, really "built on an empty tomb"? Must we accept the desperate conclusion that the religion stands and falls with the historical truth of the primitive notions as to its origin? Are the evidences of the fact that Jesus lives to be found in the past only? Was Matthew Arnold prophet as well as poet when he wrote those sad and haunting lines?

"While we believed, on earth He went,  
And open stood His grave.  
Men call'd from chamber, church, and tent;  
And Christ was by to save.

"Now He is dead! Far hence He lies  
In the lorn Syrian town;  
And on His grave, with shining eyes,  
The Syrian stars look down."

For myself, I prefer to believe that no such intimate and vital connection exists between the truth of Christianity and the traditional notions of its historical origins. Some



words of Bishop Westcott will serve to utter my own persuasion, and (as I think) to authorise the suggestions of this article:—

“The Resurrection was and is an abiding fact. It was the beginning of a new and living relation between the Lord and His people. He came to them while He went. The idea may be expressed by saying that the apostolic conception of the Resurrection is rather ‘the Lord lives,’ than ‘the Lord was raised.’ This important truth is entirely overlooked by critics who lay stress on the point that ‘there was no eye-witness of the Resurrection.’ It is impossible to see what we should have gained by the testimony of such a witness, or what he could have established which was not established by the intercourse of the living Lord with His disciples. That which had to be made clear as to Christ, was the reality of His new life. This was first established for the apostles by their complete experience of the continuity of His manifestation to them, and for the Church in all ages through the signs of His power. And it is here that the ‘proof’ of the Resurrection is to be found. Christ lives, for He works still.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *The Gospel of the Resurrection*, p. 294 (5th edition).

H. HENSLEY HENSON.

WESTMINSTER ABBEY.

## GLADSTONE AS A MORAL AND RELIGIOUS PERSONALITY.

THE RIGHT REV. W. BOYD CARPENTER, D.D.,  
Lord Bishop of Ripon.

MATTHEW ARNOLD declared that conduct was three parts of life. The obviousness of the statement is its danger: it may encourage shallow people to take superficial views of life. Three parts of man's life may lie open to the world, as three parts of a tree may throw itself above the soil; but the fourth part which is the hidden part has more virtue of life in it than all the rest. There is a hidden man of the heart, and Mr Morley's *Life of Mr Gladstone* may recall its existence.

The circumstances of Mr Gladstone's life are well known. He was born in 1809: he was five when the battle of Waterloo was fought: he was eleven when the long reign of George III. came to a close: he came of age in the year when William IV. ascended the throne: he was old enough to take an interest in Catholic Emancipation: he took his seat in Parliament as member for Newark in the year of the Reform Bill: he retired in 1894. His sixty-two years of parliamentary life teemed with questions of deep and abiding interest, and in all of them Mr Gladstone took a share, often a leading share, till in his later years he was recognised not simply as the leader of a great political party, but as the central national figure, the character which so filled the stage that others, great in their way, were overlooked—the Grand Old Man, of whom all, even his opponents, were proud.



To read Mr Gladstone's life thus as simply a political career which closed in a popular success (which few in English history have attained) is not to know Mr Gladstone. Behind his political life there was his literary life, with its ardent Homeric studies, his delight in Dante, his translation of Horace, his Latin and Greek versions of familiar hymns. Behind it also were those studies which perhaps more than any others fascinated his mind—the ecclesiastical and theological studies which resulted in his essay on Church and State, and his pamphlets on the Vatican decrees, in *The Impregnable Rock of Scripture*, and in his *Studies on Butler*. But beneath all this busy political and strenuous intellectual life, there was the life which he would have acknowledged to be the highest of all,—the life of the soul, with its claims, its responsibility, its demand for nourishment, and its sovereign place in the empire of conscience and of conduct. This human life has, like the earth's crust, its strata, and none of these must be ignored by us if we would understand Mr Gladstone: we must endeavour to estimate in due proportion the influences in Mr Gladstone's life; for only so can we judge justly of, or learn wisely from, the life of one who filled so large a space in the English story of last century.

Mr Morley has shown a judicious and kindly reticence on many matters: he has not told us everything, but he has given us, with a sufficient fulness and in wise and sympathetic proportion, evidence of the qualities which combined to give strength, versatility, and originality to Mr Gladstone's character. We can follow the scenes of political struggle; but we can also form some idea of the man, whose mind, character, and spiritual nature were growing in the midst of a life of ceaseless and singular activity.

It is not of Mr Gladstone the politician that I am called upon to write. His place among the great men who lived

“To clutch the golden keys,  
To mould a mighty state's decrees,  
And shape the whisper of the throne,”

will not be settled for many years to come, and will hardly be determined by the men of this or the succeeding generation. We work largely in the dark, and who among men will ever rightly or finally determine his brother's place? Mr Morley has not attempted this impossible task: on the contrary, he has made us feel with more painful assurance than ever how vain it is to attempt a verdict upon the life and character of any public man. In the view of the rank outsider, the man of the street, who is sure of everything because he knows so little, criticism is easy, useful, remorseless. "Why does not the Prime Minister do this or that? If I were the responsible Minister I should soon settle these things." But life is too complex a thing and the currents and tides too strong for any man to say, "This will I do: that I will achieve"; for life with inexorable hand thrusts him to work other than he would choose, girds him and carries him whither he would not, puts far out of reach his cherished dreams, and bids him face drudgery; and thus it comes that the man who thought to weave the pattern of his life in fair colours finds himself compelled to labour at some rough homespun, and to hear the blatant world criticising him the while. Oh, the pathos of it all! Let the man in the street read Mr Gladstone's life: let him try to understand at least enough to learn the charity of silence.

But my task is not to deal with Mr Gladstone the statesman, either in eulogium or apology. I have not to trace out the line or mark the evolution of his political career, but rather to deal with those wide and wonderful human characteristics which, though often overlooked, supply the key to many a perplexing problem of apparent inconsistency in the lives of public men.

For the secret springs of action are within, and the influences which make themselves felt in a man's career are many of them antecedent to his public action; and although Mr Gladstone, like all really great minds, showed himself capable of moving forward and occupying new grounds



of thought, yet he, perhaps more than others, remained all his life under the influence of views which were settled early in his career. Mr Morley points out that in matters theological Mr Gladstone practically never changed his position from that which he deliberately adopted in his comparative youth.

There are some minds which are possessed of one dominant idea, which, like the keynote of a song, governs all that follows. Mr Gladstone, if we are to accept his own view, was early brought under the spell of one dominant idea,—the idea of the Church. It will be well, accordingly, to notice the ecclesiastical trend of Mr Gladstone's thought and life.

First, of the strong influence which this idea exercised over him there can be no doubt, but I think even Mr Gladstone over-estimated or failed to understand the significance and value of this influence. It was strong, very strong.

Mr Gladstone had been brought up in a school of thought in which the idea of the Church held a place of slight, if not of insignificant, value. For all practical purposes it was a negligible quantity. The Evangelical school thought more of the soul, of its conversion, of its growth in holiness, of its discipline and training, of its preparedness for death, of its fitness for heaven, than of the Christian society in which those souls were united. If the Church presented itself to their imagination, it was rather as the great body of triumphant believers who would strike their songs of praise from their golden harps in the heavenly Jerusalem than of any society of men, knit together in visible unity upon earth. Doubtless there were Churches—so called—as the Churches of Scotland, England, and Rome; but these were convenient business organisations, from no point of view coextensive or conterminous with the true and invisible Church of Christ. Thus upon the growing mind of the child in Evangelical homes the impression was produced of the unimportant and wholly unrepresentative character of the Church as organised on earth, while, on the other hand, his imagination was appealed

to by the dazzling vision of a glorified Church hereafter. Now it belongs to youth to wish to seize its visions, realise them, translate them into concrete form ; and the transition of a youthful mind from the flat and prosaic ideas of the earthly Church, as embodied in the experiences of an English provincial town, to contemplation of the splendid sky of Italy, and the first vision of the golden glow of the dome of St Peter's, dominating the varied and venerable monuments of the Eternal City, suggested the possibility that here and now, upon earth, in visible form, the glories of the ideal Church might be realised. Mr Gladstone at Rome found his imagination fired with the vision of a Church visible, continuous, historic, partaking of that sanctity which, according to his earlier associations, could only be attained by the glorified Church hereafter. Mr Gladstone was not the first nor the last whose generous imagination has endowed earthly organisations with a heavenly splendour ; and let no man quarrel with the fine faculty which can see the ideal beneath the dull and muddy vesture of things earthly : it would be a poor world indeed if we could not sometimes trace divine footsteps on the squalid highways of the world. The idealising faculty is no loss to the young : it is useful to all ; and it is harmful to none, unless it takes on the exclusive air of unchristian arrogance. To the ideal of a Church Mr Gladstone's eager and sensitive spirit paid homage : " In entering St Peter's at Rome (31st March 1832), he experienced his 'first conception of unity in the Church,' and first longed for its visible attainment " (vol. i. p. 87). Out of this conception there rose the vision of the possibilities for such a Church : it might become a society of the highest aims, existing solely for human good : it might be an influence, "interweaving with the whole human life, a pervading and equalised spirit of religion " (vol. ii. p. 159). This is a landing-stage or point of fresh departure in Mr Gladstone's life. We are able to trace the stages which preceded and which followed this crisis. His mother was a woman of warm piety ; but a strict



and exclusive dogmatism prevailed at home. D'Oyly and Mant's Bible was heretical: Unitarians and heathen were undoubtedly lost for ever. Such was what Mr Gladstone calls "the deplorable servitude of mind" which oppressed him for years.

Light had broken upon his mind when Mrs Milnes Gaskell said to him: "Surely we cannot entertain a doubt as to the future condition of any person truly united to Christ by faith and love, whatever may be the faults of his opinions." Here, he says, "she supplied me with the key to the whole question." The study of the occasional offices in the Prayer Book had aroused his interest in the question of the Church: "The figure of the Church arose before me" (so he writes) "as a teacher too," *i.e.*, besides the Bible. "It presented to me Christianity under an aspect in which I had not yet known it: its ministry of symbols, its channels of grace, its unending line of teachers, joining from the Head; a sublime construction, based upon historic fact, uplifting the idea of the community in which we live, and of the access which it enjoys through the new and living way to the presence of the Most High" (vol. i. pp. 87-88). Thenceforward he formed an "august conception of the Church of Christ." Personal friends also influenced him in this direction. But personal traits of character must bear their share in this development. It is interesting to notice that Mr Gladstone himself recognised these: "I had an inclination to ecclesiastical conformity and to obedience as such. I was not of a mind ill-disposed to submit to authority" (vol. i. p. 161). These confessions are full of interest, especially in the light of other matters which will be touched upon later.

But he did not share the attorney-like conception of the Church which has become fashionable among men of prosaic minds and shallow hearts. A noble imagination lifted Mr Gladstone's views above all the quagmires into which literalism plunges its devotees: he could look round upon divergences of views on these and other matters with a large and tolerant

eye. The strong individualistic background which his Evangelical training had given him was not thrown away: he still held his faith strong that religion was first and foremost a personal thing; and his happy experience in meeting with grave and beautiful lives associated with other forms of belief helped out his conception of that wide and bountiful love of God which embraces all within its tenderness and mercy.

We can thus trace the force of those undercurrents of thought and feeling which tended to mitigate the severer influence of what he considered a dominant idea in his life. The idea was always present to his mind, no doubt, but intercourse with Nonconformists, and experience of the facts of life, enforced some modifications of thought: these he frankly acknowledges; but the consciousness of the idea remained: the idea of a Church guiding and directing men and states appealed strongly to a mind which loved to feel the support of the assent of others, and which was ever ready to welcome authority.

The same readiness to keep authority undisturbed in her throne showed itself in Mr Gladstone's attitude of mind towards modern scientific thought, and what is called higher criticism. In the eyes of the modern critic Mr Gladstone must be regarded as an obscurantist, or at least as a traditionalist. Certain ideas had become inextricably bound up (so it appeared to him) with the deepest of spiritual truths; they had become part of the stock possession of thought to those who shared the supreme experiences of the Christian soul. The first chapter of Genesis was the record of fact: the Bible was as truly inspired when it dealt with facts as when it dealt with spiritual truths: the theory that the Bible as a spiritual guide was infallible, but fallible as a record of facts, was to him intolerable: he repudiated such an attempt to discriminate between the secular and spiritual elements in the Old and New Testaments.

"It has been a favourite practice" (I quote from an unpublished letter) "with some to say the Bible is infallible when the subject is religious, not otherwise. On this, as I think,



unsound basis, the sacrifice of Isaac is infallible, but the Deluge may be a fable.

"I deplore, and even resent, the application of this principle to the first chapter of Genesis: first, because it seems to me to be addressed to very high religious purposes, and without it, what becomes of creation? Secondly, because in my most firm conviction that wonderful chapter is of itself a distinct and striking proof of Divine Revelation.

"I do not believe in this distinction of sacred and secular subject-matter, nor indeed in any formula known to me; but dear old Bishop Butler is my great oracle, and on this question, as on most others, supplies me with sufficient solutions, and enables me to contemplate with full content the overwhelming affirmative evidences of the Divine hand in Holy Scripture, without having a recipe for untying every knot."

This letter appears to me eminently characteristic. The deep reverence for the book whose practical inspiration he realised throughout his own life forms the closing thought of a statement which critical experts will probably find to be astonishingly inconclusive. The truth was, as Mr Morley justly remarks, that in certain directions Mr Gladstone had no intellectual curiosity. He had, Mr Morley tells us, little interest in metaphysics, but "a still more singular limitation on the extent of his intellectual curiosity was in the direction of science. . . . From any full or serious examination of the details of the scientific movement he stood aside, safe and steadfast within the citadel of Tradition" (vol. i. p. 209). "In every field of thought and life he started from the principle of authority: it fitted in with his reverential instincts, his temperament, above all, his education" (vol. i. p. 202).

It is proverbially difficult to classify human minds, but it will readily be admitted that Mr Gladstone did not belong to that class of ardent souls, imperiously exacting in the matter of intellectual honesty, to whom truth found like precious ore in its virgin bed is the first and supreme necessity; but neither can we class him among those who wilfully deceive themselves,

declaring that they survey the whole field of truth with open eye, while they deliberately limit their field of vision. Mr Gladstone belonged rather to that class of men who, finding the soul-satisfying character of certain spiritual principles, feel that nothing can or ought to shake their convictions, and that excursions into uncongenial regions, especially if such excursions seem to put accepted principles into doubt, are for them needless, and probably mischievous. He felt uneasy respecting scientific investigation: he felt uneasy respecting modern critical methods: he did not want to look into other fields of vision: within the field of vision which was his own he had found a star which had given him light: he would do nothing which might obscure to him that light. What need was there to look through other glasses? No fresh discoveries could quench the light of the star which had shone on him.

To this degree Mr Gladstone may be reckoned among the obscurantists; but the clear perception of one great and saving principle protected him from falling among the ranks of those vulgar obscurantists who make the name of religion a reproach among all who seek for and love the truth. Mr Gladstone saw the fatal snare which waited upon Churches,—the danger of divorcing orthodoxy from ethics, theology from life. “There is,” he says, “one proposition which the experience of life burns into my soul; it is this, that man should beware of letting his religion spoil his morality.”

The dread of this spoiling of morality at the bidding of religion made it impossible for Mr Gladstone to join with the rank and file of the unworthy obscurantists: it was the clear perception of this principle which probably enabled him to give welcome to a book which the religious world received with a clamour of denunciation. Mr Gladstone’s notice of *Ecce Homo*, which appeared in *Good Words* when healthy-minded Dr Norman Macleod was its editor, must have surprised many who knew, or thought they knew, the firmness of his religious opinions. The religious world, in Mr Gladstone’s view, had for some time past been making what might be called “proud



flesh": it was wholesome and well that a sharp instrument should be brought into use. *Ecce Homo* cut right across the self-satisfied orthodoxy of shallow religion.

Thus Mr Gladstone's interest in *Ecce Homo* was mainly due to the fact that it touched the question of the possible divorce between faith and practice, between intellectual belief and personal loyalty to the conclusions of faith; but with anything which appeared to him to break down the ancient and venerable walls of Bible authority he had little or no sympathy. He could not forbid the incursions of modern criticism, but he could attack the invading foe. When he thought he could discern a loose joint in their harness, he attacked with vigour and a fine display of force. When he could not assail, he could ignore; but whether he attacked or was silent, he was pained that what he regarded as sacred territory should be trodden down by the foot of an invader.

We shall, perhaps, best understand this pain if we realise how deep was the reverence with which Mr Gladstone regarded what, perhaps, we may call the Holy of Holies of human life. For not, as I read him, the idea of a Church, splendidly as this appealed to his imagination, exercised over his soul the same deep abiding power as did that conception of religion, as a personal matter, which he learned at his mother's knee. To touch this was to lay hands upon the ark of God: to take away any of its supports was to rob the soul of its confidence and its hope. Though Mr Gladstone cast off some of the enslaved notions of his youth, and revelled in the vision of a spiritual society visible on earth, yet the strong individualising sense of religion which he owed to Evangelical influences never deserted him. In his way of using the Bible, in his interest in expository preaching, in his habits of careful self-scrutiny, he was Evangelical to the last.

It is always a task of extreme delicacy to treat of those inner aspects of religious life which can only rightly be viewed by the mind which knows all; but in the present case to pass it over in silence would be to let the very heart of the

biography drop out of sight. Mr Morley tells us that this religious temper was the key to Mr Gladstone's life. "All activities were in his own mind one. This, we can hardly repeat too often, is the fundamental fact of Mr Gladstone's history. Political life was only part of his religious life. It was religion that prompted his political life. It was religious motive that through a thousand avenues and channels stirred him and guided him in his whole conception of active social duty" (vol. i. p. 200). Mr Morley's narrative adequately justifies this statement. But our interest is to represent to ourselves the features of this religious temper. Mr Gladstone was brought up in Evangelical surroundings: the best religious life in Liverpool in the early decades of the nineteenth century was Evangelical.

If the two Rectors of Liverpool belonged to the dignified section of the clergy who looked upon zeal as indecent, the daughter churches were being filled with men who had caught the spirit of Evangelical zeal. After Oxford and after his foreign trip ecclesiastical conceptions took hold of his imagination. But in spite of these influences, in spite of the adoption of views which were high church, and of widened judgments on some matters, the methods of his personal inward religious history were those of the Evangelicals among whom he had been brought up. He never ceased to use the Bible as they used it. His mode of regarding and resting upon texts carries us back to William Wilberforce. He draws ceaseless comfort and renewed strength from Bible thoughts and Bible promises. Metaphorically speaking, he sleeps with the Bible under his pillow. "On most occasions of very sharp pressure or trial, some word of Scripture has come home to me as if borne on angels' wings. Many could I recollect. The Psalms are the great storehouse. Perhaps I should put some down now, for the continuance of memory is not to be trusted. In the winter of 1837—Psalm 128. This came about in a singular manner, but it would be a long story to tell." He then enumerates other occasions on which some special passage of Scripture



brought to him the message of strength or comfort. Most of these are connected with some critical moment in his political life, such as a speech on the Budget. And this appropriation of inward strength from Bible words does not belong to one era of his life: what he found helpful in 1837, he found helpful thirty years later. If the thought of God as the strength of his health, who had covered his head in the day of battle, sustained him in the Oxford contest of 1847, the Bible consoled him in the Oxford defeat in 1865. And to the last his interest in the Bible and Bible studies did not forsake him. It would be easy to criticise the fitness to the occasion of the passages which brought a healing message to Mr Gladstone's mind. At times they may seem to us irrelevant and inapplicable,—at times as we read we are conscious of a feeling of grotesqueness, and the conviction that only a mind singularly deficient in the sense of humour could have applied them to the occasion. But in experiences of this kind no man can judge for another: to understand we must be able to conjure up not only the immediate circumstances out of which the life-crisis arose, but we must be able to share in all inner crises of the mental and moral history of the soul which is impressed. In matters of this kind the heart knows its own need and its own bitterness; and it would be easier to tell why one scent borne on the air fills the mind with the joy of old memories, and another awakens none, than to understand why some simple words which call forth no response from one man come with a power to soothe or stir to new courage the heart of another.

Another practice dear to the Evangelical of that day was long and cordially approved by Mr Gladstone: this was the practice, now almost obsolete, of preaching expository sermons. He writes thus in 1891:—

“I feel so much the force of what your lordship says on the knowledge and exposition of Scripture, that I am tempted to mention what was said to me in my early youth by Bishop Lloyd, a kind friend, a remarkable man, and decidedly a

conservative personage. He said, ' My recommendation to my clergy is that for their second sermon they should open their Bibles and expound one of the lessons or Scripture passages of the day.' "

Let me give another trait,—his habit of asking God's blessing at meal-time. Mr Gladstone was a member of a London club, select and numerically small. The club was one which had no dwelling-place; but the members met to breakfast and dine together. One evening at dinner a veteran of the club addressed a new member and said, " Mr Gladstone is the only member of the club who says grace when he presides at dinner." Here is a witness of the way he obeyed at eve the voice obeyed at prime. But not only in outward act of reverence or grateful acknowledgment, but in the inward habit of the soul, did Mr Gladstone show the abiding power of the early training. Mr Morley gives us extracts from Mr Gladstone's diary: in these we find evidence of the spirit of vigilant self-watchfulness which recognises that religion is a personal matter between God and the soul. We are in the presence of a heart which realises the seriousness of life, and therefore also the claims of the inward life upon all those who desire to make the Christian calling a personal and practical reality.

" On this day," he writes in his diary (1832), " I have completed my twenty-third year. . . . I wish that I could hope my frame of mind had been in any degree removed from earth and brought nearer to heaven, that the habit of my mind had been imbued with something of that spirit which is not of this world. I have now familiarised myself with maxims sanctioning and encouraging a degree of intercourse with society, perhaps attended with much risk. . . . Nor do I now think myself warranted in withdrawing from the practices of my fellow-men, except when they really *involve* an encouragement of sin, in which case I do certainly rank races and theatres."

This, we feel at once, is just the class of reflection in which one brought up in the old Evangelical dread of the world, of



society and its fashionable pursuits, would write when he had begun to find that he must, unless he would go out of the world, keep company with people whose modes of life differed from his own. We recognise the hesitations of soul: we can scent the austere air to which he was habituated. Cards, racing, theatres, belong to the world: they are dangerous, if not pernicious: the very tone of society is a thing to beware of: life and time are serious things: sin lies in frivolity, and the soul may meet loss in hours spent in amusements which, if not sinful, are at least dangerously exciting and wholly unprofitable. The stern sense that unused opportunities will rise to condemn men had always been with him: the realisation that work should arise from principle, not from sheer necessity only, is vivid before his mind. We open his diary 1833: it is again his birthday. The same spirit is disclosed. He speaks of "business and political excitement a tremendous trial, not so much alleviating as forcibly dragging down the soul from that temper which is fit to inhale the air of heaven" (vol. i. p. 109).

Five years later, when the excitements of political life were high, he warns himself that insensibility to flattery is not a guarantee of spiritual progress; it may be "a dangerous state; indifference to the world is not love of God" (vol. i. p. 146).

If from these personal reflections we turn to Mr Gladstone's life, we find the determination to put religion first in all that he did. This is strikingly exhibited in his young life, particularly in times when pressing and important crises might have excused him from an over-scrupulous carrying out of his self-imposed plan of duty. But the stern sense of the religious character of duty kept him faithful to his ideal. We may note this in the way in which he spent his Sundays. Thus on the Sunday before he went in for examination in the final schools, we find that he was three times at chapel, read his Bible, heard an "admirable sermon on Bethesda which could not have been more opportune if written on purpose for those who are going into the schools." Thus, though the great trial was to take place the next day, and he felt timid, utterly and miserably

unequal to the severity of its demands, he abated no whit of his religious habit, and stole no time from devotion. But it is not so much the special action which is of interest as the habit of self-discipline and of self-vigilance. Life to Mr Gladstone was serious, and equally serious to him was the character and the regulation of those inward dispositions which go to its making.

Mr Gladstone was a religious man, deeply possessed of the spirit of that experimental religion which has been for long a recognised heritage of the English-speaking race: he was a man personally religious, and he was a political leader among a people who, if not always personally religious, yet publicly recognise and value religious-mindedness. Yet, though Mr Gladstone may be thus described as a religious man aspiring to lead a religious people, it must be acknowledged that as a whole the people did not trust him. They knew him, they admired him, they recognised the magic of his voice, they hung upon his lips, they cheered him to the echo, but they did not trust him as they trusted men who were as far his inferiors in gifts as they were in moral fervour. This may be called the paradox of Mr Gladstone's life; and it cannot fail to awaken many questions, if it does not present an almost insoluble problem.

One answer may be given. The great British public admire genius, but they do not trust it. The very possession of that versatile power which can throw off dazzling images, and make familiar subjects coruscate with new light, the flexible ability which makes a man now an enthusiastic politician, now Homeric student, now an ardent controversialist, now a grave theologian, now a critic of recent novels, is too rapid in its movements to secure the confidence of the people: feats of legerdemain amuse us, but we do not feel drawn to trust the conjurer. Genius, moreover, is always dangerous: respectable dulness is safe, and safety is more important than the chance of success. Both the parliamentary leaders of the time were men of genius, but in their heart of



hearts the British public trusted neither: they trusted W. H. Smith more than they trusted Disraeli, and for a like reason they did not trust Mr Gladstone. Both were wizards, and crowds went to their shows, but when it came to confidence, the people never felt sure of a man when they "did not know where to have him." Mr Gladstone was a genius: he was a problem in 1860, and he continued a problem to the end of his days. This is one fact, and another is that England never has given her whole and unreserved confidence to any man of genius. The latent thought is that genius lacks ballast; or is the distrust of genius due to the fear of what genius may do, because of what genius has done in other lands? Is it the instinct which desires to safeguard public liberties which causes the distrust of every genius who aspires to lead? Perhaps it was well that Nelson fell at Trafalgar: had he survived, and had he consecrated his gifts to his country's politics, he might have won the suspicion of the English instead of their tears.

Nevertheless, there will be hundreds who, reading Mr Gladstone's life and discovering for the first time how profoundly his whole character and conduct were directed by religious conviction, will be disposed to reproach themselves, not because they differed from his policy, but because they harboured a distrust of his personal motives which was unworthy of themselves and unjust to their illustrious fellow-countryman.

But even if this idiosyncrasy of the British public be a fact, it does not fully account for the distrust of which we have spoken. We must seek for some other or additional reason.

Mr Gladstone's character has been called a Problem, and, according to one reviewer, the problem remains a problem even after all that Mr Morley has written. But is the problem so difficult of solution?

The problem, I suppose, would present itself to the mind of the man in the street somewhat in this fashion. "Here is a man who, from all accounts, is a good man, religious, devout, replete with moral earnestness, yet how is it that he seems

shifty, evasive,—displaying at times startling contradictions between word and action,—condescending to what appear to us to be perilous approaches to unworthy quibbling? We are compelled to admire him, but his inexplicable inconsistencies forbid us to trust him.” In writing thus I am only putting into words the thoughts which often floated through the minds of Englishmen when he was alive. Alongside the problem as it presented itself to many an average Englishman, let me place another sketch—not, indeed, of Mr Gladstone: this I should not presume to do, but of some other statesman who might or might not possess characteristics and qualities resembling Mr Gladstone’s.

Given a man of a naturally timid and reverent soul, who was brought up under influences which tended to deepen that reverence and to increase that timidity into a profound religious awe; given, at the same time, a versatile, quick, and omnivorous mind,—endowed with an extraordinary power of rapid assimilation, but not with that strenuous necessity to probe to final foundation principles,—with an imagination large enough and character noble enough to come readily under the dominion of ideals,—a mind, therefore, rejoicing in knowing much and many things, delighting in wide intellectual excursions, apt at appropriating fresh aspects of old matters; yet, from a native irresolution, intensified by a strong moral dread of making a mistake, bewildered by the ample materials for argument which his own affluent genius could array on both sides of any difficult question. Suppose that this man, being neither a philosopher with a few readily applied and strongly held principles, nor a more practical but perhaps less scrupulous man of action, who decides strongly and quickly without much laboured or anxious thought, has his lot cast amid public affairs in which rapid decisions are necessary. Can we not see that a man so constituted would often procrastinate with questions till the very moment when urgency demanded a Yes or a No? Can we not realise that such a man might often hesitate till the knock of necessity was



heard at the door? Can we not carry our thoughts further? The decisions arrived at under such conditions are charged with hesitations; they are decisions extorted by urgency, not reached through the happy sequences of strictly convinced thought: in such a case the sudden irruption of a new aspect of the question, the application to it of some unrealised moral principle, the connection with it of hitherto unconsidered circumstances, or its relation to other matters of equal urgency, might cause a mental revolution, and prompt to a change of course; hence the appearance of inconsistency which is not the inconsistency of dishonour, but of a high conscientiousness. Equally such a nature, when once and finally committed irrevocably to some decision which involved a definite line of policy, would not only marshal with rich imagination all the ample material of argument in favour of the policy chosen, but would be certain also to summon to its aid every moral consideration which could justify to his own conscience the decision which had been made. Here we should have a man, so anxious to be right that he would procrastinate decision, so anxious to be right that he could not ardently advocate any course on which his own moral approval did not shine, earnest to use life nobly, anxious to act in harmony with his own deepest moral and religious ideas, distrusting his own judgment, desiring ardently the support of other minds, capable of seeing as few others could how much might be said on both sides of a question, compelled to judge rapidly when he would fain have judged leisurely, yet deprived of the mental quality which was necessary to give him full confidence in his own judgment,—would it be wonderful that such a man should, because of his very gifts of conscience and mind, place himself in positions or follow courses of action which would bewilder supporters and opponents? Would it be wonderful that his speeches should be full of cautionary phrases and parentheses of reservation? These were the natural reflections of his own recognition of what might be said on the other side. They

would not be meant to deceive ; they would be the reservations which his own honesty of thought would require. If it be said that this analysis exposes the weakness of our imaginary statesman, be it so. What man is not weak ? Who has not some alloy mingled with his gold ? But call it weakness or what we please—and it may be so reckoned on the field of politics, yet under other aspects it may be regarded as strength,—surely the hesitations which are due to a timidity born of reverence, or to the capacity of seeing more sides of a question than one, are not dishonourable : they may be even virtuous ; and they are certainly more creditable to a man's character than are the crude certitudes and vulgar assurance of those who act without thought and without conscience.

It is difficult to speak too highly of Mr Morley's work. He has had to deal with an enormous mass of materials ; he has had to steer his way through the story of many difficult and vexed questions ; his cargo has been large, and the straits through which he had to pass were narrow and dangerous ; he was known to have strong convictions on many questions, and yet he was expected to produce a work which should not be partisan ; he had to chronicle the life of a great man with whose political aims he profoundly sympathised, but whose deep convictions on other matters he could hardly be expected to share ; he had to put a check upon his political sympathies, lest the biography should become panegyric ; and he had to give due prominence to those earnest religious beliefs of Mr Gladstone with which, as he himself tells us, he did not feel himself competent to deal. Out of the chaos of overwhelming materials Mr Morley has produced order, and the story which he has to tell carries us on without any sense of confusion, and with the intellectual comfort which is the highest tribute a reader can pay to a writer. He has—except perhaps in the last volume, where subjects come into notice which still arouse acute feelings—treated his subject with a dignified impartiality, and he has everywhere shown, even on disputed questions, that



courtesy of tone which disarms hostility. And on the anxious and important subjects which he has touched with a self-distrusting hand, he has displayed a ready and sympathetic appreciation, a just discrimination, a spirit of such kindly reverence towards the dominant Christian convictions of Mr Gladstone's life, as cannot fail to command the grateful recognition of all religious minds. On this last matter I cannot conceal my admiration. No subjects need such delicate handling as religious subjects, and no aspect of them such appreciative delicacy as those which touch the inmost recesses of the soul and throb with the pulsations of personal experiences; and yet on these experiences Mr Morley lifts the veil with as worshipful a regard for his great chief as though he were the priest of the shrine whose treasures he guarded with gladness and displayed with reverent delight. And when the last treasure has been shown, and the guardian lets fall the veil with pious and regretful hand, he presses upon us one memorial relic to treasure, as he cites Mr Gladstone's noble words: "Be inspired with the belief that life is a great and noble calling: not a mean and grovelling thing that we are to shuffle through as we can, but an elevated and lofty destiny." May I add another? When I read the story of the careful self-vigilance with which Mr Gladstone watched over the movements and development of the inward life, I see whence he derived the inspiration to believe in life as a great and noble calling, and I am tempted to recall for our own generation the lesson of ancient wisdom which this great biography so vividly illustrates: "Keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life."

W. B. RIPON.

THE PALACE, RIPON.

## MR MYERS'S THEORY OF "THE SUBLIMINAL SELF."

ANDREW LANG.

It is my wish to try to elucidate, but not to uphold, Mr Myers's theory of the "Subliminal Self." For this end I may perhaps be allowed to canvass Professor Stout's review of *Human Personality* in the *Hibbert Journal* for October 1903. From Mr Stout we obtain a clear statement of the objections which occur to a distinguished psychologist, lacking, apparently, personal acquaintance with the "supernormal" or "psychical" alleged phenomena which Mr Myers attempts to colligate and explain. My own position is between Mr Myers's and that of his critic. I have some personal knowledge of the alleged phenomena, and my sole desire is that they should receive the scientific investigation to which Mr Stout thinks that they have a claim. And I am convinced beyond doubt that there are the seeds of fire in the smoke of testimonies.

To be plain, Mr Myers believed in, and, like Malvolio, "thought nobly of the soul." He owns that his theory is like what a Chaldæan shepherd may have evolved in astronomy, or a monk in alchemy. He calls his psychology "palæolithic," taking the view of palæolithic man's ideas which has the support of M. Salomon Reinach as against M. Gabriel de Mortillet. In Mr E. B. Tylor's sense of the word, Mr Myers was an "animistic" thinker. He seems to have devoted much time to "the study of ordinary



psychology" (which Mr M'Dougall says he did not do<sup>1</sup>), and he explained, by ordinary modern psychological theories, all phenomena which he thought that they could cover. But he believed in many "supernormal" phenomena which they do not cover, and explained them by the soul or spirit, as, at least, neolithic man did. By a strange error of judgment, Mr Myers usually styled the soul "the Subliminal Self." Hence, as we shall see, arose much confusion among his critics, for which he himself is mainly responsible. However, his theory was, among other things, an attempt to show "a continuity," as Mr Stout correctly puts it, "between what are called 'psychical' phenomena and the normal course of nature recognised as such by common sense and science."

Mr Myers did try to show that these supernormal experiences were not so discontinuous as they seem with the normal course of nature, as recognised by science and common sense. Perhaps he erred, for between normal and supernormal there must be, one would think, a gap of some sort, in the nature of things; nay, if I understand Mr Myers aright, this was, at bottom, his own opinion. There is clearly a discontinuity, a gap not easy for Mr Myers to bridge over. For it must be remarked that, *ab initio*, he states his belief in his collection of alleged supernormal facts, and in a corresponding faculty, "beyond such as the life of earth, as they" (a school of psychologists) "conceive it, could foster, or an earthly environment supply."<sup>2</sup>

As to the meaning of "subliminal," Mr Myers says it applies to "thoughts, feelings, etc. lying beneath the ordinary threshold" (or "beyond the ordinary margin") "of consciousness. . . . *I have extended the application of the term to feeling, thought, or faculty, which is kept thus submerged, not by its own weakness, but by the* (normal) "constitution of man's personality" (vol. i. p. xi.). Mr Myers, it is essential to understand, holds that each human personality varies in

<sup>1</sup> *Mind*, p. 520, October 1903.

<sup>2</sup> *Human Personality*, vol. i. p. 11.

regard to its relations with the "Subliminal Self"—*using that term in his extended sense of it*. Most men have, as it were, no conscious dealings with this hypothetical Self; others, in greatly varying degrees, are more or less, but no mortal is entirely, amenable to its influence. Here we know in part, we see as in a glass darkly, "a fragment of a larger Self." To that Self, of course, even the things hidden in our ordinary subconsciousness are known. As a fact, we are beginning, thanks to Mr Galton, to understand that each of us differs, psychologically, from all others to an extraordinary extent. Mr Myers adds (and here Mr Stout, in part, seems to agree with him), "The conscious self of each of us does not comprise the whole of the consciousness or of the faculty within us" (vol. ii. p. 12). Now Mr Stout also recognises "subconscious or unconscious mental states and processes." These, however, are, he says, only "the results of mental traces or dispositions formed in the course of *the conscious experience of the ordinary self*," and their whole material is "developed from experience through . . . relation to earthly environment." The subconscious faculty recognised by Mr Stout he illustrates by the process of seeking to recall a forgotten name or word. We lose it, we try to fish it up, but our success depends on "conditions" (physical, I presume) "connected with the trace or disposition formed in the course of previous conscious experience in which the name occurred." We give up hunting for the lost name, the usual conditions then reorganise themselves on their old lines (I suppose), or "association" intervenes, and the lost name pops into our consciousness.

Now if Mr Myers attributed this ordinary recovery of the lost name to the action of the Subliminal Self which also performs or brings out "supernormal psychical phenomena," I should think him in all probability mistaken. But does he? I suppose that, if asked, he would have said, "The thought of the lost name, 'owing,' as Mr Stout says, 'to conditions [unknown] connected with traces formed in the



course of previous conscious experience,' has become *too weak to rise into direct notice*.<sup>1</sup> In this sense—the usual sense of the word 'subliminal'—the thought of the lost name is 'subliminal.' But in my extended application of the word 'subliminal' to a profounder faculty (as defined in my vol. i. p. xxi.), the recovery of the lost word is *not* due to subliminal agency."

If this correctly states Mr Myers's opinion, his essential error, as I reckon it, is obvious. He uses the already accepted word "subliminal" in two senses at least, one of them a new sense invented by himself. Now it means Mr Stout's "subliminal" or "subconscious" (limited); again it means the faculty (unlimited), not recognised by Mr Stout, but recognised by Hegel, the supernal faculty which produces super-normal experiences. If I am not mistaken, most of Mr Stout's objections rest on a very natural failure to understand that Mr Myers uses the term "Subliminal Self" in two distinct senses. Each and all of our experiences of sense exist, while we live, most of them lost in the dark abyss of the Subliminal Self as known to orthodox psychologists. This "Self,"<sup>2</sup> for the sake of clearness, I shall call "Subliminal Self I." But the supernal faculty believed in by Mr Myers is only so far akin to the "common or garden" Subliminal Self of orthodox psychologists, that it also is, as a rule, "below the threshold," or "subliminal." I shall style Mr Myers's supernal faculty "Subliminal Self II." The contents of Subliminal Self I. are submerged, Mr Myers says, because, as a rule, they are "*too weak to rise into direct notice*." The intuitions of the supernal faculty (Subliminal Self II.) are submerged, usually, "*not by its own weakness, but by the constitution of man's personality*" (vol. i. p. 21).

Mr Myers is responsible for a world of misunderstanding; he deliberately gave to a supposed supernal faculty (no new

<sup>1</sup> Cf. vol. i. p. xxi.

<sup>2</sup> The very word "Self" is a metaphor, and a mere metaphysical counter in the game of philosophising.

idea) the name which orthodox psychology reserves for a kind of mental lumber-room of things lost like the wits of Orlando. If Mr Myers had boldly talked of *his* Subliminal Self (II.) as "the supernal self," or "the soul," or "the X-self," there would have been no confusion. But there would have been much less seeming continuity between the ideas of science and common sense, and the phenomena accepted by Mr Myers.

As to the subliminal of "ordinary psychology," Mr Stout speaks for himself: "My conscious processes constantly set in operation processes beneath the threshold of consciousness, which in their turn give rise to new developments of conscious process. My conscious activity . . . always makes appeal, so to speak, to something else." *To what else?* My conscious activity, in writing this article, certainly does not make conscious appeal to the material processes and structure of my brain (about which I am ignorant), nor does Mr Stout *consciously* appeal to *neura*, and grey matter, and so forth. To what, I repeat—to what "something else"—does his conscious activity appeal? Say that he wants (as I once did) to find an hypothesis capable of colligating the recorded facts, a very odd collection, of the Persian feast of the *Sacæa*. Why, the puzzle ran, was a condemned criminal treated and clothed like a king for five days, and turned loose in the royal harem, and then whipped and hanged? If Mr Stout had wished to unravel this riddle, to what "something else" would he appeal? To "processes," I presume.

My conscious activity did not appeal to anything but familiar facts and analogies well known to me, and present to my conscious memory, and they served my turn. Mr Stout says, "In general, we take an utterly false view of mental construction when we regard it as a mere putting together of data already present to consciousness, analogous to the putting together of the parts of a puzzle spread out on the table before us." Mr M'Dougall also writes, "Myers, in fact, laboured under the not uncommon conception that



the ordinary idea or percept of the ordinary man is constructed from discrete psychical elements by a series of voluntary efforts, much as one might construct a mosaic or paint a picture, and this unfortunate error, which Myers might perhaps have avoided if he had devoted a part of his energies to the study of 'ordinary psychology,' is the principal ground for the assumed connection between the 'Subliminal Self' and genius, sleep, and sensory automatisms." Here I conceive Mr M'Dougall to make the same error as Mr Stout. Mr Myers did devote his energies to "ordinary psychology," and he took the ordinary psychological view of the ordinary psychological processes of the ordinary man. How this escaped his critics I cannot imagine.

On this point of the psychology of the ordinary man, I must make a distinction. As Mr M'Dougall and Mr Stout must know all about these things, I presume that, as they tell me, I do not solve a problem by consciously piecing conscious ideas into a mosaic. True, I am conscious that this is my vulgar way of working. But Mr Stout goes further, and writes, "The ordinary man, no less than the man of genius, may find that what, relatively to him, are original ideas develop while his thoughts are occupied with disconnected topics, or even while he is asleep." Speaking for the ordinary man, I find nothing of the sort. I accept the scientific averment that the thing occurs,<sup>1</sup> but not Mr Stout's averment that the ordinary man is conscious of such a startling experience as the emergence of the solution of a problem that he has temporarily abandoned, when he is thinking consciously of a totally different matter. If it be so, I can imagine a very easy explanation of the mystery of this experience. But, as an ordinary man, I have no such conscious experience. However, Mr Stout argues that, by virtue of the unconscious workings of his "something else," even an ordinary man may develop, for him, original ideas.

<sup>1</sup> Professor William James, if I understand him, denies it. Cf. *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. pp. 163-166 (1890). So do I, as far as my experience goes.

So does Mr Myers argue (though Mr M'Dougall and Mr Stout fail to record the fact) in the cases of men of genius—and of ordinary men. Genius, Mr Myers says, is “a power of appropriating the results of subliminal mentation, . . . ideas which he has not consciously originated,” which “rush up from the subliminal self.” This ought to satisfy Mr Stout, who grants, even to the ordinary man, the development of original ideas while his (conscious) thoughts are occupied with other ideas. The ordinary man’s “subliminal processes,” says Mr Stout, supply him with original ideas. Mr Myers, though Mr Stout does not say so, is quite at one with him about “the ordinary man.” Mr Myers writes, “I do not mean to imply that such” (subliminal) “mentation is *ipso facto* superior to supraliminal.”<sup>1</sup> The ordinary man according to his ordinary nature produces ordinary subliminal mentation, says Mr Myers, if he produces any at all : for one I don’t.

Mr Myers, though Mr Stout does not refer to the fact, has replied, in his way, to this argument about ordinary men, among whom he includes Haydon and Voltaire. He places their ordinary subliminal mentation in “the same *psychological class*” as that of Shakespeare, or of “genius genuine.”<sup>2</sup> Haydon and Voltaire, as much as Shakespeare or Wellington, enjoyed, says Mr Myers, “the same inward process . . . which draws into immediate cognisance some workings or elements of the hidden self.” “The so-called inspiration may in itself be trivial or worthless.”<sup>3</sup> There are subliminal (I.) uprushes, and subliminal (II.) uprushes : *Il y a fagot et fagot*.

Men, as I understand Mr Myers, are variously constituted as to their relations with the Subliminal Self (II.). Men are “thinking reeds,” as Pascal says ;<sup>4</sup> on some of which the wind of the spirit produces no effect at all (as in my case, and, I fancy, in that of most ordinary men), or, on other

<sup>1</sup> Vol. i. p. 71.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. i. p. 75.

<sup>3</sup> Vol. i. p. 77.

<sup>4</sup> “Man is a shaken reed in which the Soul  
That wind doth ever rustle and repine.”



ordinary men, it produces just effect enough to make Voltaire feel "devoured by his genius"—and say so—when writing his *Catilina* (not a good play); or, again, it may find an ordinary man so far amenable that it can show Haydon, "in a flash," a picture which may have been excellent (in the flash), but which Haydon's skill could not transfer to canvas. On the other hand, the Subliminal Self (II.) may find a man so happily constituted that he can not only feel the glow, like Voltaire, and see the picture by flash-light, like Haydon, but execute what has been "revealed" to him, what he has heard, perhaps, and display it to all the ages, with the success of Shakespeare or Æschylus or the Duke of Wellington.

If I understand Mr Myers, then, in regard to this certainly obscure point of original yet unconscious thinking, his Subliminal Self (II.) is successfully active in men of genius, unsuccessfully active in ordinary men. And here I am presumptuous enough to doubt the logic of a Professor of Logic in my own University of St Andrews!

Mr Stout, overlooking (as it seems to me) Mr Myers's full exposure of his own views about the Subliminal Self (II. and I.) and the ordinary man, writes, "I have already urged that all mental construction as well as all mental reproduction essentially involves the co-operation of processes which go on below the threshold of consciousness, and also that processes may develop themselves when the conscious activity which initiates them is discontinued." I must add—to complete Mr Stout's theory—"when the conscious activity is consciously occupied with some alien topic." *C'est là le miracle!* Mr Stout goes on, "There is in this no distinctive characteristic of genius"—Mr Myers has said precisely the same thing—"and, so far as I can see, no indication of the presence and operation of the Subliminal Self" (II.). Mr Myers thinks there is, *in cases of genius*, and only in these. Mr Stout continues, "Otherwise I should have regarded this article of mine as dictated by my tutelary genius" (Subliminal Self II.) "co-operating in an argument against his own existence."

This is exciting! We are to understand, I conceive, that, in doing his review, Mr Stout was aided by original thoughts, not consciously originated and pieced together (as in my vulgar method), but blazing across the track of his conscious thoughts, when they were busy with totally different topics. By a beautiful case of telepathy, Mr Stout's Subliminal Self (I.) furnished him with almost exactly the same original but erroneous ideas as those which the Subliminal Self (I.) of Mr M'Dougall supplied to *him*, while doing *his* review of Mr Myers's book in *Mind*!

But Mr Stout may say, "I mean nothing of the kind. I had no such conscious experiences, in this affair, as you credit me with. I mean that I was not conscious of the processes of my material brain, when I wrote my review." But if Mr Stout means that, he means, if I may say so without discourtesy, nothing to the point. We never are conscious of the physical processes of the brain which accompany thought. We are not at present arguing about these physical processes, as such, but about the thinking, hard and original, which is said to go on, unperceived, under and with the simultaneous physical processes of the brain which are accompanying our conscious thoughts on other topics, and then to come across these thoughts like a flash.

Once more I must hesitate about the coherence of Mr Stout's logic. He goes on, "The mental constructions required to constitute cogent evidence of the intervention of the Subliminal Self must have other characteristics peculiar to themselves. They must present a *discontinuity*, otherwise inexplicable, with the previous mental life of the person in whose consciousness they arise. But the facts point in the opposite direction. The achievements of genius are through and through conditioned by the circumstances, the social environment, and the education of the individual, together with his special interests and propensities. . . . Shakespeare in the age of Pericles would not have written such a play as *Hamlet*." Now mark, Mr Stout has hitherto insisted on being



given proof of "the *continuity* between what are called 'psychical' phenomena and the normal course of nature." But now, changing his ground, he asks for proof of *discontinuity* (attesting the interference of Subliminal Self II.) between the works of a man of genius and his "previous mental life," his "circumstances, social environment, and education, together with his special interests and propensities."

Mr Stout has reversed his logical attitude.<sup>1</sup> None the less, he finds Mr Myers meeting him on his changed ground, but of Mr Myers in that place he takes no notice, any more than in the matter of "the ordinary man." Mr Myers presents examples of genius utterly discontinuous with the circumstances (such as age), the education, and the social environment of certain persons, "arithmetical prodigies" or "calculat-

<sup>1</sup> Here it may be said that my argument is unfair; that Mr Stout really asks from Mr Myers proof of *continuity* in one set of affairs, and of *discontinuity* in quite another set of affairs. Let us see. The first request is that Mr Myers shall exhibit continuity (or rather his promise to do so is accepted) "between what are called 'psychical' phenomena and the normal course of nature, recognised as such by common sense and science" (*Hibbert Journal*, vol. ii. No. 1, p. 45).

Now Mr Myers regards genius as a "psychical" phenomenon. Next (*Hibbert Journal*, *ut supra*, p. 52) Mr Stout says that Mr Myers, to prove his point (the intervention, in genius, of Subliminal Self II.), must exhibit products of genius presenting "a discontinuity otherwise inexplicable with the previous mental life of the person in whose consciousness they arise. . . . The achievements of genius are through and through conditioned by the circumstances, the social environment, and the education of the individual, together with his special interests and propensities."

My argument is (1) that Mr Stout here changes his ground, and asks for what is discontinuous with "the normal course of nature." It is not in "the normal course of nature," is it, that a man should produce work discontinuous with his previous mental life, his education, and so on? But Mr Stout now asks for nothing less. Next, I maintain that Mr Myers gives him what he asks for in the cases of Shakespeare and Jeanne d'Arc. True, even their performances may not be out of continuity with their "previous mental life," but that life included what Mr Myers calls "the Subliminal Self" (II.), what we call genius, the miracle-working faculty. The career of Jeanne was really discontinuous with her "previous mental life"—her own conscious life before her thirteenth year, when Mr Myers's Subliminal Self II. came into her experience. Discontinuous with her previous mental life were her veridical visions and voices. But as soon as Mr Myers reaches that point, his critic does not follow him, as usual.

ing boys.”<sup>1</sup> This appears to me the best passage in Mr Myers’s book. To me Mr Myers seems here to give Mr Stout examples of the very discontinuity which Mr Stout now demands. Need I add that the amazing discontinuity between Shakespeare’s products and his social environment, circumstances, and education led Mr Bright to say that “any-one who believes that William Shakspeare (*sic*) of Stratford-on-Avon wrote *Hamlet* and *Lear* is a fool.” Mr J. E. Whittier, one of America’s greatest poets, said, “I am quite sure the man Shakspeare (*sic*) did not write the wonderful plays.” Mr Gladstone (on a post-card) wrote that the discussion of the Baconian theory was “perfectly serious”!<sup>2</sup> It was the *discontinuity* between Shakespeare’s education and circumstances that produced this amusing scepticism in the minds of Mr Bright and Mr Whittier, also of Mr Ignatius Donnelly and Miss Delia Bacon. Mr Stout has here got the discontinuity which he, not quite consistently, demands. I explain it by the genius of “the man Shakspeare,” and Mr Myers explains the genius by the Subliminal Self (II.).

I need hardly add that the career of Jeanne d’Arc is wholly discontinuous with the social environment of a hard-working peasant girl of seventeen, with her education (“I know not A from B”) and with her propensities (“I would rather be at home, sewing by my mother’s side”). For five years she resisted her “subliminal” (II.) monitors, and remained in Domremy, so much did her natural propensities conflict with her genius.

As to the argument that, in the age of Pericles, the man Shakspeare “would not have written such a play as *Hamlet*,” I reply that he would! He would have written *The Eumenides*, or something better, on the same central problem, the problem of *Hamlet*. Mr Stout has here the “discontinuity” which he now demands, but Mr Myers gives him more. He shows genius shading off into the so-called “psychical” phenomena, which made Sir John Herschel

<sup>1</sup> Vol. i. pp. 79–86.

<sup>2</sup> Mr Stronach in *The Pall Mall Magazine*, January 1904, p. 136.



recognise, in his own experience, "an intelligence working within our own organisation distinct from that of our own personality." So Herschel wrote.<sup>1</sup> Mr Myers continues to show genius shading off into "supernormal phenomena," as in Socrates and Jeanne d'Arc. But he might have added to his list Goethe, Hawthorne, Nelson, Shelley, Dickens, Thackeray, perhaps Scott, George Wishart, Dr Donne, and many others.<sup>2</sup> Now, just when Mr Myers reaches this point, essential to his thesis, Mr Stout declines to go into the matter. He has "no claim to speak as an expert about the evidence" for these supernormal phenomena. He is not convinced, and he states his objections to the testimony. To his objections I shall return, merely remarking here that Mr Myers's case, in the matter of genius, has, to my thinking, been evaded rather than met and crushed by Mr Stout. The reader must decide for himself.

Of Mr Myers's theory concerning the relations of the Subliminal Self to sleep, and of Mr Stout's criticism, little need be said. Mr Stout is still misled by Mr Myers's odd indiscretion in giving the term "Subliminal Self" to two entirely distinct conceptions. As in the case of "the ordinary man," our Professor gravely gives all the orthodox psychological explanations of the ordinary phenomena of ordinary sleep, and even of such less ordinary experiences as the solution of a puzzling problem in a dream. He utters this wisdom as if it would have been novel to Mr Myers. But Mr Myers *had* "devoted his energies to the study of ordinary psychology," despite Mr M'Dougall, and he shows that he had. Sir Walter Scott had advanced the "ordinary" theory long ago, in a note to *The Antiquary*, and Mr Myers has given precisely the same sort of explanations as are given by Sir Walter, Professor Romaine Newbold, and Mr Stout.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Vol. i. pp. 87, 88.

<sup>2</sup> I do not give the details as the evidence is of varying value: the remark is illustrative, not evidential.

<sup>3</sup> Vol. i. pp. 124-135.

Somehow Mr Stout has not perceived, or at least he does not enable his readers to perceive, that he is "preaching to a converted character," as the French say. On arriving at a dream about an Assyrian priest who solved for Professor Hilprecht a puzzle in the reading of a broken cylinder in cuneiform, Mr Myers says, "We here seem to have reached the utmost intensity of sleep-faculty *within the limits of our ordinary spectrum.*"<sup>1</sup> So far, Mr Myers has been dealing with Subliminal Self I., with the term as understood by orthodox psychologists. Thence he goes on to the supernormal faculties of Subliminal Self II., as displayed in sleep, and he is now using the phrase "subliminal" as injudiciously "extended" by himself. He has shown what our "ordinary" faculty can do in sleep, and it can do so much which would once have been held "supernatural," that he thinks it relatively a short step from these performances of our ordinary self to what, in his opinion, our extraordinary self (Subliminal Self II.) can do, according to the evidence which he produces.

As usual, Mr Stout turns away from the evidence, and writes, "Such phenomena may or may not really be found, and they may or may not involve the agency of the Subliminal Self" (II.). "But these questions are irrelevant when what we have to determine is whether the agency of the Subliminal Self" (II.) "is implied in ordinarily admitted facts concerning dream-consciousness." Mr Myers, as to these "ordinarily admitted facts," is, as I understand him, in perfect accord with Mr Stout. "Thus far the sleep faculties . . . have belonged to the same class as the normal faculties of waking life," writes Mr Myers.<sup>2</sup> If he had not believed in supernormal experiences, Mr Myers would never have needed or invented Subliminal Self II. He would have held exactly the same set of psychological opinions, right or wrong, as his critics, and would have confined his airiest flights to the realm of Subliminal Self I. He simply wants Subliminal Self II. as a provisional explanation of experiences super-

<sup>1</sup> Vol. i, p. 134.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. i, p. 135.



normal, and Mr Stout says "we need not here concern ourselves with the testimony adduced by Mr Myers."

Here is a crucial example of Mr Stout's failure to comprehend Mr Myers—that is, if I understand my author. In ordinary dreams, writes Mr Stout, "the Subliminal Self is supposed to manifest itself spontaneously." Mr Stout means Subliminal Self II. But Mr Myers has made it absolutely clear (to me) that, in *ordinary* dreams, he recognises no more than Subliminal Self I., "sleep faculty within the limits of our *ordinary* spectrum." He then advances to dreams not ordinary, but (if truly recorded) supernormal, and there Subliminal Self II. comes in. There we pass beyond "the *ordinary* spectrum."

I cannot discuss Mr Myers's views of hypnotism, and Mr Stout's reply, for lack of space and knowledge. It seems to me very probable that Subliminal Self II. is not needed, as Mr Myers thought, even in extraordinary cases of cures under hypnotism. This Mr Stout argues, I think, successfully. But Subliminal Self II. is needed (or at least would come in very handy) in explaining cases of hypnosis "telepathically produced from a distance," and in "recognitive telæsthesia" and "travelling clairvoyance" under hypnotism, about which Mr Stout says nothing.

I entirely agree with Mr Stout when he concludes that Mr Myers's "apparent unification is verbal merely." Mr Myers cannot make ordinary psychological phenomena continuous with supernormal psychical phenomena by using the phrase "Subliminal Self" in two distinct senses, one commonly accepted, one novel, and of different significance. He has but succeeded in showing *analogies* between the works of recognised "subliminal processes" and the marvels of Subliminal Self II.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For example, had Professor Hilprecht not merely dreamed of his Assyrian priest, but seen, when awake, such a figure, who revealed the puzzle of the cylinder, and had the vision been shared by others, the gap would have been nearly bridged. But would Mr Stout have accepted any evidence for that phenomenon?

So far, dialectically, Mr Stout is victorious. The attempt at establishing "continuity" is a failure. Indeed, Mr Myers admits that it breaks down in cases of "possession," as when "G. P.'s" discarnate soul occupies Mrs Piper's body. It breaks down all the way: it is a mere playing on words. My essay is in part an effort to prove that—shall I say subconsciously?—Mr Myers himself knew this. His Subliminal Self II. is really an hypothesis which, more or less, tends to colligate experiences not ordinary, but extraordinary, "supernormal" experiences. *Les Psychologues* attack Mr Myers's theory, and, as far as it palters in a double sense with words, I leave it to them. But the value of his book lies, not in a premature and fallaciously expressed theory, but in its collection of statements of facts—I say "statements of facts," not "facts." If but a dozen of these statements, say of "telæsthesia" (perception of events distant beyond any conceivable range of hyperæsthesia), be truly recorded, we are in presence of a fact quite revolutionary in the realm of psychological science. Now I am as certain of the occurrence of such facts, as I am of the presence of my writing materials: I am certain of it on evidence which I can neither dispute nor, by any effort of my poor ingenuity, explain away. And I have tried my best to explain the occurrences away, by theories of fraud, collusion, chance coincidence, and excitement on the part of myself and others. Whether the Subliminal Self II. was at work, "or did it happen in some other way," I know not, and care not a pin's fee. In my case it happened, and was instantly recorded—in Greek. Knowledge which could not be normally acquired was exhibited.

To Mr Myers's countless statements of fact, Mr Stout gives but two pages, and these are devoted to "a brief indication of my own personal attitude." Mr Stout's attitude is to explain successful and honest experiments in "thought transference" by hyperæsthesia, which is not an infrequent feature of states akin to the hypnotic trance. And this



explanation is, I think, rendered peculiarly probable by Lehmann's experiments on "unconscious whispering."

This explanation takes for granted that the experimenter, the "percipient," the person who fathoms the thought of the other, is "in a state akin to hypnotic trance." Unluckily my personal experience assures me that all the "percipients" whom I have dealt with (men and women of the educated classes, healthy and robust) are during the experiments in a perfectly normal condition. Next, no recognised hyperæsthesia can hear "unconscious whispering" when the hearer is "standing at some considerable distance, standing, in fact, in quite another room," as Mr Henry Sidgwick justly remarked. When discussing experiments in "unconscious whispering," Mr Stout does not refer his readers to Mr Henry Sidgwick's reply to the pamphlet of Messrs Lehmann and Hansen on "unconscious whispering" (*Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, vol. xi. pp. 298-315, 1896-1897). Nor does he refer them to Mr F. C. S. Schiller's review of Dr Lehmann's *Aberglauben und Zauberei*, in which Dr Lehmann cuts a poor but diverting figure (*Proceedings S.P.R.*, xv. p. 437). Mr Sidgwick seems to me to tear the argument of Messrs Lehmann and Hansen to pieces. Mr Stout may differ from me, but I offer his readers the reference to Mr Sidgwick's reply. Moreover, I do not well see how, *in a conscious experiment*, the whisperer can be an *unconscious* whisperer! How Irish! Mr Stout next appeals to "muscle-reading" performances. Muscle-reading is barred in the experiments familiar to me. There must be no physical contact. His assumed agent, hyperæsthesia, is "in contiguity with the general system of knowledge." Quite so, but it has no more to do with many well-recorded experiments than with the direction of the Gulf Stream. As to the dishonesty of honest people "in abnormal conditions," I here confine myself to honest people in normal conditions: the abnormality of the conditions has to be demonstrated. As to casual "falsification of memory," I entirely agree with Mr Stout. I insist with him on the

necessity of "a very full and precise written record of the dream or hallucination, certified by independent witnesses to have been made immediately after its occurrence," and, let me add, before its "fulfilment."

I can supply Mr Stout with precisely such a record, with every signature and attestation which the law demands, except the seals of the witnesses. These they did not think it necessary to affix. Mr Stout's only legitimate and scientific loophole of escape will then be to reply that the percipient and all the co-signatories are deliberate liars, and, practically, forgers. The circumstances recorded are, for once, mathematically incapable of explanation by chance coincidence, involving, as they do, a series of numerical figures. But there remains the legitimate scientific resource (I do not speak ironically) of saying that several people are deliberate forgers and liars. This is the weakness of this particular case. To myself (but only to myself and a small circle) the evidence is irrefragable, from our lifelong knowledge of the percipient.

But this is no evidence, in my opinion, for Science. An isolated moral miracle (which must have involved theft or collusion, and the writing of a lie, by a person of exemplary character, and a conspiracy to back that person by several others of full age and considerable intelligence) is more credible than supernormal percipience—to Science. Were the case unique in my personal knowledge, I should be disposed to agree, and to "cut" a near relation, whom I have known since childhood. I am not driven to that!

But I wish to point out that the general public can never in all time be got to understand that, if they have what they think a supernormal experience, they must instantly make such records as Mr Stout and I want,—disregarding the chance of being called liars. The public knows nothing of such precautions, or but seldom knows. Last week, a friend of mine, a distinguished historical student and writer, told me that his mother once asked him, on the day after what she took to be a supernormal experience, to write out the facts and exact



date. He thought this so foolish that he disobeyed. The "fulfilment" expected by the lady came off, the death of a near relative in Australia (the news arrived by the next mail),—and there was no record! Such is the public; not ten thousand men out of our millions know the need of records in such cases. Mrs —, the percipient (who certainly had never heard of psychical research), knew it, but her son thought he was wiser. The moral is obvious. We cannot expect more than a very few legally adequate records of *spontaneous* "supernormal" experiences. But psychologists can make experiments in *induced* hallucinations (as in crystal gazing), and in "motor automatisms" (as in "table tilting" and the use of the so-called "divining-rod").

Such experiments ought to yield, at least, new details about the accepted processes of unconscious or subconscious processes (Subliminal Self I.), and if any supernormal phenomena seemed to occur, the psychologist could make his own record. I need not add that the "subjects" (gentlemen and ladies for choice) should not be *brutalisés* by unconcealed contempt and distrust, and that the experiments should be made in a congenial and familiar kind of environment.

But am I not as a *vox clamantis in eremo*? The coincidence of historical and anthropological testimony to world-old belief in actual supernormal *experiences*, in all lands, in all stages of culture, with Mr Myers's vast collection of modern instances (some not ill recorded), and my own isolated bleat of protest as to what I have known, impinge in vain on Science and common sense. I do not expect British psychologists to try the suggested experiments with the prolonged and patient attention which they give to "ordinary psychology." I expect their "personal attitude" to be that of Mr Stout.

ANDREW LANG.

ST ANDREWS.

# THE AXIOM OF INFINITY: A NEW PRESUPPOSITION OF THOUGHT.

CASSIUS J. KEYSER, M.A., PH.D.,

Adjunct Professor of Mathematics, Columbia University,  
in the City of New York.

IT so happened that when the first number of the *Hibbert Journal* appeared, containing an article by Professor Royce on the Concept of the Infinite, I had been myself for some time meditating on the logical bearings and philosophical import of that concept, and was actually then engaged in marking out the course which it seemed to me a first discussion of the matter might best follow. The order and scope of his treatment were so like those I had myself decided upon that I should naturally have felt a pardonable pride in the coincidence, had not this feeling been at the same time quite lost in a stronger one, namely, that of the evident superiority of his manner to any which I could have hoped to attain. Indeed, so patient is his exposition of elements, so rich is it in suggestiveness, so intimately and instructively, according to his wont, has he connected the most abstruse and recondite of doctrines with the most obvious and seemingly trivial of things, and so luminous and stimulating is it all, that one must admire the ingenuity it betrays, and cannot but wonder whether after all there really are in science or philosophy any notions too remote and obscure to be rendered intelligible even to common sense, if only a sufficiently cunning pen be engaged in the service.



While his paper is thus replete with inspiring intimations of the "glorious depths" and near-lying interests of the doctrine treated, and is, in point of clearness and vivid portrayal of its central thought, a model beyond the art of most, it is not, I believe, equally happy when judged on the severer ground of its critico-logical estimates. Even on this ground, I do not hesitate, after close examination, to adjudge it the merit of *general* soundness. That, however, it is thoroughly sound, completely mailed against every possible assault of criticism, is a proposition I am by no means prepared to maintain. Quite the contrary, in fact. Nor can the defects be counted as trivial. One of them especially, which it has in common with other both earlier and later discussions of the subject, notably that by Dedekind himself and, more recently, that by Mr Bertrand Russell in his imposing treatise on *The Principles of Mathematics*, is of the most radical nature, concerning as it does no less a question than, I do not say merely that of the validity, but that of the possibility, of existence-proofs of the infinite.

And here I may as well state at once, lest there should be some misapprehension in respect to purpose, that the present writing is not primarily designed to be a review of Professor Royce's or of other recent discussions of the infinite. Reviewed to some extent they will be, but only incidentally, and mainly because they have declared themselves, erroneously as I think, upon that most fundamental of questions, namely, *whether it is possible, by aid of the modern concept, to demonstrate the existence of the infinite*. Argument would seem superfluous to show the immeasurable import of this problem, whether it be viewed solely in its immediate logical bearings, or also mediately, through the latter, in its bearings upon philosophy, upon theology, and, only more remotely, upon religion itself. It is chief among the aims of this essay, to open that problem anew, to appeal from the prevailing doctrine concerning it, in the hope of securing, if possible, a readjudication of the matter which shall be final.

This subject of the infinite, how it baffles approach ! How immediate and how remote it seems, how it abides and yet eludes the grasp, how familiar it appears, mingling with the elemental simplicities of the heart, continuously weaving itself into the intimate texture of common life, and yet how austere and immense and majestic, outreaching the sublimest flights of the imagination, transcending the stellar depths, immeasurable by the beginningless, endless chain of the ages ! Comprehend the infinite ! No wonder we hear that none but the infinite itself is adequate to that. *Du gleichst dem Geist, den du begreifst.* Be it so. Perhaps, then, we are infinite. If not,

“ ‘Wie’ fass’ ich dich, unendliche Natur ? ”

Or is it finally a mere illusion ? And is there after all no infinite reality to *be* seized upon ? Again, if not, what signifies the finite ? Is that to be for ever without definition, except as reciprocal of that which fails to be ? Is the All really enclosed in some vast ellipsoid, without a beyond, incircumscribable, devoid alike of tangent plane and outer point ? Are we eternally condemned to seek therein for the meaning and end of processes that refuse to terminate ? And is, then, this region, too, but a locus of deceptions, “of false alluring jugglery” ? Is analysis but the victim of hallucination when it thinks to detect the existence of realms that underlie and overarch and compass about the domain of the countable and measurable ? And does the spirit, in its deeper musings, in its pensive moods, only *seem* to feel the tremulous touch of transfinite waves, of vitalising undulations from beyond the farthest shore of the sea of sense ?

One fact at once is clear, namely, that, whatever ultimate justification the hypothesis may find, thought has never escaped the necessity of *supposing* the universe of things to be intrinsically somehow cleft asunder into the two Grand Divisions, or figured, if you will, under the two fundamental complementary all-inclusive Forms, which, from motives more or less distinctly felt and also just, as we shall see, though not quite justified, have been, from time immemorial, designated



as the Finite and the Infinite. And these great *terms* or their verbal equivalents—for concepts in any strict sense they have not been—though always vague and shifting, for ever promising, but never quite delivering the key to their identities into the hand of Definition, have, nevertheless, in every principal scene, together played the gravest rôle in the still unfolding drama of speculation. Or, to change the figure, they have been as Foci, one of them seemingly near, the other apparently remote, neither of them quite itself determinate, but the two conjointly serving always to determine the ever-varying eccentricity of the orbit of thought; and doubtless the vaster lines that serve to bind the differing epochs of speculation into a single continuous system can best be traced by reference to these august terms as co-ordinate poles of interest.

As a simple historical fact, then, philosophy has indeed, with but negligible exception, throughout *assumed* the existence of both the finite and the infinite. That is one thing. Another fact of distinct and equal weight, no matter whether or how we may account for it, is that man, in accord with the deeper meaning of the Protagorean maxim, has always felt himself to have within, or to be somehow, the potential measure of all that is. Is it insignificant that this faith—for that is what it seems to be—as if an indestructible character of the race, as if an invariant defining property of the germ plasm itself whence man springs and derives his continuity, should have survived every vicissitude of human fortune? that it should have been indeed, if not the substance, at least the promise, of things hoped for, the evidence, too, of things not seen, marking and sustaining metaphysical research from the earliest times? And, what is more, the spirit of such research, curiosity, I mean, fit companion and counterpart of that abiding faith, unlike “experience and observation,” has known no bounds, but, on the contrary, finding within itself no fatal principle of limitation, it has ever disdained the scale of finite things as competent to take its

measure, and boldly asserted claim to the entire realm of being.

These questions, however, have been something more than fascinating. Perhaps their rise, but not their manifold development, much less their profound significance for life and thought, is to be adequately explained on the hypothesis of insatiate curiosity alone. It must be granted that their presence, especially in the arena of dialectic, *has* been often due simply to their intrinsic magical charm for "summit-intellec[t]s." And doubtless the play-instinct, deep-dwelling in the constitution of the mind, has often made them serve the higher faculties merely as intricate puzzles, to beguile the time withal. But, in general, the questions have worn a sterner aspect. Philosophy has been not merely allured, it has been constrained, to their consideration; constrained not only because of their inherence in problems of the conscience, especially in that most radical problem of finding the simplest system of postulates that shall be at once both necessary and sufficient to explain the moral feeling; but constrained still more powerfully by the insistent demands that issue from the religious consciousness. But this is yet not all. For man cannot live by these august interests alone. And it is profoundly significant, both as witnessing to the final interblending, the fundamental unity, of all the concerns of the human spirit, and as revealing the ultimate depth and dignity of all its interests, that questions about the infinite quite similar to those that claim so illustrious parentage in Ethics and Philosophy, admit elsewhere of humbler derivation, and readily own to the lowliest of origins. Man, indeed, merely to live, has had to measure and to count, and this homely necessity, fruitful mother of mystery and doubt, *independently* set the problems of the indefinitely small and the indefinitely great; and so it was that needs quite as immediate and austere as those of Morals and Religion—I mean the exigencies of Science, and especially of Mathematics—demanded on their own ground, in the very beginnings of exact know-



ledge, that the understanding transcend every possible sequence of observations, pass the uttermost limit of "experience," which, refine and enlarge it as you may, remains but finite, and literally lay hold on infinity itself.

To this ancient irrevocable demand, thus urged upon the reason from every cardinal point of human interest, genius has responded as to a challenge from the gods, and I submit that the response, the endeavour of the reason actually to subjugate extra-finite being and compel surrender of its secrets by the organon of thought, constitutes the most sublime and strenuous and inspiring enterprise of the human intellect in every age.

What of it? Long centuries of gigantic striving, age on age of philosophic toil, immeasurable devotion of time and energy and genius to a single end, the intellectual conquest of transfinite being—what has it all availed? What triumphs have been won? I speak, narrowly, of the conquest, and demand to know, not whether it has been accomplished—for that were a foolish query—but whether, strictly speaking, it has been begun. Let not the import of the question be mistaken. No answer is sought in terms of such moral or "spiritual" gains as may be incident even to efforts that miss their aim. Everyone knows that seeking has compensations of its own, which indeed are oftentimes better than any which finding itself can give. And it seems sometimes as if the higher life were chiefly sustained by unsought gains incident to the unselfish pursuit of the unattainable. The circle has not been squared, nor the quintic equation solved, nor perpetual motion invented; neither indeed can be; yet it would show but meagre understanding of the ways of truth to men, did one suppose all the labour devoted to such problems to have been without reward. So, conceivably, it might be with this problem of the infinite. It may be granted that, even supposing no solution to be attainable, the ceaseless search for one, the unwearied high endeavour of the reason through the ages, presents a spectacle ennobling to behold, and of which mankind, it may be, could

ill afford to be deprived. It may be granted that incidentally many insights have been won which, though not solutions, have nevertheless permanently enriched the literature of the world and are destined to improve its life. It may be granted that in every time some doctrine of infinity, some philosophy of it, has been at least effective, has helped, that is, for better or worse, to fashion the forms of human institutions and to determine the course of history. Concerning none of these things is there here any question. As to what the question precisely is, there need not be the slightest misapprehension. The fact is that for thousands of years philosophy has recognised the presence of a certain definite Problem, namely, that of *extending the dominion of logic, the reign of exact thought, out beyond the utmost reach of finite things into and over the realm of infinite being*, and this problem, by far the greatest and most impressive of her strictly intellectual concerns, philosophy has, for thousands of years, arduously striven to solve. And now I ask—not, has it been worth while? for that is conceded, but—has she advanced the *solution* in any measure, and, if so, in what respect, and to what extent?

We are here upon the grounds of the *rational* logos. The whole force and charge of the question is directed to matter of concept and inference. Fortunately, the answer is to be as unmistakable as the question. It must be recognised, of course, that the “problem,” as stated, is exceedingly, almost frightfully, generic, comprising a host of interdependent problems. One of these, however, is pre-eminent: without its solution *none* other *can* be solved; with its solution, *any* other *may* be eventually. That problem is the problem of conception, of definition in the unmitigated rigour of its severest meaning; it is the problem of discovering a certain principle, of finding, without the slightest possibility of doubt or indetermination, the intrinsic line of cleavage that parts the universe of being into its two grandest divisions, and so of telling finally and once for all precisely what for thought the infinite is and what for thought the finite is.



And now, thanks to the subtle genius of the modern Teutonic mind, this ancient problem, having baffled the thought of all the centuries, has been at last completely solved, and therein our original question finds its answer: *The conquest has been begun.* Bernhard Riemann, profound mathematician and—important fact, of which, strangely enough, too many philosophers seem invincibly unaware—profound metaphysician too, having pointed out, in his famous *Habilitationschrift*,<sup>1</sup> the epoch-making distinction between mere boundlessness and infinitude of manifolds similar to that of space, the greater glory was reserved for three contemporary compatriots of his—Bernard Bolzano,<sup>2</sup> Richard Dedekind,<sup>3</sup> and George Cantor,<sup>4</sup> the first an acute and learned philosopher and theologian, with deep mathematical insight, the other two brilliant mathematicians, with a strong bent for metaphysics—to win independently and about the same time the long-coveted insight into the intrinsic nature of infinity. And thus it is a distinction of our own time that within the memory of living men the *defining mark* of the infinite first failed to elude the grasp, and that that august term, after the most marvellous career of any in the history of speculation, has been finally made to assume the prosaic form of an exact and completely determined concept, and so at length to become available for the purposes of rigorously logical discourse.

Pray, then, what is this concept? Of various equivalent forms of statement, I choose the following: *An assemblage (ensemble, collection, group, manifold) of elements (things, no matter what) is infinite or finite according as it has or has not a PART to which the whole is just EQUIVALENT in the sense that between the elements composing that part and those composing the whole there subsists a unique and reciprocal (one-to-one) correspondence.*

<sup>1</sup> "Ueber die Hypothesen, welche die Geometrie zu Grunde liegen," *Ges. Werke*. Also in English by W. K. Clifford.

<sup>2</sup> "Paradoxien des Unendlichen."

<sup>3</sup> "Was sind und was sollen die Fahlen."

<sup>4</sup> Memoirs in *Acta Mathematica*, vol. ii., and elsewhere.

*If we may trust to intuition in questions about reality, assemblages,<sup>1</sup> infinite as defined, actually abound on every hand. I need not pause to indicate examples. Those pointed out in Professor Royce's mentioned paper may suffice; they will, at all events, furnish the reader with the "clew, which, once familiar to his hand, will lengthen as he goes, and never break."* The concept itself I regard as a great achievement, one of the very greatest in the history of thought. Not only does it mark the successful eventuation of a long and toilsome search; it furnishes criticism with a new standard of judgment, it at once creates, and gives the means of meeting, the necessity for a re-examination and a juster evaluation of historic doctrines of infinity; and it is greater still, I believe, as a destined instrument of exploration in that realm which it has opened to the understanding and whose boundary it defines.

Is that judgment not extravagant? For the concept seems so simple, is so apparently independent of difficult presuppositions, that one cannot but wonder why it was not formed long ago. Had the concept in question been early formed, the history and present status of philosophy and theology, and of science too, had doubtless been different. But it was not then conceived. Now that we have it, is it too unbewildering to be impressive? Shall we esteem it lightly just because we can comprehend it, because it does not mystify? Simple it is indeed, almost as simple as the Newtonian law of gravitation, nearly as easy to understand as the geometric interpretation of imaginary quantities, hardly more difficult to grasp than the notion of the conservation of energy, the Mendelian principle of inheritance, or than a score of other central concepts of science. But shallow indeed and foolish is that criticism which values ideas according to their complexity, and confounds the simple with the trivial.

<sup>1</sup> The very simplest possible example of such a manifold is that of the count-numbers. The whole collection can be paired in one-to-one fashion with, for example, half the collection, thus: 1, 2; 2, 4; 3, 6; . . . ; the totality of even and odd being just equivalent to the even.



As an immense city or a vast complex of mountain masses, seen too near, is obscured as a whole by the prominence of its parts, so the larger truth about any great subject is disclosed only as one beholds it at a certain remove which permits the assembling of principal features in a single view, and a proportionate mingling of reflected light from its grander aspects. Accordingly it has seemed desirable, in the foregoing preliminary survey, to hold somewhat aloof, to conduct the movement, in the main, along the path of perspective centres, in order to allow the vision at every point the amplest range. It is now proposed to draw a little closer to the subject and to examine some of its phases more minutely. In respect to the modern concept of infinity, we desire to know more fully what it really signifies, we wish to be informed how it orients itself among cardinal principles and established modes of thought. But recently born to consciousness, it has already been advanced to conspicuous and commanding station among fundamental notions, and we are concerned to know what, if any, transformations of existing doctrine, what readjustments of attitude towards the universe without us or within, what changes in our thought on ultimate problems of knowledge and reality, it seems to demand and may be destined to effect. In a word, and speaking broadly, we wish to know not merely in a narrow sense what the new idea is, but, in the larger meaning of the term, what it "can."

I shall first speak briefly of the so-called "positive" character of the definition, an alleged essential quality of it, a seeming property which criticism is wont to signalise as a radical or intrinsic virtue of the concept itself. Quite independently of the mathematicians Dedekind and Cantor, who, we have seen, were the independent originators of the new formulation, the then old philosopher, Bolzano, bringing to the subject another order of training and of motive, arrived at notions of the finite and infinite, which on critical examination are found to be essentially the same as theirs, though greatly differing in point alike of view and of form. Bolzano's

procedure is virtually as follows:—Suppose given a class *C* of elements, or things, of any kind whatsoever, as the sands of the seashore, or the stars of the firmament, or the points of space, or the instants in a stretch of time, or the numbers with which we count, or the total manifold of truths known to an omniscient God. Out of any such class *C*, suppose a series formed by taking for first term one of the elements of *C*, for second term two of them, and so on. Any term so obtainable is itself obviously a class or group of things, and is *defined* to be finite. The indicated process of series formation, if sufficiently prolonged, will either exhaust *C* or it will not. If it will, *C* is itself *demonstrably* finite; if it will not, *C* is, on that account, *defined* to be infinite. Now, say Professor Royce and others, a definition like the latter, being dependent on such a notion as that of inexhaustibility or endlessness or boundlessness, is negative; a certain innate craving of the understanding remains unsatisfied, we are told, because the definition presents the notion, not in a positive way by telling us what the infinite actually *is*, but merely in a negative fashion by telling us what it is *not*. Undoubtedly the claim is plausible, but is it more? Bolzano affirmed and exemplified a certain proposition, in itself of the utmost importance, and throwing half the needed light upon the question in hand. That proposition is: *Any class or assemblage (of elements), if infinite according to his own definition of the term, enjoys the property of being equivalent, in the sense above explained, to some proper part of itself.* Though he did not himself demonstrate the proposition, it readily admits of demonstration, and, since his time, has in fact been repeatedly and rigorously proved. Not only that, but the converse proposition, giving the other half of the needed light, has been established too: *Every assemblage that HAS a part “equivalent” to the whole, is infinite in the Bolzano sense of the term.*

It so appears, in the conjoint light of those two theorems, that the property seized upon and pointed out by the



ingenious theologian is in all strictness a *characteristic*, though derivative, mark of the infinite as he conceived and defined it. It is sufficiently obvious, therefore, that this derivative property might logically be regarded as *primitive*, made to serve, that is, as a ground of definition. Precisely this fact it is which was independently perceived by Dedekind and Cantor, with the result that, as they have presented the matter, a collection, or manifold, is infinite if it *has* a certain property, and finite if it has it *not*. And now, the critics tell us, it is the infinite which is positive and the finite which is negative.

The distinction appears to me to be entirely devoid of essential merit. It seems rather to be only another interesting example of that verbal legerdemain for which a certain familiar sort of philosophising has long been famous. For what indeed is positive and what negative? Are we to understand that these terms have absolute as distinguished from relative meaning? The distinction, I take it, is without external validity, is entirely subjective, a matter quite at will, being dependent solely on an arbitrary *ordering* of our thought. That which is first put in thought is positive: the opposite, being subsequently put, is negative; but the *sens* of the time-vector joining the two may be reversed at the thinker's will. It is sometimes contended that that which *generally* happens in the world, and so constitutes the *rule*, is intrinsically positive. As a matter of fact a moving body "in general" continuously changes its distance from every object. Such change of distance from *every* other object would accordingly be a positive something. Then it would follow that the classic definition of a sphere-surface as the locus of a moving point which does *not* change its distance from a certain specified point, is really negative. Obviously it avails nothing essential to disguise the negativity by some such seemingly positive phrase as "constant" distance. The trick is an easy one. If, again, it be allowed that, a process being once started, its continuation is positive, its termination negative, then it would result that *inexhaustibility* is positive

and exhaustibility negative, whence we should have to own that it is Bolzano's definition which is positive and that by Dedekind and Cantor negative. It hardly admits of doubt that the matter is purely one of an arbitrarily chosen point of view. Every positive is the negative of its negative; every negative, the positive of its positive. Each of these reciprocals is incomplete without, implicit in, determined by, the other. The distinction is here of no importance. What is important is that, no matter which of the definitions be adopted as such, the other then states a derivable property of the thing defined. In either case the *concept* of the infinite remains the same, it is merely its *garb* that is changed. I am very far from intending, however, to assert herewith that, because the definitions are logically equivalent, they must needs be, or indeed are so practically, that is, as instruments of investigation. That is another matter, which, I regret to say, our somewhat pretentious critiques of scientific method furnish no better means of settling than the wasteful way of trial. Everyone will recall from his school-days Euclid's definition of a plane as being a surface such that a line joining any two points of the surface lies wholly in the surface. Logically that is equivalent to saying: A plane is such an assemblage of points that, any three independent points of the assemblage being given, one and only one third point of the assemblage can be found which is equidistant from the given three. But, despite their logical equivalence, who would contend that, for elementary purposes, the latter notion is "practically" as good as the Greek? And so in respect to the infinite, I am free to admit, or rather I affirm, that, on the score of usability, the Dedekind-Cantor definition is greatly superior to its Bolzanoan equivalent. Professor Royce has indeed ingeniously shown how readily it lends itself to philosophic and even to theologic uses.

I turn now to the current assertion by Professor Royce and Mr Russell that the modern concept of the infinite, of which I have given above in italics an exact statement, to



which the reader is referred, in fact denies a certain ancient axiom of common sense, namely, the axiom of whole and part. I am not about to submit a brief in behalf of the traditional conception of axioms as self-evident truths. That conception, as is well known, has been once for all abandoned by philosophy and science alike, while to mathematicians in particular no phenomenon is more familiar than that of the coexistence of self-coherent bodies of doctrine constructed on distinct and self-consistent but incompatible systems of postulates. The co-ordination of such incompatible theories is quite legitimate and presents no cause for regret or alarm. The forced recession of the axioms from the high ground of absolute authority, so far from indicating chaos of intellection or ultimate dissolution of knowledge, signifies a corresponding deepening of foundation; it means an ascension of mind, the proclamation of its creative power, the assertion of its own supremacy. And henceforth the denial of specific axioms, or the deliberate substitution of one set for another, is to be rightly regarded as an inalienable prerogative of a liberated spirit. The question before us, then, is one merely of fact, namely, whether a certain axiom is indeed denied or contradicted by the modern concept of the infinite.

It is in the first place to be observed that the statement itself of that concept avoids the expression, "equality of whole and part," but instead of it deliberately employs the term "equivalence." The word actually used by Dedekind himself is *ähnlichkeit* (similarity). But, says Professor Royce, "equivalence" is just what the axiom really means by equality. It is precisely this statement which I venture to draw in question. If we know that each soldier of a company marching along the street has one and but one gun on his shoulder, then, we are told, even if we do not know *how* many soldiers or guns there are, we do know that there are "*as many*" soldiers as guns. What the definition in question, taken severely, itself affirms in this case, is that the assemblage of guns is "equivalent or similar" to that of the soldiers. Let

us now suppose that in place of soldiers we write, for example, "all positive integers," and in place of guns, "all even positive integers"—the integers are plainly susceptible of unique and reciprocal association with the even integers,—then the definition again asserts, as before, "equivalence" of these assemblages. Note that thus far nothing has been said about *number* as an expression of *how many*. If there *be* a number that tells how many things there are in one assemblage, that same number doubtless tells how many there are in any "equivalent" assemblage, and just because the number, if there *be* one, is the *same* for both, the two are said to be *equal* by axiom. In this view, equality of groups means more than mere "equivalence"; it means, besides, sameness of their numbers, and so applies *only* in case there *be* numbers. But common sense, whose axiom is here in court, has neither found, nor affirmed the existence of, a number telling, for example, how many integers there are. On the other hand, in case of assemblages for which common sense *has* known a number, the axiom of whole and part is admittedly valid without exception. It thus appears that the axiom supposed, regarded, however unconsciously but nevertheless in intention, as applicable only in case there *be* a number telling how many, is, in all strictness, not denied by the concept in question. Numbers designed to tell how many elements there are in an assemblage having a part "equivalent" to the whole are of recent invention, and it may be remarked in passing that this invention bears immediate favourable witness to the fruitfulness of the new idea. Such transfinite numbers once created, then undoubtedly, and not before, the question naturally presents itself whether "equivalence" shall be translated "equality," or, what is tantamount, whether the latter term shall be generalised into the former; "generalised," I say, for, though it is true that, as soon as the transfinite numbers are created, there is, in case of an infinite collection and some of its parts, a conjunction of "equivalence" and "sameness of number," yet equality does not of itself deduc-



tively attach, for the transfinite numbers are in *genetic* principle,<sup>1</sup> *i.e.*, radically, different from the number notion which the concept of equality has hitherto connoted. The question as to the mentioned translation or generalisation is, therefore, a question, and it is to be decided, not under spur or stress of logic, but solely from motives of economy acting on grounds of pure expedience. If the decision be, as seems likely because of its expedience and economy, favourable to such translation or generalisation, then indeed the old axiom, as above construed, still remains uncontradicted, is yet valid within the domain of its asserted validity. It is merely that a new number-domain has been adjoined which the old verity never contemplated, and in which, therefore, though it does not apply, it never essentially pretended to; but on account of which adjunction, nevertheless, for the sake of good neighbourship, it is constrained, not indeed to retract its ancient claims, but merely to assert them more cautiously and diplomatically, in preciser terms. Even then, in case of quarrel, it is the generaliser who should explain, and not a defender of the generalised.

And now to my final thesis I venture to invite the reader's special attention, and beg to be held with utmost strictness accountable for my words. The question is whether it is possible, by means of the new concept, to demonstrate the existence of the infinite; whether, in other words, it can be proved that there are infinite systems. That such demonstration is possible is affirmed by Bolzano, by Dedekind, by Professor Royce, by Mr Russell, and in fact by a large and swelling chorus of authoritative utterance, scarcely relieved by a dissenting voice. After no little pondering of the matter, I have been forced, and that, too, I must own, against my hope and will, to the opposite conviction. Candour, then, compels me to assert, as I have elsewhere<sup>2</sup> briefly done, not

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Couturat, *L'Infini mathématique*, Appendix.

<sup>2</sup> "The Axiom of Infinity and Mathematical Induction," *Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society*, vol. ix., May 1903.

only that the arguments which have been actually adduced are all of them vitiated by circularity, but that, in the very nature of conception and inference, by virtue of the most certain standards of logic itself, every potential argument, every possible attempt to prove the proposition, is foredoomed to failure, destined before its birth to take the fatal figure of the wheel.

The alleged demonstrations are essentially the same, being all of them but variants under a single type. It is needless, therefore, in support of my first contention, to present separate examination of them all. Analysis of one or two specimens will suffice. I will begin with one from Bolzano's offering, both because it marks the beginning of the new era of thought about the subject and because subsequent writers have nearly all of them either cited or quoted it, and that, as far as I am aware, always with approval. Bolzano<sup>1</sup> undertakes to demonstrate, among similar statements, the proposition that *die Menge der Sätze und Wahrheiten an sich* is infinite (*unendlich*), this latter term being understood, of course, in accordance with his own definition above given. The attempt, as anyone may find who is willing to examine it minutely, informally postulates as follows: the proposition, There are such truths (as those contemplated in the proposition), is such a truth, *T*; *T* is true, is another such truth, *T*; so on; and, the indicated process is inexhaustible. Now, these assumptions, which are essential to the argument, and which any careful reader cannot fail to find implicit in it, are, possibly, all of them, correct, but the last is so evident a *petitio principii* as to make one look again and again lest his own thought should have played him a trick.

In case of Dedekind's demonstration, which has been heralded far and wide, the fallacy is less glaring. The argument is far subtler, more complicate, and the *versteckter Zirkel* lies deeper in the folds. But it is undoubtedly there, and its presence may be disclosed by careful explication.

<sup>1</sup> "Paradoxien," sect. 14.



Let the symbol  $t$  stand for thought, *any* thought, and denote by  $\hat{t}$  the thought that  $t$  is a thought. For convenience,  $\hat{t}$  may be called the image of  $t$ . On examination, Dedekind's proof is found to *postulate* as *certainities*: (1) If there be a  $t$ , there is a  $\hat{t}$ , image of  $t$ ; (2) if there be two distinct  $t$ 's, the corresponding  $\hat{t}$ 's are distinct; (3) there is a  $t$ ; (4) there is a  $t$  which is not a  $\hat{t}$ ; (5) every  $t$  is *other* than its  $\hat{t}$ . These being granted, it is easy to see, by supposing each  $t$  to be paired with its  $\hat{t}$ , as object with image, that the assemblage  $\mathfrak{J}$  of all the  $t$ 's and the assemblage  $\mathfrak{J}'$  of all  $\hat{t}$ 's are "equivalent." But by (4) there is a  $t$  not in  $\mathfrak{J}'$ , which latter is, therefore, a *part* of  $\mathfrak{J}$ . Hence  $\mathfrak{J}$  is infinite, by definition of the term.

Let this matter be scrutinised a little. Assuming only the mentioned postulates and, of course, the possibility of reflection, it is obvious that by pairing the  $t$  of (4) with its image  $\hat{t}$ , then the latter with *its* image, and so on, a sequence  $S$  of  $t$ 's is started which, because of (1) and (5), is incapable of termination. This  $S$ , too, by Dedekind's proof, is an infinite assemblage. Accordingly, postulate (1), without which, be it observed, the proof is impossible, postulates, in *advance* of the argument, *certainly* which, if the argument's conclusion be true, *transcends* the *finite* before the inference that an *infinite* exists either is or can be *drawn*. The reader may recall how the Russian mathematician Lobatschewsky said, "In the absence of proof of the Euclidian postulate of parallels, I will assume that it is not true"; and how thereupon there arose a new science of space. Suppose that, in like manner, we say here, "In the absence of *proof* that an act once found to be mentally performable is endlessly so performable, we will assume that such is not the case," then, whatever else might result—and of that we shall presently speak—one thing is at once absolutely certain: Dedekind's "argument" would be quite impossible. The fact is that a more beautiful circle than his is hardly to be found in the pages of fallacious speculation, or admits of construction by the subtlest instruments of self-deceiving dialectic, though it must be frankly

allowed that Mr Russell's<sup>1</sup> more recent movement about the same centre is equally round and exquisite.

And this disclosure of the fatal circle in the attempted demonstration serves at once to introduce and exemplify the truth of my second contention, which is that all logical discourse, of necessity, *ex vi termini*, presupposes certainty that transcends the finite, where by logical discourse I mean such as consists of completely determined concepts welded into a concatenated system by the ancient hammer of deductive logic. The fact of this presupposition, of course, cannot be *proved*, but, and that is good enough, it can be *exhibited* and *beheld*. To attempt to "prove" it would be to stultify oneself by assuming the possibility of a deductive argument *A* to prove that the conclusion of *A* cannot be drawn unless it is assumed in advance. The fact, then, if it be a fact, and of that there need not be the slightest doubt, is to be added to that small group of fundamental simplicities which can at best be *seen*, if the eye be fit.

Consider, for example, this simplest of syllogistic forms: Every element *e* of the class *c* is an element *é* of the class *é*; every *é* of *é* is an element *ẽ* of the class *ẽ*;  $\therefore$  every *e* of *c* is an *ẽ* of *ẽ*. I appeal now to the reader's own subjective experience to witness to the following facts: (1) Our *apodictic feeling* is the sole justification of the inference as such; (2) that felt justification is absolute, neither seeking nor admitting of appeal; (3) that sole and absolute justification, namely, the apodictic feeling, is in no slightest degree *contingent* upon the answer to any question whether the multitude of elements *e* or *é* or *ẽ* is or is not, may or may not be found to be, "equivalent" to some part of itself. The feeling of validity here undoubtedly transcends the finite, undoubtedly holds naught in reserve against any possibility of the inference failing as an act should the system of elements turn out to be infinite.

At some risk of excessive clearness and accentuation, for the matter is immeasurably important, I venture to ask the reader

<sup>1</sup> *Principles of Mathematics*, chap. xliii.



to witness how the transcendence or transfiniteness of certainty shows itself in yet another way, not merely in formal deductive *inference*, but also in *conception*. When any concept, as that of Parabola, for example, is formed or defined, it is found that the concept contains implicitly a host of properties not given explicitly in the definition. Properly speaking, the thing defined is a certain organic assemblage of properties, of which the totality is implied in a properly selected few of them. Now the fact which it is decisive here to note is that by conception we mean, among other things, that *whenever* the definition may present itself, even though it may be endlessly, a certain invariant assemblage of properties implicitly accompanies the presentation. Without such transfinite certainty of such invariant uncontingent implication, conception would be devoid of its meaning.

The upshot, then, is this: that conception and logical inference alike presuppose absolute certainty that an act which the mind finds itself capable of performing is intrinsically performable endlessly, or, what is the same thing, that the assemblage of possible repetitions of a once mentally performable act is equivalent to some proper part of the assemblage. This certainty I name the *Axiom of Infinity*, and this axiom being, as seen, a necessary presupposition of both conception and deductive inference, every attempt to "demonstrate" the existence of the infinite is a predestined begging of the issue.

What follows? Do we, then, *know* by axiom that the infinite is? That depends upon your metaphysic. If you are a radical *a-priorist*, yes; if not, no. If the latter, and I am now speaking as an *a-priorist*, then you are agnostic in the deepest sense, being capable, in utmost rigour of the terms, of neither conceiving nor inferring. But if we do not *know* the axiom to be true, and so cannot deductively prove the existence of the infinite, what, then, is the *probability* of such existence? The *highest yet attained*. Why? Because the *inductive* test of the axiom, regarded now as a hypothesis, is trying to conceive and trying to infer, and this experiment,

which has been world-wide for æons, has seemed to succeed in countless cases, and to fail in none not explainable on grounds consistent with the retention of the hypothesis.

Finally, to make briefest application to a single concrete case. Do the stars constitute an infinite multitude? No one knows. If the number be finite, that fact may some time be ascertained by actual enumeration, and, if and only if there be infinite ensembles of possible repetitions of mental processes, it may also be known by proof. But if the multitude of stars be infinite, that can never be known *except* by proof; this last is possible only if the axiom of infinity be true, and even if this be true, the actual proof may never be achieved.

CASSIUS JACKSON KEYSER.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, N.Y., U.S.A.



## THE PASSING OF CONVICTION.

PROFESSOR W. JETHRO BROWN, LL.D., LITT.D.

Professor of Comparative Law in the University College of Wales.

THE influence of recent progress upon Belief is a question which we seldom consider comprehensively. That we have grown richer and more informed is doubtless matter for congratulation. The extent to which the spirit world has held its own, or failed to hold its own, is matter for grave inquiry. Are we anything like as rich to-day, the observer of social life is compelled to ask, in the convictions which have taught the soul reverence in the past, and have given to life the sense of a purpose or mission? Do we believe in God, the fatherland, the family? In anything? I speak not merely of Belief with all our soul and strength, rare enough in all ages, but even with the half soul, the divided strength.

Questions assuredly not easy to answer, for Belief is something more than assent, and a sceptic may have more of it than all our Doctors of Divinity. It gives to life consistency and meaning, to character beauty and elevation. No man so poor in spirit but in his innermost heart knows this, knows that he may gather all the perfumes of Arabia and ride upon the crest of the storm-cloud, and yet be in all highest things most miserable; knows that if life be without the consciousness of high purpose, philosophy sinks to sophistry, learning is prostitute to Mammon, and imagination serves but to feed the passions. "The deepest, nay, the only theme of the world's history, to which all others are subordinate," said Goethe, "is the conflict of Belief and unbelief. The epochs in which

Belief, in whatever form it may be, prevails, are the marked epochs in human history, full of heart-stirring memories and of substantial gains for all after times. The epochs in which unbelief, in whatever form it may be, prevails, even when for the moment they put on the semblance of glory and success, inevitably sink into insignificance."

Whatever additions have been made in our day to the pomp and show of life, to the material comforts of life, and to our knowledge of the universe, the question of the influence of the new possessions upon the basic elements of character remains supreme over all other questions—searching, defiant, inexorable! That on the whole the influence has been hostile no man in his senses can doubt. I propose to consider how it has been so, contenting myself to speak, not of ultimate results that may be but of present results that are, not of hopes for the future but of realities in the present.

New  
Knowledge.

There is a knowledge which gives a mastery over the forces of nature, controlling things visible and invisible. Such knowledge does not affect to teach the soul reverence. "I would rather have an hour's sympathy with one noble heart than read the law of gravitation through and through."<sup>1</sup>

But our times have seen an advance in the knowledge which relates to the origin and meaning of human life—knowledge, as the candid soul must admit, often suggesting strange, unwelcome answer to the question whether man be of import and God-descended, or but as the flower that passes—knowledge in the presence of which Belief has sometimes grown stronger or assumed new forms, but has oftenest become anæmic. Very instructive in this connection is the parallel between our own age and that which saw the mediæval order discredited and forsaken. Our generation has felt the shock of a new revelation of man in his relation to the universe of Time; the close of the Middle Ages saw a new revelation of man in his relation to the universe of Space. One difference, however, is important. Whilst men were so slow to accept

<sup>1</sup> Martineau, *Faith and Self-surrender*, pp. 14–16.



the Copernican theory that Bacon in his day still adhered to the system of Ptolemy, the reception of the truths which have been won by modern research has followed closely upon their discovery. The shock to established beliefs has been more apparent and destructive. We have looked towards the earth on which we live, and have found the proofs of an antiquity so vast that the age of man has shrivelled into insignificance. We have looked towards the heavens, and our eyes have seen myriad multitudes of worlds in the processes of making. We have looked towards man and the long history of man, and the vision of a golden age has vanished; historical criticism has exposed the absurdities of literal inspiration; comparative mythology has explained the myth and the miracle; sociology has presented a vision of nations, races, and civilisations, growing, declining, dying; and science, supreme disillusioniser, has revealed in man, who thought himself heaven-descended, the mark of the ape—in man, who believed himself free, the product of the twin despotism of heredity and environment!

The results upon old beliefs have been profound. To him who looks long and intently upon society to-day, the moralities of our men and women suggest the analogy of a structure, tolerable to look upon, but based on foundations which have been sapped. Not that old beliefs have been wholly falsified, or that they have been superseded by new beliefs demanding a different *morale*. Either of these things might have been: what is apparent is that, from some cause or other, conviction is succeeded by doubts or an apathetic assent, intellectually significant, whilst morally valueless.

Are Belief and Truth then in conflict? To which question we are impelled to answer two things. First, that thought in our times has somewhat confused the relations of fact to truth, so that the one is often taken for the other. There are students of history who perplex their souls to discover whether an enemy ran down this or that side of the hill, when the one important thing to note is that the enemy did run off the hill, and so made room for a more valiant foe. There are

students of politics by whom the fact that their country may err is regarded as a proof that love of country is a barbarous sentiment. There are students of theology to whom the questioning of a miracle is a denial of all revelation. In the second place, though the conflict between Belief and Truth is often imaginary, it is often real. Not absolute truth inspires, but belief in something as true, *for me here and now*. Hence the experience, not without pathos, yet undeniable, of a soul saved from self by belief in the demonstrably false—loyalty to a worthless king, trust in a false lover, religion of the ages before morality.

Love for Truth has given to some the consolations of a faith. "The belief in truth," said Huxley, "is the most sacred and inalienable privilege of man." Yet it is significant that intellectual progress has weakened trust, if not in the beauty of Truth, at least in its attainability. We have been told that nothing can be certainly known; and the most venerated elements of the Christian faith are defended on the ground that they are not more improbable than alternative theories. That the truth of to-day may be proved false to-morrow, all ages have seen; but in none, perhaps, has proof been so clear and indisputable as in our own. And so man, a wanderer in the desert of time, wearied by the sight of visions beautiful receding further and further from him as he presses onwards, wonders if all be not mirage. Moreover, as he looks back over the path he has travelled, it must seem to him that error and falsehood have often contributed to progress, whilst the pursuit of truth has led to disaster; nay, that what is true for the best minds of his own generation might bring death to weaker minds. "Some things which a highly cultivated intelligence would probably discard, and discard without danger," says a sober historian, "are essential to the moral being of multitudes."<sup>1</sup> The inference is natural that many of the cherished beliefs of the most cultured will be despised by posterity. Thus, while to some truth seems undiscoverable, to others

<sup>1</sup> Lecky, *Map of Life*, p. 227.



there comes the paralysing doubt lest truth discovered should destroy faith in human life.

"The wages of sin is death: if the wages of virtue be dust,  
Would she have heart to endure for the life of the worm and the fly?"

Can one speak of Truth as the Hebrew of Jehovah, "Though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him"?

Not wholly for ill, man is strangely illogical, now magnifying the import of new fact, now professing new truth without forsaking the old error with which that truth is at variance. If the majority to-day could only realise the extent to which their old beliefs are attacked by new theories which they profess to accept, the social order would be endangered. We need, accordingly, to take note of the partial or complete exceptions to the statements just expressed. Some men are too absorbed in the necessities of the hour to be troubled by discoveries of any kind. They are impervious to new truth. Others find in good works a means to expel dark doubts. Some minds, strong and pure, seeking to see life steadily and see it whole, are upheld by the hope of a new synthesis which shall reduce all to order, and restore God to Nature and to life. The cure for new knowledge, they say, is more knowledge. Most thoughtful men hope this; but meanwhile, despite exceptions, it remains indisputably true to-day that the vast majority of men have slackened their hold upon older forms of Belief without finding new forms to take their place. Shallow minds seem ready to deny the possibility of more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in their philosophy; and a far greater number, without facing disturbing questions on their own account, are vaguely conscious of doubts and uncertainties which they cannot determine and prefer not to think about.

The people of England and Wales during the last hundred New Wealth. years have increased in number from nine to thirty-three millions. An observer of 1803, foretold of an increase so unprecedented, would have predicted famine. As everyone now knows, *the wealth of the population per head has been*

*doubled!* When thought on, such a result appears truly extraordinary. No one can imagine the consequences which must ensue if the same rate of increase should continue throughout the present century. Probably it will not continue. Nevertheless, since the population is certain to be less prolific than it has been, and since new inventions will continue to add to the productiveness of man's labour, we are justified in assuming a further increase in the total wealth of the country, and even in the wealth of the population per head. The fact is significant, and lends a deeper interest to the question of the influence of new wealth in our own day.

This new wealth may be regarded from different points of view. I propose here to consider its influence upon Belief.

Whoever ponders this question sincerely must conclude that the established beliefs of the mass of the population have been more undermined by new wealth than by new knowledge. The ways in which this result has been brought about deserve attention. The most obvious of all, though not the most important, is the materialising influence of added comforts. Any degree of luxury is better than squalor; yet there are few beyond the reach of squalor who can add to their comforts without losing something of their old enthusiasms. The theme is old; the distinction of our age has been to afford a supremely forcible illustration of its truth.

Reflect, moreover, upon the creation in our time of a new class of wealth-controllers who are free from the checks that accompany inherited wealth, free from the calls that spring from close contact with workmen, and free, perhaps, from the restraints which education or good breeding impose. They are able to bring desolation to thousands as far removed from one another as the ends of the earth. They can command the services of intellect, can buy rank and position, corrupt the honour of public assemblies, and ruin or delude the public by controlling or bribing the press. The dangers which result from such powers find illustration in two particular types, the rich philanthropist and the man who lives for ostentation.



The latter, by his parade, allures the multitude to false ideals of life. Living in a democracy, he sighs for the atmosphere of the court; and when men most need to be taught virtue and independence, he labours to gain acquiescence and homage. On the other hand, the rich philanthropist is hardly less a menace. Largesses, said Montesquieu, are bad in a democracy, because they make men forget that they are citizens. To the millionaire philanthropist, the largess in one form or another is apt to become the breath of life. He may give anonymously or openly: the sight which delights his soul is that of aid offered and accepted. He is too anxious to give to be kind, too wishful to save men to give men a chance of saving themselves, and too intent upon his own self-realisation to take note of the methods which are essential to the self-realisation of those he would help. "The complex network of causes and objects, which beset the path of the honest politician and which trip him up unless his hand is ever finding its way to his pocket, has been woven by the action and reaction of the reckless distribution of money. A subscription once given binds not only the giver but the recipient. *We cannot hear of the benevolence of the rich man without profoundly regretting its necessity.*"<sup>1</sup>

Yet another point of view remains. In all ages the struggle for survival goes on, but in each it assumes a special form. In our own age that form has been largely determined by the increase of our wealth. Hence the deepening of the stain which comes from rivalry in greed. I once lived near a provincial town in Australia where men passed their lives in "a peaceful and decent mediocrity." Into this world of almost Arcadian simplicity came the news of the discovery of gold near at hand. At once a company was formed and shares allotted. Another discovery soon followed, and then others, real or imaginary. Within a month the whole place was transformed. The share market engrossed public conversation. One morning the news went round that a lucky speculator,

<sup>1</sup> *Ethical Democracy*, p. 66.

who had commenced his career on the strength of an overdraft at his banker's, had just completed a *coup* for £50,000. The town became hysterical. In the market-place only one standard existed; and men began to talk with bated breath of the operations of a certain Mr X., a successful grocer of evil reputation, whose earlier ambitions could scarcely have risen beyond the hope of enjoying his ill-gotten gains in obscurity. Something like this has happened on a vast scale in modern life. Wealth has become the supreme object of individual effort, and almost a condition of individual distinction. The whole nation is tainted; and the term "conflict of nations" is so identified with commercial rivalry that we are left to suppose all other kinds of excellence superfluous. Whether men pursue the new prize for its own sake, or for the luxuries which it brings, or for the social position which it assures, the materialising influence of energies devoted to the accumulation of capital have tended to develop a type comparable to the man of whom Jeremy Taylor said that he would rather die twice than lose his fortune once. For no one supposes that the qualities upon which success in the race after wealth depends are very high, morally or intellectually. This is especially so in the case of trade. To keep the safe side of the law, to get as much as one can for as little as one can, to make as much out of a customer as is consistent with retaining him, to be an adept at puffing, to make things appear to be what they are not (often not to deceive the customer, but to enable the customer to deceive others)—these qualities may ensure success, but they do not elevate character. I will not say that trade is corrupt to-day, although I know that many competent judges think that it is. But I do say that the qualities of which I have just spoken absorb a greater part of human life to-day, and are in consequence more potent for evil.

One of many evidences of the influence of new wealth may be found in the growth of the tipping system. Originating in a desire on the part of wealthy people to get more than their share of attention and civility, the system has become an



organised levy which spares no one and curses him that takes more than him who gives. One's own servants, the servants of one's friends, the waiters at the club, hotel, or restaurant, the newsboy, the attendants at shop, theatre, or stores, the railway porter and the guard—all alike practise the arts of exploitation. For the most trifling service payment in coin of the realm is expected or demanded. The growing disinclination to wink the eye save for a pecuniary consideration might be attributed to modern travel; but the evil has spread far and wide. The tradesman of the great cities groans under the despotism of cooks, grooms, and valets, whose patronage can only be purchased by commissions. In some circles, the custom of feeing the host's servants has become so far binding that a man may refuse an invitation to dine, because his means are better suited to the less expensive experience of dining at a first-class restaurant. Such examples might suggest that the practice of receiving tips is confined to one class of the population. Unhappily the whole world of commerce is tainted by the scandal of the secret commission. And in the world of society the same practices exist, though in forms slightly varied. Few, indeed, are the doors, whether leading to great assemblies, historic clubs, or manor houses, which the golden key will not unlock, provided the approach be made not too indecently. Some very plain-speaking folk there are who even call it tipping to exchange a subscription for a peerage.

Most observers will admit the truth of what I have said of the influence of wealth in our day, accusing me of truism rather than paradox. Since, however, some may accuse me of fine talking, thinking, perhaps, that I imagine ill, I am going to submit a few test questions for the reader's reflection. For example, whether our ideas of what is beautiful and desirable are becoming less or more influenced by the thought of costliness? Whether to-day we do not pursue the merely elaborate and expensive, praising pictures which we cannot understand, and raving about the beauty of rare stones which we know we

cannot distinguish from the cheapest counterfeits? Whether, in pursuit of wealth, we do not despise the labourer? Whether we do not say a little too often that this is the vice of the system, not the fault of the individual—sipping our tea, drawing our chairs to the fire, and talking philanthropy with an easy grace and facility while drawing our dividends? Whether in such matters we are not somewhat too prone to find an anodyne for conscience in the subscription list, or in talk of the greatness of empire and commercial prosperity, while all the time we drift slowly down the slope of a virtuous materialism? Whether one class of the community is better than another, or whether in all alike it is not woe to the vanquished, spoils to the victor, and few questions asked? To me, reflecting upon such questions, it sometimes seems that the day is not far distant when our chosen maxims, “Time is money” and “Honesty is the best policy,” will represent the summit of virtuous endeavour. Should such a day dawn, Belief will be dead.

Pleasures.

New pleasures have added in many ways to the happiness of life; their chief effect upon character has been to create “an appetite for more.” Never before has there been so much cause to be reminded of the saying of Pascal that most of the ills of human life came from inability to sit still in a room. The demand for the circus and the chariot-race has become imperative. *The Churches bow to the new despotism*: religious services are made “attractive”; sermons, short, pithy, and seasoned; music and ceremonial, abundant and spectacular. *The Press bows to the new despotism*: the long article and the discourse make way for more entertaining matter; and the great part of home reading appears to be in that part of the newspaper which is devoted to “News,” to crimes, to fashions, to personalia, to scandals, social and political, and in general to sensational or extravagant details designed to gratify a prurient appetite. *Literature bows to the new despotism*: whilst our ancestors read the Bible, we read the novelette; and whilst much good literature is published in the course of



each decade, the average is not inspiring or useful, is indeed trifling, in enmity alike to good taste and sound thinking. Whatever additions new pleasures have made to the happiness of life, their general effect upon character has been hostile in proportion as individuals or classes have come under their influence. In pretence of a full life, we lead an empty one. The joy of peace and the strength which comes of calm reflection, banished from the work-hour by the intensity of the competitive struggle, are driven from the hour of leisure by the unrelenting pursuit of diversion.

Some observers, while ready to admit the truth in essence The Outlook. of all that I have said, will urge that I have dwelt too much upon the merely transitional, forgetful that new possessions are new opportunities for a higher life which shall be ours in the fulness of time. Doubtless, every one who thinks about the matter shares this hope for the future. We dare not forget, however, that such hopes have not been always realised in the history of past civilisations. Witness the degradation of Athens, the fall of Imperial Rome. The sphere of human temptation widens with the progress of the race, even where progress is most real. Thus liberty won meant licence made possible. No machinery wrought by man, however cunningly devised, can enable a race to secure the fruits of its labours without entering into a heritage of new problems and temptations. Our new possessions *may* hereafter prove aids to older beliefs or lead to new beliefs which shall take the place of the old; it remains true that they have been indisputably hostile to the old, and that hopes for a different influence in the future derive little support from a survey of the life of our own time.

#### SOME ILLUSTRATIONS.

The power of what we have gained over what we believe may be judged by taking particular beliefs and asking how much they mean to us.

(1) Rank.

*We have lost belief in Rank:* doubtless in some respects a gain ; certainly in others a loss. " I would rather be a peasant and reverence a lord, than be a politician and reverence nothing."<sup>1</sup> And man in past ages has learnt more than reverence in the great school of rank. The divine right of the squire had an even deeper social meaning than the divine right of the king, for the squire was always at hand. The fiction of noble blood, hallowed by religion, supported by a personal prowess, and impressed upon the imagination by the grace of manner and costume, was finally enforced by the might of the civil power. To-day the social value of rank sinks to insignificance. The spread of knowledge and the growth of plutocracy have undermined the foundations of class supremacy. Although we are far from social equality, although we still have classes, the power of class to train men to reverence is lacking. Envy, not reverence, is the plant that thrives in the soil of a plutocratic society.

(2) The Family.

*We have lost belief in the Family.* Here is a fact, regard it as we may—with complacency, if we think the family a relic of barbarism ; with dismay, if we are of those who doubt whether there be any power in the modern world which shall do the work which has been done by the family in the making of human character in the past. Regard the fact as we may, it is present in the most visible form, a proof irresistible of the power of new possessions. In thought, the tendency has been, at any rate until days very recent, manifestly individualistic. The voice of the Ego is heard throughout the land ; and the right of the individual has seemed more to us than the claim of society. The influence upon the integrity of the family is shown in the avoidance of parentage, and in the growth of a theory of marriage as a contract between two individuals which may be rescinded at their pleasure. The notion that a husband and wife who have ceased to love one another should continue to live together, in the interests of social standards and social morality, is condemned as disloyalty

<sup>1</sup> Fergusson, *Religion of Democracy*.



to the Ego. Whether the movement appear to us as a beautiful passionate pleading for the union of hearts, or rather as an ignoble elevation of inclination and caprice into a law of life, it is upon us, continuing and to continue.

New wealth, if we look at it in conjunction with attendant industrial change, has exerted a deeper influence. Migrations, social instability generally, divide the family and destroy its continuity. Supremely, the age of the great cities is upon us. In vain preachers proclaim that God made the country. In vain reformers cry, "Back to the land." The relatively limited demand for the products of the soil, the relatively unlimited demand for manufactures, have driven the multitude to seek their livelihood in the city by the force of an argument which defies rhetoric and laughs at preference. But the whole atmosphere of the modern city is charged with influences which are hostile to the family. In the large community, the separate identity of the smaller group is lost. The lodging-house, the flat, the factory, the streets, and the various forms of social activity or dissipation, weaken the family tie and destroy the family tradition. Other causes work towards the same end. The intense competition of modern life tells for a lower birth-rate. Modern legislation, by making the State responsible for education, has appreciably weakened the sense of parental responsibility; by sanctioning divorce, has made marriage less sacred; and by protecting womankind, has created a rival to marriage in the shape of a career for women. The general result appears to be that the family will continue to exist, but with less of the power to give to men and women the sense of something to live for.

*Have we lost Belief in Nature?* Strange question in an (3) Nature. age of Nature study! Yet study is quite other than Belief; and what men have newly learned of Nature has brought to some despair, to others a state of mind which recalls the words used by James I. in the proclamation suppressing Cowell's *Interpreter*: "This later age and times of the world wherein we are fallen . . . hath bred such an insatiable curiosity in

many men's spirits, and such an itching in the tongues and pens of most men, as nothing is left unsearched to the bottom both in talking and writing. For from the very highest mysteries of the Godhead and the most inscrutable counsels of the Trinity, to the very lowest pit of Hell, and the confused actions of the devils there, there is nothing now unsearched into by the curiosity of men's brains." There are some to-day who appear to think as James that all things are searched to the bottom. The effect upon their minds of scientific discoveries, classifications, and vocabularies has been to induce a foolish sense of comprehension and conquest which ignores how little we know or can know of the deeper mysteries of Nature. Yet it may seem to profit a man little that he can see through a piece of wood, if he lose his vision beyond it; or that he can do battle with the storm-cloud, if he shall lose the spirit which breathed in the prayer of the Breton seaman, "Help me, O God, for my bark is so small and Thy ocean is so vast."

What we have newly learnt of Nature has affected Belief in a more dangerous way. Men may easily recover from a foolish exaltation. Will they as easily recover from the effects of that emphasis which the research and discovery of our times have laid upon the darker side of Nature? In childlike faith man thought Nature beautiful; he finds her red in tooth and claw. He perhaps thought her kind, all-loving; he finds her stern and pitiless. He thought himself the centre of the universe; he learns that he is but a drop in the vast ocean of being. He thought life sacred; he learns that the law of life is the preying of higher forms upon lower. How shall he reverence this law?

Such causes may leave untouched the great unreflecting multitude of men who neither can nor wish to look on things as they are. But upon this multitude another fate waits, that of divorce from Nature. It is not easy to say how far the people of a country-side are raised in spirit by a life in constant and intimate relation with Nature, but assuredly it is not for



nought that a man shall breathe the air of the meadows and the hill-tops, see the sun in the heavens, watch its rising and setting, and witness each year the coming of spring and the falling of the leaf in autumn. He who lives ever in close touch with Nature stands in no need of fine phrases to love her. He may revere her, may be dumbly conscious of her power and her beauty, may feel the impulse from a vernal wood, although he knows no letter of the alphabet.

“A wanderer is man from his birth.  
He was born in a ship  
On the breast of the river of Time;  
Brimming with wonder and joy  
He spreads out his arms to the light,  
Rivets his gaze on the banks of the stream.  
*As what he sees is, so have his thoughts been.*”<sup>1</sup>

But if this be true, what Belief in Nature can there be for the ever-increasing multitudes who toil in the cities, who sleep in suburban villas where stuccoed frontages are crowded together in long, monotonous streets, who go to their work along crowded thoroughfares, to the screeching accompaniment of the train or the tram, and spend their days in the labour of the factory, the office, or the shop? What can Nature be to them? Surely little more than a name. They scarce see her in her diviner moods. The vasty deep, mountain and cliff, glacier and canon, the blush of dawn, the hues of the sunset, the leafy lane and the song of the thrush—these are to them faint echoes from the poet's page, the catalogues of the museum, or the hysterics of a bank holiday. They do not miss, for they can never know, the comradeship of Nature.

*We have lost Belief in the God of our Fathers.* “A man's (4)Religion,” said Carlyle, “consists not of the many things he is in doubt of and tries to believe, but of the few he is assured of and has no need of effort for believing.” Belief in God means something other than hazy uncertainties, admissions of a probability, barren assents; something other, also, than an ecstasy undisturbed by morality. The Belief

<sup>1</sup> Matthew Arnold.

has declined: to the priest this is a call to arms; to the historian, a tendency to be explained.

New knowledge is in part answerable. The old religion gave men a theory of human life. It affirmed the exactitude of Genesis, the sovereignty of God, the Divinity of Christ, the hope of Heaven, and the stern reality of Hell. All these were bound together in one great system. What has become of them? To talk of Hell to-day is hardly polite, and I have the assurance of one pastor that he dared not speak of it. "My people wouldn't stand it for a moment." The cosmogony of the older theologians is a jest; the educated man no longer discusses the exactitude of Genesis. Most men either think of Christ as philosopher and saint—or think of Him not at all. Finally, while without the churches men profess a tolerant agnosticism which admits that anything *may* be true of God, but that nothing can be *known* to be true, the world within the churches, after surviving the attack of science from without, is undergoing the more severe ordeal of historical criticism from within.

Let us look at the facts a little more closely. A vast population never go to church at all. These include many religious people; they include also a floating population ready to fasten upon the latest *ism*, the trickeries of the *séance*, or the vain imaginings of some dreamy æstheticism. But the great majority of them are frankly indifferent. On the other hand, a portion of the population do go to church—in London apparently about one person in four. But what does their attendance really mean? Not much, if we take the opinion of the outside world. There always have been men who thought the less of one for going to church: the number of such men increases. Perhaps the churches have gone too much their own way, and have clung too much to traditional methods. At any rate they have lost credit with the outside world. The non-church-goer explains them, patronises them, despises or is indifferent to them.

Of course the outside world, with its very human and



quite ineradicable instinct for self-justification, may judge unfairly. Yet if we take the word of many leaders within the churches, we abate the censure in detail rather than substance. Take from an average congregation those who attend from an uneasy sense of duty, from motives of convenience, from instincts of inherited habit, vanity, or of sociability, from appreciation of what pays, or perhaps from a willingness to

"Compound for sins they are inclined to  
By damning those they have no mind to,"

and what remains of the congregation? A few there may be who show in their lives the mystic power of the older faith; the vast majority are not religious in the Puritan sense. Their morality is based upon prudence, habit, and the fear of their neighbour's censure, rather than upon deep convictions of any kind. I do not think that the years that have passed since Emerson spoke have done aught but add force to his censure: "There is Faith in chemistry, in meat and wine, in wealth, in machinery, in the steam-engine, galvanic battery, turbine-wheels, sewing-machines, and in public opinion, but not in divine causes. A silent revolution has loosened the tension of the old religious sects, and in place of the gravity and permanence of those societies of opinion, they run into freak and extravagance. . . . Not knowing what to do, we ape our ancestors; the churches stagger backward to the mummeries of the dark ages. By the irresistible maturing of the general mind, the Christian traditions have lost their hold."<sup>1</sup>

I have spoken of the influence of what we have gained over what we believe. Make reservations as one may, it remains true that for the community knowledge has not brought wisdom, wealth and pleasure have not beautified life, and the influence of new possessions as a whole has been to undermine old beliefs without substituting new ones. I do not pretend that men to-day are wholly wanting in moral

<sup>1</sup> Essay on Worship.

uprightness, or that Religion, Nature, Rank, and the Family have lost all meaning. But I *do* contend that our honesty and morals generally are based upon prudence or habit, and lack that spiritual basis upon which alone the hope of generations can rest. The student of social life to-day may well be reminded of the reflections of the great historian who closed his work on the Middle Ages in the following remarkable words: "If it were not for the conviction that, however prolific and progressive the evil may have been, the power of good is more progressive and more prolific, the chronicler of a system that seems to be vanishing might lay down his pen with a heavy heart. The most enthusiastic admirer of mediæval life must grant that all that was good and great in it was languishing even to death; and the firmest believer in progress must admit that as yet there were few signs of returning health. The sun of the Plantagenets went down in clouds and thick darkness; the coming of the Tudors gave as yet no promise of light; it was 'as the morning spread upon the mountains,' darkest before the dawn."<sup>1</sup> If a new and brighter dawn be for us or for those who come after us, the first condition of its coming is surely that we recognise things as they are, and mistake not our darkness for light.

W. JETHRO BROWN.

ABERYSTWYTH.

<sup>1</sup> Stubbs, *Constitutional History*, iii. p. 613.



## NORTH ARABIA AND THE BIBLE:<sup>1</sup> A DEFENCE.

DR HUGO WINCKLER.

FOR more than ten years it has been clear that the Assyrian inscriptions bring before us the name of a country, which, through the variety of its possible significations, could not but open the door to manifold misunderstandings. It is the designation Muşri, which, so far as can be seen at present, is applied to four different countries. Two of these, however, are not very often referred to, and one is only once mentioned, viz. by Shalmaneser II., who states that he had received ambassadors from Muşri, who brought him presents. That this Muşri is situated in E. Asia, is evident from the fact that two-humped camels are represented on the bas-reliefs. But for this critics of the non-Assyriological order would doubtless have instructed us long ago that such a presupposition belongs to the realm of the "imagination." Greater preciseness as to the situation of the country need not here be aimed at. The object of the Muşrite embassy was probably to form a political connection with Shalmaneser after he had become suzerain of *Babylon*, a connection which is not without significance with regard to the commercial relations in that period.

The second land of Muşri, too, is only of importance for a special student of the history of Nearer Asia, and is rarely

<sup>1</sup> As the title indicates, this article is partly a supplement to the article "Babylon and the Bible," *Hibbert Journal*, October 1903. See especially pp. 79, 80.

mentioned. We meet with it in the inscriptions of Tiglath-Pileser I. (c. 1100 B.C.) and Shalmaneser II. (ninth century). It is the designation of S. Cappadocia—of a region which at that time owned the authority of the Hatti, and which adjoined the ancient seat of that people by the Halys. If this Muşri has a more general interest, it is because it has once been referred to by an Old Testament writer, though at a later time the name Muşr became Mişraim (*i.e.* Egypt). The passage is 2 Kings vii. 6, where the Damascene besiegers of Samaria take to flight because they believe that “the king of Israel has hired the kings of the Hittim and the kings of Mişraim (but read Muşri) to fall upon us.” The combination Hittim and Muşri (*i.e.* S. Cappadocia) is free from all ambiguity, for the reading “the kings (!) of Egypt” would be absurd. In fact, throughout the Biblical notices we can trace a good acquaintance with the actual circumstances of the times. Take another passage, 1 Kings x. 28 (= 2 Chron. i. 16). This passage too has become intelligible as a consequence of the recognition of a Muşri, *i.e.* S. Cappadocia, to the north of Cilicia, to which the Assyrians gave the name Kuë. It runs, “and the export of the horses through (!) Solomon took place from Mişraim *u mkwh*.” Here the last group of letters was unintelligible, and it was assumed—but without producing a connection thereby—that the text had a word *miḳweh*, or else, following the LXX., the emendation *mittekoa* (“from Tekoa”) was made. Acquaintance with a Muşri in Asia Minor which adjoined the land of Kuë, at once suggested the right interpretation—“the export of horses took place from *Muşri and Kuë*.” This land was called Sangara by the Egyptians as early as the second millennium B.C., and Cilicia, as a Persian province, is still famous for its horses in Herodotus. It is also noteworthy that, just as at the siege of Samaria it is presupposed that Muşri and Hittim are the opponents of Aram (Damascus), so here commercial relations are mentioned as existing equally with the kings of the Hittim and the kings of Aram.



The confusion of countries made by later scribes is easily accounted for. The present writer is not aware that anyone has questioned it, and he would leave it to each of his readers to decide the matter, which requires no other gift but that of a healthy common sense. There are, however, other questions connected with the name of Muşri, the decision of which presupposes the recognition of the possibility of such confusions. Of course, in debating such matters one assumes that this possibility is granted, and that the only question is whether in the third case, which is certainly not so simple as the other two, the existence of a fresh land of Muşri can be proved from the monuments or not. For if this is so, the possibility of a mention of this land in the Old Testament will have to be determined in each case taken by itself. The argument will then cease to have reference to the monuments: it will be purely historical. Nor is there any reason why people should not differ in opinion on such a point as well as on the interpretation of so many Biblical passages. Those, therefore, who argue against finding this third Muşri in the Old Testament seek in the first instance to show that there is no evidence for its existence in the monuments, a course which, if successful, would cut away the ground for the explanation of Biblical passages in this sense.

The present dispute relates to the fact observed by myself that the name Muşri is given in the Assyrian inscriptions not only to Egypt but also to the land which on the south adjoins Judea and Edom, and stretches towards the Sinaitic peninsula and Arabia. The northern boundary is formed by the *naḥal Muşri*, as the watercourse referred to is designated by the Assyrians; it is the *naḥal Mişraim* of the Old Testament. The region in question is one which is not regarded (or at least not in particular cases in which it is mentioned) as belonging to Egypt, but has princes of its own. In any case, therefore, there must have been times when this region formed an independent territory, and played a rôle of its own in history, so that we both can and must speak

of two lands of Muşri, viz. of that in N. Arabia and of Egypt.

Since the establishment of this fact by me, it has not (so far as I know) been denied by any of those scholars who are authorities in ancient Oriental history. An adverse judgment has indeed been pronounced by one scholar who is thoroughly at home in the Assyrian inscriptions, but the initiated will bear me out when I say that he has no head for those questions which require the training of a historian. We shall see, however, that this scholar's adverse judgment only proves that he has as little comprehension of this as of other historical questions. Professor Peter Jensen, to whom I refer, stands alone in his contradiction; all other recognised authorities on the cuneiform inscriptions have admitted the fact of the existence of a N. Arabian Muşri.

It therefore gives a shock to those who work at cuneiform when Dr E. A. Wallis Budge, in the preface to volume vi. of his *History of Egypt*, takes a course which is fitted to confuse the minds of those who are not Assyriologists. Instead of discussing the Old Testament passages with the view of determining which of the two lands of Muşri is meant in each case, he adopts the plan of denying the distinction altogether. And he does this not on the ground of fresh material in his hands or of information on which one might defer to his judgment, but simply because he gives a different interpretation to the passages of the inscriptions which the specialists understand precisely as I do. This, I repeat, is most surprising, because, as will have to be shown presently, Dr Budge lacks that familiarity with the cuneiform monuments which is a necessary condition of an independent judgment on such questions.

But before we test Dr Budge's criticisms, it is indispensable to lay down the principles which have to govern the decision of the question before us, and perhaps I may add that clearness on first principles has again and again to be insisted upon in the discussion of problems of the ancient



East. Too often does it appear that learned and clever men who have taken much trouble about the *Wissenschaft* of Oriental antiquity do not in all cases satisfy the preliminary conditions of a fruitful and mutually beneficial discussion of historical points. The conditions referred to have relation to clearness of thought and soundness of historical judgment.

First of all, this general assumption may be made. If a critic rejects the conclusions which another scholar upon definite presuppositions has formed, he must keep to this scholar's own statements, and not bring them into connection with the views of other persons. Or if he does this, he must at least distinguish clearly between different views, especially when the persons referred to, while agreeing in the main point, occupy in other respects very different standpoints. Therefore when Dr Budge, with perfect justice, attacks me as the founder of the hypothesis, he ought not to draw into the debate views of Hommel which differ from my own. And when he refers the reader to the consequences for the Bible, I am of course only responsible for my own conclusions, and not for those which rest upon the entirely different critical principles of Professor Hommel, or for those which, again upon different principles, Professor Cheyne<sup>1</sup> put forward *after* the appearance of my original summing-up of my own researches on Muşri.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, Dr Budge has no right to wind up his criticism thus: "The curious reader, who is anxious to see the views of other writers upon

<sup>1</sup> To prevent even a shadow of misunderstanding, we refer here to Prof. Cheyne's statements in the *Hibbert Journal*, July 1903, p. 755, with notes 1-3, and October 1903, p. 79, where he distinctly states his indebtedness to Dr Winckler's earlier researches (in 1898) as to Muşri and Kûsh in the Old Testament.—Ed.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Cheyne says himself (*Critica Biblica*, iv. p. 380): ". . . . relies, as I venture to think, unduly on the Massoretic text. The same remark applies to Winckler. Until these critics have done more justice to the new point of view in Old Testament criticism," etc. I am indebted to the writer of these words for a generous and unselfish recognition (elsewhere) of my endeavours, and am all the more grateful because he, though not my countryman, was the first scholar to "stand in the breach" on my behalf.

the work and methods of Dr Winckler and the adoption of his results by Professor Cheyne, may consult," etc. Especially out of place is it, when the matter relates to questions of Biblical criticism, on which the writer of those words has not purchased the right to speak, and when, over and above this, the Biblical passages cited by *me*, in part at least, not only (as I maintain) receive their explanation from the new hypothesis, but also lay claim to be independent proofs, of equal value with those derived from the monuments. Let the reader turn back to what has been said here on the Cappadocian Muşri in the Bible, and judge whether the explanation there given of the Biblical passages does not constitute a fresh proof of the existence of this very Muşri.

In not a few other cases, it seems to me that I have provided a very simple and natural explanation of Biblical passages, which, if Egypt, and not the N. Arabian Muşri, is the country referred to, are unintelligible. Thus from the first I had pointed out that this Muşri coincides in part with a region which adjoins Philistia, and presumably was at one time in the possession of the Philistines. No critical mind can fail to admit the identity of the narratives in Gen. xx. on the one hand and chap. xxvi. on the other. Exactly the same incident is related in the one case with reference to Abraham and Abimelech of Gerar, the "king of the Philistines," and in the other with reference to Isaac and the "Pharaoh." It is no explanation that the twofold explanation of Muşri accounts for the transference of the scene of the story *in the old tradition itself*. It would be to mistake the meaning of the genealogical legends altogether to suppose that Hagar, who flees into the "Negeb" (*i.e.* to the region of our Muşri), can possibly take a wife for her son Ishmael, the ancestor of the *Arabs*, from *Egypt*, and not from Muşri (Gen. xxi. 21). And when one of David's heroes (2 Sam. xxiii. 21) kills a gigantic "Mişrite," how can this word mean Egyptian? An excellent sense, however, is produced if "Mişrite" means "man of Muşri," for David performed his first exploits as leader of a band of



warriors in the region of Muşri. And the passages which I have *myself* claimed for the N. Arabian Muşri (see *KAT*<sup>(3)</sup>,<sup>1</sup> pp. 146 f.) still appear to me—with all respect to those who differ—unintelligible, or even absurd, if Egypt be the country intended.

The same remark may be made with reference to the Arabian Kûsh. If Muşri is argued out of existence, the existence of Kûsh in the Old Testament must also be denied. That Kûsh does exist, however, has long ago been seen by others; Glaser, for instance, has treated of it at length.<sup>2</sup> My own efforts have been limited to finding proofs for it in the inscriptions. Whether these have been successful (Dr Budge of course denies it), need not be inquired. The witness of the Old Testament itself is sufficient. For here we require no change of reading or interpretation to permit us to keep the *Arabian* Kûsh. All that we need is to put aside prejudice. Unless, indeed, Biblical evidence suddenly loses its value when it is inconsistent with the judgment of a kind of “science” which poses as “sober” and “moderate”!

The grounds brought forward by Dr Budge—after not a few predecessors—are these. When a writer speaks of Kûsh in Arabia this is only “a vague topographical indication.” See, however, 2 Chron. xxi. 16. We read here of “the Arabians who are beside the Kushites,” surely a very definite statement respecting a definite section of the Arabians. Had the Chronicler meant to be “vague,” he had no occasion to add those defining words. And if “Zerah the Kushite” (2 Chron. xiv. 9) is to be a king of Ethiopia, the historian of Egypt ought of course to have given a few words showing how this Ethiopian king could possibly have intervened in the affairs of Palestine. At the very least the question should have been discussed, whether at the time referred to Egypt was under

<sup>1</sup> Readers of the article “Babylon and the Bible,” *Hibbert Journal*, October 1903, will find the symbol *KAT*<sup>(3)</sup>, explained (p. 69), and the importance of the work set forth.

<sup>2</sup> See his *Skizze der Geographie Arabiens*, ii.

Ethiopian rule (as it afterwards was under Sabako and Taharkä) or not. But for the proof of this one seeks in vain in Dr Budge's work, as well as in other Histories of Egypt.

At present, however, the Arabian Kûsh of the Old Testament serves rather to explain cuneiform passages than *vice versa*. It is therefore needless to spend time on Dr Budge's arguments against my own explanation of these passages. As we have seen, the belief in an Arabian Kûsh obviously exists in the Old Testament, and is of ancient date.

The most essential thing is, in opposition to Dr Budge, to prove the N. Arabian Muşri from the cuneiform texts. I have already remarked that its existence has, so far as I know, been accepted by all competent judges, but that doubts may be entertained as to some passages in the texts. This I am all the more willing to grant, because no one has wavered oftener and longer, and more carefully weighed the "pros" and "cons" in each separate case, than I have done.

But before we consider the most important and decisive passages there is another question to be considered, on which all scholars do not seem to be clear. And the example already referred to—of the single expert who has raised his voice in contradiction of the N. Arabian Muşri—appears to show that a want of clearness of thought may prevent the question as a whole from being rightly apprehended. For my part, I have deliberately abstained from deciding the question, what is the ground of the occurrence of the same name in two neighbouring countries, and on good and sufficient grounds I still abstain. If the two other lands of Muşr did not exist, and if the right estimate of the entire geographical nomenclature of the ancient East were not quite different from what modern ideas would lead us to suppose,<sup>1</sup> I should accept the possibilities presently to be mentioned as certainties. As things are, I can only set them forth as *possibilities*, but this is immaterial for the *practical* question; all that is required for this is to ascertain *whether* the distinction is made, not how it is to be explained.

<sup>1</sup> See *KAT*<sup>(3)</sup>, pp. 177–182.



In fact, we must keep this well in view—that we are concerned here with definite historical cases, with political states, not with the name *Muṣr* and its philological meaning, and not with the *explanation* of its occurrence in these separate cases. For the political significance of the *modern* conception “*Allemagne*,” “*Germany*,” or “*England*,” it is indifferent how the countries referred to came to bear these names, and what these names may have signified in other times. We are speaking now of Biblical antiquity, *i.e.* of the period from the ninth century B.C. downwards; that is, we have to do with a definite political phenomenon. How this is to be accounted for, from what conditions of primitive times this, like every such phenomenon, is to be explained, is for our purpose, even if not quite unimportant, yet at any rate not decisive.

Now, as to the “possibilities.” It is conceivable (1) that we have to do with a name (*Muṣr*) which goes back to an Old-Babylonian geographical system, and was given to several countries; (2) that one of these two historical explanations may be given of the name: (*a*) the coincidence of the names is accidental, and (*b*) the name was transferred, historically, from one country to another in an early period when the two regions were connected, so that when separation took place it could bear two senses.

The latter case is historically quite intelligible. The North Arabian region referred to belonged for a considerable time to Egypt, and, indeed, theoretically was never given up by Egypt. One might therefore suppose that originally the part of Arabia which belonged to Egypt equally received the name *Muṣr*, and that when it became independent it retained the designation. Professor Jensen, however, has not been able to see this. He urges against me that “*Miṣraim*, as little as *Muṣri*, needs to be a precise and exclusive designation of the land of the Nile. The Egyptian rule extended often to the border of Palestine.” This is the only contradiction offered by an Assyriological expert, and it expresses in other words and with less clearness,

so far as the facts outside of the Old Testament are concerned, nothing which everyone would not admit as obvious, and also nothing that touches the present question.

There is also, however, this possibility—that the name was transferred, not from Egypt to our Muşri, but *vice versa*. This view gains in probability if we hold the name to have had originally an appellative meaning (“frontier-region”). Unparalleled it would certainly not be; for Muşri (or Mişir) for Egypt is a designation which is certainly not of Egyptian but of foreign origin. The case will therefore be like that of “Allemagne”; “Preussen,” too (both province and state), may be compared, though here the case is different. The first case would be that of “Bretagne” (now French), and all three should be recalled to mind by anyone who finds the whole distinction difficult to understand.

The chief point, however, is, I repeat, the evidence from the inscriptions, *i.e.* the fact that the region referred to bore the name Muşri at a definite time when it did not belong to Egypt, but was under princes of its own, and that consequently it was distinguished from Egypt. To prove this, I may refer to the passage from which I started myself, and which speaks so clearly that to discuss the possibility of another view of it would be, in my opinion, a proof of unacquaintance with the preliminary exegetical conditions. Let us, then, not dispute about this. Authorities on Oriental history and its sources agree that another opinion would be impossible.

The passage occurs in the inscriptions of Tiglath-Pileser III. In it this king states that he has appointed the *Arabian* Idibi'il as *kêpu* over Muşri. What a *kêpu* is, I have repeatedly explained.<sup>1</sup> It is a pure Assyrian word, and is used for particular functionaries. We find *kepâni* set over cities and regions. Evidently they are rather civil than military officials. They were directly subordinate to the king, and consequently had

<sup>1</sup> See the first page of the first examination of the question, *Altorientalische Forschungen*, i. p. 24.



control of the governor (*šaknu*) of a province, or of the prince of a tributary state; in a word, he was something like an English political resident. In the infancy of our *Wissenschaft* it was usual to explain the word by the mention of a *kēpu* in the legend of the Descent of Ištar, when this person was taken to be the "porter," whereas he is really to be understood as the *major domus*; hence it was considered that the *kēpu* of Tiglath-Pileser held the position of "porter of Mušri." Now, instead of seeking advice from Assyriological authorities, Dr Budge has actually adopted this naïve view to justify making Idibi'il a "warden of the marches." Of course, if one gives the words of the inscription a different sense, one comes to different results, but for my part, having brought the true meaning of the title clearly from the first, I am afraid that I cannot receive instruction on the point from those who have adopted the false one. A *kēpu* is *not* the inspector of a *frontier-land*, but may be met with everywhere. Therefore if a *kēpu* is set over Mušri, it follows (1) that this land is under Assyrian suzerainty, (2) that *kēpu* is a special administrative term, and (3) that Mušri is the land committed to his care, while he himself is certainly not the guardian of the frontier, residing outside of this land. In political life an office is designated by the land with which it is concerned, not by that with which it is *not* concerned. This excludes Egypt, and even any part of Egypt, for Tiglath-Pileser had nothing to do with this country. It must be an Arabian country over which an Arabian is appointed—at least till there is clear proof of the contrary. To make this doubly sure, we have a similar testimony for the Arabian region close to Mušri-Aribi; for the same Assyrian king relates, "A *kēpu* over her (*i.e.* Queen Samsi of Aribi) I set." Is this, pray, another "warden of the marches"? And if the queen of the land is mentioned here, but not in Mušri, I would explain this by the circumstance that Mušri at that time had no king, but only "kings," *i.e.* sheikhs.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Esarhaddon too speaks of "kings of Aribi" in this sense, on occasion of his march through Meluḫḫa.

That Meluhḥa is not Ethiopia, but a part of Arabia, is now accepted. Dr Budge thinks it useless to try to get much further, though he himself is inclined to identify it with the Sinaitic peninsula and Midian. Obviously it is immaterial for our question how far to the north and south Meluhḥa extended. Magan and Meluhḥa are primitive designations, which have rather a geographical than a political significance. Both together designate the whole of Arabia. When, therefore, Jaman of Ashdod flees *ana ite Muṣuri sa pat Meluhḥa*, i.e. "to the borders of Muṣur, which lies beside (before) Meluhḥa,"<sup>1</sup> it will be simply nonsense to understand here Egypt. For Egypt is Egypt, as Elam is Elam, and Urartu Urartu, as England is England and France France. Where that country lies, there is no occasion to say. Let us suppose a parallel Latin sentence, such as "Effugit in Britanniam quæ est in confiniis Galliæ." Plainly one would infer from the appendix that not the well-known Great Britain was meant, but the French Brittany. Dr Budge is willing to grant that Meluhḥa is W. Arabia. But if so, "Egypt by the Sinaitic peninsula" is not less absurd than "London by Richmond" or "Berlin by Charlottenburg." Even the Assyrians were not so tasteless as to define the known by the unknown. And if it be granted that Meluhḥa is to be sought in Arabia, that its peoples are *Arabian*, then it is impossible that in the year 701 help should have been brought to Palestine by "kings of Muṣri and troops of the king of Meluhḥa," if Muṣri is not analogous to Meluhḥa; for an army in the field must have been set in motion by two closely connected states. Dr Budge is so ill-informed on the whole question that he has not noticed that, to make his argument valid, he had to prove the equation "Meluhḥa = Ethiopia" (i.e. Nubia).

The whole matter had been long treated by me in this sense before I became enabled, as I thought, to provide un-historical eyes with a proof of the distinction between Muṣri and Egypt, by finding these two countries mentioned together

<sup>1</sup> For the further connection see *KAT*<sup>(3)</sup>, p. 137.



in a fragment of an inscription of Esarhaddon. We read there, in a connection which cannot now be made out, these words, *mat mu-uš-ri u mat mi-is . . . .* It seemed to me at first that the last word ought to be read *mi-iš(-ri)*, *i.e.* that the inscription gave the Babylonian form of the name of Egypt (in Assyrian Mušri). I personally laid no stress on this, since my mind was made up without its help. The discovery, as I have said, could only be welcome to me as a proof for those who were blind to the connection of things, and needed evidence of this kind.

But the unmingled joy of life is not granted to the epigraphist. Again and again it happens that fragments of tablets are broken away at the very point where we expect a disclosure from them. Long before the appearance of Dr Budge's volume, I had often pointed out to fellow-scholars that not only *Mi-iš(-ri)*, but also *Mi-lu(h-ha)*, was epigraphically possible. Now it appears from Dr Budge's Preface that he has ascertained—through whose examination of the tablet he does not say—that at the point where the break occurs, behind the sign "*iš*," there is the trace of the head of a second wedge. This would exclude the reading "*iš*," and so the supplementation "*lu(h)*" would gain greatly in probability.<sup>1</sup> I have not myself been in a position to examine the matter, but would simply refer to what I said in print before the appearance of Dr Budge's volume. It will be seen from this that the same considerations which occur to the outsider often occur to the expert, but that it frequently happens that scruples and difficulties present themselves to his mind, of which the outsider does not dream.<sup>2</sup> The name Meluhha occurs hundreds of times in the inscriptions. It is an Old-Babylonian designation, which in the times which concern us here has only a historical right, *i.e.* has become a geographical designation. The mode of writing, as usual in most names of this sort, is ideographic, although originally it was phonetic.

<sup>1</sup> [Cp. H. W. Hogg, *Encyclopædia Biblica*, col. 4529, note 5.]

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *KAT*<sup>90</sup>, p. 145, note 3.

Me-luḥ-ḥa is therefore a fixed form of writing in good cuneiform, and undergoes no changes. Thus we never find *Me-luḥ-ḥi* or *Me-luḥ-ḥu*. Similarly its counterpart Magan is constantly written with a defining sign for *ma* (= *elippu*, "ship"), never with the ordinary *ma*. In the case of both words the mode of writing is just as fixed as the orthography of any word of our own; a deviation from it is simply a scribal error. Anyone who works at cuneiform will confirm this.

Now, it is beyond doubt that everywhere, even at the Assyrian court, scribes are liable to such errors. In the case before us, however, we shall then have to suppose that the same unkind spirit, who made Esarhaddon's scribe commit such a mistake as in English "Ingland" instead of "England" would be, went on to break off the clay tablet at the very place where doubt became possible. That would be enough chance and to spare for one occasion, but such combinations of accidents do no doubt occur, and we might thus be dispensed from laying stress on Assyrian orthography. But has the unkind spirit done all his work yet? By no means. In the inscriptions of Esarhaddon we find as much mention of Muṣri as of Meluḥḥa, and so too in those of Assurbanipal (where Muṣri always means Egypt); but a connection in which Muṣri and Meluḥḥa are specified together in the way that would have to be supposed here, has not yet come before us in the other inscriptions.

But, be that as it may, my own treatment of the Muṣri question did not start from this passage, nor does it seek confirmation from it, so that the only persons who lose anything by the revised reading of it are those for whose benefit I cited it, *i.e.* those who do not feel themselves in a position to attach weight to the other arguments.

Remarkably enough, Dr Budge confuses the question by drawing into it the opinion of Professor Hommel respecting the *abar nahrân* of the Minæan inscriptions, without taking any notice of my own acceptance of the phrase. Is this



right? Ought a person who has never read one line of a S. Arabian inscription to talk of an improved theory respecting the high antiquity of the Minæan inscription? Why, this very unproved theory is most distinctly accepted by all who are conversant with the question, or at least is not controverted by any.<sup>1</sup> But this does not exhaust my complaint. Either Dr Budge has not read what I have written on the Minæan *abar nahrân*, or he has not understood it, for otherwise he would not, in his zeal to convict Professor Hommel of an error, have attacked a view which I have myself corrected, and which has nothing at all to do with my own. I am bound to point out that it was I who called attention to the designation of Syria as *ebir nari*<sup>2</sup> which occurs in Assyrian inscriptions (and is, of course, very much older). Having myself seen the clay tablet, I knew that it came from the New-Assyrian period. I then ascertained that the fragment in question was to be connected with two others, and came from a treaty of Esarhaddon with King Baal of Tyre.

All this Dr Budge overlooks. He corrects Hommel—which is now, of course, after the different fragments of the tablet have been joined by me, easy enough—but gains nothing by it. For I have never held that anything was proved as to the age of the Minæan inscriptions by the occurrence of the phrase *abar nahrân*. If Dr Budge had really read through the work of mine which he controverts, he would have been able to gather from it<sup>3</sup> that the explanation which I give to the Minæan *abar nahrân* is that which is dictated by Minæan linguistic usage, viz., not “on the other side of the river,” but “the region on the *bank* of the river,” and that I therefore recognise it again in the *kibri nari*, of which Sargon speaks when he mentions the flight of Jaman from Ashdod. For the *nahr* of the Minæan inscriptions is, in my opinion, not the

<sup>1</sup> I have already stated this in the work controverted by Dr Budge.

<sup>2</sup> *Altorient. Forschungen*, ii. p. 14. Cp. *Gesch. Israels*, i. 223, note 1. Dr Budge, as will presently be clear, has read nothing of mine continuously. He ought to have seen these passages, but probably did not see them.

<sup>3</sup> See *Muṣri-Meluḥḥa-Ma'in*, p. 55.

Euphrates, but the *naḥal Muṣri* (the Biblical *naḥal Miṣraim*), of which Esarhaddon also speaks when referring to his march to Meluhha. It is a unique misfortune that, in opposition to me (and to Hommel), Dr Budge maintains a view and a line of argument respecting the age of the Minæan inscriptions, and therewith of the inscription in question, which has had a fate well known to students of the Minæan inscriptions (and, of course, proves nothing at all for my personal view).

A conjecture was once put forward by Professor Hartmann that the inscription referred to belonged to the time of the expedition of Cambyzes against Egypt, since the fight between Mdhj and Muṣr therein mentioned was the war of the *Medes*, i.e. the Persians, against Egypt. I omit the reasons adduced for the designation of the Persians by the Minæans (who surely were not Greeks!) as Medes, and content myself with telling the fate of this discovery. Years before the appearance of Hartmann's article, I had one day remarked to Glaser how well the time of Cambyzes suited the inscription, though, to be sure, a hypothesis as to its date based upon this was impossible, for the reasons elsewhere brought forward by Glaser. Thereupon Glaser showed me the passage in his *Skizze der Geographie Arabiens* in which the possibility of such a hypothesis had long ago been considered and definitely disproved. It was after this that Hartmann and Mordtmann of themselves came upon the same obvious idea, and Glaser then pointed out that it had previously been expressed, considered, and refuted by himself. It being my practice as a writer to avoid sterile controversy, and not to mention wrong views of other scholars so soon as they may be regarded as set aside, I have made no further reference to this hypothesis.<sup>1</sup> So that when Dr Budge ventures to lecture Glaser, Hommel, and myself, and to bring forward what he thinks a brand-new idea, the reader will easily imagine what the effect of his procedure will be. Once more confounding my views most reprehensibly with those of other scholars, Dr Budge goes on to say (p. 21),

<sup>1</sup> *Muṣri*, ii. p. 5.



"Whether Ashr (in the same inscription) is to be identified with Assyria, as *Dr Winckler and others have thought*, is doubtful." I have never expressed or held such a view; indeed, I regard it as erroneous. I have not even taken up any position at all with regard to the theories of Glaser and Hommel as to the A'shur of the Minæan inscriptions and the Biblical Arabian Asshur.

Surely it would be slaying the slain to go further. It must be clear that Dr Budge arrogates a right to speak on matters to which he is a stranger, and that he has but a superficial acquaintance with the theory which he attacks. In my opinion a scientific (*wissenschaftliche*) discussion must be based upon an independent mastery of the facts. I should abuse the reader's patience if I were to carry my refutation further. I must not, however, withhold the impression which the perusal of the book to which the strongly polemical preface is prefixed has made upon me, viz., that the author had not a notion of all these things when he wrote and printed his book, and only took up the subject after the last page had been printed. To cover over his unacquaintance with the results of the last ten years' investigations, he set to work to refute them. The reader is meant to suppose that it had not seemed worth while to mention them in the book itself. But is it not as clear as the day that much that is there printed would have had to be modified if Dr Budge when writing it had had the results referred to before him? The proof is very simple. As I have already pointed out, "Muşri" in the relief force which was defeated in 701 B.C. by Sennacherib can only be Egypt, if "Meluhḥa" will bear to be explained as "Ethiopia." Dr Budge, in the preface, is aware of the difficulty of this latter theory, for he approves (see p. xvi.) my own view, which is certainly not, as he supposes, different from my present opinion, that Meluhḥa is "Sinai," and Muşri "Midian"; his words are, "with much probability." But in the work itself (*History*, vi. 191 f.) he states Meluhḥa to be Ethiopia, while, quite consistently, he regards Muşri as = Egypt. Here, therefore,

he has simply repeated the old views, and has not the faintest suspicion of my opinion.

This might well suffice. But on the principle that "in the mouth of two or three witnesses shall every word be established," I will trouble the reader with two or three examples of Dr Budge's unwisdom in claiming a critical acquaintance with the cuneiform inscriptions. On page 134 Sargon is said to have been "murdered." But the reading of the cuneiform passage on which this is based was corrected fifteen years ago. There are other notices and conjectures (see *KAT*<sup>(3)</sup>, p. 74) respecting Sargon's end, of which Dr Budge knows nothing. Also on page 134 (cp. p. 179), "Sennacherib set out on his third campaign (701), which was directed against the group of nations and peoples who were known to the Assyrians as Khatti, and to the Egyptians as Kheta." That is much the same as if on a visit to England one were to try to make oneself understood in Anglo-Saxon, and were to expect to see William the Conqueror on the banks of the Thames. Peoples and states of the Khatti had long been non-existent in Syria; the population had been for centuries Aramaic, and the entire region from the Euphrates to the northern border of Judea (*i.e.* to within a short distance from Jerusalem) was an Assyrian province. Cities and peoples of the Khatti were as unknown as states and peoples of the Anglo-Saxons or Normans are to-day under Edward VII.<sup>1</sup>

Page 135. "In his second campaign Sennacherib attacked the Kashshi and the Yasubigalli, who lived in districts where his chariots could not go." The district where these people lived has for more than twenty years been ascertained to be that of the Zagros, and Dr Budge only needed to consult any handbook of Assyrian history to inform himself on the subject.

Page 140. "As soon as Sennacherib returned to Nineveh

<sup>1</sup> In Sennacherib's inscriptions, I need hardly say, the term "Khattiland" has a geographical significance, and is even extended to Palestine. In earlier times it only meant Syria, and before that the original land of the Khatti in Asia Minor.



(after the destruction of Babylon in 689) he heard of a further league made amongst the kings of Palestine, Philistia, and Egypt, and he set out on an expedition against Egypt, intending to attack the Khatti on the way." A reference is given to J. Krall, *Grundriss der altoriental. Geschichte*, p. 156. Criticism stands amazed at such a sentence. The historical situation is as follows. We have the Biblical account of the siege of Jerusalem by Sennacherib (2 Kings xviii. 19) and Sennacherib's account of his campaign in 701. It had become the custom to identify these occurrences, till I pointed out that the mention of Tirhakah in the last of the Biblical narratives compels one to assume a second campaign of Sennacherib. And since Tirhakah did not come to the throne before 691, the second campaign must have taken place after this time, or more precisely after 689, since Sennacherib makes no mention of it, and it is from 688 onwards that notices relative to him are wanting. I further explained the story in Herodotus (ii. 141) with reference to this.

This closing inference has been universally accepted. But though a large number of treatises have referred to my first work on this subject, Dr Budge is quite unaware of my solution of the problem. He himself explains the Biblical narrative of a single expedition. (It was this assumption that a single campaign was meant which led scholars in the first instance to refer all that was said in the narrative to the year 701.) The disentanglement of the narrative has provided work for not a few scholars. Dr Budge undoes all this and restores the confusion by taking over what Sennacherib relates as to the year 701 into the campaign which is now placed after 688, and for which there is no cuneiform testimony. Hence the "league amongst the kings of Palestine," etc., which is attested by Sennacherib for the year 701, but of which we otherwise know nothing. The right view must be that Sennacherib had quite a different object in this second expedition. Here again it was open to Dr Budge to get information by studying the works of those whom he criticises.

I hope I may say without offence that scientific investigators have less authority with the public in England than they deserve. It is only this consideration which could have induced me to come forward—the idea of assisting the cause of serious investigation in England. It must surely be granted that in so doing I have done more than the general duty of all scholars would have required. For the object of scientific (*wissenschaftliche*) discussion is, for me, the interchange of views on subjects in which both parties to the debate are at home. On the present occasion no such interchange was possible. It is really time that a stop were put to the abuse which threatens to increase, to the injury of science, viz., that those who are not specialists pretend to instruct those who are in “method” and “sobriety”; because, forsooth, the new results of science (*Wissenschaft*) do not agree with what was taught in the school a generation ago. Such persons are incapable of estimating the progress of investigation, or at least have not kept pace with it, and yet they make their voices heard. The other side, in general, makes no protest, for science, even if much hindered, goes steadily on its way. It is, however, much to be wished that those who now hinder research should learn to cherish and support it, so that investigators may not be continually called upon to explain historical results which ought by this time to have become the common property of all intelligent men.

HUGO WINCKLER.

BERLIN.



## DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the “Hibbert Journal.” Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

### THE CASE OF MR BEEBY.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1903, p. 125.)

THE Council of the Churchmen’s Union for the Advancement of Liberal Religious Thought, representing a large number of clergymen and laymen, desire to protest against the action recently taken by the Lord Bishop of Worcester against the Rev. C. E. Beeby, and solely based upon an article recently published by Mr Beeby in a learned periodical.

Without expressing any opinion upon the particular theological views attributed to Mr Beeby, they feel that a wide liberty must be allowed to individual clergymen in their interpretation of the Church’s formulæ, particularly in matters which are or may be affected by the results of modern critical research.

They regard the Bishop’s method of procedure against Mr Beeby as unusual and unfair. In particular, they resent the public attack made by the Bishop in his Diocesan Magazine upon Mr Beeby’s personal honour,—an attack which, if liberty of interpretation is to be refused, could with equal plausibility be made by any of the recognised parties in the Church against any other.

Whilst frankly recognising the obligations of the clergy to obey the law, they trust that if a policy of religious persecution is to be resumed, the accused will at least be allowed the protection afforded by a formal judicial inquiry, in which due respect will be paid to the principles already laid down in previous judicial decisions.

Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D., 2 Embankment Gardens, Chelsea, *President*.

S. J. Savage, Esq., Forest Glade, Leytonstone, *Hon. Treasurer*.

Rt. Hon. Lord Avebury, 2 St James’s Square, S.W., *Vice-Pres.*

Rev. Professor Henslow, M.A., 80 Holland Park, W., *Vice-Pres.*

Rev. H. Rashdall, Litt.D., New College, Oxford, *Vice-Pres.*

- P. H. Bagenal, Esq., The Elms, Hull Road, York, *Vice-Pres.*  
 F. C. Channing, Esq., 62 Fellows Road, N.W., *Vice-Pres.*  
 Rev. T. P. Brocklehurst, Giggleswick, York.  
 B. Burton, Esq., Wherstead Park, Ipswich.  
 Rev. W. F. Cobb, D.D., St Ethelburga's, Bishopsgate, E.C.  
 Rev. W. A. Edwards, M.A., Llangan Rectory, Bridgend, S. Wales.  
 Rev. A. W. Hutton, M.A., 10 The Avenue, Kew.  
 Rev. T. L. Papillon, M.A., Writtle Vicarage, Chelmsford.  
 Rev. H. G. Rosedale, D.D., 13 Ladbroke Gardens, Bayswater, W.  
 Rev. W. Routh, M.A., 141 Denmark Hill, S.E.  
 Rev. J. R. Wilkinson, M.A., 51 Upper George Street, W.  
 Richard Stapley, Esq., 33 Bloomsbury Square, W.C.  
 Rev. W. Manning, M.A., St Andrew's Vicarage, Leytonstone, N.E., *Secretary.*
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## DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A MIRACULOUS BIRTH.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1903, p. 125; January, p. 380.)

I WELCOME Mr A. P. Whately's criticism of my article as a sober re-statement of the case from the point of view of the orthodoxy of the Church Councils. So far as I am able to follow the line of his thought, I will directly meet it, and though in the end we shall find ourselves in the same disagreement, I hope I shall not fail at least to make it clear wherein precisely our disagreement lies, and what remains the chief point at issue.

(1) I begin by pointing out that Mr Whately has mistaken my opinion in regard to miracles. I find it very difficult to deal with a view of miraculous events which are not properly called miracles because they happen but once, which are "not necessarily external to the normal course of Nature," and at the same time "would not be natural," and are out of the ordinary course of Nature, or "extraordinary." But, so far as I know, there are two views of events called miraculous held in the Church. Sir Oliver Lodge, in the *Hibbert Journal*, January 1903, speaking on the side of science, "On the Reconciliation between Science and Faith," lays it down that "First among the truths that will have to be accepted by both sides, we may take the reign of Law, sometimes called the Uniformity of Nature." One view of miracles falls in with that conception of uniformity, and the other is contrary to it. There are those who hold that a miracle "does not mean a violation, even a suspension, of any natural law," who compare miracles to wireless telegraphy and the Röntgen rays, who maintain that our Lord's Divinity was shown by His knowledge of "the occult natural forces." The Dean of Westminster says: "A man would be bold who should deny that all miracles may some day be seen to be only results



of higher laws, which are at present hidden from our imperfect knowledge.”<sup>1</sup> I take no *a priori* objection to the occurrence of miracles of that kind; nor am I disposed to deny the happening of any single event related in the Gospel records. To my mind it is a question of appropriate evidence. But what seems not to be sufficiently recognised is that when you attribute miracles to the operation of higher laws in Nature as yet unknown to the general mass of men, the effect of superior knowledge of one or some, or due to the exercise of latent powers of the human organism usually neglected; when you place the miracles of the Bible alongside the miracles of other ages and of other personalities of other lands and of other religions, you thereby destroy their value as testimony to the uniqueness of the personality of Christ and of the Christian revelation. It is difficult to deal with the arguments advanced on behalf of the particular miracle of the miraculous birth, because they are so extremely various and even discordant. At one time it is the sinlessness of Christ which is its support, now it is the hypostatic union which demands it. The Dean of Westminster brushes all such arguments aside. His argument for the miraculous birth is briefly this: In the Gospel story we have a picture of a perfect “human life.” That life was full of miracle. It is appropriate that such a life should be ushered on to the stage of history by a miraculous beginning. That seems to me the most unassailable statement of the case for the miraculous birth that has been put forth; and I am not at all disposed to question the fact of the miraculous birth supported on such grounds. But unless the miracles of the Gospel are dogmatically asserted to be absolutely unique in the history of the world, not only in degree, but also in kind, it seems to me that they cannot be regarded as holding a place in the unique revelation of God in Christ.

Mr Whately maintains that the miraculous birth is not a miracle, on the ground that it is unique. Professor Sanday, on the other hand, if I read him correctly, argues for belief in Christ’s miraculous birth on the ground that a miraculous birth is not unique in the case of Christ. Speaking of the attitude of the reverent student of comparative religion, he says: “Instead, for instance, of pouring scorn on the pagan stories of supernatural birth, he will regard their currency as testimony to some real principle in the nature of things, one of those hidden mysteries which, whether or not God wills that we should believe it now, He certainly has willed that men should believe in time past.”<sup>2</sup> When it is put before me in such a way I am quite disposed to entertain the notion of Christ’s miraculous birth. I have, indeed, so stated the problem in one of my published works, where I have said: “The question is not whether we ought to reject the miraculous conception of Jesus, but whether we ought not to be open to believe in the miraculous conception of many more human beings than hitherto we have imagined.” Such a view, however, adds

<sup>1</sup> *Some Thoughts on the Incarnation*, by J. A. Robinson, D.D. Longmans.

<sup>2</sup> *The Independent Review*, October 1903. Article by Dr Sanday on “The Obligation of the Creeds.”

nothing to the support of our belief in the uniqueness of the Divine Revelation in Christ, and it renders it absurd for Christians to make the miraculous birth an article of the Christian Faith.

With the main principle on which the argument is to be conducted I am in entire agreement with Mr Whately. He urges, as I have myself elsewhere urged, that the tenet cannot properly be treated as an isolated fact, but should be appraised as an element in the structure of Christian belief. "If this particular tenet," he says, "will not fit into the scheme of truth, its inclusion can only strain and dislocate the whole structure." All that I have ever said on the subject has been to the end of discovering its place in the scheme of Christian truth. It is because I have not yet gained any clear and consistent answer from theologians to my inquiry that I yet pursue it. It is generally conceded that the evidence of the fact is itself insufficient to compel belief, and that the compelling element of belief lies in the doctrinal significance of the miraculous birth. That being so, it is imperative to determine what is the precise doctrine on which the Church elects to take her stand when she demands belief in it from the faithful. The determination of that point is the whole purpose of my contribution to the subject.

I am now in a position to treat of the main points of difference between us. They come under the heads of (1) the notion of sin; (2) the theory of Christ's human nature; (3) the value of the Conciliar definitions of the personality of Christ.

(1) With regard to the notion of sin Mr Whately apparently holds to the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Fall of man, maintaining that the liability to commit sin is a consequence of the corruption of human nature. That is the foundation of his system of belief. But the doctrine of the Fall is now abandoned by the most orthodox exponents of the Christian faith. The Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge has recently put forth on its own responsibility a tractate entitled "Evolution and the Holy Scriptures," as the answer of the Church to some cheap literature of the Rationalist Press Association. "The child is born," says the author, "absolutely without the consciousness of sin." The fall of each comes when the faculty of conscience awakens. Man falls when he first becomes conscious of the conflict of good and evil. The fall means "the struggle of the twofold nature in man."<sup>1</sup> According to the old orthodoxy the conflict of good and evil is due to the corruption of human nature. According to the new orthodoxy it is due to the operation of the law of human nature. And that new view of the conflict of good and evil carries with it perforce a new conception of sin. If sin be conceived by Mr Whately as due to the corruption of human nature, at "the springs of life in the race itself," through the fall of Adam, it is there we part company. Modern orthodoxy does not bind me to such a conception of sin. At the same time I recognise the insight which compels Mr Whately to perceive

<sup>1</sup> "Evolution and the Holy Scriptures": being Addresses delivered by the Ven. James M. Wilson, D.D. S.P.C.K., 1903.



that the miraculous birth is bound up with the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Fall of Man. He has not, I think, seriously met my statement of the problem of sin and sinlessness, and he has no warrant, I think, in scripture or in the teachings of the Church for his attempt to define the kinds of temptation to which our Lord was subject.

(2) This leads me to the question of the theory of Christ's human nature and of the relation of the physical and the spiritual. It will clear the debate if I at once point out that my article was written solely with reference to a specific theory of Christ's human nature which has been advanced by an eminent divine. My article would never have been written had it not been for Bishop Gore's teaching, which I regard as the most deadly heresy, destructive of the very foundation of our evangelical hope. My article is based on the teachings of the "*Dissertations*," and the other references were given merely to show that, on becoming Bishop, Dr Gore had not changed his views on the subject of Christ's nature. The doctrine is that Christ on His human side is "a new physical creation," and that "the stuff of the humanity" is different from ours. The gist of the Bishop of Worcester's teaching is that the connection between the physical and the moral is so intimate, that "the miracle of a new moral creation" demands "the miracle of a new physical creation." "Must not," he asks, "the stuff of the humanity have been new too?" It is on the fact of the differentiation of this humanity from ours that Dr Gore grounds the sinlessness of Christ. There is an antecedent expectation, he argues, that Christ's birth will be physically miraculous, and that expectation conditions the historical inquiry into the evidence. The miraculous birth is conceived as the mode by which the "new physical creation," and the accompanying moral miracle of sinlessness, is effected.<sup>1</sup> In my article I do not suggest that anyone should reject the fact of a Virgin Birth if to his mind the evidence be sufficient. My argument is that, if the doctrine of the Virgin Birth be bound up with a certain theory of Christ's nature as "a new physical creation," Protestants will be compelled to reject it. For if Christ be "a new physical creation," from the nature of the case He can be no example to us, and the problem being for us now the acquirement of a new physical organisation, my contention is that the mediæval doctrine of salvation, by the introduction into the world of a new material cell through the Blessed Virgin, and the assimilation of it into our bodies through the Sacrament, seems most consonant with such a theory of Christ's human nature, and is apparently the only hope of salvation left us.

If Mr Whately repudiates Bishop Gore's teaching, as I conceive he does, he should approve my article, inasmuch as it makes clear the inferences that inevitably flow from it.

(3) Mr Whately does, indeed, repudiate it on the ground that it "is by no means necessary." He himself supports his belief in a Virgin Birth

<sup>1</sup> *Dissertations*. By Charles Gore, M.A. Dissertation I.: "The Virgin Birth of our Lord," § 7. John Murray.

by one argument, namely, that a divine Hypostasis took on an abstract humanity, and that the male element was not required to complete the human nature. He refers me to what he conceives to be the true doctrine of our Lord's person, and bids me first understand it, when I shall recognise that it demands and explains the fact of a miraculous birth. There seems to me to be a confusion of two quite distinct ideas expressed under the common term "person," and I am disposed to question the theological correctness of the rendering of the divine Hypostasis of the Logos by "His personal being." I venture to think that the doctrine of the Virgin Birth is in desperate straits, if it is dependent on the metaphysical subtleties of the obsolete philosophy of the Church Councils. Here we profoundly differ, and Dean Mansel has adequately expressed my opinions. "There is a union of philosophy with religion in which each contributes to the support of the other; and there is also an union, which under the appearance of support does but undermine the foundations and prey upon the life of both. To which of these two the above argument belongs it needs but a bare statement of its assumption to determine. It tells us that our belief in the doctrine of God manifest in the flesh indispensably depends upon our acceptance of the Realist theory of the nature of universal notions. Philosophy and theology alike protest against such an outrage upon the claims both of Reason and of Revelation, as is implied in this association of one of the most fundamental truths of the Christian faith with one of the most questionable speculations of mediæval metaphysics. . . . Neither Christian truth nor philosophical inquiry can be advanced by such a system as this, which revives and sanctifies as essential to the Catholic Faith the forgotten follies of Scholastic Realism, and endangers the cause of religion, by seeking to explain its greatest mysteries by the lifeless forms of a worn-out controversy. 'Why seek ye the living amongst the dead? Christ is not here.'"<sup>1</sup>

CHARLES E. BEEBY.

BIRMINGHAM.

## THE ALLEGED INDIFFERENCE OF LAYMEN TO RELIGION.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1904, p. 235.)

ALL religion has a secret, as well as an outward, manifestation—the two aspects of the fire in the wall seen by Pilgrim in the house of the Interpreter. If laymen have ceased to believe that Christianity has a secret worth their endeavour to obtain, or even understand, they will inevitably be indifferent to its outward observance.

The most largely accredited form of the Christian secret is the belief that the risen Christ Himself is always accessible, has always access to, the spirits of men who seek Him. The experience of the overwhelming majority

<sup>1</sup> *The Limits of Religious Thought*. By Henry Longueville Mansel, B.D. Lecture I.



of the faithful attests that He has been, or is, for them no vague intermittent oracle, but a person who with every seeking and candid soul takes a different way of love, and bestows upon each what he receives from the Source of all—life and strength and joy. These witnesses also attest that the gifts of the Christ have this hall-mark—distinguishing them from any largess that devils may bestow—that the life He gives is only gained by a daily dying, His power is only conferred on the weakness of entire dependence, and His joy is only won through tears. Thus, to the mass of the faithful the one vindication, the one attraction, of every form of real Christian worship is that in the midst is Jesus Christ, saying still, “Where two or three of you are gathered together in my name, there am I—with you, not subject to those separating conditions that you well know apply to your beloved dead, for a spirit hath not the nature in common with you that I have.”

The want of belief in the Christian secret may be proved by the absence of reference to it in the discussions upon religion so frequently heard or seen in print. Laymen, learned and otherwise, consider the decline of church-going without a word concerning the attraction of the risen Christ. Perhaps some of these, writing for the public on such a matter, have an acquaintance with the inner influence of Christianity which they feel a reluctance to betray; but in that case they cannot regard it as the vital point of the whole question, and in what other way they could regard it if their belief in it were real is hard to conceive. With belief in the living Christ no sane man could offer as adequate reasons against the practice of his religion, its failure to sooth the senses, or boredom; nor would he weigh the counter-attractions of sport or business, or raise the objection that the common ritual was not that best fitted to appeal to the reason or the emotions. He would either yield himself to the divine influence, or he would say, “I fear and flee so terrible an intimacy. I suspect, indeed, the controlling power of God to be there, and I would be free to shape my life to other ends.” From current discussions upon religion we learn, too, the kind of difficulties that exist in the minds of such as can think for themselves, and are reflected in the minds of those who habitually think in the formulæ of others; and those difficulties are not such as would be raised if men admitted that they must find the Divine Person before attempting to solve any problem concerning Him. Although to the philosopher the great underlying problems of thought are the same yesterday, to-day and for ever, the mind of the age throws up to the surface of current thought difficulties that vary in form for each generation. To-day, *e.g.*, we hear constantly that it is impossible to believe that personality, as we understand it, is contained in the nature of God, without making Him such an one as ourselves; that it is absurd to attribute to man responsibility, because His freedom is limited; and so on. If earnest men are so hindered it must be because they do not perceive that Christianity is, first and last, a friendship with the man who secretly pours the oil of God’s light into the

soul; that, consequently, the faith that Christianity demands is the strenuous activity of the whole human person—will, reason and emotion—rising up to seek the Divine Person: and it claims that, thus seeking, the soul will make the discovery of him whose friendship perfectly satisfies; no room being thus left for doubt as to the reality of the personal meeting, theoretic difficulties concerning it must fall into a new perspective. If this claim were the thing men set before their minds as the beginning of Christianity, they would see that on the conditions of its whole demand Christianity must, on the threshold, be accepted or rejected; that, while any drugging of the reasoning powers can only make the soul the weak child of an earth-born authority, it is useless to apply the understanding without giving oneself as entirely to prayer and to obedience.

It is thus proved by the reasons given for his indifference to Christian observance, and by the nature of his difficulties, that the indifferent layman does not believe in the reality of the Christian secret.

Let us picture the probable attitude of a large number of now indifferent men if they began to suspect that Christianity actually held a secret of power. Most of us have at some time met with a person—it may have been a learned prelate, a simple-hearted evangelist, a man of affairs, a long-suffering mother, a busy housewife, or some fellow-creature stretched on a bed of pain—who has impressed us as having a heart filled with the choicest quality of the love that fulfils the law, and an indefinable elegance and steadiness of mind, be it shrewd or simple. They impress us with the idea of symmetry and the conviction that, with or without great parts or great opportunities, there is an inward splendour of motive and achievement and an outgoing grace which we regard with a lingering curiosity and desire. We think of their circumstances and limitations, and wonder unfeignedly that they could have shown themselves so independent of them. In after years the mind reverts to such persons, and this feeling regarding them is rather increased than lessened by time. We say to ourselves that we should be the better and the greater for being like them. Many of us have been in some large or small congregation where the same sense of power and peace and independence of circumstance overcame us with cumulative force. If the ordinary religious service left such an impression on our minds, would there be the indifference of the laity which we are discussing? If, however mean or ornate the outward part, the onlooker were forced to suspect an inward glory, should we not always leave the place with the same lingering curiosity and desire? Certainly, to most men this desire would not be lessened by the perception of self-sacrifice involved. The average Briton, in the field, in the market, in the study, and even in any form of strenuous vice, is eagerly giving his life day by day in the hope of getting a better for himself and his, and his most ardent desire is to know how to do this more effectively.

Are we not, then, driven to believe that if the core or essence of Christianity were held vividly and constantly before men, all who are not entirely frivolous must accept or reject it with some degree of force? Wide



indifference to current Christianity thus proves, not only wide unbelief in the power of Christ, but also that that power is not commonly presented in our religious observances. He is talked of in doctrine and symbol, but He is not there in spirit, and the letter is dead.

It may be difficult to explain the well-recognised law by which the secret of Christianity is imparted by the mere presence of those who live in its power, but certain it is that, whatever the form of service be, we find an impression made on the most indifferent visitor by clergy and congregation thus possessed, an impression different not only in degree but in kind from that he carries away from the ordinary religious service of our land. It is beside the point to discuss here what degree of the spirit of Christ a man must have to make him in some real sense a Christian; it is certain that he must be dominated by that spirit before he can be a medium through which Christ can be presented to his fellow-men ere they have discovered Him for themselves. Our simplest form of authority is, "Where any of you are met together in my character or way of thinking, there am I"; from which we see that if a Christian gathering is to be instinct with Christ, it is necessary that the mind of Him whom they worship be in the worshippers, if not in undisturbed, in dominant possession. It is, of course, a very different thing to say that the mind of Christ must dominate a man's mind, and to say that his life must be, or appear, always consistent with that mind. A man may fall daily from the ideal on which his whole purpose is fixed, and yet be dominated by that ideal and infect others with his intensity of purpose.

Let us attempt a fair inquiry, asking whether or no the average clergyman and minister and their followers are adequately dominated by those teachings of Christ which they all accept.

It is difficult to discover by his words what any man thinks on matters of theology or of traditional beliefs and virtues, because each set of men use the words and phrases in which they have been instructed in such subjects, or in which they are accustomed to instruct, with a different shade of meaning, or with little meaning of any kind, as the case may be; and he must be supernaturally endowed who could judge from a man's conversation on such subjects as to whether he means what he says or knows what he means. Or should we try to take as our guide what our pious fathers used to call "the daily walk," here again it would be immediately seen that such a test is useless for our purpose; for, as has just been suggested, the Divine Majesty, as revealed by Christianity, has this unique glory, that be the sin, even the besetting sin, never so great, contrition will form in the inmost soul a dwelling-place for the Most High, and that infirmities of heart and temper are the very burdens of which it is said that God carries not only them but their bearer.

Perhaps, on the whole, one of the most accurate tests of what a man's religious mind actually is, is the religious newspaper that he chooses to read, to give to his family, and to quote. A man, especially a clergyman, will usually suppose himself to be superior to the paper he reads, but it

can be shown by any publisher that if the paper is not what its readers really seek, they will not pay for it, and it would have to be conducted on missionary principles, such as those of a political propaganda. If, then, we can assure ourselves of the opinions urged by papers largely supported by the Anglican clergy and their friends, or by the Nonconformist preachers and their followers, I think we unquestionably obtain a very real insight into their minds. To bring the test within our scope we must consider the respective views of such papers on some one question. We might take the quarrel between High Church and Evangelical ritualists, or any other sectarian difference; but perhaps it is simplest to take that question which looms largest at present as a matter of practical Christian policy, the Education controversy.

It is not our business to give an opinion as to whether the difference dividing Christians on this question is important or unimportant, or whether the right lies on one side or the other. It concerns us only to inquire whether each party, assured of the right of its own cause, is truly trusting in God and endeavouring to love its opponents, as if dominated by the mind of Christ.

Is there, in the first place, on both sides, as a basis of the highest courage, that faith in God proper to the Christian soldier?

A well-known Nonconformist paper was, in the beginning of the controversy, responsible for the statement that if the new Act were enforced Nonconformity would soon cease to exist; and over and over again, on the side of the Anglican Church, the battle-cry has been sounded that the religion of the nation will depend on the enforcement of the Act. Is it not clear that men who complacently write and read such statements have forgotten that, even where God apparently loses the battle, He is, according to Christian faith, most gloriously victorious, and that, therefore, while fighting under His banner is the most solemn duty, there can be no need for restless abuse of the enemy or the employment of the mercenaries of evil as allies?

Again, as regards the duty of love towards one's neighbour, do we find any one of the exclusively religious papers has persistently advocated throwing into the bitter waters of this controversy that generous love which is the first necessity of Christian character, and which alone can make them sweet?

It must be the imperative duty of every clergyman who would be more than a nominal Christian, to find out the noble motives and high virtues of passive resisters, and to exhibit them before the minds of Churchmen as children of God and followers, however curious their gait, of Him who said that He would take every unkind action, nay, every omission of kindness, to His little ones as an injury to Himself. It might require a good deal of effort on the part of a clergyman to keep his mind open, if not to the Nonconformists' view of the Education Act, to the belief that their Christian graces are as great, or possibly even greater, than his own; but he himself would be the first to admit that this would not require



greater humility than his Master has manifested toward himself. If he has a prestige derived from his position in an Established Church, it puts on him the obligation to make the first move towards Christian relations. If he is jealous of this prestige let him hasten to exercise its greatest prerogative.

It is also the duty of every Nonconformist minister to come into some sympathetic relation with the clergy of his neighbourhood, however unkind and uncalled for the stiffness of their demeanour, and, by patient endeavour and gentle overture, to discover how they really regard the Education controversy. He can surely find out much that is beautiful and good and wise in the lives of the local clergy, and dwell on these traits as he speaks of them to his own people. In this way he would go far to heal the breach, if not of opinion, of neighbourly feeling, between his own followers and Churchmen. Such a course would undoubtedly demand humility and the crucifixion of prejudice; but the Nonconformist may well remember that his Master, in painting for all time the perfect neighbour, chose a heretic for His model, and taught that he who would love his neighbour must first look for him in the most unlikely of places.

The representative organs of the two parties could not be what they are if numbers of Christians on either side were thus showing forth Christ.

It is possible that, after the misunderstanding fostered and gloried in by writers on both sides, Christians may not soon join in any common solution of the Education difficulty; but if there be any power of the Holy Ghost, any answer to prayer or blessing upon peace-makers, such conformity to the mind of Christ on the part of leaders in any locality could not fail to bring about an understanding on the higher level of a common desire to be loyal to Christ, a common failure and a common repentance.

Instead of this, and in accord with the tone of their respective party papers, galling misrepresentations are made on both sides. Church people, especially in the rural districts, say that the motive which actuates the passive resister is hatred of true religion. There are communities where this statement passes for a truism in the mouths of high and low, and is never seriously denounced by vicar or curate. There are, again, other communities which explain to themselves the attitude of their fellow-Christians by saying that the Bishops and clergy are actuated by motives of ecclesiastical greed rather than by any real tenderness towards the souls of the children.

Our argument is that if persons making these and other ill-tempered statements recognised that they were betrayed into them by temptation, and as constantly repented and sought to make amends, the popular religious journalism would be wholly different. We are forced to believe that the nominal British Christian, except in rare instances, considers rancour consistent with Christianity.

This quarrel over the Education Acts is, of course, but one of a long series of quarrels which, like shooting pains, declare the deep-seated

disease—the pitiless uncharity of hearts which, zealous and full of many marvellous works, do not beat in unison with the heart of Christ.

The plain indifferent layman—and let all good Englishmen thank God for this—the indifferent layman can never be persuaded that the Christ of the Gospels can live to inspire men while they clearly disobey His precepts. It does not occur to him to seek Jesus Christ among such people, so it comes about that he practically assumes Him to have passed away.

It will naturally be objected to the indifferent man's view of religious warfare that the evolution of Christianity through nineteen centuries has been made up of, and apparently largely accomplished by, the clash of opposing swords, that in fact its divine Founder, when about to quit the earthly life, commanded His disciples to possess among them the two swords which they have ever since turned against each other with more or less salutary effect. And there can be little doubt that England to-day would be a thousand times nearer decadence if there were within her places of worship that apathy which may be mistaken for the blessing of peace when it is the touch of death. But because it is folly to regard the approach of corruption, the ceaseless worm and the slow combustion of decay, as peace when it is the attack of the last enemy, there is no reason to hold that love is not a stronger force of life than hatred, or to suppose that when the disciples contended by the way they were actuated by virile forces which would have evolved a higher life than was attainable by submission to the rebuke conveyed by Jesus in the parable of the little child.

We have no right to expect that Christianity will be a compelling force in any country where its inner secret and only source of influence, the power of the risen Lord, finds so fitful and rare an expression.

AUTHOR OF "PRO CHRISTO ET ECCLESIA."

## THE ALLEGED INDIFFERENCE OF LAYMEN TO RELIGION.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1904, p. 235.)

It is very difficult, after any discussion of this subject, to leave an impression on the reader's mind that he is any nearer the truth than he was before. A great many interesting and very true remarks may be made, and were made in the January number of this Journal, and though some of the remarks contradicted others, I should be inclined to think both sets were true, since, in fact, they were made about different classes of people. In order to help towards a little clearness and precision, I suggest that the following classification be adopted. Laymen who are under discussion may be divided into:

- (a) religious;
- (b) strongly moral people, probably capable of becoming religious;
- (c) those interested in religion;
- (d) the hostile or indifferent.



I would define these briefly. (*a*) includes all who have a sense of a personal God, and a feeling based on experience that communion with Him elevates their whole being; (*b*), those in whom this feeling is still dormant, though generally capable of being roused by the right influences; (*c*), those to whom the last description does not apply, their interest being intellectual and confined to the speculative questions—history, anthropology and psychology, etc.—which belong to the subject. (*c*) find no place in (*b*), though (*b*) sometimes do in (*c*). (*d*) may be neglected in the discussion. (*b*) would include duty-loving, unspeculative minds. It is very necessary, in inquiring into the causes of a spread of indifference to religion, to be quite clear what groups of people are under discussion.

There seems to be some agreement among the writers of the four essays that the interest in religion is not declining, but the interest in orthodoxy is; further, that various causes account for the decline in church-going, such as distractions of amusement, mediævalism in formularies, feebleness of preaching; and generally that a restatement of Church doctrine is required before educated laymen can be expected to show sympathy with it. Now I would maintain that these and similar observations are true if they relate to (*c*), but scarcely true at all of (*b*), and quite untrue of (*a*). Religious people as above defined have always been church-goers. They pray because they cannot help it, and find in the beautiful words of the Prayer Book the most perfect expression of their inward aspirations. Bad though the reading may be, and monotonous the repetition, nothing can deprive them of the satisfaction of being joined in spirit with countless believers all over the world as they blend petition and praise in a superlative form of worship. But (*c*) were church-goers a hundred years ago and later, for very different reasons. There was nothing else to do. They were not men of prayer in any genuine sense, though they assisted at public prayer as a matter of course. But nowadays there is no matter of course about it. Fashion decides in favour of everybody doing what they like; and if formerly there were attractions in church, such as an interesting discourse, not too doctrinal, or good music, to-day these and the like are to be got far more easily elsewhere.

Thus I would corroborate many of the observations in the four articles, provided that I were at liberty to exclude (*a*) from their application. There is nothing to show that the religious people of to-day participating in Church life are fewer than they were a hundred years ago. The majority of them are unaffected by doctrinal disputes, because they feel that they have gained a certitude about some spiritual facts which nothing can conceivably disturb. Modernising of liturgies would be of no use to them, and in most sermons they find something in harmony with their deepest thoughts. (*c*), on the other hand, never were interested in doctrinal statements, nor are they now, though these statements are made with far more skill and vivid reference to daily life than they were to our grandfathers. Nor again do (*c*) feel able to pray any better than their forebears. All prayer was always an effort to them, and I feel sure that the majority of them have practi-

cally ceased to pray in private; so that it would be strange if public prayer had much attraction for them. Yet these are just the class who enjoy reading clever articles on religious controversy, and are keen spectators of the struggle of the Church "mid toil and tribulation, and tumult of her war."

In short, the difference between now and a hundred years ago I should take to be that the class denoted by (c) have ceased to profess an allegiance which they never felt at all in the way that (a) always have felt theirs. Meantime, there is no proof that (a) have declined in numbers.

Thus the discussion relates to only one class out of four, excepting so far as (b) may be considered to be affected by modern changes, and to be driven more and more in the direction of (c). This question touches on the further question of what should be the course adopted by ministers of religion. On this, some of the writers of the articles have offered suggestions, and as to their practicability I would venture first to lay down the maxim that the religious class (a) must be fed. This means that if in such a matter as preaching it is impossible to suit the requirements of (a) and (c) in the same sermon—which is certainly the case with all but a minority of gifted preachers—then the claims of (a) must take precedence of those of (c); further, that next to the claims of (a) the most important are those of (b). Whatever course, in short, a minister may adopt of preaching or ritual or visiting, he must not be expected to leave (a) without the best spiritual nourishment he can give them, or to do anything which will cause (b) to incline towards (c) or (d). This principle I have no space to defend; but all who accept it will see at once how difficult it becomes to organise church services in accordance with the principle and also with the tastes of (c).

I would readily admit that the number of people apparently quite irresponsive to any religious appeal and belonging either to (b) or (c) is large enough to cause the most anxious questionings among religious workers; but from the nature of the case it is impossible to be sure that they are increasing in number relatively to the population.

E. LYTTTELTON.

HAILEYBURY, HERTFORD.

## THE ALLEGED INDIFFERENCE OF LAYMEN TO RELIGION.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1904, p. 235.)

THE first three papers under the above title must have seemed to some readers to take too little account of the theory of worship, and of the particular conditions of public worship. The Church of England assumes that worship is an expressive act, which, to be public, must be common; to be common, must be familiar; to be familiar, must be formal. It assumes also that the worshipper, as an agent, is prepared to read into



and between the lines of liturgical use, his own personal devotions. It is hardly matter, then, for wonder if the passive listener, waiting to be impressed, using nothing, adding nothing, finds its Orders of Service "tedious," "monotonous," "mechanical." Worship, says Matthew Arnold—a layman not too "ecclesiastically-minded"—should have in it as little as possible of what divides; but this means the selection of a type, and the typical cannot be completely that which each man would choose.

As for preaching, Hooker long ago challenged the critics to define a good sermon. Preaching, he contends, *as a word of art*, should be understood with restraint to its own special matter. If, then, the sermon has its technical limitations, it may easily become as "commonplace" as any other lesson often given in the same "matter." There are also the limits which the preacher, as a teacher, imposes on himself. His aim is to edify—to deal with the infirmities of the many rather than with the perplexities of the few, to persuade the will rather than to inform the mind. Πᾶσα παιδεία δοκεῖ εἶναι λύπη.

The modern church, it is added, is "æsthetically unattractive." But this is the very peril of religion, that the use of sense may return upon itself and become sensuous. It was the fear of this rebound that caused Ruskin—another layman—with all his fineness of perception through sense, again and again to doubt "how far the splendour of art is compatible with the honesty and usefulness of religious service." Ritualism, as a form of æstheticism, has this at least on its side, that its art is severely symbolical.

The fourth paper has drawn to itself deserved attention. Under indifference the writer sees dissatisfaction—dissatisfaction with a religious world which exalts Christian ideals, and fails to impress them upon its own political, social, and commercial life. It is true, no doubt, that the cause for complaint is not so much the traditionalism of one Church as the professionalism of all. At the same time it is equally certain that ideals, because they are ideals, will always be in advance of actual attainment. That they are not more adequately realised, is the fault of the community as a whole. As the author of *Ecce Homo* has well said, "The Church has only failed as civil society itself has failed." If armies and prisons and police-courts are a reproach to religion, they are not less discreditable to civilisation; if free churchmen are not consistent with their own "principles," neither are plain citizens as good as their own laws. It should be remembered also that the counteracting movements which make for peace and righteousness have their birth, as a rule, in religious societies, and are there nursed into action, before they reach the stage of popular adoption and support.

It is a little difficult, moreover, to see why dissatisfaction should take the form of inert indifference. Dissatisfaction is only petulance, if it cannot do more than be displeased. It is open to the dissatisfied, yearning for what Bishop Westcott used to call the social realisation of the Christian Creed, to make a Church which shall be a model to all Churches. Or is it that, with religious freedom, the capacity for religious association has

inversely grown less? Is it that we are self-conscious, self-contained, less dependent on official leadership, less inclined to come under doctrinal distinction, denominational description, congregational observation? There is undoubtedly in many minds reaction against the exclusive sense given to "religious duties," and the excessive credit given to their "performance." There is an unexpressed feeling that these outward acts ought not to be made the tests of spiritual condition. It is seen every day how easily solemnities may be played with, and turned to trifling use. The awe and fervour of the old worship have fled; emotion is fast fading into sentiment. The controversies of our fathers excite us no more; they have fallen into historical perspective, and are vanishing away. Church-membership, with its pledges and responsibilities, demands too much; we prefer a vague comprehension, committing us to nothing. We respect all faiths, but will be bound by none. Be this as it may, the layman has his opportunity. Let him preach from the housetop all that the pulpit has taught in vain. Better still, let him go in and out amongst the crowd, introducing the principles of primitive Christianity into public affairs. Then, perhaps, he will feel that there is something still lacking, and will not rest until he has also recovered the principles of primitive Christian worship.

E. P. BARROW.

MANCHESTER.



## REVIEWS

*The Gospels as Historical Documents.* Part I. "The Early Use of the Gospels."—By Vincent Henry Stanton, D.D., Ely Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge.—Cambridge University Press, 1903.

THE above volume is the first part of an extremely comprehensive work. The second part is to deal with the history of the composition of the Synoptic Gospels, the third with the internal character of the Fourth Gospel, whilst the fourth will test the validity of all four Gospels, in regard to the characteristics which they have in common, by investigating, for example, their representations of Jewish life and thought, and by comparing them with other very early Christian writings, especially those contained in the New Testament.

The first part is concerned with the early use of the Gospels. It goes without saying that from a scholar of Professor Stanton's reputation we were entitled to expect a valuable and many-sided treatment of the subject. But if we are to attribute to his book a higher degree of excellence than to previous undertakings of a similar kind, we must at the same time judge it according to the highest standard, and ask whether it is completely satisfactory from all points of view.

1. The plan of the work is the following :—In regard to each post-apostolic writing dealt with by the author, the date of the composition is in the first place determined, and in the second place the use therein made of the Gospels is considered. According to the principle laid down in the Preface, when "a large amount of agreement exists among competent scholars who have approached the consideration of the topics in question with different prepossessions," the discussion is brief; in other cases, it is more elaborate.

Unfortunately, however, this very excellent principle is not always consistently adhered to. For example, whilst the author offers a careful estimate of the evidence as to the date of the *Shepherd of Hermas* (pp. 34–41), he fixes upon A.D. 140–150 as the date of the *Expositions* of Papias (p. 52), simply qualifying the statement with the word "probably," although precisely the two scholars on whose opinion, in conjunction with Lightfoot's, he lays the greatest weight, Harnack and Zahn, differ in this regard. The

latter says (*Forschungen*, vi. p. 111) that "the statement of Harnack ('not before A.D. 140,' or 'in the years A.D. 140 [145]–160') is purely imaginary." Following Volkmar and Hort, Professor Stanton (p. 76) considers that the *First Apology* of Justin "must have been composed five or six years at least after A.D. 140," and passes over without a word the discovery of Kenyon (*Academy*, Feb. 1, 1896, p. 98) that this work of Justin's must have been written shortly after A.D. 150, inasmuch as the name of the prefect Felix referred to in chapter xxix. appears in Egyptian papyri. With reference to the *Ad Autolycum* of Theophilus (p. 144), the well-known doubt as to the Bishop Theophilus being the author is not so much as mentioned, and similarly, with reference to the "letter of the Smyrneans regarding the martyrdom of Polycarp" (p. 138), the doubt as to the date of the composition being shortly after Polycarp's death receives no recognition. For signs of acquaintance with the Gospels in the last-mentioned work, the reader is simply referred to Lightfoot, so that without Lightfoot's book he cannot become acquainted with them. So, too (p. 57), for the reasons in support of the position that the Fourth Gospel was used by Papias, the reader is referred to Lightfoot and Harnack; for the dates of the appearance of Marcion, Basilides, and Valentinus, to Harnack alone (p. 64); whilst not even a single book is named where proof can be obtained for the statement that the description of the Apostles' fulfilment of their mission in 1 *Clem. Rom.* 42 "might well have been moulded on passages of the *Acts*" (p. 14).

2. As to the time in which the several works of the Church Fathers were respectively composed, we have already alluded to some of the author's conclusions to which, as it seems to us, exception must be taken. We are compelled, however, to express dissent from a still larger number of his conclusions, and especially in such cases where the dates preferred by him and those preferred by us show very material divergence. One of such cases we shall touch upon immediately.

3. We turn, then, at once to Professor Stanton's statements as to which of the Gospels were made use of by each of the Church writers. Here the author not unfrequently gives one the impression of being animated by the sincere resolve to maintain nothing save only what can be assumed with certainty. Nevertheless we question whether he has not often deviated from this line of procedure. Concerning *Barn.* iv. 14, he says (p. 33) with justice that this is "our earliest instance of the citation of a saying of Christ as 'scripture.'" In the year A.D. 130, the date upon which he rightly fixes for the composition of the *Epistle of Barnabas*, this estimate of the Gospels would have been in the highest degree surprising, since it is not until A.D. 170 that the next examples of such an estimate make their appearance. Consequently it has been for long supposed that the author of the *Epistle of Barnabas* believed himself to be quoting from a book actually recognised as "scripture," possibly 4 *Esra* viii. 3, "multi quidem creati sunt pauci autem salvabuntur," and that he only erroneously fastened upon the form of words in Matt. xxii. 14. Yet Professor Stanton passes over



this supposition in silence, and simply remarks that "the saying in question is contained in the *Gospel according to St Matthew*, and could not so far as we know have been derived from any other source." This assertion is controvertible on still another ground. Characteristic though it is of Dr Stanton's method, it might seem to contain no serious error, inasmuch as, even if the quotation be referred, as above suggested, to 4 Esra, the use of Matthew by Barnabas would none the less have to be conceded. But there exists, side by side with this, the other possibility, which Professor Stanton through this assertion of his likewise negatives, that the quotation might have circulated *viva voce* as a "winged word."

Of still greater importance is the latter possibility in the case of Polycarp *ad Phil.* vii. 1, "Everyone who shall not confess that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is antichrist." Professor Stanton, however, is of opinion (p. 20) that the passage "must assuredly have been taken from" 1 John iv. 2, 3. Moreover, he thereby overlooks another fact, namely, that if it be absolutely necessary to assume a written source, this source might equally well have been 2 John 7, an epistle, that is to say, which many critics regard as prior in date to 1 John. But Professor Stanton goes to the farthest length in this direction on p. 13, where he discerns a sign of acquaintance with the *Acts of the Apostles* (xx. 35) in 1 *Clem. Rom.* ii. 1, "being more glad to give than to receive." This is a saying of Jesus concerning which it is not merely a supposition but a certainty that it circulated by word of mouth as an ἀγράφων. How can the reader feel confidence in the reasoning of a writer who regards it as permissible to conclude that the author of 1 *Clem.* could only have obtained this saying from the *Acts*? In another place (p. 30, n. 1), where it is a question of refuting the hypothesis of Harnack that the *Didachè* is posterior to the *Epistle of Barnabas*, he is quite alive to the consideration that the phrase, upon the occurrence of which in both writings Harnack bases his argument, "is one which might have been common in Christian preaching."

Or what shall we make of the contention (p. 125, n. 3) that "perhaps 2 Cor. xi. 13 ('such men are false apostles') should be taken as evidence that Christ's saying (Matt. xxiv. 24, Mark xiii. 22, 'there shall arise false Christs and false prophets') was known to St Paul in this form," i.e., "many false Christs and false apostles shall arise," a form which is used by Justin (*Dial.* 35), and in similar manner by Hegesippus (*Euseb. H. E.* iv. 22. 6) and Tertullian (*De Præscr. Hær.* 4)? The passage in 2 Cor. xi. 13 has absolutely nothing in common with the passages quoted from the Gospels, and it has in common with the form used by Justin, Hegesippus, and Tertullian only the words "false prophets," not, however, "false Christs."

Another kind of unwarranted inference is employed by Dr Stanton, when (p. 69), in spite of the admission that Hippolytus probably did not draw from Basilides, but from one of the latter's disciples, he adds, "At any rate the use of the third and fourth Gospels by a genuine disciple would raise a presumption in favour of their having been used by the master likewise." Here there is presupposed exactly what ought not to be pre-

supposed, namely, that these Gospels were just as accessible to Basilides himself as to his disciple. But how,—if the Fourth Gospel saw the light somewhere between A.D. 132 and A.D. 140, whilst Basilides was active under the rule of Hadrian?

Still more important, however, is the presupposition made throughout by Professor Stanton, that, if there can be shown to be resemblance between a canonical and a non-canonical writing, the former is uniformly to be regarded as the earlier. He altogether fails to reckon with the possibility that the opposite of this might also be the order of sequence, and he is equally oblivious of the other possibility that characteristic expressions and phrases might well have been the common property of the language of the Church and have been adopted in two writings, independently of each other.

Now, it is precisely upon this presupposition that his most important result, as to the time when the Gospels were used, rests. After the recapitulation on p. 275, he reaches the conclusion that “in the Church of Rome” the Gospels “seem all to have been in use some thirty years earlier” than the middle of the second century. This is supported (*loc. cit.*) solely by reference to the *Shepherd of Hermas*. But let anyone take into consideration the parallelisms between this work and the Fourth Gospel given on p. 74 *sq.*, and he will acknowledge that not one of them requires another explanation than the one last mentioned, namely, the common language of the Church. Moreover, the date assigned (about A.D. 120) rests entirely upon the ascription of the *Shepherd of Hermas* to the years between A.D. 110 and A.D. 125, whilst it seems to us unallowable to leave out of account the distinct assertion of the *Muratorian Fragment* that it was written during the episcopate of Pius, that is, at the earliest, A.D. 140.

In like manner, to mention only a few of the other more important results, it is to be noted that Dr Stanton, notwithstanding all the pains he has taken, cannot get away from the fact that Justin cites the Fourth Gospel only very sparingly, and not at all in the same way as the Synoptic writers (*cf.* the careful investigation of E. A. Abbott in *Encycl. Bibl., Art. Gospels*, §§ 101–104).

Again, a constantly recurring feature of Professor Stanton’s method of proof is to be found in the assumption that Apocryphal Gospels would not have been used in the influential circles of the Church. Not less interesting than bold, in this respect, is his contention that Justin would not have employed the *Gospel of Peter*, but a form of the *Acta Pilati*, which has not come down to us, a source from which the author of the *Gospel of Peter* also drew (pp. 93–121). And the same may be said of his contention that Justin did not use the *Protevangelium Jacobi*, but a source common to them both, viz., either the *Gospel according to the Hebrews*, or an oral tradition; in any case he would not have been familiar with a *written* version of the *Gospel according to the Hebrews* (pp. 121–128, 261–264). Yet, over and above all this, Dr Stanton considers himself justified in maintaining that the *Gospel according to the Hebrews*, which possibly Justin used indirectly, “seems never, properly speaking, to have been



accounted 'apocryphal' " (p. 126 ; *cf.* 256-260). A similar consideration is emphasised in connection with the *Gospel according to the Egyptians*, which he admits would have been used in Egypt, if not in the whole of Egypt, by the insistence that "its tendency may not have been markedly heretical, and indeed probably was not" (p. 268).

4. The apologetical bias, which manifests itself in all these contentions, —we are convinced unconsciously and in full conviction of their scientific foundation,—comes to light especially in the last of the chief positions of the whole argument, when, namely, Professor Stanton proceeds to draw from the use of the Gospels the consequences bearing upon their authority in the earliest times. His most important propositions on this subject are the following:—"There must have been good grounds for believing that the Fourth Gospel was founded upon apostolic testimony in order to overcome the prejudice that would be created by the contrasts between it and" the Synoptics (p. 277). "The basis of the Canon was . . . a belief in the apostolicity of the writings included. The Gospels . . . were accepted as the authentic embodiment of the Gospel which the Apostles at first preached" (p. 271). This is only true to the extent that it was imperatively necessary, as against the Gnostics and Montanists, to appeal solely to the writings of Apostles, and that such verification was naturally desired. But what in reality was investigated, before a writing could be incorporated in the Canon, was rather whether the contents of such writing corresponded to the views of the Catholic Church. That this was the case is proved by the *Muratorian Fragment*, which gives as ground for the adoption of the four Gospels that *uno ac principali spiritu declarata sint in omnibus omnia* ; it is proved again by the action of the Bishop Serapion of Antioch (*Euseb. H. E.* vi. 12), who at first allowed the use of the *Gospel of Peter*, and afterwards forbade its use, because in the meanwhile he had read it, and had found in it heretical views ; it is proved finally by Dr Stanton's own last sentence quoted above from p. 271, in so far as that is applied to Mark and Luke (the theory of Irenæus that Luke belonged to the Canon because its contents went back to what was communicated by St Paul was very soon relinquished by the Church Fathers). If this be recognised, Dr Stanton's entire argument collapses. In particular, there is nothing more in the way of the theory that the Fourth Gospel secured for itself recognition on account of its contents, and thus overcame any suspicion that might be raised against it through failure of evidence as to its apostolical origin.

5. The question as to whether in the last third of the first century the Apostle or the Presbyter John resided in Ephesus deserves a separate treatment. It is unfortunately too complicated a matter to permit our entering here into details. We can only touch upon two fundamental points. Dr Stanton thinks (p. 217) that the youthful Irenæus could not have been mistaken as to whether the aged Polycarp meant by John, about whom as his teacher he was accustomed to relate, the Apostle or the Presbyter. But why not, if Polycarp always spoke of one John, and described him as

"the disciple of the Lord"? Would not that have led Irenæus astray? The ground which impels one to this supposition is the silence of the entire first half of the second century in regard to the sojourn of the Apostle John in Ephesus. The way in which Dr Stanton tries to explain this silence (p. 237) seems to us altogether untenable. "The persons of the Evangelists," he says, "were for a time commonly lost sight of, because the minds of Christians were absorbed with the main contents and the outline of that Gospel which had been at first orally delivered," and, specifically with reference to the last surviving apostle in Ephesus, he adds, "His real influence may have been confined within a narrow circle of his disciples." But do not the letters in *Apoc.* ii. *sq.* prove the authority of the Ephesine John over the whole province of Asia?

PAUL W. SCHMIEDEL.

ZÜRICH.

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*An Enquiry into the Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel.*—By James Drummond, M.A., LL.D., Hon. Litt.D., Principal of Manchester College, Oxford.—London: Williams and Norgate, 1903.

"At last, a really good book on the right side," is the greeting some of us will be inclined to give to Dr Drummond's book. A like greeting might have been given to Dr Stanton's *The Gospels as Historical Documents*, Part I., which preceded it by a few weeks, and covers part of the same ground. The appearance of these two books almost together is the more welcome because they come at the end of what, from the point of view of which we are speaking, has been a long series of disappointments.

About a decade and a half ago (fifteen years in Germany and thirteen in England), the eminent Göttingen professor Dr Schürer felt himself able to announce a gradual *rapprochement* between the two sides in the great controversy about the Fourth Gospel. Conservative critics, in defending the genuineness of the Gospel, had ceased to insist upon its rigid accuracy; they were prepared to allow a rather considerable element in it as due to the subjectivity of the writer. At the same time their opponents were drawing back from a number of untenable positions; they were coming to see that the date of the Gospel could not be as late as had been supposed; they were giving up many of the objections that had been brought in detail; indeed, the view seemed to be steadily gaining ground that the Gospel, if not actually the work of St John, might well be the work of a disciple of St John, and embody a tradition received from him. In this way the two sides seemed to be drawing nearer to each other, and there seemed a fair prospect of their reaching a sufficient mutual understanding. As we look back over the years that have elapsed since Schürer wrote, it must be admitted that this prospect has been only partially fulfilled. There remains, of course, the middle party, containing some eminent names, with Schürer himself and Harnack at its head.



There is also an interesting little side group, represented by Delff and Bousset and one or two others, who, while denying the Gospel to the Apostle the son of Zebedee, claimed it for "the beloved disciple," whom they identified with a member of the high-priestly circle at Jerusalem, a disciple of the Lord, who afterwards settled at Ephesus. On this view the Gospel was still the work of an eye-witness, if not of an Apostle.

But, although these two groups still maintain their ground, an even greater number of writers in recent years has rejected all compromise, and refuses to admit the connection of the Gospel either with eye-witness or Apostle. The list includes Jülicher, O. Pfeiderer, Jean Réville, P. W. Schmiedel, and, practically, H. J. Holtzmann. The latest and most disappointing of all the additions to this list was the French writer, Abbé Loisy. At the moment when this scholar has had the mortification of seeing his books placed upon the Index, it would be ungenerous to speak of him only in terms of criticism. But the very causes and qualities which attracted our sympathy also increase our regret at finding him in the ranks of the enemy. Even the Dean of Westminster, in his little book on the Gospels, which contains so much that is admirable, seemed to me not quite to succeed in hitting the mark as to the Fourth Gospel. The argument seemed to point one way, and the summing-up another. And, though I myself agree cordially with the conclusion, I could only do so by a rather different—and, I venture to think, truer—statement of the premises.

With the appearance of the Abbé Loisy's elaborate commentary, the lowest point seemed to be reached. But now, in quick succession, Dr Stanton's and Dr Drummond's books have redressed the balance, and have once more placed the criticism of the Gospel on what I believe to be a sound footing. It is not only a question of particular conclusions, it is a whole question of method.

When Harnack wrote his famous Preface to his work on the *Chronology of the Early Christian Literature* in 1896, he had evidently a sense that there was something wrong in the criticism of the day. There was something wrong, and something different was wanted. And, if I am not mistaken, it is just that something which Dr Stanton and Dr Drummond have supplied. The two writers have much in common. Both give one the impression of having dwelt long upon their subject, of knowing it thoroughly, and having all the details of it at command. And then their special characteristic is that they are constantly testing the logic both of their own arguments and those of others, bringing to bear upon them an admirable sagacity, never deceived by vague assertions, but always striving to get at realities. It is the true wariness of the judicial mind. And it is especially pleasing to note that the qualities displayed are thoroughly English. I do not remember to have ever had this impression quite so strongly before. We have had great minds applied to criticism, but in each case some other quality was more prominent: in Bishop Lightfoot, a certain breadth of scholarship; in Westcott and Hort, rather different kinds of subtlety. But the conspicuous feature in Dr Stanton and Dr

Drummond is this judicial wariness, continually testing the logic of the critical process. It reminds one of a sentence that Mark Pattison used about Bishop Butler: every brick is rung before it is laid in its place.

At last one feels that the English mind is making the contribution that it is qualified to make, and ought to make, to the study of this question of the Fourth Gospel. Illustrations abound. I might take one from Harnack's volume to which I have referred. He begins by laying down excellent principles, but his practice does not quite conform to his theory. In pursuance of his proof that in the tradition of the second century there was a gradual confusion between John the Presbyter and John the Apostle, he undertakes to show that Irenæus derived all his knowledge on the point from the *Expositions* of Papias. In this way, if it was all caused by a single source, the confusion became more possible. And it is indeed very likely that Irenæus did derive most of his information about the Presbyters and their surroundings from the work of Papias. But what then? Ingenious as the theory is, and skilfully as it is worked out, a single sentence disposes of it. "Critics speak of Irenæus as though he had fallen out of the moon, paid two or three visits to Polycarp's lecture-room, and never known anyone else. In fact, he must have known all sorts of men, of all ages, both in the East and the West, and among others his venerable predecessor Pothinus, who was upwards of ninety at the time of his death" (Drummond, p. 348). Dr Stanton writes to very much the same effect. The two English writers are strongly against the substitution of the Presbyter for the Apostle. Writing quite independently of each other, they both strenuously uphold the tradition of St John in Asia Minor, and they both insist on the substantial character of the evidence which connects him with the Gospel.

Another subject on which Dr Drummond has some valuable remarks is the Argument from Silence. How often have we been told that the subordinate use of the Fourth Gospel by Justin Martyr proves that he assigned to it a lower degree of authority than to the Synoptics! It is refreshing, in such a case, to listen to Dr Drummond's robust agnosticism, supported as it is by aptly chosen parallels. "But why, then, it may be asked, has Justin not quoted the Fourth Gospel at least as often as the other three? I cannot tell, any more than I can tell why he has never named the supposed authors of his Memoirs, or has mentioned only one of the parables, or made no reference to the Apostle Paul, or nowhere quoted the Apocalypse, though he believed it to be an apostolic and prophetic work. His silence may be due to pure accident, or the book may have seemed less adapted to his apologetic purposes; but considering how many things there are about which he is silent, we cannot admit that the *argumentum a silentio* possesses in this case any validity" (p. 157). The note, which Dr Drummond appends to this, seems to me of great importance. "An instructive instance of the danger of arguing from what is not told is furnished by Theophilus of Antioch. He does not mention the names of the writers of the Gospels, except John; he does not tell us



anything about any of them; he says nothing about the origin or the date of the Gospels themselves, or about their use in the Church. He quotes from them extremely little, though he quotes copiously from the Old Testament. But most singular of all, in a defence of Christianity he tells us nothing about Christ himself; if I am not mistaken, he does not so much as name Him or allude to Him; and, if the supposition were not absurd, it might be argued with great plausibility that he cannot have known anything about Him." The rest of the note is not less pertinent, and not less pointed. I suspect that from it critics might learn a lesson that is greatly needed. Not much would be left of many learned treatises if undue applications of the Argument from Silence were excluded. For instance, it seems to me that misuse of this argument enters deeply into, and largely vitiates, the treatment of the external evidence by M. Loisy.

Terse little comments like the above are constantly occurring in Dr Drummond's book, and I think constitute the greatest part of its value. Here is another instance: "Freiherr von der Goltz, in an elaborate work, tries to prove that Ignatius, though influenced by Johannine thought, was unacquainted with the Gospel. His argument seems to me to rest on a very questionable critical canon, viz. that an author will not use a Scriptural expression in a connection of his own, or give it an application which the original writer did not intend, or fail to quote it when he might reasonably do so. How many religious writers might be proved by such a canon to have been ignorant of the Fourth Gospel" (p. 258). The remark is very just, and it certainly deserves to be made. Still it is not conclusive of the question whether Ignatius implies use of the Fourth Gospel or not. It disposes of the objection that he cannot be referring to it. The alternative, however, remains open that Ignatius may, in some way that we cannot trace, have been influenced by the oral teaching of the Apostle.

On the whole question of the external evidence, Dr Drummond's view might almost be called optimistic. He endorses affirmatively almost every item of evidence that has ever been alleged. He believes that the Gospel was used, not only by Justin, but by both the great Gnostics, Basilides and Valentinus; and he finds traces of it in the Apostolic Fathers, Ignatius, Barnabas, and Hermas. I believe that, in the main, his arguments are excellent, and that they will thoroughly stand the test of time. But in some points of detail they may need revision. I do not doubt that Dr Drummond himself will pay close attention to the points on which Dr Stanton differs from him. Such, for instance, would be the supposed allusion to the Four Gospels in Hermas (Drummond, p. 255; Stanton, p. 47 n.); the use of *φησί* in introducing quotations (Drummond, p. 297 f.; Stanton, p. 68); the position of Apollinaris in the Quarto-deciman controversy (Drummond, p. 507 ff.; Stanton, p. 185 f.).

Some of these criticisms affect the writer of this as well as Dr Drummond. He does not on that account think them any the less noteworthy; on the contrary, he gladly hails them as marking the

advance that comes from open discussion. At the same time it is a pleasure to him to find so many coincidences of opinion, even on points confessedly doubtful, between himself and Dr Drummond. One of the most important of these refers to the doctrine of the Logos, and the relation of St John to Philo (Drummond, p. 24 f.). He fears, however, that the phrase "total absence of Philo's special vocabulary" must be held, in view of the parallels collected by Aall and Grill, to overshoot the mark.

If in his treatment of the external evidence Dr Drummond might be called optimistic, the same cannot be said of his treatment of the internal. As I believe that he a little overstates the one, so also I am inclined to think that he understates the other. For instance, there are several points in the comparison of the Synoptics with the Fourth Gospel—such as the duration of the Public Ministry, the visits to Jerusalem, and the dates of the Last Supper and the Crucifixion—in which more than one thoroughly critical writer would either leave the question open or give the preference to the Fourth Gospel, and yet Dr Drummond decides against it. And although I agree with him that some of the arguments used will not bear the stress laid upon them, there are others that I should rate more highly than he does. Part of Dr Drummond's argument—and a very excellent part—may be taken as qualifying or correcting a line of observation that I have used a good deal myself (p. 376 ff.). Here, too, I gratefully accept the correction; but I think there is rather more to be said, and I hope to have an opportunity of saying it. One feels that the examination of the internal data of the Gospel, though this portion of the book is full of good things of the same kind as those in the other, is yet some way from being so exhaustive.

If I am to pass on to criticism—and I suppose that it is the critic's business to criticise—I imagine that the principal count is likely to be that the book is not quite constructed to scale. Some parts of it are very thorough, others are rather slight. I might note, *e.g.*, the section on the "History of Opinion" (pp. 67–71) as rather perfunctory. This is not the only way in which the book shows some inequality. I am not one of those who think it fair to find fault with a writer because his book does not contain references to literature that has appeared only a few months before its publication. The preparation of Dr Drummond's book has evidently been spread over a long period—probably not much less than thirty years. It also deals with great masses of literature, including articles up to the spring of 1903. But, allowing for this, one is a little surprised to find no reference whatever to Schmiedel, whose weighty contributions to *Encyclopædia Biblica* appeared in 1901. There is also a marked absence of allusion to so able a writer as Jülicher, the first edition of whose *Einleitung* came out in 1894, and the second in 1901. Again, there is, I believe, no allusion to Delff, except so far as this may be implied in a small-print note on Bousset (p. 211). I should myself think less of the silence as to Pfleiderer's *Urchristentum*; but Schmiedel and Jülicher are quite in



the front rank of criticism. Then again, the architectonic structure of the book does not seem to be quite satisfactory. It begins with a division on the "general character" of the Gospel, which is, however, not very clearly distinguished from the treatment of the internal evidence that comes much later. Inserted between these two parts is the great mass of external evidence (pp. 67-351). After the internal evidence (pp. 352-385) come answers to objections, which end with an elaborate discussion of the Paschal Controversy (pp. 444-513), which looks as if it would be more in place among the external evidence. Finally, the book closes with a single page of summing-up, which, most judicial as it is, fits on with a certain abruptness. The book, indeed, makes upon one the impression of having been "written round" the three or four considerable monographs which have appeared previously in this country or in America.

In regard to the position which he has taken up, Dr Drummond will be prepared to find himself in a cross-fire from two sides. While he clearly pronounces for St John the son of Zebedee as the author of the Gospel, he reduces its historical character to the lowest point compatible with such a hypothesis. I believe myself that he goes too far in this direction. I should be inclined to argue: If the author was really an eye-witness of the events, then the events must have happened more nearly as he describes them. This conclusion seems to be confirmed by the great precision of detail which marks his descriptions. But I have no doubt that, on the other side, many will argue conversely, that if the descriptions are not to be trusted to the extent Dr Drummond supposes, then the author cannot have been an eye-witness.

Dr Drummond will be prepared for this; and he has every right to his opinion, which I think that he does well not to defend in greater detail than he has. But there are a few incidental expressions scattered about the book which go far to explain why, from my point of view, he goes just so far as he does and no further. I have said that he has in a marked degree some of the best English qualities; but I am not sure that he has not also something of an Englishman's defects. He comes to the study of the *Origins of Christianity* in the spirit of a British juryman, the very best of his kind. But he does not, even in imagination, cease to be a Briton; and he shows an imperfect sympathy with states of mind that are very different from those of the Englishman of the present day. For the great passage of Irenæus upon the Four Gospels, he has only the epithet "absurd,"—on this point I would venture to commend to him the much worthier language of Professor Stanton; and when he comes to speak of the *Acts of John*, he can only see their "monstrous absurdity" (p. 345). If one could enter a little more into the spirit of the writer of those Acts (I refer to the text published by Dr M. R. James), I think one would be aware that such expressions do them an injustice. They contain some quite profound thoughts; and when we think how difficult it must have been for these early Christians to realise what they meant by the Divinity of Christ, we shall perhaps be less surprised at the experiments to which

they had recourse in the effort to realise it. *E parvis majora*: I suspect that if Dr Drummond's eyes were opened to see rather more of the excuses for Docetism, they might also be open to see other things besides.

W. SANDAY.

CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD.

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Alfred Loisy.—*Le Quatrième Évangile*.—Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1903.

A GENERAL introduction, more closely printed than the rest, fills the first 150 pages, of which the heads of discussion are as follows: The Fourth Gospel in relation to Church tradition—to modern criticism—to the Synoptic Gospels—Its character, doctrine, origin, plan, literary form, textual tradition, etc. The rest of the work is a commentary in larger print, in which the text, divided into thirty-five episodes, is explained in detail in accordance with the principles expounded in the introduction.

Of the author of the Fourth Gospel M. Loisy writes thus:—

“He was a Christian—not a convert from paganism, but one formed in the Jewish Alexandrine school. He was a believer who seems not to have had the least personal recollection of the real life, teaching, and death of Jesus; a theologian who, being as such altogether a stranger to historical aim and method, and careless of matter of fact, felt not the least scruple in adapting tradition to his doctrine; even if he knew how to retain from tradition certain leading facts without which all Christianity would fade away into mere ideas. He was a profound mystic and enthusiast, a seer, in whom lived the gospel which he expounds, and who sets before us rather his own self than the historical Christ.

“That he was an apostle and a companion of Jesus, we cannot for a moment suppose. He is visibly further away than Paul from the Christ who lived upon earth, and yet Paul never knew the Saviour in the flesh. He became a disciple of Paul, or rather of Paul's writings, for one discerns in him as little the sense of what was characteristic of the apostolic age as of what was characteristic of the ministry of Jesus. If you judge him only by his book, you can take him neither for an apostle nor for a direct disciple of the apostles, but only for a man of the third generation of Christians. . . . One cannot dream of identifying him either with John the apostle or with John the elder.”

The last chapter, thinks M. Loisy, is by another hand than chs. i.–xx. It was written in imitation of the latter by those who introduced this gospel into the Church, and who, without really knowing who had written it, wished it to be ascribed to the “beloved apostle,” and to see the latter identified with John, son of Zebedee—an identification, however, which they only ventured to hint at, and not explicitly affirm. M. Loisy points out that this last chapter was composed in deference to the Petrine tradition of the Roman See. It was clearly intended to meet the objections



raised from the first in the Church of the second century to the idea of Johannine authorship.

The Fourth Gospel, then, according to M. Loisy, is devoid of historicity. Its author treats the Synoptic tradition as Philo treated the O.T. (p. 122). "Allegory," he writes (p. 75), "is the characteristic feature of Johannine teaching. It shapes the narratives, which are deeply symbolic of a secret meaning which the author only occasionally discovers to us. It no less shapes the discourses, in which Christ constantly speaks a figurative language, full of double meanings, which the evangelist himself supposes to have been unintelligible to those who heard it. Thus the Fourth Gospel in its entirety is nothing but a great theological and mystical allegory, a work of speculation having nothing in common, as regards form, with the preaching of the historical Christ."

The Gospel is a presentation of Jesus as the incarnation of the pre-existent divine Word, and if the rôle of being the Word is less emphasised in the discourses than that of being a pre-existent divine person, life and light of the world, that is merely a concession on the part of the evangelist, who was sensible that the idea of the Logos was no part of the evangelical tradition, but a loan from Greek philosophy (p. 98).

To this dominating idea are subordinated the few details of the life which, being drawn from the Synoptic tradition, can claim to be historical. As for the miracles of the Fourth Gospel, they are devised to bring out in allegorical wise the Christological ideas of the evangelist. "All these miracles reveal an essential function of the Saviour, an aspect of his mission. The *mise en scène* is ever subordinate to the lesson which the evangelist would inculcate. If certain details sometimes seem intended for nothing else than to keep up an appearance of history and preserve an aspect of verisimilitude, it is none the less the case that the narrative always stops short just where it suits the symbolism, even at the expense of appearing to be interrupted or incomplete. The history of the paralytic loses itself in the discourse which it leads up to; so does that of the man born blind. We do not hear what became of Lazarus after his resurrection. The author drops his narratives so soon as he has got out of them what he wanted" (p. 83).

The Abbé Loisy's work is full of learning and insight; and the only adverse criticism that might perhaps be offered is that he sometimes goes too far in his attempts to discover an allegorical fitness in the setting of circumstance within which the evangelist enshrines the dialogues, or rather monologues. Thus he says (p. 328) that "the night which covers with its darkness the interview of Nicodemus with Jesus well symbolises the gloom which enveloped the Judaism of the Pharisees." Granting—what M. Loisy shows to be probable—that the entire interview is fictitious, yet the author of the fiction may have surely set the interview by night in order to suggest to his readers that Nicodemus was afraid of the Jews seeing him visit the Saviour.

Nothing is better reasoned in the whole book than the explanation,

p. 175 ff., of the text, John i. 13. M. Loisy shows that the reading found in Justin and Irenæus and preferred by Tertullian must be original, and he points out that the words ἐξ αἱμάτων preclude the supposition that the virgin birth is here glanced at, for Jesus anyway must have derived His blood from a human mother. If, therefore, any human birth was intended by the passage, it must have been of an apparent or docetic kind. "But," he writes (p. 181), "the precise instant of the incarnation, in the theological sense of the word, is not indicated. In the perspective of the Gospel, this initial moment is the baptism of Jesus, because then and then only the glory of the Word began to manifest itself in the works of the Saviour. Thus the birth of Jesus is relegated to a point outside the horizon contemplated by the evangelist, regarded as a thing which has happened (*si on la considère comme fait*). If regarded dogmatically as the apparition of the Son of God in the flesh, it is referred in idea to the moment of baptism." And again, p. 182: "It is just because the virginal conception is not indicated in the Fourth Gospel, and because the incarnation blends itself in its perspective with the descent of the Spirit on Jesus on the occasion of His baptism, that the adversaries of the Johannine writings pretended to detect in the first chapter the gnostic theory of a heavenly Æon presenting itself to John; as if the author had really suppressed the first thirty years of Jesus' life."

M. Loisy realises that after all the important question is not whether or no an apostle wrote the fourth gospel. "Its unhistorical character," he writes (p. 136), "is demonstrable, quite apart from the question of who wrote it. It was not necessary to be an apostle in order to write a historical account more or less exact or complete of the teaching and life of Jesus. Nor is it in itself impossible for an apostle to have composed a theology of Christ." He proceeds to sum up the difficulties in the way of the hypothesis of apostolic authorship in so masterly a manner that one feels any modern scholar who upholds that hypothesis to be at least as wanting in perspective and insight as the much-derided upholders of the view that the Pauline epistles were only concocted in the second century.

"The Fourth Gospel" (p. 119) "has contributed more than any other writings of the New Testament, more even than those of Paul, to implant Christianity in the Greek world and to make of it a universal religion."

It may indeed be said that if Athanasius had not had the Fourth Gospel to draw texts from, Arius would never have been confuted. Had the fathers of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries not known this Gospel, or not embraced it as authentic, the Church would have remained semi-Ebionite, and the councils of Nice and Ephesus would never have taken place. And this is why the Vatican, summoned by M. Loisy's work to choose between truth and free criticism on the one side, and the fetters of traditionalism on the other, has made the choice it has. Any other would have been suicidal.

FRED. C. CONYBEARE.



*Humanism: Philosophical Essays.*—By F. C. S. Schiller, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1903.

THIS volume consists of a preface and fourteen essays, most of which are reprints from various periodicals. It is unfortunately impossible, within the limits assigned to this review, to discuss them all. But as some of them belong to the last century, time as well as space shall condition our choice, and we will confine ourselves to the *Philosophical Essays* of the twentieth century. They and the Preface have a common subject, viz. Pragmatism, or, as Mr Schiller now proposes to call it, Humanism—that is, Mr Schiller says, “the attitude of thought which I know to be habitual in William James and in myself, which seems to be sporadic and inchoate in many others, and which is destined, I believe, to win the widest popularity.”

In Essay I., *The Ethical Basis of Metaphysic*, after some objections to the metaphysical doctrine of the Absolute, as upheld by Mr F. H. Bradley—objections which will commend themselves to those who disagree with Spinoza, and will be valueless to those who do not—Mr Schiller defines Pragmatism as “the thorough recognition that the purposive character of mental life generally must influence and pervade also our most remote cognitive activities.” All our actual thinking is purposive, all actual realities are related to the ends of our practical life. The ethical conception of *Good* is superior to, and a determinant of, the logical conception of *True* and the metaphysical conception of *Real*. “Reality and the knowledge thereof essentially presuppose a definitely directed effort to know.” But this effort will not be made without a purpose, nor is purpose possible without knowledge or *knowing* without *valuing*: “Knowledge is a form of *value*, and the foundations of metaphysics have actually been found to lie in ethics.” If the Good, for us, is thus “the supreme controlling power in our whole experience,” then we must discard the notion that “Reality is what it is, whatever we may do.” Determinism “has of course an absolutely indefeasible status as a scientific postulate.” But “we may yet have to recognise the reality of a certain measure of indetermination.” The world is partially determined by our action. Finally, “the pragmatist will tend to put a personal interpretation upon his transactions with Nature and any agency he may conceive to underlie it.” Our metaphysics must be, if not religious, “in any case *quasi-ethical*.”

In Essay II., “*Useless Knowledge*,” “independently objective reality” is denied to the world: the world is real for me while I am in it. The world, the truth, and the good are relative to us: by the true and the good we mean the true and the good for us. Axioms, eternal truths, self-evident truths are hypotheses, postulates, assumptions which we make simply and solely because they would be useful, if they were true; and which are true

so far as they are useful. Useless knowledge would be "knowledge of the Absolute, or, what comes to the same, of the Unknowable"—if it were knowledge.

Truth, in Essay III., is declared to be a *form of value*—a value which is due to the fact that thought is purposive, and that it has (in our waking moments) an interest, and, being interested, "it effects the necessary *selection* among the objects of our attention, accepting what is consonant, and rejecting what is discrepant, with our aim in thinking." This process of valuation, or rather this form of value, may be differently assigned not only by two different individuals, but by the same individual at different periods of his life: subjective truth-valuations are of the most varied nature. But some of these truth-valuations come to be adopted by society: a process of selection is carried on by society. The principle of selection is "the usefulness and efficiency of the propositions." The principles selected by society as useful, or found by society to be useful, are thereby constituted objective truths: "Social usefulness is an ultimate determinant of truth." If an individual truth-valuation sustains itself thus, the truth grows systematic and objective: "there come to be truths which are the same for all." "In its fullest sense our truth must harmonise with our whole experience."

In Essay XV., *Philosophy and a Future Life*, the view is expressed "that 'the world' is primarily 'my experience,' *plus* (secondarily) the supplementings of that experience which its nature renders it necessary to assume, such as, *e.g.*, other persons and a 'real' material world." Reality is guaranteed to this world just so long as it does its work and explains our experience. The "common world which is experienced by us all" is a "great social convention" which we postulate for practical purposes. This common world, the "real" material world, or "objective" world, "is nobody's experience, but is supposed to account for everybody's."

The above summary may serve to show what Mr Schiller means, in his Preface, by "the invincible individuality of philosophy." It may explain the suspicion with which he views "all attempts to explain away the human personality which is the formal and efficient and final cause of all explanation." It will illustrate the fact that his starting-point in philosophy is the "frank acceptance of our immediate experience and experienced self." He begins with no doubt that "he has a responsible personality and a soul and conscience of his own, and is not a mere phantasmagoria of abstractions, a transient complex of shadowy formulas that Science calls 'the laws of nature.'" And the central thought of his Pragmatism, or Humanism, is "the purposiveness of our thought and the teleological character of its methods."

Mr Schiller starts with a "frank acceptance" of the assumption (his assumption) that he exists, and without attempt to make the assumption reasonable or easy for anyone else. The existence of other persons, and the existence of a real material world, are also assumptions which he makes. But these assumptions are, he says, rendered necessary by the nature of



his experience. We have, or he has, therefore, to accept frankly, or to assume, not only that he exists, but also that he has experience, and that his experience renders certain other assumptions necessary. This seems to be very much the same position as that of Descartes and of individualism—another instance of “the invincible individuality of philosophy.” If this is the case, then Mr Schiller does not seem to be more successful than Descartes was in moving from his individual existence and experience to the existence of other persons, of the world and of God. The existence of an objective world is an assumption made necessary by Mr Schiller's existence. It is a large assumption, and the necessity is not quite clear. The objective world “is nobody's experience,” and therefore not Mr Schiller's. In what sense it is “real” and “objective,” when it is merely “a great social convention,” seems to require explanation. “Social” seems to imply the existence of other people; but if (p. 285) we cannot observe the death (in the sense of the destruction) of another, for the simple reason that we cannot see or observe his existence, it is not quite clear in what sense his existence is an assumption rendered necessary by our experience. His existence and his death seem alike unreal. The world may be a social convention; society can hardly be so. Other people do not come within Mr Schiller's experience: their existence is a necessary assumption. If this meant a necessary inference, Mr Schiller's philosophy would be open to the same objections as Descartes'. If it means a necessary assumption in the same sense as we have seen the existence of a real objective world to be according to Mr Schiller, then the existence of the individuals who constitute society is itself “a great social convention.” But why should not other people and the world exist by the same right as Mr Schiller? If they are not part of his experience, is he, himself?

F. B. JEVONS.

BISHOP HATFIELD'S HALL, DURHAM.

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*Old Testament Prophecy.*—By the late A. B. Davidson, D.D., LL.D., Litt.D. Edited by J. A. Paterson, D.D.—Pp. xiii + 507. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1903.

PROFESSOR PATERSON deserves our grateful praise for the promptness with which he is publishing Dr Davidson's literary remains. Two volumes of sermons and a volume of essays, besides the present work, have already appeared. He is also at work, I believe, preparing his late colleague's commentary on Is. xl.-lxvi. for publication. The long-expected *Old Testament Theology* in the *International Theological Library* is to be edited by Principal Salmond, and is expected soon to appear. The present volume is not concerned with individual prophets, but with Hebrew Prophecy in general.

Any work of Davidson's would command respectful consideration, but

a discussion of Hebrew Prophecy from his pen evokes no slight anticipations. As the editor reminds us, this was his favourite study, pursued with unflagging ardour through forty years. It was the subject of a masterly article which he contributed to Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*. And it was his treatment of prophecy in the lectures contained in the present work, to which, as the editor says with some justice, was largely due "the changed attitude of all the Churches in Scotland to Biblical Science, during the last twenty-five or thirty years." To understand prophecy is to understand the genius of the Religion of Israel, and few were qualified as the author to reach the throbbing heart of a religious idea. At the foundation of all his work lay an accurate and delicate scholarship, and he had a wide knowledge of the literature of his subject. But all this would have been inadequate equipment for what he achieved. It is the merest superstition to imagine that scholarship in itself qualifies a man to speak with authority on exegesis and Biblical Theology. Too much English work never succeeds in "getting away," it is too absorbed in minute philology to move easily in the realm of great ideas. It was in this realm that Davidson's powers found their fullest and most congenial exercise. He set a high value on exact grammatical knowledge, but he was no mere pedant. A keen and penetrating intellect was united in him to a deep and original religious experience, and a sensitive sympathy with those spiritual truths which only the spiritual can aright discern. There must always be something incommunicable in our apprehension of the deep things of God. But, in spite of his shyness and reticence, there was in Davidson little of the inarticulate. He had a singular gift of expression, so that he not only thought himself into the meaning of his author, but was enabled to utter his ideas with surprising lucidity, force and fidelity. Yet while his was a mind which could in no way be regarded as commonplace, he was equally free from all that was fantastic or overstrained. A remarkable sanity and independence of judgment secured him against any surrender to the fanciful or arbitrary. With him genius was never divorced from common-sense. No doubt there is something to be said on the other side. He distrusted critical novelties, and moved with a slowness and caution that seemed provoking to his more adventurous fellows. But he did move, and occupied several positions with relation to the same problem at different periods of his life. So far as I know he originated no critical theory, and his interest in criticism was tepid where it did not aid in the more intelligent understanding of religious development. The newer textual criticism was thoroughly uncongenial to him; and while he had abundant justification for this, it may perhaps be questioned whether he did not unduly distrust the legitimacy of conjectural emendation. Moreover, his temper of mind gave some colour to the charge of a "paralysing scepticism," which a reviewer once brought against him. On many things and people he made up his mind, and expressed it with much incisiveness, and a biting humour, made all the more pungent by its slight sting of cynicism. But he saw both sides of many questions so clearly, and felt their



strength so dispassionately, that he found it hard to take either. Yet when we think of the more numerous band of confident scholars and theologians, we may well be thankful for one who so constantly reminded himself how slender are the data for the solution of many of our problems, and who preferred to sit in the seat of the scornful rather than run with the giddy multitude.

If I confess that the volume seems to me disappointing, I hope that this will be held to imply no reflection on either author or editor. Professor Paterson has given himself with devotion to his task, and has not felt free to interfere with the author's work. I should, for my own part, have welcomed the addition of numerous footnotes from his pen; I think they would have been of great value to students. But on this point he had the fullest right to use his own discretion. I find it hard to believe, however, that Davidson can have gone on to the end saying some of the things found in the book. Some things must surely have been omitted, other things expanded, when the lectures were delivered. Had Davidson himself prepared the volume for publication it would have been very different. An editor, of course, had to publish the MS. much as it was, he could not take unwarrantable liberties with his author's text. If one seeks to analyse this dissatisfaction, I think it is not difficult to explain it. The lectures themselves when delivered in the class-room seem to have had an almost indescribable effect on his students. But now that they appear in cold print they are tamer, the fire seems to glow in his words more faintly than I had hoped. In none of his later books, with all their high and splendid qualities, is there the spontaneous eloquence, the magical style that make his early commentary on Job (alas, unfinished!) a perennial delight. I hoped that these qualities, pruned by the author's severer self-restraint in his later works, might still blossom here. But, quite apart from style, a minor matter after all, the atmosphere of the book as a whole strikes one as strange. The discussion of the conditions under which God revealed Himself to Adam before the Fall, is a case in point. The problems discussed in the book were in some instances burning problems years ago, but are so no longer. Then we have well-established positions excellently and elaborately proved, while newer questions, on which we should have welcomed the author's judgment, do not appear above the horizon. For us to-day the Isaianic Problem does not suggest a discussion whether Isaiah wrote the last twenty-seven chapters of the book that goes by his name. It is rather a whole series of problems: are we to deny to Isaiah the great Messianic prophecies in chaps. ix. and xi.? are we to accept the very late second and first century dates favoured, for so much in the former part of the book, by Duhm and Marti? must we admit the presences of glosses and of post-exilic happy endings on anything like the scale adopted by these scholars and those like-minded with them? What view are we to take of the date and composition of the apocalyptic section, Is. xxiv.—xxvii.? or of Is. xxxiv., xxxv.? how much of the last twenty-seven chapters belong to the Second Isaiah himself? if with most scholars we

limit his work to Is. xl.-lv., what view should we hold about lvi.-lxvi. ? are these chapters the work of a single author, Duhm's Trito-Isaiah, or of several ? But it is the old question of the unity of authorship of the entire book that Davidson discusses. He deals excellently with the strange views of symbolism that used to be prevalent, and with the follies that mark the so-called "prophetic interpreters" ; but these things are so incredible to us now, that we cannot easily think ourselves back into the state of mind to which they seemed matters for serious consideration. The discussion of the prophetic consciousness is valuable, but here also the problem is now before us in a rather different form. The chapters on Messianic Prophecy, on the Servant of Yahweh, and especially on the False Prophets, are among the best in the book.

I should be sorry if my review led anyone to neglect the work. The subject is one on which we have too little that is touched by the breath of the modern spirit. It goes without saying that, in spite of all the drawbacks, inevitable in the sad circumstances, the volume exhibits a large and sagacious outlook and abounds in wise and suggestive utterances, in sparkling epigram, in happy metaphor, in pregnant sentences, packed with meaning. If it is a reviewer's duty to point out what he conceives to be its limitations, it is a pleasure to give expression to the reverence and gratitude which are the due from all students of the Old Testament to one of the greatest masters in Biblical Science that our land has produced.

ARTHUR S. PEAKE.

WHALLEY RANGE, MANCHESTER.

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W. Baldensperger.—*Die messianisch-apokalyptischen Hoffnungen des Judenthums*.—Strassburg : J. H. Ed. Heitz, 1903.

THE new and completely re-written edition of Baldensperger's *Selbstbewusstsein Jesu* appears in two parts, of which the first represents chapters i.-iv. of the second edition (1892). As appears from its title, this part discusses only Jewish apocalypse.

Baldensperger's new edition is highly acceptable. Few fields of biblical research have yielded greater results these thirteen years past than the pseudepigraphic and apocalyptic literature, and few indeed are the scholars so well qualified as he to pronounce on these results. The work of R. H. Charles has indeed supplied the English-reading public with admirable editions of texts hitherto inaccessible, at the same time that his critical analysis and interpretations have demonstrated their importance and thus awakened new interest. In Germany the new edition of Schürer contributes to the same result ; but everywhere the thinking world begins to require more. We perceive that the explanation of Christianity as a *worship* of the Messiah must be sought, not exclusively in the influence of Hellenism, at least not in that influence within Christian times alone, but also in the pre-Christian transformation of Judaism in general, and Jewish



Messianism in particular. For as research proceeds we find the centuries between the Exile and John the Baptist anything but the "Four Centuries of Silence" they were once designated. On the contrary, Jewish monotheism was gradually preparing itself for the admission of mediatorial beings. Jewish transcendentalism was getting ready for a Logos doctrine, Jewish particularism was preparing for universalism, the hopes of national deliverance were yielding to new conceptions of individual redemption and adoption, the hopes of Messianic hegemony to a hope of personal immortality. In this field of Jewish eschatology accordingly, represented by the little known literature contemporary with and shortly antecedent to the beginnings of Christianity, must be sought the roots of those conceptions under which the disciples of Jesus interpreted to themselves and to us His Messianic self-consciousness. So far as His conception of Messiahship transcended the political ideal of Israel's old-time national history, in the direction of Messiahship as understood by Paul and the Gentile Church, we must find the foreshadowings of it in the Wisdom literature with its hypostasis of creative and redemptive Wisdom; still more in the pseud-epigraphic and apocalyptic, with its cosmological and eschatological speculations. With the destruction of Israel's national life the Messianic hope had perished only to rise again transformed and glorified. The work of Jesus gave it ultimately the form in which it has been transmitted to us in the Gospels, though here criticism must of course differentiate an earlier element representing Jesus' own thought, and a later, representing subsequent belief. But however great the personal contribution which Jesus' own religious genius superadded to the earlier attempts to transform Messianism, the work of research in this field is indispensable. We need to know what amount of change had already been accomplished, and in Baldensperger we have a scholar competent to grasp the problem as a whole, while carefully dealing with all the multitudinous problems of detail.

Necessarily one of the most fundamental and vital, as well as most difficult divisions of the work, is the chapter on "Sources," in which the reaction is more pronounced than ever against the disposition formerly in vogue to classify everything as late, or interpolated, which showed affinity with Christian conceptions. Baldensperger proves that the origin of much which was once supposed to have originated with Christianity is really earlier, and was held in forms as consistent with strictly Jewish belief as they would be inconsistent with Christian. A notable instance is the dating of *Jubilees* in the period of the later Hasmonaeans, with convincing refutation of the attempts to find in it polemic references to Christian ideas. Almost coincidentally appears the new edition of *Jubilees*, by R. H. Charles, based on hitherto unpublished manuscripts, in which the brilliant editor vindicates a still earlier date for the work, reversing the long-accepted relation to Enoch, and showing the dependence to be, at least in part, on the side of the latter. Further welcome evidence of scientific advance appears in the present edition of Baldensperger's work, in that this writer is now able to adopt a date for the *Assumptio Mosis* ("soon after the

beginning of our era," A.D. 1-10? <sup>1)</sup> in substantial agreement with E. Schürer and R. H. Charles, receding from his former view that the author of the work had witnessed the schism in Israel effected by the new faith. The contrast drawn in the last three important Jewish apocalypses known to us—*Assumptio Mosis*, *Apocalypse of Baruch*, and second *Esdras*—between a faithful and unfaithful element in Israel typified by the separation of the Ten Tribes, no longer seems to him to be a reflection of the separation of the Church from Judaism. This new application of the doctrine of the Remnant is in fact too general a characteristic of the times of degeneracy which followed Maccabean success to receive any such specific application. In the period of disappointment which gave rise to the Pharisaic party it was impossible for a true upholder of Mosaism not to feel the necessity of some such distinction of the faithful minority as against the apostate and worldly aristocracy.

The general standpoint and mode of treatment scarcely requires consideration in so well-known and standard a work; but those already familiar with it in its earlier form will look with interest to see what change, if any, has been produced by the animated discussions of the last decade on the origin and significance of the title "Son of Man." In this case, also, we find as usual that Baldensperger has taken full account of the recent literature. Indeed, one is surprised, in turning the pages of the new edition, to see to how large an extent the former bibliography of the whole subject has been displaced by the titles of more recent works. But there is no hesitation or ambiguity about Baldensperger's position. The title "Son of Man" is to him distinctly pre-Christian, an outgrowth of the Danielic passage, based of course on a wrong exegesis, but closely connected with the general disposition toward transcendentalism. Even the pre-existence of the Messiah was a current doctrine, although the distinction between ideal and real pre-existence was at least ill-defined. Apocalyptic Messianism had fastened as tenaciously to the Danielic figure of the "Man of the Clouds" (*Anani*) as nomistic to the Prophet like unto Moses, raised up "from among your brethren." The use of the title in Enoch is evidence neither of late date nor of Christian interpolation; it is no more than should be expected from the phenomena of the Gospels themselves. Baldensperger admits that *barnasha*, from its general significance (*homo*), was not well adapted for use as a Messianic title, and that the evidence for its currency in *synagogue* circles is slight. That it was used, however, in circles familiar with apocalypse, and with specific reference to the super-human being understood to be presented in the vision of Daniel, seems to him a demonstrable fact.

One may well await with keen interest the completion of the work. What Gunkel and Bousset have done in Germany and R. H. Charles in England becomes all the more serviceable and significant when thus systematically set forth.

BENJ. W. BACON.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

<sup>1</sup> "The latest historical event known to the author is the expedition of Varus (4 B.C.)."



*Jesus im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert.*—By Heinrich Weinel.—Tübingen und Leipzig: E. C. Mohr (Karl Siebeck), 1903.

It is an interesting fact, significant, perhaps, of that rhythm observable in human affairs as in the universe, that the century which has seen the greatest upheaval in the foundations of Christian belief, should witness at its close a return to the religious ideal embodied in Jesus of Nazareth. Under the influence of scientific thought and historical criticism the doctrine of Christ's divinity has crumbled away, but in the eyes of many His character, as depicted in the Gospels, stands forth as matchless as before. To them He is the supreme religious genius of the world, the culmination of its spiritual development.

As such He appears to the author of the above work, which, elaborated from a lecture given in Bonn in the winter of 1900-1, was published last year in Tübingen.

Many and varied have been the judgments passed on Jesus Christ during the past century. Biblical critics, poets, rationalists, freethinkers, philosophers, social and religious reformers, all have given their verdict on His character, and have accepted or rejected His teaching, according as they found it in harmony or at variance with their ideas. These judgments Weinel submits to a more or less detailed criticism, and points out with singular clearness their limitations. Increase of knowledge and of historic imagination has modified, if not actually destroyed, some of the conclusions of the earlier school of biblical critics. Even Strauss and Renan are the representatives of systems which have had their day. While paying a just tribute to the critical acumen and immense learning of the one, and acknowledging the artistic power of the other, Weinel holds both incapable of sounding the depths of Christ's personality.

The philosophical conceptions of Jesus Christ are likewise inadequate expressions of His character as painted in the Gospels; for they rest on an exaggeration or misunderstanding of the ascetic element in His nature. Thus Schopenhauer saw in Christ the personification of the denial or the negation of the will. Nietzsche and Wagner, as his disciples, accepted this conception, the former, however, in the spirit of revolt. Through the influence of these ideas a likeness has been sought between the teaching of Buddha and that of Christ; though, as Weinel is at pains to show, only a superficial or one-sided acquaintance with their teaching can lead to the idea of a fundamental resemblance between the two, Christ inculcating self-denial for the sake of others, while Buddha enjoined it for the sake of self.

In the field of social reform Wagner and Tolstoi have looked to Jesus Christ for an answer to the problems of our society and civilisation, and social democracy has not failed to justify some of its ideals by an appeal to His teaching.

How does Weinel's conception of the character of Christ differ from these, and on what materials does he found that conception?

In the first place, he accepts without reserve the judgment which historical and literary criticism have passed on the Gospel narrative. Our sources for the life and doings of Christ fall into two groups, of which Matthew, Mark, and Luke form one, John's Gospel being the other. The foundations of the three first Gospels are a historical narrative agreeing in the main with Mark's Gospel, and a collection of Christ's sayings in Aramaic, but worked out by Matthew and Luke from a Greek source. In addition to these, each evangelist had other sources, oral or written. John's Gospel belongs to a much later period, a point to be borne in mind when considering the conceptions of Jesus formed by earlier critics, whose ideas of His character were largely drawn from this source, one which contradicts the others in many points, and gives abundant internal evidence of its later origin. Historical criticism has placed beyond doubt the fact that Jesus shared the beliefs, and in consequence the intellectual limitations, of His time. To seek from Him, therefore, a solution of problems concerning which He neither had, nor could have, any knowledge, betrays a lack of historic thinking. On what then rests His claim to be considered the world's greatest religious genius? The answer may be summed up in a few words: He infused a new spirit into religion, He was the beginner of a new era in the spiritual history of man. In the author's words, He gave men a new God and a new ideal of humanity. Jesus claimed neither to be a religious nor a social reformer: what He preached was a change of the will and purity of heart. The polytheistic world judged men quantitatively, by their actions, irrespective of the motives from which these spring: Jesus taught that our actions are worthless unless the outcome of a pure heart. Polytheism believed in a physical, tangible union with the deity, consummated by such rites as circumcision and renewed by sacrifice. Christ taught a purely spiritual relation to God, the medium of which is prayer. There is nothing mawkish or sentimental about the character of Christ as portrayed in the Gospels. The sternness with which He rebuked hypocrisy and His decision are sometimes lost sight of. The ideal He gave His followers was that of a simple, brave life, upright and pure, full of kindness and sympathy and of helpful work for others. He was no world-weary hermit, but a nature delighting in all that life offers of good. His responsiveness to nature, the way in which He drew from her analogy and metaphor for imparting some of His deepest truths, are proof that He possessed the true poet's soul.

But it is in His faith in God that, according to Weinel, we touch the real depths of His character. Inheriting from His own people that belief in a personal God which the peculiar history of Israel had done so much to develop and foster, possessed, too, of that refinement of conscience and strength of will which Israel's religion had produced in the noblest of her sons, Jesus transformed the awe-inspiring God of the Jew into the Father who is love. In its spiritual development humanity has touched nothing



higher than the relationship of Jesus to God, His faith in God's goodness, and the nature of His communion with Him.

Such in brief is Weinel's conception of the character of Jesus Christ as depicted in the first three Gospels, and stripped of the traits which erring criticism or imagination has added to it. Can it be our ideal now? Can Christ inflame our hearts to-day for the new humanity of which His life was the example? So asks the author, and his answer is stern and uncompromising. "Either Christ or nothing," he says; "either one believes in Christ's God or none, either in Christ's ideal of humanity or in Nietzsche's." Love and egoism are the two great levers of the universe, the one as needful, as elementary, as the other. The State and law have been evolved: there was a time when they were not, and man's primeval instincts had full play. What forbids the hope that some day Christ's ideal of society may prevail? Science can account for but a small part of human life; a whole range of experience and emotion lies beyond her ken, in a sphere to which religion is the only medium of access. Our only guide here is the Prophet, the spiritual genius of humanity. Through Him we gain a glimpse of a higher world: let us accept His teaching, but let us not expect to sound its depths. That is no more possible to the ordinary man than a full comprehension of genius in any other sphere. The forms through which man sees the eternal are continually changing: theology may and must change, but the spirit of Christ, His attitude to God, the world, and man, are the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.

Amongst the various conceptions of Jesus Christ which Weinel reviews is one which deserves more than a passing notice, by reason of its strong resemblance to the author's own—that of Houston Stewart Chamberlain. The latter's now famous book, *Die Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, contains no more fascinating chapter, none written with a greater glow of enthusiasm, with that burning conviction which speaks straight to the heart, than that entitled, "Die Erscheinung Christi." Weinel's adverse criticism of Chamberlain's attempt to prove Christ of non-Jewish descent need not concern us here; there is more in their views to unite than to separate the two men. Both believe in the significance of the individual in history, and both see in the personality of Jesus the secret of His power even to the present day. To both our civilisation appears withering for want of the regenerative breath of a deep religious faith, and both point back to Christ as the only source from which a new religious life can be drawn. Both are more or less at one in their conception of religion as a living force, transcending the powers of the understanding and eluding any but figurative definition.

With Christ, says Chamberlain, there appeared on earth a new species of man, one whose springs of action had their source in a nature diametrically opposed in instinct, tendency, and aim to that of ordinary humanity. Here we touch a point of vital importance to the comprehension of Chamberlain's, and, if I have understood it aright, of Weinel's, conception

of Christ. It is often assumed that the acquirement of the Christian virtues is only possible after severe struggle with the "natural" man. Christ postulated no such struggle, but rather such a total change in the spiritual constitution of man, if I may so phrase it, that these virtues appear as the necessary, nay inevitable, manifestation of the character. The turning of our cheek to the smiter must be of the nature of an instinct, spontaneous, unreasoned, unconscious, because the necessary outcome of our nature, if it is to have any moral worth at all. He who has experienced that inward change of will can as little act from the ordinary motives characteristic of humanity as a thorn-tree can yield grapes. When mankind shall have reached this stage of spiritual development, then, but not until then, will it have the right to call itself "Christian."

In one important point there is a divergence in the views of Chamberlain and Weinell. With his greater sympathy for Indo-European religious thought, the former interprets Christ's "mystery" — "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you"—almost in terms of Kantian philosophy. Weinell, on the other hand, lays stress on Christ's faith in, and relation to, a personal God as the motive power of His life. Weinell's conception is undoubtedly the more accurate historically, whereas Chamberlain's is the more in harmony with the intellectual ideas of the present day. It may be true, as Weinell affirms, that science can neither prove nor disprove the existence of a God; it is nevertheless the fact that scientific modes of thinking have induced a habit of mind incompatible with faith in a personal God such as Christ believed in. And one thing is certain, our faith must harmonise with our intellectual conception of the universe. The least particle of doubt acts as a corrosive which will inevitably destroy the whole. "Christ's God or none," says Weinell, in the glow of his own conviction; but Chamberlain shows that our religious life may still draw its inspiration from Christ without sharing His faith in a personal God.

Weinell's book closes with a notice of the tendency to reform visible in the German Protestant churches, a tendency to which an impetus has been given by Harnack's well-known work, *Das Wesen des Christentums*. In the gradual spread of the spirit of Christ he sees the dawn of a new day which shall see Catholic and Protestant united, not in the Christianity of the churches, with its strong admixture of paganism, but in that of the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

C. MABEL RICKMEERS.

RADOLFZELL, GERMANY.

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*A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Numbers.*—By George Buchanan Gray, D.D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis in Mansfield College, Oxford.—Edinburgh, 1903. (The International Critical Commentary.)

THE book of Numbers has not attracted many commentators, and till the present volume was issued, only Dillmann (1886) and Strack (1894) were considerable. Now, after the manner of these things, we have three first-class commentaries all at once. Dr Gray's appeared last summer, and it has since been followed by Holzinger's volume in Marti's series, and Baentsch's in Nowack's. Dr Gray's work, in solidity of scholarship and judiciousness of judgment, has no reason to shrink from comparison with any of the volumes of the series to which it belongs. In plan it follows its predecessors, and, in addition to the commentary proper, provides introductory discussions on sources, text, historical and religious value. As in this series there are to be six separate volumes, each by a different author, upon the Hexateuch, this plan involves a good deal of overlapping. From the general lines of Hexateuch analysis Dr Gray does not ask us to diverge. He belongs to the prudent school that will not attempt to carry out analysis too rigidly. Accordingly, though the fact of compositeness, *e.g.* in JE's account of the spies (cap. 13 f.) and of Dathan and Abiram (cap. 16), is certain, yet no analysis so far offered is allowed to be more than partial and tentative. Similarly in regard to P; though P is justifiably articulated into P<sup>g</sup>, P<sup>s</sup>, and P<sup>x</sup>, yet it is impossible to determine with confidence, *e.g.*, how much, if any, of the matter defined as P<sup>x</sup> formed an original part of P<sup>g</sup>. Reservations of this sort are inevitable along the present lines of literary criticism, but we shall expect more definite results when further work has been done in "that new phase of Hexateuch criticism . . . due to archæology and the comparative study of social customs" (Cheyne). Towards that stage Dr Gray's book is a notable contribution. On matters of text, Dr Gray grants that, while there has been little transcriptional error, yet there are some corruptions antecedent to the Greek versions, and therefore corrigible only by conjecture; but on the other hand he thinks that the theory of far-reaching corruption of the text and mutilation of (perhaps) the great majority of the names in the book is not allowable on any principles of textual criticism at present established. In the commentary itself the outstanding excellence is the treatment of matters of archæology from the standpoint of Comparative Religions. Discussions on Ordeals, the Nazirites, Taboo, the Cult of the Serpent, and so on, in the religion of Israel, are carried out from this point of view with a thoroughness and comprehensiveness that are without precedent in an English commentary.

J. H. WEATHERALL.

CARMARTHEN.

*Studies in Dante.* 3rd Series. Miscellaneous Essays.—By Edward Moore, D.D.—Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.

DR MOORE's recently-issued third series of *Studies in Dante*, in addition to much varied matter of value to Dante students, unfortunately furnishes one more instance of the strange illusions into which men fall when they undertake to interpret ciphers. The temptation to "cook" the data in order to reach a foregone conclusion almost always proves irresistible; and it is impossible for the investigator to realise how easily mere coincidences may betray him. The subject is of so much importance and is apparently so little understood that we venture to select it for special treatment; but in doing so we must offer our sincerest apologies to Dr Moore, and must explain that this is a note on "The Treachery of Ciphers," and does not pretend in any sense to be an adequate review of the important and valuable work, the title of which stands at its head.

Dr Moore undertakes to read the celebrated prophecy of "a five hundred and ten and five" in the last canto of Dante's *Purgatorio*. He argues (on grounds that appear to us quite inconclusive) that the person referred to must be Henry VII., and proceeds (p. 265): "Granting these points, I say, it seems to me to follow almost *necessarily* that the number 515 *must* somehow be made out of the letters of some form of the name of Henry." (The italics are Dr Moore's.) The rest is easy. As nothing is to be made out of the Roman or Greek letters, we must try the Hebrew alphabet. Various forms of Henry's name are tried and found wanting. "Arrico" is selected at last, and though Dr Moore confesses that he has no contemporary authority for it, analogy suggests that it is a legitimate form. But the numerical values of the corresponding letters of the Hebrew alphabet yield  $1 + 200 + 200 + 10 + 100 + 6 = 517$ , so we are foiled again. Now comes the time for cooking. Dr Moore finds that modern Hebrew grammars do not give  $o = \gamma$ , so he thinks (and finds a Jewish scholar to agree with him) that Dante may have found his Jewish authority (whatever it was) unable to give him a numerical equivalent for  $o$ . Under these circumstances he might, when thrown on his own resources, give the value 4 to  $o$ , because it is the fourth vowel in the (Roman) alphabet. This will give the desired result, and Dr Moore is triumphant. But the difficulty about the  $o$  is entirely fictitious. Instead of consulting modern grammars and modern Jews as to whether or not there may have been a doubt as to the value of  $o$ , we should surely consult the practice of the Jews of Dante's own time to see whether there really was any such doubt or difficulty. I take the means that happen to lie to my hand in the shape of the Hebrew version, by Zerahjah b. Isak, of "Themistius on Aristotle's *De Cælo*,"<sup>1</sup> executed in 1284. Plato appears as אפלטון, the word "philosophers" is adopted, and becomes פילוסופים; Aristotle generally figures in the abbreviated form of אריסטו. There is never any doubt about  $o$  being  $\gamma$ . "The

<sup>1</sup> Berlin, 1902.



chances *against* any given name . . . corresponding thus precisely with a large number like this are simply enormous," says Dr Moore (p. 271 *sq.*). At any rate the chances have been too hard for "Arrico," for we have seen that it does not "correspond exactly" with the number. "Ugguccione" is a candidate that might be suggested. His name occurs as *Ugutius* in a contemporary historian. It would be easy to construct an *a priori* argument (arrived at *a posteriori*) to show that we should expect the "dux" of the Latin 515<sup>1</sup> to keep the central place in the full title, and should look for the form — dux — with a name in the first place and a qualification in the second. Now *Ugutius dux Gibolengus* (an authentic form) gives us exactly 517, or, with Dr Moore's value for o, 515. A slight modification (transliterating the termination "ius," as Zerahjah does, by יאוס, and supposing *Gibolenus* to take the place of *Gibolengus*) will give us 515 by honest Hebrew transliteration. (Zerahjah authorises us to represent *x* by כס.) *D[ominus] Imp[erator] Kanis Magnus* also gives 515; and we may suppose that Dante wished to indicate that he expected to see Can Grande on the imperial throne (as indeed we may gather he did from the *Veltro* prophecy in *Inf. I.*), and indicated this expectation in his cipher. Strangely enough *M[esser] Edoardo Moore* also gives 515 (representing *e* by כ, *vide infra*); and I have had no difficulty in getting other like results. But it must be admitted that all these data are in a sense doctored, though the values of the letters are not cooked. I will conclude with a perfectly simple and unmedicated solution. Dr Moore evaluates Dante's own name at 525. He must get this by taking the Latin form of the name *Danthes*,<sup>2</sup> transliterating it דאנתס = 4 + 1 + 50 + 400 + 10 + 60 = 425. But Zerahjah's transliteration of Xenophanes is סאנופנס, suggesting that *e* should not be rendered by ' but by כ in the body of a name, and not at all in the terminal "es." *Danthes* then will be דאנתכ or 4 + 1 + 50 + 400 + 60 = 515. Now at last we have a 515 undoctored and uncooked! Moreover, Dr Moore rightly insists that the "515" is to put an end to the adulterous intercourse of the Court of Rome with the royal house of France, or, in other words, to end the Babylonian captivity at Avignon and bring back the papacy to Rome; and he also reminds us that many Dante scholars give 1314 as the date of the *Purgatorio*.<sup>3</sup> Now we know that in this very year of 1314 Dante wrote a solemn letter to the cardinals, assembled at Carpentras to elect a Pope, urging them to choose an Italian Pope and restore the papal seat to Rome! What can be more striking than this coincidence?

Surely this is enough. Grant that the 515 "must somehow" be Dante, or Dr Moore, or Henry, or anyone else, and you can prove it.

There is not the slightest mystery in this. There are twenty-two numerically significant letters in the Hebrew alphabet, the highest single

<sup>1</sup> The current interpretation simply takes DXV = DVX.

<sup>2</sup> *Dantes* would not do, for t would give ט, not ת.

<sup>3</sup> I do not myself adopt this date, still less Dr Moore's earlier year. I should suppose the *Purgatorio* was completed about 1318.

value being 400; and thus if we succeed in getting any combination of letters to fall anywhere between 115 and 915 (or generally between  $x-400$  and  $x+400$ ) we have twenty-two chances on each side of our number of reaching a result which may be made to correspond with it by adding or dropping a single letter. This is rather more than one chance in twenty; but Dr Moore has allowed himself to *manipulate* one of his letters, which gives a wider margin for ingenuity than the mere adding or subtracting. If we are dealing, as we almost always shall be, with a name that can be written in four of five different forms, that makes our chances of success something better than one in five or four. Then, again, we can always take our choice between transliterating into Hebrew, according to the rules (double letters becoming single, and some vowels dropping), or simply taking the numerical values letter by letter (and so counting a doubled letter twice and every letter once), so that it is hard indeed if we cannot make at least half of a group of arbitrarily selected names come so near success that by adding, subtracting, or manipulating a single letter we can bring out the result we want. And this, be it observed, is the measure of Dr Moore's success. So far from the chances against it being "simply enormous," I should say they are about even. That "Danthes" should come out *exact*, and that we should have a document precisely in point to confirm our interpretation, is of course a piece of luck; but it is such a piece of luck as anyone who has interested himself in these matters will quite expect to strike from time to time.

PHILIP H. WICKSTEED.

CHILDREY, WANTAGE.



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- 80 *Haslett (S. E.)* Pedagogist Bible School; scientific study of the Sunday school with chief reference to curriculum. 385p.

Revell, 1904.

- D DOCTRINE 10 .. *God*, 22 .. *Christ*, 60 .. *Eschatology*, 70 .. *Faith*, 90 *Apologetics*.

*Anderson (K. C.)* The Larger Faith: some aspects of the new Theology. 376p.

Black, 1903.

*Conn (J.)* Fulness of time, and other studies in theology. 218p. MacLehose, 1904.

*Patton (Francis L.)* Theological Encyclopedia. Princeton Th. R., Jan. 1904.

[Theological Disciplines arranged under following scheme:—1. *Thesis* (a) Rational Theology; (b) Scriptural Theology; (c) Ecclesiastical Theology. 2. *Antithesis* (a) Polemic Theology; (b) Apologetic Theology. 3. *Synthesis* or Systematic Theology: (a) Christian Ethics; (b) Dogmatics.]

*Pope (J. O'F., S.J.)* A plea for scholastic theology. J. of Th. St., Jan. 1904.

[Addressed to Anglicans. Scholastic methods would give precision to theological thought, and by tending to intellectual agreement would promote Christian unity.]

*Loisy (A.)* The Gospel and the Church. Trans. by C. Home. 277p. Isbister, 1903.

[See *Hibbert Journal*, vol. i. p. 602, and vol. ii. p. 142.]

*Voces Catholicae*. Prof. Loisy and the Teaching Church. Cont. R., Feb. 1904.

*Portalie (E.)* Le Dogme et l'Histoire.

Bulletin de Litt. Ecclési., Jan. 1904.

[A strong attack, from the side of Catholic philosophy, on M. Loisy, whose theological system is here identified with the late Aug. Sabatier's. The writer ridicules the idea of "this everlasting consciousness of the divine," which is the inspiration and justification of Mormonism and every other religious extravagance.]

*Sabatier (Paul)* Les derniers ouvrages de l'Abbé Loisy. R. Chrétienne, Jan. 1904.

[A welcome to M. Loisy's work in the name of free thought. The writer anticipates Loisy's influence will have pronounced effects upon Protestantism. His work is as destructive of Protestant as of Catholic dogma.]

*Lacey (T. A.)* Harnack and Loisy. 18p.

Longmans, 1904.

[Paper read before certain members of the University of Oxford. Author says, "If I believe Jesus of Nazareth to be personally God Eternal, it does not follow that I shall look to find historical evidence of the fact in the records of his Galilean life. The fact is outside the scope of history."]

- h *Cuthbert (Father)* Prof. Harnack and the Gospel. Cath. World, Jan. 1904.

*Foakes Jackson (F. J.)* Christian difficulties in the second and twentieth centuries. A study of Marcion and his relation to Modern Thought (Hulsean Lectures, 1902-1903). 175p.

Arnold, 1903.

*M'Fadyen (J. E.)* Hellenism and Hebraism. Amer. J. of Theol., Jan. 1904.

*Armstrong (A. C.)* Transitional eras in thought, with special reference to the present age. 355p.

Macmillan, 1904.

- 12 *Sidney (Philip)* The Truth about Jesus of Nazareth, as derived from a study of the Gospel Narratives. 215p.

Stewart, 1904.

[A defence of the divinity of Christ called forth



- by Schmiedel's article on the Gospels in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*.  
**Porter (F. C.)** *Inquiries concerning the Divinity of Christ.*  
 Amer. J. of Theol., Jan. 1904.  
 [Knowledge of the historic Jesus and experience of the ideal Christ (Paulinism) both lead to the belief in the divinity of the Lord.]
- 26 **Peake (A. G.)** *A Reply to Dr Denney.*  
 Expos., Jan. 1904.  
 [On the doctrine of the Atonement.]  
**Denney (J.)** *Adam and Christ in St Paul.*  
 Expos., Feb. 1904.  
 [Reply to Prof. Peake's paper in *Expos.*, Jan. 1904.]
- Leipoldt (J.)** *Der Begriff meritum in Anselms von Canterbury Verönnungslehre.*  
 Th. St. u. Krit., 2nd No., 1904.
- 64 **Ruhl (Ludovicus)** *De mortuorum iudicio [Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Verarbeiten, Bd. ii., Heft 2].* 105p.  
 Ricker, 1903.  
 [Collection of passages from Greek and Latin authors bearing on the question.]
- 65 **Abbott (Lyman)** *The Other Room.* 120p.  
 Melrose, 1904.  
 [Following Plato, author urges "the practice of Immortality."] **Chester (W.)** *Immortality and rational faith: the predictions of science, philosophy, and religion on a future life.* 208p.  
 Revell, 1903.
- Delaune (G.)** *Evidence for a future life; tr. and ed. H. A. Dallas.* 280p. Welby, 1904.
- 81a **Clemens (C.)** *Zur Methode der Erklärung des Apostolikums.*  
 Th. St. u. Krit., 2nd No., 1904.  
 [Discusses how the Apostles' Creed should be explained and used, in face of intellectual difficulties felt in regard to it.]
- 83a **Rashdall (H.)** *The Creeds and the Clergy.*  
 Indep. R., Feb. 1904.  
 [Reply to Dr Sanday. Contends that the duty of veracity is limited by considerations of social expediency, properly understood.]
- 90 **Henslow (G.) and others.** *Christian Apologetics. A Series of Addresses, with Introd. by W. D. M'Laren, ed. by W. W. Seton.* 145p.  
 Murray, 1903.  
 [These six addresses on Christian Evidences were delivered before the Christian Association of University College, London, the first of them calling forth the much-discussed speech of Lord Kelvin, included in this volume.]
- Beattie (F. R.)** *Apologetics; or, the Rational Vindication of Christianity; intr. by B. B. Warfield, in 3 vols. Vol. I: Fundamental Apologetics.*  
 Richmond, Presb. Pub. Com., 1903.
- E ETHICS** 1-9 *Practical Theology, Christian Ethics, Transition to General Ethics, 10" Theories, 20" Applied Ethics, Sociology, 23 Economics, 27 Education.*
- 6 **Schenk (F. S.)** *Modern practical theology.*  
 Funk & W., 1903.
- 10 **Fairbrother (W. H.)** *The Relations of Ethics to Metaphysics.*  
 Mind, Jan. 1904.  
 [By an examination of the ethical doctrines of Kant, Spencer and Mill, it is shown that even for those writers who maintain that Ethics is wholly independent of Metaphysics, the theory of "what ought to be done" rests throughout upon an analysis of "that which exists."] **M'Gilvary (E. Bradley)** *Ethics, a Science.*  
 Phil. R., Nov. 1903.
- [Ethics being a science and not an art, as such it is descriptive and not normative and theoretical, although practical in the sense of having a direct bearing upon practice, chiefly by liberating the mind from moral prejudices, and by suggesting new and better ideals.]
- Hall (T. C.)** *Relativity and Finality in Ethics.*  
 Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1904.  
 [The moralised man acknowledges himself bound by categorical imperatives "to do right," although he is on that account the more alive to the difficulty of discovering just what the right course for him is.]
- Alexander (H. B.)** *The Spring of Salvation.*  
 Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1904.  
 [Defends *melancholia juvenutis* as neither reprehensible nor pathological, but as due to awakening self-study. It is to be transcended by the discovery of the worthwhile in life.]
- Palmer (G. H.)** *The Nature of Goodness.*  
 Houghton, M. & Co., 1903.
- Payot (Jules)** *Cours de Morale.* 286p.  
 Armand Colin, 1904.  
 [Claims to be written on a new plan. In the place of a dogmatic and traditional method it would substitute a constant appeal to experience, reflection and reason. The book deals with the scientific foundations of Morality, Duties towards ourselves and others, and Religious Sanctions.]
- Rauh (F.)** *L'Expérience Morale.* 246p.  
 Alcan, 1903.
- Darlu (A.)** *La Morale de Rénouvier.*  
 R. de Méta. et de Mor., Jan. 1904.  
 [E's morality is essentially individualistic, a doctrine of liberty and autonomy, rational as opposed to sentiment, a morality of work and its just rewards.]
- 20 **Worms (René)** *Philosophie des sciences sociales. i. Objet des sciences sociales.*  
 Giard et Briere, 1903.
- Coleman (J. Melville)** *Social Ethics. An Introduction to the Nature and Ethics of the State.* 357p.  
 Baker & Taylor, N.Y., 1903.
- Oppenheimer (F.)** *Skizze der sozial-ökonomischen Geschichtsauffassung, ii. Vierteljahrssch. f. wiss. Phil., xxvii., 4.*  
 [Social and economical forces are determining factors in historical progress, though the economical impulse is the decisive cause of historical movement. Men stream from places of higher to those of lower commercial pressure along the line of least resistance.]
- Brown (W. Jethro)** *The True Democratic Ideal.*  
 Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1904.  
 [Democracy once stood for Liberty or Equality. It now stands for what may be described as Brotherhood. Whilst life has become in many ways more materialised, there has been developed a new and very exalted social ideal.]
- Bouglé.** *La Démocratie devant la science.*  
 R. de Méta. et de Mor., Jan. 1904.
- Duff (Robert A.)** *Proverbial Morality.*  
 Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1904.  
 [Most popular maxims can be met by other and opposite ones; hence proverbial wisdom reflects not only the many-sidedness, but the contradictions and perplexities which life presents.]
- Neel (J. E.)** *Un appel de Tolstoï.*  
 R. chrétienne, Dec. 1903.  
 [Analyses and condemns T.'s theory that all power is an evil, and to be defeated by a passive resistance.]
- Rauh (F.)** *Le Devenir et L'Idéal Social.*  
 R. de Méta. et de Mor., Jan. 1904.  
 [A propos of Levy's *L'Affirmation du droit collectif*.]
- 22 **Ritchie (Eliza)** *The Toleration of Error.*  
 Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1904.  
 [To tolerate ideas on the supposition that an

opinion, whatever its character, can be held without either good or evil resulting from it, is to found liberty of thought on a most untrustworthy basis.]

- 23 *Bosanquet (H.)* Physical Degeneration and the Poverty Line. Cont. R., Jan. 1904.  
*Bolen (G. L.)* Getting a living: the problem of wealth and poverty. Macmillan, 1904.  
*Cunningham (W.)* Growth of English industry and commerce in modern times; in 2 pts. (1) Mercantile system. 646p. (2) Laissez faire. 439p. Clay, 1903.  
*Labriola (Antonio)* Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History; tr. C. H. Kerr. 246p. Chic., C. H. Kerr, 1904. [Investigates the causes and principles of socialism and communism.]  
*The Tenement House Problem*; by various writers. 2 vols. Macmillan, 1904.  
 24 *Barrows (S. J.)* Crime in England. Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1904.  
 27 *Lockyer (Sir Norman)* On the Influence of Brain-Power on History. Address to British Association, Sept. 9, 1903, with four Appendices. 74p. Macmillan, 1903.  
*Anon.* The University of London. Church Q. R., Jan. 1904. [A sympathetic consideration of the needs and possibilities of the new teaching University.]  
*Cramer (S.)* Noodig Verweer. Teyler's Th. Tijd., 3, 1903. [Reply to Holwerda's plea for denominational teaching in the Universities.]  
*Crooker (J. H.)* Religious Freedom in American Education. 226p. Amer. Unit. Assoc., 1903. [A report upon the condition and progress of unsectarian education in American schools, academies, and colleges.]  
*Findlay (J. J.)* Training of teachers: inaug. lect. in Vict. Univ. of Manchester, Oct. 1903. Sherratt & H., 1903.  
*Gould (F. J.)* The Children's Book of Moral Lessons (2nd Series). 219p. Watts, 1903. [The first series of these lessons, issued in 1899, dealt with "Self-control" and "Truthfulness"; these with "Kindness" and "Work and Duty." A plan of moral instruction is prefixed.]  
*Luckey (G. W. A.)* The professional training of secondary teachers in U.S.A. 319p. Macmillan, 1904.  
*O'Shea (M. V.)* Education as adjustment: educational theory reviewed in the light of contemporary thought. Longmans, 1904.  
*Williams (S. G.)* History of ancient education; do. mediæval education. Syracuse, N.Y., Bardeen, 1903.  
*Anon.* The Education Acts and After. Church Q. R., Jan. 1904. [The systems of various German states are examined for suggestions for use in England. The local authority should provide religious instruction in accordance with the wishes of the parents. This would give popular control, and do away with the Cowper-Temple clause, and the endowment of undenominationalism.]  
 28 *Fouillée (A.)* L'idée de Patrie. R. de Méta. et de Mor., Jan. 1904. [Disputes Darlu's contention that international solidarity cannot be strengthened without weakening national solidarity.]  
 31 *Thwing (C. F.)* The Teachings of Christ and the Modern Family. Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1904.

[Treats exhaustively of the Christian conception of marriage and the law of divorce.]

- Williams (E.)* Scriptural Doctrine of Divorce; intr. by C. B. Patterson. N.Y., Alliance Pub. Co., 1903.  
 60 *Stimson (H. A.)* The Evolution of Chastity. Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1904.

## F PASTORALIA 2 Sermons.

- Kempis (T. à)* Prayers and Meditations on the Life of Christ; tr. W. Duthoit from text of M. J. Pohl. 358p. Paul, 1903.  
*Tyrrrell (G.)* Lex orandi; or Prayer and Creed. 252p. Longmans, 1903.  
*Great French Preachers*; 1. Lent and Holy Week; sermons by Bourdaloue and others; tr. and ed. C. H. Brooke. 248p. Richards, 1904.  
*Warfield (B. B.)* Spiritual Culture in the Theological Seminary. Princeton Th. R., Jan. 1904.  
 1 *Spurgeon (C. H.)* Smooth stones taken from ancient Brooks; a collection of sentences, etc., from the works of the Puritan, Thomas Brooks. 202p. Passmore, 1903.  
*Foxell (W. J.)* Sermon and Preacher: Essays on Preaching. 184p. Murray, 1904.  
 2 *Brooke (Stopford A.)* The Kingship of Love. 858p. Isbister, 1903. [Twenty-five sermons preached in London during the winter of 1902-3.]  
*Clifford (J.)* Secret of Jesus: Sermons. 238p. S. C. Brown, 1904.  
*Davidson (A. B.)* Waiting upon God. Ed. by J. A. Paterson. 390p. Clark, 1904. [Final selection from the sermons of the late Prof. Davidson. The title indicates how this book contrasts with its companion volume, "The Called of God."] *Mennitt (F. B.)* Riches of Christ: sermons. 270p. Rivingtons, 1903.  
 9 *Stanley (Maude)* Clubs for working girls. Rev. ed. 262p. Richards, 1904.

## G BIOGRAPHY 2 English.

- C *Delehaye (H.)* Catalogus codicum hagiographicorum Græcorum monasterii S. Salvatore, nunc bibliothecæ universitatis Messanensis. Anal. Bolland., Tom. 23, fasc. 1, 1904.  
*Delehaye (H.)* L'hagiographie de Salone, d'après les dernières découvertes archéologiques. Anal. Bolland., Tom. 23, fasc. 1, 1904.  
 1 *Gaskoin (C. J. B.)* Alcuin; his Life and his Work. 275p. Clay, 1904.  
*Anon.* A Jesuit Philanthropist. Church Q. R., Jan. 1904. [Biographical account of Friedrich von Spee, referring especially to his work in discrediting trials for witchcraft.]  
*Rousseau (J. J.)* Deux Lettres de J. J. Rousseau à Mme. Delessert. R. chrétienne, Feb. 1904.  
 2 *Anon.* Charlotte Mary Yonge. Church Q. R., Jan. 1904.  
*Alfred (King)* Asser's Life, with Annals of St Neots, erroneously ascribed to Asser; ed. with intr. and comm. by W. H. Stevenson. 518p. Frowde, 1904.  
*Bells (Mrs Arthur)* Lives and legends of



- English bishops and kings, mediæval monks, and later saints. 392p. Bell, 1904.
- Brighid (St)* and her times, acc. to the account of the Hon. Alg. Herbert, by Christopher Irvine. 110p.
- Hodge, Figgis & Co., 1904.
- Gosse (Edmund)* Jeremy Taylor (Eng. Men of Letters). 246p. Macmillan, 1904.
- 2V *Cartier (T. T.)* Life and Letters. Ed. W. H. Hutchings. 350p. Longmans, 1903.
- Kidd (E. J.)*, Ed. Selected Letters of William Bright, D.D. Memoir by P. G. Medd. Wells, Gardner & Co., 1903.
- Smith (Goldwin)* Morley's Life of Gladstone, i. N. Amer. R., Dec. 1903.
- See also *Edin. R.*, Jan. 1904; *Davison (W. T.)*, in *Lond. Q. R.*, Jan. 1904; and *Selby (F. G.)*, in *East and West*, Dec. 1903.
- 3V *Haverfield (F.)* Theodore Mommsen. E. Hist. R., Jan. 1904.
- 5 *Anon.* Fahie's Life of Galileo. Edin. R., Jan. 1904.
- 70V *Armes (W. D.)*, Ed. The Autobiography of Joseph Le Conte. 339p. Appleton, 1903.
- 73 *Abbott (Lyman)* Henry Ward Beecher. Houghton, M. & Co., 1903.
- Howells (W. D.)* The Personality of Hawthorne. N. Amer. R., Dec. 1903.
- Howe (Maud)* and *Hall (F. H.)* Laura Bridgman, Dr Howe's famous Pupil and what he taught her. 394p.
- Hodder & Stoughton, 1904.
- [An interesting account by Dr Howe's two daughters of a remarkable experiment.]
- H HISTORY x Persecutions C Christian M Mediæval R Modern 2 English.**
- Xénopol (A. D.)* Caractère de L'Histoire. Rev. Phil., Jan. 1904.
- [Defence of view that history should occupy itself with individual facts against the objections of Lacombe.]
- Severance (Allen Dudley)* Church History as an Aid to Christian Unity. Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1904.
- Anderson (R. E.)* The Story of Extinct Civilisations of the West. [Library of Useful Stories.] 201p. Newnes, 1903.
- a *Petrie (W. M. Flinders)* Methods and Aims in Archaeology. (66 ill.) 226p. Macmillan, 1904.
- x *Allard (Paul)* Les Persécutions et la critique moderne. 63p. Bloud, Paris, 1904.
- A *Budge (E. A. Wallis)* A History of Egypt from the end of the Neolithic Period to the death of Cleopatra VII. 8 vols. New York, Frowde, 1903.
- O *D'Alviella (G.)* Syllabus d'un Cours sur les origines du Christianisme d'après l'exégèse contemporaine. Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., Nov.-Dec. 1903.
- [Synopsis of six lectures on the early development of the literature, doctrine, constitution, etc., of the Church.]
- Poncelet (A.)* La bibliothèque de l'abbaye de Micy, au ix<sup>e</sup> et x<sup>e</sup> siècle. 9p. Anal. Bolland., Tom. 23, fasc. 1, 1904.
- R *Harnack (A.)* Luther et le P. Denife. R. chrétienne, Feb. 1904.
- [A denunciation of Père D.'s book, *Luther et les origines du Luthéranisme.*]
- Serfass (Ch.)* Le paulinisme de Port-Royal.—Pascal. R. chrétienne, Feb. 1904.
- Ward (A. W.) and others, Eds.* The Cambridge Modern History; vol. ii. The Reformation. 883p. Clay, 1903.
- [Contains articles on "Medicean Rome," by Prof. Kraus; "Luther," by Dr T. M. Lindsay; and on "Calvin and the Reformed Church," and on "Tendencies of European Thought in the Age of the Reformation," by Dr A. M. Fairbairn. Review will follow.]
- 1 *Bibliotheca Franciscana ascetica medii ævi*, Tomus i. Opusculi sancti Patris Francisci. 218p. Tomusii. Speculum Beatæ Mariæ Virginis. Fr. Conradi a Saxonia. 309p. Quaracchi, 1904.
- Anon.* Franciscan Literature. Edin. R., Jan. 1904.
- Hocart (James)* Le Monachisme. 410p. Fischbacher, 1903.
- [Author treats of the pagan origin and the fundamental errors of Monasticism, its pernicious influence on Religion, Morality and Society. Whilst recognising its brighter side, he contends that it is radically opposed to the teaching of Christ and to the spirit of Christianity.]
- McCabe (Jos.)* Twelve years in a Monastery. 2nd rev. ed. 246p.
- Smith, Elder & Co., 1903.
- [A considerable number of cases have lately come to author's knowledge of priests who are quite as liberal as Dr Mivart, and in some cases as sceptical as himself, who intend to remain in the Church and work for the removal of the emphasis from belief to conduct.]
- Preuschen (Erwin)* Mönchtum und Sarpiskult. Eine religionsgeschichtliche Abhandlung. 2<sup>te</sup> Aufl. 67p. Ricker, 1903.
- Lake (K.)* The Greek Monasteries in South Italy, iv. J. of Th. St., Jan. 1904.
- [Dealing with the Libraries of the Basilian monasteries.]
- 1M *Dowden (J.)*, Ed. Chartulary of the Abbey of Lindores, 1195-1479. Edited from the original MS., with transl. and abstracts of the charters, notes and appendices. 396p. Scottish Hist. Society, 1903.
- 2 *Paul (Herbert)* A History of Modern England. Vol. i., 450p. Vol. ii., 446p. Macmillan, 1904.
- Mahaffy (J. P.)* An Epoch in Irish History, 1590-1660. 404p. Unwin, 1903.
- [An account of the foundation and early fortunes of Trinity College, Dublin. Author makes a contribution to the Elizabethan and Jacobean history of Ireland, and to the history of the struggle for the education of the people.]
- Thompson (H. L.)* St Mary the Virgin, Oxford, in its Relation to English History. 196p. Constable, 1904.
- [Author, who is vicar of the University Church, gives many interesting details of University history.]
- 2R *Smellie (Alexander)* Men of the Covenant. The Story of the Scottish Church in the years of the Persecution. 440p. Melrose, 1903.
- [Review will follow.]
- 2-1 *Mudie-Smith (R.)* The Religious Life of London. 534p. Hodder & S., 1904.
- [Results of Daily News Census.]
- 2-6 *Dowden (Bp.)* Notes on the Succession of the Bishops of St Andrews, III. J. of Th. St., Jan. 1904.

- 4 *A. G. B.* The Religious Situation in Paris (July-Aug. 1903).  
Amer. J. of Theol., Jan. 1904.

# I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C *Fathers* 2 *R. C. Church* 3 *Anglican*.

- A *Bauer (Walter)* Der Apostolos der Syrer in der Zeit von der Mitte des vierten Jahrhunderts bis zur Spaltung der syrischen Kirche. 84p. Ricker, 1903.

*Völter (Daniel)* Die Apostolischen Väter. Theil. I. Clemens, Hermas, Barnabas. 478p. Brill, Leiden, 1904.

- C *Lawlor (H. J.)* Notes on Lactantius. Hermathena, xxix., 1903.

*Turner (C. H.)* An Exegetical Fragment of the third century.

J. of Th. St., Jan. 1904.

[Introduction and Latin Text. The commentary is on Mt. xxiv. 20-44. Hippolytus, or Victorinus, may be the author.]

- 2 *Griselle (Eugène)* Fénelon métaphysicien. Rev. de Phil., Jan. 1904.

[Autograph letter of Fénelon's, hitherto unpublished, written to demonstrate the testimony of Jewish religion at the time of Christ to the truth of Christianity, and the superiority of the Catholic Church to rival sects.]

- 2M *Gasquet (F. A.)* Some Letters of Saint Bernard. 310p. Hodges, 1904.  
[A selection from Eales' translation.]

- 2W *Anon.* The Abbé Loisy and the Liberal Catholicism in France. Quar. R., Jan. 1904.

- 3 *Anon.* The Church in South Africa. Church Q. R., Jan. 1904.

- 3M *Anselm (St)* Proslogium, etc., tr. Wm. Adlington. Paul, 1903.

*Deane (Sidney Norton)* St Anselm. 313p.

Open Court Publishing Company, 1903.

[Contains translations from the Latin of the *Proslogium*, the *Monologium*, the *Cur Deus Homo*, and an Appendix to the *Monologium* entitled *In Behalf of the Fool*, by Gaunilo, a monk of Marmontiers.]

- 37 *Burns (F.)* Crisis in the Church of Ireland; or, How to solve the problem of her destiny. Simpkin, 1904.

- 4 *Révile (Jean)* Liberal Christianity; its Origin, Nature, and Mission. Trans. and ed. by Victor Leuliette. 221p.

Williams & Norgate, 1903.

[See *Hibbert Journal*, vol. I. p. 830 sqq.]

- 5 *De Witt (John)* Jonathan Edwards: A Study. Princeton Th. R., Jan. 1904.

[Address delivered at the celebration of the 200th anniversary of the birth of Jonathan Edwards.]

*Foster (F. H.)* Prof. Park's Theological System. Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1904.

[Continuation. Deals with Park's views on the doctrines peculiar to the Bible.]

*Reid (H. M. B.)*, Ed. Church of Scotland. Official Report of Proceedings of Second Church Congress at Aberdeen, Oct. 1901. 174p. Blackwood, 1903.

*Thompson (C. L.)* The Presbyterians ("The Stories of the Churches"). 312p.

Baker & Taylor, 1903.

- 6 *Vedder (H. C.)* The Baptists ("The Story of the Churches"). 245p.

Baker & Taylor, 1903.

- 9 *Hollins (J.)* The Salvation Army; a short study of its defects and possibilities. Mod. Language Press, 1903.

# L LITERATURE. 2 *English* 3 *German* 5 *Italian* 9 *Classical*.

*Firkins (Oscar N.)* The Reader's Contribution to the Power of Literature.

Biblio. Sacra, Jan. 1904.

[The immediate cause of literary effect is a heightened receptiveness on the part of the reader. It is the peculiar faculty of genius to inspire this receptiveness.]

*Symons (Arthur)* Cities. 268p.

Dent, 1903.

[Essays on Rome, Venice, Naples, Seville, Prague, Moscow, Budapest and Constantinople, in which the author attempts to delineate the souls of these several places.]

- 2 *Boswell (J.)* Life of Samuel Johnson. 2 vols. 786p. and 844p. Newnes, 1903.

[An extremely well printed and convenient edition.]

*Bunyan (J.)* Pilgrim's Progress; ill. with 25 drawings on wood by Geo. Cruikshank fr. the collection of Edwin Truman; biogr. intr.; indexes. 352p. Frowde, 1903.

*Herbert (G.)* The Temple; repr. fr. first ed. Bell, 1903.

*James (M. R.)* Catalogues of the Libraries of Christ Church Priory and St Augustine's Abbey at Canterbury, and of St Martin's Priory at Dover; now first collected and published with intr. and identifications of the extant remains. 648p. Clay, 1904.

*Collins (J. C.)* Studies in Shakespeare. Constable, 1904.

*Moulton (R. G.)* The Moral System of Shakespeare. 381p. Macmillan, 1903.

*Dewar (G. A. B.)* Shakespeare's Nature. New Lib. R., Jan. 1904.

*Gneath (E. H.)* Philosophy in poetry: a study of Sir John Davies's poem, "Nosce teipsum." 327p. N. Y., Scribner, 1903.

*Moorat (L.)* Noel; and, The world is old to-night; from "Bethlehem," a nativity play by L. Housman.

De La More Press, 1903.

- 2V *Dunn (H. T.)* Recollections of Dante, Gabriel Rossetti and his Circle. Ed. by Gale Pedrick. 96p. Elkin Mathews, 1904.

*Greenslet (Ferris)* Walter Pater (Contemporary Men of Letters Series).

M'Clure & Co., 1903.

*Kitchin (Dean)* Ruskin in Oxford, and other studies. Murray, 1904.

*Warren (T. Herbert)* Tennyson and Dante. Month. R., Jan. 1904.

*Howard (N.)* Savonarola: a city's tragedy. 148p. Dent, 1904.

- 2W *Hardy (Thomas)* The Dynasts. A Drama of the Napoleonic Wars. Part 1. 245p. Macmillan, 1904.

*A. E.* The Divine Vision.

Macmillan, 1904.

[Poems by George Russell.]

- 4 *Brunetiere (F.)* Études Critiques sur l'Histoire de la Littérature Française.

Hachette, 1903.

*Brunetiere (F.)* Cinq lettres sur Ernest Renan. Perrin et Cie., 1903.



- 5 *Carroll (J. S.)* Exiles of Eternity: an exposition of Dante's Inferno. 573p. Roy. 8vo. Hodder, 1903.  
*Moore (E.)* Studies in Dante, 3rd series; miscell. essays. 404p. Frowde, 1904. [See p. 634.]
- 7 *Conway (R. S.)* Vergil. 20p. Nutt, 1903. [Inaugural Lecture at Owens College.]
- 8 *Murray (Gilbert)*. The Meanest of Greek Tragedies. Indep. R., Jan. 1904. [The *Electra* of Euripides.]
- 9 *Sandys (J. E.)* A History of Classical Scholarship. From the sixth century B.C. to end of Middle Ages. 671p. Clay, 1903.
- 16 *Thesaurus Palæohibernicus*: a collection of old Irish glosses, scholia, prose and verse; ed. Whitley Stokes and John Strachan. Vol. 2. 462p. Clay, 1904.
- 20 *Archer (W.)* Ibsen's Apprenticeship. Fort. R., Jan. 1904.

## M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4 *Hinduism.* 7 *Judaism.* 9 *Demonology.* 12 *Occultism.*

- Carus (Paul)* Stone-worship. Open Court, Jan 1904.
- Garnier (J.)* Worship of the dead; or, Origin and nature of pagan idolatry and its bearing upon the early history of Egypt and Babylonia. 454p. Chapman & H., 1904.
- 1 *Toutain (J.)* Bulletin archéologique de la religion grecque 1898-1902 (*concluded*). Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., Nov.-Dec. 1903.
  - 2 *Hepding (Hugo)* Attis: seine Mythen und sein Kult [Religionsgesch. Versuche und Vorarbeiten, Bd. 1]. Ricker, 1903.  
*Paul (Herbert)* The Religion of the Greeks. Nineteenth Cent., Feb. 1904. [Treatment of Miss Harrison's book as throwing light upon Greek Literature.]
  - 4 *Müller (F. Max)* The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. New ed. 505p. Longmans, 1903. [Vol. xix. of Max Müller's Collected Works.]  
*Slater (T. E.)* The Higher Hinduism in relation to Christianity. Certain Aspects of Hindu Thought from the Christian Standpoint. 2nd ed., rev. 300p. Stock, 1903.  
*Tattvabhushan (S.) and others.* Aspects of the Yedanta. [To the Memory of Max Müller.] 168p. Natesan, 1903. [Papers on the religion, the morality, and the doctrine of the future life of the Vedanta.]
  - 5 *Arnold (Sir Edwin)* The Golden Temple. Buddhism, Sept. 1903. [A Poem, introductory to this new Quarterly Review of the International Buddhist Society.]  
*Rhys Davids (C. A. F.)* The Threshold of Buddhist Ethics. Buddhism, Sept. 1903. [The founders of Buddhism explicitly rejected the method of pure asceticism. The student is taught on every occasion of sense-consciousness to discriminate and appraise it, the sense-impression, psychologically and then ethically, as a mode of feeling, and through the regulative power of intellect to determine how and how much he shall feel.]  
*Maitriya (Ananda)* Nibbāna. Buddhism, Sept. 1903. [From the torment of the dream of life an everlasting Awakening, from the torture of selfhood an eternal Liberation; a being, an existence, that to name life were sacrilege, and to name

- Death a lie; such is the goal of the Buddhist Faith.]
- 7 *Montagu (Lily H.)* Thoughts on Judaism. 154p. Johnson, 1904.  
*Bacher (A.) and Wolf (A.)* What is "Jewish" Literature? Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1904. [Two answers to Levy's paper in J.Q.R., July 1903. Levy's reply is given.]  
*Bevan (A. A.)* North Semitic Inscriptions. J. of Th. St., Jan. 1904. [Review of G. A. Cooke's Text-book of N.S. Inscr.]  
*Cook (S. A.)* North Semitic Epigraphy. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1904. [Considered specially in connection with G. A. Cooke's Text Book of N.S. Inscr.]  
*Henriques (H. S. Q.)* The Jews and the English Law, v. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1904. [Deals with the position of the Jews under the Commonwealth. The theory that Cromwell gave them toleration and favour is disputed.]  
*Hirschfeld (H.)* The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at Cambridge, IV. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1904. [Text of three fragments, with translations.]  
*Montefiore (C. G.)* Rabbinic Conceptions of Repentance. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1904.  
*Söderblom (N.)* Notes sur les relations du Judaïsme avec le Parsisme, à propos de travaux récents. Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., Nov.-Dec. 1903. [The works are: J. Weiss's *Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*; Boklen's *Verwandschaft der jüdisch-christlichen mit der persischen Eschatologie*; and Bousset's *Religion des Judenthums in N.T. Zeitalter*. The writer differs from these in minimizing Parsee influence on Judaism.]  
*Steinschneider (M.)* Allgemeine Einleitung in die jüdische Literatur des Mittelalters. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1904.
  - 7k *Perles (F.)* Proben aus dem Nachlass von Joseph Perles. Jewish Q. R., Jan. 1904. [Lexical notes on rabbinic words.]
  - 9 Birthday book of destiny; compiled from ancient Hermetic and Rosicrucian sources, arr. and interpreted by Sepharial. 270p. Nichols & Co., 1903.
  - 9, 6 *Cook (E. W.) and Podmore (F.)* Spiritualism: Is communication with the spirit world an accomplished fact? (Pro and con series.) 240p. Isbister, 1903.  
*Raupert (J. G.)* Modern spiritism: A critical examination of its phenomena, character, and teaching in light of known facts. 256p. Sands, 1904.
  - 20 *Anon.* Monotheism in Semitic Religions. Church Q. R., Jan. 1904.
  - 26, cp. B. 1 m *Kohler (J.) and Peiser (F. E.)* Hammurabi's Gesetz. Bd. 1. Uebersetzung, Juristische Wiedergabe, Erläuterung. Pfeiffer, Leipzig, 1903. [Contains exhaustive discussions of the enactments of the Code, of its relation to other ancient codes, and of its contributions to our knowledge of the history of civilisation and comparative law.]
  - 31 *Foucart (G.)* Imhotep. Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., Nov.-Dec. 1903. [Contests Sethe's theory, that Imhotep was a real man deified, and offers an alternative theory.]
  - 51 *Carus (Paul)* The Canon of Reason and Virtue, trans. from Lao-tze's Tao Teh King. 48p. Open Court Company, 1903.

**P PHILOSOPHY** 10 .. *Metaphysics*, 21  
*Epistemology*, 40 .. *Psychology*, 60 .. *Logic*,  
70 .. *Systems*, 90 .. *Philosophers*.

*Von Glasenapp (G.)* Der Wert der Wahrheit, i. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxiii., 2.

[Different kinds of reality,—the reality of things is that of being; of forces, that of producing; of laws, that of validity; of relations, that of subsisting; of events, that of happening,—all of which are important for determining the worth of truth.]

*Vaschide (N.)* et *Von Buschan* Index Philosophique, 1902. 351p.

Naud, Paris, 1903.

[A bibliography of philosophy and allied sciences for 1902 published by the *Revue de Philosophie*. It is, however, anything but complete, so far as Germany and England are concerned.]

*Meuffels (H.)* Un Problème à résoudre. En quelle Langue doit être donné l'enseignement de la Philosophie dans les Séminaires? (Suite et fin.) Rev. Néo-Scol., Nov. 1903.

10 *Renouvier (Ch.)* Le Personalisme.

Alcan, 1903.

[This is the last work of the great thinker, published shortly before his death. In it the author gives a *résumé* of his "neo-critical" philosophy, culminating in the contention that God is only knowable through the idea of human personality developed to perfection.]

*Eagar (Alex. R.)* The Spirit of Man. A Prolegomenon in Spiritual Metaphysic.

Hermathena, xxix., 1903.

12 *Stirling (J. H.)* The Categories. 158p.

Oliver & Boyd, 1903.

13 *Batault (G.)* L'Hypothèse du Retour éternel devant la science moderne.

Rev. Phil., Feb. 1904.

[Blanqui, Le Bon and Nietzsche each conceived the theory almost at the same time. Explanation of Nietzsche's position and attempt to show its compatibility with the hypotheses of modern science.]

*Kozłowski (W. M.)* L'Évolution comme principe philosophique du devenir.

Rev. Phil., Feb. 1904.

[While the ancients admitted the possibility of a return to the primitive state, modern science admits only one direction in the process of evolution; it regards the process in its totality as irreversible.]

17 *Szeman (J. N.)* Der Stoff vom philosophischen Standpunkte.

Archiv f. system. Phil., x. i., 1904.

[The physical features of material bodies are in the last resort nothing else than activities, a truth which leads to the result that what are called the secondary qualities are the essential ones, and the so-called primary qualities but the different degrees of intensity of these.]

*Kelvin (Lord)* Baltimore Lectures on Molecular Dynamics and the Wave Theory of Light. 715p.

Clay, 1904.

*Whetham (W. C. D.)* Matter and Electricity. Quar. R., Jan. 1904.

[Account of the recent researches of Curie, J. J. Thomson, Rutherford and others, and their bearing on the scientific conception of matter.]

See also *Curie (Mme. S.)* in Cent. Mag., Jan. 1904; *Zimmern (A.)* in 19th Cent., Jan. 1904; *Trowbridge (J.)* in Atl. M., Jan. 1904; and *Rutherford (E.)* in Harper, Jan. 1904.

18 *M'Laughlin (J. B.)* Life and Energy. Dub. R., Jan. 1904.

21 *Beck (P.)* Erkenntnistheorie des primitiven Denkens.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxiii., 2.

[An attempt to support Wundt's theory of the original objectivity of all presentations by a consideration of primitive views of the spirit world.]

23 *Rogers (A. K.)* Rationality and Belief. Phil. R., Jan. 1904.

[Rationality is in itself an abstraction. There must first be something to rationalise, to harmonise. It is primarily to our willing and feeling selves that the content of thought goes back. We believe the evidence of the senses, not because we can prove it, but because we have to accept it as true, if life is to go on.]

27 *Portig (Gustav)* Das Weltgesetz des kleinsten Kraftaufwandes in den Reichen der Natur. Bd. i. In der Mathematik Physik und Chemie. Bd. ii. In der Reichen der Natur und des Geistes (Sonderabdruck). 332p. and 105p.

Kielmann, 1903-4.

[All the phenomena of nature and mind are subject to the fundamental law of producing the greatest possible amount of work from the comparatively least expenditure of energy. Author defends a dualistic *Weltanschauung*.]

*Thomson (C. T.)* Religious Hallucinations. 27p. Ohio Herald Printing Co., 1903.

33 *Honeyman (J.)* On certain unusual Psychological Phenomena.

Proceedings S.P.R., xviii. 47, Jan. 1904.

[Hallucinations of a subject whose left eye, destroyed by glaucoma, had been excised, and whose right eye, slightly myopic, was defective.]

*Piddington (J. G.)* Phenomena in Mrs Thompson's Trance.

Proceedings S.P.R., xviii. 47, Jan. 1904.

[Exhaustive treatment of 200 pages. Discuses, *inter alia*, purported communications from Prof. Henry Sidgwick.]

*Sage (M.)* Mrs Piper and the Society for Psychical Research. Trans. by N. Robertson, with pref. by Sir Oliver Lodge. 211p.

B. Johnson, 1903.

[Accepted by the S.P.R. as a faithful *résumé* of experiments conducted under its auspices.]

40 *Lipps (Theodor)* Leitfaden der Psychologie. 358p.

Engelmann, 1903.

[Based on the theory that all psychological processes are unconscious processes. Psychology is the science of the contents of consciousness.]

*M'Intyre (J. Lewis)* A Sixteenth Century Psychologist.

Brit. J. Psychol., Jan. 1904.

[An account of the naturalistic psychology of Bernardino Telesio.]

*Ward (James)* On the Definition of Psychology. Brit. J. Psychol., Jan. 1904.

[Psychology is the science of immediate experience, which is primarily conative and not cognitive. Immediate experience is both "subjective" and "objective," the former term applying here to the owner, and the latter to the property he owns.]

*Ribot (Th.)* De la valeur des questionnaires en Psychologie.

J. de Psychol., Jan.-Feb. 1904.

*Tardieu (Émile)* L'Ennui, Étude Psychologique. 300p.

Alcan, 1903.

42 *Raymond (F.)* et *Janet (P.)* Dépersonnalisation et Possession.

J. de Psychol., Jan.-Feb. 1904.

48 *Kirkpatrick (E. A.)* Fundamentals of child study; discussion of instincts, etc.

Macmillan, 1903.

*Munson (J. P.)* Education through nature study: foundations and methods. 297p.

N.Y., Kellogg, 1904.



- Thorndike (E. L.)* Educational psychology (Lib. of psych. and scientific methods). N. Y., Lemcke & Buechner, 1903.
- Standinger (F.)* Kant's Bedeutung für die Pädagogik der Gegenwart. Kantstudien, ix., 1 und 2, Feb. 1904.
- 49 *Paulsen (F.)* Parallelismus oder Wechselwirkung? (Schluss.) Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxiii., 2. [Finds Husserl's dualism of physical and psychical monads utterly irreconcilable with modern scientific conceptions.]
- M'Dougall (W.)* The Sensations excited by a Single Momentary Stimulation of the Eye. Brit. J. Psychol., Jan. 1904.
- Müller (Robert)* Ueber die zeitlichen Verhältnisse in der Sinneswahrnehmung, ii. Vierteljahrssch. f. wiss. Phil., xxvii., 4. [In a percept, sense and perception characters are to be distinguished; to the first belong quality and intensity, to the second spatial and temporal extensity.]
- Sherrington (C. S.)* On Binocular Flicker and the Correlation of Activity of "Corresponding" Retinal Points. Brit. J. Psychol., Jan. 1904.
- Marillier (L.) et Philippe (J.)* Sur L'Aperception des Différences Tactiles. Rev. Phil., Dec. 1903.
- 52 *Lipps (Theodor)* Einführung, innere Nachahmung und Organenempfindungen. 20p. Engelmann, 1903. [An investigation as to the essence of æsthetic emotion.]
- 53 *Binet (Alfred)* De la Sensation à L'Intelligence (Suite). Rev. Phil., Dec. 1903. [Experiments show that the mind employs in turn two modes of interpretation, one verbal, the other sensorial. Their duality and independence an important question of psychology.]
- Binet (Alfred)* L'Étude Expérimentale de l'Intelligence. 308p. Schleicher, 1903. [Rejects from the empirical side the doctrine of Association of ideas as explanatory of thought processes and insists upon the subordinate part played by images in thinking.]
- Laprie (P.)* Expériences sur l'activité intellectuelle. Rev. Phil., Feb. 1904. [Result of experiments, devised to determine under what circumstances intellectual activity is exercised, shows that its movement and direction depend on intellectual causes.]
- Flournoy (Th.)* La Sensation du "Déjà Vu." J. de Psychol., Jan.-Feb. 1904.
- 55 *Dugas (L.)* L'Imagination. 350p. Doin, 1903.
- 59 *Bradley (F. H.)* The Definition of Will, iii. Mind, Jan. 1904. [Concluding Article. After discussing the various types of volition, the relation of aversion to positive desire, and of desire to conation, and the distinctive character of Will, author deals with the question, how it is that in volition the idea realises itself. The passage from the idea to inward or outward fact requires some particular bridge, and the bridge is a "disposition," the latter element of which has through experience become qualified in idea by its starting-point. The machinery which brings about the self-realisation is redintegration.]
- 60 *Dewey (John) and others.* Studies in Logical Theory. 401p. Chic. Univ. Press, 1903. [These "Studies" by Prof. Dewey and his colleagues presuppose that there is no reasonable standard of truth except upon the postulate that Reality is dynamic or self-evolving, and except through reference to the specific offices which knowing has to perform in readjusting and expanding the means and ends of life.]
- Husserl (E.)* Deutsche Schriften zur Logik in den Jahren, 1895-99, v. Archiv. f. system. Phil., x. i., 1904. [A discussion of Marty's articles on impersonal judgments and the relation of Grammar to Logic and Psychology.]
- Dantec (F. Le)* La Logique et L'Expérience. Rev. Phil., Jan. 1904. [Discusses Poincaré's *La Science et l'Hypothèse* and Freycinet's *De l'Expérience en Géométrie*.]
- Watson (John)* Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, i. Demonstration. Phil. R., Jan. 1904. [In this first article a summary is given of Aristotle's general view as to the nature of science.]
- Conturat (L.)* Les Principes des Mathématiques. R. de Mét., et de Mor., Jan. 1904. [First of a series of articles suggested by Russell's book. Deals with the Calculus of Propositions, of Classes, and of Relations.]
- 61 *Reichel (H.)* Darstellung und Kritik von J. S. Mills Theorie der induktiven Methode (Schluss). Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxiii., 2.
- 72 *Creighton (J. E.)* The Standpoint of Experience. Phil. R., Nov. 1903. [Philosophy has to deal with the world in its immediate relations to the knowing and willing subject, i.e., with experience as we actually live it. From this standpoint of internal experience, the subject includes the object, the ideal furnishes the system within which the real falls.]
- Walsh (C. M.)* Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism, ii. Mind, Jan. 1904. [If "phenomena" = objects outside us in a single world belonging to a single consciousness, then things-in-themselves ought to be regarded as things-in-God, which would be just as much transcendental to us (and transcendental, too) as Kant's noumena.]
- Bauch (Bruno)* Die Persönlichkeit Kants. Kantstudien, ix., 1 und 2, Feb. 1904.
- Paulsen (Fr.)* Zum hundertjährigen Todestage Kants. Kantstudien, ix., 1 und 2, Feb. 1904. [The fundamental position of Kant is his insistence on the supremacy of Reason in knowledge and reality, not the agnostic features of his negative criticism. It is as the founder of a rational idealism that his work will endure.]
- Windelband (Wilhelm)* Nach hundert Jahren. Kantstudien, ix., 1 und 2, Feb. 1904. [Written for Kant's Centenary. In Kant's spirit, we are called upon to-day to produce a "Kritik of the Historical Reason," which shall exhibit the grounds of universal and necessary principles in the whole range of human culture, in the moral and spiritual life, in Art and Religion, no less than in natural science.]
- Herman (F.)* Immanuel Kant's philosophisches Vermächtnis. Kantstudien, ix., 1 und 2, Feb. 1904. [Discusses the errors of Kant's immediate successors and of the Neo-Kantian writers, and finds in the posthumous work published by Reicke a starting-point for future advance on the lines of the Critical Philosophy.]
- Schmid (F. A.)* Kant im Spiegel seiner Briefe. Kantstudien, ix., 1 und 2, Feb. 1904.
- Adickes (E.)* Auf wem ruht Kants Geist? Eine Sakularbetrachtung. Archiv f. system. Phil., x. i., 1904. [Every truly independent philosophical system is only possible once as the product of a particular personality under particular temporal conditions. "Forward from Kant to the problems of the present age!" should be the watchword of the century.]
- Riehl (A.)* Helmholtz in seinem Verhältniss zu Kant. Kantstudien, ix., 1 und 2, Feb. 1904.

[A discussion of Helmholtz's use of Kantian doctrine in his theories of external perception, of space and time, of causation, and of unconscious inference in sense apprehension. Author combats the theory of a non-Euclidean Geometry.]

*Runze (G.)* Emerson und Kant.

Kantstudien, ix., 1 und 2, Feb. 1904.

*Kühnemann (Eugen)* Herder und Kant an ihrem 100 jährigen Todestage.

Kantstudien, ix., 1 und 2, Feb. 1904.

[No opposition can be greater than that between the two modes of thought: it is the opposition between Naturalism and Idealism.]

73 *Barth (Paul)* Zu Herders 100 Todestage.

Vierteljahrsschr. f. wiss. Phil., xxvii., 4.

[Herder was a psychologist of the intuitive school, and his psychological theory was that of Leibniz. Author discusses his relation to Kant, his theory of the origin of language, his standpoint in literary criticism, his conception of Humanity, and his philosophy of history.]

76 *Dumas (G.)* Saint Simon, Père du Positivisme, i. Rev. Phil., Feb. 1904.

*Belot (G.)* Les Principes de la Morale Positiviste et la Conscience contemporaine.

Rev. Phil., Dec. 1903.

[Insists on the value of the practical philosophy of Comte. Discusses his theory of human personality and of political liberty.]

*Michélet (G.)* La Science et l'Esprit scientifique. Rev. de Phil., Jan. 1904.

[A criticism of the "New Positivism" or "Philosophy of Action," with special reference to Poincaré, Duhem, Milhaud, Bergson, Le Roy and Wilbois.]

*Chartier (E.)* Vers le Positivisme absolu par l'Idéalisme par L. Weber.

R. de Méta. et de Mor., Jan. 1904.

77 *Hugenholz (P. H.)* Ethisch Pantheisme. Een Studie. Holkema en Warrendorff, 1903.

*Ritchie (Eliza)* The Reality of the Finite in Spinoza's System. Phil. R., Jan. 1904.

[As against the view that Spinoza reduces finite modes to mere illusory appearances, it is contended that it is existence itself, *per se* not divisible, yet evidenced in the manifold, which is the centre of his whole thought.]

84 *Was (H.)* Plato's Wetten.

Teyler's Th. Tijds., 3, 1903.

86 *MacCunn (John)* The Cynics.

Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1904.

[Ascetic absurdities ought not to obscure from us the fact that Cynicism was the first thorough-going plea for moral freedom which the western world had seen.]

*Tardieu (E.)* Le cynisme: étude psychologique. Rev. Phil., Jan. 1904.

[Cynicism, Egoism that avows itself, is a sentiment bound up with our whole life.]

88 *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus*. Meditations; a new rendering based on the Foulis tr. of 1742, by Geo. W. Chrystal. 240p.

Schulze, 1904.

*Watt (W. A.)* The Individualism of Marcus Aurelius. Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1904.

[The essence of the individuality Marcus desired consists in its inability to exist for itself: individuality cannot, as he demands, become "cosmic" simply by abstraction.]

89 *Van Becelaere (F. L.)* A Summary Exposition of Saint Thomas Aquinas's Philosophy of Knowledge. Phil. R., Nov. 1903.

*Wulf (M. De)* La décadence de la Scolastique à la fin du moyen âge.

Rev. Néo-Scholastique, Nov. 1903.

92 *Purser (Frederick)* Butler's Indebtedness to Aristotle. A Reply.

Hermathena, xxix., 1903.

V *Hicks (G. Dawes)* Prof. Adamson's Philosophical Lectures. Mind, Jan. 1904.

[A twofold development traceable in Adamson's thinking. On the one hand, he advanced farther and farther from the view of psychology as a purely natural or empirical science; on the other, he was more and more inclined to accept the fundamental principle of Empiricism or Naturalism in his Epistemology.]

*Fairbairn (A. M.)* Herbert Spencer.

Cont. R., Jan. 1904.

See also *Hudson (W. H.)*, *Crozier (J. B.)* in Fort. R., Jan. 1904; *Anon.* in Blackwood, Jan. 1904; *Harrison (F.)* in Positivist R., Jan. 1904; *Anon.* in West. R., Jan. 1904; *Villa (G.)* in R. d'Italia, Dec. 1903.

94V *Brauer (H. G. A.)* The philosophy of Ernest Renan. 170p.

Univ. of Wisconsin, 1903.

*Dauriac.* Les moments de la Philosophie de Charles Rénouvrier.

Bulletin de la Soc. fran. de Phil., Feb. 1904.

*Janssens (Edgar)* Charles Rénouvrier.

Rev. Néo-Scholastique, Nov. 1903.

## V ART 83 Sacred Music.

*Dessoir (Max)* Anschauung und Beschreibung. Ein Beitrag zur Aesthetik.

Archiv f. system. Phil., x. i., 1904.

*Moore (T. Sturge)* The Idea of Proportion. Month. R., Jan. 1904.

[Explains special use of the term in relation to the appreciation of works of art and to their internal structure.]

*Binyon (L.)* The Art of the Nineteenth Century. Quar. R., Jan. 1904.

9 *Walters (H. B.)* Greek Art, p. 252. 40 ills. (Little Books on Art.)

Methuen, 1904.

[Deals not only with sculpture but also with architecture, painting, ceramics, bronze work, gems and coins.]

22 *Ward (J.)* The Reconstruction of Karnak. Month. R., Jan. 1904.

23 *Bernard (J. H.)* Cathedral Church of St Patrick: a history and description of the building, with a short account of the deans. (Cath. Series.) 100p. Bell, 1904.

52 *Sketchley (R. E. D.)* G. F. Watts. (Little Books on Art.) 29 ills. 206p.

Methuen, 1904.

55a *Selincourt (Basil De)* A further Study at Assisi. Month R., Feb. 1904.

[Proposes Giovanni Gaddi as the author of the Life of Christ in the north transept of the Lower Church.]

*Wilpert (G.)* Roma sotterranea. La Pitture delle Catacombe Romane. 568p.

Rome, Desclée, 1903.

56 *Baldry (A. L.)* Velasquez. [Newnes' Art Library.] 88p. Newnes, 1903.

[64 illustrations of the artist's chief works.]

83 *Gressmann (Hugo)* Musik und Musikinstrumente in Alten Testament. [Religions geschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten, Bd. ii., Heft i. 32p.

Ricker, 1903.

*Richardson (A. M.)* Church Music. (Handbks. for clergy.) 176p.

Longmans, 1904.

*Breed (David R.)* The History and Use of Hymns and Hymn Tunes. 364p.

Revell, 1903.

G. D. H.; G. H.; and J. H. W.



# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

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## SIR OLIVER LODGE ON "THE RE-INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE."

THE RIGHT REV. E. S. TALBOT, D.D.,

Lord Bishop of Rochester.

I HAVE been asked to write some comments upon my friend Sir Oliver Lodge's article, "Suggestions towards the Re-interpretation of Christian Doctrine." I believe that the suggestion was made upon the knowledge that I had been in personal and friendly communication with him upon the article, and I should not, on my side, have fallen in with the proposal, unless I had assured myself that it would be welcome to himself that I should do so. I say this much, because I write as one who, though not a theologian, is accustomed to look at things from the theological side, and much of what I have to say is critical of some of Sir Oliver's positions.

But, in truth, my first and strongest feeling about the article is that of satisfaction that a man of his high scientific distinction should come upon theological ground; and my second is one of gratitude for the spirit in which he deals with the matter, and for the contribution which he makes. For, in truth, it is more of this that we greatly need. The unhappy

divisions between different forms and currents of human thought, and the aloofness from one another of the men who represent them—between, for example, the artists and the men of science, between the men of science and the men of philosophy, and between any of these and religious specialists—are a cause of general damage to our higher thought and life, from which the development of religious interpretation, in particular, suffers and starves. God has given us, in this time, great abundance of light through the knowledge of natural things. It must be that the men of that kind of knowledge could, if they would, and if we would hear and accept, bring us much help in discerning the bearings of the truths of revelation. They would not complain if we detected in them what they see so clearly in us when we venture on their ground—namely, a certain amateurishness of thought and expression. But this is the rebate upon a great gain; often, indeed, it is only the obverse of the advantage which we derive from an untechnical handling of matters so living and so profound that the inadequacy of technical language and treatment with regard to them (however necessary it may be) is most quickly and keenly felt.

Sir Oliver Lodge may be sure, then, that we make him welcome upon what, in the sense that he will understand, may be called our own sphere.

But what he brings goes far to increase this welcome. His clear acknowledgment of God as “a Being”—the Being—“whom it is possible to love to serve and to worship”; and of whom we may think that “matter” is “the living garment”; his reverent recognition of “a Holy of Holies” such as man could not of himself conceive, but of which glimpses could be and were opened when “the face of God” was “revealed in the flesh” through “a Spirit perfectly Divine on the spiritual side, whatever that may mean”; his assurance that science has at least nothing to say against “belief in spiritual existence before all worlds,” and, indeed, “surmises” what looks that way—these, and much else beside, make us recognise the voice



of a comrade from whom we will willingly hear what he has to impart to us of that which he has himself received.

Very congenial to us, too, and yet wholly natural to scientific method, is his respect for the phenomena of spiritual experience. He has nothing in common with the inconsistency which will treat with scrupulous care every detail of observed fact in "nature," narrowly so called, but lightly toss away as a piece of credulity or superstition a deep and widespread instinct of human "nature." Here, surely, is a special meeting-ground of those who come from theology and from the science of nature respectively. Theologians and scientists alike have often, for different reasons, been disposed to neglect it. But again and again in this short essay the writer pays to such experience the deference of a mind reverent to human fact as well as to Divine dealing. How strongly much of this spiritual fact has been lit up for him by Christian Theology, Lodge would probably himself declare. But he has more than one quarrel with that Theology, at least as he conceives it; and it is with one of these in particular that I wish to deal.

For the article is largely directed against "the expression of the doctrine of the Atonement traditionally and officially held, or supposed to be held, by the churches to-day." The wording appears to mean that what he attacks is not only what is popularly held by some, but is the proper interpretation according to its own documents and interpretations given by Church Theology. He is prepared, indeed, to find individual "modern theologians and experts," even many of them, in agreement, though reticent agreement, with himself. But he thinks that this is only because they have "travelled far beyond the original intention and superficial interpretation of their creeds and formularies." He has chosen difficult ground for the "amateur," as I, who venture to follow him, keenly feel. And I think that he has dealt hardly with theology in two ways. He has credited her with what is not really hers, and he has refused on insufficient ground what she rightly maintains. I will try to make good these criticisms.

Sir Oliver Lodge regards the "doctrine of the Atonement" as based on two presuppositions—"the fall of Adam imputed to the race," and the propitiation by blood of an "angry God."

Now Theology has been fashioned so closely out of scriptural material that its teaching about human sin has been partly expressed, from St Paul's argument to the Romans onwards, in terms of the ancient story of Adam in Eden. I should not indeed allow that St Paul's teaching is fairly and fully represented by saying that Adam's fall was by him regarded as imputed to the race; his words are that "through one man sin entered into the world"; but he adds that "so death passed unto all men for that all sinned." But of this, at any rate, I am clear, that the fall of man would never have taken the place that it has held in Christian theology had it not been that in the story of Adam men read what has been well called "the great but terrible truth which history, not less than individual experience, only too vividly teaches each one of us" (Driver, *Book of Genesis*, p. lxx.). That, and not the imputation of "vicarious sin," is the foundation-stone which has to be pulled out before the "doctrine of the Atonement" begins to shake. Sir Oliver says—lapsing, I venture to think, for a moment below the usual high level of his thought—that "the higher man of to-day is not worrying about his sins at all, still less about their punishment," and least of all about the inherited fault in his nature. One is tempted to meet this by some question as to whether some of the moral shallowness, which I think most of us are conscious that we share with our time, may not be due to this very cause. But this is a matter of which it is hard to judge fairly from the clerical side. And following my friend's own good example, and looking for the seed of truth in any widespread tendency, I would rather recognise that the deepening and absorbing preoccupation with the fact of sin, and with the tragic side of redemption in mediæval Christianity, as compared with the brighter and more creative spirit of the first ages, had some-



thing morbid about it, and did not mean a proportionate increase in moral energy. But the bright front and buoyant tread of early discipleship came of sin conquered or being conquered, and not of sin ignored.

It is, however, with the second count of the criticism that I am even more anxious to deal. The Atonement, it complains, implies the propitiation of an angry God. And with this, as the means of this, it implies the infliction of punishment upon the innocent, that the anger may cease against the guilty. This "vicarious" punishment Sir Oliver seems to connect with the idea of the angry God of early religion. It seems important, then, first to say (lest mistake should remain in any mind) that not only all true Christian theology, but, long before Christian days, the purified religion of Israel had cleared away all idea of a God capriciously angry. But how was this done? It was done by the spirit-led intuition and teaching of the prophets which identified God and righteousness. This explains to us what is possibly at first sight a little surprising—the triumph of such a Psalm as the 97th. It was a tremendous deliverance to the heart to believe with conviction that Righteousness rules the world. It was a tonic and deliverance to the human spirit, which anticipates at a lower level the impetus that the Gospel of Redemption was to give.

But did this remove the idea of the wrath of God? Plainly it did not. All ideas of caprice, of bad temper, of the human vice of anger, were gone.<sup>1</sup> But the wrath was there in all its awfulness, and goes on through the Bible, through the words of Jesus, to the "Wrath of the Lamb" at the end.

What, then, did it mean? It meant, one might venture to say, as one has lately said,<sup>2</sup> "the fixed and necessary

<sup>1</sup> It may be said that the element of caprice (if in so profound a mystery one may use such a word) re-entered in one colossal form, when men tried to sound the depths of responsibility, in the terrific doctrine of election in the Calvinistic sense. But this was—so to say—at an altogether different stage of the problem. It was still evil and evil only with which God was angry.

<sup>2</sup> A. T. Lyttelton in *Lux Mundi*, 10th edition, p. 287.

hostility of the Divine nature to sin, and the manifestation of that hostility." But I would rather describe it in words from Lodge's own article, and say that it was, on the personal side, the attitude or relation to sin of "a constant, steadfast, persevering universe" (p. 465), or rather of the God who has given to that universe His own constant, steadfast, persevering character.

It is this which, as it seems to me, makes it so entirely misleading, to couple together, as the article does, the idea of a "wildly vengeful Deity" and the words about "righteous vengeance" in a Christian hymn. They are morally poles apart—the one anthropopathic indeed, in the lower sense; the other wholly congenial to those stately and austere conceptions of order which science regards as specially her own.

Congenial to those conceptions, not of course identical with them. For any word like wrath implies the belief that our natural knowledge of God comes to us through two sources—through the observed world of phenomena, and through human experience; it comes, that is, in impersonal and personal forms. Sir Oliver Lodge fully recognises this. He would recognise, as many of his expressions show, that in ultimate Being, that is in God, we have to deal not only with a constant and steady force, but with force or being which is in some true sense personal. God, if the expression is not too bold, must feel and mean that which in the constant and recurring order (within and beyond our present experience) He is and does.

The wrath of God, then, as I should claim, is an expression which contains nothing that Sir Oliver Lodge should or would attack.

But it may be different, if we may judge from what he writes, when we come to words and thoughts which have been deemed to be correlatives (in the less strict sense) of the wrath, such as appeasing, propitiation, punishment, and the like.



Now, in order to judge of these points, it is necessary to recall what, upon the showing of the Christian Faith, the Death of Christ was. It was the means which brought what was needed by the moral situation of man. It brought illumination, it brought strength and endurance, it brought remedy. If this claim is to be admitted at all, it is plain that a thing of such various moral power will be complex. Sir Oliver Lodge thinks apparently that its power was that of revealing: in a noble passage he indicates what it revealed, “an infinitude of compassion, *an ideal of righteousness, the inevitableness of law*, the hopelessness of rebellion, the power of faith, the quenching of superstitious fear in filial love.” In the words which I have italicised, the writer is, I think, influenced more than he realises by the ‘doctrine’ which he thinks he is combating. If the death of Christ is said to have exhibited to man “the ideal of righteousness, and the inevitableness of the moral law,” we might ask how it does so, and with what aim. But the point which I would urge is that ‘revealing,’ magnificent as it is in moral effect, is not a sufficient category. There was something to be done, accomplished, finished. This is the truth underlying the transactional theories of the Atonement which have reasonably given so much offence, but which it must be remembered are limiting interpretations or stiffening crystallisations of a great truth of Scripture and of Theology, that Christ died for our sins, bare our sins, took away our sins.

What was this which had to be *done*? It was something which vindicated the injury done to the right by sin.

I do not suppose that Sir Oliver Lodge would object to the idea of Divine Forgiveness. It is required inexorably if the fact of sin and the personal aspect of God, to Whom we attribute love, are recognised together.

And it may be fairly claimed that Christian experience has conclusively shown what the really remedial and recreative power of forgiveness is. This is, indeed, only upon the higher plane of Divine action what we have seen for ourselves in

human, and especially in child, life. Forgiveness, it must be plainly recognised, has been throughout and everywhere a capital feature of the Christian Gospel, incapable of being explained by, or analysed into, anything else.

But all forgiveness, it has been well said, is a mystery : it is a fragmentary thing ; it is always in strange antinomy and contradiction to the truth of the inexorable connection between evil and its consequences. If, then, we are to recognise forgiveness from God to man, it will have indeed that beauty of pure boon and gift which the best human forgiveness reflects ; but it will be but one side of a whole, in which we shall surely also recognise what satisfies the inexorableness of righteousness.

It is this double character of the work of Christ, and of His Death, which is, I think, hardly recognised in criticisms such as those of Sir Oliver Lodge. For (1) it tends towards the Miltonic contrast between the Father and the Redeemer, and obscures the truth that what was done in Christ's death was done by the love of God Himself achieving redemption for the race and the world, with which, as we are bound to speak, He was at once 'angry' with 'wrath' because of its sin, but yet loved it, 'so loved, that He gave His Son.' In Christ God is known as forgiving spontaneously, freely, without condition, out of His infinite compassion, and because love of all the 'laws' of Being, and therefore of Himself, is the highest and ultimate law. It is the 'simple' answer to the simple cry, "Have mercy upon me, O God," "put out all my misdeeds." But the difference (or one difference) between the declaration and accomplishment of this forgiveness, and a mere declaration of it which He might conceivably have made in words of Divine assurance and authority, is that the All-forgiving found a way for the forgiveness in which it should not clash (as we speak) with other moral necessities.

And in so speaking we are not dealing in mere conjecture. We have facts to guide us. For as Lodge reminds us himself, there is a "charity" in man, and, we may add, a forgiveness,



which "weakly relieves man from the consequences of his blunders"; a forgiveness which condones, and 'says no more about it.' Such forgiveness may easily be demoralising. Human forgiveness in its best forms is saved from being so by its accompaniments, and perhaps most of all by this, that the forgiven child has *seen the pain given by its fault* to the forgiving parent. Is it presumptuous to say that it is the stupendous analogue of this when Divine forgiveness comes indeed freely, but comes by Divine Love itself bearing, before our eyes, our sins or their results? And the double power of the cause is reflected in the result; for beyond dispute, the faith in the Atonement has with single but twofold power given to man's life the *allegro* of peace and hope and confidence, and filled it with an immeasurably deeper estimate of what right and wrong are, and what the conflict between them means. It has never, let us clearly remember, suggested that all the results of sin are cancelled: experience makes clear that they are not, that they remain part of the moral order of the world, and of the righteous discipline of us sinners. They have not been borne for us in such sense that we have not to bear them. What the Atonement has removed is the guilt that separates from God, and that part of the results of sin which comes as discouragement, hopelessness, and despair.

The question will follow whether it is a right description to say that Christ bore the *punishment* of our sins. My answer would be in the negative: that it would be wrong, or at the very least misleading. And (2) it sounds unreal. One can only be punished for what he has himself done, and Jesus had not sinned.<sup>1</sup> But many a human instance shows that parts of what is inflicted as punishment may be willingly borne by others. And Christian thought contemplating the Death of Christ has

<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to note that even Calvin, who put the assertion of His suffering punishment into the form of saying that He underwent all that a condemned and lost man could undergo, says elsewhere, "*neque tamen inuimus Deum fuisse unquam illi vel adversarium vel iratum.*" I owe the quotation to Professor Denney's remarkable volume on *The Death of Christ*, 1903.

realised with intense conviction how the Lord, though He could not be punished, did enter into, and identify Himself with, and bear, the whole of the suffering and misery, even (as it seems) to the sense of separation from God, which are in man the punishment of sin. There are depths here which are matters rather for the meditation of the sanctuary than for controversial discussion. But the marvellous power of human sympathy points upwards towards such a 'fulfilment' by the Divine love in the Son of Man.

Perhaps we might state the matter, from the point of view of the necessity for vindication of the right, in language which does not pretend to be explanatory, by saying that in a sinful world it was necessary that the Divine Redeemer should suffer death: that by His doing so the intensity of evil was shown by the same act which overcame its force: that the conscience of man recognised in this what justified his own consciousness of the inextinguishableness of sin, by any act of his own, and yet met its demand; and that the message of forgiveness coming in this form, or in this company, spoke what the conscience could accept as true to its deepest instincts at once of fear and hope. At any rate this is what happened.

But such attempts at statement may only darken counsel. It is more useful to point out what requires all possible emphasis, that whatever truth may be expressed by this vindication of right through the suffering and death which, because of sin, and to "condemn sin in the flesh" the Redeemer had to undergo, it is only one side or aspect of what is inherently many-sided. It is combined in one with the perfecting through suffering of the human character of Jesus—with the offering to God of heart and will in a completeness both of execution and of proof which nothing but "unto death" can give—with the "grievous suffering and agonising patience," which Sir Oliver Lodge suggests is inevitable in the "carrying through even by Deity," of an evolution of the higher life of man; and most of all it has to be combined with the power, so marvellously displayed, of this Death, to pass over into other lives in



the forms of self-sacrifice and submission, and to incorporate them into one great surrender, one great offering of suffering and sinful but purified humanity.

The propitiatory character is part of one whole with these, not as a segment is part of a circle, but as a quality is part of a character. And therefore when it is viewed, as for purposes of thought or teaching it has to be viewed, in separation, it begins to lose its true proportion. This disproportion is what has been magnified into distortion by some theories of the Atonement which have prevailed in phases of theological teaching, but which, on a fair review of theological history, are seen not to be essential parts of theology.

It will, I think, be recognised by thoughtful men that if the Death of Christ is seen to blend and centre in itself, the greatest laws or truths or experiences (call them what we will) of the moral life, the fact that what secures this splendid synthesis should have in it a *quantum* of mystery beyond what these different elements explain, is not merely no objection to its truth, but rather helps to satisfy the mind that there is indeed in it a Divine work and solution.

And if some are disposed (I do not think that Sir Oliver Lodge would be one of these) to resent any introduction of the element of mystery, I would urge that the Death of Christ, as the doctrine understands it, is not only a moral centre. It specifically deals with that which all thinkers, and specially 'naturalist' or monistic thinkers of all kinds, recognise as a mystery: I mean, of course, the fact of guilt or the consciousness of guilt. That this should be met by a doctrine which, along with its high and illuminating moral reasonableness and moral power has mystery in it, is surely no matter for objection.

My object in writing this has been to show that Sir Oliver Lodge, coming into the treatment of a subject which from its proved adaptation to so many forms and sides of our moral and spiritual need must be uniquely complex, has rejected an element or elements in the truth of the Atonement which his

reverent spirit and his method of spiritual induction may lead him later to recognise as a legitimate and necessary part of theological interpretation, and of the power of the Cross over life. In this sense only, and quite respectfully, I have used the word "amateurish" in connection with his work. Will he forgive me if I say that there are other points in his article which would perhaps give even more justification to the epithet? He wrote hastily when he said that "orthodox people" regard the Christ as "only half man, say some; only quarter man, say others." (I do not follow the distinction.) It is a curious lapse to be made by one who writes himself later (in a sentence only formally hypothetical) of "the advent of as lofty a Spirit as we can conceive perfectly human on the bodily side with all that that implies" (Christian theology could not be content with the word "bodily" to express the fulness of the humanity through and through), "and perfectly Divine on the spiritual side, whatever that may mean." Nor, if he speaks of what has happened and does happen, and not of what might be inferred as likely to happen by some critic of the doctrine, can he maintain that by the doctrine of the Divine Christ "the hope of a higher humanity is taken from us." It is a familiar connection in thought and practice that from what Christ has done *for* us comes the estimate of what He does and is to do *in* us.

When he writes lightly, "demi-gods were common enough in those days," and seriously that "even such tales may be crude heraldings of a divine truth," we may claim with fullest respect that his thoughts about the Incarnation are as yet immature, and decline, as unprofitable under the circumstances, to discuss with him the "good" or "virtue" or "intellectual aid" to be found in the Church's faith as to the Lord's Birth, a subject which of all others claims to be considered in its own context.

But grave as these topics are, I shall not end in the key of criticism, but in that of satisfaction that such a man as Sir Oliver Lodge should bring into the field of Theology such



a contribution as this. The fact is full of hope for the prospects of English thought upon the highest subjects. The many mistakes of the past, the need of an open ear for the teaching of the future, forbid on the part of Theology the kind of criticism which would either discourage or push aside a contribution like this. But the truth which Christian Theology tries to set forth has a depth and a coherence, and has commanded from the conscience a response, which must compel the more respect the closer it is approached. We may expect that one who approaches in Sir Oliver Lodge's spirit will increasingly recognise this ; while we are very certain that this article shows there are few minds more capable of helping in the task of correlating it with the knowledge and the instincts of present and coming days. Few Christians, I think, will read the article without feeling that if Theology must claim to have something to teach even the ablest and most reverent of those who enter her domain, her sincerity and her outlook have much to gain from welcoming what they bring, whether in the form of challenge or contribution, or of both combined.

EDW. ROFFEN.

## HEGEL'S THEORY OF TRAGEDY.

A. C. BRADLEY,

Professor of Poetry in the University of Oxford.

SINCE Aristotle dealt with tragedy, and, as usual, drew the main features of his subject with those sure and simple strokes which no later hand has rivalled, the only philosopher who has treated it in a manner both original and searching is Hegel. I propose here to give a sketch of Hegel's theory, and to add some remarks upon it. But I cannot possibly do justice in a sketch to a theory which fills many pages of the *Æsthetik*; which I must tear from its connections with the author's general view of poetry, and with the rest of his philosophy; and which I must try to exhibit as far as possible in the language of ordinary literature. To estimate this theory, therefore, from my sketch would be neither safe nor just—all the more because, in the interest of immediate clearness, I have not scrupled to insert without warning remarks and illustrations for which Hegel is not responsible.

On certain characteristics of tragedy the briefest reminder will suffice. A large part of the nature of this form of drama is common to all the forms of drama; and of this nothing need be said. It will be agreed, further, that in all tragedy there is some sort of collision or conflict—conflict of feelings, modes of thought, desires, wills, purposes; conflict of persons with one another, or with circumstances, or with themselves; one, several, or all of these kinds of conflict, as the case may be. Again, it may be taken for granted that a tragedy is a story of



unhappiness or suffering, and excites such feelings as pity and fear. To this, if we followed the present usage of the term, we should add that the story of unhappiness must have an unhappy end; by which we mean in effect that the conflict must close with the death of one or more of the principal characters. But this usage of the word "tragedy" is comparatively recent; it leaves us without a name for many plays, in many languages, which deal with unhappiness without ending unhappily; and Hegel takes the word in its older sense.

Passing on from these admitted characteristics of tragedy, we may best approach Hegel's peculiar view by observing that he lays particular stress on one of them. That a tragedy is a story of suffering is probably to most people the most obvious fact about it. Hegel says very little of this; partly, perhaps, because it is obvious, but more because the essential point to him is not the suffering but its cause, namely, the action or conflict. Mere suffering, he would say, is not tragic, but only the suffering that comes of a special kind of action. Pity for mere misfortune, like fear of it, is not tragic pity or fear. These are due to the spectacle of the conflict and its attendant suffering, which do not appeal simply to our sensibilities or our instinct of self-preservation, but also to our deeper mind or spirit (*Geist*, a word which, with its adjective, I shall translate "spirit," "spiritual," not because it means anything mystic or distinctively religious, but because our words "mind" and "mental" suggest something merely intellectual).

Now why, according to Hegel, does the tragic conflict appeal to our spirit? Because it is itself of the spirit. It is a conflict, that is to say, between powers that rule man's spiritual life, and have the right to rule it. They are the substance of humanity, and especially of man's ethical nature. The family and the state, the bond of parent and child, of brother and sister, of husband and wife, of citizen and ruler, or citizen and citizen, with the obligations and feelings appropriate to these bonds; and again the powers of personal love and honour, or of devotion to a great cause or an ideal interest like religion or science

or some kind of social welfare—such are the forces exhibited in tragic action ; not indeed alone, not without others less affirmative and perhaps even evil, but still in preponderating mass. And as they form the substance of man, are common to all civilised men, and are acknowledged as powers rightfully claiming human obedience, their exhibition in tragedy has that interest, at once deep and universal, which is essential to a great work of art.

In many a work of art, in many a statue, picture, tale, or song, such powers are shown in solitary peace or harmonious co-operation. Tragedy shows them in collision. Their nature is divine ; but they have left the repose of Olympus, entered into human wills, and become mortal foes. And this spectacle is not only interesting but terrible. The essentially tragic fact is the self-division and intestinal warfare of the spiritual substance, not so much the war of good with evil as the war of good with good. Two of these isolated powers face each other, making incompatible demands. The family claims what the state refuses, love requires what honour forbids. The competing forces are both in themselves rightful, and so far the claim of each is equally justified ; but the right of each is pushed into a wrong, because it ignores the right of the other, and demands that absolute sway which belongs to neither alone, but to the whole of which each is but a part.

And one reason why this happens lies in the nature of the characters through whom these claims are made. It is the nature of the tragic character, at once his greatness and his doom, that he knows no shrinking or half-heartedness, but identifies himself wholly with the power that moves him, and will admit the justification of no other power. For all the richness of their natures, in the conflict these characters concentrate their being in one point. *Antigone* is the determination to do her duty to her dead brother ; *Romeo* is not a son or a citizen as well as a lover, he is lover pure and simple, and his love is the whole of him.

The end of the tragic conflict is the denial of both the



exclusive claims. It is not the work of chance or blind fate ; it is the act of the spiritual substance itself, asserting its absoluteness against the excessive pretensions of its particular powers. In that sense, as proceeding from an absolute right which cancels claims based on right, but pushed into wrong, it may be called the act of "eternal justice." Sometimes it can end the conflict peacefully. The contending powers may reduce their claims—a conclusion, however, which is apt to weaken the impression of tragic strength in the characters ; or again such a reduction of their claims may be imposed on them by some superior authority—for instance, a divine agency. But sometimes they press their quarrel to extremes ; and then, instead of a solution, there is a catastrophe, the denial of the one-sided claims involving the death of one or more of the persons concerned. The ultimate power thus appears as a destructive force. Yet even here, as Hegel insists, the end is not without an aspect of reconciliation. For that which is denied is not the rightful powers with which the combatants have identified themselves. On the contrary, those powers, and with them the only thing for which the combatants cared, are affirmed. What is denied is the one-sided and therefore wrongful assertion of their right.

Such in outline is Hegel's main view. Two of his illustrations are taken from *Æschylus* and *Sophocles*. *Clytemnestra* has murdered *Agamemnon*, her husband and king. *Orestes*, their son, is impelled by filial piety to avenge his father, and is ordered by *Apollo* to do so. But to kill a mother is to sin against filial piety. The spiritual substance is divided against itself. The sacred bond of father and son demands what the equally sacred bond of son and mother forbids. When, therefore, *Orestes* has done the deed, the *Furies* of his murdered mother claim him for their prey. He appeals to *Apollo*, who resists their claim. A solution is arrived at without a catastrophe. The cause is referred to *Athene*, who institutes at *Athens* a court of sworn judges. The votes of this court being equally divided, *Athene* gives her casting-vote for *Orestes* ; while the

Furies are at last appeased by a promise of everlasting honour at Athens. In the *Antigone*, on the other hand, to Hegel the perfect exemplar of tragedy, the solution is negative. The brother of Antigone has brought against his native city an army of foreigners bent on destroying it. He has been killed in the battle, and Creon, the ruler of the city, has issued an edict forbidding anyone on pain of death to bury the corpse. In so doing he not only dishonours the dead man, but violates the rights of the gods of the dead. Antigone without hesitation disobeys the edict, and Creon, despite the remonstrance of his son, who is affianced to her, persists in exacting the penalty. Warned, however, by the prophet Teiresias, he gives way, but too late. Antigone, immured in a rocky chamber to starve, has anticipated her death. Her lover follows her example, and his mother refuses to survive him. Thus Antigone has lost her life through her absolute assertion of the family against the state; Creon has violated the sanctity of the family, and in return sees his own home laid in ruins. But in this catastrophe neither the right of the family nor that of the state is denied; what is denied is the absoluteness of the claim of each.

The danger of illustrations like these is that they divert attention from the principle illustrated to questions about the interpretation of particular works. So it will be here. I cannot stay to discuss these questions, which do not affect Hegel's principle; but it will be well, before going further, to remove a misunderstanding of it which is generally to be found in criticisms of his treatment of the *Oresteia*, and especially of the *Antigone*. The critic says, for example, in effect: "Hegel talks of equally justified powers or claims. But Æschylus never meant that Orestes and the Furies were equally justified; for Orestes was acquitted. Sophocles never meant that Antigone and Creon were equally right. And how can it have been equally the duty of Orestes to kill his mother and not to kill her?" But, in the first place, it is most important to observe that Hegel is not discussing at all what we should



generally call the moral quality of the acts and persons concerned, or, in the ordinary sense, what it was their duty to do. And, in the second place, when he speaks of "equally justified" powers, what he means, and, indeed, sometimes says, is that these powers are *in themselves* equally justified. The family and the state, the bond of father and son, and the bond of mother and son, these are each and all, one as much as another, powers rightfully claiming human allegiance. It is tragic that obedience to one should involve the violation of another. These are Hegel's propositions, and surely they are true. Their truth is quite unaffected by the fact (assuming it is one) that under the circumstances the act combining this obedience to one and violation of another was morally right, or by the fact (if it is one) that one such act (say Antigone's) was morally right, and another (say Creon's) was morally wrong. It is sufficient for Hegel's principle that the violation should take place, and that we should feel its weight. We do feel it. We may approve the act of Antigone or Orestes, but we feel it is no light matter to disobey the law or to murder a mother, that (as we might say) there is much justice in the pleas of the Furies and of Creon, and that the *tragic* effect depends upon these facts. If, again, it is objected that the underlying conflict in the *Antigone* is not between the family and the state, but between divine and human law, that objection, if sound, might touch Hegel's interpretation,<sup>1</sup> but it would not affect his principle, except for those who recognise no obligation in human law; and it will scarcely be contended that Sophocles is to be numbered among them. On the other hand, it is, I think, a matter for regret that Hegel employed such words as "right," "justified," and "justice." They do not mislead readers familiar with his writings, but to others they suggest associations with criminal law, or our everyday moral judgments, or

<sup>1</sup> I say "might," because Hegel himself in the *Phaenomenologie* uses those very terms "divine" and "human law" in reference to the *Antigone*, and it is within the bounds of possibility that he and the objector might use these terms in the same sense.

perhaps the theory of "poetic justice"; and these are all out of place in a discussion on tragedy.

I return to Hegel. The exposition of his main view is followed by an account of some differences between ancient and modern tragedy (the former being practically identified with the plays of Æschylus and Sophocles). I shall confine myself to a selection from his remarks on the latter, since what he says of ancient tragedy is little more than an enlargement of parts of his account of tragedy in general, while in that account he seems rarely to think of modern tragedy at all. The result is unfortunate. We get the impression that, while he considered the idea of tragedy to be fully realised by Æschylus and Sophocles, he regarded modern tragedy as on the whole a much more imperfect embodiment of that idea. It is quite possible that this was really his opinion; and it would not imply of necessity the further opinion that Shakespeare or Goethe was a man of less genius than Æschylus or Sophocles, any more than a conviction that sculpture reached its highest point at Athens need imply a conviction that Michael Angelo had less gift than Phidias. But it is, I think, more likely that this peculiarity of his exposition is partly due to educational considerations. He probably thought that the nature of tragedy is most *clearly* seen in Greek examples, and that therefore, in lecturing, he could best make his general theory clear by stating it in terms applicable most completely to those examples. At the same time, I doubt if he would have thought this but for the fact that, long before he lectured on æsthetics, and in the days of his greatest enthusiasm for the Greeks, he had had occasion to deal with Greek tragedy in his early essay on *Naturrecht* and in the *Phaenomenologie*, whereas a consideration of modern tragedy did not lie in the scheme of those works. And then he perhaps supposed that a mere modification of his theory of Greek tragedy would render it applicable to modern works.

Hegel considers first the cases where modern tragedy resembles ancient in dealing with conflicts arising from the



pursuit of substantial ends—ends not merely personal. And he points out that modern tragedy here shows a much greater variety. Subjects are taken, for example, from the quarrels of dynasties, of rivals for the throne, of kings and nobles, of state and church. Calderon treats of the rights and duties of love and honour regarded as binding powers. Schiller in his early works makes his characters defend the rights of nature against convention, or of freedom of thought against prescription. Wallenstein aims at the unity and peace of Germany; Karl Moor attacks the whole arrangement of society; Faust seeks to attain in thought and action union with the Absolute. In such cases the end is more than personal; it represents a power claiming the allegiance of the individual; but it does not always or generally represent a great *ethical* institution or bond like the family or the state. We have passed into a wider world.

But, secondly, he observes that in a larger number of instances such public or universal interests either do not appear at all, or, if they appear, are not the main subject, but only a kind of background for it. The real subject is some personal end or passion—not necessarily selfish, of course, but still personal, subjective. The importance given to subjectivity—this is the distinctive mark of modern sentiment, and so of modern art. A part at least of Hegel's meaning may be put thus. We are interested in the personality of Orestes or Antigone, but chiefly as it shows itself in one aspect, as identifying itself with a certain ethical, not merely personal, relation; and our interest in the personality is inseparable from our interest in the power it represents. It is not so with Hamlet, whose position so closely resembles that of Orestes. What engrosses our attention is the whole personality of Hamlet in its conflict, not with an opposing spiritual power, but with difficulties chiefly in his own nature. No one could think of describing Othello as the representative of an ethical family relation. His passion, however much nobility he may show in it, is personal. So is Romeo's love. It is not

pursued, like Posa's freedom of thought, as something universal, a right of man. Its right, if it can be said to have any right, is one rooted in mere personality.

On this main characteristic of modern tragedy others depend—for instance, that variety of subject to which reference has just been made. For when so much weight is attached to personality, almost any fatal collision in which a sufficiently striking character is involved may yield material for tragedy. Naturally, again, characterisation has become fuller and more subtle, except in dramas which are more or less an imitation of the antique. The characters in Greek tragedy are far from being types or personified abstractions, as those of classical French tragedy tend to be: they are genuine individuals. But still they are comparatively simple and easy to understand, and have not the intricacy of the characters in Shakespeare. These, for the most part, represent simply themselves; and the loss of that interest which attached to the Greek characters from their representing not only themselves but an ethical power behind them, is compensated by an extraordinary subtlety in their portrayal, and also by their possession of some peculiar charm or some commanding superiority. Finally, the interest in personality explains the freedom with which characters more or less definitely evil are introduced in modern tragedy. Mephistopheles is as essentially modern as Faust. The passion of Richard or Macbeth or Lady Macbeth is not only personal, like that of Othello; it is egoistic and anarchic, and leads to crimes done with a full knowledge of their wickedness. Such beings as Iago and Goneril, almost portents of evil, are not indeed made the heroes of tragedies; but, according to Hegel, they would not have been admitted in Greek tragedy at all. If Clytemnestra had been cited as a parallel to Lady Macbeth, Hegel would have replied that Lady Macbeth had not the faintest ground of complaint against Duncan, while in reading the *Agamemnon* we are frequently reminded that Clytemnestra's husband was the sacrificer of their child. He might have



added that Clytemnestra is herself an example of the necessity, where one of the principal characters inspires hatred or horror, of increasing the subtlety of the drawing or adding grandeur to the evil will.

It remains to compare ancient and modern tragedy in regard to the issue of the conflict. We have seen that Hegel attributes this issue in Greek tragedy to the ethical substance or eternal justice, and so accounts for such reconciliation as we feel to be present even where the end is a catastrophe. In the catastrophe of modern tragedy, he says, a similar justice sometimes appears; but, where it appears, it is still not quite the antique justice. And the reason is that the characters represent themselves rather than any ethical power, or even are evil and attack some ethical power. If they do the latter, like Richard or Macbeth, we feel something cold and "criminalistic" about the justice that acts in the catastrophe: we feel that the hero "only gets what he deserves," like a criminal before a judge. And if he is a character like Wallenstein or Götz, who are not evil, and may even be said in some sense to represent a cause, his destruction by the opposing political power is still not felt to be the assertion of a concrete ethical whole against the false independence of the part. In either case, partly because the sense of reconciliation is so far imperfect, partly because the interest is so largely in individualities as such, it is desirable that the individual himself should show some measure of reconciliation with his fate. And he may do so, religiously, by feeling that he is exchanging his earthly being for an indestructible happiness; or by recognising the justice of his fall; or he may at least show us that he maintains to the end, in the face of the forces that overwhelm him, the freedom and strength of his own will.

But there remain, says Hegel, many modern tragedies where the catastrophe is felt to be due not to any kind of justice, but to unhappy circumstances and outward

accidents. And then we rise to nothing higher than the feeling that everything finite is in its own nature doomed to perish. Such a feeling is one of mere sadness; and, if the hero is a noble soul, it may become the impression of a dreadful external necessity. This impression, which contains no element of reconciliation, is softened or avoided when circumstances or accidents are so depicted that they are felt to coincide with something in the hero himself, as in *Hamlet* the rottenness of Denmark is answered by a mortal disease in the hero's soul. But even here, as in *Romeo and Juliet*, our predominant feeling is one of pain. Hegel, I think, was of opinion that in modern times healthy sentiment rightly prefers a peaceful solution wherever it can be attained without serious loss of depth. This does not mean, of course, that he disapproved of Shakespeare's catastrophes; but it is clear that he did not quite like the exhibition of extreme forms of evil, and he had the greatest contempt for such contemporary phenomena as the representation in drama of a malicious fate and the sentimental indulgence of melancholy. To him, as to Wordsworth, the affirmative power of the spirit, even in its profoundest divisions, was the deepest truth and the most inspiring theme. I have no doubt he thought *Hamlet* a greater work than *Iphigenie*, but I suspect he loved Goethe's play the best.

Most of those who have thought about this subject will agree that the ideas I have tried to sketch are interesting and valuable; but they suggest scores of questions. Alike in the account of tragedy in general, and in that of the differences between ancient and modern tragedy, everyone will find statements to doubt and omissions to regret; and scarcely one of Hegel's interpretations of particular plays will escape objection. It is impossible for me to touch on more than a few points; and to the main ideas I owe so much that I am more inclined to dwell on their truth than to criticise what seem to be defects. But perhaps after all an attempt to supplement and



amend may be the best way of throwing some part of Hegel's meaning more into relief.

To begin with the attempt to supplement. He seems to me to be right in laying emphasis on the action and conflict in tragedy rather than on the suffering and misfortune. No mere suffering or misfortune, no suffering that does not spring in great part from human agency, and in some degree from the agency of the sufferer, is tragic, however pitiful or dreadful it may be. But, sufficient connection with these agencies being present, misfortune, the fall from prosperity to adversity, with the suffering attending it, at once becomes tragic; and in many tragedies it forms a large ingredient, as does the pity for it in the tragic feeling. Hegel, I think, certainly takes too little notice of it; and by this omission he also withdraws attention from something the importance of which he would have admitted at once: I mean the way in which suffering is borne. Physical pain, to take an extreme instance, is one thing: Philoctetes, bearing it, is another. And the noble endurance of pain that rends the heart is the source of much that is best worth having in tragedy.

Again, there is one particular kind of misfortune *not* obviously due to human agency, which undoubtedly affects us in a tragic way. I mean that kind which suggests the idea of fate. Tragedies which represent man as the mere plaything of chance or a blank fate, or a malicious fate, are never really deep: it is satisfactory to see that Maeterlinck, a man of true genius, has now risen above these ideas. But, where those factors of tragedy are present which Hegel emphasises, the impression of something fateful in what we call accident, the impression that the hero not only invites misfortune by his exceptional stature and exceptional daring, but is also, if I may so put it, strangely and terribly unlucky, is in many plays a genuine ingredient in tragic effect. It is so, for example, in the *Œdipus Rex*. It is so even in dramas like Shakespeare's, which exemplify the saying that character is destiny. Hegel's own complaint against the prominence of accident in the plot

of *Hamlet* proves it. Othello would not have become Iago's victim if his own character had been different; but still, as we say, it is an extraordinary fatality which makes him the companion of the one man in the world who is at once able enough, brave enough, and vile enough to ensnare him. Desdemona's loss of the handkerchief, Juliet's waking from her trance a minute too late, are other instances. Now, it may be said with truth that Hegel's whole account of the ultimate power in tragedy is a rationalisation of the idea of fate, but his remarks on this particular aspect of fate are neither sufficient nor satisfactory.

Hegel's insistence on the element of reconciliation in a tragic catastrophe, and his remarks on the various forms it assumes, have the greatest value; but one result of the omissions just noticed is that he sometimes exaggerates it, and at other times rates it too low. When he is speaking of the kind of tragedy he most approves, his language almost suggests that our feeling at the close of the conflict is, or should be, one of complete reconciliation. This it surely neither is nor can be. Not to mention the suffering and death we have witnessed, the very existence of the conflict, however much a supreme ethical power may be asserted in its close, remains a painful fact, and, in large measure, a fact not understood. For, though we may be said to see, in one sense, how the opposition of spiritual powers arises, something in us, and that the best, still cries out that it ought not to arise. And even the perception or belief that it must needs be that offences come would not abolish our feeling that the necessity is terrible, or our pain in the woe of those through whom they come. But this exaggeration in Hegel's language, if partly due to his enthusiasm for the affirmative, is mainly, I think, an accident of lecturing. In the *Philosophy of Religion*, I may add, he plainly states that in the solution even of tragedies like the *Antigone* something remains unresolved.

On the other hand, his treatment of the aspect of recon-



ciliation in modern tragedy is in several respects insufficient. I will mention only one. He does not notice that in the conclusion of not a few tragedies pain is mingled not merely with acquiescence, but with something like exultation. Is there not such a feeling at the close of *Hamlet*, *Othello*, and *King Lear*; and that although the end in the last two cases touches the limit of legitimate pathos? This exultation appears to be connected with our sense that the hero has never shown himself so great or noble as in the death which seals his failure. A rush of passionate admiration, and a glory in the greatness of the soul, mingle with our grief; and the coming of death, so far from destroying these feelings, appears to leave them untouched, or even to be entirely in harmony with them. If in such dramas we are able to feel that the ultimate power is no mere fate, but a spiritual power, then we also feel that the hero was never so near to this power as in the moment when it required his life.

The last omission I would notice in Hegel's theory is that he underrates the action in tragedy of what may be called by a rough distinction moral evil rather than defect. Certainly the part played by evil differs greatly in different cases, but it is never absent, not even from tragedies of Hegel's favourite type. If it does not appear in the main conflict, it appears in its occasion. You may say that, while Iago and Macbeth have evil purposes, neither the act of Orestes nor the vengeance of the Furies, neither Antigone's breach of the edict nor even Creon's insistence on her punishment, spring from evil in them; but the situation with which Orestes or Antigone has to deal, and so in a sense the whole tragedy, arises from evil, the murder of Agamemnon, and the attempt of Polyneices to bring ruin on his native city. It would, in fact, be difficult to find great tragedies, ancient or modern, in which evil has not directly or indirectly a prominent part. And its presence has an important bearing on the effect produced by the catastrophe. On the one hand, it deepens the sense of painful awe. The question why

affirmative spiritual forces should collide is hard enough; but the question why, together with them, there should be generated violent evil and extreme depravity is harder and more painful still. But, on the other hand, the element of reconciliation in the catastrophe is strengthened by recognition of the part played by evil in bringing it about; because our sense that the ultimate power cannot endure the presence of this evil is implicitly the sense that this power is of one nature with good. If it rejects the exaggerated claims of its own isolated powers, the power which provokes from it a much more vehement reaction must be an alien power. This feeling is forcibly evoked by Shakespeare's tragedies, and in many Greek dramas it is directly appealed to by repeated reminders that what is at work in the disasters is the un-sleeping Ate which follows an ancestral sin. If Aristotle did not in some lost part of the *Poetics* discuss ideas like this, he failed to give a complete rationale of Greek tragedy.

I come lastly to the matter I have most at heart. What I take to be the central idea in Hegel's theory seems to me to touch the essence of tragedy; but he has nowhere expressed this idea in a form sufficiently general, and his own account of the nature of tragedy does not cover anything like the whole field of instances. This account is usually misreported, and there is some excuse for the error. He is supposed to teach that tragedy portrays only the conflict of ethical powers like the family and the state. In reality, as we have seen, he adds to these ethical powers other spiritual powers, such as love and honour, and various universal interests or ends. But even so he fails to include in his general formula those numerous cases where, by his own showing, no such universal ends collide. Accordingly, when these cases come to be mentioned (and among them are some of the most famous plays), they tend to appear rather as declensions from the idea of tragedy than as embodiments of it. I should like to propose a restatement of the principle which would avoid these defects.

If we remove the reference to ethical and other universal



powers or interests, what have we left? We have the idea—to repeat a formula not, I think, Hegel's own—that tragedy portrays a self-division and self-waste of spirit, or a division of spirit involving spiritual conflict and waste. It is implied in this that on *both* sides in the conflict there is a spiritual value. The same truth may be expressed (again, I think, not in Hegel's own words) by saying that the tragic conflict is one not merely of good and evil, but also, and more essentially, of good with good. But if we say this, we must be careful to observe that “good” here means anything that has spiritual value, not moral goodness alone, and that “evil” has a similarly wide sense.

Now this idea of a division of spirit involving conflict and waste covers the tragedies of ethical and other universal powers, and it covers much besides. According to it the collision of such powers would be one kind of tragic collision, but only one. *Why* are we tragically moved by the conflict of family and state? Because we set a high value on family and state. Why then should not the conflict of anything else that has sufficient value affect us tragically? It does. The value must be sufficient—a moderate value will not serve; and other characteristics must be present which need not be considered here. But, granted these conditions, *any* spiritual conflict involving spiritual waste is tragic. And it is just one greatness of modern art that it has shown the tragic fact in situations of so many and such diverse kinds. These situations have not the peculiar effectiveness of the conflicts preferred by Hegel, but they may have an equal effectiveness peculiar to themselves.

Let me attempt to test these ideas by choosing a most unfavourable instance—unfavourable because the play seems at first to represent a conflict simply of good and evil, and so, according both to Hegel's statement and the proposed restatement, to be no tragedy at all: I mean *Macbeth*. What is the conflict here? It will be agreed that it does not lie between two ethical powers or universal ends, and that, as Hegel says,

the main interest is in personalities. Let us take it first, then, to lie between Macbeth and the persons opposing him, and let us ask whether there is not good on both sides—not an equal amount of good (I never maintained that), but enough good on each to give the impression of spiritual waste. Is there not such good in Macbeth? It is not a question merely of moral goodness, but of good. It is not a question of the use made of good, but of its presence. And such bravery and skill in war as win the enthusiasm of everyone about him; such an imagination as few but poets possess; a conscience so vivid that his deed is to him beforehand a thing of terror, and, once done, condemns him to that torture of the mind on which he lies in restless ecstasy; a determination so tremendous and a courage so appalling that, for all this torment, he never dreams of turning back, but, even when he has found that life is a tale full of sound and fury, signifying nothing, will see it told out to the end though earth and heaven and hell are leagued against him;—are not these things, in themselves, good, and gloriously good? Do they not make you, for all your horror, admire Macbeth, sympathise with his agony, pity him, and see in him the waste of forces on which you place a spiritual value? It is simply on this account that he is for you, not the abstraction called a criminal who merely “gets what he deserves,” but a tragic hero, and that his war with other forces of indubitable spiritual worth is a tragic war.

It is required by the restatement of Hegel's principle to show that in the external conflict of persons there is good on both sides; it is not required that this should be true, secondly, of both sides in the conflict within the hero's soul; for the hero is only a part of the tragedy. Nevertheless in almost all cases, if not in all, it is true. It is obviously so where, as in the hero and also the heroine of the *Cid*, the contending powers in this internal struggle are love and honour. Even when love is of a quality less pure and has a destructive force, as in Shakespeare's Antony, it is clearly true. And it remains true even where, as in Hamlet and Macbeth, the contest seems to



lie, and for most purposes might conveniently be said to lie, between forces simply good and simply the reverse. This is not really so, and the tragic effect depends upon the fact. It depends on our feeling that the elements in the man's nature are so inextricably blended that the good in him, that which we admire, instead of simply opposing the evil, reinforces it. Macbeth's imagination deters him from murder, but it also makes the vision of a crown irresistibly bright. If he had been less determined, nay, if his conscience had been less maddening in its insistence that he had thrown the precious jewel of his soul irretrievably away, he might have paused after his first deed, might even have repented. Yet his imagination, his determination, and his conscience were things good. Hamlet's desire to do his duty is a good thing, but what opposes this desire is by no means simply evil. It is something to which a substantial contribution is made by the qualities we most admire in him. Thus the nature of tragedy, as seen in the external conflict, repeats itself on each side of this conflict, and everywhere there is a spiritual value in both the contending forces:

In showing that *Macbeth*, a tragedy as far removed as possible from the *Antigone* as understood by Hegel, is still of one nature with it, and equally answers to the account of tragedy proposed, it has been necessary to ignore the great difference between the two plays. But when once the common essence of all tragedies has been determined, their differences become the interesting subject. They could be distinguished according to the character of the collisions on which they are built, or of the main forces which move the principal agents. And it may well be that, other things being equal (as they never are), the tragedy in which the hero is, as we say, a good man, is more tragic than that in which he is, as we say, a bad one. The more spiritual value, the more tragedy in conflict and waste. The death of Hamlet or Othello is, so far, more tragic than that of Macbeth, that of Macbeth than that of Richard. Below

Richard stands Iago, a figure still tragic, but unfit for the hero's part; below him persons like Regan or, in the very depth, Oswald, characters no longer (at least in the dramatic sense) tragic at all. Moral evil, that is to say, so greatly diminishes the spiritual value we ascribe to the personality that a very large amount of good of some kind is required to bring this personality up to the tragic level, the destruction of evil as such being in no degree tragic. And again, it may well be that, other things being equal, the more nearly the contending forces approach each other in goodness, the more tragic is the conflict: that the collision is, so far, more tragic in the *Antigone* than in *Macbeth*, and Hamlet's internal conflict than his struggle with outward enemies and obstacles. But it cannot be right to describe tragedy in terms that exclude *Macbeth*, or to describe *Macbeth* in terms which imply that it portrays a conflict of mere evil with mere good.

The restatement of Hegel's main principle as to the conflict would involve some change in his language as to the catastrophe. It is obvious that the cause of that element of reconciliation which he requires must not be presented in terms appropriate to one alone of the many kinds of tragedy. On the other hand, it seems to me clear that his general requirement that such an element should be present is right. A work which left us simply horrified, depressed, or bewildered, would to that extent be a bad tragedy. But whether it is possible to go beyond this general requirement, and to devise a formula as to the impression which any good tragedy must produce concerning the nature of the ultimate agent in the catastrophe, is a question too large for discussion here.

I leave it to students of Hegel to ask whether he would have accepted the criticisms and modifications I have suggested. Naturally I think he would, as I believe they rest on truth, and am sure he had a habit of arriving at truth. But in any case their importance is trifling, compared with that of the theory which they attempt to strengthen and to which they owe their existence.



## HERDER.

T. BAILEY SAUNDERS.

To most of us Herder is nothing but a name. If we are asked what we know of him, we are obliged to admit that we know very little; and if we are also asked whether we want to know more, we may perhaps confess to a certain curiosity but not to any lively interest. We regard him, in fact, as a forgotten writer, who was probably therefore a dull one. Yet judged by what his own countrymen think of him he ought to excite our attention, for they tell us that in the hundred years that have passed since his death some of the best products of the human mind have grown from ideas which he helped to sow. By his own countrymen, indeed, he is still honoured as one of the heroes of the golden age. He is still recognised as a leader in that great intellectual advance during the later half of the eighteenth century which all clear-sighted Germans consider, and rightly consider, to be the highest of their achievements. He maintains an important place next to his illustrious contemporaries Goethe, Lessing and Schiller, Kant and Fichte, although no one puts him on the same level with the greatest of them, and scarcely anyone even with the least. That in spite of this he should have remained a name to us is not, of course, extraordinary; for are we not all aware—painfully or complacently aware—that as a nation we are commonly indifferent to foreign ideas, or that, if we give them any welcome at all, it is a welcome which is in general tardy and half-hearted? Even among those of us who are drawn to

German literature at its best I shall hardly be wrong if I assert that outside our schools and colleges there is little interest in any but the most conspicuous writers, and in these, if the truth be told, the interest is only here and there of a kind that stirs enthusiasm. If poetry and romance appeal to us, we have, of course, at some time or other in our lives, read the best that Goethe wrote; we may possess a slight acquaintance with Lessing; we may be able to recall the finest things in Schiller and Heine. If we have any tincture of philosophy we may perhaps have studied Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. I say *perhaps*, because it will always remain a remarkable circumstance, and the plainest proof of our strange insularity, that the two most representative English philosophers of the last century—I mean Mill and Spencer—knew nothing, or next to nothing, and were not ashamed to be ignorant, of the labours of those supreme masters of modern speculation.

With these writers our interest in what the Germans have done in literature has come, as a rule, to an end, although signs are not wanting that at present, largely through the medium of translations, we are paying it more attention. But if we wish to understand something not only of the influences which have shaped their poetry and philosophy but also of the origin of those larger conceptions of history and theology which they have created, and which go back, as they assure us, to the classical period of their literature, we must extend our view to Herder. Their larger conception of history they owe first and foremost to him, and he also deepened their feeling that between all these spheres of thought a definite connection exists. In that period, indeed, no one embodied it so fully and so closely as he. It is a connection which in any period we shall do well to remember, and more particularly, perhaps, in our own, when, from the very ardour and multiplicity of our special studies, we run a grave risk of forgetting it altogether. Here, then, we have reasons for considering this writer whom we mostly ignore; and if we try to



discover what he accomplished for his own people, perhaps we may be fortunate enough to find that he has a lesson to teach us which we have not yet learned in its entirety.

Our failure to appreciate Herder is not without some excuse. Honour him as the Germans may, none of them will any longer claim that he is a popular author. Nay, in spite of his reputation, it is doubtful whether, apart from the years in which they appeared, his writings have ever been in much demand even in his own country. When the first complete edition appeared in sixty volumes, the intelligent public was soon content with a small selection, and later efforts to present him as a whole have not succeeded in changing the verdict that he can be enjoyed only in fragments. The Germans, indeed, if they are pressed for a frank opinion, will admit that he is honoured more than he is read, in spite of the space which he occupies in their histories of literature. But the fact remains that they keep him in their hearts as well as in their histories, and they keep him there because of the great work which he did for the nation.

If I am to say at once and in brief what that work was ; if I am to describe at the outset the service which he rendered to his contemporaries and successors—well then ! it was to point the way, to influence, to inspire. Those who rate him highest look upon him as the great *Bahnbrecher*, as the enthusiastic pioneer who explored the entire field of knowledge and made luminous suggestions everywhere. They look upon him as the brilliant and versatile genius who so fertilised the golden age with new ideas that, if he had not lived and laboured, the age itself would have assumed a different character. Coming, as they tell us, at a moment when they were struggling to be free from artificial aims, to be delivered from the dry, rationalistic, purely logical temper which dominated the earlier half of the eighteenth century, he not only gave them fresh thoughts but by his zeal and energy saw those thoughts adopted. Nor is this all ; for they claim that by inspiring so much that was vital in the men of his own and the next generation, who in

their turn gave form and pressure to the whole development that followed, he laid the lines on which a considerable part of the intellectual life of Germany, and consequently of Europe, has since moved. That these, however, are large assertions to make of any one writer at any period is obvious. Some of them may be true, but on the other hand there will always be a serious remainder impossible of proof, if only for the reason that the intellectual life of a nation is made up of many diverse elements, social and political as well as mental, and is determined by many conditions only some of which are calculable. When this is the case with a single nation, who is to disentangle the intricate play of forces in several nations at once, or measure the precise influence of one mind over so vast an aggregate of thought? We shall be safer in limiting our horizon to Herder's own age, and, if we go beyond it, all that I, at least, can attempt is the barest indication of the channels in which his ideas still flow, even though mingled with many others. That his ideas have not been lost, that, on the contrary, they have re-appeared again and again, is what makes him worth our study.

Let us first turn for a moment to the man himself. I need not do more than just mention the outward events of his career. He came of a humble family in East Prussia, where he was born in 1744. He studied at Königsberg and learned much from Kant; still more, perhaps, from Hamann, a curious, desultory, but suggestive writer, known in his day as the Magician of the North. He learned most of all, however, from the works of Rousseau, which, according to his own account, were his constant companion when he was a young man. Like most young men of talent, he nursed the wildest ambitions. He wanted by turns to be a great physician, a great lawyer, a great schoolmaster. Finally he came to think that the pulpit would provide him with the readiest path to fame, or, as he told Kant, be the best means of bringing culture home to the masses. After teaching and preaching at Riga, travelling and acting as a tutor, meeting Diderot and other



of the Encyclopædists in Paris, Lessing in Hamburg, and the youthful Goethe in Strassburg, he spent five unhappy but not uneventful years as chaplain to the reigning house of Schaumburg-Lippe. He was already well known as one of the *Stürmer und Dränger* of that day. They were young men very conscious of their own importance and extremely sentimental, living on Shakespeare and Rousseau, thinking that they could do everything by intuition, and talking at large of fancy and freedom—young men whom we have always with us, desirous of being or at least of acting and looking like men of genius. Some of them had strange fates. At the age of thirty-two the one who concerns us here, instead of becoming, as he apparently wished, a professor of theology at Göttingen, found himself, largely through Goethe's influence, chaplain to the Court at Weimar, and general superintendent of the churches in the neighbourhood.

Herder, as we shall see, was not happy in this position, but it gave him the platform from which he could unfold his thoughts and deliver his message. That he had a message was plain. He had begun to deliver it before he came to Weimar. Out of all his ambitions the first to emerge clearly was also the strongest and most effective—the ambition, namely, to free himself and others from the numbing tyranny of the rules and formulas which attached to the poetry, the history, and the theology of his young days. Germany at the moment was in the hands of the so-called men of enlightenment—the writers who supposed that all the previous ages of the world were dark ages, and that their own was the first in which the full light of reason had shone on the human mind. This was a light, however, which, as they further supposed, was enjoyed only by the few, namely, themselves. In their view reason consisted of certain clear and definite principles, divinely planted in the mind and heart of every man and existent from all eternity, even if only now for the first time fully understood. In their view, too, all philosophy and religion, and all general conceptions in other branches of

knowledge, were either applications of these fundamental ideas or else simple deductions from them. Safe, as they imagined, in the possession of reason, they looked upon the physical universe and human history as fields in which its marks might be discovered by all who would take the trouble to investigate them. Knowledge, indeed, consisted in finding these marks. The laws of nature, they were convinced, exhibited a rational order; that is to say, certain phenomena in nature were arranged by God in accordance with rational ideas and purposes. How to explain the rest of the phenomena they did not know, but they hoped that in the end whatever was would be found to be right. In the same rough and ready fashion they regarded the languages and literatures, the religions and civilisations, the laws and governments of which history tells us, as the outcome of this rational order, although it was an outcome more or less imperfect. History, as they saw it, was mostly a chapter of accidents, a chronicle of names and dates, of wars and intrigues, of frauds and deceptions, and whatever degree of reason it showed was not inherent in it but only a reflection or application of certain principles which were quite independent of it. Theology, which in its baser aspects was simply imposture, was in its higher only another application of those principles of reason, and the great truths on which religion rested could all be proved in the last resort by logic alone. As for poetry, it was the private monopoly of the cultured, and as France was the land of culture the best that the poets could do was to imitate the French.

In their conception of poetry we no longer follow the men of enlightenment, but is it equally certain that in some other respects we may not require the same corrective as Herder supplied? In the deification of present knowledge at the expense of the past, in the worship of a cold and mechanical reason as the only guide of life, in the profound belief in ready-made principles we can recognise much that is not yet extinct. This whole tendency, commonly called Rationalism, he was



one of the first of his time to call in question. Very early in his career he began to insist that the present was only to be understood by the past, that the past was not the barbarism and folly which it was thought to be, and that to the past and to nature the poets, historians, and theologians would have to go, if they wanted fresh draughts from the springs of life. Here he had been plainly reading Rousseau to advantage; but whereas Rousseau by his return to nature was aiming at the reconstitution of society Herder was proposing the reconstitution of thought. There was, however, the great difference between them that he was not dazzled by the Frenchman's picture of a primitive age of peace and innocence which never existed; nay, he turned away from it with the determination to investigate the past for himself by the help of science, and in the light of literature and art. He wanted to find out how civilisation really arose, and to give fresh vigour to poetry and a fresh understanding to religion by bringing out their true character. This he supposed that he could do by showing what they were in their origin, and by tracing the various phases of their growth. It was *natural growth*, he declared, and not any application of ready-made principles which could best explain them.

How did he proceed? He told the poets not to imitate the French, but to discover what was good in themselves and to imitate that. He told them that so far from poetry being the privilege only of the few it was common to all men, and as fundamental and necessary an expression of the human spirit as speech itself; nay, that at first it was religion; it was the account which men gave of their own fate. He showed them from innumerable examples taken from all nations and all times, from the ancient poetry of the Hebrews, from Homer, from the Indian epics, from the Ossianic and Germanic legends—he showed how in every nation poetry was the direct outcome of the inmost soul of the people. We may thus see, he said, as freshly to-day as when they were first expressed, the hopes and fears, the thoughts and emotions, of every people

standing out against the dark background of its actual history. With a singular capacity for seizing and reproducing whatever seemed to him noble or beautiful in the life of the past, he was able to present to his own age such a picture of what they had regarded as barbarous or dark ages as to alter their whole conception of antiquity. He helped them to see that the past was not a mere chronicle of fraud or stupidity, relieved here and there by rational ideas; but that the beliefs and practices which each age exhibited depended upon its surroundings and were for it the normal and natural expression of its intelligence. What he did, therefore, was to trace for his contemporaries, largely through the poems which he collected and translated, but also through the works of the classical writers, the course which civilisation had taken. In a word, he came to regard civilisation as the gradual unfolding of the human spirit under the pressure of circumstance. While Kant by his psychological analysis was confuting the Rationalists and pointing to the limitations of reason, Herder was effecting the same result by his historical criticism. He was putting an end to the notion that intelligence, morality, or religion could be explained in the light of certain fixed, external and invariable principles.

This was a notion, however, which was being slowly undermined before Herder began to write. Fifty years previously the Neapolitan philosopher Vico had arrived at the conception of a natural development of human activities through the influence of material surroundings, although he regarded this development as a manifestation of divine Providence, and confined his study of it to individual epochs. Montesquieu had traced the varying character of national laws to the play of local, social, and climatic conditions. So far as I am aware, there is no evidence to show that Herder was acquainted with the *Scienza Nuova*, but he often quoted from the *Esprit des Lois*. In the same way he borrowed from Hume, Shaftesbury and Lowth, but to everything that he borrowed he gave a new meaning. He owed much also to Leibnitz, putting to



his own use, for instance, the law of continuity as applied to nature, the doctrine of pre-established harmony, and the theory of the indefinite development of the monads. Moreover, when he took up his pen, the general treatment of history had become fashionable. Voltaire had published his famous essay on the progress of morals and intelligence. Two German writers now almost forgotten, Iselin and Meiners, were tracing the fortunes of the human race or explaining what they supposed to be the educational plans of the Deity.

But these efforts were small in comparison with Herder's attempt to regard history as a great progress leading to a great end. He saw with a clearness remarkable for his time the futility of trying to understand the past by abstract theories, or, in other words, by later ideas; and that the only way to understand it was to look at it in itself. With a vigour entirely novel to the men of enlightenment, and hardly surpassed since, he laid bare the truth that each age must be judged by its own surroundings and its own aspirations. Only so, he said, can we be fair to it and make it yield its secret. Only so can we get at the real meaning of the thoughts and emotions of different nations and different climes, and—what is still more important—only so can we follow the thoughts and emotions of successive ages in their inner connection. As a mere record of outer events, history, he said in effect, is unintelligible, but in the thought behind those events there is something that gives them a unity. Hence in his chief work, his *Ideas for a Philosophy of Human History*, it is intellectual and moral phenomena with which he is mainly concerned—intellectual and moral phenomena as shaped by circumstance, as realising for each age the particular ideal and the particular happiness of which it was capable, and as so making for the progressive development of the race. What others had tried to do for individual epochs or aspects of human life, he tried to do for human life as a whole. Where they had dealt with special developments, his aim was to trace the general development of all the great human interests, moral and religious,

and to show that in their natural and gradual growth they were realising an ever higher and higher ideal. Further, as men could conceive of no beings very different from themselves, as they made their gods and angels in their own image and represented them as magnified men, he called this ideal, in one word, *Humanity*; and in every sense which that word could bear he found the great progress leading to a great end.

In his desire to see life steadily and see it whole, or, as the philosopher might say, to bring the world into the unity of a single conception, Herder insisted, certainly for the first time with any fulness, that throughout all their efforts to realise the ideal men and nations were dependent on their physical surroundings. In the primitive age the very form and direction of their thoughts, their language, poetry, and religion were as natural and spontaneous as the instincts of the lower animals. It is a significant fact that he began his chief work with a description of the earth as a part of the universe, and then went on to describe the growth of vegetation, of organic life, of the first beginnings of sensation and intelligence. Just as history was the process by which mankind fulfilled its high destiny and developed that ideal of Humanity which it followed, so nature could be properly understood only as a preparatory process, in which lower organisms led to higher, the crystal to the plant, the plant to the animal, the animal to the spiritual being in man. What is especially interesting in this connection is that he offered suggestions which seem to be astonishing anticipations of later theories. He spoke of sensation as developing through various mechanical stages from mere irritation. He only just missed the phrase "struggle for existence," and only just fell short of the idea of natural selection, although he conceived all animals as keeping within their several types. He declared in so many words that to his thinking "there is no psychology possible which is not at every step definite physiology." Above all, we find him busied with the problem of the origin of speech, and seeing in advance how large a part it would play



in the natural science of the future. The older he became, the more, indeed, did he turn to natural science as the key to accurate knowledge and fruitful discovery. He was well aware that his chief work suffered from the lack of more accurate knowledge, and he admitted in his preface that a true philosophy of human history could not be written perhaps for hundreds of years. But nevertheless he had a firm hold on the scientific principle that necessity and law reign everywhere, alike in the physical domain and in history. "The God whom I seek in history," he declared, "must be the same who is in nature, for man is only a small part of the whole, and is everywhere interwoven with it."

There were plenty of critics in his own day, as there will be plenty in ours, to call him a materialist—a name, as we know, which is less often a description than a term of reproach or even of abuse. Like much other reproach and abuse it is indiscriminating. In Herder's case as elsewhere the critics failed and still fail to recognise that a man may accept the mechanical interpretation of nature, may believe, too, that mind, so far as our knowledge goes, is inseparably linked with matter, and yet not believe that all the phenomena of life and mind can be reduced to matter or its properties and relations. The material and mechanical interpretation is the method of physical science and is applicable without exception to all physical phenomena, but it does not explain any reality that may lie behind them. It is not incompatible with an idealistic or teleological interpretation, for mechanism may serve a purpose and matter may be the means by which an ideal is realised.<sup>1</sup> That a purpose is servable and an ideal realisable is, indeed, the foundation of all morality, all art, and all religion. The view that a higher intelligence than ours might perceive the inner identity of the mechanical and teleological interpretations of nature was expressed by Kant in his *Critique of Judg-*

<sup>1</sup> This great problem can hardly be stated intelligibly in a couple of sentences, and perhaps I may be allowed to refer the reader to an attempt which I have made to state it in a volume called *The Quest of Faith*, ch. v.

*ment*, but it was previously expressed in a much profounder form by Herder, and it is the leading idea of his philosophy of history. "The force," he said, "which thinks and works in me is in its nature as eternal as that which holds suns and stars together. The instrument may, like the stars, wear out, but the laws by which they all exist and re-appear in other forms never change ; . . . for all existence is identical and an indivisible concept." This combination of a material and an ideal conception which Herder tried to see in nature and history has remained, I need hardly say, to our time and will yet come by its own.

It was unfortunate that this desire for unity of thought led him into acute conflict with Kant. He saw in the severe intellectualism, sceptical tendencies, and apparent disregard of emotion which distinguished the critical philosophy, much to condemn. He could not share the view that man's highest duty was to develop a freedom opposed to nature, nor did he believe that the existence of a God ought to depend on the mere postulate of a practical as distinguished from a pure reason. He denied that the mind could be split up into any such different agencies, or that, if reason existed at all, there could be any ground for doubting the existence of a Supreme Reason. From this he passed by an easy step to his general conception of the relation of this Supreme Reason to the universe. Drawing on Spinoza, whom he helped to rescue from an ignominious neglect, he proclaimed that every physical law was a mode of the Divine Order. But as Kant observed, he tempered his Spinozism. He made room for the conception, taken from Leibnitz, and altered in the taking, that there were independent organic forces operating in matter. These he regarded as also expressions of the universal energy, the Supreme Reason which was also the purest Will—a belief, he said, which, "if we would not accept it from St John, we may at least accept from the doubtless still more divine Spinoza." Here all his speculations on poetry and history, science and philosophy, found their meeting-point ; for if the



happiness of men and nations lay in pursuing a moral and intellectual ideal, and if in its pursuit they were at once an end for themselves and a means for others, it was in this ideal that the lineaments of the Divine Order might be discerned. His ardent faith, difficult as it may be in all the seeming confusion of the world, was that nature and history were thus combined in one vast Harmony as the manifestation of God.

Of the impression which these high thoughts and aspirations made on Herder's contemporaries I could not speak in detail without a review of the whole literature of his age. Let it suffice if I quote the testimony of the man who was best fitted to testify. Goethe declared that Herder's thoughts had been so extensively borrowed, and had become so rapidly part of the general stock of knowledge, that in a short time they seemed to be commonplaces. He himself highly appreciated the *Ideas for a Philosophy of Human History*; he read it, he said, again and again as the most congenial of gospels. We might gather, perhaps, from such praise that the personal relations between the author of this work and his contemporaries were of the most intimate character, and that he was everywhere regarded with affection and esteem. But alas! for human weakness, the desire to be worthy of these high thoughts, however sincerely and devoutly cherished, was linked with an excessive sense of personal superiority to others which others did not always share, with a love of teasing and mocking which hurt his friends, and with a domineering temper which commonly ended by leading them to avoid his society altogether. Goethe also tells us that Herder, soft as was his heart, had a strenuous, impatient and captious spirit, and that he was fonder of disgusting people with their performances than of encouraging them. But what was worse, he has given us to understand that Herder was ungrateful, and not only ungrateful but endowed with what he aptly calls a repugnance to gratitude—a rare phenomenon, as he adds, occurring only in men born in humble or helpless circumstances, who

conscious of great gifts have to fight their way step by step and accept any assistance offered them. They come to be annoyed at benefits of a material kind, especially when conferred by dull people, because they cannot consent to regard their own achievements, which belong to a higher sphere, as any fit compensation. With the warmth of his heart Herder could overcome this and other failings for a time, and fascinate even a Goethe with the wide range of his knowledge and the still wider range of his imagination ; but the failings re-appeared when trouble and anxiety came upon him. The prophet of Humanity had a wife and many children, a small income, debts which he could not always discharge, and continued ill-health. Much was done for him, but he discovered still more that was not done. Compelled in his youth to live on a crust a day, he nursed pretensions and assumed rights which gradually proved to be intolerable. His ambitions—and they were many—often made him forget to be even civil to those who had helped him. He was always too ready to impose his opinions with what he himself may have felt to be zeal but his enemies resented as arrogance. There was much in the life of the Court at Weimar, much, too, in Goethe's life, which he was forced to disapprove ; and he was not very wise in the way in which he expressed his disapproval. He also fell a prey to the debilitating reflection that men to whom he thought himself superior both in knowledge and in conduct were gaining more favour from the world than they deserved, or at any rate than he was gaining himself ; and he saw, with a feeling which it is difficult to put to his credit, the growing friendship between Goethe and Schiller, and the mutual advantage which that harmonious partnership proved to both of them. Finally, in spite of early obligations, his criticism of Kant degenerated into a tirade, which was all the more violent because Kant had spoken of the unscientific character of his researches and his tendency to substitute imaginary analogies for strict proofs. When he died in his sixtieth year he left to posterity the spectacle of the historian



of all the ages lacking the wisdom sufficient for his own day, and the critic gifted with a fine feeling for beauty and merit in the past belittling in the present one of the first philosophers and one of the first poets that the world has seen.

To be frank, then, the man himself is less edifying than his work. He does indeed make us wish to learn something about his actual life, to follow the familiar intercourse which he enjoyed at times with his great contemporaries, and to trace from book to book the heroic enthusiasm in which, also at times, he laboured for noble ends. But, when all is said, he does not seem to be numbered among those who speak to us out of the past by the mere power of their personality. A strong, and if the testimony of both friends and enemies be accepted, a commanding personality he had, coupled with a certain explosive energy which led Wieland to speak of him as an electric cloud. With those who came into touch with him it at first helped to awaken and spread the reputation which he won by his books; yet it was not of the kind that, transfigured by death, ensures its possessor the continued interest and sometimes the affection of posterity.

The result of his many conflicting emotions was that Herder's life was often very miserable. Most of his friendships issued in estrangements. He seemed incapable of living on equal terms with his fellow-men, or of adopting for any length of time any other attitude but that of a schoolmaster. Unless he was revered and obeyed he was uncomfortable. The only certain personal relation which he preserved throughout was that with his wife; and had it not been for her sympathy he would, in my opinion at least, have done much less than he did. But, apart from personal relations, he had the gnawing sense that he had missed his aim, and that he had missed it largely because he was bound in the fetters of a system which he could not accept. It was his particular misfortune to have been placed in a position where his knowledge and his genius were at issue with the creed which he was expected to profess, and where he could not say what he would. It was

a position which was not uncommon in his day, and is certainly not less uncommon now, but it neither was nor is of a kind to confer happiness. In a word, he was a clergyman appointed to teach and preach particular doctrines, and dependent for his living on doing so, and yet all the while profoundly conscious that so far as he understood those doctrines at all or believed them, he understood and believed them in one sense and most of his congregation accepted them in another. There is a pathetic touch in his suggestion that every man at death ought to leave a written statement of the things in life which he took to be mere show or deliberate farce, but from fear of consequences could never openly denounce. We should benefit, he declared in his grim fashion, by putting them off when we put on our shroud. The trouble, as one of his German exponents puts it—I cannot but believe correctly—was that Herder wanted to think freely, and he found himself president of an ecclesiastical assembly. That he felt this inward tension keenly was honourable to him, but that the tension probably shortened his life is easy to believe. He spoke once of a subtle form of suicide of which only the elect were capable—the men who, nursing a high ideal and straining after it with irresistible desire, see it dashed to pieces before their eyes. Men of this kind, he said, hide their trouble from their friends, and keeping the sad secret in their heart die a slow death.

But Herder's work was greater than he knew. I need not again refer to the strength which he added to the partly religious and partly scientific creed known as Pantheism. We must remember that Lessing, and in a deeper sense Goethe, also helped the spread of that creed. Nor need I dwell on the fact that, by insisting on the natural development of all that is good and noble in human life he gave a new basis to humanitarian morals. His supreme gift was his feeling for the past and his understanding of it. By the exercise of this gift he prepared the way, more effectually, perhaps, than any of his contemporaries, for that outburst of



thought and emotion — vast, complex, many-sided, full of glowing hopes and enchanting ideals, full, too, of much patient research and profound speculation—which we know, vaguely enough but still expressively, as the Romantic movement. Here, as his countrymen say, is his epoch-making work; and whatever use the future may yet find for his ideas and suggestions, certain it is that he brought to the study of history a new meaning and a new value.

There are a good many people, I imagine, who still think that history has no meaning. They would be ready to endorse the opinion which Schopenhauer sometimes held, that all the changes in the world have only been fresh combinations of the same facts, like the shapes taken by the bits of glass in a kaleidoscope—interesting, doubtless, but exhibiting no trace of orderly development. On the other hand, there is the view suggested by Herder and worked out with some divergence by Hegel, that history is the progress and the realisation of an ideal in accordance with law. Again, there is the theory, most fully put into practice by Carlyle, that it is the personality and character of great men, appearing suddenly like new stars, but of an origin beyond our power of calculation, that controls the destinies of the race. I cannot here go into this complicated question, further than to point out that it assumed no shape in the nineteenth century, and can hardly assume any in the twentieth, that does not stand in close relation with one or other of Herder's speculations. Throughout them all he never lost sight of the principle of evolution, and, as I have already said, he seemed on the very verge of suggesting some of the methods of it which were fully explained and widely accepted only after the labours and the research of two generations of later thinkers. We are so accustomed to regard evolution as one of the great facts of nature, although we understand no more than its exterior aspects and conditions, that only with an effort can we realise how strange the application of this principle, not only to all natural but also to all historical phenomena,

must have seemed to the Rationalists of his age. To its application everywhere Herder gave a mighty impulse, and the way in which he used it in explaining the products of thought and emotion is not yet exhausted. Although the claim that he was the first in this field is subject to some reservations; although many of his ideas have been corrected; although much has been done to extend and deepen his view of the unity of all human interests, and although that view was eclipsed for a long time by the predominance of the critical and transcendental philosophy, we can at least agree with his countrymen when they say that he was the first to show clearly that it is not abstract reasoning but patient inquiry into origin and growth that is the most profitable means of approaching the vast problems of civilisation and religion. We may even go further and agree with them when they tell us, with a touch of justifiable pride, that he was the earliest writer to give articulate expression to the modern German way of looking at knowledge, the earliest to exhibit what they recognise, and what we, too, must recognise, as their special contribution to the mental equipment of the nineteenth century—I mean, of course, *the historical sense*. In so many words they declare that to Herder may be traced something at least of the work done by all the great Germans who came after him, and that he it was who gave the most effective stimulus to that general tendency to inquire, that spirit of *Forschung*, which was continued and developed in many different directions by Goethe, in philosophy by Hegel and Lotze, in history by Niebuhr and Ranke, in theology by Strauss and Baur, in law by Savigny, in natural science by Baer and the brothers Humboldt—a tendency, as we know, which has spread over the civilised world, is still in full progress, and is producing effects, especially in the domain of religion, which we are only just, perhaps, beginning to appreciate to the full.

If this is Herder's reputation in his own country, if he can be regarded there as the prophet of so much of the spirit of



the nineteenth century, it might at first blush seem a matter of certainty that he should be well known and honoured elsewhere. Yet such is clearly not the case. For this, however, three or four reasons at once suggest themselves. In the first place, his style is turgid, diffuse, disconnected, pretentious; and in literature, as we know, nothing lives but style. If the Germans, who are not very exacting in this respect, can no longer read him, and indeed soon ceased to read him, how can other nations be expected to do so? Secondly, there is the fact, which Goethe noted, that Herder's thoughts passed almost at once into the current literature of his day, and so in a few years were no longer recognised as new. Then, again, all his books are unfinished, and many of his statements were soon found to be inaccurate. Further, the very Teutonic character of his imagination, the vague conjecture, the tendency to substitute guess for observation—however often the guess may look inspired—has prevented him from being wholly acceptable to the French with their love of precise theory and their respect for logic, or to ourselves with our practical sense and our conservative caution. He has, of course, had admirers among both nations. Madame de Staël talked and wrote about him. A translation of his *Ideas* was made by Edgar Quinet, who became an ardent disciple. Cousin hailed the volume as a great monument to the perpetual progress of mankind, and Michelet referred to it with admiration. But, on the other hand, in the works of Comte, where Herder's influence might be expected to be visible, there is little or none; and, beyond a stray article or two in a magazine and a volume of literary criticism, nothing has been published since which would lead us to believe that he has attained to any great fame in France. Nor has he met any better fate among ourselves. At first he was treated with contempt. When he died one of our leading reviews at the moment scorned the notion that "such extravagant opinions as his, conveyed in an obscure jargon made up of new and fanciful terms, and frequently at variance with

revealed religion, could be very acceptable to an English public." As we learn from his English biographer, Mr Nevins, a verdict of a similar kind was expressed in even more explicit terms by Coleridge. In treating of German literature Carlyle mentioned his name, although without much interest, and Buckle seemed to be content with one or two quotations. Some of us may have read his views on schools and education with profit, and here and there a solitary student may still turn to his volume of *Ideas*, or his *Spirit of Hebrew Poetry*, or his free rendering of the *Romance of the Cid*. But to be candid, his own verses have neither the strength nor the music to attract us, and for the reasons given there is something in the method of his philosophy that, profound in some respects as that philosophy may yet prove, leaves us cold to its enthusiasm.

Have we, then, done Herder justice? However largely the nineteenth century may have seen his aspirations realised, or whatever the twentieth may find in them, is there nothing that he can tell us to our advantage to-day?

Let us look at his view of theology. Have we nothing to learn from the fact that his theology, in any high sense, was simply his philosophy—a kind of Pantheism which left room for individual effort as one of the manifestations of the eternal energy; or that it included so eager an interest in all natural phenomena and their laws that it may also be said to be his knowledge of nature as well? We know, too, how he discovered it in its simplest form in primitive poetry and mythology; and how Hebrew poetry, in particular, which in his view was the oldest and most natural poetry in the world, was the first theological effort of a people who of all peoples were most conscious of the divine. We may perhaps regard these suggestions as vague, but, if theology in any new and widened conception of it is ever to regain its old position as queen of the sciences, they are suggestions which may still be turned to good. Moreover, it was no abstract or colourless Pantheism that he wanted. "If Spinoza," he declared,



“had lived a hundred years later, had been freed from Descartes’ influence, and had philosophised with a better theory of nature and more knowledge of its history, what a different shape his abstract philosophy would have taken ! To explain the laws of nature and not trouble about the particular intentions of the Deity ; to show how those laws operate, and how by the combination of active forces in such and no other organs the phenomena of the world appear and live and act according to an inner necessity—this would produce the best possible love and veneration of God.”

To him religion was acquiescence in the Divine Order ; it was “our intimate consciousness of what we are *as portions of the world* and of what we as men ought to *be and do*.” It came by no other revelation than could be seen in the natural education of the race, working through human reason and emotion, more especially in great minds, and bringing men to this consciousness of their highest interest. It was out of the reach of mere rationalism or any critical philosophy ; it was a matter of the heart and of immediate apprehension.

His attitude towards Christianity, dogmatic systems, and the Bible, was equally significant, and may still be instructive. To him, as to Lessing, Christ’s religion and not Christianity was what we ought to profess—an assertion which, embodying as it may a necessary historical distinction, does not seem to fit in with any consistent theory of development, such as he might have been expected to hold, in anticipation, indeed, of a common tendency nowadays. On the other hand, he was far from regarding development as uniform. He had only to look at history to see that over and over again in religion as in other things the course taken was backward. To him, too, ecclesiastical doctrine was only the husk in which the kernel was kept alive, and he was driven to regard the husk as a pious fraud again and again renewed. To explain how doctrine arose ; to show that it read new senses into old words and banished or obscured their original meaning ; to prove that it was the outcome of fantasy and speculation on matters beyond our ken ; to insist that it could never usurp the place of faith, this, he said, would be the true process of enlightenment.

“What might not a good history of dogma teach us ! What shadows from that magic lantern would not pass before eyes. . . . Dogmatics is nothing

but history of dogma—to bring out the philological, the historical, and the philosophical aspect of every single dogma, and then show how it is employed in our own time, how instructive and profitable that would be !”

Here, again, we have a suggestion which has been carried out in many directions since he and others made it. How much it has done, and how much it has yet to do, in our whole conception of theology !

Once more : regarding *humanity* as the final cause of nature he could not discover anything but what was natural and true in the purest religion of humanity that the earth had seen, the religion which acknowledges that all men are brothers and conceives God as their Father.

“Christ was the spiritual Saviour of the race, who aimed at creating sons of God, so that they might co-operate in the design of Providence to promote truth and goodness among men. What other ideal could men have of their happiness and perfection on earth but this ideal of humanity which is always active ?”

Consistently with this view of the religion of humanity in its highest form, Herder bade us read the Bible in a human way, forestalling Jowett’s maxim, “Interpret the Scriptures like any other book.” He himself saw in the Old Testament a collection of popular poems, mythologies and histories, and he constantly spoke of local and national legends in connection with it ; but he did so in the firm conviction that they were the natural and necessary expression of the religious consciousness attained by the ancient Hebrews. His position as general superintendent of the Weimar churches made a similar view about the New Testament difficult or even dangerous to pronounce, but the longer he lived the more confidently did he suggest that the task of the historian was to free Christ’s teaching from the mass of contemporary superstition and legendary accretion which had so soon obscured it.

We continue in such a chaos of opinion on these great questions that Herder’s view of them, expressed more than a hundred years ago, will still divide those who may read him into opposite camps. To both sides, however, he can still utter a potent word : “Theology is a liberal study, and does not require that a man shall make a slave of his soul.”

T. BAILEY SAUNDERS.



## THE TWO IDEALISMS.

W. R. SORLEY, M.A., LL.D.,

Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge.

IN Adamson's *Development of Modern Philosophy* (i. 57) the fundamental principle of Idealism is said to consist in assigning an "existential character" to truth, and in regarding "objects of intellectual apprehension as constituting a realm of existence over against which the world of concrete facts stands in inexplicable opposition." This view is clearly derived from Plato, and through him became traditional in the schools as the doctrine of the real existence of ideas or universals. A single passage may be referred to, as representative of this view, from the introduction to the systematic exposition of the ideal theory in the *Republic* (v. 476-7). In this passage it is said that beauty and deformity, justice and injustice, good and evil, and all other ideas are each of them one thing, although "by union with actions and bodies and one another, each appears to be many." And these ideas, it is said, are apprehended by knowledge, whereas the apprehension of sights and sounds and sensible objects generally is called opinion merely; and when a man knows, what he knows, namely, the idea, is something ( $\tau\acute{\iota}$ ), and this something is or has being ( $\delta\upsilon$ ).

On the other hand, a quite different statement is commonly given of the fundamental proposition of Idealism. It is said to consist in the assertion that reality is spiritual, that all existence has its centre and being in mind. "Idealism," as Kant puts

it,<sup>1</sup> "consists in the assertion that there are none but thinking beings." To the same effect is the recent statement of Professor Royce: "Every idealist holds . . . that all that is is the expression of the spirit."<sup>2</sup> This mode of statement is probably due to the influence of Berkeley more than to that of any other philosopher; and accordingly Berkeley's phrase "*esse is percipi*" is sometimes taken as expressing the essence of the idealist position. This, however, is apt to mislead. Berkeley never used "*esse is percipi*" as expressing his philosophical position, nor did he use the general formula at all. It was only of "sensible things" that he said "their *esse* is *percipi*."<sup>3</sup> For him the ultimate nature of reality is not passive but active. It is true that "the very existence of an *unthinking being* consists in *being perceived*." But "*thing or being*" is a general name which "comprehends under it two kinds, entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing but the name in common, viz., *spirits* and *ideas*"; and the latter are "dependent beings, which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in, minds or spiritual substances."<sup>4</sup>

According to this view, therefore, reality is mental; material things, in so far as they are not apprehended by mind, are nothing at all; in so far as they are objects of mental apprehension, they are what Berkeley calls ideas, and their existence is dependent upon mind; the ultimate reality is minds or spirits. But, according to the first or primary form of Idealism, objects of intellectual apprehension, or what Plato calls ideas, are themselves real. There is thus a clear *prima facie* difference between the two views. Both may be said to have their origin in opposition to the naïve Realism of common-sense—the assumption that the objects of sense perception, or what are called material things, are the real. But the opposition is carried out in different ways. The contention of the first form of Idealism is that objects of sense-perception are

<sup>1</sup> *Prolegomena*, § 13.

<sup>2</sup> *The World and the Individual*, ii. 246.

<sup>3</sup> *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, §§ 88–89.



constantly changing, and that the faculty by which they are apprehended varies from individual to individual, and from moment to moment ; whereas the ideas are said to be eternal and unchanging, and to be apprehended by a true knowledge which is free from the variability of sense. The ideas are therefore said to have a reality which sense-objects do not possess. The reasons for this conclusion thus seem to be drawn from two sources : from the different natures of the objects apprehended, and from the different modes of subjective apprehension. The constancy of true knowledge distinguishes the apprehension of ideas from sense-apprehension, which is variable. But the mere fact that both the ideas and sense-objects are subjectively apprehended does not enter into the argument. Plato would be giving up his case if he said that the reality of the ideas depended upon their being apprehended by the mind. Apart from other reasons against this solution, it would only bring the ideas into line with the objects of sense. On the other hand, the argument which supports the second form of Idealism is different, and has a different issue. It is based entirely on the reference to subjective apprehension or to consciousness : what we perceive is object of perception ; what we think is object of thought ; whatever we say 'is' is either mind or dependent upon mind ; reality is spiritual.

In their initial statement, therefore, at the least, the two views differ both as to what they assert to be the true nature of reality and in the reasons given for their assertions. We have to inquire how they have come to be regarded as identical and to be called by the same name, and what their relation to one another is.

In considering the identification of the two views, I do not intend to enter into any historical detail, but only to point out the logical steps which seem to be required to make the transition from one to the other valid. These necessary steps may, I think, be distinguished. The first form of doctrine consists in the assertion of eternal realities called ideas, and apprehended by a true faculty of knowledge. There is no

suggestion, at this stage, of this true faculty of knowledge being a divine or infinite reason. It is the reason which is in every man, and which can be reached by sifting the contents of his mind; and it apprehends a reality which is not dependent upon the human mind for its existence. In order to identify this reality with spiritual or mental existence three steps (it seems to me) require to be taken:

In the first place, the ideas themselves, though eternally real, cannot be without mutual relation; otherwise we should be left with a multiplicity comparable to the multiplicity of sense; they must be articulated into a system. In this system unity must be sought and may be discovered. The order of the whole ideal world may, perhaps, in this way, be found in and expressed by a single idea, such as the Good-itself of Plato.

The second step is the most momentous. It is led up to by the assertion of the unity of the ideas which constitute real being; but it goes beyond this assertion. As the ideas are known more or less dimly, more or less mixed with appearance, by our intelligence, so the whole system of ideas is regarded as clearly before one divine intelligence.

Yet a third step remains to complete the process. If the system of ideas is present to the divine mind, it cannot be present to it just in the same way as the ideas are present to human minds. Even if the existence of human minds is not limited to their appearance in bodily organisms, they have at least their periods of forgetfulness, during which the ideas are not present to them; so that the existence of ideas cannot depend upon the existence of human minds. But no reason is conceivable for asserting that the ideas are present to a divine mind at one time and not present to it at another. If, then, there is a supreme or divine mind to which the ideas are present, they must be eternally present to it. And therefore this presence of the ideas to the divine mind or reason cannot be understood to be of the same nature as their presence to finite minds. The being of the ideas will not be independent



of that infinite reason or mind in the way in which it is independent of finite reason or finite minds. God will be conceived as either the cause of the ideas, or as identical with that highest idea in which the whole system of being is summed up and explained. From this point of view Reason may be said to be creative: God is the cause — or, perhaps better, the ‘ground’ — of the ideas. In this way reality comes to be identified with mind, or, to use the term which Kant has made common, with self-consciousness.

By these steps we may pass from the first form of Idealism to the second—from the view that reality consists in ideas or “objects of intellectual apprehension,” to the view that reality is spiritual. It is also true that what is essential in each step may be found in Plato himself, and reappears in almost all the great thinkers, Greek and medieval and early modern, who followed out the line of thought upon which Plato was the first to enter. And thus it may easily appear that the assertion of the reality of the ideas is identical with, or comes to the same thing as, the assertion that reality is spiritual. In this lies the explanation of the fact that the two forms of Idealism are not commonly distinguished from one another, and that it is the second form that is prominent in modern thought. But, before accepting the conclusion that the two views are essentially the same, only differently expressed and approached from different sides, we must take account of certain considerations connected with the transition from the one view to the other—a process which has been described, but which has not been shown or said to be logical.

The question is whether, having started with the first form of doctrine, we are logically compelled to take the steps which lead to the other form of doctrine. The steps in this transition have been enumerated; and it is the second of these steps which is most important, for it takes us on to entirely new ground. To begin with, the ideas are said to be known, not as mental ‘states’ or modifications, but as realities eternally existing independently of the changes and chances of human

apprehension. As, however, the ideas are known (although inadequately) by man's reason, the conclusion was drawn that they have their place (no longer inadequately known) in the divine reason. But this conclusion holds only if one important position be first of all reached or assumed. If God, a supreme or infinite reason, exists, then perhaps the ideas may be inferred to be His ideas. And it is because the being of God is commonly assumed that the inference seems so easy.

Yet the assumption in this connection must be met by reflection. If God is, then it is clear, to start with, that the ultimate explanation of the universe, that which in the fullest sense is, is spirit, reason, or mind; and that ideas, and whatever else may be said to be, must depend for their being upon God. In this sense, then, "*esse is percipi*" may be a fair statement of the truth as to the existence of what is not mind; all such things (including the ideas) will consist in some relation to or dependence upon a spiritual principle or God. But this view is altogether independent of Idealism in its primary meaning, in which the existence of the ideas was not held to depend upon their being known. It results directly from the assertion of God as the supreme reality upon which all other being depends.

On the other hand, if the being of God be not assumed (or arrived at on grounds independent of the Ideal theory), then the question arises whether the assertion of Idealism in its first form is of such a nature as to lead logically to the assertion of God. And this question can only be answered by considering, again, the exact assertions made by this form of Idealism. These assertions may be said to be two—a negative proposition and an affirmative. The negative proposition is a denial that the so-called material things apprehended by sense are real. Reality does not consist in the tables and chairs and houses, hills and rivers and trees and animal bodies, sun and moon and heavenly bodies, nor in anything else which is apprehended by sense-perception. The affirmative proposition is



that the things that are real can be apprehended by intellect alone, sensation only obscuring our view of them. How these real beings, called ideas, are to be enumerated and classified is a question to which idealists, ancient and modern, have given different answers. Into these differences we need not enter. It is enough that the ideas thus asserted to be real are not sensible but intelligible objects — universals: the particular passes; the universal remains, is eternal. Nor will it make any difference for our purposes if reality is said to belong to the universal, not in itself as a thing apart, but in its union with particulars. This is a point of fundamental importance for the elaboration of the Ideal theory; but it does not simplify, nor indeed in any way affect, the transition from the assertion of the ideas to the assertion of the divine mind.

The question remains, Does the assertion that reality or being belongs to universal, intelligible, objects, and not to particular, sensible, objects, bring us any nearer to the conclusion that God is, or to the vaguer conclusion that reality is spiritual? I see no logical reason for asserting that it does so. We are inclined to think that it does only because we can't get out of our heads the view that these ideas or universals are mental contents, and therefore mental or spiritual in nature. But that is not the view of Plato, nor of anyone who adopts the first form of Idealism. It is, indeed, the view which this form of Idealism starts by denying. You and I have the faculty of knowing these ideas; but the existence of the ideas is not dependent upon our knowing them. There is, accordingly, no reason as yet for saying that their existence implies or requires a spiritual ground or mind. We know that they are, and that their being is independent of us and our knowledge. So far as this point (that is, their implication of mind) goes, the ideas of Plato or any other adherent of the first form of Idealism are just in the same position as the atoms of Democritus or any materialist. The latter are apprehended by us; but their existence does not depend on our apprehension: they are even asserted to be eternal realities, just as the

ideas are said to be eternal realities. Why, then, should we conclude that the ideas imply an eternal apprehending mind any more than the atoms? If we say, what most recent writers say who have reflected on the general theory of science, that the atoms are conceptual and dependent on mind, we may base upon this a spiritual view of reality; but, in doing so, we shall have distinguished this spiritual view of reality sharply from Idealism in its primary signification.

The point needs to be enforced—for there may be a certain unwillingness to grant it—that if these ideas which we say we know are eternal realities, they cannot be in any way dependent on our knowing them; and thus it seems gratuitous to assert that they must exist in an eternal mind, when we have not as yet established the reality of such eternal mind.

Accordingly, we are forced to conclude that, while it may be possible that, without ideas, the rational mind would vanish for lack of objects, the ideas themselves are not similarly dependent upon mind. It is much nearer the truth to say that ideas make mind than that mind makes ideas. There does not seem to be any logical ground for denying that the ideas may exist altogether apart from mind. The universe, on this view, would consist of ideas, eternally existing and somehow united in a system, but not present to any eternal self-consciousness. Even if this system of ideas were held to centre in one highest idea—like the Platonic Good-itself—by reference to which the whole universe of being would require to be interpreted, that would in no way imply the assertion of self-consciousness or reason as belonging to this highest idea, and the spiritual nature of reality would not be vindicated.

There is only one way in which this result can be avoided, and that is by introducing mind or self-consciousness somewhere in the hierarchy of ideas which is also the scale of reality. The most obvious way of doing this is by maintaining that the highest idea is itself just Spirit, that is to say, God. That this course has been taken is true. How it can be defended demonstratively is quite another question. But



suppose, for the moment, that we have somehow reached this conclusion. Either the other ideas are dependent for their reality on the highest idea, or they are not. If they are not, the ideas with which we start are eternal realities independent of mind, and God is a hypothesis which we do not need. Whatever such a view may be, it is not the Idealism of Plato or Descartes or Hegel. When once the highest idea has been reached, we must be able to turn round and show how all other ideas are dependent upon it. God, once found, must be the source of all reality to its outmost verge. The ideas with which we started must therefore be dependent upon spirit or self-consciousness: only in and through it can they be real. And this result will require a revision of our premisses. Even if we continue to say that the ideas cognised by us are independent of our consciousness, we must hold that they are dependent upon the eternal consciousness: that the ideas of beauty, truth, and the like are not, after all, independent realities, but only factors in, or parts of, the content of infinite mind. From the first, therefore, they must have involved that reference to a subject which, at the outset, they were assumed not to need.

If this process of thought were shown to be logical, the first form of Idealism would at the same time be shown to pass into the second form. But we should also have to allow that the ideas with which our inquiry started were not independent realities, although they were eternal realities: that they implied all along a reference to an infinite subject, of which we were at first unaware, but the necessity of which became evident to us at some point or other in our study of the system of the ideas.

Perhaps all the foregoing account of the first form of Idealism may be set aside as a bit of Scholasticism. It assumes that the idea and my thought of the idea are different, whereas (it may be said) modern Idealism never makes this distinction. Reality (it says) is to be found not in ideas which are something distinct from thought, though cognised by

thought, but in thought itself. 'Ideas,' in modern usage, are just thoughts—'acts' or 'states' of consciousness. I do not think that the view previously referred to is dead. Even if it has been dormant for a time, it shows now some signs of vitality—or of resurrection. And I have taken account of it not only because of its importance in modern as well as in ancient thought, but also because it admits of clear and intelligible statement. But I find much greater difficulty in making quite clear to myself the meaning of this modified doctrine which must now be considered; for it seems to start with an identification of the state or act of consciousness with its object.

According to this view—to quote a recent definition<sup>1</sup>—reality is "a system of thought-determinations." If by this is meant that reality consists of the determinations of my thought, then the doctrine is intelligible enough. It is an Idealism of the second form (that is, a Spiritualism), and that species of it which is called Subjective Idealism. If, again, the thought-determinations are held to be those of an Infinite Spirit or God, then also the view is quite intelligible—though there may be some difficulty in showing how we come to know God's thoughts. It is still an Idealism of the second form (that is, a Spiritualism), and that species of it which is called Absolute Idealism. In either case thought itself is not hypostatized: it is nothing without a thinker.

The system elaborated by Hegel is of this kind. Thought and thought-determinations have for him no reality apart from spirit. He makes clear, at the outset of his argument, that the thought which penetrates into reality is a mental act. "The real nature of the object," he says,<sup>2</sup> "is brought to light in reflection; but it is no less true that this exertion of thought is *my* act. If this be so, the real nature is a *product* of *my* mind, in its character of thinking subject." The whole dialectic is a series of thought-determinations which seek to comprehend

<sup>1</sup> Mackenzie, *Outlines of Metaphysics*, p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> *Encyklopädie*, § 23 (Wallace's Translation).



this real nature; but this comprehension is completed only in the Absolute Idea, which is Spirit. If we call reality, as Hegel conceived it, a "system of thought-determinations," we have to bear in mind two things: in the first place, that it is my thought which penetrates into this system; and in the second place, that only the Absolute Idea in which it terminates has independent reality: all the other thought-determinations are one-sided, and, as expressions of reality, self-contradictory; their truth lies simply in the degree in which they express the Absolute Idea or Spirit. All reality is spirit; and what we commonly mistake for reality is a partial or one-sided aspect of spirit.

There is therefore no difficulty in classifying the Hegelian system. It is an Absolute Idealism which might just as well be called Absolute Spiritualism. To describe such a view of the universe as a "system of thought-determinations" is, I think, misleading; for that phrase suggests that "thought-determinations" explain reality without themselves needing explanation.

It is this latter species of Idealism—in which the thought-determinations are spoken of as if they were determinations neither of my thought nor of your thought nor of God's thought, but just of thought—that I find puzzling. It is not Idealism of the first form, for the ideas are simply thoughts; it does not seem to be Idealism of the second form, for the dependence of these thoughts on subject mind or spirit is, if not denied, kept out of sight. The reasons which have led to this modified view may perhaps be suggested. The idealistic philosophy which succeeded Kant was, like Kant's own thought, centred in self-consciousness; and Hegel, in particular, recognised both the implication of the individual thinker in the activity of thought, and the dependence of objective reality upon the Absolute Idea or Spirit. Now, in the first place, this dependence of reality upon spirit may not be expressly denied by the writers who speak of thought-determinations as constituting the universe; and, in so far as it is admitted by

them, they are really Idealists of the second form, or Spiritualists. But it is not often that full confidence is felt in the validity of the whole method by which Hegel reaches his result; and, in the case of some writers, there is diminished confidence as to the validity of the result itself. These writers are not so certain as Hegel was that only spirit really is, that all other things are but incomplete expressions or aspects of spirit. Yet they work with thought-determinations much as he did; but they treat them as having a reality independent of mind, such as he did not ascribe to them. In the second place, they refuse to look upon these thought-determinations as acts or states of the individual thinking mind. That solution seems to them shut off by the psychologists who have analysed the finite self into sequences and complexes of changing states. From the thought-determinations, or thoughts, or ideas, with which their inquiry begins, the reference to a thinking self is excluded, on the implied or expressed ground that the self is (or may turn out to be) a composite product, and itself just the result of such thoughts or ideas.

When the doctrine is approached in this way, the intellectualist emphasis implied in the term 'thought-determinations' may appear uncalled for, and a more colourless phrase would seem more appropriate. Thus, instead of our first (and perhaps final) reality being described as thought (without a thinker), many writers prefer to use a more general term, and talk of experience (without a subject) or psychical facts (without a psyche). And in this way the doctrine is brought more or less nearly into line with the Presentationism of J. S. Mill and other thinkers, with whom the Idealists of last generation carried on a pretty constant controversy.

This view is relevant to our present inquiry only in so far as it is an essential part of a system which is professedly idealist. To illustrate it I will refer to a recent work in which an idealist view of the world has been worked out with great logical skill and in attractive style. In his two volumes on *The*



*World and the Individual*, Professor Royce has set forth a system of Absolute Idealism which, like Hegel's, may be called an Absolute Spiritualism. With his conclusion and its applications I am not at present concerned, but rather with his starting-point and argument. For he professes to start simply with ideas and their objects, and he has done what is sometimes omitted by metaphysicians: he has given an account of the steps in the argument which lead to his conclusion. In these preliminary steps, it is obvious, the conclusion itself ought not to be assumed. And it is from his premisses that I should like to illustrate the view under consideration.

The result finally arrived at by Professor Royce is that "the only reality" is "the actual conscious fulfilment of meaning."<sup>1</sup> And this conclusion may be said to be simply the more complete statement of the definition with which he begins, when he says that an idea is "any state of consciousness . . . which when present is then and there viewed as at least the partial expression or embodiment of a single conscious purpose."<sup>2</sup> The idea, that is to say, is not the *mere* content immediately present in consciousness; its meaning is at the same time a purpose which goes beyond the immediate content. This meaning may be distinguished into two kinds, internal and external. The internal meaning is "the conscious inner purpose embodied in a given idea."<sup>3</sup> But "finite ideas always undertake or appear to have a meaning that is not exhausted by this conscious internal meaning presented and relatively fulfilled at the moment when the idea is there for our finite view. . . . They at least appear to have that other sort of meaning, that reference beyond themselves to objects, that cognitive relation to outer facts, that attempted correspondence with outer facts, which many accounts of our ideas regard as their primary, inexplicable, and ultimate character."<sup>4</sup> The author contends, however, that this opposi-

<sup>1</sup> *The World and the Individual*, i. 445.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 22, 23.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 308, 425.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* i. 26.

tion of internal and external meanings is apparent only. In truth, the idea seeks no other. "Ideas really possess truth or falsity only by virtue of their own selection of their task as ideas."<sup>1</sup> The external meaning is "strictly continuous with the internal meaning, and is inwardly involved in the latter."<sup>2</sup> The "possibility of other embodiment means for you just now simply the incompleteness or partial non-fulfilment of your present purpose."<sup>3</sup> Reality lies in its complete fulfilment: "What is, or what is real, is, as such, the complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas."<sup>4</sup>

The general view thus indicated does not call for remark now. The point which requires attention is the usage of the term 'idea,' and the rôle which it plays. The stress, it is clear, lies upon the "internal meaning of finite ideas." Reality consists just in the fulfilment of this internal meaning. The ideas referred to are finite ideas; their internal meaning is their "conscious inner purpose"; that is to say, ideas are volitional as well as cognitive facts: their content as facts includes a purpose; and the complete fulfilment of this purpose is reality. What, then, is this 'idea' upon which the whole account of reality is made to rest? To this question also an answer is given. "Any conscious act at the moment when you perform it . . . . is . . . . an idea."<sup>5</sup> But at other moments (we may ask), when you don't perform it, what is it then? The answer must be, I think, that it is nothing. The idea is indeed a mere "fragment of life," a mere "conscious thrill," as the author calls it in one place.<sup>6</sup> It is evanescent, rises to the surface for a moment, and disappears. The author uses the personal pronoun so frequently that we are apt to forget that, on his theory, at this stage of it, 'I' and 'you' are nothing at all. There are only these "fragments" called ideas, each expressing an inner purpose in an inadequate way—and ex-

<sup>1</sup> *The World and the Individual*, i. 32.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 337.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 23.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 33.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 339.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 33.



pressing it for a moment only. They appear inexplicably out of nothingness, and as the moment passes, sink back into nothingness. The metaphysicians have appealed to Hume, and to Hume they must go. Like him, they will admit no centre for this life of finite ideas—which is not a life, but a mere sequence of “fragments” or “thrills.” And they need to be reminded that, as Hume resolved reality into vanishing impressions, they also have left themselves nothing but vanishing ideas as the basis of their whole structure. And each idea, as it vanishes, vanishes for ever. It is impossible to point to a “conscious act” or “thrill” or “fragment of life” which is ever repeated. With the exclusion of all reference to the conscious subject which expresses itself in them, the ideas are left absolutely lacking in continuity. And it becomes an entirely arbitrary assertion to maintain that two successive states are the same idea.

It may be replied, of course, that these various fragmentary ideas have their unity in the Absolute. But, in order to say this, we must first of all have reached the Absolute. And Professor Royce’s method, and the method of those who adopt this species of Idealism, is to work from the ideas to the Absolute. The ideas, therefore, may not be assumed, to start with, as unified in this way. The simple explanation that they have unity and continuity from their relation to finite subjects of experience is ruled out. When I glance at this paper and see an undotted *i*, I have an idea which may be said to be purposive, for the *i* is dotted before I turn away. But when Professor Royce says that reality consists just in the final fulfilment of the “inner meaning” of this finite idea, he has put a great deal more into its “inner meaning” than is present in its conscious content—or else he has a very poor conception of reality.

The emphasis laid on the purposive character of the idea is really inconsistent with the vanishing nature which would characterise the mere idea (were such possible) which is not a part of the life of mind. “Psychical fact” is inconceivable

except as fact of a psyche. And when we are told that the idea "selects," "intends," "wants," "desires,"<sup>1</sup> and "somehow truly learns . . . to develop its own internal meaning,"<sup>2</sup> we can see that this is only an awkward way of saying that 'I' or 'you' intend, desire, learn, etc.; and this view is borne in upon us still more strongly when we read of the "whole will of the idea,"<sup>3</sup> and even of the "individual life of the whole idea."<sup>4</sup>

The use of such language to describe a conscious state assumed as subjectless may be excused on the ground of the difficulty which surrounds the determination of the nature of the subject implied in experience and its relation to the self which in course of experience we come to realise and to know. But the difficulty is not got rid of by a confusion between the mere "conscious thrill" or artificially separated fragment of experience and the continuous purpose in which mental life is manifested. It is possible to conceive a mental state without the subject that has that state having any knowledge that it has it; but it is not possible to conceive it as a conscious state which belongs to no subject at all. And when this conscious state is said to have an internal meaning or purpose containing many elements not yet discoverable in its content, it is still more absurd to hold it to be a mere wandering, subjectless experience. The psychological questions connected with the degree of continuity belonging to the self and the unity of the subject involve difficulties which are certainly real enough. But they do not enter at this stage. And even if they did, they would not be comparable with the absurdity of starting with a "conscious thrill" which no one feels, or with an experience which is not the experience of any subject. The emphasis on purpose is not only an assertion of continuity; it implies that this continuity is due to the subjective factor, and not to what may be called the presentational factor. And in this connection I welcome the definite admission of Professor Taylor, who follows in the main Professor Royce's doctrine on

<sup>1</sup> *The World and the Individual*, i. 327, 306-7, 337.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 33.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 456.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 339.



this matter. He lays stress upon "the true 'subjective' factor of selective attention throughout experience," and as a consequence maintains "that all experiences imply an element which is *in* the experiencing mind, but not *presented to it*."<sup>1</sup>

If we are to begin with ideas as psychical facts, one thing is clear. My psychical facts are not the same as your psychical facts nor as anyone else's; and accordingly the beginning must be made with psychical facts which are mine or yours or someone's. There may be—there is—no reflection on this subjective reference at early stages in the development of life. It may be clear only *for* the observer; but it is *in* the observed. It is the worm you tread on that turns, and not the worm that plies its work unconcerned an inch away from your foot; and whatever psychical fact there is corresponding to being trodden upon belongs to the one worm and not to the other. The infant may have never said that "this is 'I'"; and yet it makes a world of difference to it whether the satisfied hunger or the pain of a pin-prick is its feeling or the feeling of some other infant equally "new to earth and sky." The incommunicableness of individual life is not a product whose origin can be traced in experience. It is founded on a unique fact which lies at the basis of all experience. Your feeling and my feeling, however alike they may be in content, are not the same feeling; and they do not come any nearer to being the same feeling however much the likeness in content be increased. If we ignore this plain basis of fact, we cut away the ground on which we may hope to build up an explanation either of the unity of the finite individual or of the unity of experience as a whole. The way to the latter is not made easier by neglecting the fact of finite centres of consciousness. Apart from their presence to such finite centres of mental life, the psychical facts which one is asked to inquire into are atomic; and, unlike the atoms of the materialist, they perish at the moment of their appearance. Out of them no solid structure can be built which will enable us to reach the

<sup>1</sup> *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 80.

Absolute Reality. Every plank of the bridge gives way as we touch it; and we shall certainly not pass in safety simply because the bridge is a very long one.

If this argument be correct, it follows that the type of idealist philosophy which starts with psychical facts or thought-determinations as constituents of reality can occupy a tenable position only if it admits the subjective reference which these elements imply; and if this be allowed, it must be reckoned as a Spiritualist view of the world, and therefore as belonging to the second form of Idealism.

The discussion has brought out a further point of interest for the general comparison of the two forms of Idealism. It has shown the abandonment of the intellectualist implication which has been characteristic of almost all idealist systems, from Plato onwards. Berkeley's theory is an exception; but its historical connections are with a different type of thought. Up to Kant, Idealism laid stress on intellectual cognition, to the exclusion or depreciation of sense-apprehension. Kant had this tradition in mind when he distinguished between phenomena and noumena, and identified the latter with things-in-themselves. And the tradition maintained itself when Kant's successors again crossed the boundary which he had set to knowledge. Hegel's Idealism, in particular, is essentially an intellectualist system in which the real is expressly identified with the rational. To break with so long a tradition is certainly a notable performance. Yet, if the fundamental proposition of Idealism is its assertion not of the intelligible character but of the spiritual nature of reality, the validity of the traditional interpretation may fairly be called in question. If reality is spiritual, there seems to be no sufficient reason for identifying it with thought and excluding the immediate experience of which sensation is the most obvious type, though it may also include experiences more nearly allied to volition and emotion. And this result is supported by the admissions of the most thorough despisers of sense-perception. For they



have always seen that the objections to describing the life of Infinite Mind in terms of discursive thought are as grave as, though different in kind from, the objections to describing it in terms of sense.

In this way, by its recent exponents, the doctrine that reality is spiritual seems to be set in sharper opposition than before to the doctrine that "objects of intellectual apprehension" constitute the real world. Of this latter view only one thing more need be said. As Professor Adamson suggested in the passage which I quoted at the outset, it has always to face the difficulty that some kind of existence must be assigned to sensible objects. If intellect has its objects, must not sense-perception have objects too? If the former are independent of their apprehension by mind, may not the latter also have an independent existence? A form of Realism seems at present to be entering speculative thought which will so far adopt Idealism as to give an affirmative answer to both these questions. It will contend both for the independent existence of the objects of sense-perception and for a reality corresponding to scientific and ethical conceptions. It will thus hold to the reality both of something similar to the Platonic ideas and of the material objects to which he was unable to assign any being at all. The peculiarity of this view is, that it seems to separate mind from the world of reality of which it is cognisant. And it thus remains in fundamental opposition to the view which looks upon all reality as, in the last analysis, mind, or dependent upon mind.

W. R. SORLEY.

CAMBRIDGE.

## PRESENT ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY.

S. H. MELLONE, M.A., D.Sc.,

Examiner in Mental and Moral Science in the University of London.

OUR object in this paper is to bring together into the light those aspects of the Problem of Immortality which are of most interest to thoughtful persons to-day, and are likely to remain so for some time to come. Biological and anthropological questions may be set aside. It used to be feared that the theory of evolution, as presented in Darwin's *Origin of Species* and *Descent of Man*, had disposed of the belief that man is in any true sense a spiritual being. The supposed ape-like ancestor jeopardised every real interest of the human soul. And yet what theory of descent, in past ages, could be more disturbing—if questions of beginning are of any relevance at all—than the evident fact that the beginning of every individual life is purely animal? Why should the theory be deemed of such vast and terrible significance, if the physiological fact is of no importance? Whatever view we may take as to the bearing of the physiological beginning of each individual life on the question of its destiny, that view must *a fortiori* hold good of the beginning of the race. We must avoid the use of the word "origin," which is ambiguous and misleading; we have no scientific right to speak of anything more than the historical beginning in time; the mere substitution of the accurate term "beginning" for the inaccurate one "origin," in these too



often confused discussions, is enough to show the true bearing of what is at issue.

It has also been supposed that the anthropological theory as to how belief in the soul began—as set forth, for instance, by Spencer and Tylor—has a vital bearing on our problem. But even if we grant to this theory all that it claims, the truth or error of our belief in “something after death” is not touched. To ask “How did this belief begin? what causes suggested it to the primitive mind?” and to ask “What are the causes of its survival or continuance afterwards?” are two entirely different questions. If any belief in its beginning rests on illusions characteristic of the childhood of the race, this will not affect its truth as *we* hold it, unless our belief were the same as that of the primitive savages among whom it began, or were held on the same grounds. Why do we state such obvious truths? Because intelligent persons have often suggested that, since the belief in another life, in its original form, rested on primeval superstitions, it is in its developed form, as held to-day, groundless!

I. The purest and the most natural source of belief, or, as it is to-day, of a *desire to believe*, lies in human affection: that those whom we have loved long since may, like the mystic angel-faces of Newman’s dream, be but lost awhile. We are not concerned to put adequately into words the strength or the bitterness of this longing, ever renewed in the heart of man, age after age—a longing which, unsatisfied, shakes the fabric of faith to its foundations. We wish only to draw attention to one note in it which not infrequently escapes notice. It is not through selfish fear that we tremble on the brink of death, and cling to the severing link of our existence here; it is a clinging to our fellow-creatures. If the immortal life is to be more than a name for a shadow, it must be a life where men are members one of another, not less, but more than they are here. We desire an immortality which shall signify a personal life in the full sense of these words, not the existence of a “disembodied spirit,” or a “pure, indivisible,

immaterial substance"; and a personal life must be an *embodied life*. This is a plea which gathers to itself the strength of the whole social nature of man. There are others which have their roots in the universal moral consciousness of man. There is first the great discrepancy which has furnished moralists with a theme since history's dawn: the disproportion between the abilities and just deserts of men, and the recognition given to them in this life. When every allowance is made for the possibility that the inequalities of life are not so great as they appear, and that worldly honour, success, or happiness is not the true reward of moral desert, there remains a range of facts so vast that we cannot number the multitudes who in this life have suffered incalculable wrong. "The injustice or inequality seems the more flagrant," says a modern divine and thinker, "when we see that it is the very goodness of the good to which their extra share of suffering, the very badness of the bad to which their immunity from suffering, is often traceable. On the one hand, the very sensitiveness of conscience which characterises the former, subjects them to inward pangs of self-reproach, to painful moral conflicts and struggles, to bitter distress for the sorrow and sin of the world, of which the latter know nothing; and on the other hand, against these and other causes of suffering the vicious or morally indifferent are case-hardened by their moral insensibility." It is not merely by their own sufferings that men are oppressed. "I feel a pain in my brother's side," is the motto of the higher ethical endeavours of to-day. This feeling is intensified, apart from all questions of desert, by a consciousness of the intolerable conditions in which tens of thousands of our fellow-creatures pass their lives. Grant that in the future the civilised world will see to it that no such black spots disgrace the very name of "civilisation," can there have been no other possibilities for those who have come here only to swarm and fester for a little while, too miserable to be conscious of their misery, shut out for ever from all possibility of living a human life? The great and good, who have known the inward joy of



noble work, might be more justly believed to perish, for they at least have *lived*. Yet for these too there is a claim of equal strength. They are the strong workers of the world, builders of the city not made with hands. Is it possible that these great souls who have accomplished so much—they and all that was in them—have become dust and vapour, and nothing more? Are they to have no share in the abiding glory of their work, and never see the oncoming triumph of the ideals for which they laboured and died?

It is true that we find strange variations in human sentiment and conviction on this subject. Hence the interest which attaches to an inquiry set on foot two years ago by the English and American branches of the Society for Psychical Research, who issued a *questionnaire* with a view to ascertain how far and on what grounds there is a wish for a life after death. The main interest of the inquiry belongs to the answers to the first two questions, which were as follows:—

- I. Would you prefer (a) to live after “death,” or not?
- II. (a) If I. (a), do you desire a future life whatever the conditions might be?
- (b) If not, what would have to be its character to make this prospect seem tolerable? Would you, *e.g.*, be content with a life more or less like your present life?
- (c) Can you say what elements in life (if any) are felt by you to call for its perpetuity?

The Committees of the Society who are in charge of this inquiry evidently are inclined to think that the strength of the desire for another life is much overrated, that a vast number do not care, while many would really prefer annihilation. As one who has had some slight experience of the difficulty of obtaining answers to this *questionnaire*, the present writer may be permitted to comment on what seem to him to be the probabilities of the case. The most serious obstacle to taking the results of such an inquiry as a true indication of “Human Sentiment with regard to a Future

Life" lies in the fact that mere moods may have the force of conviction for the time being. Hence, where the preference for annihilation is expressed, as a thoughtful critic of the *questionnaire* has recently said, "in some cases it is due to personal wrong-doing; in many others it is an unreal pose, which is the result of fashion and prejudice; in others it is simply lack of imagination." And—to the disgrace of our civilisation be it said—we cannot deny that in some cases it is due to conditions which have not only taken away all interest from earthly existence, but have destroyed all desire for better things. Yet this is not the last word as regards this real or supposed loss of desire for continuance of life. What shall we say of such expressions of feeling as the following? Harriet Martineau speaks of a longing for rest, confessing that she would tire of the Forever. Charles Bray writes, "I am thankful for life, and would willingly do it all over again, but I have no wish to begin again under entirely new conditions; neither can I see how, with a new body and under such altered circumstances, the recollection of my existence here could be of the slightest service to me." R. L. Stevenson pleads for a stern struggle with fate while we live, but also for a putting away of "this fairy tale of an eternal tea-party, and that our friends will yet meet us, all ironed out and emasculate, and still be lovable." What is the explanation of this feeling in such minds? We believe that at the bottom it is a protest, not against the thought of continued life, but against an inadequate interpretation of "immortality," against the notion of mere Endlessness without Growth, and therefore against the possibilities of utter discontinuity or of eternal sameness. The notion of existence without end, never getting "quit of oneself," is a weariness or even a horror to many minds; and not unreasonably so, for if we adopt such a view, we have dropped the vital element in the thought of a future life. The vitally important factor in the idea is not mere endlessness, but continued growth. It is true, growth is the progressive fulfil-



ment or realisation of latent powers : it is and must be a process in time. But to suppose that the process is literally endless in time, is to go far beyond anything that experience or reflection warrants in our present state. If the idea of a future life is presented in such a form that it seems to fail in giving the field for the exercise and progress of our best faculties which even this life gives, there is nothing strange in a repudiation of it.

We have briefly reviewed the main sources from which the immortal hope springs. Before proceeding to estimate their worth as sources of evidence, of probability or proof, we may inquire how they appear when judged specially from the ethical standpoint. As we know, it has been urged that the race would rise to a higher point of view if the hope of immortality were dispensed with.

We reply that there is one truth which we not only admit, but lay down as primary and fundamental. The superiority of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness to their opposites is not conditional on the permanence of the individual life. If someone "doubted" their superiority, we could not cure him of his moral scepticism by convincing him that his personality was to endure for centuries or millenniums. To ask, as Tennyson, for example, is so fond of doing, "What is it all of it worth" if death is the end, is to put the emphasis in the wrong place. Immortality is not the whole of the religious view of the world, but only a subordinate part of it, a consequence (as we shall see) of the more fundamental view that Truth, Goodness, and Love are supernal realities, whose permanent worth does not depend on the continued existence of any man or million of men. "Human ministers of Justice fail, but Justice never." Hence, so far from saying that a noble earthly life is not worth living without immortality, we say the opposite of this. Immortality is worth having, just because a noble earthly life has an intrinsic worth of its own. It follows that the only true preparation for another life is to make this life noble ; and the profound truth of Spinoza's saying appears : *Homo liber de nulla re minus quam de morte cogitat.*

Is there, however, any real substitute for the immortal hope? We are told that if individuals perish by the way, even after they come to be forgotten their work survives. This is true as far as it goes. How far it goes will be made clear to anyone who tries to answer Huxley's forcible question: "Throw a stone into the sea, and there is a sense in which it is true that the wavelets which spread around it have an effect through all space and all time. Shall we say that the stone has a future life?" The universal life of humanity, which is ever deepening, growing, developing, and advancing through the ages to its consummation, has a deeper unity than any that science finds in dead matter; but it is none the less true that to take this fact, of the results of our individual lives being incorporated into this wider life of humanity, as a substitute for the belief in personal immortality, is mere confused self-deception.

Is the desire to live after "death" merely the barren utterance of human egoism? It is not to be denied that the desire for another life as affording "compensation" has been so held as to become a refined form of selfishness. But the real meaning of the wish for "compensation" is nothing ignoble or selfish. Frequently we can trace in it a motive like that which animated Milton's great poem, "to assert Eternal Providence, and justify the ways of God to men," to *live to see* the meaning of the apparently undeserved sufferings of life. Even when we regard it simply as the expression of a man's interest in his own destiny, it is the opposite of a merely personal or selfish wish. The man who desires the compensation of another life is not desiring anything which he can enjoy by himself, and from which others can be excluded. He wants to be allowed to go on loving those whom he has loved here, and to go on doing whatever good he has done here, and more. If you will say that this is to seek a reward, then—as Tennyson reminds us in his noble poem on "Wages"—it is the reward of going on.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> An impressive statement of the same thought will be found in the late Principal Caird's *Gifford Lectures*, vol. ii, p. 292.



II. We found that two motives were specially prominent in forming the desire for another life: that personal affection and love may continue, and that personal goodness may grow. These may be stated together in a form which includes both: that all our faculties may be realised and exercised to their fullest capacity. In this life we do not find it possible to be and to do all that we feel and know ourselves to be capable of; every element in the life that now is, seems rudimentary, incomplete, and preparatory. What is the significance of this fact?

The story of the evolution of living beings, as interpreted by modern science, tells us that each new physical quality or power—such as a sharpened sense, or the beginning of a new organ—which survives and grows, does so because it is useful for a purpose and is needed. Utility for a purpose involved in physical life: this is the important factor in the evolution of the distinctive features of new species in the animal world.

What are the qualities distinctive of human life? Without entering into interrupting refinements concerning “animal intelligence” or “animal conscience,” it is evident that while human life includes animal life, it rises above the latter; and these higher things which distinguish man from the animals are his rational, moral, and spiritual qualities. We may make in the sphere of spiritual life an assumption similar to that which science makes in the sphere of physical life: that these characteristically human qualities have their proper use and function, which is not realised until they are exercised in all their fulness. Everything that is best in us bears witness in itself of a power of life and growth far beyond the utmost afforded by the opportunities of earth. True, there are human beings in whom the higher emotional, intellectual, and moral qualities seem crushed out of existence, and there are others who seem to show no sign of possessing such qualities. Yet everyone who has begun to use the higher gifts of his manhood, has begun to find in them possibilities of growth to which no limit can be seen; and the more faithfully he does

all that this life calls for, the more he feels that a thousand such lives would not exhaust his powers.

These distinctively human qualities do not serve any merely physical purpose; they are not useful in the biological sense. "The moment we enter into the inner circle of human characteristics," says Dr Martineau, "the interpretation of these characteristics as instruments for working the organism utterly fails us." In fact, to explain them, in their present form, by this means, is never attempted; but it is supposed that they were manufactured out of primitive animal wants whose utility to the organism needs no demonstration. We need not dwell here on the growing perception that this process of manufacture is inconceivable, and rests on a fundamental misconception of all that development can possibly mean.<sup>1</sup>

If, then, the realisation of such powers has a purpose, which is not fulfilled until they are put forth to their full capacity, we must suppose that human existence is constructed on a scale such that each man can put them forth in their fulness. This means that the life begun here is continued beyond death, where these endowments may find progressively more adequate scope and employment. At first sight, the analogies of nature's ways do not lead us to regard this suggestion as a very hopeful one. What if the undeniable waste in the animal and vegetable world has its analogue in the human world? It involves a waste of resource, and a frustration of purpose and capacity; if in the case of man death ends his life, there would only be a similar blighting of promise, and perishing of capacities that have just begun to unfold. Granting that the analogy is a true one, *i.e.* mere waste in both cases, we must observe that in one it is a waste of physical capacity, in the other a waste of intellectual, moral, and spiritual capacity. Has this difference any significance? Have we a right to hold the growth of human love and reason as worth more—to expect that, though physical life

<sup>1</sup> The writer may be permitted to refer to *Leaders of Religious Thought*, pp. 114–124, where he has treated this subject more fully, with references.



may be wasted, spiritual life will not be? A conviction of the absolute and indefeasible worth of these human ideals answers the question for us. These are the only things that give value to life; and if we have a right to believe anything, we have the strongest moral and intellectual right to believe that these shall abide for ever. We do not, however, admit that the aforesaid analogy is a true one. The physical waste is not so in reality, it is a change of form; but if the progress of humanity continues, while the individuals whose efforts contribute to it perish by the wayside, then what perishes is the best part of the whole achievement—the effects of each man's work which remain in his living, growing self. All our ideals are realised for us only by personal activities which grow by their personal use.

The assumption on which our conclusion rests—that human faculty has a purpose—itself rests on a deeper principle, apart from which it is groundless. This deeper assumption is that the world is rational, is constructed according to an order or plan on which we can depend. Otherwise there could be no ground for supposing that our powers fulfil any purpose by their growth, or that the incompleteness of this life has any meaning. And this assumption or trust that the universe is rational, is one kind or direction of trust in God. There is no abstract proof of this principle, because the truth of all reasoning depends on it; but it is progressively verified by acting on it or working it out; and this, as Browning always reminds us, is the one searching test which in the end never fails. Thus at bottom the belief in immortality depends on belief in God, for to believe in God means at least to believe that the creative power which sustains the universe is rational. We may therefore trust the truth in the immortal hope, not as we trust the results of particular observations and experiments, but as a reasonable probability, based on the essential reasonableness of the world.

III. Among the difficulties remaining there are some, the scientific aspects of which call for special attention.

The old materialism, represented by the theories of Cabanis and Büchner in the middle of the last century, assumed that the brain *produces* consciousness. The standing metaphor for this type of materialism was suggested by Plato,<sup>1</sup> that the soul is to the body as the musical harmony is to the instrument that produces it. Modern writers liken the soul to a "force" which the brain exerts, or to a "state" into which it passes, just as matter under certain conditions passes into a state of incandescence. On the other hand, scientific thinkers like Dubois Reymond, Huxley, and Tyndall themselves frankly admit that the production of such a thing as consciousness in the brain is more than an enigma—it is almost a self-contradiction. And such assertions as that of Büchner, that "thought is a mode of motion," have only to be carefully scrutinised in order to reveal themselves as simple or rather complex nonsense.

The more refined form of materialism which would be professed in some quarters at the present day assumes that consciousness is a "function" of the brain. It is evident that this need not mean more than that the manifestation of mental life and personality in this world of time and space depends on the brain and nervous system; but more than this is meant, although the theory does not commit itself to the assertion that bare brain and nerve produce mind and feeling. The point of view of which we speak is connected with the results of modern physiology and physiological psychology. The latter study is specially concerned to investigate those mental facts whose bodily concomitants are best known, such as the elementary forms of perception, impulse, and memory. It works on common ground with physiology in studying the different brain-changes which correspond to different states of consciousness; and the *localisation* of these changes in the brain has been determined with considerable success. Now in these investigations the physiologists nearly always forget the vitally important fact which Professor James has stated so

<sup>1</sup> *Phædo*, 86a.



forcibly. Is the mind a "function" of the brain? "If we are talking of science strictly understood, function can mean nothing more than bare concomitant variation. When the brain activities change in one way, consciousness changes in another way; when the currents pour through the occipital lobes, consciousness sees things; when through the lower frontal region, consciousness says things to itself; when they stop, she goes to sleep, etc. In strict science, we can only write the bare fact of concomitance." This fact has suggested the famous hypothesis of "psycho-physical parallelism," that every change in consciousness corresponds to a change in the activity of the brain—a hypothesis which is well grounded as regards the more elementary facts of sensation and ideation, and is assumed to hold throughout. This principle, rightly used, should exclude materialistic and all other assumptions as to the real connection between the mental and the physical series, for about this connection it says nothing. It is adopted by careful writers for that reason, as a hypothesis regulating the study of mental in relation to physical facts. But many of the physiological school have given it a materialistic turn by speaking always as if the mental state were entirely "dependent" on the bodily, and assuming that the mental state is "explained" when its corresponding bodily state is assigned. Hence the idea has arisen that the "new" psychology has proved everything characteristic of human personality to be due to the activity of the brain and nervous system; while the truth is, that if such results appear in the end to be proved, it is only because in the beginning they were taken for granted.<sup>1</sup>

On the whole, modern psychology has nothing to contribute to the solution of our problem. Psychology has effectually disposed of what Professor James calls "the whole

<sup>1</sup> The doctrine of "parallelism" in its metaphysical bearings is discussed by Professor Ward in his Gifford Lectures on *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. lectures xi.-xiii., and in his article on "Psychology" in the supplementary volumes of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, vol. xxxii. p. 66; also by the present writer in his *Studies in Philosophical Criticism*, pp. 84 ff.

classic platonising Sunday-school conception" of the soul and body as two separate things, of which the body is necessary to the soul only in this world of sense, while the soul is absolutely "immaterial," "separated by the whole diameter of being" from bodily existence. On the contrary, we find it nearly impossible to say where body ends and soul begins; but psychology affords us no means of making clear the distinction between them. And, apart from mere assumptions, we are told nothing as to their connection which is not obvious from common experience. We do not need the psychologist to tell us that there is a good deal of the body in the affections and emotions of the soul, that in deep thought the brain is taxed, that anxiety or joy affects the heart, that other instincts affect other organs; and as a writer like the late R. H. Hutton freely admitted, "the only distinction we know with any certainty between the two is that the soul is more essential to the personality, while the body is less so."

We shall not enter on the large subject of the attitude which the metaphysical theories of the past have taken towards this question. In the end, the verdict of a metaphysical system must depend on the view which it takes as to the nature of individuality and the relation of the individual life to the Absolute Ground of all being, the Eternal Life of God. Unfortunately, the connection between the problem of immortality and this metaphysical problem gives rise to a confusion of two different questions. There is the question of future fact, of what *is to be*, as Tennyson, voicing the common sense of the race, states it: "Does our individuality endure?" And there is the question of present fact, of what *is*: "Do we share in an eternal life, and does that connection become a matter of experience?" It is evident that an answer to one of these questions is not necessarily an answer to the other. If man is a "reproduction" or "differentiation" of the Eternal Mind, and so partakes of an eternal life, it does not follow that, regarded as an individual spirit, he is eternal; and if this metaphysical tie is what gives absolute value to human life,



the thing of absolute value might remain while individual spirits were extinguished, provided the race continued. We are thrown back on the evidence on which we formerly dwelt, of the intrinsic possibilities of man's own higher nature, which is the one thing of supreme worth in the known universe, and which bears within it the power of ever-growing life.

"Is there, then," it may be said, "no *certain* knowledge?" This question, which seems so plausible, is yet most unreasonable. Strictly speaking, none of our knowledge is "certain" in the sense of being free from any assumption and from the possibility of future modification. "But, waiving these refinements, cannot we 'know' that our individuality endures, in the sense in which we 'know' any other matter whatsoever,—as a matter of fact and evidence?" This, again, is an irrational demand. We cannot know that there is a future life in the sense in which we know that the earth and planets move round the sun. This and similar results are based on *definitely measurable* facts, constantly and uniformly recurring in the experience of our senses; while the main foundations on which our belief in another life rests are the higher possibilities of human nature as revealed in moral and spiritual experience. Though these latter facts also form a constant and uniform experience, they are not definite and measurable, and their adequate interpretation is not immediately obvious.

The numerous body of "spiritualists" would claim that there are facts affording us direct experience of a life after death. "Spiritualism" is a theory to account for certain alleged facts. Are they genuine facts? If so, are we compelled to adopt that theory of their origin? Twenty-one years ago a group of friends who had been inquiring into the "spiritualistic" phenomena founded a society for systematic investigation of the truth and error in world-wide beliefs which are usually classed as "superstitions." Among the founders were the late Professor Sidgwick, Mrs Sidgwick, the late Edmund Gurney, the late F. W. H. Myers, and Professor

Barrett; and soon afterwards Mr Frank Podmore, Professor William James, Sir Oliver Lodge, and other equally well-known names were added to the list of active members and workers. The alleged occurrences which the Society found itself called upon to investigate contained a strange mixture of conscious and unconscious deception; but the result of its work has been to show that the world of mind is infinitely more complex than was suspected, and that there are latent in it capacities beyond the scope of those familiar to common life, and different in their mode of action. Hypnotism or artificial somnambulism had long been recognised by physicians and even by scientific psychologists; but other facts were brought to light, which the psychology of the schools refuses to recognise. There is such a thing as a vision or impression of events distant in space or time, from its simple form in unconscious or automatic writing up to a detailed knowledge of affairs with which there was no normal means of acquaintance. There is such a thing as thought-transference; not by mere muscle-reading, or unconscious whispering, for after all necessary sifting the alleged facts are found to give reasonable force to the hypothesis that under certain unknown conditions communication is possible between one mind and another, or one brain and another, through none of the usually recognised channels of sense ("telepathy"). There is such a thing as the vision of an apparition of an absent person at some crisis in the life of the latter, and especially at or near the point of death: between death and apparitions of the dying a connection exists which is not due to chance alone. The result of these investigations has been on the whole decidedly adverse to the "spiritualistic" hypothesis, although some of the most careful workers have convinced themselves that certain facts can be explained in no other way. Setting this hypothesis aside, as we must do, what other supposition do the phenomena suggest?

Mr F. W. H. Myers has formulated a theory which, he considers, harmonises the whole range of facts above men-



tioned, together with such abnormally diseased states of consciousness as those described by M. Pierre Janet in his work on *L'Automatisme Psychologique* and *L'État mentale des Hystériques*, and the apparent facts of spirit-possession, ecstatic vision, etc.<sup>1</sup> The theory is that our normal consciousness is in continuous connection with a larger consciousness of which we do not know the extent ("the sub-liminal self"). This region is the larger part of each of us. It is "the abode of everything that is latent, the reservoir of everything that passes unrecorded or unobserved." It is not only the abode of lapsed memories, stuff that dreams are made of, sub-conscious sensations and impulses, antipathies, and the like; it is also the seat of superior faculties, more subtly perceptive than those of everyday life. To these faculties are ascribed the supernormal occurrences whose reality has been proved. Mr Myers has probably carried this theory of a sub-conscious self too far, through failing to see that the deepest differences within the mental region do not exclude the most intense unity; and we find that other writers, pursuing the same line of thought, have divided the mind into two separate parts, making, in fact, two minds of different qualities and powers.<sup>2</sup> It is interesting to find that Hegel had recognised the possibility of hypnotism, clairvoyance, etc., and had explained them by the falling back, as it were, of the normally developed consciousness into the formless life of feeling characteristic of the primitive consciousness, which is capable of a kind of diffused sympathy with the surrounding world.<sup>3</sup> Hegel's view would exclude the supposition of James and Myers that the sub-conscious is on one side in contact with higher spiritual influences. Nevertheless the *facts* are of first-rate scientific importance; and we venture to think that the

<sup>1</sup> See Mr Myers' elaborate work on *Human Personality*; and for Professor James' version of the theory, his recent *Gifford Lectures*.

<sup>2</sup> See, for instance, T. J. Hudson, *The Scientific Demonstration of a Future Life*; and E. Gyl, *L'Être Subconscient* (Paris, 1899).

<sup>3</sup> See Professor Wallace's edition of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 30 ff., with the Introductory Essay, No. iv.

investigation and testing of them—whatever be the final scientific fate of Myers' explanation of them—has disproved, on experimental grounds, the supposition that the existence of mind depends on the mechanism of nerve and brain, as physiological science understands these terms.

We are in any case led to the conclusion, which might be defended on general grounds, that "matter," as it figures in the literature of physical science, is an abstraction. Some of the prophets of science would admit this, and eagerly assure us that "we do not, and perhaps never shall, know what matter really is"; but they would scorn the supposition that the qualities of matter which we do not yet know should make any difference to those which we do know, *i.e.* that they should be capable of any efficient action inside the region which is known. We are shown "a sort of sunlit terrace" in which the mathematicians take their exercise; and where that terrace stops, science stops, and the absolute metaphysical ground of the world begins (for science the unknowable). Philosophy unfortunately has done much to encourage this conception that the teeming universe in which we live and move is verily nothing else than a thing of two aspects—mechanism and causation on the one hand, and meaning on the other; the world of mechanical causation being the world in which science is at home, and the other world (not a world of other things, but another way of viewing the same things) being the eternal world of the absolutely real. "If anything," says Professor James, "is unlikely in a world like this, it is that the next adjacent thing to the mere surface-show of our experience should be the realm of eternal essences, of platonic ideas, of crystal battlements, of absolute significance." And we may add that, if anything is likely, it is that the material world includes objects of many different forms and degrees of reality operative within it, that there are kinds of matter and sources of energy subtler and more complex than were dreamt of, that the universe has in it resources deeper than any of which we have the faintest inkling, deeper than our deepest thought



can reach so long as our bodily senses are limited as they now are.

The somewhat trivial difficulties raised as to the embodiment of the spirit in the life beyond, and as to its beginning under the conditions of this life, should be regarded in the light of what we have been saying. The visible and tangible body decays in the grave: is that all? Certainly not; for science explains the body as consisting of material molecules, invisible and intangible, in highly organised forms of combination. These molecules enter into other combinations in the earth: but were they the whole of the body? Here we touch the root of the matter. If science has but touched the outer film of the reality with which it deals with its theories of molecular action, it has opened to us far larger possibilities of embodied existence than any which it has destroyed. The position of the authors of *The Unseen Universe* was surprising only because it was taken by two eminent professors of physics and dynamics in the year 1875. If, again, it is asked, "When does the existence of the soul, or its connection with the body, begin?" we must be clear as to the meaning of our terms. If the soul were created with a complete outfit of faculties, ready in all respects for the plunge into the life of sense, it would be inevitable that the question should be pressed, at what point in the history of the body was the ready-made soul joined on to it, or whether the soul pre-existed. But now we know that the beginning of the soul could not have been after this manner. What does experience tell us as to its beginning? As we try to work backwards in the history of mind, with the aid of comparison and analogy, we find ourselves coming nearer and nearer to a state of what Mr Spencer would call "indefinite homogeneity"; the differences that were distinct in the adult mind disappear, complexity grows less and less, until we come to a state of vague feeling which must still be called consciousness, but from which knowledge, will, and all distinct sensations and mental images, are absent. At what point in the physiological development of the organism, previous to birth,

this first faint dawn of "sentience" emerges, we do not know and we cannot guess. We have good reason to believe that in its beginning the consciousness of the human *fœtus* is analogous to that of the oyster, perhaps even to that of the amoeba, and that the gradual growth in complexity of nervous structure proceeds along with growth in complexity of conscious life. We know also that the physical connection between parents and offspring is in some mysterious way the basis of a spiritual connection. Beyond this our conclusions have to be altogether speculative. But there is a serious confusion of thought in imagining that this question of the beginning is the fundamental one. The beginning of any growth shows us, as far as the outer appearance goes, nothing even to tell us what the thing is, far less what it is to be: there is a point at which the *ovum* of man is indistinguishable from that of any invertebrate animal; at a later point in its development, it might be that of any vertebrate animal; at a still later point, that of any mammal, and so on. As the capacities of any growing thing gradually emerge, we have gradually better ground for inferring what it will come to be; and the case of mental growth is on the whole an analogous one. In this way the profound remark which has come down to us from Aristotle is seen to be of ever-increasing significance. The end may throw light on the beginning, but not the beginning on the end. It is not impossible that we shall have to reverse the agnosticism of the last century, and admit that we have clearer knowledge of ends than of beginnings. We may be agnostic as regards the speculative questions of evolutionary psychology, while we hold firmly and with good reason to the great principle that for each person growth continues, and death is but a stage in life.

S. H. MELLONE.

HOLYWOOD, BELFAST.



## L'HYPOCRISIE BIBLIQUE BRITANNIQUE.

THE REV. W. F. COBB, D.D.,

Rector of St Ethelburga's, London.

OUR witty neighbours in Paris do not like in us what they call "l'hypocrisie biblique britannique," which is their pretty way of saying that they do not understand us. But when did two nations of different races succeed in understanding each other without bloody wars, and centuries of misunderstanding, and jealousies without number? When, too, one of the two races is Teutonic and the other Celtic, mutual understanding becomes a historical miracle, not to be despaired of, indeed, as the treaty recently concluded shows so happily, but yet not to be attained by merely wishing for it. When, however, one brings an accusation against the other, it is as well for the respondent to inquire whether the proofs brought against him are sufficiently cogent, and whether he has done anything to warrant the unfavourable opinion which has been formed of his character.

There is no need to discuss the charge of hypocrisy, for nobody takes it seriously; but a number of events are happening in our national life which seem to call for some little self-analysis, by way of finding out what is that characteristic trait in our character which has got itself labelled as "hypocrisy." When that is done with any seriousness the result will probably be that we shall have to knock off a little of that good opinion of ourselves which sits so naturally on us.

Anybody, indeed, who stops to meditate on our peculiarities

as a nation will be sure, sooner or later, to turn to Cicero's famous eulogy of his fellow-citizens in which he emphasises religiousness as their crowning virtue. He will then proceed to note further resemblances between the two peoples. The Romans had little art that was of home growth and native inspiration. Nor have we. They had none of that intellectual quick-wittedness which has given the Greeks a deathless name in history. Their best writers in prose and verse sat at the feet of Greek masters. On the other hand, they had a genius for organisation, for road-making, for bridge- and viaduct-building, and for governing subject nations with a good-humoured tolerance which concealed for the most part the iron ferocity behind it. In all these points the parallel is complete. Unfortunately, we accept the parallel where it flatters us, and turn a blind eye to it when it hurts our vanity. Yet what Cicero said of the Roman religion is true of us, in the sense in which he said it, though that happens unfortunately to be one which deprives us of all right to pride ourselves on our virtue, or to look down on other people for their atheism, superstition, or whatever we choose to call that in them which differentiates them from us.

What Cicero meant was that no people were more punctilious in paying the gods the proper reverence which was their due in the official cult derived from La Cité antique. What Socrates had said humorously about paying a cock to Æsculapius, Horace would say half cynically, half credulously, when he was nearly killed by a falling tree. The Roman might not believe in his gods, but he was a practical person, and a good conservative, and reflected, therefore, that the observance of a ceremony, even if it did no good, yet could do no harm, and so the balance would generally be on the side of offering the prescribed sacrifice.

In countries where the Roman Church has taken over the Roman Empire this same characteristic holds good. That remarkable Church has inherited all the imperial instincts, the organising power, the massive common-sense, the patient



endurance and suppleness of her forerunner. She has inherited, too, its limitations. She deals with religion as a system of external observances, a creed, a cult, an organisation. When religion as an internal force, welling up from Christian depths, asserts its rights, that Church knows how to master it and make it subserve her own far-reaching purposes. She captured monasticism, yoked Francis to her car, and silenced Molinos.

But this judgment on Romanism is a commonplace, an article of the religious creed of every worthy Protestant. But what is not a commonplace, but a first-class heresy, is the audacious proposition that English religion is, on the whole, of precisely the same character. It does not move in the world of the ideal, but is essentially practical, common-sense, self-restrained, and prudent. In short, it is of a vulgar and common mould, fairly good for every-day wear, but incapable of giving inspiration, or of raising a people from the trough of the wave of unbelief to enthusiasm, self-devotion, and ecstasy. It is good of its kind, very often supremely excellent, but its kind is not the highest, not that of Christ Himself. When it does obtain a glimpse of the ideal, it will be found that it owes it to a prophet, or poet, or mystic dreamer who has Celtic blood in his veins.

All sensible men, it has been remarked, are of the same religion, but what that is the sensible man never tells. On the other hand, the ordinary Englishman is never content till his religion takes a concrete form, over which he may indulge his invincible love of fighting. What he abominates most of all is a Seer, for he wants his truth served up in little packets plainly labelled and valued, and that sort of article no Seer can supply. His contempt for the mystic, especially for the Oriental mystic, is unbounded. That is why the Quakers were persecuted impartially by prelacy and sectaries. Both these latter were on the highroad of a good, honest, intelligible religion, while the Quakers were stupid dreamers and as obstinate as any Brownist. What note of respectability in an Englishman's eyes could a religion have which denied the

necessity of a ministry, ceremonial, sacraments, and, *horribile dictu*, did but prate instead its jargon about the inner light? The ancient dislike for Quakerism is as lively as ever, for it is ingrained in our national constitution, and if it lets the Quakers alone to-day, does so only because it has found other victims.

A few facts drawn from recent ecclesiastical history are enough to justify this view completely. Perhaps no more damaging instance can be taken than from the fight over the latest Education Act. That fight has degenerated into a squabble between Church and Chapel, in which the Church sought very properly to secure as abundant opportunities for her organised work as she could, and the Chapel asserted with equal propriety its fixed resolve that it would do all it could to lessen those opportunities. It would be a gross libel on the Christianity of the Gospels to say that it was present in this contest, where the external interests of one Church—the Established—were pitted against those of another—the Federation of Free Churches. It is superfluous also to point out that while these powerful bodies were at daggers drawn, education itself, which was supposed to be at stake, had less than no attention paid it, and this in face of the acknowledged fact that the State schools find it impossible to give any education (as distinct from instruction), just because Church and Chapel care more for their respective conceptions of religion than they do for religion itself. Both share the English dislike of the ideal, and both glory in what should be their shame.

Or take the simple and childlike belief that is so common in the efficacy of Church Reform to purge the ills of our Churches. Abolish private patronage, or at any rate make its way hard; give the Church power to choose its own bishops, and make its own laws; set about the work of organising one large Congregational Church, as you have already organised your Free Churches; change “circuit systems” into “mission centres”; in short, bring your machinery up to date, and a new era of prosperity will open for the Church. The most



dangerous thing about this advice is its truth. It is so true that it stands in the way of higher truth. Nobody denies that every Church wants reform ; it would not be a human institution if it did not ; but the evil is that Churchmen are led to confine their energies to making good machines, when what they really want is driving power. Put the finest ecclesiastical system ever devised into the hands of a canon lawyer, and he will wreck it as an instrument of religion in twelve months. On the other hand, a prophet's power will be felt long after his death, even if he have little or no genius for organisation. This simple belief in the saving power of machinery is characteristic of the English mind when it is engaged in religion, and might be said to be a property of it under all circumstances, were it not for its acquiescence in the present skimble-skamble method of carrying on the government of the Empire. One thing may be affirmed with some assurance, and that is, that the English Church would never have been stirred up to effect or accept reform in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries if it had not been for the existence of tangible and visible evils which made some reform necessary for ordinary comfort. When the Middle Age asked, through John of Salisbury, whether an archdeacon could be saved, and replied, "By no manner of means," it was not his failure to realise the Christian ideal which it had in view, so much as the nuisance caused by his Court, its officials and their fees. It is very probable that similar inconveniences may produce, one of these days, some similar attempt to grease the wheels of ecclesiastical machinery. It is not so probable that public notice will be taken of the discrepancy between the official mind and that of Jesus of Nazareth. That discrepancy must assume some concrete form before the English mind can be stirred up to interfere with it.

Nothing, again, has been so remarkable in the history of what has now come to be known as the Ritual Movement as the importance attached to it both by its supporters and its opponents. Why, the very name suggests our English dislike for the abstract. Why should the term "ritual" have been

dissociated from its strict usage to denote the rites, or forms of words, used in public worship, and transferred to ceremonial, unless it be that we love the material side of things, and feel that we cannot have too much of it, and, therefore, attach more importance to what is done than to what is said, to ceremonial than to ritual? Here is clearly a case in which the Roman fever finds congenial soil in the English constitution, and that quite as truly in the Protestant half of it as in the Catholic. A hasty observer might even conclude that popular Protestantism was the very object aimed at in the taunt about "*l'hypocrisie biblique britannique*," because, while it affects to loathe ritualism, it is unable to believe that a bad ritual can be expelled except by another—which may, for aught they know, be still worse. The public platform, Bills in Parliament, Protestant Associations, Laymen's Leagues, Church of England Leagues, *et hoc genus omne*—these are the external forces by which it is hoped to deal with external difficulties. It seems never to enter the mind of these ritualistic Protestants that what is the matter with the other side is its externalisation of religion, and that their action shows emphatically that they believe in the saying "*Similia similibus curantur*."

Of course they may retort, they will retort, that those who are guilty of ritual excesses have pledged themselves to obey certain rules of the Church as by law established, and are lawless people who richly deserve to have the law invoked against them. Exactly; that is precisely the ground of my complaint. They themselves are so completely captive to the outside of things, that they put their trust in princes and in the children of men, and their police laws, and trust to the Judge and the Member of Parliament to do what they evidently believe religion by itself cannot do. It is not their fault, of course, that they share the limitations of their English character, but it is certainly open to anybody who does not, to point out that the ritual squabble is a case of the pot calling the kettle black. Both sides are legalists, and are free to expatiate in their own



field, but are not free to pretend that that field has anything to do with religion as Jesus Christ taught it.

But the most significant example of the thesis before us is to be found in the almost universal belief held by those who profess and call themselves orthodox, that belief is identical with faith, instead of being its shell, and sometimes its extinguisher. Indeed, it may be said that no single fact has done so much to turn Christianity into the wrong channel as the want of a verb cognate in origin to the substantive "faith," whereby it has come to be accepted as a matter of course that to say, "I believe," is all one with saying, "I have faith." Yet the most superficial consideration should be enough to show that no necessary connection exists between the two. I may believe all the historical articles of the Apostles' Creed, and yet be wholly devoid of that faith which the Lord laid such stress upon. On the other hand, I may be a man living in the light of the inward faith I have, loving the Son of God above all earthly persons or things, and be ordering my daily life after the pattern of His, in all humility, and with many backslidings and weaknesses, but quite honestly and perseveringly; and yet I may as a trained thinker have grave doubts whether the case, say, for a physical resurrection, or the Virgin Birth, has been made out beyond all doubt. As things are, the Church (if her forward sons are to be followed) wants the former type of man, and would extrude the latter. Yet she bears the name of Christian!

It is necessary to put in the parenthesis about the forward sons of the Church, because it does not follow that those who are so ready to speak for her do really represent the settled convictions of those who are quiet in the land, occupy no official position, engage in no controversies, preach no sermons—and do not even write in the magazines. What the Church of England believed at the Reformation is represented—very roughly, it is true, and often ambiguously—in the formularies she then adopted; what she believes now no mortal man knows, for she has no opportunity of saying what is in her

mind. Convocation or Church Congress has each, no doubt, its uses, but it would require much boldness, in the light of our national development, to say with the Canon that Convocation is the Church of England by representation, or that the abiding mind of the Church finds adequate utterance at any Church Congress. It is the small and silent minority who determine the direction of religious progress, and they, whether clergy or laity, are not much in the public eye.

The blind reliance, however, which the English mind has come to place on belief in certain theological propositions, or statements about historical facts, is something more than aberration ; it is the sure and certain mark of an inferior stage in the evolution of religion. It was appropriate to the Middle Ages, and its survival among leaders of religious activities to-day is proof that the genius of the Middle Ages is still powerful in our midst. The Papal Church, though beaten in its conflict with the Teutonic race, has yet succeeded in stabbing its opponent with a poisoned dagger. This poison it is which makes diseased men fancy themselves whole, and religious leaders all around us fancy that belief in dogmas is—I will not say a good substitute—but the same spiritual act as faith in God. Its working is the more deadly because, as all men can hear who will, the distinct call from God is being made to-day that we should go up higher to a more honourable seat at the feast of religion. Multitudes are responding to that call, but, alas ! they are too often outside the orthodox fold. They know whom they have believed ; they have the witness in themselves ; they do not deny the value or sanctity of dogmatic decisions in matters of faith ; but they know, with a certainty that no argument can shake, which no argument has given, that the spiritual value of the dogmas of the Church has been caricatured and vulgarised by the grossness of the interpreters. It is due to this grossness that so much has been said lately about a subject which all reverent minds would prefer to shroud in silence. I refer to the Virgin Birth.



They have no desire to deny the Church's belief in the Virgin Birth—if we are to select that as a typical case—they are too humble to set their own judgment against that of the Church at large, especially since they know that they have no fresh information on the point. But they say two things—one of less importance, and one fraught with unspeakable consequences. The fact of less importance is that the extant evidence for the dogma is, to say the least, of imperfect reach, is balanced by significant omissions, and by some statements which are hard to reconcile with the belief that the New Testament writers, as a whole, held it, and has to struggle too against the penetrating power of the argument from analogy. All this, however, is quite capable of being harmonised with the dogma, and if nothing more were to be said, then nothing ought to have been said at all.

But behind the discussion lies a far deeper problem which has received all too scant attention, and that is that the Incarnation and the Virgin Birth constitute, not an identity, but a correlation. What is the importance of the distinction? Why, this, that Christianity without the Incarnation would be no Gospel at all. If God was not in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself, then was there no revelation from God in the life and death of Jesus Christ. The Unmanifest would remain still a dark, distant, and dread Figure, loveless and unloved. But even if the Virgin Birth were expunged from the Creed, the Incarnation would still remain the fundamental tenet of Christianity. What, then, is the reason for insisting on the necessary connection between the two? Anselm argued that there were four ways in which God could create man—from man and woman, which is the rule; from neither man nor woman, as in the case of Adam; from man alone, as in that of Eve; and from woman alone—which had not occurred before the birth of Jesus Christ. If He were to come from a woman, then it must be from a virgin—as to that he remarked, “Non opus est disputare.” Fortunately, the time has arrived when there is need.

I say, "fortunately," because the fact of the need is proof of the dawning of a higher and purer conception of religion. The stress laid on the Virgin Birth—as distinct from the Incarnation—is bound up with a low view of religion, a heretical view as to the nature of matter, and a false soteriology. Jesus Christ came, it is admitted, to save man from sin, to reveal God as the Father, and to teach us how to rise to the level of our moral and spiritual highest. He was not a magician using old-world charms of material origin to produce spiritual results, but One who reawakened in man his latent spiritual powers, and so inspired him to co-operate with spiritual tools in the building of a spiritual temple. To Him the Father's world, spiritual and material alike, was good, like its Author; it was not matter which defiled man, but man who misused matter. He knew nothing of human nature as a *massa perditionis*, nothing of total depravity. He joined in the social life of those He was not ashamed to call His brethren, and hallowed the whole of man's activities by correlating them to their true end—the Will of God. The practical Manichæism of Augustine, of Monachism, and so much of current orthodoxy is flatly contradictory of His deepest teaching. He warned His followers beforehand off the dangerous belief that nature's processes carry with them something of an evil taint. His teaching as a whole on this point is so unambiguous that nothing but blindness can account for the age-long contradiction it has received at the hands of His followers—and some of them the noblest of all. But nowadays that excuse cannot serve. It is not blindness but cowardice, or obstinate conservatism, or want of education in religion, which attaches a religious value to the doctrine of the Virgin Birth: I say the doctrine, and not the fact. The fact no loyal Churchman cares to contradict. Its religious value no Christian man is at liberty to appraise high. That some people among us do appraise it at the highest can only be regarded as another striking proof of the inability of the English mind to grasp the pure religion of our Lord. We demand it in a concrete form, materialised.



Materialism, in short, which as a scientific philosophy is dead, is enshrined in the temples of English Christianity.

A further example, and a very painful one, may be drawn from the general characteristics of the so-called "religious newspapers"—so called on the *lucus a non lucendo* principle, no doubt. They are, for the most part, fairly good secular papers, which make a speciality of dealing with the war of sects, with the material prosperity of the Churches, with their meetings, preachings, collections, practical difficulties, with forms of worship, with creeds, presentations to ministers, choice of bishops and other pastors, with history, ecclesiology, architecture, music—in short, with religious politics in general. No doubt much genuine piety lurks behind the politics, but its existence is to be assumed, not inferred. It is certainly noteworthy that we have on this side of the water no such religious papers as are common in Germany, where everything is scrupulously correlated to "piety" as its end—no paper, for example, which corresponds to *Die Christliche Welt*.

No sensible person would blame the conductors of our religious papers—except in one or two cases, where the tone of the paper, to put it mildly, is all that a Christian paper ought not to be; they speak for their readers, and would cease to exist if they did not. The serious thing about them is the proof they afford of the delight which the ordinary Christian takes in the externals of religion, of his standing, that is, at a lower stage of the evolution of religion than that to which he is called by the Master Himself. The English in him has been too strong for the Christian.

If we take the religious press once more as our barometer, we shall be filled with shame when we observe its general attitude towards that elusive creature known as the Higher Criticism. It is not in itself elusive, but when it is drawn and coloured by the religious journalist it takes a form which fills one who knows it in its own home with amazement and laughter. With the exception of one—and that a Free Church organ—no single religious paper treats criticism with justice,

and most of them treat it with gross injustice, for which ignorance is the only decent excuse. Yet criticism is an instrument of piety ; its professors know quite well that piety does not thrive, and, to a larger extent than people suppose, cannot thrive, unless its intellectual body is one that is fitted to its environment. That body they are preparing. What is the chief manifest result ? The “religious” papers are full of sound and fury—*omne ignotum pro terribifico* ; they talk of a conspiracy, and display whenever the subject is mentioned a quite unreasoning excitement. But the most curious point of their behaviour, from a psychological standpoint, is the smug complacency with which they assume their own infallibility. They are the heirs, as they think, of a certain outward presentment of the biblical revelation, and seem incapable of realising a fact to which all experience bears witness, viz., that an inheritance which is not kept up—aye, and improved as circumstances require—is sure to fall into decay. That is just what has happened to the traditional estate of the orthodox, but they themselves seem to fancy that stout denial of dry rot is enough to stop it. They are a standing illustration, in their self-complacency, censoriousness, and furious ignorance, of the reasons why the French talk of “l’hypocrisie biblique britannique.”

Meanwhile, there is growing up in our midst a silent, little noticed, almost subterraneous movement, which was first partly inspired by a revived theosophy, partly fed with American thought, by men who are carrying on Emerson’s influence, and is now destined to play a considerable part in moulding the religion of the future. It has little or no organisation ; its disciples meet more or less publicly for discussion and mutual edification ; they form no Church, because they do not possess that English spirit which loves the outward, the tangible, and the visible. But the ideas which they hold dear are being disseminated through the press, through lectures, sometimes through the pulpit, and, most powerfully of all, through private conversation. They are the leaven which is gradually leavening the whole lump, so far, that is, as



they find the lump capable of yielding to their penetrating and troublesome working.

To what has been said, one apparently fatal objection may be made. If the English temperament is so incapable of the mystic, or the ideal side of religion, as you seem to think, then where is the good of attempting to screw it up to a height which is beyond it? In the endeavour to attain an elevation beyond its breathing power, it may lose possession of what it holds already. The answer is that no such thing exists as a true-born Englishman, as Defoe showed long ago when called on to champion Dutch William. He is a mixture of many elements, and owes his worldly success to the judicious way in which the blend has been made. But the strength of his own constitution has been shown by its persistency, which causes that the Englishman in the firm of John Bull & Co. still remains the predominant partner. Wherever a practical view of the possibilities of things is required, a nice sense of the way to adjust the means to the end; where it is a cool head that is more necessary than a warm heart, John can hold his own. But when it is the ideal that is in question, we are forced to rely on the Celtic fringe. Where the two are brought into clear harmony in nation or individual, there we are shown a prophecy of the future, of a perfected mankind. At present Saxon and Celt are on speaking terms, but not much more; the Celt in a man thinks the Saxon which is joined with it is a boor, and the Saxon returns the compliment by saying something about visionaries. Similarly, in the present condition of religion in our midst, the sole way out of the deadlock is to be found in the frank recognition by Saxon and Celt alike that each can supply the defects of the other, and that tolerance must be allowed to do what sympathy or mutual understanding cannot.

This sounds perhaps viewy, but nothing better can be found. The stodgy, Saxon half of me says it is folly; but my other half, the ideal, the Celt, hopes that it is not.

W. F. COBB.

# THE VALUE OF THE HISTORICAL METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY.<sup>1</sup>

PROFESSOR WILLIAM KNIGHT, LL.D.

IN his lectures on *Philosophy, its Scope and Relations*, the late Professor Sidgwick discussed this subject with the impartiality and catholicity which characterised all that he wrote, or said, or did ; but as, in the two very able and suggestive chapters of his book which deal with it, he advanced some propositions which will not be universally endorsed, it may be useful for those who agree with him in the main to re-examine the question in the light of his treatment of it. This will lead them to look into kindred speculative questions, because it is a signal instance of the correlation of philosophical problems, and their solidarity, that we cannot discuss this one adequately without considering the origin of the individual and his destiny, the nature of appearance and reality, the question of causation, with sundry other topics, as Mr Sidgwick himself has done. The historical method of inquiry takes cognisance of all of these, traverses some of them, and offers a solution of others. For example, to select only one, if the result of inquiry by this method were to lead us to take it literally that

We are such stuff as dreams are made of,  
And our little life is rounded with a sleep,

this would vitally affect any counter-consideration as to the

<sup>1</sup> The following paper was read at the sixth meeting of the Scots' Philosophical Club, in January 1903.



greatness of man and his destiny, supposed to be evidenced by consciousness or otherwise.

Some of the recent advocates of the historical method of inquiry have been more than aggressive towards the psychological one, which is limited to the introspection of consciousness. They have affirmed that the new method has, as Mr Sidgwick put it, "invaded" and "supplanted" the old one, discrediting both its procedure and results; that it has, in fact, revolutionised our knowledge. This, as it seems to me, is a great exaggeration, and it has produced a reaction in favour of the other method, which assuredly can never be set aside as useless. Both methods are necessary, and each is of almost equal value; but, as the historical one was a dominant feature in our later nineteenth-century philosophising, it is perhaps more important to appraise its value, than to note its defects.

In endeavouring to do this, no one can be blind to the extent of the service rendered to the students of Philosophy—who have been trying to examine their consciousness without its aid—by this method of seeking for an explanation of human experience, in those states out of which it has arisen, and the sources whence it has sprung. This is not to "seek the living amongst the dead," because the essence of the historical method in Philosophy may be put in a sentence thus. The main characteristics of every system of thought, and every scheme of the Universe, are due to the antecedents which have shaped them, to the processes which have evolved and the causes which have differentiated them. It is not the mere brain power of the thinker that has been the chief formative cause of the philosophy which he has adopted, or elaborated. Antecedent influences, of which he may never have been conscious, reaching him by remote inheritance, not only from his parentage training and nationality, but from the whole of the ancestral and transmitted thought of the world, have made himself and his philosophy what they now are. Of course, without the formative power of the recipient, what he

may receive is a mere blank, an unappropriated residue; and it is by the operation of thought and feeling, working upon our inheritances when the conscious state is reached, that the characteristics of the former become manifest. It is then that they are built up into definite form. But I think that the labour of each individual in dealing with the problems which have reached him from the past—and even the work of the founders of the greatest systems—has had less to do with their formation and subsequent characteristics, than the influence of the antecedent thought of the world, of which these founders have been unconsciously the heirs. It is one of the tasks of Philosophy to trace out these causal influences, to marshal them in order, and try to explain them. It finds *one* explanation in the sources out of which each system has sprung.

It has been conclusively demonstrated, so that it is now both an axiom and a commonplace—and this is one of the best gifts which last century gave us—that all our philosophies have been evolved out of antecedents which resemble, and yet differ from them; that, as with organisms so with systems, only the “fittest to live” have survived in “the struggle for existence”; that, while none of those which have disappeared have been extinguished, their activity has only lessened for a time; and that all have the power of revival, and the certainty of re-incarnation. This has been due partly to the inevitable super-annuation and decay of the best things that exist, partly to the reactions which are also inevitable, and partly to the inherent vitality of what has seemed to perish. Alike in Philosophy and Art, in Social Life, in Politics, and in Religion, all the best things that are ever evolved are superannuated in time. They have to die, and be reborn, in incessant palingenesis. What is more; they would become stale and unprofitable to the individual, monotonous and wearisome to the race, if they were doomed to live on without decay. The lament of Tithonus would then be relevant to each—

Me only cruel immortality consumes.

And just as it is expedient for the individual to contem-



plate his death with perfect equanimity before he dies, to realise the cessation of his work while his energy is at its highest ; so it is expedient, when one announces a philosophical system as his own, or a political party as the one to which he belongs, that he should contemplate its inevitable displacement, and coming subordination to another, which must soon take its place.

But the historical method of studying the succession of the systems of Philosophy involves, and carries with it, the comparative one of examining each in the light of the stage it has reached, and therefore in the light of all the rest, as evolved products of the highest reason of the race. It may therefore be said to take up the intro-spective, experiential, subjective method along with it, while it is in the main extra-spective, inductive, and objective. The latter brings out better than the former does, or can do, the underlying unity of the systems ; shewing that they have all been shaped by circumstances, and differentiated by forces, working both within them and without. It demonstrates that the thought of the world is an organic whole, which develops with inherent continuity ; and that all our systems are its broken fragments. If we proceed by the other method, we are much more likely to select a single system as the only true one ; and to estimate and criticise the rest by the light it gives us, even although it be not a solar-beam, but only the rush-light of our own idiosyncrasy. If, however, we regard each as an adumbration, or sample of the whole, the transient apocalypse of that which we can see and know only in part, we are much less likely to overmagnify our insight. Furthermore, if all the systems have sprung from roots of truth, and if each (to quote a well-known saying) is in the main "right in what it affirms, wrong only in what it denies," then the study of their evolution by this method will yield us a criterion of their relative worth. It may not tell us how much truth, and how much error, is present in each ; but it will prevent us from affirming that any one is altogether true, or any other wholly false.

It is to be noted, however, that we do not turn to this method to escape from the illusions of our own subjectivity, merely by getting hold of, or by coming into contact with, objective fact. That is not enough. Facts in isolation from one another, however accurately apprehended, teach us very little. It is by a knowledge of their origin and their issues, of their manifold relationships and bearings on one another, their underlying affinities,—especially when the antagonism which may have occurred on their emergence has died away,—that we apprehend their real nature. It cannot, I think, be emphasised too strongly of mere phenomenal succession, or the march of events in a “process of becoming,” that such *transiency* explains nothing. It does not tell us how the succession has come about, or how it has been kept up. We must have some light, if only the faintest, on these points; and we must also know something as to the nature of the tie which binds them together. Hence, as I said, the question of causality cannot be ignored by us in this discussion; more especially because, in the examination of it, we pass from physics to metaphysics, and in the latter province proceed from the objective to the subjective; while we do this with a view to the reconquest of the former by means of the latter.

Passing from this, it is worthy of note that the study of the products of contemporary thought, while it seems easier because it is nearer us, is really much more difficult than is the study of a distant period, the records of which have been preserved with any adequacy. The thought of no age has ever been fully intelligible to itself. Hence it is that so many persons try to escape from the turmoil of contemporary opinion to what they vainly imagine will be a “final settlement” of controversy. It must be left to posterity, to the arbitrament of time, to adjust and determine scores of problems which we are incompetent to solve, not because of their difficulty, but because we are now too near to them. In even partially understanding any period by the historical method, we have in reality got beyond it. Most, if not all, the causes which have



determined the rise of particular beliefs have to be ascertained—and they are often very complex, and exceedingly involved—before the period can be said to be historically known, and can be adequately appraised. So soon, however, as these causes are *known*, they may be said to be *superseded*.

It is thus that the progress of Philosophy, while continuous, is to so large an extent subterranean, and unconscious to the individuals who participate in it. It operates most powerfully out of view ; but, as it cannot cease to advance, all its developments must of necessity alter. Its very genius is that of change. It would ossify, if it were stable. But in human thought, although everything disappears, nothing ever perishes ; and although it may lie latent for ages, apparently dead, like the mummy-wheat in Egyptian tombs, every idea that has once lived, returns to grow in another form. It is this spectacle of the incessant appearance and disappearance of systems that gives so great a zest to the historical method of studying Philosophy ; and, while we may reduce the manifoldness to a certain unity—in the alternate rise and fall of two antagonistic yet supplementary schools of thought, which have controlled and checked each other, viz., the realist and the idealist—there has been a vast “increasing purpose” in the succession, so that the History of Philosophy is just (as Ferrier put it) “Philosophy taking its time.”

Let me repeat that a historic chronicle of the succession of systems is not enough for posterity. Such a pageant, like “the story of the nations,”—the record that this, that, or the other thing, has been held to be true—however picturesquely drawn, does not teach us much. An inventory of the current beliefs of mankind, with the information added that an unconscious “stream of tendency” has set that way, that everything has been evolved out of hidden nooks and corners, that they are here, and “behold they are all of them very good,” does not satisfy us as truth-seekers, labouring in these nooks and corners. No. We must apply our logic to the entire series of beliefs that have arisen and exist, to the products produced by evolution,

with a view to eliminate the errors which have crept in amongst them, and which lurk concealed. And we must do more, we must try to strangle these errors one by one; that is to say, to refute them with a view to their extirpation and extinction. In short, every system that has appeared must be thrown back into the alembic of consciousness, out of which they have all emerged, that the fire may test every one of them; and it is only those of the asbestos-type that have any right to live. But this process of subjecting each opinion or belief to the fire of criticism is really *a part of the historical method*. It follows our psychological study, directing the critical one; and it can be applied—and should be applied—to every province of our knowledge *seriatim*.

But it has been said (and here I reach Mr Sidgwick's special contention) that it does not apply, and is not relevant to, the progress of the Sciences, because their fundamental principles do not change. Mathematics, for example, are now studied in the same way, and the same conclusions are reached by it now, as were come to in the days of Euclid and Archimedes. Similarly the methods of Astronomy and Physics do not change. I maintain, however, that the historical method *does* apply to our knowledge of what has been won for mankind by these sciences, as well as by Chemistry; and that it can now direct and guide them fruitfully, because by means of it we can trace the evolution of new and more accurate readings of the book of Nature, and interpretations of the Universe. When we come to Astronomy, it shows us how to distinguish the vagaries of astrology from the sure and certain data of the imperial science of the stars.

So too with Geology. To know the history of the cosmic processes which have made the globe we inhabit what it now is, has cleared up for us one of the "riddles of the sphinx." Let us grant that this method does not carry us very far, not nearly so far as its special votaries contend. As a matter of course it does not remove the ultimate and abiding "mystery of things"; but it explains much, not by an examina-



tion of surface phenomena now in operation, but by taking us back millions of æons, in its study of the antecedents of matter and motion and life. When we come to Biology, its aid is greater still. The researches and discoveries of Darwin have glorified the historic method in dealing with those Sciences to which he mainly devoted himself. His whole work may be described as historical. Its result was a magnificent piece of scientific and architectonic history, accomplished not by an examination of books and MSS.—the written relics of earlier civilisations—but by the study of cosmic processes, the activity of which has had no interval from the dawn of time. Its success has induced the scientific psychologist to make use of the same method in the sphere of personality, to transfer it to the realm of ethics, and to exhibit the growth of human nature in a normal manner from the embryonic stage to its present relative maturity.

But we must note again, and note well, that the study of the past by itself alone cannot explain the present. And why? Simply for this reason. We must take into account the energy that has been in operation within every link of the chain of sequence, shaping the present and creating the future. Here, again, we reach the problem of Causality. That antecedence and sequence can explain occurrences, that processes can account for products, I consider the most helpless of philosophical theories. Our inheritances taken by themselves do not explain what we now are. The chief thing to be investigated is what we have done with our heritage, how we have handled our legacy. The opening up of those vistas, along which we see the beginnings from which humanity started, shows us the working of a cosmic process in which universal order may be traced. At the same time we must interpret the whole history of man as the manifestation of his inherent nature, and latent characteristics. There is, of course, a vast interval between the embryonic and the mature consciousness, between "man and the ascidian," just as there is between the infant and the adult; but why should we select

one stage of the evolving process, and mark it off as typical of the whole? Are not the characteristics of infancy often more representative than those of age, and certainly more so than the characteristics of senile decay?

Another thing is this. The historic study of systems, as the efforts of the race to understand "the rock out of which it has been hewn," shows us not only the derivation of each, but also its composite character. We see how many elements have entered into its formation,—elements of thought, feeling, imagination, tradition,—which the introspective study of consciousness could not disclose. It shows how each elaborated system has been affected by national character and racial tendency, and what it owes to these formative elements.

It may not be inexpedient in this connection to refer to the way in which the earlier histories of Philosophy were written. They were mere miscellanies, records of detached belief, without unity or increasing purpose. They were written from points of view which were dogmatically assumed. In other words, all previous opinions were laid upon a Procrustes bed, and were accordingly stretched so as to bring out the truth of only one of them. (This characterised most of them down to the times of Ritter and Hegel.) Or, they were written with the foregone conclusion that all were worthless *ab initio*. (This has been the flaw in many histories from Sextus to Lewes.) In both cases the attitude has been unsympathetic, if not antagonistic. From Ritter onwards, however, the attitude has been one of sympathy less or more. Each system has been dealt with from the point of view of the place it occupied in the development of the thought of the world.

Now of the many who have ignored this principle—whether in writing History, or in constructing a System—it may be said that, if they have been exact in their criticism, it has been by mere accident. They have been accurate by hap-hazard, if they have any title to be regarded as scientific.

It is a most interesting question, however, whether the



modern world has reached its belief in evolution through a historical study of the changes which have occurred in the course of its own development, or by an examination of what is now going on amongst phenomena, in their present transformations. Without trying to answer so large a question, and to solve collateral problems, it seems to me that the historical method is of no use unless we begin with the present, and reason back from it to the past; concluding—by way of analogy—that what went on in former times resembles what is in operation now. “Looking backwards” is useless, if we do not carry with us the method and principle of introspection. In other words, moral retrospect will not help us, if we have no “coign of vantage” from which to see with clearness now. Suppose that we construe the history of the cosmos as the entrance of particularisation into a realm of vacancy, difference succeeding sameness—or (as Mr Spencer put it) heterogeneity coming in after, and arising from, homogeneity—we cannot put an intelligible meaning into the process, if we do not see it so far in operation now. Let us grant that every movement amongst the molecules differentiates them, and builds up other structures accordingly. Admit that the rise of new organic forms is impossible without such movements in the struggle for existence, the question remains, “Is the differentiation due to a formative principle at work within the stream of tendency?” The conditions of a new world may exist, and be in progress, within each atom as it moves on its axis; and if, at every point in our regress along the evolving stream, we have the same problem confronting us, if wherever we take our temporary stand we find its ubiquity, the problem of origin will not be solved by the mere place we occupy, and the view we have from it. It is surely not a great discovery that things went on in the past as they go on now, and the historical question, “Whence came they?” may be set aside in favour of the philosophical one, “From what do they now arise?” It comes to this, that our widest range over areas of space, and our farthest regress over intervals of time, bring us no nearer

to a solution, if we cannot find one here and now, by introspective analysis.

But it may be said, can we not find it by a comparison of certain points in the ever-evolving series? If, for this purpose, we bring together phenomena occurring somewhat far removed from one another, and find marked differences between them—while there has been no break in the chain of inheritance—we may get some light as to their production, as well as their succession; and here it seems to me that we may vindicate the historical method.

For that purpose note again the instructive parallel between the growth of the child and the evolution of the race. Certainly the progress in the former is from sameness to difference, from simplicity to complexity, from homogeneity to heterogeneity of experience; and there has been a causal or productive element at work throughout, acting along with mere succession. Let us grant the fundamental difference between Man and Nature, the dualism of mental states and their material accessories, correlated as they are so closely in experience; and also grant their possible separation, and their continued existence when detached from one another, as well as their present alliance. Growth from a rudiment, hidden altogether at first, is quite compatible not only with duration afterwards, but with separability from the root, as a zoophyte floats off from a parent stem. It may be that the process of growth, while the mind is closely surrounded and enfolded by its envelope, is the necessary prelude and preparation for casting that envelope aside. The insect and crustacean find it so; and why may not this life of ours, on a similar principle, be the preamble to one detached from it? It is nearly the most familiar thing in experience that we outgrow what we once were, as well as what we formerly knew. This outgrowth is partly determined by the cessation of what has hitherto fed and nourished our life, but it is also due to the rise of new affinities, aroused in us by a knowledge of what the race has hitherto achieved.



The historical method has also this advantage in its favour. It keeps the inquirer from vagaries, and caprices. If one takes a wide survey of the rise and fall of systems, it may save him from the wanderings of his own subjectivity. Doubtless, at the same time, it may lay a certain arrest upon him. It may curb the flights of fancy and imagination, if one turns from the intellectual chart which he has succeeded in constructing to the hundreds which have preceded it. The examination of others which in the past have arisen, declined, and fallen, will prevent him from being lost in cloudland; and so this method of inquiry may be described as to a certain extent prosaic rather than poetic, more realistic than ideal. If the intellect is made to stand as a sort of sentinel, with drawn sword, at the door of the fancy, it may at least save us from eccentricity or intellectual vagabondism; and it will perhaps be found that flightiness, or at least caprice, is more frequently the outcome of the psychological method of inquiry, while the historical is under the guidance of the light of reason. It is by one or other of the two methods, however, that all philosophical achievements have been won, and it is by a combination of the two that, as truth-seekers in this new century, we are at once stimulated, directed, and controlled.

It will follow from such a study of the origin, disappearance, and palingenesis of systems, that the old attitude of intolerance towards those of them which we now perceive to be uncouth, or *outré*, will vanish. The historical method must breed tolerance, if for no other reason than this, by giving a fresh interest to the things that are superseded. If

Men may rise on stepping stones  
Of their dead selves to higher things,

surely the race may do the same; but the stepping stones are not, therefore, to be destroyed. They may surely remain, as memorials of past experience; and may even become milestones on the roadways of individual and national progress, historic cairns monumental to posterity.

I therefore magnify the historical method of inquiry into

all problems and systems of belief, on the following grounds. It enables us to see through illusions, to distinguish between appearance and reality, or shadow and substance, to disengage the envelope from the essence of systems, to break the shell and find the kernel. It supplies us with a theory of truth and error. It enables us to understand the nature of causality, as well as the genesis of systems, while we get beyond processes to products. It demands tolerance, and gives zest to the study of every system that has been evolved. It has already opened up an almost illimitable prospect for the future. While history—as we now have it—may have told us some lies about things as to which we most of all wish to know the truth, and has certainly handed down many legends to us, its function now is to enable us to distinguish between fact and fable. If what it has brought us be adequately sifted, and readjusted by scientific tests, it gives a dispassionate verdict as to the worth of what remains. It fills up many missing links in the chain of evidence. It proves that nothing has come to the front without a justification from its antecedents; and furthermore, that what has seemed to die out of the consciousness of mankind has often only hybernated, and that there is really no such thing as loss in the intellectual and moral inheritances of the world.

WILLIAM KNIGHT.



## THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.

ST GEORGE STOCK.

WHY is there a problem of evil? Why is there not also a problem of good? Evil is at least as much a fact as good; there is no more mystery about one than about the other. The problem and the mystery are entirely made for us by our theology, which postulates that the cause of all things is the will of a single almighty, all-wise, and all-loving being. And yet, when once this proposition has been laid down, the problem is already solved. For on this supposition there is only one answer possible to it, and that is—"There is no evil; all things are very good." No philosophy but that of an unflinching optimism is open to the Christian Theist. In accordance with his first principle he is bound to maintain that this world with all its sin and sorrow is still a world which was created "for a perfect end, by perfect means, with a perfect purpose, and on a perfect plan." To him the world must necessarily be, not only the best world possible under the circumstances, but the best of all conceivable worlds.

Now this proposition may be true, but practically we do not, and we cannot, believe it. Evil is there; it is the enemy; it is a thing to be abolished; it is far too potent a factor in our daily lives for us really to accept a philosophy which thus calmly sets it aside. Nor, if we could succeed in doing so, would the doctrine be a wholesome one. For to believe that we are in a perfect world already must cut at the roots of that human endeavour after perfection upon which all our

hopes of progress depend. And that we are in such a world follows of necessity from our saying that all things are the work of a perfect and all-powerful creator. This doctrine, I venture to say, will have to be given up, if theology is to be brought into touch with the times. The mystery of this unfathomable universe is one that the plummet of our thought will never sound. But at least we can avoid, and as an intellectual duty we are bound to avoid, plain and palpable self-contradictions. We cannot assert in the same breath the reality of evil and the fact of creation by an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent being.

For mark what creation means. It is something absolutely different from making—from the *ποίησις* of Aristotle. The maker, without being a bad workman, may always find fault with his tools. Aristotle's God was no creator, but an energy informing a matter which co-existed eternally with itself. Now this is not the Christian doctrine. "Let no one ask," says Lactantius (*Div. Inst.*, ii. 8), "out of what materials God made such vast and wondrous works; for He made them all out of nothing." This doctrine leaves no loophole for ascribing evil to anything but the will of the divine creator. The blame cannot be thrown on man's will or on the will of the Devil. "No one who allows evil is good" is a proposition which would be let pass for true by anyone who was not defending a thesis, but we have only to add to it as a minor premiss, "God allows evil," to be involved in a conclusion which no Theist can admit.

Neither Greek philosophy nor the Persian religion were subject to the like embarrassment with our theology. Both of them left room for evil in the constitution of things, the one assigning it to a passive, the other to an active principle, the one to the intractable nature of matter, the other to a malignant spirit. Our theology will have to free itself from the contradiction inherent in it, if it is to be accepted by reasonable and thoughtful men. Let us by all means continue to idealise all that there is of good in our own nature, and call it



God, but while so doing let us be careful to distinguish this, the god we worship, from that other meaning of the word "God," in which it is a synonym for the sum-total of things, whereof we know and can understand so little.

A word now as to how we come to be involved in difficulties from which earlier thought was free.

We derive our religion from the Jews, a people with as distinct a genius for religion as that of the Greeks for literature and art, or that of the Romans for law and arms, but not a people marked by any metaphysical subtlety or philosophic breadth of thought. The early Hebrew, gazing in wonder at the starry skies, was content to exclaim:—"By the word of the Lord were the heavens made; and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth" (Psalm xxxiii. 6). That was his simple creed, and it is one of the legacies of thought which he has bequeathed to us.

But the Jews themselves had two religions—that is to say, there is an earlier and a later form, which differ so widely from one another as to justify us in regarding them as distinct.

The earlier form is an uncompromising Monotheism, in which all evil as well as good is ascribed to the agency of one almighty being—"I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form the light and create darkness; I make peace and create evil; I am the Lord, that doeth all these things" (Isaiah xlv. 7).

God was in those days—be it said without irreverence—his own Devil. He may have created for himself innumerable spirits, but, if so, they were merely messengers of his that do his pleasure; as yet, we hear nothing of "war in heaven," no whisper of a revolt against the Most High.

When Pharaoh's heart has to be hardened that evil may be brought upon himself and upon his people, it is the Lord himself who hardens it; it is the Lord who moves David to number his people, that the act may be avenged by a devastating pestilence; it is the spirit of the Lord that prompts Samson to his prodigious feats of slaughter; and when the

spirit of the Lord had departed from Saul, it was still an evil spirit from the Lord that troubled him (1 Sam. xvi. 14).

Thus physical and moral evil alike come direct from God, the one source of all existence and the one cause of all events. There is no attempt made to devolve from him the burden of his own creation. All plague, and fire and famine; all turbulent passions; all frenzy and melancholy madness; all boils and blains upon man and beast; all sickness and untimely deaths, with the thousand and one calamities that devastate the homes and the hearts of men, are ascribed, not as afterwards to the malignity of evil spirits, but to the direct volition of the Mighty Maker, who has power over the clay to make one vessel to honour and another to dishonour.

Everywhere indeed in the Old Testament angels are at work fulfilling the behests of Jehovah: it is the angel of the Lord who walks in the pestilence and who falls with sudden panic upon the invading host; it is the angel of the Lord who slays the first-born in every Egyptian household; it is moreover the special function of angels to foretell the birth of distinguished persons—of Isaac, in whom the Hebrew race was potentially contained; of Samson, the Jewish Hercules; of Samuel, the uncrowned king of Israel; angels take upon themselves human form and mingle familiarly among men; they dine with Abraham and pass the night with Lot; and in the book of Tobit we find the angel Raphael disguising himself as a hired servant, that he may conduct Tobias safely on a journey. But be their intervention trivial or important, merciful or maleficent, it is always in strict accordance with the will of the Almighty. God and his angels have not yet found their dark counterpart in the Devil and his legions. Even the amount of individuality that is implied in angels having proper names is the effect of foreign influence: in the primary form of the Jewish religion the personality of Jehovah is so engrossing and transcendent as to overshadow that of all his subordinates. The full scope of this early phase of thought reveals itself in the vision of Micaiah (1 Kings xxii.



19-23), which reminds one of the councils of Zeus in the *Iliad*—“I saw the Lord sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven standing by him on his right hand and on his left. And the Lord said, Who shall entice Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-Gilead? And one said on this manner; and another said on that manner. And there came forth a spirit, and stood before the Lord, and said, I will entice him. And the Lord said unto him, Wherewith? And he said, I will go forth, and will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And he said, Thou shalt entice him, and shalt prevail also: go forth and do so.”

It is evident that here we are in the same stage of thought as in the Homeric poems, where there is no difficulty at all felt in ascribing evil to divine agency. The religious consciousness has not yet reached that degree of development which makes Plato prefer to limit the omnipotence of God rather than ascribe to him the authorship of evil. We reach that later in St James; but between his period and that of which we have been speaking the Jewish religion had undergone a vital change.

In my childhood I had no doubts as to the origin of evil. I was taught, as an unquestioned portion of the Christian verity, to ascribe it to a person, who went under many aliases, being variously known as the Devil, Satan, the Old Serpent, Apollyon, Abaddon, Beelzebub, or Lucifer, a person of strong character, various of whose sayings and doings were known to us, partly from the writings of the Jews, partly from those of Milton. This person may now be considered to be dead, for that post-mortem discussion which follows the demise of celebrated characters has long ago set in. It has revealed this personality as being a far more complex one than appeared to a mind saturated from infancy with the unconscious dishonesty of the pulpit, which found one consistent scheme of teaching from the first verse of Genesis to the last of Revelation. The leaders of Christian thought now give us leave to interpret the story of the Garden of Eden as a fable, a liberty,

by the way, which was taken by the Jews themselves as long ago as the days of Philo and Josephus. Now in fables we know that animals can speak. The serpent of Genesis is no devil, but a *bona fide* serpent. It was only later speculation (Rev. xii. 9) which detected the arch-fiend disguised under its form. In the narrative in Genesis there is not a hint of anything of the kind. The serpent there is one of the beasts of the field "which the Lord God had made"; it is "cursed above all cattle," its curse consisting in having to trail on its belly and eat dust; perpetual enmity is prophesied between its seed and that of the woman; it is to attack them in the heel, and they are to aim their blows at its head. Of this prophecy we have all seen the fulfilment in the mangled snake by the roadside and in the cruel instinct which arms the hand against that reptile without question of venomous or innocuous, and which sacrifices even the gentle slow-worm on account of its serpentine form.

Leaving out of account therefore the serpent of Genesis, we are met with the fact that the Devil only grows up in the Old Testament and does not attain maturity until the New.

In the book of Job we find Satan among the sons of God paying court at stated times to the Almighty—"Now there was a day when the Sons of God came to present themselves before the Lord, and Satan came among them" (Job i. 6).

He holds the office of Accuser General of Mankind, which he discharges indeed with asperity, but there is no indication that he is exceeding his duty.

A similar part is played by Satan in the book of Zechariah, where the seer in vision sees "Joshua the high priest standing before the angel of the Lord, and Satan standing at his right hand to be his adversary." On this occasion Satan is rebuked by the Lord for his over-zeal; at the same time it is distinctly intimated by the high priest being clothed in filthy rags that the accusation was not wholly groundless.



The only other passage in the Old Testament in which the word Satan is used as a proper name is 1 Chronicles xxi. 1, where we are told that "Satan stood up against Israel, and moved David to number Israel," whereas in the corresponding passage in 2 Samuel xxiv. 1 it is God himself who moves David to do this.

Such is the meagre part played by Satan in the Old Testament. Now let us turn to the New.

In the New Testament Satan is no longer one of the sons of God; nor is he merely the accuser of mankind, whose character was soured by his office. He has developed into something far more resembling the Evil Principle of the Persian religion.

In the interval between the Old and the New Testament the Jews have been so profoundly affected by Oriental speculation that they have practically a new religion. Ideas have dawned upon them undreamed of in the simpler faith of their fathers; man's life has at once deepened and darkened; awful vistas have been opened to their imagination, and dread possibilities, involving tremendous and eternal issues.

In the early Hebrew religion we have a scheme of purely temporal rewards and punishments: there is no hint of a life beyond the grave. In the later religion, on the other hand, the absorbing idea of man's immortality has wholly taken possession of the Jewish mind, and all dreams of a prosperous earthly life in a pleasant land have paled into insignificance before it. What mental riot and inebriation are produced by the introduction of this great idea into a system of thought! How man's life is exalted and expanded by it! How he despises his fellow-creatures, whom he deems destitute of the same high prerogative! As for them, they come up and perish without name or number, like the rank grasses that wither when the sun is strong; but the soul of the meanest son of man is a thing that fills eternity and a prize that gods might battle for. Here is a difference to start with which sets the earlier and the later form of the Jewish religion wide as

the poles asunder. The Sadducees on this point represent the side of Mosaic orthodoxy: but they were few in number, although men of wealth and position. It was the Pharisees, however, with their innovations of tradition, with their angelology, and their doctrine of immortality, who held possession of the popular mind, insomuch that when the Sadducees took office they had to feign conformity to Pharisaic notions, as the multitude would not otherwise tolerate them (*Jos. Ant.*, xviii. 1, § 4).

Again, the early Hebrew religion was, as we have seen, a real Monotheism, in which there was but one source for good and evil, one fountain both of bitter water and sweet. The new religion, on the other hand, is a veiled Dualism, under the constitutional forms of Monotheism. It is impossible now to ascribe evil to God. From him cometh down every good and perfect gift, but it is sheer impiety to suggest that he can tempt man to evil. The differentiation of functions, which we have seen beginning in the Old Testament, between God and the Devil, is now complete.

In the old religion this world was still God's world; in the religion of the New Testament it is the Devil's world. He is the acknowledged "Prince of this world," and all its pleasures, and its power, and its pomp are his. He is the "Prince of the power of the air, that now worketh in the children of disobedience," inspiring all unsanctified thoughts, and all mankind are his natural-born subjects, children of wrath, and destined to destruction, unless some mightier and beneficent being can enter this strong man's house and spoil his goods. It is this conception of human life as the arena of a struggle between the powers of light and darkness that rendered possible the conception of a Saviour, so different from the Messiah who was to restore the throne of David. The whole meaning of Christianity lies in the notion of an internecine war between the two kingdoms of good and evil. It was to destroy this deep-seated dominion of Satan that God is declared to have sent Christ upon earth, that he might



deliver some portion of mankind from the power of darkness and translate them into the kingdom of the son of his love. By the appearance of the Saviour the Devil's hold upon the world was loosened; demons were cast out, by no magical collusion with Beelzebub, as the Pharisees fain would have it, but in spite of him; and the mysterious "world rulers of this darkness" were shaken upon their thrones. When the Seventy returned to their Master, exhilarated by their success in expelling demons through the power which he had imparted to them, Jesus is recorded to have said, "I beheld Satan like lightning fall from heaven" (Luke x. 18), evidently signifying some diminution which the power of Satan was supposed to have undergone.

Lastly in the old religion angels were a mere machinery whereby God executed his purposes, the nameless commissioners who went obediently on his mandates, and had no individuality or character of their own, insomuch that it is difficult to distinguish between "the angel of the Lord" and the Lord himself. The Sadducees even contrived to eliminate the belief in angels altogether, while professing a veneration for the books of Moses. In the new religion, on the other hand, we have two mighty hierarchies, one of good, the other of evil—thrones and dominions and principalities and powers, rising tier above tier in ineffable altitudes of grandeur or gloom, over which the eye of the imagination wanders, till it is dazed on the one hand by the insufferable splendours that half veil and half reveal the Father of Lights, or lost on the other in the unfathomable night that shrouds the throne of the King of Darkness.

With this strong contrast before us between the old religion of the Jews and the new, can we go on repeating the simple formula of their earlier faith, which the Jews themselves were forced by the advance of the religious consciousness to abandon?

The Christian Scientists, though speculation is perhaps not their strong point, have nevertheless done good service to

religious thought by putting together two propositions which most people admit separately, namely,

(1) God is All;

(2) God is good.

But out of these two propositions there inevitably arises a third, namely,

All is good,

or, in other words,

There is no evil.

This is strict logic, even though the tiro may fancy that he detects a flaw in the reasoning. Now, as we saw at starting, this is the only position open to Christian Theism. But it is not open to common-sense. We know in practice that there is evil. Unless, therefore, we are content with a religion divorced from practice, our religion must recognise this practical truth. Consequently we must deny one of the premisses which between them contain the conclusion.

Are we then to deny the proposition that God is good? Our instincts of reverence make us shrink from doing so. But if the word "God" is to be taken in the sense in which it is asserted that God is All, it is plain that this must be done; for evil as much as good is a part of the constitution of things. But then can we worship a Being who is partly good and partly evil? Could we, for instance, imagine ourselves putting up prayers to Mr Bradley's Absolute — a Being consisting of a single experience, made up of all individual experiences, good, bad, and indifferent, a vast consciousness, containing the consciousness of the publican and sinner equally with that of the saint and sage? No; we can only worship a being whom we believe to be purely good.

It is therefore the other premiss that must be denied in the interests of religion, and we must cease to assert that God is All. This means that we must give up making religion into a theory of the universe, and be content to regard it as a passion of the heart. And this is surely its true character.



It is something more akin to love than to philosophy or metaphysics. Listen to the Psalmist of old:—

“As the hart panteth after the water-brooks,  
So panteth my soul after thee, O God.”

Or listen again to St Augustine—“Thou hast made us for thee, and our heart can find no rest, until it rest in thee.” There speaks the spirit of religion, craving to give itself to something it can trust. The God we worship is not the whole of things, which in many of its aspects does not call for worship, but is simply the Spirit of Good. This God is not an inference from facts without, but a revelation from the heart within. He is not reached by the road of experience nor yet by logical necessities of thought. There has been no proof of the existence of God in which the intellect cannot find a flaw. Let us seek for him then where he may be found, and that is in our own souls. Within man’s inmost spirit

“lies  
The mystery of mysteries,”

not in any volume, however sacred. Whatever we can divine of best and truest and purest in our own nature, that we objectify under the name of God.

But, it will be said, the Spirit of Good is a mere abstraction. Well, if it be so, men have ere now worshipped abstractions; yes, and died for abstractions. Were the Romans such benighted Pagans after all, when they set up temples to Faith and Piety and Virtue?

Yet are we so sure that the Spirit of Good is a mere abstraction? Who shall pronounce those to be in error who have felt that there is a power within and yet above them, a will higher than their own, wherefrom they may expect strength and guidance, if they seek it in sincerity of heart?

But even if this conviction be an illusion, or at most an unverifiable hypothesis, at all events we know that right is better than wrong, whether it succeed or whether it fail.

Good is intrinsically superior to evil and *ought* to be supreme. There is always a God *de jure*, even if there be not one *de facto*. Are we never to fight for a cause unless we are assured of its triumph? What matter then if the Spirit of Good be not omnipotent, and be not an expression of the whole of things? It is still the one true God, and altogether worthy of our worship. Wherever men of goodwill are to be found, there is the Holy Catholic Church and there the Communion of Saints. Who shall presume to say that this society is limited to earth and extends not its fellowship into worlds unseen? Here on earth the crust of conventionality conceals and distorts the true features of the soul, and good men often misunderstand and misrepresent one another. But it may be that in the world of soul response is quicker and recognition surer, when the spirit of man mounts thereto on the wings of aspiration. Help from a will like our own seems to be the only tenable theory of prayer, unless we are content to believe that prayer, when answered, answers itself, being at once cause and effect. It is the human God in Christianity that has given it its power over the heart. The Spirit of Good has been identified with the Spirit of Jesus.

About this it is not the place to speak here. Suffice it now to say that it effects the necessary distinction between the God of Nature, whom we may fear or admire, but cannot love, and the God of Grace, strong to save us from our sins. The God of Nature is not moral, nor yet immoral, but simply non-moral. His ways are not as our ways, and they furnish no example for our guidance. The awful power that reveals itself around us is a fact to be reckoned with, not a being to be worshipped. If we insist on representing God in this sense as a person, we reduce that power to our standard of behaviour, and by that standard he must be condemned. Now for the conscience to condemn God is a peril to religion, and for the conscience not to condemn God is a peril to morality. Let us therefore make up our minds what God it is we worship. Is it the God of Nature revealed to us by



science or the God whom our hearts reveal to us? We must take our choice, and desist from the vain endeavour to fuse the two into one. How beautiful are those lines of Keble:—

‘There’s not a strain to Memory dear,  
Nor flower in classic grove,  
There’s not a sweet note warbled here,  
But minds us of Thy Love.  
O Lord, our Lord, and spoiler of our foes,  
There is no light but Thine : with Thee all beauty glows.”

And yet how one-sided and untrue to fact, if addressed to the God of Nature! For to Nature belongs the ugly equally with the beautiful, the awful and sinister as well as the benign, the howling wastes of blackness as well as the sunlit pastures. Let us then frankly acknowledge of the God we worship that his kingdom is not of this world, but let not that prevent us from striving to the uttermost that that kingdom yet may come.

ST GEORGE STOCK.

OXFORD.

## ART AND IDEAS.

CHARLES MONTAGUE BAKEWELL, PH.D.,

Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of California.

THE question that underlies any discussion of the philosophy of art is that of the relation of æsthetics at once to ethics and to philosophy, or, more precisely, of the relation to each other of the three Ideals that dominate in these three fields respectively, the Beautiful, the Good, and the True. Are they mutually involved in works of art, or is the realm of the beautiful absolutely independent and self-sufficient?

I. Turning to the facts, we are at once confronted with the time-honoured dispute between critics of form and critics of content. And here, with regard to æsthetic judgments, moral goodness and philosophic truth are in precisely the same case. If the one is ruled out, the other is also; if the one is admitted, the other is admitted at the same time. Undoubtedly the modern tendency is to exclude both, to rest the case for art on a refined and subtle sensuism: æsthetics is simply an affair of feeling, as the word itself implies,—a matter of direct appreciation; that is, an appreciation not mediated by any moral or philosophical considerations. The artist is neither philosopher nor moralist, but simply the man of exquisitely subtle sensibility, whose world of sensations and feelings is wondrously wealthy and varied. That world he merely appreciates,—values for what it obviously is, and not for any ulterior purpose or meaning it may suggest. This very appreciation is, to be sure, a matter of selection, but the selection is determined by the



artist's genius, which is a sort of glorified taste. We, on our part, in enjoying the artist's creation are privileged to enjoy his world as it has been instinctively moulded by his sensitive frame.

For lack of a better term, we shall call this view æstheticism. It is the doctrine that æsthetic appreciations are sufficient unto themselves; that art has nothing to do with philosophy or morals. The approving judgment of this school runs, so far as poetry is concerned—and *mutatis mutandis* it applies to other forms of art as well—*ça marche et ça m'amuse*, the thing goes and it pleases me.

This view has, no doubt, a decadent look; and its prevalence has, in fact, given much encouragement to the horde of decadent artists in our day. The decadent is the man whose practical motto is: Taste life, experience all things, multiply your emotions as much as possible, sticking not at opium, hashish, or harlots, when normal means have been exhausted,—and then let a fine sensibility do the rest. But this is in truth a perversion, however natural a perversion, of the view that would set art wholly free from the leading-strings of philosophy, morals, and religion. One need only point out that the decadent in his mad career has but dulled the edge of his fine sensibility, and thereby defeated his own purpose. So we cannot thus easily expose the weakness of æstheticism by exhibiting the decadent as its unmasked exponent.

Æstheticism has brought its natural reaction in the rise of modern symbolism. The æstheticist seizes upon what we may at once recognise as indisputably true of art: it must please, and it is not a substitute for sermons or for philosophical or scientific treatises. The symbolist, on the other hand, feels that ideas, intelligible meanings, and even moral purposes are involved, and, apparently unable to secure these things in any other way, drags them in by violence and hurls them at you. Now we may readily admit that in a work of art ideas as such must be subordinated, must not be so obtrusive that one forthwith turns away from the impression to ponder its

meaning and follow out a train of reflection which that meaning suggests; and, of course, a supposed work of art that requires a "key" is in a still worse case. However, symbolism is a perversion of idealism, and no more settles the dispute in favour of æstheticism than the behaviour of the decadents establishes idealism. The obvious trouble with symbolism is that the ideas, and the sensuous imagery that conveys the impression, are, like the music and the drama in most opera, forcibly collocated and not intimately blended.

Now, one may freely admit that in judging a work of art as a work of art one takes it for its own sake, simply appreciates it, and for the time being deliberately eschews the analytic or reflective attitude, and does not ask what its message is, or whether it has any message. And one may also admit that in taking this other attitude one is no longer taking the artistic object merely as a work of art, but is taking it as also an object in a rational and moral universe. Nevertheless, one need be in no way committed by these admissions to the belief that a true work of art is not bound up—yes, indissolubly bound up,—with the moral and intellectual ideal. That question is still left open. The things one likes are, after all, an index of the kind of character one is. Perhaps unconsciously, instinctively, we are drawn toward great works of art because we dimly feel that in them we have in some measure found the embodiment of our moral aspiration. Perhaps the sickle of time will destroy all works of art save those in which these things are present. Yes, perhaps their presence is the very ground of our appreciation of works of art, and the reason for our making a special class of the fine arts, and distinguishing them from the arts that merely tickle and please—like the art of cookery.

An illustration will make this point more clear. There is this same aspect of spontaneity in one's appreciation of one's fellow-men. "The reason why I cannot tell, but this I know, and know full well, I do not like you, Dr Fell." This expresses the initial attitude both of likes and dislikes. Yet if one is



continually thus baffled, the judgment weakens, one grows indifferent. The fact is that, in most cases, in the intercourse of daily life, reasons without end keep rolling out, telling you why you admire or hate that person so. Yet there is a sense in which all these reasons are impertinent,—do not give the why at all. For your attitude is not the result of a long train of reasoning, of piling syllogism on syllogism, Ossa upon Pelion, and then drawing out the conclusion: "Therefore, Beatrice, I love thee," or, "Therefore, Dr Fell, I hate you."

II. It might seem that the question as to the implication of the Ideals of the True and the Good in works of art could be tested by simply taking those great works that have stood the test of time, and examining them to see whether these things are there found. In most cases we should find them; in some they are far to seek. But even should we find them in all, our thorough æstheticist would not be slow to point out the circle in such reasoning. For, after all, the history of art is brief, and the point he would make is precisely that art is now for the first time becoming emancipated from the thralldom of tradition and entering upon its own free career.

But if we cannot settle the controversy between æstheticism and idealism by an examination of the acknowledged masterpieces, can we not do so by making appeal to the artists themselves? What report do they give? This way helps as little as the other. For, in the first place, the artists themselves by no means agree, and, while the majority in our day might express themselves in terms of pure æstheticism, there are many notable exceptions.

Those artists who espouse the cause of idealism are, besides being artists, also men given to reflection, philosophers, and, perhaps, as in the case of Leonardo da Vinci, men of science as well; and, in giving us their theories of art, it is the philosopher and not the artist in them that for the time being has the floor. Those artists who deny the dependence of art upon the ideas of the Good and the True are simply reporting their

attitude as artists; and this brings us to the second reason why the appeal to the artist is *ultra vires*: the artist works synthetically, not analytically; his method of procedure is direct and immediate. "The rest may reason and welcome, 'tis we musicians *know*," may express his attitude. That is, while he may be confident of the value of his results, and dignify them by using the term "know," he is equally sure that it is not a kind of knowing that is the result of "reasoning."

The idealist, however, although well aware that the artist, as artist, simply "paints the thing as he sees it," would call attention to the fact that what the artist sees is by no means determined merely by what is there before his eyes, but is the result of a selective process, more or less sub-conscious, which is determined by what he himself is. Even from the standpoint of pleasure, the kind of pleasures singled out, and their arrangement, is an indication of the kind of man. If this is true, the great artist must be a great character and a man of true vision,—a fact not lightly disproved by recalling the surface immoralities of some truly great artists. His work, while thus being from one point of view the simple expression of his inward vision, is in truth not the expression of his private and personal feelings about things, but rather a creation that forthwith takes its place in the realm of reality. It is more real than the things of Nature, not less so. To it one can continually return with fresh interest, for its content is inexhaustible. It is in its way an epitome of Nature,—Nature as transfigured in the vision of the master-seer, and compacted into the single definite impression. It is thus fraught with meaning, and also indissolubly bound up with the moral ideal. Yet the idealist, quite as much as the æstheticist, objects to the "novel with a purpose," and to any supposed work of art that has an obvious meaning or moral written over it. To him such a meaning is condemned, by its very obviousness, as shallow and superficial. Nature's meanings are large and elusive and difficult of comprehension. Such a work is therefore less significant and less real than Nature, not more so.



III. An attempt is sometimes made to settle the dispute empirically, by examining, not the works of art nor the views of the artists, but rather the attitude toward works of art of him who is able to appreciate artistic things. A consideration of this position will help to draw a little sharper the lines of the controversy.

The competent judge of a work of art, it is said, is simply the man who is gifted with a refined sensitiveness that has been stimulated and developed by much experience of beautiful things ; his organism has become so delicately attuned that in the presence of a beautiful object he thrills with pure and unalloyed joy, neither knowing nor caring why. Such a one is a connoisseur, a virtuoso ; his judgments are spontaneous, and he is impatient of reasoning, which withdraws the mind from the simple appreciation of the thing before it. If he deign to give reasons at all for the joy that is his, he will prattle of harmony of colour, of graceful lines, of balance and proportion, of rhythm and melody, and possibly of the sense of mystery and the appeal to the imagination. In short, he will keep pretty close to the purely sensuous character of the work ; and all who do not take a work of art in this way he will accuse of failing to see the beautiful object in their eagerness to see *through* it.

There is a better and a worse type of this æstheticism. The worse, the more boisterous sort, would display its critical competency by being prodigal in the use of adjectives of adoration when in the presence of approved works of art. And there is frequently something pathetically sentimental in the contortions of those who are so fearful lest the intrusion of ideas should mar the exquisiteness of the sensuous thrill which the work of art is expected to give. But there are also the choicer spirits, who hold themselves in check, and it is with them alone that we are concerned. One can deny neither the existence of such virtuosity as theirs, nor the value of the judgment it pronounces. Yet all this settles nothing ; for the idealist, too, recognises that aspect of spontaneity in artistic

appreciation which the æstheticist is here insisting upon, and recognises, moreover, the fact that in going beyond this aspect one is ceasing, for the time being at least, to take the work of art purely as a work of art.

The idealist, however, holds that this attitude, when taken as self-sufficing, is precisely like the view in ethics that would reduce morals to matters of good taste. This is a plausible ethical doctrine. There are things a gentleman doesn't do. Nor do we regard a man as altogether moral unless he chooses the right and eschews the wrong without reasoning thereon, with that same instinctive, intuitive sense of eternal fitness that guides a gentleman aright in the lesser matters of the law. Morals must become manners. Yet one cannot convert this proposition, and make "taste" the measure and source of morality, without softening the moral law. The inadequacy of this view is patent in the presence of any great moral crisis. It would be ludicrous to say that one would go to the stake "for conscience's sake" just because, and only because, sincerity and intellectual honesty are part of the gentleman's code of manners.

In æsthetics this attitude is equally limited. Take, for instance, in literature, the *Oresteia* or the *Divine Comedy*. One may read such works a hundred times and see new meanings all the while; each time be led farther and farther afield in the consideration of problems of human life and destiny, and each time, as he returns to the work from these excursions into philosophy and morals, find his eyes but the more keenly trained for the spontaneous enjoyment of the perfect work before him. Thus, in some cases at least, making explicit the ideals of the Good and the True suggested by a work of art does but train one for a better appreciation of the beautiful as such. And what is true of literature is true also of music and painting and sculpture, and even of architecture.

The æstheticist, in his attitude toward the appreciation of art, is very apt to hide under cover of that sophistically ambiguous popular saw, *De gustibus non est disputandum*, which means



several quite distinct things. It may simply mean that one cannot argue oneself, or another, into the enjoyment of a taste that is distinctly unsavoury. Or, again, it is the expression of the live-and-let-live of latitudinarian democracy: "You like this, I don't; tastes differ; that is the end of the matter." Finally, as used by our exacter æstheticists, our connoisseurs, it by no means affirms that one man's taste is as good as another's. It rather indicates a certain condescension. Our connoisseur never doubts the real superiority of his æsthetic judgments, and when he remarks to one who differs from him, usually with a shrug of the shoulders, "*De gustibus*," it is as if he said, "Poor fellow! You are no doubt a boor; but it is hopeless to reason with you, for the root of the matter is not in you."

Usually there is a certain rivalry of these three meanings, now one and now the other gaining the supremacy; and the plausibility of any one spreads over the rest. Yet the third meaning, which is the dominant one with the connoisseurs, is shared at times by all who hold the pseudo-tolerant view of æstheticism. They would all admit that it is a matter of indifference, so far as one's soul's salvation is concerned, if one do not like beans, or if one object to an over-insistence on purple shadows. But if one prefer to eat with one's knife, to be slovenly in one's habits; if one prefer the latest rag-time to Beethoven, Marie Corelli to Thackeray,—then it is quite different. The *De gustibus* comes out with the accompanying shrug: that soul is in jeopardy. Now the moment this third meaning creeps in, an appeal is in effect made to a norm or canon of good taste that is objectively valid; and thereby the standpoint of pure æstheticism is abandoned, and the work of art is brought within the scope of reason and morals.

IV. With these facts before us, we can clearly see what is involved in the controversy. The issue is not whether or no the work of art, as such, appeals primarily to the purely appreciative rather than the reflective and moral sides of man's nature, to his emotions rather than his intellect or his will;

since idealist and æstheticist are in entire agreement on this point. Nor is it the question whether the world of feeling as organised by the ideal of beauty is a self-contained world, with a kind of inner completeness of its own ; since idealists also may admit this. It is, rather, whether this realm of beauty is so distinct and independent that the ideals of truth and moral goodness have no structural part in it, nor beauty in the worlds organised primarily by these ideals.

We have seen that in some cases, at least, the intertwining of these ideals is obvious ; that by some artists it is expressly affirmed, and that by most critics avowedly æstheticist it is tacitly assumed. And the alternative seems to be, either the acceptance of the interpenetration of these ideals, or else the substitution of " I like," or " I don't like," for the ordinary æsthetic judgment. The fact is that the sensuist in æsthetics, if he be thorough, is a hedonist in ethics, and a sceptic or an agnostic in metaphysics. These views encourage one another. They are all attempts to get along without anything that is objectively valid—at least anything knowable—and are reaffirmations of the old Protagorean motto : Man,—the creature of sensation,—is the measure of all things.

But if the attempt to hold the æsthetic world entirely sundered from ethics and philosophy lands one in mere privacy of opinion, it is also open to grave objections on psychological grounds. There was a time when psychology viewed man as if he could be divided into distinct and separate compartments, called faculties. There was the faculty of sensation and feeling, the faculty of will, and the faculty of intellect. If there is one advance in psychology more sure than another, it is that marked by the abandonment of this whole faculty-view. Every one of the contents of consciousness involves the aspect of directness, of privacy and particularity, that is characteristic of feeling ; every one involves the aspect of universality that is characteristic of reason, if it be only in the employment of the categories which make each particular content a definite object of consciousness ; every one involves the aspect of



directive activity that is characteristic of will, if it be only in the matter of attention. The entire self is involved in every act of consciousness, and the attempt of æstheticists to keep the world of feeling sundered from the realm of morals and of reason is simply a return to this antiquated piecemeal view of man. In truth, it is not a fragment of man that is involved in æsthetic judgments, but the whole man, and therefore we may be sure that a supposed work of art, if it offend morals and reason,—yes, if it do not contribute to morality and rationality,—is bad art, and in the long run will not please. Only, in applying these supersensuous tests, one must be careful not to employ any narrow, provincial, or ultra-puritanic notions of moral goodness, or any merely abstract considerations of reason.

V. The old-fashioned faculty-view of man has in our day worked itself out practically in a very instructive manner. The æstheticist tends to carry his view beyond the region of art into all concerns of life. Side by side with this view has developed a sort of one-sided rationalism which would reduce all things to mere happenings in nature, and all these, in the last analysis, to mathematical equations,—the attitude of radical scientificism. And simultaneously there has developed the view of the apostles of “action,” who are impatient alike of feeling and of theory, and can only sing the praises of the strenuous life. The main thing is to be up and doing. It is not, “Be sure you are right, then go ahead,” but, “Go ahead anyway.” All of these views are counterfeit philosophies, inasmuch as they take a fragment of man for the whole person.

Corresponding to these views are three quite distinct types of genuine philosophies, which are marked by the more or less exclusive predominance of one or the other of these three ideals. We may call them abstract idealism, voluntarism, and mysticism. These are genuine philosophies, inasmuch as each takes into consideration all sides of human nature and all of the facts involved. And yet, in the end, in each case the

unity which is sought in the interpretation of experience in its totality is too exclusively dominated by the ideal which marks the realisation of a single aspect of human nature,—formal reason, will, or feeling,—to the undue subordination of the other two.

Abstract idealism is the result of the attempt to unify the world of experience from the standpoint of bare logic. It accordingly holds that all reality, if it is to be intelligible at all, must be encompassed within the unity of a single all-embracing consciousness. The outcome is: There is but one genuine reality; all the manifold variety of experience is to be viewed as moments or aspects or fragments of the one inclusive reality. This reality is indeed a *lonely* "God," and soon comes to have a very unreal look, for it can have no real relations. We may, it is true, try to describe a quasi-life of such a being, and after the fashion of the school speak of its dirempting itself continually into a world of partial expressions of its being, and continually healing the breach by drawing the world back into itself. But should we go on to call this being God, its only title to that august name would seem to be that it looks very like "the ancient of days," since its life consists in one long-drawn game of senile solitaire, which it plays with its own doubles as counters. In fact, this philosophy is confessedly unable to find room for any complete individuals save one, and that because it has been dominated throughout by the view that all relation is limitation. And in the end even this One ceases to have any real significance. Thus, in the inevitable dialectic of thought, this philosophy finally reveals its inner contradiction; its "real" passes over into a realm beyond knowledge.

Voluntarism hits upon that aspect of intelligent life which is manifested in the will, and makes that the fundamental thing. It may, and frequently does, start in a practical human interest in freedom; or it may start from the psychological consideration of the part played by the will in attention; or it may proceed from metaphysical considerations of



the cause, or ground, of reality. But in any case the final outcome is the same: will, severed alike from intellect and from feeling, and independent of them, becomes pure *arbitrium*, and is as such an unintelligible thing. Thus this view, logically enough, leads once more to reality as beyond knowledge, and to a denial even of the will in any significant sense. Though first appearing as the Divine Arbitrium of Scotus, or the Will of Schopenhauer, it finds in the Unconscious of Von Hartmann its final outcome. The same relentless dialectic carries this partial view beyond itself.

Mysticism seizes upon that aspect of immediacy, of direct ownership, which is present in all knowing and in every act of consciousness, and is specially characteristic of feeling, and makes this the fundamental fact. What is to the mystic the most striking thing about the mind's progress toward truth and reality is this going out of the mind toward its object,—welcoming it, appreciating it, identifying itself with it. When we are in ignorance, or possess merely opinion or dogma, the object of consciousness seems an alien thing. The flash of insight takes away this alien character; the object and the self seem to merge in one. To be sure, this alien character reappears; for always, after the first glow of satisfaction in the discovery of truth, new questions arise that mark the presence still of ignorance and limitation. So it is, ever, in the finite world. In all struggles after knowledge, in all efforts of the will to realise its aim, the satisfaction that crowns success is short-lived. New vistas unconquered by reason and will keep ever opening up. Thus the mystic comes to conceive the world of struggle, and of attainment that but marks the beginning of fresh struggles, as a world wherein the soul lives estranged from itself. The soul is, however, animated by a longing, a passionate longing, to be at home with itself. Thus he comes to look upon the finite world as of value only in so far as one makes use of it in the effort to escape from the bondage of the finite and find one's fruition in the immediate enjoyment of absolute reality. Unrest, satisfaction; unrest,

satisfaction ;—thus he reads the story of man. Yet no finite satisfaction ever satisfies ; Faust never finds the moment to which he can say : “ O stay, thou art so fair.” So, once more, reality slips off into a world above and beyond all knowledge.

Within the realm of the finite, however, it is above all in that pure and disinterested joy felt in the presence of beauty, whether of objects, pursuits, or character, that this view gets its most striking confirmation. In such experiences, the mystics say, the soul finds its kin, and feels at home. It is by the path of beauty that the soul rises into its kingdom and into reality. So even truth and good deeds are regarded as desirable for their very beauty.

Summon all the saints, from Dionysius to Bonaventura, and you will find that what quasi-positive content their conception of ultimate reality possesses is borrowed from the region of art. They may not tell you what reality is, for it is above knowledge, but they are sure that it will give in a supreme way that disinterested satisfaction of the soul’s longing that beautiful things give, in their poor degree, in this world below ; that it will “ over-fill the eyeless intellect with superbeautiful splendours.” The one aim in life is, that feeling should be set free from the bondage of the things of sense and of the passions, and be lifted up into the one supreme, absorbing Passion, wherein feeling is at last freed from the feelings, the whole world of finitude vanishes in a glow of indescribable splendour, and the soul is left in mystic union with God.

The voluntarist calls the mystic a dreamer ; the rationalist accuses him of obscurantism. But his heart is untroubled, for he has found the peace that passeth understanding.

It is to our father Plato that all these mystic views, so far as they have appeared in the Western world, trace their pedigree, although he was not himself a pure mystic. And many sober men, who for the most part dwell far enough from these views, occasionally catch the fire of the mystic’s vision. And when the appeal is made from the head to the heart,—when it is not made in the interest of lazy reason, but by earnest



students,—it is in truth made in the interest of a larger reason than that which is employed in purely formal reasoning, and is a demand for a fuller recognition of that aspect of the truth which the mystic has made supreme, that aspect which is primarily revealed when the ideal of beauty is made the key to the interpretation of nature.

VI. As in psychology the three aspects of human nature, feeling, reason, will, can never be actually sundered, so in philosophy the three ideals which bring order and unity into the world viewed from the standpoint of these aspects taken severally are in truth inextricably conjoined. Neither can exclude the others without in the end consuming itself in the effort to do so. Yet each point of view may, and must, be carefully discriminated from the rest.

And thus we can see the real significance of the cry: Art for art's sake. It is quite legitimate to abstract this aspect of experience from the other two, and consider it in its totality apart from them. And yet we can be very sure that a work of art, if it is to appeal to the complete man, and not to an abstraction substituted for man, cannot continue to please if it shock the ideals of the Good and the True; and if it is to continue to please, it cannot shock these ideals.

The pure activity of cognition transforms the surface world of sensations and feelings into an objective world of truth and reality; into a world that then seems to be wholly independent of the self.

The pure activity of the will presents the sharpest contrast to this. Here the self seeks to affirm itself, and to assert its independence of any dominating objective order. Man is man, and master of his fate. Consciousness turns into self-consciousness, the expression of self-activity.

Through the pure activity of æsthetic feeling the very objective world is made intimately mine; and my subjective pleasure is transformed into a joy that seems detached from everything purely mine, seems to find its being at the very core of reality itself. Thus the limitation of subject and

object seems to vanish, and cause becomes effective without compulsion. This seems to have been Aristotle's meaning when he said, "God draws the world unto himself as the beloved the lover." And the very same activity appearing in human relations in spiritual love, in the free attachment of fair soul to fair soul, breaks down the barriers between man and man, and discovers an identity that but emphasises distinction,—a fact that is a stumbling-block to the formal logician.

The function of æsthetic appreciation in this large sense, and of the ideal that organises the world of æsthetic appreciations, is twofold:—(1) To put positive content into the conception of absolute reality as identical with the object of my individual quest, and thereby to put added meaning into the notion of a causation that is free; and (2) To put significance into the unity-in-distinction of absolute self with absolute self, every such self being a free member of the ideal commonwealth which is a "kingdom of ends."

Yet, once more, these three activities can in no strict sense be sundered from one another. Each phase is present in all, and all are necessary to each if any is to be made intelligible; but now one, and now another, may be dominant. In discussing them we have perforce made the sphere of reason comprehend all. This it must be able to do if the other realms are to be intelligible. But now we can clearly see that reason, in order to comprehend these other realms, and even to comprehend itself, must equally assert its helplessness without the activity of the will at every step; and this in turn reveals its lack of vitality without the force of desire, which, when coherent, is simply the individual appreciation of reality in the organisation of feeling under the dominion of the ideal of beauty. And so, if reason must comprehend all, it can only do so by employing categories to which the will and the love of the beautiful give the clue.

CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.

BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA.



## DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the “Hibbert Journal.” Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

### THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CHRIST.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1904, p. 476 ff.)

#### I.

IN his article on the Resurrection of Jesus Christ Canon Henson raises the question as to how far the argument which is often drawn from “the empty tomb” is a valid one. An objection to it which is in some ways similar to that which Canon Henson makes had occurred to my own mind, and some ten years ago I wrote to Bishop Westcott about it. In my letter I pointed out that the argument which is to be found in most apologetic works really proves too much. We do not expect that at our own resurrection the material of which our earthly body has consisted will be collected together again, and that out of this material a resurrection body will be fashioned. In our own case, that is to say, there will be nothing corresponding to “the empty tomb.” If our Lord’s Resurrection was in any true sense a type of our own, then the disappearance of the body from the tomb is really a difficulty in the way of belief rather than an explanation as to how our own resurrection will take place.

Bishop Westcott’s answer may possibly be of interest to some of your readers. He wrote (the letter is dated April 12, 1893, and was not published in the *Life and Letters*):—“The question which you raise is of very great interest. Practically I think it is enough for us to say that it was the will of God so to present the phenomena of the Resurrection as to convey the fullest apprehension of the truth. If the body had remained, the idea of continuity would have been lost, and so through the action of God it passed away, or rather was felt to have been taken up. For myself, I go further, and venture to apply more general principles. That which we speak of as ‘matter’ is, as far as I can see, only the manifestation of force, life in the widest sense, under the conditions of time and space. It has in itself no existence. The Lord’s life was never interrupted. He lived through death. As long as He remained under the conditions of earthly life, His body represented the action of His life.

When He entered on another form of existence under new conditions His life found a new embodiment. When we die, the sovereign life which rules all the subordinate vital forces passes away, and the separate forces act according to their nature, and we 'see corruption' by this new operation of disbanded forces. The thought is, I feel, obscure and difficult, yet it seems to me to be helpful."

Bishop Westcott's point of view is evidently very different from Canon Henson's. Canon Henson would have us believe there was no "empty tomb" to account for. The Bishop was too sound a critic to deal with historical testimony in such a fashion. His own way of regarding the question is extremely interesting, and thoroughly characteristic of himself.

Canon Henson states the difficulty with his usual clearness, but as providing a solution of it his article is not very helpful. Moreover, he has hardly made good his claim to be an exponent of Bishop Westcott's views.

The discussion of St John xx. 4-7 in the first chapter of Mr Latham's "The Risen Master" forms, as it seems to me, a very interesting comment on the line of thought suggested by the Bishop's letter. Mr Latham shows that "St John would have us understand that our Lord's body had disappeared out of the grave-clothes, as though it had passed into air, leaving them, flat and fallen together, on the stone slab." Mr Latham makes no attempt to deal with the metaphysical problem which is here involved. He says, "The condition of things in the tomb is what it would have been if the 'natural body' had passed into the 'spiritual body,' simply vanishing away. Of course there is no explanation in this. It shows a way of contemplating the mystery, that is all. What a spiritual body is we cannot possibly know, and of what a natural body is, we are constantly finding that we know less than we thought." It is the metaphysical problem which the Bishop attacks. Whether in the hint that he gives there are data for its solution it must be for others to judge.

ALBERT G. ROBINSON.

BUSBRIDGE RECTORY, GODALMING.

## II.

It is possible for one to be a liberal in theology, to sympathise very strongly with the progressive aspirations of Canon Henson's article, and yet to feel some impatience with the Canon's handling of this great theme. There are so many suppositions and assumptions in the article that a reader who had not committed himself to either conservative or liberal ideas might be tempted to think the traditional position stronger than it really is. Some things are put far too loosely. Thus the statement (p. 489) that "it is certain" Paul gave no place to the empty-tomb theory is hardly justified. The argument of Paul's first recorded sermon (Acts xiii. 16-41) seems to proceed inevitably towards that theory. "He whom God raised up saw no corruption" can only mean the very opposite of



Matthew Arnold's oft-quoted words about "the Syrian star." On the other side of the discussion Canon Henson appears to point us to what is a veritable mirage in contemporary religious thought. He seems to share that confidence in a spiritual proof of the Resurrection which found so striking an expression in the late Dr Dale's *Living Christ and the Four Gospels*. He asks, "Are the evidences of the fact that Jesus lives to be found in the past only?" (p. 492). Well: what other evidences have we? Does our Lord appear to any man after the way described in the Resurrection narratives and the manifestation on the Damascus road? And, short of such an appearance, how can we know that He lives? Dr Dale stated the "argument from experience" very effectively if vaguely; but is that argument really cogent enough? Our ideas of God are practically in accordance with the ideas we have found in the New Testament connected with the teaching and life of Christ. With these ideas focussed upon a screen of spiritual imagination we approach the Divine. We think of God in terms of Christ. And our thinking and praying are again and again answered by holy impulses of grace and strength. We know that God answers us when we approach Him thus. But does it follow from this fact that Jesus Christ rose from the dead, or that, in the usual sense of the word, He lives—lives, *i.e.*, as an Intermediary and Viceroy between God and man? In the spiritual life of the Roman Church the Virgin Mary is generally believed to be in conscious relationship with those who address her, and I do not think that any student of Christian history would deny that this belief has operated with a very real effect in the direction of social purity and charity and mercy. Read, for instance, the story of the artist Murillo, with his passionate devotion to the Virgin and his enthusiasm for the Immaculate Conception. "The Virgin" was to him just as really a source of blessing ennobling character and life as "the living Christ" is to the modern orthodox Protestant. Yet, is this to be regarded as evidence for the truth of the Roman doctrine concerning the office of the Virgin in heaven? I would humbly submit that we must choose between a reliance upon "historical evidence" of the Resurrection for the basis of our belief in the living, mediating Personality of our Lord, making the best of whatever such evidence we have, and a frank abandonment of that belief, together with the assertion of a more universal form of religion.

ARTHUR MARTIN.

SOUTHAMPTON.

### III.

CANON HENSON's suggestion that St Paul's conception of the resurrection body does not necessarily imply the empty grave seems to me to break down on the fact that to Paul the resurrection body was mediated through the dead physical body. "The dissolution of the physical body in the grave," says the writer, "will not hinder the process of resurrection in the case of Christ's disciples." No: because, according to St Paul, that dissolu-

tion is actually one of the stages towards resurrection. But surely Canon Henson goes on to argue in quite a different sense when he infers that the fate of Christ's physical body may be of no consequence to His resurrection. The dissolution of the physical body of Christ would not "be necessarily incompatible with the process of resurrection in the case of Christ Himself." No: if you keep the cases exactly parallel, and mean that Christ too might conceivably have found His resurrection body by way of the dissolution of His physical body, *i.e.*, by a process to which that dissolution contributed one of the stages. But Canon Henson means no such thing. He means, apparently, that, if we take the analogy from Pauline doctrine, Christ might have found a resurrection body apart altogether from the destiny of His earthly dead body, *i.e.*, by a process to which that body contributed nothing at all. The logic of this inference strikes one as being amazingly faulty, and the construction put on Paul's doctrine of resurrection is, to say the least, surprising.

Resurrection, according to St Paul, surely means "rising again," the rising again of the dead body. There would be no controversy about this if it were not for the impression that the rising again of the dead body must now be regarded as an untenable doctrine. Our anxiety, however, to save the Apostle's credit must not induce us to misread his thought. Except under the extreme pressure of a theory, could anyone be brought to imagine that when Paul spoke of the resurrection of Christ or the resurrection of the saints he contemplated something with which the bodies in the grave had absolutely no concern!

Is there, then, no discrepancy at all between St Paul and the Evangelists? And how are we to make the doctrine of the resurrection of the body tolerable to the modern mind?

As to the latter question, the key consideration, it seems to me, is that the final resurrection is a part of the great consummation when the material world shall be transmuted into a higher form of existence. It is the incoming to the renovated "physical" order of those who were embodied in the original physical order, but who lost their embodiment at death. It is rightly called resurrection, not merely because the persons who rise belonged to the old order, but because the bodies in which they rise are derived from the transformed elements of that order to which their original bodies were restored. Resurrection is not necessarily a re-collection of the identical particles of the body that died. The material body even in life was not an isolated, fixed, and identical quantity as regards the particles that formed it, but was in free communion with the material world of which it was a part. When, therefore, the identity of the body as a body has been destroyed, resurrection need not imply more than this—that as the material world gave material embodiment to the soul, and took it away, so the "spiritual" world which has come out of the material world will restore embodiment to the soul—embodiment of its own kind. The resurrection of the individual body, *i.e.*, is to be interpreted in connection with the transformation of nature. This interpretation does not



appear to me to put any undue strain on New Testament doctrines, nor is it, I think, rendered inconceivable by anything the modern mind has discovered. The essential meaning of the final resurrection is (1) that it is the reversal of the experience of physical death, and (2) that it is the extrusion of mortality from the physical sphere. These ends are attained (1) by the return of the soul to physical embodiment in the same (though renewed) world from which it was excluded by death, and (2) by the transformation of the material.

What, then, of the Resurrection of Christ? As it is that in virtue of which the final resurrection is brought about, the whole reversal of physical death and the whole victory over it must be expected to appear in it. Resurrection has to do with the transformation of matter; therefore, neither with us nor with Christ can it consist with simply dropping the material and proceeding to the manifestation of life in new spheres and by new means. That would not be to reverse death—it would be to leave death master of the field. Christ's work in overcoming physical death was (1) to come back to embodiment in the physical world, so reversing death, and (2) to come back with such power as to effect the transformation of matter in His own body. As His victory over death (as regards His own experience) was necessarily to be immediate and decisive, His body did not suffer dissolution, and His victory could only begin from the point of the resuscitation of that same body which was crucified. How strange that Canon Henson should regard the empty grave as insignificant! The reversal of physical death could not be, and could not be conceived, apart from it. The great truth, on which the whole weight of evidence (as the Gospels show) must first bear, was, not that Christ had somehow eluded death, but that He had come back alive to the very sphere from which death had sent Him forth—*i.e.*, to "physical" embodiment. (It will be observed that I take the word "physical" in a sense inclusive both of the material and the so-called "spiritual"—*i.e.*, all the phases which the "physical" may assume). Hence, though Christ's body might have immediately passed from the grave to that glorified condition in which it would have been beyond the test of human perception, Christ for the sake of His disciples halts on the way and exhibits His body during forty days under those conditions under which his disciples could arrive at a well-grounded assurance of the fact. Hence there is little trace of supernatural glory about Him. He is mistaken for the gardener. He walks with two of His disciples and sits down to a meal without being thought superhuman. He accumulates the evidences of the physical reality of His body. The disciples must know He is not a phantom. Hence the narrative in Luke xxiv. 39 that excites the Canon's incredulity. It is by no means to be considered that the Gospels contradict the Apostolic dictum, "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God"; but by what right do we claim the realisation of that dictum before Christ has (in the Apostle's sense) entered the kingdom of God? (*cf.* John xx. 17). Already it is sufficiently indicated that Christ's body is not a mere resuscitated material body.

There is no hint of mystery about the resuscitated body of Lazarus or Jairus' daughter. These were only called back to mortality. But the mystery of Christ's risen body is unmistakable, and it has powers which are not known to the present physical sphere. Paul and the Evangelists, therefore, are not inconsistent, but they naturally see the resurrection process at different stages—the former, as completed in heaven; the latter, on the way to completion during the unique forty days. Does not the uniqueness of the forty days necessarily require such a difference of view? And why the Ascension if it was already included in the Resurrection?

Canon Henson asks us, principally on the misapplied authority of a single text, to reject practically the whole evangelical tradition (which almost all testifies to the empty grave), and to reduce to unintelligibility St Paul's own doctrine. And the whole result is to dissipate the reality of Christ's victory over death, and to reduce the doctrine of the Resurrection to a condition of vagueness which could only be a symptom of its speedy evanishment.

PAISLEY.

JOHN PORTEOUS.

## REDEMPTION THROUGH BLOOD.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1904, p. 461 ff.)

No religion can hope to retain for long its hold over human life when once it has grown afraid to reconsider its phraseology. But, on the other hand, no religion can afford to accept the conscience of the individual as the sole test of the validity and value of the phraseology that it has received as an inheritance from its own past. And the only way to steer safely between these two dangers is to welcome every challenge that asks of us the re-examination of our phraseology in the light of current thought. For metaphors are worth what they are worth to the men who use them to-day.

No part of Christian phraseology has been in recent years more adversely criticised than that which is connected with the idea of redemption through blood. And it may be frankly admitted that the whole idea comes to us out of a cycle of thought that belongs to primitive stages of religious development. But the fact that it has survived suggests that it may perhaps express truths of religious life that cannot be so well expressed otherwise. At all events, before consenting to the abandonment of all such language, it may be worth while to inquire what are the ideas that it suggests to the minds of the men who still use it. It has a right to be heard in its own defence before the final verdict of educated opinion is given against it.

Now, at the outset, it is worth while to point out that a religious phraseology that is to meet the need not only of trained thinkers, but of the wayfaring man, must "surprise by a fine excess." It must be to some



degree startling—crude, if you will. For the great danger of religious ideas is that they grow so familiar that their power of appeal is blunted. Even metaphors that are at first sight repulsive may have their use as a stimulus to thought.

But is the language of blood-redemption so unfamiliar? No one feels any difficulty in accepting such a phrase as "He shed his blood for his country's salvation," or "The nation was saved by the blood of her noblest citizens," or "Blood is thicker than water." Or again, to take another class of metaphors, we habitually speak of "blood-relations," or of "nobility of blood." How far do such phrases help us to understand the language of our hymns and of our Scriptures? Let us see.

"There is a fountain filled with blood,  
Drawn from Emmanuel's veins,  
And sinners plunged beneath that flood  
Lose all their guilty stains."

When a Salvation Army captain leads off this refrain at some street corner, what does it mean to him?

Primarily it is the record of an experimental truth. He knows that a change has taken place in his life, that he is no longer the man that he was, and he believes that change to be the outcome of a death that happened long ago, the influence of which is still alive in the world. Perhaps he will say that he has been "delivered from the wrath of God." If we express the thing that he means by saying that his life has ceased to be a habitual violation of the true laws of life, and is now consciously seeking to understand and obey them, we shall save ourselves from an anthropomorphism, but we shall not alter the essential truth, except in so far as we take out of it the sense of a personal relationship which is the secret of its power of appeal.

And if, beyond the fact of personal experience, he asks further for what permanent truths the phraseology stands, he will find at least three.

1. It stands for the idea of *cost in moral movement*. It expresses the idea that the process of evolution is no easy and plain ascent up the scale of being, but that man's progress at every stage must be bought by sacrifice of personal comfort or inclination to larger issues. He finds at the foundation of his religion a story that commits all who believe it to the choice of the true path rather than the easy path. For the essential fact about the sacrifice of which he sings is that he believes it to have been voluntary. Every minister whose work has lain among the lowest and worst knows the strength of appeal that lies in those words, "He died for me." The death of Christ was an event that happened at a certain moment in time, but the Christian man believes that he sees in it the expression of the greatest permanent law of life—progress through sacrifice.

2. Again, the word suggests *the supreme value of life*. All this language about blood means that the only thing that a man can really give is himself. All other gifts are external, unsatisfying. And therefore it

becomes a challenge. The blood of the martyrs—it was poured out gladly by men who believed that blood poured out for them asked for nothing less in return. What other language would adequately convey the idea that life is of infinite value, and yet is to be willingly laid down in the defence of things noble and true?

3. But why all this talk of fountains of blood in which a man may bathe himself—of cups of blood that a man may drink? Does it embody any permanent truth that justifies its retention? Surely it does embody this truth, that religion is a present fact; that no mere acceptance of a historic truth, or gratitude to a historic martyr, will suffice to change a man's life as men's lives are changed by belief in Christ. It is the idea of union, of a family life, of a new heredity under the power of which a man comes when he seeks to put his life into harmony with the permanent spiritual forces of the universe.

For blood is a symbol of character. We arouse the anger of some descendant of the Scandinavian sea-kings, and we say that we have "aroused in him the blood of his Norse ancestors." And so surely, when unexpected elements of good show themselves in some character under the influence of the Christian impulse, we might say that we have "aroused in that man the blood of Christ." In both cases a human character is permanently affected by influences in its own past. Why should the metaphor be reasonable in the one case, and inadmissible in the other?

We have left a long way behind the old ideas of the propitiation of an angry God by the slaughter of an innocent victim, of the imputing of a vicarious offering. For in truth the whole of this language about blood conveys the idea not of a life imputed but of a life imparted.

"Oh, wash me in Thy precious blood."

That cannot mean, impute to me a righteousness that I do not possess; it can only mean, communicate to me a righteousness that I cannot attain to alone. It is the cry for spiritual emancipation, for the lifting of life out of its squalor and meanness. It is not the cowardly appeal to be excused for wrong-doing in virtue of the sacrifice of another, but the request to be enabled to achieve truly the purpose of life, here or hereafter, by the gradual process of uplifting that comes through union with the Divine.

Perhaps the truth of the matter is that such language as we are now discussing jars on the feelings of our own age because we are lacking in two great characteristics of the men to whom it rang true—we are inexperienced in the discipline of suffering, and we are blunted in our sensitiveness to sin. If sin is an unimportant matter, to be ignored in practice and minimised in thought; if suffering is a disagreeable thing, to be avoided wherever possible, and pushed into the background while we join the race for enjoyment, then all this language about blood is only the irritating reminder of certain outworn superstitions. But if the permanent facts of the world are that there is an inexorable moral law at work, and that progress and not pleasure is the true end of our being, then the language has, I submit,



a significance that should make us reluctant to throw it on one side till those who urge us to do so can tell us in what other phraseology we can embody these truths, so that they may be, not a philosophy for the scholar, but a gospel for the poor.

J. HOWARD B. MASTERMAN.

QUEEN'S COLLEGE, BIRMINGHAM.

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PROFESSOR SCHMIEDEL'S CRITICISM OF DR STANTON'S  
"GOSPELS AS HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1904, p. 607.)

I DESIRE to make a brief reply to Dr Schmiedel's strictures in the last number of this *Journal* (pp. 607-612) upon my volume on the *Early Use of the Gospels*. Some examination of them will, I think, be useful, because it will help to raise the broad question as to what is sound reasoning in matters of historical criticism.

1. I must say a few words as to his charge of "apologetical bias" (p. 611 and elsewhere). He is kind enough to add that he believes it to be unconscious, but he thinks he knows my own mind better than I know it myself. I suppose that we all of us have theories to explain how it can be that persons apparently well-informed and rational differ from us on the questions which divide men. But experience shows us that we may easily be at fault in such conjectures. And at any rate it is generally best that we should keep them to ourselves, since we cannot prove them. In controversy we have to do with the arguments of opponents, not with the influences which we imagine have perverted their judgment. It is, I conceive, as improper for Dr Schmiedel, by imputing to me theological prepossessions, to minimise the value of my work in the eyes of those who are ready to suspect bias in anyone who maintains a conservative position, as it would be for me to depreciate work of his in the eyes of the orthodox by attributing to him bias of an opposite sort.

The kinds of bias are many; the fear itself of bias in one direction may create bias in another. Each investigator should by frequent self-examination seek to guard against the form, or forms, of bias to which he may be himself most liable. It may seem to some impossible that one who regards the traditional faith of the Christian Church as of priceless value should be able to examine questions relating to it in an impartial spirit. But the desire to find a secure foundation for that faith, and the conviction that every weak point in any argument which may be put forward on its behalf is sure to be detected in days of searching inquiry such as our own, may supply, I believe, motives strong enough to counteract the distorting effect of feeling. It must be added that our views on questions of Christian history, as well as those we form of characters and movements in other departments of history,

may legitimately be affected by our convictions of a general kind in regard to God, the world, and man. But wherever such elements enter into our decisions—as they will to a peculiar degree in our judgments on the credibility of the Gospel narratives, though they do not in any special manner in the subject now in hand, the early use of the Gospels—we ought to acknowledge this frankly to ourselves, and to make it apparent to others.

These thoughts are, and for years have been, constantly present to my mind. I cannot, therefore, submit without protest to Dr Schmiedel's charge.

2. I turn now to a passage ((3), on p. 608) in which there will be several points to notice. "The author," he observes, "not unfrequently gives one the impression, in his statements as to which of the Gospels were made use of by each of the Church writers, of being animated by the sincere resolve to maintain nothing save only what can be assumed with certainty. Nevertheless we question whether he has not often deviated from this line of procedure." I must altogether disclaim ever having cherished the intention which Dr Schmiedel apparently thinks would have been a praiseworthy one, though in his opinion I have not faithfully acted upon it. On the contrary, I believe that, if I had formed and carried out such a resolve, I should have shown that I entirely mistook the nature of the subject. The conclusions at which I arrived on various separate points seemed to me to rest on evidence of very different degrees of strength, and consequently to be, some more, some less, probable. And it appeared to me that even the best established might need to be revised on a review of the evidence as a whole, while even the more uncertain might not be without value if they were confirmed by such a review. I imagined that I had made this point of critical method abundantly evident. But I am not sorry to recur to it, because it has seemed both to me and to others, that Dr Schmiedel and those critics who maintain similar positions to his do not pay sufficient attention to the force of cumulative evidence.

3. I pass to the instance of my making an unwarranted statement which Dr Schmiedel gives in the immediate sequel. It is that the saying "Many are called but few chosen," which is introduced in *Ep. of Barnabas* iv. 14 with the formula "it is written," could only, so far as we know, have been derived from St Matthew. This is a point which has received a great deal of attention, and the view I have stated is widely accepted. It did not seem to me necessary to discuss it again. But let us now see what the alternatives are which Dr Schmiedel proposes. The first is one which others besides himself have tried. It is that "the author of the *Ep. of Barnabas* believed himself to be quoting from a book actually recognised as 'Scripture,' possibly 4 Esra viii. 3," "Multi quidem creati sunt pauci autem salvabuntur." The only point in common between these words in 4 Esra and the saying in question is the contrast between "many" and "few." The distinctive ideas expressed by the words "called" and "chosen," which are closely connected with the preaching of the Gospel, are wholly unrepresent-



sented in the thought of the verse of 4 Esra referred to and its context.<sup>1</sup> Of course the possibility of error attaches to all human testimony. The author of *Barnabas* might have fancied that he had seen the words which he quotes in some book in which they did not occur. But it is very improbable that he was mistaken in this instance, for several striking parallelisms with St Matthew in his little treatise create a strong case for his having been acquainted with our first Gospel.

Another explanation put forward by Dr Schmiedel is that "the quotation might have circulated *viva voce* as a 'winged word.'" The sentence seems to mean that the author of *Barnabas*, though he knew the saying to be a portion of oral tradition, yet used in regard to it the formula "it is written." This is indeed an extraordinary suggestion, which seems to ignore altogether the natural force of words. But we have still to consider the reason which is alleged for having recourse to these strained expedients for avoiding the supposition that the author of the *Ep. of Barnabas* took the words from St Matthew. "This estimate of the Gospels," observes Dr Schmiedel—that, namely, which he assumes would be implied in the quotation of a saying of Christ as "Scripture"—"would have been in the highest degree surprising, since it is not until A.D. 170 that the next examples of such an estimate make their appearance." I should myself have been considerably surprised if the formula "it is written" necessarily involved that full-blown recognition of the Gospels as Scriptures which Dr Schmiedel imagines. That view of them must have grown and spread gradually. After the Gospel had been committed to writing, it would probably ere long occur, now to one, now to another, to apply the familiar formula "it is written" to words which had even before been accounted sacred. This might well happen without any formal reflection in the first instance on the question whether the writing containing them was, or was not, to be classed with the Scriptures of the Old Testament; while the habit of practically regarding a new set of writings as Scriptures would thus arise. Partial anticipations, at least as remarkable as the one before us, of ideas which have subsequently become prevalent, have been (I venture to say) common in history.

4. Dr Schmiedel alleges (p. 610) that I make throughout "the pre-supposition that, if there can be shown to be resemblance between a canonical and a non-canonical writing, the former is uniformly to be regarded as the earlier." I will not stay to discuss whether this is a fair statement, but will say a few words upon the criticism which follows: "He altogether fails to reckon with the possibility that the opposite of this might also be the order of sequence, and he is equally oblivious of the other possibility that characteristic expressions and phrases might well have

<sup>1</sup> Somewhat similarly, Dr Schmiedel (p. 609) credits Polycarp with indifference to the natural force of words when he says that in *Ad Phil.* vii. 1 his "source might equally well have been 2 Jn. 7 as 1 Jn. iv. 2, 3." There is a difference of tense between these two, which unquestionably makes some, and probably a very considerable, difference in the meaning, and Polycarp agrees with 1 Jn. iv. 2, 3.

been the common property of the language of the Church, and have been adopted in two writings, independently of each other."

In the statement of the first of these two "possibilities," which I am supposed to have overlooked, the expression "the earlier" is somewhat vague. But as the contrast with the next sentence shows, "the earlier" must mean "the source which the other has used." And it would appear, from the instances mentioned in the sequel, that I ought to have considered whether the parallelisms with the Fourth Gospel in Hermas and Justin may not have been derived by the evangelist from those writers. I confess that I do not think that supposition worthy of serious discussion. The expressions in question are in thought and style of one piece with the contents generally of the Gospel according to St John. In the other writings they lie like fragments of some kind of rock in a region where the geological formation is quite different.

The second "possibility" referred to above has far more substance. To deal with it fully it would be necessary to examine the Gospels themselves, to compare other Christian writings therewith, and to study generally the history of Christian thought up to the middle of the second century. It did not fall within the scope of the volume which I have published to do this. Other considerations also bear upon the point, some of which will, I think, be found there. But I did not give it the prominence which I should have done if I had been writing some years ago. The question has, as it seems to me, been faced in a satisfactory manner at earlier stages of the controversy on the history of the New Testament Canon.

5. The space at my disposal will permit me only to notice one more of Dr Schmiedel's points (p. 611): "What in reality was investigated, before a writing could be incorporated in the Canon, was rather whether the contents of such writing corresponded to the views of the Catholic Church." Neither of the two instances, which, according to Dr Schmiedel, prove this position, is to the purpose. The words of the *Muratorian Fragment* refer, like similar words of Irenæus, to the harmony of the Gospels among themselves, not to their agreement with the Church's creed. And Serapion, when he permitted the little Church of Rhossus to continue their practice of publicly reading the *Gospel of Peter*, certainly did not imagine himself to be settling the Canon of Scripture. He shows no disposition to adopt *Peter* at Antioch; and indeed it would have been thought ludicrous for the practice of Rhossus to be taken as a guide in a matter which concerned the Church at large.

I do not, however, deny that the touchstone of heresy was applied to certain books which pretended to be Apostolic, and that the vanity of this pretension, and of the claim to be included in the Canon which was made on their behalf, was held to be thus demonstrated. The instances of the employment of this argument belong especially to the beginning of the third century. It became natural when once the notion had been formed of a collection of sacred writings whose authority was connected



with their Apostolicity. It is certain, on the other hand, that some early Christian writings "whose contents corresponded with the views of the Catholic Church" were not included in the Canon.

V. H. STANTON.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

### THE PASSING OF CONVICTION.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1904, p. 553.)

As a clerk on the London Stock Exchange, and still on the sunny side of thirty, I speak, I believe, for a numerous and representative class of the community. If the indifference and even contempt of such a class as this could be overcome, there would certainly be less reason for the pessimistic views of Dr Jethro Brown. Here on the Stock Exchange we find ourselves in what is commonly regarded as a very maelstrom of worldliness and vice. Yet if a census were taken, I believe it would be found that the vast majority were professing members of the Church of England. Why, then, has orthodox Christianity so completely lost all hold of them? How is it that it exerts so little influence on their general conduct and views of life? Summed up in a word, it is, I believe, because orthodox Christianity has ceased to be a *living* faith. It does not answer to the needs of the ordinary man; it furnishes him with little *practical* guidance in his daily life. The ideals inculcated by Jesus Christ are entirely out of touch with modern conditions and requirements. They appear to the ordinary man impracticable and utopian.

I well remember how, when I was a boy of about seventeen, and a devout, ardent Christian, my faith sustained its first shock from a study of Greek philosophy. I had always been given to understand that before the advent of Jesus Christ the world was sunk in the lowest depths of wickedness and ignorance; that, therefore, God had sent his only-begotten Son to teach men how they should live in order to inherit the kingdom of heaven. What, then, was my amazement to find that centuries before Christ, philosophers had lived in Greece who taught all that seemed to me most admirable and most needed for the spiritual salvation of mankind in the Christian religion. Where, I asked, was the need for God to incarnate in human form in order to reveal truths, a knowledge of which already existed in the world? I found little or nothing in the *ethical* teaching of Jesus superior to what one might find in the philosophy of Plato, and I might also add of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. I may have been wrong—probably I was—but at any rate the discovery of this fact, if fact it was, first shook the foundations of my belief.

My religious convictions received their second shock when I read Darwin's epoch-making "*Origin of Species*." Here we had the cosmology and biology of the Old Testament absolutely subverted. My belief did, however, in an enfeebled form survive that shock. It was possible to argue

that those parts of the Bible which were inconsistent with modern science were allegorical, or, in the terminology of the Swedenborgians, "written according to the law of correspondences." But this kind of quibbling, of tortuous and sophistical attempts at reconciliation, became as time went on more and more repugnant to my sense of intellectual honesty. This, of course, did not affect the teaching of Christ, but still one cannot be surprised at a youth wondering why, if Christ was God Himself, and therefore omniscient, he did not correct the popular ideas in respect of these things, as he did in respect of others, instead of appearing, on the contrary, to endorse them.

Soon after this I was introduced to the study of Hindu and Buddhist philosophy. This, however, did not, as some might suppose, effect a further subversion of my belief in the Christian religion. It had quite a different effect: whatever there was of truth and beauty in the Christian religion appeared to me, in the full blaze, as I then thought of a higher, intenser light, to be but an imperfect reflection of that light, the primal source of all the great religions. This theory of a common origin solved, at any rate, the puzzling parallelisms to be found in so many great religions, even down to incidents and circumstances in the lives of their founders. The ethical teaching, too, of some of these philosophies, while embracing the highest conceptions of the Christian religion, went even beyond them in the sublimity of its ideals, and in a benevolence which included not only the human race but *all that lives*; and, being more *explicit*, it appeared to me better adapted to the practical needs of our daily life.

We were told in the last number of this Journal that the *secret* of the Christian religion was a sense of the living presence of the risen Lord; that there could be no doubt and questioning when once this had been experienced. But what, judging by the accounts we have of such experiences, is the liveliest sense of spiritual communion of the Christian with his Saviour, compared with the intimate, ecstatic, sense of *Oneness* with Brahma, experienced by the Hindu Yogi? The one experience proves no more and no less than the other. They are both phenomena of great psychological interest. What precisely one may infer from them, however, it is as yet premature to say. I can only refer those who believe that such mystical experiences are the peculiar privilege of the Christian to such books as Professor James' "Variety of Religious Experiences," and to the results of modern psychic and psychological research.

This brings me to another point I should like to say a word about. Orthodox Christianity stands or falls, it may be said, with its *uniqueness*. Now nobody, I believe, who has sympathetically entered into the spirit of some other great religion, could, whatever his views might be about their comparative merits, uphold the uniqueness of the Christian religion in any one *essential* particular. Take, for instance, what may be called the pivotal doctrine of Christianity, the Divinity of Christ. Well, the idea of a Divine incarnation or Avatar has probably been familiar to the Hindu mind for several thousand years. In the Bhagavad Gîta Krishna claims to be the



Supreme Deity, to know all things, to have created all things, to be immanent in all things. Further, he declares that it is by a knowledge of him that salvation is attained.

"They verily who worship Me with devotion, they are in Me, and I also in them."

"He who knoweth Me, unborn, beginningless, the great Lord of the world, he among mortals is without delusion, liberated from all sin."

"Having pervaded this whole universe with a portion of Myself, I exist."

"He who seeth Me everywhere, and seeth everything in Me, of him will I never lose hold, and he will never lose hold of Me."

"By Me all this world is spread out, the embodiment of the unmanifested."

Such are a few of the sayings of Krishna, taken at random from this wonderful discourse.

Then, again, Dr Fraser and other mythologists have shown us that most of the other characteristic doctrines and traditions of the Christian religion bear a remarkable resemblance, to say no more, to the customs and traditions of primitive people all over the world. The notion of the sacrifice of a divine human person, "himself to himself," at about the vernal equinox, for the redemption of the sins of the people was evidently no new one. And so one might take one doctrine after another and show that it is not peculiar to the Christian religion. This religion is not *unique* either in its ethical teachings, in its doctrinal teachings, or in the mystical experiences of its devotees.

I am afraid I have left no space to speak of the disturbing effects on the lay mind of the Higher Criticism. Great numbers of the laity, no doubt, are waiting to see in what form the Bible will emerge from the melting pot purged of its dross.

When our pulpits are occupied by men whose reading has been wide and catholic: when their minds are no longer invincibly biassed by their education; when their career and their very livelihood no longer depend upon the acceptance of certain antiquated beliefs, then, and not till then, shall we find our churches better attended by the more reflecting and better informed members of the laity.

CITY CLERK.

COPTHALL HOUSE, E.C.

## THE AXIOM OF INFINITY.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1904.)

PROFESSOR KEYSER'S very interesting article on "The Axiom of Infinity" contains a contention of capital importance for the theory of infinity. The view advocated by those who, like myself, believe all pure mathematics

to be a mere prolongation of symbolic logic, is, that there are no new axioms at all in the later parts of mathematics, including among these both ordinary arithmetic and the arithmetic of infinite numbers. Professor Keyser maintains, on the contrary, that a special axiom is covertly invoked in all attempted demonstrations of the existence of the infinite. I believe that, in so thinking, he has been misled by the brevity, and perhaps obscurity, with which writers on this subject have usually stated their arguments. I am myself, as yet, obnoxious to the same charge; for the strict and detailed proof, with all the apparatus of logical rigour, is too long to be given incidentally, and was therefore reserved by me for vol. ii. of my *Principles of Mathematics*. It is possible, however, with a little care, so to set forth the outline of the proof as to make it appear that, whether "exquisite" or not, it is certainly not "round."<sup>1</sup>

I presuppose, in setting forth this argument, the definition of number, and the proof that, with the suggested definition, every class has some perfectly well-defined number of terms. These matters I have discussed at length in Part II. of the above-mentioned work; and so far as appears, Professor Keyser has no fault to find in regard to them.

The first step is to demonstrate that there is such a number as 0. The number of things fulfilling any condition which nothing fulfils is defined to be 0; and it may be shown that there are such conditions. For example, nothing is a proposition which is both true and false. Consequently, the number of things which are propositions that are both true and false is 0. Thus there is such a number as 0.

We next define the number 1 as follows. The number of terms in a class is 1 if there is a term in the class such that, when that term is taken away, the number of terms remaining is 0. That classes having one member exist is not hard to prove; for example, the class of things identical with the number 0 consists of the number 0 alone, and has only one member.

We proceed in like manner to the number 2, and we prove that the class consisting of the numbers 0 and 1 has two members, from which it follows that the number 2 exists.

It is in the next stage of the argument that, if I am not mistaken, Professor Keyser has been misled by an undue brevity. He appears to think that, at this point, the advocates of infinity are content with a vague "and so on"—a sort of *etcetera* which is intended to cover a multitude of sins. But *etceteras*, common as they are in ordinary mathematics, where they are represented by rows of little dots, are not tolerated by the stricter symbolic logicians. I shall try to show how it is that the argument proceeds without them.

We first prove the principle of mathematical induction<sup>2</sup>—a principle

<sup>1</sup> See *Hibbert Journal*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 549–550.

<sup>2</sup> I omit the proofs of propositions here assumed. Some of these proofs will be found in § 4 of my article in the *Revue de Mathématiques*, vol. vii.; others in Mr A. N. Whitehead's article in the *American Journal of Mathematics*, vol. xxiv.



which, in this domain, does work for us such as could hardly be expected but from an *etcetera*. This principle states that any property possessed by the number 0, and possessed by  $n+1$  when it is possessed by  $n$ , is possessed by all finite numbers. By means of this principle, we prove that, if  $n$  be any finite number, the number of numbers from 0 to  $n$ , both inclusive, is  $n+1$ . Consequently, if  $n$  exists, so does  $n+1$ . Hence, since 0 exists, it follows by mathematical induction that all finite numbers exist. We prove also that, if  $m$  and  $n$  be two finite numbers other than 0,  $m+n$  is not identical with either  $m$  or  $n$ . It follows that, if  $n$  be any finite number,  $n$  is not the number of finite numbers, for the number of numbers from 0 to  $n$  is  $n+1$ , and  $n+1$  is different from  $n$ . Thus no finite number is the number of finite numbers; and therefore, since the definition of cardinal numbers<sup>1</sup> allows no doubt as to the existence of a number which is the number of finite numbers, it follows that this number is infinite. Hence, from the abstract principles of logic alone, the existence of infinite numbers is rigidly demonstrated.

The above is the strict proof appropriate to pure mathematics, since the entities with which it deals are exclusively those belonging to the domain of pure mathematics. Other proofs, such as the one from the fact that the idea of a thing is different from the thing, are not appropriate to pure mathematics, since they do, as Professor Keyser points out, assume premisses not mathematically demonstrable. But such proofs are not on that account circular or otherwise fallacious. Accepting the five postulates enumerated by Professor Keyser on p. 549 as assumed by Dedekind, I deny wholly that any one of the five *presupposes* the actual infinite. It is true that they together *imply* the actual infinite; it is indeed their purpose to do so. But it is too common, in philosophising, to confound implications with presuppositions. At this rate, all deduction would be circular. The contention advanced by Professor Keyser is essentially the following: If the conclusion (the existence of the infinite) were untrue, one of the premisses would be untrue; consequently the premisses beg the conclusion, and the argument is circular. But in all correct deductions, if the conclusion is false, so is at least one of the premisses. The falsehood of the premisses presupposes the falsehood of the conclusion; but it by no means follows that the truth of the premisses presupposes the truth of the conclusion. The root of the error seems to be that, where a deduction is very easily drawn, it comes to be viewed as actually part of the premisses; and thus very elementary arguments acquire the appearance, quite falsely, of *petitiones principii*.

Another point which calls for criticism is the psychological form of Professor Keyser's statement of the axiom of infinity. He states this axiom (p. 551) as follows: "Conception and logical inference alike presuppose absolute certainty that an act which the mind finds itself capable of performing is intrinsically performable endlessly." This statement is rendered vague by the word *intrinsically*; but I sincerely hope there is no

<sup>1</sup> See my *Principles of Mathematics*, chap. xi.

such presupposition in inference, since it is a most certain empirical fact that the mind is not capable of endlessly repeating the same act. Even apart from the fact that man is mortal, he is doomed to intervals of sleep; when he is drunk, he cannot perform mental acts which he can perform when he is sober, and so on. I am aware, of course, that such accidents are intended to be eliminated by the word *intrinsically*; but when they are, as they must be, explicitly and in terms eliminated, we get an axiom so complicated, and so plainly full of empirical elements, that it would require extraordinary boldness to present it as underlying all logic. The only escape would be to say that "the mind" is to be taken to mean God's mind. But few will maintain nowadays that the existence of God is a necessary premiss for all logic.<sup>1</sup>

The truth is that, throughout logic and mathematics, the existence of the human or any other mind is totally irrelevant; mental processes are studied by means of logic, but the subject-matter of logic does not presuppose mental processes, and would be equally true if there were no mental processes. It is true that, in that case, we should not know logic; but our knowledge must not be confounded with the truths which we know, and in the case of logic, although our knowledge of course involves mental processes, that which we know does not involve them. Logic will never acquire its proper place among the sciences until it is recognised that a truth and the knowledge of it are as distinct as an apple and the eating of it.

B. RUSSELL.

LONDON.

<sup>1</sup> See my *Philosophy of Leibniz* (Cambridge, 1900), chap. xv., especially § 111.



## REVIEWS

*Electricity and Matter.* By J. J. Thomson, D.Sc., F.R.S., Cavendish Professor of Experimental Physics, Cambridge.—London: Constable, 1904.

IN 1902 the Corporation of Yale University came into possession of a fund given by the children of Mrs H. E. Silliman to establish an annual course of lectures as a memorial to their mother. The lectures were to illustrate the wisdom of God as manifested in the natural and moral world, by the orderly presentation of the facts of nature or history, in the belief that the end of the foundation would be secured more effectively by such presentation than by any attempt to emphasise the elements of doctrine or of creed. Professor J. J. Thomson was invited to cross the Atlantic last year to give the first course, and this book contains the substance of the lectures which he delivered. It makes a magnificent start for the lectureship, for it is a most fascinating work, full of brilliant suggestion, and, to the physicist, interesting in every page.

It contains an account of the new ideas of the structure of matter which have been at the same time the guide and the outcome of the recent researches by Professor Thomson and his pupils, which have made the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge the foremost school of physics of the present time. The larger book on *The Conduction of Electricity through Gases*, by the same author, published last autumn, contains a full account of the work done, not only at Cambridge, but by the whole army of investigators throughout the world. But that is an account for the student of physics, who wishes to know in full detail both theory and experiment. This smaller work presents the general trend of the researches, and the new ideas of atomic structure to which they have led, in a form more accessible to the general reader. We have in it also later developments of the author's ideas than in the larger work, and he takes us more into his confidence, so that we can almost see the ideas growing into form in his mind.

I shall pass over the earlier chapters, though they are deeply interesting and important to the electrician, in that they open up a prospect of a new electrical theory based on the author's conception of the part played by

the lines of force by which Faraday taught us to represent electric actions. I shall only attempt a sketch of the theory of atomic structure which is set forth in the later chapters, a theory which may have interest for others than students of physics.

In approaching this theory we must completely abandon the old idea of the atom as a little indivisible particle. We may still think of a specimen of an elementary body such as hydrogen, or mercury, or gold, as consisting of minute units all alike in the same element, and the word "atom," though it no longer bears its original meaning, remains as a convenient name for one of these units. But the unit itself is of highly complex and composite structure. It can be broken up under certain conditions, and it is even possible that one element may break up into other elements, and that the transmutation of matter, so long a dream of the alchemists, may become a reality.

We are to think of the forces which bind the various portions of the atom together as electric forces, and of the forces which bind the atoms together into compound molecules as also electric forces. This suggests that the atom may itself be electrical, and so we are led to attempt the identification of electricity with matter. Let us see how these speculations are the outcome of actual observation and experiment. Long ago, the decomposition of liquids by the electric current led to the idea that every molecule or group of atoms consists of a positively electrified part and a negatively electrified part, held together by electric attraction. Indeed, if we assume the existence of molecules and atoms, or use them as the language in which we express physical facts, this appears to be the only interpretation we can put upon the observed phenomena. Thus, if two platinum plates are immersed in hydrochloric acid, and positive electricity is supplied to one plate, while negative electricity is supplied to the other, the acid is torn asunder into hydrogen and chlorine. The hydrogen is pulled towards the negative plate, as if its atoms were positively charged, and the chlorine towards the positive plate, as if its atoms were negatively charged. On reaching the plates the charge of each is neutralised by the opposite electrification received from the plate to which it comes, and each constituent finally appears without any sign of electrification. Faraday further showed that the same weight of acid is always decomposed by the same charges of electrification put into the plates. Now, assuming that atoms exist, there are various concordant lines of research which enable us to calculate the number of atoms in a given weight of acid, so that Faraday's result implies that each atom of hydrogen, as it moves towards the negative plate, has a definite positive charge, always the same, and each atom of chlorine moving in the opposite direction has always the same negative charge, numerically equal, though of opposite sign, to that in the hydrogen atom. If other compounds are torn asunder we may get other atoms than hydrogen or chlorine, but whatever the atom, the charge on it is either exactly equal to that on the hydrogen atom, or double or treble, or a small exact multiple of it.



So far we have ancient history. The starting-point of the new theory was a great discovery made by Professor Thomson when experimenting on the passage of the electric current through attenuated gases. If a current is driven between two metal plates in a closed glass tube containing a gas so highly rarefied that there is only perhaps a millionth part as much as would fill the tube at atmospheric pressure, then, as Varley and Crookes showed more than thirty years ago, a stream, or rather a hail, of negatively electrified matter rushes straight across the tube from the negative plate. Where this hail of negative matter strikes a surface it gives rise to the X-rays of Röntgen. If a magnet is held outside the tube, it acts on each charged particle while the particle is moving, just as it would on a wire carrying a current in the line of motion of the particle. The stream of particles is deflected from a straight course into a curve, and the deflection depends on the proportion of the mass of each particle to the charge it carries.

Realising this dependence, Thomson, shortly after Röntgen's grand discovery, set to work to determine the proportion of charge to mass, using a magnet of known strength to deflect the stream. But the deflection also depends on the speed of the particles. The magnetic experiment does not give this, so that a second experiment is needed, which we may here regard as one to determine the velocity. One such second experiment used by Thomson consisted in passing the stream between oppositely electrified plates. In this case also it was deflected, and a combination of the measurements of the two deflections gave him the ratio of charge to mass. Here was the great discovery. He obtained the startling result that the ratio of charge to mass was about a thousand times as great as in the hydrogen atom, when torn from its partner in liquid decomposition, and the still more startling result that it was the same whatever kind of gas was in the tube. Had the particles in the stream been the ordinary charged atoms which come to the plates when a liquid is decomposed by the electric current, the proportion of charge to mass would have been the same as that in such decomposition, and it would have differed for different atoms, being less for hydrogen than for oxygen or chlorine. The new discovery led at once to the supposition that the negatively electrified particles in the gas are mere minute fragments of atoms which have been torn away, but which have succeeded in carrying off the whole negative charge hitherto assigned to the atom. If we adopt the alternative supposition that the carriers of charge are complete atoms, we must further suppose that each has succeeded in collecting on itself the charges of many other atoms—in hydrogen, the charges of a thousand of its fellows, in oxygen, the charges of eight thousand, and so on. But this supposition is open to direct test. The negative particles can be produced outside a rarefied tube, and if they are in a space saturated with water vapour, a cloud forms, one droplet on each particle. By counting the number of drops in the cloud, and by measuring the total negative charge on the cloud, the charge on each drop, that is, the charge

on each negative particle, was found, and it came out to be the same as that on the hydrogen atom in liquid decomposition. The first supposition, then, is almost irresistible, that in the rarefied gas the atoms actually have small fragments torn away from them, that these carry with them the negative charge hitherto assigned to the complete atom, and that such fragments are exactly alike, whatever the atoms from which they are torn. Thomson terms the fragments "corpuscles." In favour of their minuteness we have the observation, first made by Lenard, that they can pass to some extent through thin, apparently continuous plates of metal. We must imagine them so small that some members of the stream can find a free passage through the grosser molecules of the metal, just as some drops of rain in a shower can find their way down between the leaves of a tree.

At first sight, then, the difference between atoms of different elements would appear to lie in the positively electrified part. As a trial hypothesis we might assume that the hydrogen atom consists of a big positive part which contains  $\frac{999}{1000}$ ths of the mass, and constitutes the essentially hydrogen part of the mass, and a little negative corpuscle which contains the other  $\frac{1}{1000}$ th part of the mass. The corpuscle is attracted by the positive, and no doubt revolves round it, but is detachable by appropriate forces. In the oxygen atom we should have a positive part sixteen times as heavy, with two detachable negative corpuscles, and so on.

When an atom is positively electrified, we must imagine a negative corpuscle torn away, and the attempt of the remaining part to get it back or get one from some other atom is manifested in its positive electrification, an expression of its dissatisfaction with the deprivation from which it suffers. But an atom may have more than its normal complement of corpuscles. If it has one in excess it may attract another atom with a corpuscle wanting. This attraction is manifested in its negative electrification, an expression of its desire to share its riches with others.

So far, an atomic system would appear to resemble such planetary systems as the Earth with her one moon, or Mars with his two moons, or Jupiter with his five moons. But to make the resemblance complete we should have to suppose an interchange of satellites possible. The Earth might steal a satellite from Mars, and Mars might go about dissatisfied till he could beg a satellite from Jupiter. Or if Jupiter had borrowed one from Saturn, Mars and Jupiter might unite to form a compound system with seven moons in all.

Perhaps this astronomical idea of atomic structure goes nearly as far as mere electrical experiment will warrant. But a hypothesis is of very limited use if it is merely a working model of the facts upon which it is based. It has far greater value if it will work in such manner as to co-ordinate other facts, and if it will suggest new lines of research. No atomic model is of much value unless, for instance, it gives some account of the radiation of light. Now, on the planet and satellite theory, the big positive nucleus with one or two negative corpuscles circling round it would certainly give out waves. Every time a corpuscle went round, one wave would start



forth, the same in kind as the electric waves used in wireless telegraphy, but on an ultra-microscopic scale. There is every reason, too, to suppose that light consists of such minute electric waves. But the radiation sent out by a single corpuscle would be so considerable that there would be a rapid diminution in the energy of the system, and the corpuscle would move in a spiral orbit, nearing its primary at every revolution, and every revolution would occupy less time than the last. Thus it would send out shorter and shorter waves as it moved in, and the light would not be of the fixed character shown by spectrum analysis. The bright lines of a glowing gas would be changing from red through yellow to blue, till some fresh energy was imparted to the system, when they would jump back again to the red end, and once more travel down the spectrum towards the blue. Again, the complexity of the spectrum, the large number of fixed wave-lengths always present in the light sent out, implies complexity in structure far greater than that given by one or two corpuscles. Here, then, we have two requisites in a working model of the atom—a highly composite structure to account for the numerous kinds of waves emitted, and fixed times of revolution of the components to account for the fixity of length of each wave.

Instead, then, of the planetary model, Thomson imagines a system of quite another type. His hydrogen atom consists, not of a single positive body with one corpuscle revolving outside it, but of a big sphere of uniformly distributed positive electrification, and a thousand negative corpuscles travelling, each in its own orbit, *within the positive sphere*. The total of positive electrification is equal to the sum of the negatives in the thousand corpuscles; so the total charge of the atom is a thousand times greater than has hitherto been supposed. The negative corpuscles repel each other, but the positive globe attracts them more. The time of revolution of each corpuscle will then be nearly constant, and if one of them is disturbed it will give off waves very much of the character observed in the spectrum. A further point is that with such complexity energy will leak away in radiation much more slowly than from a system of the planetary type; this accords with observation. The author recognises fully that this model of the atom is very crude and imperfect. The globe of positive electrification cohering and not scattering through mutual repulsion of its parts, not concentrating on the negative corpuscles, but remaining of uniform electric density, not offering any resistance to the motion of the corpuscles, is contrary to all experience. We may feel sure that it is only a temporary expedient to secure such forces on the negative corpuscles as will keep them moving round the centre in fixed times. It will doubtless be replaced by some machinery more in agreement with experience.

Even in its early form, however, the structure is wonderfully suggestive, in its co-ordination of physical and chemical facts. Its most remarkable feature is, perhaps, its identification of matter and electric charge. Matter is electric charge, or electric charge is matter, whichever way we like to put it. Some physicists may prefer the first statement; the man in the street

will certainly prefer the second. It has often been surmised that we might arrive at such identification, but the path to it was first pointed out by Thomson himself, in a celebrated paper written more than twenty years ago. Maxwell had already shown that upon his theory a moving electrified body would produce a magnetic field round itself, and would so be equivalent to a length of electric current. The energy of motion would therefore consist not only of the energy of the body carrying the charge, but also of the magnetic energy in the space round it. Rowland confirmed Maxwell's theory by a direct experiment in which a moving electrified body was shown to deflect a magnet near it. Thomson calculated the amount and distribution of the magnetic energy round a moving electrified sphere. He pointed out that if the motion of the sphere was increased, the magnetic energy was increased, and work had to be done, or energy had to be supplied, to give this increase. Thus there is difficulty of two kinds in moving a charged body, difficulty in setting the mass in motion and difficulty in setting the charge in motion. The first difficulty experienced is the root idea of ordinary mass or inertia; the second difficulty may be described by saying that the body has "electric mass" by virtue of its charge. Calculation showed that in the case of a sphere the magnetic energy is nearly all in the space just outside the sphere, within a few radii of it, and that the smaller the sphere the greater is the "electrical mass" for a given charge. If we make the sphere small enough, we may make its electrical mass as large as we please.

Now let us apply this idea to the new atomic model. Let us take the hydrogen atom with its globe of positive electrification and the swarm of negative corpuscles circling inside it. We can estimate in various ways the outside dimensions of the system, and all these ways agree in saying that it is a little more than a thousand millionth of an inch across. This is the diameter we must assign to the globe of positive electrification. Now such a globe, even with the thousandfold atomic charge we have assigned to it, would possess no appreciable electric mass. It is far too large. But the corpuscles may be imagined to be mere dots in comparison, and if we suppose them to be little spheres somewhere about a thousand billionth of an inch in diameter, then we find that the thousand of them will, in all, possess electric mass equal to the actual mass of the atom. That is, the difficulty of changing the speed of a body of hydrogen is entirely accounted for by the difficulty of changing the speed of its negative corpuscular charges. There is no need for the two kinds of mass, material and electric—the electric kind suffices.

This is a great simplification. For we know by direct experiment that electric mass is a reality, and that the massiveness of a charge consists in the magnetic energy always present when it gets into motion. Further, we are obliged to suppose that all matter contains electric charges, and therefore that all matter possesses electric mass. It is a very real gain to know that this is the only kind of mass we need imagine.

But there still remains that property of matter, whose investigation we



owe to Newton, the gravitation of mass towards mass. Electric forces as yet give no account of this. The model does not yet work so as to produce gravitation. That may be a future achievement.

A most interesting feature of the new atomic structure consists in its suggestion that the difference of properties of different atoms is to be accounted for by the different arrangements of corpuscles rotating in rings inside the positive globe. This feature of the model is admirably illustrated by a beautiful magnetic experiment devised by Alfred Mayer. A number of sewing needles are magnetised, stuck through little bits of cork, and floated vertically on water with their like poles upwards. The opposite pole of a strong bar magnet is brought down towards the surface of the water, and it is most fascinating to watch the needles arranging themselves in regular patterns under the attraction of the pole and their mutual repulsions. The patterns change with every change in the number of needles. Three needles will arrange themselves at the corners of a triangle, 4 in a square, 5 in a pentagon. After this, there will be one or more needles inside and a ring outside. Thus 10 needles form a triangle inside, under the pole, with 7 at the corners of a heptagon outside; 20 needles have a triangle inside, a heptagon outside that, and a ring of 10 outside all; 35 give a triangle inside, round it a heptagon, round this again a ring of 13, and outside all a ring of 15. Here we have a model of the model imagined by Thomson, which anyone can make and study.

Let us assume that the atomic arrangements are like those of Mayer's magnets, and that the triangular arrangement of corpuscles has certain properties. We note that it occurs with 3, then recurs with 10, with 20, and with 35. The properties of the atom with 3 corpuscles may be expected to recur, then, in atoms with 10, 20, and 35 corpuscles, ascending in atomic weights. But the properties will not exactly recur, for the outer rings will modify them. Herein lies the suggestiveness of the structure. The arrangement of the elements according to the Periodic Law shows that they can be grouped in families, with likeness in property among members of the same family, the likeness being modified as the atomic weight increases.

In Mayer's experiment the needles are at rest. In the atomic model the corpuscles revolve in orbits round the centre of the positive globe, and this motion influences the figures. Thomson finds that certain figures are stable, or will persist, when the velocity in the orbits is sufficiently rapid. But, if the motion decreases, at a certain point instability comes in, and the figures change their forms. Such decrease of motion may be produced by the loss of energy by radiation of waves outwards, and the instability may result either in a rearrangement of the corpuscles into rings of different numbers, an "allotropic modification" of the element, or an actual expulsion of one or more corpuscles from the system, such expulsion as we appear to have in the radium class of elements. Even a greater convulsion may occur when the velocity slows down to the critical point, and a big piece of the atom may be flung away, as in the emanation from radium.

In a very remarkable paper in the March *Philosophical Magazine*, Professor Thomson develops the mathematical theory of the system which he has pictured. The difficulty of treatment increases greatly with the increase in the number of corpuscles in the atom, but by a most ingenious and powerful method he has succeeded in investigating the conditions for permanence of form with atoms containing as many as 60 or 70 corpuscles. The much greater numbers which we must ascribe to the real atoms are still beyond the reach of mathematics, and we must for the present be content with the analogies of such simpler systems as can be investigated. It is very interesting to note how the stability changes as the number of corpuscles increases from 59 to 67. Thus an atom with 59 corpuscles is very stable. It will not permanently lose or gain a corpuscle. One with 60 can easily be so disturbed as to expel one, and thus show a single unbalanced positive charge. One with 61 can somewhat less easily expel two corpuscles, and so show a double unbalanced positive charge, and so on. Beginning at the other end, an atom with 67 corpuscles is stable, like the 59 atom. One with 66 can easily hold an extra corpuscle, and so acquire a single negative charge. One with 65 can rather less easily hold two extra corpuscles, and so acquire a double negative charge. This very closely corresponds to what we have in real families of elements. Thus in the family beginning with helium, and passing with ascending atomic weight through lithium and beryllium to oxygen, thorium, and neon, helium is stable and refuses to combine. Lithium is electro-positive, and can combine as if it had a single positive atomic charge. Beryllium is also electro-positive, and can combine as if it had a double positive atomic charge. At the other end neon is stable and will not combine. Thorium, the last but one, is electro-negative, as if with a single negative charge; oxygen, the last but two, electro-negative, as if with two negative charges; and the intermediate elements resemble the intermediate corpuscular systems. Here, then, is a very notable correspondence between the properties of the chemical elements and those of the new atomic structures by which they are represented.

The remark will perhaps bear repetition, and indeed many repetitions, that such an atomic system as Professor Thomson has imagined is not to be tested by its reality. Its reality is beyond proof, and is in fact profoundly unimportant. Its value lies in the mental picture which it enables us to form of processes of which the details are beyond the range of our senses, in the number of different phenomena which it will represent, in the lines of research which it will suggest. It must be a good working model, working with machinery of which the action can be followed. Judged by these standards, the new atomic model is abundantly justified. We can easily picture it, at least in its essential feature of a swarm of corpuscles circling round a centre, and—no small advantage—we can illustrate it by Mayer's experiment. It gives some account of radiation and the peculiarities of the spectrum. In some degree it explains mass. It gives a most suggestive account of the family likenesses among the elements. Above all,



perhaps, at the present moment, it enables us to picture the breaking up of the radio-active elements, which is the only interpretation we can put upon the startling properties which they reveal. Further, there is not the slightest doubt that in the minds of Professor Thomson and the band of brilliant workers of which he is the leader, it has served as a guide to new and most successful research. No small achievements for a hypothesis still in early infancy.

J. H. POYNTING.

UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM.

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*Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion.* By J. E. Harrison.—  
Pp. 659. Cambridge University Press, 1903.

THE previous writings of Miss Harrison have led us to expect much when a new work issues from her pen, especially one of such compass and intention as that which is now before us. We feel a certain pleasurable excitement in the sure anticipation of many ingenious hypotheses, many novel and bold suggestions, that will perturb the orthodoxy of learning, and will stimulate even those scholars whom they fail to convince. And certainly such anticipations are not belied by the *Prolegomena*. The main content of the book is, first, an examination of certain parts of primitive Greek ritual, and secondly, a survey of Orphism, especially in its relations to the Dionysiac worship. In her preface she explains that it is partly her object to fill a gap in existing English scholarship, for she is of opinion that in England "no serious attempt has been made to examine Greek ritual." She may be reassured to know that this is not absolutely the case: that the serious students of Greek religion in England—their number is unfortunately few, but is increasing—are sufficiently impressed with the deep importance of Greek ritual; and that they are well aware that Greek literature is not the sole source of evidence, and that the Homeric poems are not our earliest testimony. Nevertheless, they will always be keenly interested to know what Miss Harrison has to say about the subject. The main thesis which she aims in various ways to establish may be summarised thus:—In the soil of Greek religion we can and must distinguish an earlier from a later stratum; on the one hand, a primitive ritual which is mainly magical, aiming at purification and the aversion of ghosts and evil influences that flutter around us like malarial bacilli, and is therefore by nature dark and gloomy, being dedicated to the ghostly powers of the lower world and—when it recognises gods at all—to the Θεοὶ Ἀποτρόπαιοι, who were originally nothing but the ghosts of evil whom the ritual sought to avert; the formula of its sacrifice, when the idea of sacrifice is developed, is "Do ut abeas": on the other hand, the "Olympian" ritual of which Homer and Pindar are prophets, a ritual not of "Aversion" but "Tendence" (Θεραπεία), cheerful, familiar, self-confident, in which the

sacrifice is a gift offered to the gods, who on certain occasions can be attracted to feast with the worshipper; the formula of this sacrifice is "Do ut des," and we miss in it the deep sense of sin and the necessity of atonement: these two rituals belong to two different layers of population, the first, which may be called chthonic, being aboriginal, the second, which is the "Olympian," coming from the north and laying itself over the earlier, but never blending organically with it: from the dark ghost-world of the first, an inarticulate religious protoplasm, emerge by a process which is called the "making of a goddess" or "the making of a god" certain definite anthropomorphic forms, some local hero-gods, but chiefly goddesses, conceived usually as mother and maid or mother and daughter: this stage of evolution corresponds to a matriarchal society, where the woman was dominant in the family, and the goddess in cult: this more primitive social-religious system was partly suppressed by the "Olympian" patriarchal bourgeoisie, but not wholly, for "the real religion in the sixth and even fifth century of the main bulk of the people was one of fear and deprecation, not cheerful tendance," and by the fifth century the "Olympian puppet-show was played out": the study of the lower stratum is the really important task for the student of Greek religion, because this alone explains the mysteries which, "when informed by the new spirit of the religions of Dionysos and Orpheus, lent to Greece its deepest and most enduring religious impulse": the last word of Greek religion was Orphism, which gave to the Eleusinia whatever of strength and spiritual significance those rites possessed; the only real gods in Greece were Bacchus and Eros, and Orphism was true religion in the sense that "it was the worship of the real mysteries of life, of potencies (*δαίμονες*) rather than of personal gods."

These are theses of evident importance for comparative religion; they are meant to be taken quite seriously, and are stated with boldness, occasionally with brilliance, and with an earnest, even passionate, conviction that often approaches dogmatism. A fair judgment of them is only attainable through long and laboured research on the same and connected lines; and it is only after two careful readings of the whole treatise that I venture to express my opinion that the writer has failed in that which must be the test and the basis of any authoritative work, the collection and the evaluation of evidence. The intellectual apparatus necessary to such a task must be furnished partly by the study of ancient literature, including inscriptions, partly by the study of monuments, partly by wide acquaintance with the modern facts of anthropology. The study of ancient literature demands accurate translation, a faculty of reasonable interpretation, and a *Quellen-Kritik*, or the power of estimating the differing value of authorities; and to these must be added for the present purpose some knowledge of comparative philology, for one obvious way of distinguishing between aboriginal and alien, between pre-Hellenic and Hellenic strata, would be a careful examination of the religious names that belong to the two different deposits. In all this part of the necessary mental equipment Miss Harrison



has here shown herself deficient. She almost staves off criticism, indeed, by a frank admission that she is no philologist; but she exposes herself to it by dabbling in derivations, by consulting and accepting the guesses of amateurs, and by drawing important deductions from impossible or at best hopelessly unprovable—and therefore gratuitous—etymologies. The most salient examples are perhaps afforded by her etymologising concerning *Διάσια*, *Διπόλεια*, *Ἀνθεστήρια*. As regards the two first words, she endeavours to detach them from the stem that forms the name of the chief Indo-Germanic god, as for theological reasons she endeavours to exclude him from the ritual which they designate. Her scepticism in regard to *Διάσια* arises from the proved length of the first vowel, but would disappear in the light of further knowledge concerning the phonetic effects of the disappearance of a digamma before certain vowels (in some of her other derivations the difference between long and short vowels does not trouble her when it should): hence *Διάσια* for her is the Curse-ritual, *Dipolia*—of which, it should be noted, the right form is *Διπόλεια*, undoubtedly the festival of Zeus Polieus—becomes, according to her suggestion, a “Plough-curse”—a suggestion that defies the formative law of Greek compounds. There looms upon us a word hitherto unknown in Greek vocabulary, *δῖον*, “a curse,” and a spirit of evil can be described as a “Dian demon.” For her etymological explanation of *Ἀνθεστήρια*—as derived from *ἀνα* and the stem *θεσ*, which appears in *θέσσαι*, meaning to “pray” or “conjure”—Dr Verrall is responsible; and she is not aware that his guess ignores the fact that *ἀνα* in compounds does not suffer “apokope” in Attic-Ionic, except in a few words, such as *ἄνθεμα*, which are taken over from poetry. And if we give to *Ἀνθεστήρια* the verbal sense which she is rightly informed should belong to it, and interpret it as “the ritual which causes the earth to bloom,” it accords sufficiently with her theory of the festival. There is no space here to discuss her other excursions into this dangerous field: her hypotheses concerning *βρόμιος*, the Beer-god, and *τραγωδία*, the Beer-song, founder on difficulties other than philological: these and similar ones, though put down seriously, are only *jeux d'esprit*.

More important still is a certain deficiency in her scholarship, which is often the cause of mistranslation and misunderstanding of texts: (p. 195) *Æsch. Prom. Vinc.* 800, *ἔξει πνοάς*, “none may behold and bear their breathing blight,” such use of *ἔξει* for *ἀνέξεται* being unknown in Attic; (p. 424) *Æsch. Fr.* 123, *καὶ τῶνδ' ἔπινε βρῦτον ἰσχυαίνων χρόνῳ*, “thereat he drank the *βρῦτον* and waxed strong,” as if *ἰσχυαίνειν* were the same as *ἰσχύειν*; (p. 534) the well-known words in Demosthenes, *De Corona*, *ἐπὶ τῷ μηδένα πώποτε τηλικούτ' ὀλολύξαι σεμννόμενος*, “pluming yourself that no one has ever before uttered such words” (the context alone might have saved her from this). Other examples might be quoted, but some argument, for which this is not the place, would in some cases be needed to prove the error. In a quaint note on a book by Dr Taylor (p. 569), she appears to make light of minor verbal inaccuracies; but her inaccuracies are not minor, and are more than verbal. Wrong meanings, forced and often

mystic significance, sub-conscious intentions, are attached to words and phrases that a fuller knowledge of the author and a more careful comparison of contexts would rule out; but a list of these could only be given and discussed in a philological journal. And many obvious slips and wrong references betray the haste with which the book has been written off. The eighth day of the month is given as the birthday of Apollo from Plutarch (p. 501), though Plutarch definitely mentions the seventh day, and a short study of Apolline ritual impresses upon our memory the seventh as his sacred and natal day, whence the god was specially called "he of the seventh day." Again, in her account of the Anthesteria, which contains much that is really valuable and interesting, her view of the ritual of the dead is mainly based on an important citation from the historian Theopompos given by a scholiast whom she quotes, from which she gathers that the people religiously refrained from eating the offerings to the ghosts. But she has not noted that Dindorf, who publishes the scholia, mentions another scholiast (G. Venice) who gives the passage from Theopompos in a far more perfect form, which makes it clear that the people all partook of these offerings; and this sole fact—which was quite easy for a little research to discover—nullifies a great part of her theory. We are puzzled by a statement on p. 477, a censure on Pindar as incapable of rising to the height of the Orphic sentiment, "Werde was du bist": is there some irony intended, or is the writer unaware that Pindar, and no Orphic mystic, is the very author of the phrase of which the German is a translation—Γένει οἷος ἐσσί (*Pyth.* 2, 133)?

These and many similar examples, as well as the writer's own frank and modest acknowledgments, compel us to conclude that her reading of the classical texts has been too fragmentary and desultory to enable her to speak with full authority on the great problems she has selected to handle. And one most serious drawback on the literary side is the absence of any ethnological study, a drawback which she herself acknowledges, and which is perhaps both the cause and the effect of a defective sense in her of historical reasoning. The general theory of the work can only be approached in the light of some reasoned hypothesis concerning the people of the "old order" and the people of the new. Which of the two were of Hellenic speech? Apparently the new people; yet Meilichios is said to belong to the old stratum, and as a god or demon to be older than Zeus; but his name is as Hellenic as the name of Zeus, and obviously of somewhat later formation. And none of her Pantheon of the old order—with the possible exception of Hyakinthos—has a clearly un-Hellenic name. Were the aborigines, then, Hellenes? Here is a grave "Aryan" problem which is never faced by the writer. The task of tracing the correlations of cult-evidence and ethnography requires exact training in historical criticism. She only occasionally attempts it, and never seriously; a striking example of bad argumentation in this line is her conclusions about Æakus (p. 611): he is ranked as a hero of the old or pre-Achæan order, because within the marble precinct of the Aiakeion at Ægina there was an altar which was said to be the



tomb of Æakus. But if any hero has the right to be called Achæan, it is this Æakus, as he was merely the eponymous ancestor of the Æakidæ, who came from the Achæan country of Phthiotis, and was consecrated as the priest of the specially Achæan god, Zeus Hellanios.

The whole of her religious exposition is deeply infected by her sociological theories concerning matriarchy. It would be a great gain to the book if the names "matriarchy" and "matriarchal" could be expunged wherever they occur; they occur with wearisome frequency and in strange places. Her knowledge of this very important anthropological question is derived, according to her own statement, from a short but brilliant article by Professor Tylor in the *Nineteenth Century* of 1896. But it has profited her nothing, nor has she taken to herself the lesson which it might have taught her, that "matriarchy" does not at all demand or imply the rule of women. No anthropologist living or dead is responsible for the amazing vision of a matriarchal earth which reveals itself in these pages: of the time when no child necessarily knew his own father; when Zeus was not yet come "with his virtuous thunderbolt" (p. 566), to destroy free love; when there was mere *σύμμιξις*, but no *γάμος*, nor "the squalor of domestic happiness"; when women, being in power, evolved goddesses after their own image, the mother and the maid, or Amazonian deities like Athena, who took "matriarchal" baths to restore their virginity (pp. 312, 315), or if the women tolerated a male divinity, they always endeavoured to keep him an infant (pp. 561-562). Stript of its extravagances, the theory may be soberly stated that the prominence of goddess-worship and matriarchy mutually imply each other; many students of comparative religion, myself among them, have at times held this view. I now believe it to be fallacious, for reasons that I have recently set forth.<sup>1</sup> And even if the theory was as true of ancient maternal communities as it is certainly not true of those that now exist, there is nothing but evidence of the thinnest texture to suggest that prehistoric Athens, Crete, and the Thrako-Phrygians were in the "maternal" condition. Miss Harrison's dogma concerning a "matriarchal" religion in Crete is based mainly on a Cretan seal discovered by Mr Arthur Evans, which she reproduces; but she ignores the evidence from another published seal from Gnosus, of equal importance, which shows us a prominent male divinity coming from the sky and receiving worship. It would be a boon to herself and others, who value Miss Harrison's work, if she would consent to reconsider her whole theory touching this matter in the light of wider reading. She is evidently deeply attached to it, and it sometimes inspires such passion in her as usually finds vent at meetings on women's rights: the Æschylean Athena is bitterly rebuked as "the Lost Leader" for her "shameful betrayal" in her utterance, "I am all for the Father." Moreover, the writer brings strong theological animus to her work, and in reading her pages one misses the quiet, unprejudiced temper of science. She defends Sabazianism against Demosthenes, and Cybele-Attis mysteries against Bishop Clemens, whom, though more discriminating than most of the

<sup>1</sup> In *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 1904.

Christian propagandists that opposed Paganism, she accuses of "ignorant blasphemy," because he attacked the impurities of those mysteries: "blasphemy" is in any case a strange word here, for we presume that no one now believes in Cybele, and Miss Harrison's view concerning the innocence of the impure element in ancient ritual will not bear philosophic scrutiny.

Her attitude towards the Olympian religion is usually contemptuous; she believes that it was on the whole "played out by the fifth century B.C.," yet the private inscriptions and dedications, the best statistics of the people's religion, do not justify this belief: nor do her scattered remarks on the various personages of it reveal much research, or any appreciation of its contributions to civilisation. A careful study of Homer and Apolline ritual does not incline one to accept her statement that the Homeric religion and the "Olympians" knew nothing of atonement and purification, nor will the student of the ordinary state religion be willing to allow that her formula "Do ut des" expresses by any means the whole truth about its cultus. A different view has been presented in a recent article in this Journal. The sharp line she draws, prompted by a passage in Isocrates, between the Olympians and the θεοὶ ἀποτρόπαιοι or "chthonic" powers, was not drawn so strictly in actual cult; many of the high gods become quasi-chthonic, and cereal wineless offerings and *πέλανοι*, devoted, as she thinks, mainly to the dead and the lower powers, belonged to the higher also; and she ought at least to have reckoned with the hypothesis that this fusion of ideas and ritual belonging to the upper and to the lower world may have already been accomplished by many of the cults before they invaded the territory of Greece; also that many of the deities arrived fully developed, having already taken over much magic ritual, such as the Thesmophoria, which was well known in Europe, and which was not necessarily pre-religious—as she deems it—though perhaps originally non-religious. Many of her leading theories must escape discussion here, partly because there is no space, partly because she does not discuss them herself. She accepts the Spencerian theory of the development of gods from ghosts; but she must know there are some who do not, and she brings no new arguments in its support. She accepts Usener's theory of an "adjectival" period of religious forms preceding concrete polytheism, and believes that to this earlier period such shadowy forms as Kouroutrophos and Meilichios belonged. She does not seem to be aware that there are flaws in this theory. She reduces it almost *ad absurdum* by her suggestion that Apollo Genetor ("the Father") of Delos was a fusion of Apollo and an old deity in Delos called "Genetor": who, if there were any, were the inhabitants of Delos before the Ionians arrived, is a question that she does not consider. Her account of the ritual of the dead is mainly good and sound, but her formula "Do ut abeas" fails to apply as an axiom: the great fear of the departed spirit was probably a later growth; for much Mycenæan evidence shows us the earlier desire of communion with the dead, which is not fear, and the Anthesteria and other ritual attest the sense of fellowship which prompted to the occasional eating a sacramental



meal with the spirit of one's kindred. Finally, she suggests many parallels between Greek paganism and Christianity, but she fails to pursue them with criticism or precision: for instance, on page 553 it is implied that a doctrine like the Immaculate Conception was familiar to the pre-Christian Greeks; but all that the facts warrant us in saying is that a goddess who in some places was called Παρθένος or Κόρη—the latter title meaning “Girl” or “Daughter,” not “Maiden”—might in certain legends bear a child: but in this there was nothing necessarily mystic or miraculous.

Her best work is her account of Orphism, though she fails to prove, as others have failed, that Orphism penetrated into the inner circle of the mysteries.

The whole book is attractive because of its vitality and happy flashes of imagination; at the same time it is provocative and disappointing because of its animus and uncritical temper, and because so little in this complex tangle of facts is discussed and argued out *au fond*.

L. R. FARNELL.

EXETER COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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*La pensée religieuse au sein du Protestantisme libéral.—*

A. N. Bertrand.—Paris: 1903.

THE circumstances of the production of this work give it exceptional value. At the meeting of the Association of Liberal Clergy of France at Lasalle last year, a young member of the conference, M. Bertrand, read a paper on the deficiencies and possibilities of advanced Protestantism. The conference thought so highly of the discourse that they decided to publish it to the world.

The paper is decidedly the work of a candid friend, who, while having no doubts as to his own sympathies with advanced liberal thought in religion, sees its weak side—a line, I may observe, somewhat resembling that taken by Mr Jacks in the January number of the *Hibbert Journal*.

M. Bertrand begins with a brief history of liberal Protestantism in France. He shows how, during the last century, starting from the teaching of Kant and Schleiermacher, it produced first a school of rationalism, in which the most prominent name is that of Athanase Coquerel père, and next a reaction in a more supernaturalist direction, led by Samuel Vincent. He goes on to sketch the positions taken up by the great teachers of the latter part of last century, Scherer, Bouvier, A. Sabatier, Albert Réville, and the reactions of the school of history and the school of psychology.

But the part of the book most interesting to us is that in which M. Bertrand sets himself to sketch the weaknesses and defects of the liberal theology. He distinguishes between the defects which arise from the failings of the advanced leaders, and those which belong to the movement

itself. The former belong to the imperfect nature of man—want of courage and initiative, an imperfect comprehension of the circumstances of the age, indolence and superficiality. The latter, according to M. Bertrand, are mainly three.

The greatest of all defects of liberal Protestantism is, according to the author, its want of spontaneity, by which he means its too negative character, its want of courage and initiative. Those who leave the orthodox ranks, he observes, are apt to be at once attacked by their friends for rejecting this or that doctrine. They try to justify themselves, and in so doing become absorbed. The holders of the new views "have been obliged to enter on the field of dogma; they have begun to discuss the conclusions regarded by their adversaries as essential; and, by a strange yet natural optical delusion, they have soon come themselves to consider this refutation as the essential part of their programme." "The liberals have replied; they have allowed themselves to be enticed on to the enemy's ground, have adopted their way of considering questions by means of discursive reasoning only; and thus the movement, which was not at first rationalist, has in time become so."

The further defects of the liberal theology, its want of due ponderation, and its want of homogeneity, spring largely from this unfortunate bias, against which M. Bertrand works with all his force. The plan of campaign which he recommends is what he calls the throwing aside of rationalism, the forsaking of theology for religion, the abandonment of abstract reasoning for an appreciation of the religious life and the feelings in which it is rooted—in a word, an appeal from the theoretical to the practical reason.

The supersession of rationalism by pragmatism seems to be a process going on more or less in all the liberal churches. It is evident that M. Bertrand is largely influenced by the writings of M. A. Sabatier. "The great danger of rationalism is that, if we allow ourselves to be carried away by it, liberalism will become a movement no longer religious but philosophic or theologic." It is thus that the movement of M. Renouvier and his friends came to an end. What is wanted is not keener criticism, but more faith, greater activity, more life.

Yet from both the great schools of liberal theology which now prevail M. Bertrand would seek aid for the free working of the spirit of faith. The school of historic criticism reminds us that there is work in religion for the intellect as well as for the impulses. It is mainly concerned with two things—the restoration of the authority of the fact, the bestowal on thought of rigorous exactitude. It has often failed through the use in historic science of the methods only suitable in the sciences of nature. Hence one-sidedness and superficiality. "In particular, in the criticism of dogma, the historic school has sometimes shown narrowness. It has examined the conclusions of the traditional dogmatics, and found there only vain formulæ rising out of a blind desire of speculation and reasoning. But ought not criticism itself to suggest that we should discern between



dogmas? Certainly some are vain: are there not others which express—well or ill—feelings specifically Christian, and even essential to Christianity?" "Take, for example, the dogma of the Trinity, and that of the divinity of Christ. Can one place these on the same footing? Who does not see that the first is derived, secondary, based only on speculative ideas, while it is otherwise with the second?" "We must distinguish between what may be called ontological dogmas and experimental dogmas."

All this appears to me both interesting and sound. There exists a school, to which one is sometimes disposed to refer even Professor Harnack, which regards all dogma as more or less a corruption of pure primitive teaching. And there is a school, of which M. Loisy may be said to be representative, which regards dogma as something lying apart from history, and to be received by faith on authority. To both schools M. Bertrand's *distinguo* comes with much appropriateness. I would even venture to carry it a step further, and to say that not only must we distinguish between the dogmas which are mere intellectual creations, and those which are a rendering of experience, but we must also endeavour to discern between good and evil in the case of the latter. Granted that these doctrines of Christianity are expressions of life, yet life itself has been, even in the Christian Church, by no means always directed by the spirit and ideals of the Master. To suppose that the Church has always been supernaturally guided towards what is right in doctrine is just as unreasonable and unhistorical as to suppose that the writers of the Gospels were supernaturally led to what was true in fact.

As might have been expected, M. Bertrand's sympathies are with the psychological school even more than with the historic. He rightly sees that we need alike in religion an observational psychology which plunges into the recesses of the human heart, and a historic psychology which examines and analyses the great works of the mighty religious writers of the past. "Religious thought must endeavour to penetrate the inner life of the great Christians who have had a richer religious life than we, especially of those who have been nearer to the source of all Christian experience." And the faculty of religious cognition is by no means a purely intellectual faculty; according to Michel Nicholas, "*on ne connaît son Dieu que dans la mesure où on lui ressemble.*"

M. Bertrand, I think, mentions Mr William James but once; but the countrymen of M. Sabatier have no great necessity for seeking illumination and guiding from other countries. M. Bertrand's work is in itself pleasing, and it comes to us as the expression of a tendency among the liberal Protestants of France, who, though few, exercise in their own country an influence out of proportion to their small numbers.

PERCY GARDNER.

OXFORD.

*The Origin and Propagation of Sin.* Hulsean Lectures, 1901-2. *The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin.* By the Rev. F. R. Tennant.—Cambridge University Press.

MR TENNANT tells us, in the preface to his first volume, that his lectures embody an attempt to "supply a criticism of the implications of a traditional doctrine, and a restatement of so much of its essential meaning as can be retained" (viii.). Modern theology, he says, "retains original sin, but repudiates original guilt." "Consequently," he adds, "some have roundly asserted that what is called original sin is not sin" (20). With this assertion Mr Tennant appears entirely to agree. "The actuality of sin is derived solely from the individual will influenced by its social environment" (117). "Apart from the conscious volition of a person there is no such thing as moral goodness or badness. The term 'sin' and its derivatives can only be applied to the issues of will" (161). "Inherited organic nature . . . contains no moral element whatever" (119), but only "the material out of which sin is made by the will" (170). "According to evolutionary doctrine, man's constitution is at first simply animal. He inherits the tendencies of the stock, the original material of impulse and emotion out of which sin is soon easily made; but that, as a matter of science, is the normal and inevitable constituent of the common nature in which we all have kinship or solidarity, and, as a matter of Ethics, is neutral, indifferent, and non-moral. . . . They are simply the conditions which render virtue and vice equally a possibility when will and conscience have been acquired" (114). "Evil is not the result of a transition from the good, but good and evil are alike voluntary developments of what is ethically neutral" (115). "There is every reason to believe that the awakening of man's moral sense or sentiment, his discovery of a law by which he came to know sin, was an advance accomplished by a long series of stages. Consequently the origin of sin, like other so-called origins, was also a gradual process rather than an abrupt and inexplicable plunge. The appearance of sin, from this point of view, would not consist in the performance of a deed such as man had never done before, and of whose wickedness, should he commit it, he was previously aware; it would rather be the continuance in certain practices, or the satisfying of natural impulses, after they were first discovered to be contrary to a recognised sanction of rank as low as tribal custom. The sinfulness of sin would gradually increase from zero; and the first sin, if the words have any meaning, instead of being the most heinous, and the most momentous in the race's history, would rather be the least significant of all" (91).

I. (a) Mr Tennant concludes that "the organic unity of the race pertains directly only to the material side of our constitution. Heredity, in the strict sense of inheritance by birth or descent, . . . cannot take place 'in the region of the spiritual personality'" (34). These last words are quoted from a note in Dr Gore's *Epistle to the Romans*, which Mr Tennant interprets as Traducian. Now, Traducianism, according to Mr Tennant,



involves "materialistic and impossible metaphysics of mind" (35, footnote). He endorses Professor Ladd's opinion that to "speak of parents transmitting their minds to their offspring, in part or in whole, is to use words that have no assignable meaning" (32-33). He does so, apparently, because we cannot regard the soul as having extension in space, nor can we "conceive of it as a matter-like entity capable of self-division and reproduction such as we attribute to a unicellular plant" (32). But, evidently, Mr Tennant does not hold the Sankhya doctrine of a sterile plurality of uncreated souls. He admits that the number of existing personalities can be increased. How, then, is the increase brought about? Mr Tennant tells us: "The only view of the origin of the soul which is consistent with the observed facts of experience and with the metaphysics which ethical theism can embrace is a form of Creationism refined of the crudities incidental to its popular statement, such as is taught by Lotze. The soul, according to this philosopher, is, as it were, a 'uniformly maintained act of God,' begotten from Himself when the organism with which it is destined to be associated has been prepared" (33). But, surely, this involves difficulties which are essentially identical with those that Mr Tennant thinks decisive against Traducianism. It is true that, according to Lotze, God is the immediate agent in the production of new personalities, whereas, according to Traducianism, the productive agents are individual human personalities; but, according to each doctrine, we have the creation of spirit by spirit, and if in the idea of personality there be nothing inconsistent with the thought of production by the Divine Spirit,—which, after all, must be a kind of reproduction,—why must we deem it inconceivable that the human spirit can reproduce itself?

(b) Weismann's doctrine of the non-transmission of acquired modifications seems to Mr Tennant to place another difficulty in the way of Traducianism. But, if acquired modifications be not transmitted, it is, as we are led to believe, because of an initial separation between the somatoplasm and the germ-plasm. Mr Tennant, who, because he accepts "Christian presuppositions," may be presumed to believe in the existence of spirit as a distinct entity, should, therefore, show reason for believing that an essentially similar distinction exists in the "spiritual personality." If he cannot, his argument rests only upon a gratuitously supposed and unconfirmed analogy. It may perhaps be said that this is only forensic disputation—that soul and body are probably not so distinct as this criticism presupposes them to be, and that the question of "transmission" or "non-transmission" "in the domain of the spiritual personality" cannot be adequately discussed without also discussing the more fundamental question of the relation of soul to body. True, but Mr Tennant nowhere raises the ulterior question, and the course of my criticism is of necessity determined by the limitations and presuppositions of his argument.

(c) Mr Tennant appears to think that a doctrine can be proved invalid by the history of its formation. "It will be plain," he says, "that if the nature of the Fall-story and of its inspiration be altogether different from

what it was assumed to be during the time in which the doctrines based upon it were elaborated, the validity of such doctrines will be impugned" (26, note). He thinks that "a historical study of the development of the doctrines" examined in his lectures—"a taking of them to pieces, as it were, to show the nature of their material and the processes by which they have been constructed"—furnishes "one of the best criterions of their validity and finality" (viii.). But, in so far as this makes genesis the determinant of validity, does it not involve either an ignoring or a radical misapprehension of the idea of doctrinal development? A "Logic of Doctrinal Development" does not appear to be wholly beyond the joint resources of philosophy and theology. But perhaps Mr Tennant would say that such a "Logic" would destroy the category of "authority"? I do not think so. Transform—or shall we say "transfigure"?—that category such a Logic certainly might, but I cannot bring myself to think that even the most complete loyalty to it would require us to abandon the thought of authoritative doctrine.

(d) In justice to himself, Mr Tennant ought to have made it clearer wherein his doctrine of man differs from that of "Naturalism." It is obvious that he is not a "Naturalist," and yet his account of the origin of sin contains nothing that decisively marks him as anything else. Man, apparently, was at first "lawless, impulse-governed organism"—"flesh" before he became "spirit" (11). "According to evolutionary doctrine," which Mr Tennant seems unreservedly to accept, "man's constitution" was at first "simply animal" (114), and the awakening of his moral consciousness found him "heavily weighted with his inherited load, not, indeed, of abnormal and corrupted nature, but of non-moral and necessary animal instinct and self-assertive tendency" (11). On a later page we find it suggested that man's *physical* nature is "necessarily endowed with instincts, appetites, and impulses, with self-assertive tendencies inevitably accompanying the capacity to feel pleasure and pain" (92). Morality, we are told, is a "social creation, not a ready-made endowment of the individual" (88), and the account given, in the passage already quoted from p. 91, of the "awakening of man's moral sense" does not seem distinguishable, in any important particular, from the account given of that awakening by "Naturalism." By the "nature" of man, Mr Tennant means man's "congenital endowments." "The word chiefly refers, therefore, to man's animal and sensuous organisation, his instincts and inborn springs of impulse, his undeveloped mental faculties" (172). We read, indeed, of "the acquisition and superposition of a 'higher nature'" (93), but of that "higher nature" and the origin of it no account is given.

II. The Christian doctrine of sin finds its natural complement in a doctrine of judgment. Now, this judgment, even as set forth in those words which Christian faith accepts as most authoritative, is so momentous—its consequences are so tremendous—that, whenever, in more recent times, Christian thinkers have attempted to connect this doctrine of "the last things" with the fundamental conceptions reached by ethical inquiry,



they have felt constrained so to define the ethical ground of condemnation as to exclude from it everything for which the individual, as an ethical personality, cannot be held completely and solely responsible. In this way they have reached the conclusion that—to quote once more Mr Tennant's words—"the actuality of sin is derived solely from the individual will," and that "the term 'sin' and its derivatives can only be applied to the issues of will."

With this, of course, there can be no quarrel. But yet we may fairly ask whether this predominance of the thought of a judgment to come has not unnecessarily and harmfully narrowed much of the ethical thinking of Christendom.

We are told—in words that, although only of denominational authority, may yet be taken as expressing a catholic belief—that "the chief end of man is to glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever." But the perfect glory of the perfect God can be fully set forth only in life as perfect as His own, and the full beatitude of His nearer presence can be known, can be "enjoyed," only by natures in which receptivity is not limited by defect of sympathy. The small-heartedness that issues in meanness, the hardness that prevents charity, the narrowness that is unresponsive to thought's higher wisdom—these things obscure the glory that man should make manifest, and to these the Beatific Vision itself would bring only inappreciative unrest. And yet these things belong to that "nature" which Mr Tennant accepts as "given," and which, he tells us, is not in itself a proper subject for ethical censure—for either praise or blame.

It is obvious that our ethical thought upon "the last things" must include more than the idea of judgment, and whatever that implies. We must find room in it for the conception of man's completeness, and, in our interpretation of the Christian economy of grace, we must set that economy forth as ancillary to that completeness, and not simply as instrumental in Redemption.

If we do this, it may not be necessary to revise our definition of sin, but it will certainly be necessary to recognise that man needs to be "saved," not only from his sins, but also from things that are not sins—from shortcomings and limitations that hinder the full and harmonised expression of the manhood that is potentially his. But the more earnestly we endeavour—each one in his own life and his own character—to define and to meet this wider need, the deeper will be our sense of our individual sinfulness, and the less restricted will appear the range of sin.

I do not say that Mr Tennant adheres to the old-fashioned "faculty" psychology, but his words suggest that psychology. He speaks as though the will were a separate power—almost as though it were a separate entity—that makes use, *ab extra*, for good or for ill, of habits and capacities brought into being independently of its own activity.<sup>1</sup> But, surely (if I

<sup>1</sup> Mr Tennant's account of "the empirical origin of sin" more than once recalled to my mind that conception of spiritual existence without content which seems to be a characteristic result of more than one line of Eastern thought.

may assume, as Mr Tennant does, the validity of Christian presuppositions), no human habit can be formed, no human capacity can be developed or exercised, without conation, without some determination of man's "free" spiritual activity? Now, it is precisely such determined activity that constitutes concrete "will."

The tremendous consequences of a final condemnation at the Last Assize have led men to insist that ethical judgment can properly pass only upon that which is the result of deliberate or, at least, conscious choice. The righteousness of God, they have said, will condemn, not the wrong that is done involuntarily, but only the sin that implies a consentient will. And some have found relief in this thought, as though it narrowed the grounds of judgment. Some, too, have found more than relief: they have found more or less of content—of contentment with their present estate. In ordinary lives the moments of conscious deliberation or of conscious choice are comparatively rare. Plain men ordinarily act according to their several natures, and if, in the presence of clear alternatives, they act with a single purpose to do right, they easily persuade themselves that nothing more is required of them. Careful only to avoid the patently sinful, they give no thought to those unnecessary imperfections—mistakes in judgment, defects in charity, feebleness in action, impoverishment of interest—which, because not obviously caused by a rebellious will, do not *seem* sinful. Thus they become blind to life's higher possibilities of achievement and service, and if they read of the penitence of the saints, that penitence, in its unreserved abasement of spirit before the All-Holy, appears to them extravagant or morbid. But these "unnecessary imperfections" do not come to us by heredity or by fate. Each of them has a history—reaching back, it is true, into the guided life of infancy, but continuing also into the relative freedom of adult years—and at every stage of that history spirit has been present, acting, if not always deliberating, accepting, without compulsion, lower forms of good because they were the nearer, submitting to an impoverishment that was not inevitable. When we reflect upon all this, our consciousness of sin will become deeper, and our thoughts of the Christian redemption wider. The penitence of the saints will no longer seem abnormal, nor shall we be easily persuaded to dismiss the gladness of their faith as merely a vagrant enthusiasm.

ARTHUR BOUTWOOD.

BLEDLOW.

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*The Nature of Man — Studies in Optimistic Philosophy.*—By Elie Metchnikoff, the English translation edited by P. Chalmers Mitchell.  
—London: Wm. Heinemann, 1903.

THE sentimentalist, the mystic, the religious-minded will derive scant comfort from Professor Metchnikoff's book. It is not written for them, but against them; not to console, but to destroy. Measuring life, its value, its significance, its goal by the purely subjective standard of their



own fanciful ideals, they are victims of a pernicious obsession, with which the physician rather than the philosopher is called upon to deal. Here is a new treatment of the various "idées fixes"—products of religion and philosophy—which, in the course of humanity's quest for the Holy Grail, have cankered life with the fear of death, and blighted happiness with the poison of despair. The obsessions have an origin and a development. They can be diagnosed. They can be physiologically explained. To remove the morbid results, we have but to remove the morbid conditions. We must understand human nature in its weakness and in its strength. Science which has already accomplished so much is able even now, Metchnikoff believes, to accomplish this also. The eternal questions as to man's origin and man's destiny have, we are told, already been answered beyond the possibility of dispute. "Whence do we come?" science has been asked unceasingly. Is not man a being unlike other beings, made in the image of God, animated with the divine breath, and immortal? No, science answers. Man is a kind of miscarriage of an ape, endowed with profound intelligence, and capable of great progress. "Whither are we going?" . . . . "Science cannot admit the immortality of the soul. . . . Death brings absolute extinction. . . . Immortality exists only for very low organisms that renew their lives with complete regeneration, and that have no highly developed consciousness."

The noble origin, and the everlasting destiny which the ludicrous inadequacy of his actual existence has ever caused man to postulate, are, Metchnikoff assures us, proved by science to be nothing but the delusions of megalomaniacal melancholy. Yet the author styles his book: *Studies in Optimistic Philosophy*. It is true, indeed, that although we are but "corruption and worms," the "worms" at least are admitted to be immortal. To the sentimentalist this is scant consolation. They participate in us, and we in them. But their immortality is as indifferent to us as that of the *Chætogaster*. It requires something more than a belief that all-powerful science will set all doubts at rest in the long run; it requires some specific remedy to cure the disillusioned megalomaniac of his constitutional melancholy. Metchnikoff describes the disease in most of its phases, and prescribes a treatment. To be perfectly fair, we must discuss this most singular outcome of a consistently physiological point of view as we should a medical essay. By accident, an unfortunate accident, it lays claim to philosophical importance. Let us say at once that in so far as it treats philosophical ideas not merely as symptoms of a state of mind, and in a psycho-pathological sense, but as *ideas* whose logical validity is in question, Metchnikoff's work is valueless. It were not less reasonable to have expected from Kant or from Hegel the anticipation of the "Theory of Immunity," or the discovery of the Phagocytes, than from the great biologist a right appreciation of the critical or the dialectic method. Nevertheless, the work is full of novel observations of the highest psychological interest, and not beneath the notice of the most self-confident philosopher.

In order to define the completely normal life, science must obtain clear insight into the abnormal conditions under which man's life is generally lived. He is but ill-adapted to his environment. The moral evils, the physical defects with which he is afflicted are the price he pays for his high development. He suffers from appendicitis, and occasionally too from the pangs of unsatisfied love. He fears death, and desires an impossible continuance of life beyond the grave. A number of rudimentary organs, the cæcum, the large intestine, the wisdom teeth, the hair of his body, are always useless, and often the source of active discomfort. They prove his descent and endanger his life. Many of his instincts awake long before their functions are mature. Others, essential to the preservation of the race—the family instinct, the social instinct of human sympathy,—are so weak that their functions are irregularly performed, or not performed at all. The only organ which distinguishes anatomically the woman from the female gorilla—the hymen—is superfluous and inconvenient. The one instinct which distinguishes us from the rest of the animal kingdom—the fear of death—is totally useless and altogether harmful. Perhaps the most instructive chapters in the book are those which deal with the disharmonies of human nature—first, those of digestion, then those of reproduction. The imperfect adaptation of means to end in man is in strong contrast with the perfect adaptation frequently manifest among lower animals. The fertilisation of some orchids—*Herminium* and *Catasetum* for instance; the provisioning of their larvæ by fossorial wasps with Coleoptera, which they paralyse but do not kill by stinging the nervous centre controlling the movements of the legs, are quoted as among the most striking examples of adaptation in nature. Yet even here “any close investigation of organisation and life reveals that, besides many most perfect harmonies, there are facts which prove the existence of incomplete harmony.” Even orchids possess rudimentary organs, and fossorial wasps useless instincts. The more organised the instinct and the more automatic the function, the more patent is the disharmony when normal conditions are disturbed. Metchnikoff does not claim perfect adaptation for the whole of nature to the exclusion of man, but merely that, in the course of his relatively short racial existence, man has been the less able to adapt himself completely to his environment since, owing to his complex and “freakish” organisation, the environment has changed much more rapidly than the more firmly established elements of his nature, and the more recently acquired have not had time to become regular in their operation. He is not herbivorous, he is sedentary, and yet he is still burdened with digestive apparatus which, highly useful for ancestors that had to snatch a meal and decamp without digesting, is useless to him. Social custom, economic necessity, prevents early marriage among Europeans. Yet the sexual instinct develops before the reproductive function is mature, and remains until after this function has decayed. Again, we love life and fear death, and love life the longer we live. Physiology speaks a crude language. But Metchnikoff's similes often add force to his points. “The instinctive love of life, he says, resembles the



sexual instinct in a great many women. Just as the love of life goes on increasing when the best of life is past, sexual pleasure is often unfelt by women until their beauty is already faded." It is when death is nearest that the instinctive love of life manifests itself most intensely. The tragic puzzle has inspired most of the religions and many of the philosophies of mankind. Asceticism has its root in the disharmonies of the reproductive system; the resignation of Buddhism, the other-worldliness of Christianity, the pessimism of the moderns, have their root in the disharmony between the will to live and the conditions of life. All these speculations are of great psychological importance. No less interesting are some observations which to the reviewer, at least, are quite new. Jean Jacques has said, "Life becomes dearer to us as its joys pass away. The old cling to it more closely than the young." We must look to the years to come for a verification of this remark in our own experience. The young would ridicule it as a poetical paradox. If we are miserable at twenty, is it conceivable that we should be happy at forty? What have the advancing years in store for us? What joy is there in gout, grey hairs, the humdrum monotony of a prosaic existence? Yet it would appear that youth, with its fine promise, its glorious dreams, its passionate vigour, is the season of pessimism; ripe manhood the season of optimism. Quite a number of facts seem to prove that "in most human beings" the instinct of life, unlike most other instincts, "develops slowly, and becomes stronger and stronger as the years pass by." The problem of optimism and pessimism is placed by this observation, psychologically speaking at least, in quite a new light. It would be interesting to know whether the desire for a life beyond the grave increases as men grow older;—a problem which we commend to the attention of Mr F. C. S. Schiller and the Society for Psychical Research.

In Part II. Metchnikoff deals with the religious and philosophical attempts to combat the ills arising from the disharmonies of the human constitution. We have already indicated that to follow the author in a philosophical discussion would not be a useful task. Suffice it to say that religion and philosophy in his view have completely failed, because they have adopted the wrong method, and set up demands which the ascertained facts of science directly contradict.

We are bound, however, to notice his polemic against the idea of a future life. It would be out of all proportion to devote more than half-a-dozen lines to the treatment of a topic which Metchnikoff dismisses in a couple of pages. He claims that the idea "is not supported by a single fact, while there is much evidence against it." We fear that Metchnikoff has not done the Society for Psychical Research the honour of studying the painstaking methods they have adopted to sift such evidence in favour of survival as may be said to exist, and that he has formed an exaggerated notion of the value of physiology as a guide in this matter. The evidence against survival may be summed up in the law of psycho-physical parallelism, a law which is much too vague to rest any definite inference upon.

It may be asserted with perfect truth that "the modern study of the functions of the mind has shown, beyond all question, that these are dependent on the functions of the central nervous system," and with equal truth that we are as yet entirely ignorant of the precise nature of this dependence. Such is, however, the question at issue. Psychology is not sufficiently advanced to prove or to negative any particular answer. With the problem of human personality, and the connection between individual consciousness and bodily functions, we pass into a region where no belief can be regarded as better than an hypothesis, and where the value of hypothesis consists mainly in stimulating to further investigation. Science has by no means disproved the possibility of survival. To science alone can we look for any proof of its actuality.

The progress of physiology and medicine has gradually tended to remove a number of organic disharmonies. Serum-therapy is advancing year by year in its victorious war against infectious diseases. Useless organs can be excised and prevented from working mischief. We are not told what science has done or can do to remove the far more important disharmonies in the reproductive sphere. In two chapters of the profoundest interest, Mechnikoff deals with the scientific study of old age and the scientific study of death. He believes that science will be able to cure the disharmony between the love of life and the fear of death. The general characters of senile degeneration are described, and the phagocyte theory is invoked to explain them. The invasion of the tissues in old age by macrophags is illustrated in detail by the process of the whitening of the hair. The explanation of degeneration suggests a method of preventing it. We have but to prevent sclerosis by "strengthening the higher elements of the human body, and so preventing them from growing old." A novel extension of serum-therapy which may some day be discovered will succeed in prolonging life far beyond its present term. Death is at present an unnatural and violent process. If life could be prolonged until the instinct to live had played itself out, death would be robbed of all its terrors. Metchnikoff's ideal is the familiar biblical longevity. A time will come when, like Abraham, like Isaac, and like Job, we shall die, willingly, without fear, "being old and full of days," our years numbering between one hundred and forty and one hundred and eighty.

Such is the nature of the proposed cure! Such is the robustness of the eminent biologist's optimism! It were easy to ridicule this quaint salvation by serum-therapy, to denounce the proposed solutions as a futile travesty of the most fundamental questions. In all of us the sentimentalist dies hard, and the sentimentalist makes demands upon life which cannot be satisfied by the prediction that he will grow wiser when he grows older. So runs the ordinary jibe of the disillusioned Philistine. But at twenty-three one fears not death but middle age. We live not so much in the present as in the future. It is not the actual gift, but the promise of a greater and a better than we have ever known which sustains us and stimulates to one more effort. We cannot in the period of promise unfulfilled place ourselves



at the point of view of reminiscent maturity. Metchnikoff's philosophy is one for men who have passed their prime. Again, at all times, I imagine, one's desire is not to run the normal course, but to be oneself, to be individual, to live one's own life. The great fallacy of the physiological point of view, of naturalistic philosophy in general, consists in supposing that, once the laws of normal development clearly defined, mankind in general will leap to hasten the effects of their operation. But why anticipate the inevitable? The spiritual history of mankind tells of one long struggle to retard or to avoid it. Each moment of our life, each phase of our action and passion has an intensely personal value, altogether different from, perhaps quite incompatible with, what the physiologist would make us believe is its objective significance. What makes the normal man of organs, functions, instincts, as apart from his own conscious personality? What is there in common between the medical view of fertilisation and every man and woman's view of love? In spite of Metchnikoff's vigorous onslaught, the reviewer must confess to a survival of the sentimentalist in him, perhaps because modern philosophy is altogether on his side. And fortunately, for it is just these personal valuations, productive of so much disharmony, that keep us alive. If we really could look upon our nature and upon the world from an uncompromisingly "objective" point of view and as Metchnikoff would have us do, I find in his work one of the strongest reasons for believing that the game would not be worth the candle. Life is tolerable not for what it is, but for what we could wish it to be. Considered as a remedy for the fear of death, Metchnikoff's treatment cannot be regarded as specially successful. The instinct to live is not really a desire to live as long as possible, but a wish that at any moment one could turn the past into the future, and live it over again. We crave not for life's extension, but for its renewal. We want it ever fresh and young and full of promise. Considered as an answer to the fundamental puzzles of human existence, Metchnikoff's book stirs in the natural man a spirit of revolt, tinged here and there with disgust. Philosophy sides with the natural man.

F. N. HALES.

LONDON.

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*Der Katechismus der Urchristenheit.*—Von Dr Alfred Seeberg.—Leipzig : 1903. Pp. v. 281.

IN this highly ingenious and suggestive volume the author essays not simply to prove that shortly after Christ's death there arose a catechism based upon sayings of the Master, the contents of which were preached by the primitive missionaries and taught to catechumens, but also to reconstruct the shape and substance of this little creed. It consisted mainly, we are told, of (a) an ethical code, called "The Ways," and (b) of a formula of faith, to which the Lord's Prayer and the sacramental words of Jesus were

usually added. The former (*a*), originally extant in Aramaic (p. 43), not merely was presupposed by Paul (cp. Rom. ii. 17, xvi. 17, 2 Thess. ii. 15), and therefore existed previous to his conversion in A.D. 35, but went back (pp. 44 f.) to pre-Christian sources (cp. Matt. xv. 19, Mk. vii. 21), which probably resembled the Jewish catechism for proselytes underlying Barnabas and the Didachê. It contained definite ethical teaching or tradition, and implicit references to it are most adroitly found, *e.g.*, in passages like 1 Thess. iv. 3-8 and Col. iii. 5-8, which, even in their loose reproduction of its contents, point to a list of sins to be shunned and of virtues or graces to be cultivated. The main difference between the apostolic and the sub-apostolic allusions, according to Dr Seeberg (p. 36), is the latter's omission of *χαρά* and *ἀγαθωσύνη* from their scheme of virtues. But while the existence of such a rubric is credible, it has not yet been proved; even with the partial parallel yielded (after the criticism of Dr C. Taylor and Hennecke) by the "Two Ways" catechism in the Didachê, and even with the probability that some such instruction must have become fairly stereotyped at an early stage in the growth of Christianity, one cannot altogether accept Dr Seeberg's conjectural reconstruction. His acuteness is visible on every page. But dogmatic interests and the power of imagination have rather overweighed his historical sense. Undoubtedly he has called attention to a factor too frequently ignored, and some of his contentions are in the right line. But a solution of the problem requires broader considerations than those of mere exegesis, least of all the dexterous exegesis offered by our author. I do not suppose, for example, that many critics will agree to take *my ways* (in 1 Cor. iv. 17) in the sense of Paul's other phrase *my gospel*, as though the apostle practically meant "The Ways" (or Christian catechism) with which he had identified himself.

The same criticism applies to Dr Seeberg's reconstructions of the Greek formula of faith (*b*), which he considers must have been early united to (*a*), to judge from Ac. xx. 21, xvii. 30, etc. This confession runs as follows, in an English version of its Pauline recension: "The living God, who created all things, sent forth his Son Jesus Christ, born of the seed of David, who died for our sins according to the scriptures and was buried, who was raised on the third day according to the scriptures and appeared to Cephas and the twelve, who sat down on the right hand of God in the heavens, all authorities and principalities and powers being made subject unto him, and who cometh on the clouds of heaven with power and great glory." Though most New Testament critics find here and there echoes of formulæ, liturgical or otherwise, Dr Seeberg goes evidently much further. Yet it is difficult to believe that the early Christian faith crystallised so early into any one stereotyped formula, and positive evidence is not forthcoming. For it is rather precarious to find the formula cited in 1 Cor. xv. 3-5 (pp. 45-58), and surely it is scarcely critical to select, in somewhat arbitrary fashion, words and characteristic phrases throughout Paul's writings and then argue that these must reflect a formula which rose before A.D. 35 on the basis of



Christ's sayings (cp. 2 Pet. iii. 2). Dr Seeberg traces the catechism with great acuteness and plausibility throughout 1 Peter, the sub-Pauline Pastorals (with their *παραθήκη* and *ἐντολή*), Hebrews, and Luke's writings. But he fails to do justice to the freedom of oral instruction or to the influence of unwritten tradition; his combinations are often purely verbal; and his exegesis fails frequently to convince—as, for example, in the case of 1 Cor. xv. 2, where he takes *τίνι λόγῳ* as the norm of the preaching, or Heb. vi. 1 f. (pp. 261 f.), from which he deduces the astonishing result that the resurrection and judgment formed no part of Paul's original catechism. Occasionally, however, his suggestions are fresh and quite noticeable; e.g., on "the faith of Jesus" (166 f.). To the post-Pauline formula of Matt. xxviii. 19–20 he devotes several candid pages (236 f., 271), unconscious, however, of Mr Conybeare's hypothesis. The Lord's prayer (pp. 241 f.), he also thinks, was recited *after*, not before baptism and the reception of the Spirit (cp. Rom. viii. 15, Gal. iv. 6), and *κύριος ἡσους* (Rom. x. 9, Phil. ii. 11) is held to have been the catechumen's reply to the catechism (p. 182).

Upon the whole, although the book has often an appearance of special pleading, and although it suffers from a surplus of exegetical and a deficiency of historical acumen, there is a far from inconsiderable amount of suggestion to be gathered from its pages upon the relation of the early Christian writings to the implicit and incipient confessional element in the new faith. But I confess it seems a healthier method to work back to these writings from the Roman symbol, as Kattenbusch has done in his second volume on the Creed, than to run the risk, native to Seeberg's daring method, of reading more into spontaneous epistolary expressions than they will legitimately bear.

JAMES MOFFATT.

DUNDONALD.

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*Das Christusbild des Urchristlichen Glaubens, in religionsgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung.*—Vortrag, gehalten in verkürzter Fassung vor dem internationalen Theologen-Kongress zu Amsterdam, September 1903.  
—Von Otto Pfeiderer.

IN one of his essays the late Professor Huxley remarked on the difficulty he had in determining which of the many conceptions of the character of Christ came nearest to that of the actual historical Jesus. The problem seemed to him insoluble, a view which modern theological research tends more and more to confirm. While paying a high tribute to the scholars whose labours in historical and literary criticism have enabled us to distinguish between the Jesus of history and the Christ of ecclesiastical dogma, Dr Pfeiderer warns us against the belief that an absolute distinction is here possible. As he points out, the Gospel narratives are already tinged with the various religious and philosophical ideas current in the Jewish and Pagan worlds at the time of their origin. The picture

they give us of Christ and of His teaching, while containing that element of historical truth referable to the actual memory and tradition of the personality of Jesus, is itself only an approximate likeness of the original. This fact impairs to some degree the value of those works which claim to restore the historical Jesus by removing the accretions which in the course of ages have gathered round His image as left in the minds of His disciples; while the widely differing construction of which the same sources are capable, in the hands of the various writers from Renan to Harnack, proves how largely subjective prejudices and sympathies have in each case coloured the author's conception of his subject.

In all these efforts Dr Pfeiderer sees at work the tendency to eliminate elements which are foreign to our modern way of thinking, and to replace them by a more or less fanciful picture which, though it may appeal to our sympathies, differs widely from the conceptions of Jesus Christ current among the early Christian communities. In his opinion, scientific theology cannot sanction such a procedure. The mythical element which enters so largely into the conceptions of the early Christians can neither be ignored nor treated as delusion or superstition. On the contrary, myths and their corresponding rites are the fundamental source of our knowledge of religion. The task before the theologian of the twentieth century is the fearless examination of Christian beliefs in the light of the myths and legends of universal religion. When we understand these we shall be able to do justice to the others, and to that drastic realism of language in which they are couched, a realism so foreign to our modern taste that we are continually constrained to interpret it symbolically.

The close connection existing between early Christian ideas and the religious conceptions of the Pagan world proves that the origin of Christianity had nothing in it of the miraculous, but was a natural and necessary development out of pre-existing conditions. The objection that Christianity loses in value when so regarded, the author meets by an ingenious analogy drawn from the sphere of chemistry. He reminds his readers that every new chemical combination is the result of a "creative synthesis," that the new product is something absolutely different from the mere sum of its elements, and contains in fact a new principle which differentiates it entirely from any other combination. So Christianity, despite its relation to, and connection with, the religious and philosophical speculations of its own and previous ages, is something totally different from these. Into the old forms it poured the purer content of a new moral ideal, through them it taught the new law of love, a love of which the life and death of a God-inspired prophet had given the actual manifestation, and which had none of the cold and academic character of the systems of moral righteousness inculcated by the Stoic, the Platonist, or the Pythagorean.

The current myths of Paganism were, in fact, the only vehicle through which Christianity could impart her new truths to the heathen world. Refusal or failure to adapt herself to the mode of thought universal at



that time would have meant her defeat. Nor must it be forgotten that, though Jesus Christ was the first to teach the new ideal and give the initial impetus to the new religion, the ideas which He shared in common with His time, while they gave to His moral teaching that singular intensity and enthusiasm the impulse of which is not yet lost, impressed on it a character which unfitted it for universality. "The emancipation of the Christian idea from the rigid fetters of Judaism was only possible at the cost of clothing it in the fluid forms of myth and rite."

In the investigation of these with reference to Christianity, the author urges caution in distinguishing between internal affinity and historical connection. Certain fundamental ideas are common to all religions, born of the fundamental instincts of humanity, or they may be due to the operation of similar causes under similar conditions. Others, again, show a resemblance so detailed and so striking that it makes the assumption of historical contact admissible.

As a specimen of the methods which scientific theology should follow, and of the results to be gained from investigation on the lines he suggests, Dr Pfeleiderer takes the early Christian conceptions of Jesus Christ as *Son of God, vanquisher of Satan, worker of miracles, subduer of death and giver of life, King of Kings and Lord of Lords*, and examines the parallels to these existing in Jewish and Pagan religious and speculative thought.

When, for instance, Christ is represented now as the Son of God by adoption, now as the incarnation of a pre-existent divine being, now as the Logos made flesh, and again as God-man in virtue of a miraculous birth, the study of contemporary beliefs enables us in every case to trace the genesis of these apparently conflicting conceptions. To the influence of ancient Jewish belief on the earlier Messianic tradition we owe the theory of adoption. Out of the Messianic conceptions of later apocalyptic literature, mingled with, and influenced by, Greek philosophical speculation, Paul developed his theory of Christ as incarnate Son of God. The later idea of Christ's virgin birth was but a linking together of these conceptions of apotheosis and incarnation, a process rendered easy by the tendency of the popular mind at that time to attribute to its heroes and great men a semi-divine origin.

The most striking resemblance to the whole legend of Christ's birth is offered by that of Buddha, as related in the *Lalitā Vistara*, a legendary biography translated into Chinese in the year 65 B.C. Here the likeness extends not merely to details in narrative, but may be traced in the conception of the Buddha as a divine being, pre-existent in heaven, his designation "Purusha" (Man) and "Mahāpurusha" (Great Man) recalling in a striking way the apocalyptic and Gospel titles of the Messiah. The close resemblance between the theory of successive Buddhas and the doctrine held by the Elkesaitic Gnostics as to successive incarnations of the Holy Spirit in Adam, the patriarchs, Moses, and Jesus, makes it almost probable that here at least a direct influence has been at work, a probability enhanced by the close proximity to India of Eastern Persia, where this sect had its origin.

In the early Christian conception of Christ as the vanquisher of Satan the influence of Pagan myth is again apparent. In the apocryphal story of the persecution of the child Messiah by the Devil, of its flight and subsequent rescue by the Archangel Michael, of its removal to heaven, whence it is to return in the future and make an end of Satan's kingdom, the author traces the widely prevalent myth of Leto and Apollo, itself ultimately a figurative expression of the struggle between light and darkness. The incorporation of this myth into the Messianic cycle was the result of that tendency to reconcile Jewish and Hellenic ideas which we have seen elsewhere at work, its adaptation leading necessarily to the sacrifice of its original simplicity.

In the idea of Christ as the subduer of death and the bringer of life to mankind, it is easy, again, to trace the relation to Pagan thought. Whether we take the conception of Christ's death as an atoning sacrifice, reconciling man with God, or that which represents the purifying influence of Christ's blood as the chief factor in the emancipation of mankind from sin and death, or, again, that which attributes to His resurrection the destruction of the power of the Devil over mankind, in each case Pagan religion can furnish a parallel. The belief in the necessity of an atoning sacrifice and in the magical properties resident in the flesh and blood of the victim, or in whatever symbolises these, is one perhaps more deeply rooted in the Semitic race than in any other, though the traces of it in Hellenic religion are fairly numerous. With this conception and that group of ideas concerning the participation in the life of the risen Christ by His followers, through belief in His Name, baptism, and the partaking of the Lord's Supper, we touch the bed-rock of religious belief; for the conceptions underlying the myths and rites of the mysteries, originating as these did in the animistic ideas of primitive man, were transferred to the Christian sacraments, as is abundantly proved by the study of the myths of Osiris and Isis, Adonis, Orpheus, Demeter and Persephone, with their associated cults. But here again, as the author is careful to point out, though the forms were apparently unchanged, the idea manifested in them had an ethical and spiritual significance to which Paganism can offer no parallel.

In conclusion, the myths and rites of early Christianity have a lesson for *us*. They "teach us through history to look beyond history to the Eternal and All-present God, Who is a God of the living and not of the dead. It is not in the archives of a dead past that He reveals Himself, but in that living 'Spirit of Christ,' that divine principle which we see at work wherever the minds of men are open to a knowledge of the truth, wherever the heart glows for what is good, wherever love for the welfare of the community leads to the daily sacrifice of self, wherever men struggle for social right and justice, wherever there is faith in the coming of God's Kingdom among us, and wherever in that faith the world is overcome."

C. MABEL RICKMERS.

RADOLFFZELL, GERMANY.



*The Cambridge Modern History*: Vol. II., *The Reformation*.—Edited by A. W. Ward, Litt.D., G. W. Prothero, Litt.D., and Stanley Leathes, M.A.—Cambridge: University Press, 1903.

ENGLISH historical scholarship has suffered heavy losses during the last few years by the death of Freeman and Stubbs, of Froude and Green, of Lecky and Gardiner, of Creighton and Acton. For the present, it appears, we must be content with "scientific" histories, produced on the system of limited liability, or—shall we say?—co-operative partnership. But though this may have its advantages, in these days of specialism and the vast accumulations of material, it would be a lamentable thing if the nation which produced a Gibbon and a Macaulay should reduce its historical compositions to the form and colour of an encyclopædia or a blue-book. This further volume of the great *Cambridge Modern History* cannot fairly be described in such terms as these last. On the other hand, it is clearly not to be classed amongst the philosophical or literary products of historical research. Twelve authors share the nineteen chapters between them, and the space allotted to each is rigidly limited. A great transition of political, intellectual, and religious life, affecting most of the countries of Europe, has to be described. If, as is here the case, a certain completeness of narrative with regard to external events be aimed at, it is inevitable that the canvas should be overcrowded; that tone and composition should suffer; and that what is gained in comprehensiveness should be lost in breadth of treatment, in emphasis of essentials, and in that definite effect and appeal which the master-hand of the great creative artist alone can make.

We imagine that this volume will be of more use to the university student for the Schools, than to those readers who are interested primarily in the history of religious development and ideas. One feels that the preoccupation of several of the writers is rather with political and constitutional than with religious history. Above all, we miss in this book a general summing up of the leading ideas and personalities of the Reformation era, from the standpoint of modern thought. To readers of the present day, the most interesting point of view from which to regard the sixteenth-century Reformation is the nineteenth and twentieth century Reformation which is now the chief concern of the world of religious intelligence. But for such a treatment as this we must look rather to the late Charles Beard's Hibbert Lectures on "The Reformation of the Sixteenth Century in its Relation to Modern Thought and Knowledge," than to the more massive, but less brilliant and discriminating, volume under review.

We turn to what must necessarily be but a brief glance at the various sections. The opening chapter on Medicean Rome, by the late Professor Kraus, is chiefly notable for a somewhat revised estimate of the Pontificates of Julius II. and Leo X., highly favourable to the former, whose "mediatory and conciliating attitude towards the Renaissance thought," however,

proved all in vain to stem the tide of change. The essential religious and moral force to carry through such a fusion of the old and the new was wanting. Italian idealism was submerged; and the Germanic races were severed from Rome. Mr Stanley Leathes has charge of the second and third chapters, which narrate the dynastic contentions of the Habsburg and the Valois—that secular rivalry which, while it “extinguished the joy of the Renaissance,” served, at least, the purpose of giving Luther and the Reformers time to consolidate their forces, and tighten their grip upon the Germanic lands. Principal Lindsay (of the Free Church College, Glasgow), who sketches in chapter iv. the history of Luther to the Diet of Worms (1521), suffers by being constrained to tell in thirty-seven pages what, *e.g.*, the late Charles Beard told with brilliant power, and at none too great a length, in ten times the space;<sup>1</sup> and by coming to the end of his tether before he has had time to estimate the general effects of Luther’s personality upon the Reformation movement. We might, with benefit, have had a more summary treatment of the question of Indulgences, but are grateful for the brief passages in which the writer gives the significance of the Saxon Reformer’s early training in “the religion of fear,” and the saturation of his mind with the ascetic and unworldly type of religious thought. The four succeeding chapters are by Professor A. F. Pollard, who has acquitted himself well in these laborious portions of the book. In a clear and able narrative he traces the victory of the separatist and territorial principle in the Empire over the ambitions of Charles V.; the alliance of the reforming movement with the bourgeois of the German towns (the Reformation was everywhere a middle-class movement); the crushing of the German peasantry, who received as little sympathy from the Lutherans as from the Catholic Imperialists, and who, in consequence, “relapsed into a state of mind not far removed from materialistic atheism” (p. 192); the conflict of creeds and parties in Germany; the wrecking of the broad schemes of Zwingli and Philip of Hesse upon the rock of Luther’s panic fears and stubborn conservatism; the Erastianism of the German Reformers, and the price that liberty and social progress have had to pay for it; the beginning of the Catholic reaction; and finally, the disappointing results of the long struggle in the Augsburg Peace of 1555, with its inconclusive doctrine of “*cujus regio ejus religio*”—“the creed,” as Professor Pollard well calls it, “of Erastian despotism.” There follow brief sketches of the Reformation in France (by Mr A. A. Tilley), where the movement never became a national one, and was merged after a time in political quarrels; and of the Reformation in Switzerland (by the Rev. J. P. Whitney)—which increases the regret that Zwingli, great as was his influence, met so untoward a fate, and that he had not a larger stage for the display of his democratic thoroughness and his practical common sense. Of the slight stirrings of the new spirit in Italy, Spain, and Portugal, of which the Rev. W. E. Collins writes under the title of “The Catholic South,” and the

<sup>1</sup> *Martin Luther and the Reformation in Germany, until the close of the Diet of Worms*, 1889.



chapter (from the same pen) on "The Scandinavian North," we have no space to speak. Mr R. V. Laurence contributes a clear and well-written summary of the Catholic movement for reform, culminating in the formation of the Jesuit Order, the meetings of the Council of Trent, and the triumph of the narrower ideas of the Counter-Reformation. The story which he tells of the failure of the liberals in both Catholic and Protestant camps, and the victory of the zealots, is one which has a deep significance and contains a serious warning for our own times.

Coming now to the Reformation in our own country, the work is divided between four writers. Dr Gairdner's chapter on Henry VIII. shows, of course, a very intimate knowledge of the history of the reign, but it is too much concerned with the merely secular and political aspects of events to be of much assistance to the student of religious history. Professor Pollard takes up the story at the accession of Edward VI., dealing with sympathetic fulness with the schemes of the Protector Somerset, and making some important remarks (p. 478 *sq.*) on the national and practical character of the Reformation in England, and its failure to produce any great religious thinker. We miss, however, some account of the development of Cranmer's theory of the Eucharist, and the contents of the Forty-two Articles and Second Prayer Book. Following a chapter by Mr Bass Mullinger on Philip and Mary, we are glad to welcome in Professor F. W. Maitland's section on "The Anglican Settlement (under Elizabeth) and the Scottish Reformation" a lighter and more entertaining style—sometimes, it is true, a little obscure by reason of its over-allusiveness, concentration, and "pregnancy," but marked by a tactful handling of contentious incidents and themes (*e.g.* the Vestiarian quarrel), and many touches of irony and humour. The importance, in determining the character of the "Elizabethan Settlement," of the Catholic and pro-French proclivities of Mary, Queen of Scots, and her rivalry with Elizabeth in regard to the succession, are well brought out; but one could have wished for a more adequate exposition of the religious position in England at the time when "Anglicanism" took its stereotyped form—for good or ill. Perhaps we shall hear something of Elizabeth's relations with the Puritans in a succeeding volume.

Two important sections have been intrusted to the Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford,—a too slight final chapter on "Tendencies of European Thought in the Age of the Reformation," and a fuller treatment of "Calvin and the Reformed Church." We turn to these pages with a special interest, and find, as we should expect, a distinction and power, and a touch with principles and ideas, which mark them out for particular attention. Dr Fairbairn's love of antithesis finds ample scope in his comparison of the three great figures of Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin; the moral greatness, combined with an intellectual timidity and limitation, of the Saxon Reformer forming an effective foil to the greater thoroughness, the fuller democratic sympathies, of the Swiss. In his picture of the austere figure of Calvin, however, we have something very like an enthusiasm of eulogy, from which many readers, we imagine, will feel inclined to dissent.

Dr Fairbairn claims for Calvin that he "united the humanism of Erasmus with the faith and conscience of Luther"; that he had a real capacity for friendship; that he displayed "a pædagogic genius," was zealous for learning, and rendered memorable service to the French tongue by making it a literary vehicle of charm and power. This catalogue of virtues, however, is almost more eloquent by what it omits than by what it includes. It may be urged that the prime historic interest and significance of Calvin lies elsewhere than in these directions—namely, in the religious temper which his work displayed and enkindled, and in the doctrinal and ecclesiastical system which he stamped upon half the Protestant world. The "rule of the saints" in Geneva, in Calvin's lifetime, was a sorry substitute for the "Kingdom of God." In the New England which we see pictured in the pages of Hawthorne, in the Scotland of Knox and the Covenanters, in the activities of the Westminster Assembly, in the mental torments of Bunyan's *Grace Abounding*, and the awful gloom which descended upon the gentle spirit of Cowper—in these we recognise, it is true, a pitiful sincerity, and often an intensity of moral power. There is religion here; but it is the religion of the Law and not of the Gospel. It is a message of fear, and not of gladness. It is Augustinianism, robbed of the softening influences of the Catholic cult, triumphing over the gentle spirit of the Man of Nazareth. It was an evil day for Protestantism when, at the crisis of its youthful life, its destinies came to be shaped by the cold, juristic methods of Calvin's mind—a mind vigorous and pure, it may be, but alien from "the mind of Christ." To-day, the whole gigantic edifice of Protestant Scholasticism is either being "restated" or falling into ruins. Scotland is seething with new and more liberal ideas. Barrie and Ian Maclaren write of the "Auld Lights" as of beacons that are going out. In America, the genius of a young nation has shown itself in the churches which followed Channing in his departure from the Calvinistic desert. In France, the most potent voices are those of Sabatier and Réville. In Geneva itself, an expiatory monument was recently erected on the spot where Servetus was sacrificed to the bigotry of the Protestant Inquisitor. Before the light of modern science the gloomy theology of the Fall has vanished, and a cloud has been lifted from men's minds. If we are to write a history of Calvin from the point of view of modern ideas, it is impossible that these judgments of human development should be ignored. The tragic mistake of the Protestant leaders was that they stamped religion for centuries as "correct opinion"; they closed the door to progress; they translated their Justification by Faith (a principle of Freedom) into Justification by Creed (a principle of external Authority). In our day the lineaments of the Christ have had to be recovered. Harnack has to vindicate the essential principle of Luther, as against the degenerate doctrines of Lutheranism. The "Five Points" of Calvinism have to be confronted with the fair humanities of the Parables of Jesus and the Sermon on the Mount. Of all this there is little hint in Dr Fairbairn's pages; yet these



considerations are surely of importance in estimating Calvin's place in history, and the "tendencies" of Reformation thought. When Dr Fairbairn says (p. 363), that "Calvin's imagination, playing upon the primitive Christian literature, helped him to see the religion Jesus instituted as Jesus Himself saw it," we can only record our respectful dissent. The world could well have dispensed with a portion of the "sublimity" (p. 366) of that theology, which, on our author's own showing, "occasioned the hottest and bitterest controversies known to Christian history." Nor can we wax enthusiastic over "Calvin's irenic services to Protestantism" (p. 376), when we recall his relentless hostility to that free exercise of private judgment which formed the very *raison d'être* of Protestantism itself.

We conclude our perusal of this volume with mingled feelings of gratitude and regret: gratitude for an honest and laborious effort to present English readers with a summary survey of the whole vast field of the Reformation movement in Europe; regret, that there is still evinced in academical quarters such a considerable measure of chariness in handling the attempts at religious reformation in a past day in relation to the renewed attempt in our own. History, after all, is of more than antiquarian importance. Its chief value must still remain in its being "philosophy teaching by examples."

H. S. PERRIS.

LONDON.

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*Problems of Living.* By J. Brierley, B.A. ("J. B."), author of *Ourselves and the Universe*, *Studies of the Soul*, etc.—Pp. vi. + 356.—James Clarke & Co., 1903.

THIS is a book of reconstructive Christianity. It consists of a preface and thirty-six short essays, whose brief titles suggest in each case some familiar experience of the soul on the pathway of its thought, and invite curiosity to follow it round the corner. "Religion's Impossibles," "The Coming Creed," "The Higher Lawlessness," "The Moment After," "Imagination in Ethics," and "The Soul's Secret" may serve as examples. Each study is complete in itself; yet, though some seem to stand alone, a strong sequence of thought and plan welds the book into a fairly systematic exposition of the author's whole view of life's problems and the Christian answer to them. Though as far removed as possible from the systematic creed-maker, Mr Brierley is evidently one of those writers who do not believe in patchwork. Neither his criticism of the old creeds nor his efforts towards a restoration of the Christian edifice are of this character. He does not chip out a bit of weatherworn stone here and there, and rejoice to fill in the little holes with little glaring modern thoughts. His criticism is of a more drastic character. The old edifice is too small. The congregation of reverent thoughts that now demand access to the

temple of God requires a larger building. The old temple must pass away, that a new and nobler edifice may more than take its place.

Nevertheless, Mr Brierley's whole treatment of the subject of Christianity is, in a sense, purely incidental. His main purpose is to deal with the human problem, both individual and social, as it appears in the light of the larger universe revealed to us by modern thought. This human problem he regards as essentially a transcendental one. Believing that the spiritual element in man is the only adequate clue to our sphinx riddle of a world, he sees that our problems of living are all, finally, religious problems. In order to solve them we require a religious faith free from sectarian limits, allied to the soul's universal affirmations, and at one with the inmost nature of things. Such a religion, he believes, we already have, ready to hand, in Christianity. Yet, owing to grievous faults of Christian statement, this has not been generally recognised, and the difficulties which the modern man finds in the Christian beliefs mainly arise from this cause. It is at this point that Mr Brierley's special subject, "Problems of Living," comes in contact with Christianity, and appeals to it for that restatement of its answers, in accordance with the modern form of question, which thus incidentally becomes a main feature of the book.

The book opens with a discussion of the religious and moral "Impossibles" of Christianity as they would appear to a man of high nature trained in the science of the modern world, and coming, without prepossession, quite fresh to the study of the New Testament. After reminding us that seeming impossibles are inevitable to our finite human thought, and quite as much in metaphysics and mathematics as in religion, Mr Brierley endeavours, by a deeper study of these Christian doctrines, to reveal to us the actual truths that are represented by them. Thus the two supposedly impossible doctrines of Incarnation and of God as Person are rendered more intelligible to us when we consider them together, and perceive that the Soul of the universe has indeed come to speaking terms with our consciousness, yet has only done so along the channel of human personality, and that man is, on this planet at least, the appointed organ and voice of the Eternal Reason. Thus, in man's spiritual evolution we have a world-process which is the ever clearer exhibition of God as Person, and that by the method of incarnation.

With regard to the Christian miracles, our author, in a fine passage upon the supernatural, shows how every stage in nature has a stage above, or supernatural to it. A man is a miracle-worker to his dog, and supernatural to the nature of the stone which he tosses into the air. Similarly Christ, being the spiritual grade above us, exercised an influence which, allowing for all exaggerations in the growth of miracle-story, appeared supernatural to other men. In brief, Christ himself is the miracle. He is the new personality. Though the outer world remain the same as from eternity, yet a new note has been struck, and in the inner world all things have become new. The supernatural in Christianity lies in its spiritual power. A new vision of the Eternal has reached the human consciousness.



With regard to the moral impossibles which appear so obviously on the surface of Christian teaching, Mr Brierley first warns us that we must not throw away the essential meaning of Christ's words by too literal an interpretation of the luxuriant metaphors of the East. We shall then find that, whilst the impossibility of realising the Christian ideal still remains, yet it remains as a spur and an incentive. As in the past, so in the future, the magnificent imperative, "Be ye perfect," must ever attract and uplift mankind, just because, as all ideals should be, it is not near for our easy grasping, but high up in the heavens for our endless aspiration.

The third essay, entitled "The Coming Creed," is well summarised in its concluding words: "The Church began without creeds, and it has no more need of them to-day than in its first age. The missionary will go forth now, as then, equipped with a Power and a Programme, and will find them enough. Taking in his heart the love of God and of his fellow, the mind of Christ and the Spirit's energies, taking with him also, as far as may be, the arts and crafts by which God's revelation of perfect human living is expressed, he will win new victories of faith, and with none to gainsay the triumph." These words may also serve us well as a brief summary of the general plan of the book. Mr Brierley does not present us with any new creeds and formularies. He rather seeks to interpret for us the whole universe as essentially Christian at heart, and to apply the spirit of Christ to the practical problems of life. In the essay on Cosmic Free Grace, for instance, he interprets the universe as not revealing to us the exactitude of its justice until we have first recognised its ultimate foundation in Free Grace. As we freely receive, so must we freely give. Here lies the answer to our most pressing social problems; for here we discover that our highest right is the right to share the divine spirit, the right of free giving. If we fight for our rights we shall fight for this, and to get this spirit back into the world, even as Jesus showed it on the Cross, is the true highway of the world's redemption.

A specially noteworthy essay is that entitled "Religion and the Child," in which the thought of Wordsworth in his "Ode on Immortality" finds admirable prose expression, and is fitted into its all-important place in a revised Christian programme.

Criticism of such a book would, of course, be endless: it is a good book for good people; we are not so sure that it would be a good book for bad people. The problems of life with which it deals are mainly the problems of that higher spiritual life which only the righteous attain to. Where there is a will there is a way. To those who have a mind to live good lives and to make for heaven, our author shows a clear and unmistakable way. But we are not sure that he does more than this. Without overlooking the stress which he lays from time to time upon the redemptive powers of an enlightened and spiritual Christianity, we yet feel that his occasional emphasis is insufficient as a restatement of Christianity. We rise from a perusal of these beautiful and charming essays with a feeling that sensual and selfish people are

distinctly stupid and foolish people, and what is still worse, that they are pessimistic people, and worst of all, that they are people whom our author does not care about. While, therefore, there is much here that Jesus himself might have written, had he remained in Nazareth and written a book, we believe something more has yet to be added to these pages ere they can adequately reproduce that burning sense of the burden of sin, and that yearning to redeem the sinner, which led Jesus to become the founder of Christianity.

In brief, Mr Brierley is an interpreter ; and as such his soul is calm, and he vividly reflects just so much of the world's passionate life as he can do dispassionately. He rejoices calmly yet continually, chiefly in the works of God in the human soul and in the universe, but occasionally, we suspect, in those happy turns of a sentence which sparkle all through his book, and so continually rejoice his reader.

To sum up, we are indeed grateful to Mr Brierley for a book so rich as this is in spiritual helpfulness, and in intellectual guidance. It is a book full of hope for the future, and of a great good courage. This restatement of Christianity reminds us of a young eagle delightedly realising that it is now strong enough to kick its old eggshell out of the nest, and greeting the abyss beneath and the heavens above, with the keen joy of one who is looking out now for wing-roads and swoop-paths. So Christianity faces its new world. The abyss of human sorrow and the heights of human joy are all alike accessible to the voluntarily suffering and gloriously triumphant spirit of the Christian. This, if we rightly interpret our author, is the essential message of his book, and his final answer to all our "Problems of Living."

WILFRED HARRIS.

BOLTON.



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[The fruits of long study and recent intercourse with Tolstoy.]
- 27 Rihani (Ameen F.) The Quatrains of Abu'l-Ala. 144p. Grant Richards, 1904.
- 70 Collins (Churton) The Poetry and Poets of America, i., ii., and iii. North Amer. R., Jan., Feb., Mar. 1904.

## M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4 Hinduism. 7 Judaism. 9 Demonology. 12 Occultism.

- Macculloch (J. A.) Religion; its Origin and Forms. (The Temple Primers.) 184p. Dent, 1904.
- de Milloné (L.) Comparaison de quelques mythes relatifs à la naissance des Dieux, des Héros, et des Fondateurs de religions. R. de l'Hist. des Rel., Jan.-Feb. 1904.
- Anon. The Yezidis: A Strange Survival. Church Q. R., April 1904.  
[The devil-worship of this people is a degraded sun-worship. The name of their sacred symbol, Melek-Tâ'us, is connected with Tammûz, the Babylonian sun-god.]
- 2 Carus (Paul) Pre-Christian Crosses as Symbols of Chthonic Deities. Open Court, May 1904.
- 3 Wissowa (D. G.) Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur Römischen Religions- und Stadtgeschichte. München, 1904.  
[This work forms a supplement to the author's Religion und Kultus der Römer, see Hibbert Journal, vol. i. p. 590.]
- 4 The Vedānta-Sūtras. With the Commentary of Rāmānuja. Part iii. Trans. by George Thibaut. (The Sacred Books of the East.) 800p. Clarendon Press, 1904.
- 7 Rodkinson (M. L.) The History of the Talmud. Vol. i.: Its Development and its Persecution since its Birth. Vol. ii.: The Historical and Literary Introduction to the new edition: Ethics, Criticism, etc. With portraits and plates. 1904. Eng. Agents, Williams & Norgate.
- Adler (M. N.) The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela. Jewish Q. R., April 1904.  
[A revised text, with translation, of Benjamin's travels.]
- Schechter (S.) Genizah Fragments. Jewish Q. R., April 1904.  
[Text of three fragments.]
- Hirschfeld (H.) The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at Cambridge. 5th art. Jewish Q. R., April 1904.
- Cowley (A.) Samaritana. Jewish Q. R., April 1904.  
[I. A Genizah fragment: text with translation of two letters of a Samaritan priest of Cairo. II. An alleged copy of the Samaritan Pentateuch.]
- Adler (E. N.) A Letter of Menasseh ben Israel. Jewish Q. R., April 1904.
- Bacher (W.) Zur jüdisch-persischen Litteratur. Jewish Q. R., April 1904.  
[Description of MSS.]

Philippson (D.) The Reform Movement in Judaism. Jewish Q. R., April 1904.  
[Continues the account of the German movement, and enters upon the history of the English one.]

Guttmacher (A.) and Rosenau (W.), edd. Year-Book of Central Conference of American Rabbis, vol. xiii. 390p. Baltimore Press, 1903.

[Contains papers on *Assyriology and the Bible*, by Dr E. Kohler, and on *The Theological Aspect of Reformed Judaism*, by Prof. Margolis.]

8 Syed (Ali) Spirit of Islam; or, Life of Mohammed. Paul, 1904.

9 Montmorand (Brenier de) Ascétisme et mysticisme: étude psychologique. Rev. Phil., March 1904.

[Author considers asceticism to be the source of all mysticism. He examines the ascetic method as the orthodox mystics have practised it, and rejects the view that asceticism is a pathological symptom.]

Griffiths (F. de), Thompson (H.), edd. Demotic magical papyrus of London and Leiden. Grevel, 1904.

12 Evans (H. Ridgely) Eliphas Levi—Magician and Mystic. Open Court, March 1904.

[Levi was born in Paris about 1800. Fragments are given from his various writings.]

31 Kristensen (W. B.) Dualistische en monistische denkbeelden in d. Egypt. godsdienst. Theol. Tijd., May 1904.

51 The Odes of Confucius. Rendered by L. Cranmer Byng. The Duties of the Heart, by Rabbi Bachye. Trans. by E. Collins. (The Wisdom of the East.) 45-48p. The Orient Press, 1904.

52 Revon (M.) Le Shintōisme, i. R. de l'Hist. des Rel., Jan.-Feb. 1904.

Stead (Alfred) Ancestor Worship in Japan. Mont. R., June 1904.

Anon. Japan and Western Ideas. Church Q. R., April 1904.

## P PHILOSOPHY 10 " Metaphysics, 21 Epistemology, 33 " Psychical Research, 40 " Psychology, 60 " Logic, 70 " Systems, 90 " Philosophers.

Woodbridge (F. J. E.), ed. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method. Science Press, 1904.

[This new periodical is issued fortnightly. The early numbers contain valuable papers by Dewey, Münsterberg, Ladd, Rogers, and others.]

Höffding (Harald) Philosophische Probleme. 120p. Reisland, 1903.

Murray (J. Clark) What should be the attitude of teachers of Philosophy towards Religion? Inter. J. Eth., April 1904.

[In reply to Prof. Royce, author maintains that a man does not necessarily surrender the spirit of a philosophical critic by taking one side in a controversy, nor does he with certainty preserve that spirit by refusing persistently to take any.]

Adickes (E.) Bericht über philosophische Werke, die in englischer Sprache in den Jahren 1897 bis 1900 erschienen sind.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxiv. 1. [Regards Shadworth Hodgson's *Metaphysics of Experience* as beyond question the most important metaphysical work of this period.]

Glasenapp (G. von) Der Wert der Wahrheit, ii.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxiv. 1.

- [The search for truth is in reality a striving to gain knowledge of the divine, and derives its value therefrom. Truth in itself, apart from this object, has no value.]
- h *Merz (John Theodore)* A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century, vol. ii. 820p. Blackwood, 1903. [Review will follow.]
- 10 *Dilles (L.)* Weg zur Metaphysik, Bd. 1. Subjekt und Aussenwelt. 281p. Hauff, 1904.
- Royce (Josiah)* The Eternal and the Practical. Phil. R., March 1904. [Presidential Address to American Phil. Assoc. The need for the Eternal is one of the deepest of all our practical needs. Herein lies at once the justification of pragmatism and the logical impossibility of pure pragmatism. All that is practical borrows its truth from the Eternal.]
- 11 *Haldane (R. B.)* The Pathway to Reality. Stage the Second. Gifford Lectures, Univ. of St Andrews, 1903-4. 275p. Murray, 1904. [Review will follow.]
- M'Taggart (J. E.)* Mr Haldane's Pathway to Reality. Indep. R., June 1904. [Author holds Haldane to be mistaken in attributing to Hegel a belief in the personality of God. The Ultimate Reality, according to Hegel, was spiritual and a unity. But it was open to him to conceive God as a unity whose parts were self-conscious, but was not self-conscious as a whole. Of such a nature is a state or a college. On this basis, the immortality of the finite soul is possible, but scarcely so if God be a Person.]
- Stein (Ludwig)* Der Sinn des Daseins. 448p. Mohr, 1904.
- Dressler (Max)* Die Welt als Wille zum selbst. 112p. Winter, 1904.
- 13 *Alcxejeff (W. G.)* Ueber die Entwicklung des Begriffes der höheren arithmologischen Gesetzmässigkeit in Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften. Vierteljahrssr. f. w. Phil., xxviii. 1. [By "arithmological" is understood a process of change which takes place not in gradual stages but "sprungweise." Author attempts to prove that the chief theories of modern chemistry presuppose such process, and to found on it an explanation of human freedom.]
- Rey (A.)* Les principes philosophiques de la chimie physique. Rev. Phil., Apr. 1904.
- Nys (D.)* L'hylémorphisme dans le monde inorganique. R. Néo-Schol., Feb. 1904.
- Morgan (T. Hunt)* Evolution and Adaptation. 483p. Macmillan, 1903.
- Harris (G. A.)* A New Theory of the Origin of Species. Open Court, Apr. 1904. [An account of the theory of Hugo De Vries, Prof. of Botany in Amsterdam.]
- Richard (Gaston)* L'idée d'évolution dans la nature et l'histoire. 410p. Alcan, 1903. [Evolution is a regulative concept, not a universal law of the objective universe. It implies consciousness or thought as the subjective aspect of the life of nature.]
- 17 *Thomson (J. J.)* Electricity and Matter. [Silliman Memorial Lectures, Yale, 1902.] 162p. Constable, 1904. [See p. 813.]
- Lodge (Sir Oliver)* Steps towards a new Principia. Nature, 26th May 1904. [A full review of Prof. Thomson's book, of which the author thinks it is difficult to over-estimate the force and suggestiveness. In the Cambridge Laboratory of late years the most splendid work in pure physical science has been done, and there an erection comparable in some respects to the Principia is being raised.]
- Bottone (S.)* Radium, and all about it. 96p. Whittaker, 1904.
- 19 *Duhem (P.)* La théorie physique; son objet et sa structure, i., ii. Rev. de Phil., April, May 1904.
- Couturat (L.)* Les principes des mathématiques, ii. L'idée de nombre. iii. L'idée d'ordre. Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., March 1904.
- Milhaud (G.)* Les principes des Mathématiques d'après M. Russell. Rev. Phil., Mar. 1904.
- Moisant (X.)* Un caractère de la philosophie moderne, le mathématisme. Rev. de Phil., May 1904.
- 21 *Rickert (Heinrich)* Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. 252p. Mohr, 1904. [A new and much enlarged edition of the author's well-known monograph published some years ago.]
- Russell (Hon. B.)* Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions, i. Mind, April 1904. [The first part of an article on Meinong's theory. In the case of presentations and judgments Meinong distinguishes three elements—the act, the content and the object. These elements he seems to hold are wholly psychical, the object, like the other two, being part of the total mental state. Against this view, author contends that the object of a presentation is the actual external object itself, and not any part of the presentation as such.]
- Beck (P.)* Erkenntnistheorie des primitiven Denkens (Schluss). Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxiv. 1. [Deals with the memory-pictures and the general notions and conceptions of primitive thought.]
- Regnaud (Paul)* L'origine des idées. 127p. Alcan, 1904.
- Schmidkunz (Hans)* Neues von den Werten. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxiv. 1. [A discussion of Krebig's work upon the psychological basis of a system of Values.]
- Ulrich (G.)* Bewusstsein und Ichheit. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxiv. 1. [The finite ego is contained in the divine universal consciousness, held and surrounded therein by the principle regulating all being, which principle differentiates itself into the laws of nature, of perception, and of will.]
- 26 *Mentré (F.)* Le Role du Hasard; dans les Inventions et Découvertes. Rev. de Phil., April 1904.
- Mercier (D.)* La Liberté d'indifférence et le déterminisme psychologique. R. Néo-Schol., Feb. 1904.
- 27 *Underhill (G. E.)* The Use and Abuse of Final Causes. Mind, April 1904. [Man's science, philosophy, religion, are all anthropomorphic, and rightly so. The concept, final cause, owes its origin to reflexion upon the conscious process of man's voluntary actions. By analogy it is extended to the acts of animals and plants, even to inorganic things, and to the universe as a whole. As in the case of other conceptions—space, time, number, identity, causality, etc.—so here, experience is the only test of its validity and of the extent of its validity.]
- Adler (Felix)* The Problem of Teleology. Inter. J. Eth., April 1904. [The notion of *telos* is a bond that ties together a number of parallel causal series. There is no such thing as a single end. An end is what it is in a society of ends. It is a social concept, and cannot be justified by means of the category of causality.]



- 30 *Bourdon (B.)* La perception de la verticalité de la tête et du corps.  
Rev. Phil., May 1904.  
*Durante (G.)* Considérations générales sur la structure et la fonctionnement du système nerveux.  
J. de Psychologie, 2 and 3, 1904.
- 32 *Sidis (Boris)* An Inquiry into the Nature of Hallucination. Psychol. R., Mar. 1904.
- 33 *Podmore (Frank)* The Newer Spiritualism.  
Indep. R., June 1904.  
[Rejects supernatural view of psychical research phenomena, but thinks Myers' theory of subliminal consciousness of value.]
- 40 *Bentley (J. M.)* The Psychological Meaning of Clearness.  
Mind, April 1904.  
[Clearness is to be ranked with quality and intensity as a characteristic of the simple sensation.]
- Bryan (W. Lowe)* Theory and Practice.  
Psychol. R., Mar. 1904.  
[Presidential Address to American Psychological Association, Dec. 1903.]
- Lubac (Émile)* Esquisse d'un système de psychologisationnelle. 262p. Alcan, 1904.
- Dittrich (O.)* Grundzüge der Sprachpsychologie. Bd. 1. Einleitung und Allgemeinpsychologische Grundlegung. 901p.  
Niemeyer, 1904.  
[Based mainly on Wundt's work. A book of diagrams illustrating the book (p. 96) is issued along with it.]
- Ettlinger (M.)* Untersuchungen ueber die Bedeutung der Descendenztheorie für die Psychologie. 86p. Bachem, 1904.
- 48 *Thorndike (E.)* Heredity, correlation and sex differences in school abilities. 60p.  
Macmillan, 1904.
- 49 *Meyer (Max)* On the Attributes of the Sensations. Psychol. R., Mar. 1904.
- D'Istria (F. Colonna)* Ce que la médecine expérimentale doit à la philosophie.  
Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., Mar. 1904.  
[Author goes through the work of Pinel and shows that he constantly employed the method of analysis and of classification as Condillac had developed it.]
- 53 *Biernliet (J. J. van)* La Mesure de L'Intelligence. J. de Psych., Mai-Juin, 1904.
- 53 3 *Piéron (H.)* La conception générale de l'association des idées et les données de l'expérience.  
Rev. Phil., May 1904.
- 55 *Mayer (A.)* Influence des images sur les sécrétions. J. de Psych., Mai-Juin, 1904.
- 57 *Féré (Ch.)* Travail et plaisir. 476p.  
Alcan, 1904.
- 59 *Manning (E. A.)* The Psychology of the Will.  
East and West, May 1904.
- 60 *Naville (A.)* De la vérité: remarques logiques.  
Rev. Phil., May 1904.
- Watson (John)* Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, ii.  
Phil. R., Mar. 1904.  
[Treats of Aristotle's view as to the nature of induction and its relations to other processes of knowledge.]
- 64 *Bastian (A.)* Das logische Rechnen und seine Aufgaben. 176p. Ascher, 1904.
- 71 *Brunschwig (Léon)* "Vers le Positivisme Absolu par l'Idealisme," de L. Weber.  
Rev. Phil., May 1904.
- 72 *Jerusalem (W.)* Kant's Bedeutung für die Gegenwart. 51p. Braumüller, 1904.  
[Memorial Address at Vienna, 12th February 1904.]
- Busse (Ludwig)* Immanuel Kant.  
Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxiv. 1.  
[Address to the students of Königsberg on the occasion of the Centenary of Kant's death.]
- Windelband (W.)* Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung. 32p. Winter, 1904.  
[Memorial Address at Heidelberg on the day of the Centenary.]
- Leon (X.), ed.* Centenaire de la Mort de Kant. Séance Commémorative organisée par la Société française de Philosophie.  
Bulletin de la Soc. fran. de Phil., May 1904.  
[Contains papers on the "Critique of Judgment," by V. Delbos, on "Kant and Modern Mathematics," by L. Couturat, and on "Kant's Morality," by E. Boutroux.]
- Apel (M.)* Immanuel Kant. 110p.  
Skopnik, 1904.
- Romundt (H.)* Kant's "Widerlegung des Idealismus." 24p. Thienemann, 1904.
- Simmel (Georg)* Kant. 187p.  
Duncker & Humblot, 1904.  
[Sixteen lectures delivered to students of all faculties at the University of Berlin. The mode of exposition was determined by the wish to make the book serve as an introduction to philosophical thinking.]
- Erdmann (Benno)* Historische Untersuchungen ueber Kant's Prolegomena. 149p.  
Niemeyer, 1904.  
[Shows that the Prolegomena was originally intended by Kant to be a popular presentation of his system, but that its character was changed in the course of its composition.]
- Blind (Karl)* Kant as a Democratic Politician.  
West. R., March 1904.
- Kohfeldt (G.)* Ein bisher noch ungedruckter Brief Kants v. J. 1790. Mit Nachschrift des Herausgebers.  
Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxiv. 1.
- Weber (H.)* Hamann und Kant. 248p.  
Beck, 1904.
- Valentiner (Th.)* Kant und die Platonische Philosophia. 94p. Winter, 1904.
- Evellin (F.)* La Raison et les Antinomies, iii.  
Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., Mar. 1904.
- 76 *Dumas (G.)* Saint-Simon, Père du Positivisme (Fin).  
Rev. Phil., Mar. 1904.
- Morgan (C. Lloyd)* The Riddle of the Universe.  
Cont. R., June 1904.  
[Discusses the problems raised by Haeckel in five open letters, all of extreme interest.]
- Christie (R.)* Haeckel's Monistic Philosophy.  
Cont. R., April 1904.
- Veizen (H. Thoden van)* System des religiösen Materialismus. Bd. 1. Wissenschaft der Seele. 477p. Reiland, 1904.
- Vignon (Paul)* Sur le Matérialisme scientifique ou Mécanisme antitéléologique, à propos d'un récent traité de Biologie.  
Rev. de Phil., Mar., Apr., May 1904.  
[Author criticises scientific materialism with special reference to Le Dantec's Treatise on Biology. He examines psychology as materialism understands it, and the mechanical doctrine of descent, and considers the problem of imitation.]
- 84 *Huit (Ch.)* Un Episode du "Sophiste."  
Rev. de Phil., Mar. 1904.  
[Author criticises the details of this dialogue and gives reason for doubting its authenticity.]
- 89 *Bernies (Victor)* L'Abstraction scolastique et l'Intellectus agens.  
Rev. de Phil., Mar. 1904.

- Wulf (M. de)* Introduction à la Philosophie Néo-Scholastique. 350p.  
Institut super de Phil., 1904.
- Lindsay (James)* La philosophie de Saint Thomas. R. Néo-Schol., Feb. 1904.
- De Vorges (Domet)* L'abstraction scholastique. Rev. de Phil., May 1904.
- 90 *Iverach (J.)* Descartes, Spinoza, the new Philosophy. (World's Epoch-makers.) 258p.  
Clark, 1904.
- 92 *Hobbes (T.)* The philosophy of Hobbes in extracts and notes collated from his writings, selected and arranged by J. J. E. Woodbridge. 391p.  
Minneapolis, H. W. Wilson Co., 1903.
- Hobbes (Thomas)* Leviathan. The text ed. by A. R. Waller. (Cambridge English Classics.) 528p. Clay, 1904.
- Mondolfo (R.)* Saggi per la storia della morale utilitaria. I. La Morale di T. Hobbes. 275p. Drucker, 1903.  
[A critical treatment of Hobbes' moral and political philosophy.]
- M' Taggart (J. E.)* Hegel's Treatment of the Categories of Quantity.  
Mind, April 1904.  
[Continuation of former papers on Hegel's Logic.]
- Keller (L.)* Joh. Gottfr. Herder und die Kultgesellschaften des Humanismus. 106p.  
Weidmann, 1904.
- Brockdorff (Cay von)* Schopenhauer und die wissenschaftliche Philosophie, i.  
Vierteljahrssr. f. w. Phil., xxviii. 1.  
[Author holds that existing estimates of Schopenhauer's philosophy are unsatisfactory, and proposes to undertake a deeper investigation. In this part of his essay he deals with Schopenhauer's views as to Space and Time, the quantities of the sensuous world, causality and substance.]
- Wandschneider (A.)* Die Metaphysik Benekes. 165p. Mittler, 1904.
- Nietzsche (Fr.)* Nachgelassene Werke. Bd. x. 534p. Naumann, 1904.
- Lang (A.)* Nietzsche und die deutsche Kultur. 59p. Bachem, 1904.
- Hollitscher (J. J.)* Friedrich Nietzsche. 275p. Braumüller, 1904.
- Éhler (R.)* Friedrich Nietzsche und die Vorsokratiker. 176p. Dürr, 1904.
- 92V *Foster (Sir Michael)* Huxley.  
Nat. R., May 1904.  
[First "Huxley" Lecture of the University of Birmingham, March 13, 1904. Some thoughts about Huxley's ways of work, his views and his aims.]
- Spencer (Herbert)* An Autobiography. 2 vols. 556 + 542p. Williams & Norgate, 1904.  
[Review will follow.]
- Dewey (John)* The Philosophical Work of Spencer. Phil. R., March 1904.  
[The significant point in regard to Spencer's work is his sitting down to achieve a preconceived idea. The more we compare the achievement with the prospectus of 1860, the more we are struck with the way in which the whole scheme stands complete, detached, able to go alone from the very start.]
- Berthelot (R.)* Sur les origines de la philosophie de Spencer.  
Bulletin de la Soc. fran. de Phil., April 1904.
- Anon.* The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. Edin. R., April 1904.  
See also *Aveling (Francis)* in Dub. R., April 1904; *Iverach (J.)* in Crit. R., March 1904; *Gribble (Francis)* in Fort. R., June 1904; *Halleux (J.)* in R. Néo-Schol., Feb. 1904.
- Davidson (W. L.)* Professor Bain's Philosophy. Mind, April 1904.  
[Bain's is a name in philosophy that cannot die. What British psychologists have been able to accomplish during the last half century has been in no small measure owing [to the lead that he gave through his two great works. His distinctive positions are commonplaces now, but they were new when they appeared.]
- Fraser (A. C.)* Biographia philosophica: a retrospect. 350p. Blackwood, 1904.  
[Review will follow.]
- 94V *Bowcard (Ch.)* L'Histoire du Droit et la Philosophie de M. Bergson.  
Rev. de Phil., Mar. 1904.
- Renouvier (Charles)* Les derniers entretiens, publiés par Louis Prat.  
Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., Mar. 1904.  
[With the desire that the ideas to which he had devoted his life should be more widely known, Renouvier spent the four days before his death in explaining them once more to his friend M. Prat. He spoke on the Refutation of the Infinite, the idea of Space, the Self, the Problem of Evil, the future of Philosophy, and intended to speak on the nature of God and on Immortality the day he died.]
- Dauriac (P.)* Le testament philosophique de Renouvier. Rev. Phil., April 1904.  
[By this title author refers to Renouvier's last book, "Le Personalisme," which contains (1) a Cosmogony, and (2) a Cosmology. These are discussed. With Leibniz, and with W. James amongst contemporaries, Renouvier lays stress on the idea of force in mental effort.]

## V ART 83 Sacred Music.

- Lee (Vernon)* Recent Aesthetics.  
Quar. R., April 1904.  
[Deals with the works of Lipps, Stern, Groos, Sourian, Marshall, Hirn and Grose.]
- Czobel (Stefan von)* Entwicklung der Schönheitsbegriffe. Leipzig, 1904.  
[Th. 3 of the author's *Genesis unserer Kultur*.]
- Roussel-Despierres (Fr.)* L'idéal esthétique. 186p. Alcan, 1904.
- Haynes (E. S. P.)* Standards of Taste in Art. 62p. Elkin Mathews, 1904.
- 33 *Mach (E. von)* Greek Sculpture. Its Spirit and Principles. 857p.  
Boston, U.S.A., Ginn, 1904.
- 50 *Baxter (Sylvester)* The Legend of the Holy Grail as set forth in the frieze painted by E. A. Abbey for the Boston Public Library: with des. and interp. by S. Baxter. 119p. Curtis & Cameron, 1904.
- 52 *Turner (J. M. W.)* Liber Studiorum. 16p. 70 plates. Newnes, 1904.
- Corkran (Alice)* Frederic Leighton. With 38 illustrations. (Little Books on Art.) 221p. Methuen, 1904.
- Chesterton (G. K.)* G. F. Watts. (Popular Library of Art.) 174p. Duckworth, 1904.
- 83 *Edwards (J. H.)* God and Music. 319p.  
Dent, 1904.
- Palestrina. Selections from the Works of, by E. C. Gregory. No. 8. "Magnificat" and Nunc Dimittis. Frowde, 1904.  
G. D. H.; G. H.; and J. H. W.



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


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
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